

This translation of Book IV dd.43-49 of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. These distinctions fill volume fourteen of the Vatican critical edition of the Latin text edited by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Quarrachi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. In addition, there are passages where not only the argumentation but the grammar too is obscure, and I cannot vouch for the success of my attempts to penetrate the obscurity. So, for these and the like reasons, comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Note: this volume of the critical text seems to be less well edited than earlier volumes, and has some infelicities of division and subtitle, as well as of punctuation and grammatical marking, that have had to be changed in the translation. Not all these changes seemed significant enough to need indicating in footnotes.

Peter L.P. Simpson  
January, 2020

The translation is now being revised and reformatted, to correct some looseness and error of translation, supply some omissions, and help reduce file size.

*NB:* The interpolated texts, added at various points in some of the questions, are texts inserted in the *Ordinatio* by earlier editors from equivalent passages in other surviving commentaries on the *Sentences* by Scotus. The Vatican editors placed these in footnotes or an appendix and they are translated here for the convenience of the reader.

Peter L.P. Simpson  
July, 2025

# THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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## Book Four

### Forty Third Distinction

#### Question One

*Whether there is a Future General Resurrection of Men*

1. “Lastly about the condition of the resurrection” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.1 n.1]
2. About this forty third distinction I ask five questions, and first whether there is a future general resurrection of men.
3. That not:  
*Ecclesiastes* 3.19, “There is one death for men and beasts;” but beasts do not rise again; therefore.
4. Again, *Job* 14.12, “When a man sleeps he will not rise; until the heavens are worn away, he will not awake;” but the heavens will never be worn away, since they are incorruptible.
5. Again the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.338b13-20, “What things are corrupted according to substance do not return the same in number, but the same in species.” The same he maintains in *Physics* 5.4.228a3-6.
6. Again, through reason: the whole requires the union of the parts, therefore the same whole the same union; but the same union will not return, because it is interrupted, – and the interrupted does not return the same, because if it does return, there will be iteration; but iteration is repugnant to identity, because iteration posits number, identity takes it away.
7. The opposite:  
*Job* 19.25-26, “I know that on the last day I will rise from the earth etc.”
8. Likewise *I Corinthians* 15, “We shall indeed all rise.”

#### I. To the Question

9. Here two things need to be seen: first, about possibility, – second, about fact.

#### A. About the Possibility of Resurrection

##### 1. First Opinion

##### a. Exposition of the Opinion

10. About the first it is said thus [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.1 a.1], that if in man the sensitive soul were diverse from the rational soul, and consequently corruptible as in other animals, it would very well be concluded that in the resurrection there would not be the same sensible soul, and consequently not the same animal either.

11. But if it be posited that the same soul according to substance is in man rational and sensible, we will in this suffer no difficulties – as he himself makes clear elsewhere [*ibid.* IV d.44 q.2 ad 1], showing the difference of man to other corruptible things for the purpose, because “the form of other animals is not per se subsistent, so that after the corruption of the composite it may be able to remain, as it is about the rational soul,

which retains the ‘to be’ – that it acquired for itself in the body – even after separation from the body, and into participation of that ‘to be’ the body through resurrection is drawn, so that there is not one ‘to be’ of the body and another of the soul in man, otherwise the conjoining of soul and body in man would be accidental; and thus no interruption is made in the substantial ‘to be’ of man so that the same thing in number not be able to return because of interruption of being, as does happen in other corrupted things, whose ‘to be’ is altogether corrupted.”

12. This statement therefore stands on this, that although the interrupted cannot return the same in number, yet, because the ‘to be’ of the intellective soul is the same ‘to be’ as the ‘to be’ of the whole, the matter too remains the same, and so in nothing pertaining to the substance of man is an interruption made in the ‘to be’, therefore it is possible for a man to return the same in number. Not so in other things corrupted.

#### b. Rejection of the Opinion

13. Against this is the authority of Augustine, *City of God* 22.20 n.2: speaking of the flesh to be returned in the resurrection of man: “although – he says – it had in all ways perished, nor had any of its matter remained in any hidden parts of nature, the Almighty may, whence he will, bring it back or repair it;” therefore, the totally destroyed and corrupted in total ‘to be’ can be repaired the same.

14. Again through reason:

If a thing destroyed were annihilated, that ‘nothing’ – following its annihilation – would be of the same idea as the nothing that was the term of creation ‘from which’, because these opposite changes have the same thing for term: one for the term ‘from which’, the other for the term ‘to which’; but to the ‘nothing’ that is precedent to creation there was not repugnant but that ‘that to which it is opposed’ was able to be created; therefore also after annihilation the same can be created. – The reason is confirmed, because it is plain that on its part the same power remains; and on the part of a stone, let it be that the stone has been annihilated, there is as much possibility simply for ‘to be’ after annihilation as before creation, because it no more includes a contradiction, – nor does that ‘nothing’, into which the stone has gone, more take away possibility, because it would not take it away except as an opposite; but to the same [opposite] and equally it was opposed before creation.

15. Again, in man there is some positive entity, which neither is a material nor a formal part nor parts, as was proved in III d.2 nn.73-77. And for the purpose at hand it is sufficient to repeat one reason, because something is there caused by intrinsic causes; but neither the material cause nor the formal is caused by intrinsic causes, nor both together; therefore there is some other entity than the causes taken separately or together, and that is destroyed, otherwise a man would not be truly dead, because the whole entity of man would not be corrupted, and yet that entity will be repaired the same in number, otherwise it would not be the same man in number.

16. Again, if God in this instant *a* and in the whole time in between up to *b* and also in *b* were to conserve this ‘to be’, it would be conceded that it would be the same in number altogether; therefore, if in that *a* [God] conserve it and again in instant *b*, and in the intermediate time not conserve it, still it will be the same, and yet it will be

interrupted in the time between; therefore a thing interrupted can return the same in number.

17. Proof of the consequence:

Because the identity of that 'to be' as it is in *b* to itself as it is in *a* does not depend essentially in conservation on that intermediate time, because neither as on formal cause nor as on any essential cause whatever.

This is also proved in another way, because otherwise God could not create the same 'to be' in some instant and not conserve it (in another instant or particular time), because if in the prior instant he creates and in the following time he conserves, and that 'to be' – as conserved in that time – is essentially required for the identity of that 'to be' in instant *b*, then if it were not conserved in this time but first created, in *b* it could not be created the same.

18. Again, the diversity of a posterior does not argue the diversity of a prior essentially; but these instants are posterior essentially to the permanent 'to be' itself; hence too that 'to be' remains the same in all succeeding instants whatever; therefore, whether a continuation be made between those instants or not, no less will the 'to be' itself be able to be the same. – Or thus: if the 'to be' were in *a* and in the subsequent time and in *b*, it would be the same in *a* and in *b*; therefore, if it were destroyed posterior to that, which is to endure in the intermediate time, still not necessarily from this will there follow a diversity of it in *a* and in *b*.

19. Again, from that root, that a 'to be' simply destroyed or interrupted cannot return the same [n.11], unacceptable results follow.

First, that God could not resuscitate a brute the same in number, whose opposite sometimes is read to have been miraculously done by the saints, as is plain about the bull that St. Silvester resuscitated, as is had in the legend about him [Jacob Voragine, *Golden Legends* ch.12]; and to deny that this is possible for God is a mark of great infidelity, and yet the sensitive soul of it [the bull] is interrupted and destroyed.

It follows too that all the accidents which are corrupted in the corruption of man, or before the resurrection of man, could not the same in number return; and then the resuscitated man would not have the same proper property in number as before, because that proper property did not remain after death, because it was of the whole as whole, and not of the soul alone. The consequent is impossible, that it be the same under the species and not have the same property.

It follows also about the other accidents, that the powers of the soul, which – according to this [fellow: Aquinas] – are accidents, since they are not accidents of the soul alone, but of the whole composite (according to the Philosopher *On Sense* 1.436b6-11 and *On Sleep* 1.453b11-54a7), that they cannot return the same; and so man in the resurrection would not have the same hearing and seeing power, – and so on about the others.

It follows too that he would not have the same quantity, because that does not remain, neither in the remaining matter alone nor in the intellectual soul.

20. Again, in something else does a position seem to be at fault which posits that the whole 'to be' of man remains non-interrupted. [n.12].

First because – as was proved before [n.15] – the total entity is interrupted.

Second, because the 'to be' of the intellectual soul is not the total 'to be' of man (as he accepts, nn.10, 12), because every being has some 'to be'; man as man is some

being, and not only the soul; therefore he has some proper ‘to be’, and not only the ‘to be’ of the soul.

21. Again, he contradicts himself in this, because elsewhere he says the state of the soul in the body is more perfect than its state outside the body, because it is part of a composite, and every part is material in respect of the whole.

22. Against this I argue as follows: what has the same proper ‘to be’ totally is not more imperfect by this alone that it does not communicate that ‘to be’ to another; but for you [sc. Aquinas] totally the soul has the same ‘to be’ separated as conjoined, indeed [it has] the ‘to be’ which is the total ‘to be’ of man when it is communicated to the body; therefore it is in no way more imperfect for the fact that it does not communicate that ‘to be’ to the body.

23. The major is plain, because perfection is naturally presupposed to that which is ‘to communicate perfection’; therefore, it is not greater or lesser by this that it communicates or does not communicate, – and this most of all, if through such communication no other ‘to be’ is of the whole than thus ‘to be’.

24. Again, it was proved above, in the matter about the Eucharist [*Ord.* IV d.11 nn.285-286], that in man there is another substantial form from the intellective soul, and consequently, since it is of any form at all to give ‘to be’, the intellective soul does not give the total ‘to be’ of the composite.

25. This same thing can be adduced against the first [argument, n.10], because that form is interrupted according to ‘to be’, and yet it is brought back the same.

To the proof which he intimates to the contrary [n.11], because then the union of soul and body would be accidental, the consequence is to be denied, because just as union is not nothing, but is of something to something, and consequently is of being to being, so it is of what has ‘to be’ to what has ‘to be’ (because I do not grasp that there may be some being outside its cause without having its own ‘to be’); therefore just as being can be compounded per se with being, so what is per se receptive and possessed of its own ‘to be’ [can be compounded] with what is per se received and possessed of its own ‘to be’; nor is the union accidental because this is per se perfectible and that per se perfection, for if ‘to have to be’ were to take away the idea of the per se perfectible, then there could not be any ‘to be’ per se perfectible but non-being.

## 2. Second Opinion

### a. Exposition of the Opinion

26. In another way it is posited [Giles of Rome, *Theorems about the body of Christ* I] that because nature does not act except through movement and change, therefore it cannot bring back the same thing in number, because motion or change cannot return the same in number; but God can act not through motion and change; and therefore, by the opposite, he can also bring back the same thing in number. – And for this can be adduced something else that this Master [Giles] touches on, that because God respects matter as it is a ‘what’, he can on it – as in no way distinct – impress a form, because as it is a ‘what’ it is not distinct, and so he can always impress the same form while the matter remains the same, and this is always; but a natural agent does not respect it as it is a ‘what’, – therefore it cannot indifferently induce just any form into it however much remaining the same, and so not induce the same form.

### b. Rejection of the Opinion

27. Against this: to the thing proposed, the false is supposed, that God does not act through change in resuscitating. Which is proved, because matter was first under privation of form, and comes to be under form; therefore, through the action of the agent it transitions from privation to form; but such transitioning is properly ‘change’, because the whole idea of change is saved there.

28. What he [Giles] says from the other part about a natural agent, the conclusion seems doubtful, and it will be touched on in question 3 [nn.178-180]; but the reason does not conclude, because it need not be that if the posterior cannot return the same, therefore neither the prior; and change is posterior to the form itself.

This is confirmed, because *de facto* God, when resuscitating, does not bring back the same change in number, because resuscitation is not the same change as generation, and yet the same form in number will be brought back. Hence it is a fallacy of the consequent from distinction of changes to infer distinction of terms, for it does well follow conversely, namely if another form is acquired that there is another change; but the same [form] can very well be acquired by diverse changes, just as the same ‘where’ in species can be acquired by diverse local motions in species, as by straight local motion and circular motion, which are to such an extent of different idea that they are not comparable, *Physics* 7.4.248a10-b6. Augustine too in *On the Trinity* 3 ch.9 nn.16-19 maintains that the same thing in species can be generated equivocally and univocally, – which changes however are of other idea.

29. The proof also for this, the antecedent, namely that change cannot be brought back the same in number [n.28], is not valid, because although the unity of the whole from the parts is the continuity of part with part, yet the unity or identity of a part with itself is not the continuity of it with another part; although therefore interruption may posit the non-continuity of a posterior with a prior, it does not follow that it takes away its identity with itself.

### 3. Scotus’ own Opinion

30. As therefore to this article [n.9], I say that there is possibility on the part of God, from his omnipotence (but if it is possible for another cause, of this I do not treat here, but in question 3 it will be said [nn.221-222]), and on the part of the object possibility simply, because it does not include a contradiction.

31. And this is proved by authority and reason against the first opinion, and this whether it [the object] be brought back through change or without change, because each is possible, as was argued against the second opinion [nn.27-29].

32. And that that opinion touches on the regarding of matter as it is a ‘what’ [n.26] was touched on in the material about the Eucharist in d.11 [nn.148, 158]: for if it had any good sense it would perhaps be this, that ‘God does not regard matter in a certain order passing from form to form’, in the way in which a natural agent necessarily regards it, because [a natural agent] cannot immediately pass over from just anything to just anything.



33. But this difference does nothing for ‘being able to bring back the same thing in number or not’, because that order regards forms according to specific ideas, and not according to their identity or distinction, because to the form of wine the form of vinegar can at once succeed, and not the converse immediately; but that to this form of wine it succeed or to that is indifferent, just as indifferently from this fire or that water is generated. Therefore an agent, having regard to the order of forms in a change, can as have something preceding the form to be induced by it as if it were immediately acting without such order, – and consequently, if it be absolutely possible for it to bring back the same thing in number, it will not be impeded by this that it is determined to such an order of forms in acting.

## B. About the Fact of the Resurrection

34. About the second article, whether ‘there will be a resurrection’ can be shown by natural reason, about this at once in the following question [nn.52-53].

35. But for now the conclusion is manifest from the truth of the faith.

36. For this truth as an article of faith both the *Apostles’ Creed* expresses and the *Nicene Creed*: “I look forward to the resurrection of the dead,” which also the *Athanasian Creed* [expresses]: “All men have to rise again along with their bodies” etc.

37. This is also had very expressly in many places of Scripture, as *John* 11.23-26, *Matthew* 22.31-32, *I Corinthians* 15.20-22, *Job* 19.25-27, and *II Maccabees* 12.43-46, ‘*Unless those who had fallen he hoped would rise again*’ etc.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

38. To the first argument: Solomon was there [n.3] proclaimer, now speaking for the part of the foolish, now replying according to the opinion of the wise, – and that was said in proclaiming on behalf of the foolish. But he contradicts that later (*Ecclesiastes* 12.5, 13-14), “Man will go to the house of his eternity.” And there follows: “Let us all equally hear the end of speaking: fear God and observe his commandments, for this is the whole man; all things that are under the sun, God will bring into judgment etc.”

39. To the second [n.4]: although the heaven will never be worn away as to substance, yet it will be worn away as to efficacy on these inferior things, in generating and corrupting them, because after the judgment this influence will cease; and as to this can be understood that verse in *I Corinthians* 7.31, “The figure of this world is passing away.” Or it could be said that this verse is speaking of that heaven of which St. Peter is speaking in his canonical [letter] *2 Peter* 3.10: “The heavens will be consumed in heat,” – which is not understood but of the elementary heaven [*Ord.* II d.14 nn.4-8].

40. To the third [n.5]: the Philosopher is there distinguishing circulation in celestial bodies from circulation in corruptible bodies, because there the substance is not corrupted through motion, and therefore it returns the same, not as if receiving ‘to be’ through this motion, but it comes to be present to the same part through the motion bringing it back. But circulation in these inferior things is according to corruption of substantial form and the bringing back of it, – and therefore it does not so return here the same in number as there. But whether Aristotle universally deny that ‘the same thing in number can return’, about this in question three [nn.173-179].

41. To the last [n.6], it can be said that a composite can return the same, although the same union of parts not return, because that union is not of the essence of the whole, nor is that union the total entity that is from the parts, nor [is it] the form of this entity. But because union is simply necessarily required for total entity, and it does not seem that anything is the same in number unless that be the same in number that is necessarily required for it, therefore it seems truer that the union will return the same, – and this if it be taken for that relation of parts united with each other, but not for that undergoing which does not last but the instant of the resurrection: for that can be posited other, just as also that change [sc. the resurrection] is other than generation.

42. And when it is argued that that union was interrupted etc. [n.6], I say that the interrupted can return the same in number, not only the absolute, but also the respects, if its extremes return the same in number: for I believe that Mary had the same relation to her Son – after the passion – that she had to him before Christ's passion, and yet it was interrupted in the death of her Son because of the destruction of the term, and in the death of Mary<sup>1</sup> because of the destruction of the foundation.

43. And if you say that this response seems to contradict itself, because it denies that the passive union returns the same, and yet that is necessary for the coming to be of the whole, and according to this dictum something cannot return the same unless that return the same which is necessary for the 'to be' of it, – I reply: let it be that union, as it is a passion [sc. an undergoing], is necessary for the coming to be of the whole, it follows that there is not the same coming to be of the whole unless there be the same union, and this I concede; and then either will neither be the same, which is probable, because that change, as was said [n.41], would not be the same as the generation of man; or each will be able to be the same, which is not there a contradiction.

## Question Two

*Whether it can be Known by Natural Reason that there is a Future General Resurrection of Men*

44. Secondly, I ask whether it can be known by natural reason that there is a future general resurrection of men.

45. That so:

A natural desire cannot be in vain, the Commentator [Averroes] *Metaphysics* II com.1; but man has a natural desire for being always, and this desire can be known by natural reason; therefore etc. Proof of the minor, because something is not fled from naturally except by virtue of a natural desire or love for another thing; but man naturally flees from death (this is plain through experience; it is plain too through the Apostle *II Corinthians* 5.4, "We do not wish to be unclothed, but clothed upon").

46. Again, it is naturally known that beatitude is naturally desired (this is plain from *Ethics* 1.5.1097b1 about beatitude in general, and from 10.4.1174b18-75a1 about beatitude in particular); but it is known, by natural reason, that beatitude cannot be but sempiternal; therefore, it is known by natural reason that man is ordered to some sempiternal perfection. – Proof of the minor: Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII 8.n.11 proves that by reason thus: "A dying man life itself, though blessed, deserts; either then it deserts

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<sup>1</sup> The Church's teaching that Mary was assumed bodily into heaven does not by itself determine whether she died first or did not die first.

him unwilling or willing or neither. If unwilling, how is a life blessed that is so in the will that it not be in the power? But if willing, how will a life be blessed which he wanted to end who had it? If you say that neither, neither willing nor unwilling, but neither is that life blessed which is such that – whom it makes blessed – it is unworthy of his love.”

47. Again, it is naturally known that a whole species does not lack its end without its being attained in some individual; but it is naturally known that blessedness is the end of the human species; therefore, also that man can attain it, at least in some individual. But it is not possible to attain it in this life, because of the many miseries that accompany this life, such as variety of fortune, infirmity of body, imperfection of knowledge and virtue, and instability and fatigue in exercising the acts of perfection, so much so that no operation – however much delightful in the beginning – can be continually delightful, rather, being wearied by it, to cease from it will be delightful. And it is known by natural reason that beatific activity is not wearisome. Nor can it be had by the separated soul alone, because in this man would not attain his end; therefore, it will be had in another life by the whole conjoined [man]. And consequently at least it seems through natural reason to be concluded what things man may reach his end in.

48. Again, by natural reason it is known that every species, which is of the integrity of the universe, is perpetual, because the integral whole is perpetual; but man is the most perfect species, at least among these things below: “For we are in some way the end of all things,” *Physics* 2.2.194a34-35.

49. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII.8-9 n.12, speaking of life immortal and eternal: “Whether – he says – human nature lacks this [life], and it is no small question; indeed, those trying to find this by human arguments, scarcely a few, endowed with great genius, unbusied in leisure, erudite in the most subtle doctrines, have been able to reach to tracking down the immortality of the soul only.”

50. Again, *Acts* 17.18, it is said of certain Athenians listening to Paul that they were saying that “he seemed to be a preacher of new daimons, because he was preaching to them Jesus and the resurrection;” and yet those Athenians were philosophers, very able in natural reason (it is plain about the convert Dionysius [the Areopagite], who was one of them); therefore this, which seemed to them so remote from the truth, does not seem to be well known through natural reason; hence all that Paul there adduces is only certain persuasions, as is plain there.

51. Again in *Acts* 26.23-24, although Paul was saying “If Christ is able to suffer, if first of the resurrection etc.,” Festus said with a loud voice, “You are mad, Paul.”

## I. To the Question

52. Here it is manifest that if any reason may show the resurrection, it must be that it is taken from something that is proper to man, so that it does not belong to other corruptible things. Now this is not matter, even incorruptible matter; nor any destructible form, because although such be in man and more excellent than any form of a brute, yet from that a sufficient reason cannot be taken for proving the resurrection of the whole. Therefore, it is necessary that it be taken from the specific form of man, or from an operation belonging to man according to that form.

### A. About Three Propositions for Proving the Resurrection of Men

53. Proceeding in this way, from three propositions the matter at hand is concluded. – and if all those were known by natural reason, we would have the thing proposed. And they are these:

‘The intellective soul is the specific form of man’, second ‘the intellective soul is incorruptible’ (from these it follows that the specific form of man is incorruptible); a third is added, that ‘the specific form of man will not remain perpetually outside its whole’, it follows therefore that at some time the whole same thing will return. This iterated return is called ‘resurrection’ according to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.100, “Resurrection is a second raising up of that which was dissolved.”

54. About these three propositions, how they are known, let us see in order.

#### 1. About the First Proposition, namely ‘the Intellective Soul is the Form of Man’

##### a. Opinion of Others and the Weighing and Integration of it

55. About the first it is said that it is known by natural reason [Aquinas, *ST Ia* q.76 a.1 corp.].

56. This is shown in two ways: in one way through the authorities of the Philosophers who asserted this, and only as known by natural reason; in another way by adducing the natural reasons, from which this is concluded.

##### α. Proof by Authorities of Philosophers

57. About the first [n.56]: Aristotle defines the soul, *On the Soul* 2.1.412a19-b6, that ‘it is the act of an organic physical body’ etc. And at 3.4.429a10-11 he says, “Now about the part of the soul by which it knows and is wise,” where he seems to posit the intellective soul a part at least subjective of the soul previously defined in general.

58. Again, all philosophers have commonly put as his proper difference ‘rational’ in the definition of man, by ‘rational’ understanding that the intellective part is an essential part of him.

59. Nor, briefly, is there any notable philosopher found who would deny this, although that accursed Averroes in his fiction *On the Soul* III com. 5 and 36, which however is not intelligible, neither to him nor to anyone else, posits a certain separate intellective substance, conjoined by means of phantasms, which conjunction neither he himself nor any follower has been able to explain nor, through that conjunction, to save that ‘man understands’. For according to him man formally would not be but a certain excellent irrational animal, however through a certain irrational and sensitive [soul] more excellent than the other animals.

##### β. Proof by Natural Reasons

60. About the second [n.56]: for the thing proposed there is not easily found a reason *a priori* nor *a posteriori*, except from the proper operation of man, – if indeed form becomes known from proper operation, as matter from transmutation. From the operation therefore of understanding the thing proposed is argued thus: to understand is

the proper operation of man; therefore, it proceeds from his proper form; therefore, the intellective [soul] is the proper form of man.

61. But this reason suffers an objection, because the ‘intellect’ is related to [act of] ‘understanding’ according to them only passively, and not actively; therefore, this proposition ‘proper operation is from proper form’ does not prove that the intellective soul is the proper form of man, if indeed this operation is not from it according to them but from the intelligible object or – according to some – from the phantasm.

62. Therefore from that operation I form the argument otherwise thus: man understands formally and properly, therefore the intellective soul is the proper form of man.

63. The antecedent<sup>2</sup> seems manifest enough according to the authorities of Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.4.429a21-24 and *Ethics* 1.6.1098a3-4, 1.7, that ‘to understand’ is the proper operation of man; and operation, as it is distinguished from action or making, is formally in him operating and is not from him into another; likewise, *Ethics* 10.7.1177a12-b1, 8.1158b7-32, 9.1179a22-32, puts into ‘to understand’ the happiness of man, – and it is manifest that that happiness is formally in man; therefore also that operation in which it consists.

64. But it is necessary to try to prove the antecedent by reason (against the impudent if he deny it), and this by understanding in the antecedent the ‘to understand’ properly speaking, by which I understand ‘an act of knowing transcending the whole genus of sense knowledge’.

65. That antecedent is therefore proved in one way [second way, n.70] as follows: man knows by a non-organic act of knowing; therefore, he understands properly.

The consequence is plain from the reason already set down [n.63-64], because intellection properly is knowledge transcending the whole genus of sensation; but all sensation is organic knowledge, from *On the Soul* 2.1.412a21-b9, 2.11.423b31-42a7. – The antecedent of this enthymeme<sup>3</sup> is proved, for an organ is determined to a certain genus of sensibles, from *On the Soul* 3.4.26b8-23, and this on that account because it consists in a mean proportion between the extremes of that genus; but some knowledge we experience in us which does not belong to us according to such organ, because then it would be determined precisely to the sensibles of a determinate genus, the opposite of which we experience, because we know through such act the difference of any genus whatever of sensibles to something else that is not anything of that genus; therefore we know each extreme (this consequence is plain according to the Philosopher, thus arguing in *On the Soul* 2.11.423b31-4a7 about the common sense).

66. But here it is objected:

First, because organic knowledge is what is present in according to a determinate part of the body; but that [knowledge] about which it is argued that through it we distinguish sensibles from non-sensibles is present in the whole [body] first, and therefore it is not through any organ, properly speaking; however it does not transcend the whole

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<sup>2</sup> Namely: ‘man understands formally and properly’

<sup>3</sup> The antecedent is “man understands by a non-organic act of knowing” and the argument it is the antecedent of is an enthymeme because the premise that a non-organic act is an act of understanding properly is left unexpressed. This premise itself is proved by the statements that understanding properly is knowing that transcends the whole genus of sensation, and that sensation does not so transcend because it is the act of an organ and an organ is tied to a determinate class of sensibles. The inadequacy of this argument is shown in what follows.

genus of sensitive knowledge according to perfection, because it is first in the whole, and consequently it is as material as that which is in the whole through a part: for thus a property of the whole is material just as something which is in the whole through a part.

67. Second, the thing assumed is denied, namely that that act is not present-in according to any organ, because it is present-in according to the organ of imagination, – of which the proof is, because with that [organ of imagination] damaged knowledge is impeded. Nor does that proof [n.65] about the determination of the organ to a certain genus conclude, because imagination extends itself to all sensibles.

68. But the first objection [n.66] is excluded by something there touched on [n.65], because through that act [sc. of understanding] we separate the whole genus of sensibles from anything outside that whole genus.

69. Nor does that proof [n.67], that ‘this act is impeded when the organ of imagination is damaged’ conclude: for this is because of the order of these powers in operating, and not because understanding is exercised by means of this organ.

70. In another way the principal antecedent [nn.65, 62] is proved, because there is some immaterial knowledge in us: no sensitive [knowledge] can be immaterial; therefore etc.

71. This term ‘immaterial’ is frequent in the Philosopher’s use in the matter at hand, but it seems ambiguous. For it can, to the matter at hand, be understood in three ways:

Either immaterial because incorporeal, in this way because not through a bodily part and organ, – and then this is the same as the proposition already posited about the non-organic.

Or in another way immaterial, because in no way extended, – and then it says more than ‘non-organic’: for although all organic [cognition] is extended because it is received in the extended, not however only [organic], because if it were received in the whole composite first, since that is extended, still the operation would be extended.

In a third way its immateriality can be understood in comparison to the object, namely so that it regard the object under immaterial ideas, as namely insofar as it abstracts from the here and now and the like, which are called the material conditions.

72. Now if immateriality were proved in the second way, the proposed conclusion would be got more than from its proof in the first way; but it does not seem it thus can be proved (unless from the conditions of the object which that act regards) unless perhaps from reflection, because we experience that we reflect on the act of this knowledge as much as it is not reflexive on itself; and therefore from the object of this act a proof of the antecedent finally comes to be.

73. Thus we have in ourselves some knowledge of the object under that idea under which there cannot be of it any sense knowledge; therefore etc.

74. The antecedent [n.73] is proved, because we experience in ourselves that we know in act the universal.

75. And we experience that we know being or quantity under some idea more common than is the idea of the first sensible object, even in respect of the supreme sensitive [power].

76. We also experience that we know the relations consequent to the natures of things, even of non-sensible [things].

77. We experience too that we distinguish the whole genus of sensible things from anything that is not of that genus.

78. We experience too that we know relations of reason (which are second intentions), namely the relation of universal, of genus and species, and of opposition and other logical intentions.

79. We experience too that we know that act by which we know these things and that, according to which this act is in us, which is through a reflex act on the direct act and receptive of it.

80. We experience too that we assent to certain complexes [=propositions] without possibility of contradicting or erring, as to the first principles.

81. We experience too that we cognize the unknown from the known through a discursive process, such that we cannot dissent from the evidence of discursion nor of the knowledge inferred.

82. Any at all of these [instances of] 'to know' is impossible for any sense power; therefore etc.

83. But if someone stubbornly deny that these acts are in man, nor that he experiences these acts in himself, it is not further to be disputed with him, but it must be said to him that he is a brute (just as with him saying 'I do not see color there' one should not dispute, but it must be said to him 'you need senses because you are blind'). So by a certain sense, that is by interior perception, we experience these acts in us; and therefore, if anyone deny these, it must be said say that he is not a man, because he does not have this vision that others experience.

84. The assumption, namely 'that none of these acts can be present according to any sense power' [nn.82, 73], is proved, because in act 'the universal' is known under as much indifference as the thing thus known is at the same time sayable of all the singulars in which it is saved: in this way does sense not know [n.74].

85. But about the second it is more evident [n.75], because no power can know anything under an idea more universal than the idea of its proper object (as sight does not know anything under an idea indifferent to color and to sound); therefore that knowledge, which is of something under an idea more common than any posited object, even of the highest sense, cannot be any sensation.

86. The third [n.77] proves the same, because no sensation can be distinguish-ative of its first sensible object, that is its most common, from that which is not such, because neither can it be of both extremes.<sup>4</sup>

87. About relations consequent to certain things not sensible among themselves, or non-sensibles to sensibles [n.78], it is plain through the same [n.86], because sense has no power for these; and it is much more plain about these relations that are called [relations] of reason, because sense cannot be moved to know something that is [not<sup>5</sup>] included in a sensible object as sensible; a relation of reason is not included in anything as it is existent; but sense is of the existent as it is existent. And through this can be

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<sup>4</sup> Sight is only of color and not also of non-color; and hearing is only of sound, and not also of non-sound etc.

<sup>5</sup> There is no 'not' in the Latin text but it is found in some mss. It may seem at first sight necessary. But probably 'sensible as sensible' here means 'sensible under the idea of sensible', for while sense perceives sensible things, it does not perceive the *idea* of what it is to be a sensible thing.

proved the principle also about universal act, because to a universal in act it is repugnant to be an existent as it is existent.<sup>6</sup>

88. The other, about reflection upon act and power [n.79], is proved through this, that a quantum is not reflexive on itself.

89. The other two, about composition and assent to composition, and about discursive [reasoning] and assenting to the evidence of discursive [reasoning, nn.80-81], are proved from relation of reason, because these are not without relation of reason.

90. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.65] is proved thus: if such an act is in us formally, since it is not our substance, because sometimes it is present and sometimes not present, therefore it is necessary to grant there some proper receptive thing; but not anything extended, whether it be an organic part or the whole composite, because then that operation would be extended; nor could it be of the sort it is said to be about objects of the sort they are said to be; therefore it must be that it is present according to something not extended and that that is formally in us: that cannot be but the intellectual soul, because any other form whatever is extended.

91. Or in another way can this consequence be proved, by going to the condition of the object of this act, because any form inferior to the intellectual, if it has an operation, has it precisely in respect of an object under ideas opposite to these said ideas; therefore, if we have an operation about an object under these ideas, that will not be in us according to any form other than intellectual; therefore it is in us according to intellectual [form]. Therefore, intellectual [form] is formally in us, otherwise we would not be formally operating according to that operation.

92. From the second human operation, namely the will, the same thing can be proved, because man is lord of his acts, such that it is in his power through will to determine himself to this or its opposite, as was said in [*Lectura*] II d.25 n.94; and this is known not only from faith but also through natural reason. Now this indetermination cannot be in any sense appetite, whether organic or extended, because any organic or material appetite is determined to a certain genus of appetibles agreeable to it, such that that [genus] apprehended cannot not agree nor the appetite not desire; therefore the will, by which we thus indeterminately will, is an appetite not of any such form, namely material, and consequently of something exceeding every such form; of this sort we posit the intellectual, – and then, if that appetite is formally in us, because also to desire is, it follows that that form is our form.

## 2. About the Second Proposition, namely: ‘The Intellectual Soul is Incorruptible or Immortal’

93. About the second principal proposition, which is that ‘the intellectual soul is immortal’ [n.53], it is proceeded just as about the first, by first adducing the authorities of the philosophers, who thought this.

### a. It is Proved through the Authorities of the Philosophers

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<sup>6</sup> A universal is not a real being but a being of reason, or an abstraction from real beings, formed by the mind for purposes of understanding. So (*pace* Platonism) it is not properly an existent.



Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.2.413b25-27, says that “the intellect is separated from other things as the perpetual from the corruptible.” If it be said that it is separated as to operation, – on the contrary: from this the proposed conclusion follows, because if it can be separated according to operation, also according to ‘to be’, according to himself [Aristotle] *On the Soul* 1.1.403a7-12.

94. Again, *On the Soul* 3.4.429a29-b5, a difference is posited between sense and intellect, that “an excelling sensible [thing] corrupts sense”, and because of this, after sensation, such [sense] less senses the less sensible thing; not so about the intellect, rather after it has understood the supreme intelligibles, it more understands the inferior ones; therefore the intellect is not weakened in operating, – and then further it follows that it be incorruptible in being.

95. Again *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a21-27, “Moving causes, as if first existing, – but which as idea (that is form) [exist] simultaneously (supply: with the caused thing as a whole); for when a man is healed, then also health is. But whether afterwards something remains needs to be examined: for in certain things nothing prohibits [it], as if the soul is such, not all, but the intellect” etc. He means therefore to say that the intellect is a form remaining after the composite, but not before.

96. Again, *On Animals* 16 [*Generation of Animals* 2.3.736b27-28]: “It remains only ‘that the intellect arrives from without’;” therefore, it does not receive ‘to be’ through generation, but from an extrinsic cause; and, consequently, it cannot receive ‘not-to-be’ through corruption nor through any inferior corruptive cause, because its ‘to be’ is not subject to any such cause, since it is from a superior cause immediately.

97. Again, from the statements of the Philosopher there are formed some reasons [*Authorities of the Philosopher*, 3, 18; n.45]:

There is one principle with him that ‘natural desire is not in vain’; but in the soul there is a natural desire for being always.

98. Again, *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b29-30 he maintains that ‘matter is whereby a thing can be and not be’; therefore, that which does not have matter, according to him, does not have the potency for not being; the intellective [soul] does not have matter, according to him, because it is a simple form.

99. Again, *Ethics* 3.9.1115a32-b1 he maintains that a brave man should expose himself to death for the republic, and he maintains the same in *Ethics* 9.8.1169a18-20, and is speaking according to the judgment of natural reason; therefore according to natural reason the immortality of the soul can be known. Proof of this consequence, because none on account of any good of virtue, whether in himself or in another or of the republic, ought or can desire altogether his ‘not to be’, because according to Augustine, *On Free Choice of the Will* 3.7-8 nn.68-84, ‘not to be’ cannot be desired; but now, if the soul were not immortal, he dying would accept totally ‘not to be’.

#### b. It is Proved through the Reasons of the Doctors

100. Again, one doctor [Aquinas, e.g. *ST* Ia q.75 a.6] argues, as if from the words of the Philosopher, as follows: what is corrupted is either corrupted by its contrary or by defect of something necessarily requisite for the ‘to be’ of it; but the intellective soul does not have a contrary, nor is the ‘to be’ of the body simply necessary for its ‘to be’, because it has a proper ‘to be’ per se and the same in the body and outside the body; nor is there a

difference except that in the body it shares in that ‘to be corrupted’, outside the body it does not share. – Again, the simple cannot be separated from itself; the soul is simple; therefore, it cannot be separated from itself, and consequently neither from its ‘to be’ can it be separated, because not through another form than itself does it have ‘to be’. It is otherwise about the composite, which has ‘to be’ through the form, which form can be separated from matter, and so the ‘to be’ of the composite destroyed.

101. But the Philosopher seems to have thought the opposite because, at the end of *Metaphysics* 7 [c.17.1041b11-33], of intention he maintains that all the parts, which can remain separated from the whole, are elements, that is material parts, as he himself there takes elements; and besides such [elements], it is necessary to posit in the whole some form by which the whole is that which it is, which [form] cannot remain separated from the material part, the whole not remaining; therefore if he conceded that the intellective soul is the form of man, as is plain from the proof of the preceding proposition [nn.62-63], he does not posit that it remains separated from matter, the whole not remaining.

102. Again, it seems a principle with him [the Philosopher] that ‘that which begins to be, ceases to be’: hence in *On the Heavens* 1.10.279b17-21, against Plato, he seems to hold it for impossible that something will have begun to be and yet be perpetual and incorruptible; and in *Physics* 3.4.203b8-9, ‘On the infinite’: “of what there is a beginning, of that there is an end.”

#### α. The Proofs of the Philosophers are not Demonstrative

103. It can be said that although for proving this second proposition [nn.53, 93] there are probable reasons, not however demonstrative ones, indeed not even necessary ones.

104. And what is adduced for it according to the first way, from the authorities of the philosophers [nn.93-99], can doubly be solved:

In one way that it is doubtful what the Philosopher felt about this: for he speaks variously in diverse places, – and he had diverse principles, from some of which he seems to follow one opposite, from others another. Hence it is probable that in this conclusion he will have always been dubious, and now more seemed to accede to one part, now to the other, according as he was treating of matter consonant with one part more than with the other.

105. There is also another response, more real, that not everything ‘said by philosophers assertively’ was for them proved through necessary natural reason, but frequently they did not have but certain probable persuasions, or the common opinion of preceding philosophers.

106. Hence the Philosopher says *On the Heavens* 2.12.291b25-28 (in the chapter ‘On two difficult questions’) “One must try to say what appears, considering it right for eagerness to be attributed rather to modesty than daring, if someone on account of philosophy values a stand and a slight sufficiency where we have the greatest doubts.” Hence a slight sufficiency frequently sufficed for the philosophers where they could not reach anything greater, lest they would contradict the principles of philosophy.

107. And in the same chapter [n.106]: “About the other stars the Egyptians and Babylonians speak, from whom we have many things believed about each of the stars.”

108. Hence philosophers sometimes acquiesce on account of probable arguments, sometimes on account of assertions of their own principles at a tangent to necessary reason. And this response would suffice for all the authorities, many though they were, that they do not prove the thing proposed.

109. However it can be replied in order:

To the first [n.93], that he [Aristotle] does not understand this separation except precisely in this, that the intellect does not use the body in operating, – and because of this it is incorruptible in operating, speaking of that corruption by which an organic virtue is corrupted because of corruption of the organ; and this corruption only belongs to the organic potency, according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 1.4.408b21-22: “If an old man were to receive the eye of a young man, he would see just like a young man;” therefore, the seeing power itself is not weakened or corrupted as to operation, but the organ only. Nor yet from this incorruption of the intellect (because namely it does not have an organ through whose corruption it can be corrupted in operating) does it follow that it is simply incorruptible in operating, because then it would follow that in being it would be incorruptible, as is then argued [n.94], but it only follows that it is not corruptible in operating, in that way in which an organic power [is]. However, it would be posited simply corruptible, according to that of *On the Soul* [1.4.408b21-22]: “The intellect is corrupted in us when a certain interior thing is corrupted,” and this to this extent, because it would be posited the principle of operating for the whole composite the operation proper to it; but the composite is corruptible; therefore, also its operative principle. And that it is the principle of operating for the whole, and the operation of it the operation of the whole, Aristotle seems to say in *On the Soul* above [1.5.411a26-b30].

110. To the other [n.94] I say that ‘a surpassing sensible corrupts the sense’ per accidens, because it corrupts the organ, because it dissolves the mean proportion in which the good disposition of an organ consists; and by the opposite, the intellect, because it does not have an organ, is not corrupted by an excelling object, – but from this it does not follow that it is incorruptible, unless it be proved that it not depend in its being on the whole which is corruptible.

111. To the third [n.95], from *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a21-27, it is said that Aristotle put that under doubt, because he says “perhaps”, but he does not say ‘perhaps’ as to this that the intellect remains afterwards, that is after the whole, but he says: “not every soul, but the intellect;” and there follows: “for that every [soul] is perhaps impossible,” where he was in doubt whether it is possible for every soul to remain after the composite. But about the intellect he does not doubt but that it does not depend in being on the whole that is corruptible; if therefore he expressly assert this, it can be said that yet it was not demonstrated to him through necessary reasoning, but made persuasive through probable reasons.

112. To the other [n.96], it is very doubtful what he himself thought about the beginning of the intellective soul; for if he did not posit that God does something immediately *de novo*, but only with a sempiternal motion moves the heaven, and this as remote agent, – by what separate agent would he himself [Aristotle] posit that the intellective [soul] is *de novo* produced?

113. For if you say that by some intelligence, it is doubly unacceptable: one, because it cannot produce a substance (*Ord.* IV d.1 n.75); another, because that [intelligence] no more can produce something new immediately than God, according to

the principles of the Philosopher about the immutability of the agent, and so about [the agent's] sempiternity in acting. Nor can he himself, as it seems, according to his own principles posit that the intellective [soul] is the term of a natural agent, because – as it seems from *Metaphysics* 12.3.1070a25-27 – he posits it incorruptible (and no form that is the term of a natural agent is simply incorruptible).

114. It can be said that he posits that it immediately receives 'to be' and a new 'to be' from God, because that it does receive 'to be' sufficiently follows from his [Aristotle's] principles, since he does not posit that it had perpetually preceded without a body nor that it had beforehand been in another body. And it is not probable, according to reason, from whom it can receive such 'to be' – nothing being presupposed – except from God.

115. But on the contrary: therefore he [Aristotle] would concede creation.

I reply: it does not follow, because he did not posit another production of the composite and of the intellective soul, just as neither of fire nor of the form of fire, but the animation of the organic body he posits to be the production per accidens of the soul itself.

116. Now we posit two productions: one from the 'not to be' of the soul to the 'to be' of it, and that is creation; another from non-animation of the body to animation of it, – and that is production of the animate body, and through change properly speaking. He therefore who would posit only the second would posit no animation,<sup>7</sup> and thus Aristotle.

117. But although you avoid – according to him – creation, how can it be saved that 'an immutable agent produces something new'?

I reply: in no way, unless because of a newness in the passive receptive thing. For that an effect, totally and precisely dependent on an active cause, were new, would be reduced, according to Aristotle [nn.94-99], to some variation of the efficient cause itself; but that an effect – dependent on an agent and a receptive thing – may be new, can be reduced to the newness of the passive thing itself, without newness of agent.

118. And so would it be said here, that God of natural necessity transmutes an organic body to animation as soon as the body is susceptible of this animation, and by natural causes does this susceptible thing at some time newly come to be; and therefore there is then a new changing toward animation from God himself.

119. But why must this newness be reduced to God as to agent cause?

I say that because as he is the first agent, and therefore, according to Aristotle he is always acting with some action on the passive subject, being always in the same way disposed, so that, if some passive subject can be new and receptive of some form, which form cannot be under the causality of any second cause, God is the immediate cause of that; and yet newly, because to every passive power in an entity it is necessary to posit some corresponding active power, – and therefore, if to a new passive [power] there does not correspond any active created [power], there will correspond to it immediately the divine [active power].

120. To the other [n.97], about natural desire, it will be replied in replying to the principal reasons [nn.138-145], because the first principal reason, the second and the third [nn.45-47] proceed from this.

121. To the other [n.98] from *Metaphysics* 7 about matter: that description of matter is true, – not however only in understanding that 'matter is whereby a thing' of

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<sup>7</sup> That is, no making of a soul by creation.

which it is part ‘can be and not be’, but the thing [is] either what it is part of or what is received in it; otherwise the form of fire couldn’t not be, because matter is not part of the form of fire.

122. To the other [n.99] about the brave man, a great dispute is made whether according to right reason one should expose oneself [to death]. It can however be said, as the Philosopher replies in *Ethics* 9.8.1169a17-33, that he [the brave man] bestows on himself the greatest good in exercising that great act of virtue, and he would deprive himself of this good, indeed he would live viciously if – with that act omitted – he were then to save his ‘to be’ through however much ‘to be’; but better is the simply greatest good even momentary than a remiss good of virtue or a life vicious for a long time. Hence from that it is proved evidently that the common good – according to right reason – is more to be loved than one’s proper good, because his whole proper good a man should expose to destruction simply, even if he not know his soul immortal, because of the salvation of the common good, and that is more to be loved simply because of whose salvation the ‘to be’ of another is contemned.

### β. To the Reasons of the Doctors

123. To those reasons of the doctors:

To the first [n.100], if it understand the soul to have ‘per se to be’ the same in the whole and outside the whole, according as ‘per se to be’ is distinguished from the ‘to be-in’ of an accident, in this way the form of fire – if it were without matter – would have ‘per se to be’, and then it could be conceded that the form of fire would be incorruptible. But if it understand about ‘to be per se’ that it belongs to a composite in the genus of substance, thus it is false that the soul without the body has ‘per se to be’, because then its ‘to be’ would not be communicable to another, because in divine reality too ‘per se to be’ taken in this way is incommunicable. Hence in every way it fails that the soul has ‘per se to be’ without the body therefore it does not need the body, because in the second understanding the antecedent is false, – in the first, the consequence is invalid unless you add there that naturally or without a miracle it [the soul] has ‘per se to be’ in the first way; but this proposition is a thing believed, and not known by natural reason.

124. To the other [argument, n.102]: not every corruption is through separation of one thing from another: for by taking the ‘to be’ of an angel, if that be posited – according to some [Aquinas] – other than the essence, that is not separable from itself, and yet it is destructible through succession of the opposite to its ‘to be’.

### 3. About the Third Proposition, namely ‘The Specific Form of Man will not Remain Perpetually Outside its Whole’

125. About the third proposition it is said [Aquinas] that it can be proved from this, that a part outside the whole is imperfect; and a form so noble will not remain perpetually imperfect; therefore not separate from the whole either.

126. Again, “nothing violent is perpetual” according to Aristotle *On the Heavens* 1.2.269a19-28; but the separation of the body from the soul is violent, because against the natural inclination of the soul, according to the Philosopher, because it [the soul] is inclined naturally to perfecting the body.

127. Now about this proposition [n.125] it seems that the Philosopher, if he had posited the soul immortal, would more have posited it to remain perpetually without the body than in the body, because 'everything composed of opposites is corruptible'.

128. Nor do these reasons prove it:

The first [n.125] not, for that major 'a part outside its whole is imperfect' is not true except of a part that receives some perfection in the whole; and the soul does not receive perfection, but communicates it. And thus an argument can be formed to the opposite, because it is not repugnant for something to remain equally perfect in itself, though to another it not communicate its perfection: this is apparent about the efficient cause, to which it is not repugnant to remain however much without its effect; but the soul remains equally perfect in its proper 'to be', whether conjoined or separate, in this however having a difference, that separated it does not communicate its 'to be' to another.

129. Through this to the other [n.126], because natural inclination is double: one to first act, and it is of the imperfect to perfection and is concomitant with essential potency; and there is another inclination, to second act, and it is of the perfect to the communicating of perfection, and it is concomitant with accidental potency.

About the first, it is true that its opposite is violent and not perpetual, because it posits perpetual imperfection, which the Philosopher had for unacceptable [*On the Heavens* 2.14.296a32-34], because he posited in the universe causes ablative at some time of any imperfection whatever; but the second inclination, even if it be perpetually suspended, is not properly called violent, because not an imperfection either; and now the inclination of the soul to the body only is in the second way.

130. Or it can be said, according to Avicenna [*On the Soul* 1.1, 3], that the appetite of the soul is satisfied through this that it did once perfect the body, because that conjunction is for this that the soul by means of the body acquire its perfections through the senses, which it could not acquire without the senses, and consequently not without the body either; but once conjoined it acquired as much as it simply has appetite to acquire in that way.

#### B. Recapitulation of the Things Said about the Three Propositions

131. I say therefore that of these three propositions [n.53], from which is formed a reason for the resurrection in some way a priori (because taken from the form of man to be resuscitated), the first is naturally known. And the error opposed to it – which is proper to and of Averroes alone [n.59] – is worst, not only against the truth of theology but also against the truth of philosophy: for it destroys science, because [it destroys] all acts of understanding as distinct from acts of sensing, and all acts of choice as distinct from acts of sense appetite, and so all the virtues, which are not generated without choices made according to right reason; and consequently, one so erring would have to be exterminated from among the community of men who are using reason.

132. But the other two [propositions] are not sufficiently known to natural reason, although for them there are certain probable persuasions: for the second, indeed, several and more probable, hence also that one the Philosopher seems to have more expressly perceived, –but for the third fewer. And consequently, the conclusion, following from these, is not by this way [sc. a priori, n.131] sufficiently known to natural reason.

133. The second way to it is from *a posteriori* [arguments], of which some probable ones were touched on in the principal arguments, as about the beatitude of man [nn.46-47].

134. To this also is added [that] about the justice of God retributing; but now in this life the virtuous suffer greater pains than the vicious. And this argument the Apostle seems to touch on, *I Corinthians* 15.19, *If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are more miserable than all men etc.*

135. But these reasons *a posteriori* [nn.133-134] are less conclusive than those taken a priori from the proper form of man [n.131]: for it does not appear, through natural reason, that one is the Ruler of all men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.

136. And let it be that it were so said, that for each in his own good act there is retribution enough, as Augustine says [*Confessions* 1.12 n.19], “You have commanded, O Lord, and so it is, that every sinner is a punishment for himself,” so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin. Hence it is plain that the Saints, arguing *a posteriori* for the matter at hand, do not intend to put together but certain probable persuasions. Just as Gregory in book 4 [*Moralia* 14.55 n.70], with certain persuasions set down for this, says: “He who for these reasons will have unwilling to believe, let him because of the faith believe.” Likewise, the teaching of Paul in *Acts* 17.4, 12, 34; 26.8, 19-20, and *I Corinthians* 15.12, 35-38, 42-51, by the example of a grain of wheat falling [to the ground], and by the resurrection of Christ: *if Christ has risen* the dead too will rise, and by just retribution – they are not but persuasions probable or only from premises believed; it is plain by running through them one by one.

137. Briefly therefore it can be held that neither a priori (namely through the idea of the intrinsic principle in man), nor a posteriori (namely through the idea of some operation or perfection congruent to man), can the resurrection be proved necessarily by relying on natural reason; therefore this is not held as altogether certain except through faith. Indeed, neither is the second proposition in the first way [nn.93-102], as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 13.9 n.12,<sup>8</sup> held by reason, but only through the Gospel, – with Christ saying [*Matthew* 10.28], “Fear not those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul.”

## II. To the Principal Arguments

138. To the first argument [n.45]:

139. Either it is being argued precisely about natural desire properly speaking, and that is not any elicited act, but only the inclination of nature toward something, – and then it is plain that there cannot be proved a natural desire for something unless there first be proved a possibility in nature for that; and consequently, in arguing conversely, there is a begging of the question.

Or it is being argued about natural desire less properly speaking, that namely it is an elicited act, but in concordance with natural inclination: and then again it cannot be

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<sup>8</sup> See also above n.49. “Of those indeed who tried to find these things out by human argumentation scarcely a few, endowed with great genius...and educated in the subtlest doctrines, were able to attain to tracking down the immortality of the soul alone... But that the whole man, who consists of soul and body, will be immortal, and for this reason truly blessed, is promised by this Faith, not with human argumentation, but by divine authority.”

proved that some elicited desire is natural in this way unless it first be proved that for that there is a natural desire in the first way.

140. But if you argue that that is naturally desired which when apprehended is at once desired by an elicited act, because this proneness does not seem to be except from a natural inclination, – in this one way would the first [proposition] be denied, because a vicious man is at once inclined to desiring (according to his habit) that which is offered to him; but because nature is not at once of itself vicious nor in everyone, and anyone at all at once desires that which is apprehended, it follows that that desire is not vicious; therefore this response is not general.

141. Therefore it can be said that it would be necessary to show that that apprehension is according to right reason, not erroneous [reason], – otherwise if, on an erroneous apprehension, at once everyone desires with an elicited act, it does not follow that that desire is consonant with the inclination of nature, nay more opposed; and it is not manifest through natural reason that, with reason showing to man always ‘to be’ as desirable, reason is not erroneous, because it would first be necessary to show that this could belong to man.

142. Briefly therefore every middle [term] from natural desire seems to be inefficacious, because for its efficacy it would be necessary to show either a natural potency in nature for this, or that the apprehension (which at once this desire follows), if it is an elicited act, is a correct apprehension and not erroneous: and of these the first is the same as the conclusion which is concluded from natural desire; and the second is more difficult or less known than this conclusion.

143. But to the proof of this, that ‘the natural desire of man is for immortality because he naturally flees death’ [n.45], it could be said that this proof would conclude equally about any brute whatever. And if that be adduced of the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29, “better is in everything always to be than not to be,” this is to the opposite: first because it would be equally conclusive in the brute as in man, second because he [Aristotle] adds [*ibid.* 30-32], “but this is in all things impossible, to exist continually, because of being far distant from the Principle,” and therefore “in the remaining way God has completed nature, making generation continuous,” – as if he be saying: since natural desire is for always to be, in things in which this is impossible in itself, it is for that as it is possible, namely in the continuation of the species in diverse individuals. And thus would he concede about man, as about another generable, that he has a natural desire to be always, not in a single individual, but in such succession.

144. But always the drive seems to stand, that fleeing one opposite he does not flee it except because of love of the other. It can be conceded that from this it follows that, when he flees death for now, he loves life for now, and so about any designated ‘now’; but it does not follow ‘therefore for the infinite’.

145. And to that of the Apostle [n.45] I reply: ‘we unwill’ we inspired or certified by faith, and indeed ‘we unwill naturally’, such that this ‘unwilling’ is according to natural inclination; but it is not known by natural reason that this ‘to unwill’ is according to natural inclination.

146. To the second [n.46]: I concede that it is true that beatitude – not only in the universal but also in particular – is desired naturally by man, as will be plain below in d.49 [*Rep.* IVA d.49 nn.6-8]. But it is not known by natural reason that it [beatitude] in particular, namely which consists in that in which we believe it to consist, is naturally



desired by man; for it would first need to be known by natural reason that that act would be fitting for us as end.

147. When therefore you prove [n.46] through the Philosopher that beatitude not only in general, from *Ethics* 1, but also in particular, from *Ethics* 10, is desired naturally, – I reply: that idea of ‘beatitude’, which the Philosopher reckons special, namely that it consists in the most perfect speculation of the highest causes, is very universal; but in descending in particular, he himself does not seem to have proceeded beyond the speculation the most perfect in this life. Hence, after this beatitude of man has been inquired into, he adds, “It is necessary too that that the body is healthy, and that there is food and servitude; yet it must not be reckoned that the happy man needs many and great things” [*Ethics* 10.5-9.1175a3-78b35].

148. Therefore that special happiness, which we posit (because we do posit a speculation, possible for man, by far more perfect than any whatever possible for him in this life), that is not naturally known to be our end, nor is it naturally known that it is naturally desired by us as end.

149. When you prove, through Augustine’s reason, that beatitude cannot be but sempiternal [n.46], this will be granted – by him who holds that human beatitude can be had in this life –, that willingly he loses it, because he should, according to right reason, will the condition of his nature; and right reason shows to this [person], not having faith, as it seems to him, that the condition of his nature is mortality both of soul and of body; and therefore he ought to will to lose, just as even life, so blessed life.

150. And when you say ‘a life is not blessed that was not loved by him having it’ [n.46], it is true, if it were not loved for then when it is possible and fitting for him loving it; but that ‘thus it is fitting forever’ is not known through natural reason.

151. To the other [n.47], it is conceded that it is known to man that he can attain his end in some individual and – consequently – [attain] beatitude in that degree in which it is known that beatitude is the end of man.

152. And when you say that this is impossible in this life [n.47], I say that this impossibility is not known through natural reason.

153. When you adduce misfortunes: infirmity of body, imperfection of virtue and science [n.47], – it is replied that all these are repugnant to perfect felicity, which sort – it is known – belongs to the intelligence, but not which sort – it is known – can belong to man.

154. To the fourth [n.48], it would be said that this species will be perpetuated in the universe through a continuous succession of individuals, which the Philosopher would posit through continuous generation; but it will not be continued through the life of any individual nor any individuals in the species.

155. From these it is apparent how great are the thanks that must be referred to our Creator, who has rendered us through faith most certain in these things that pertain to our end and to sempiternal perpetuity, which the most ingenious and most erudite were able through natural reason to attain as if nothing of, according to that which was adduced from Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII ch.9, that ‘scarcely a few etc.’ [n.49]. But if faith be present, which is in those to whom *Christ has given to become sons of God* [John 1.13] there is no question, because he himself has rendered his believers in this most certain.

### Question Three

#### *Whether Nature Can be Active Cause of Resurrection*

156. Thirdly I ask whether nature can be active cause of resurrection.

157. That so:

Because in nature there is a passive and natural potency for resurrection: for the soul is naturally inclined to perfecting matter, and conversely matter is naturally inclined to the soul as to perfection; but to every passive natural potency there corresponds an active natural potency, otherwise the passive natural potency would be in vain; therefore there is some natural active potency in respect of resurrection.

158. Again, in nature there is a double process: one in compounding, another in resolving, – and from which one begins, to that the other terminates, and conversely; therefore, each seems to be equally subject to the action of nature, because also each [is] term of each. But nature can dissolve this composite into the components. Therefore, conversely, from the components it can produce this composite.

159. Again, let fire be corrupted into air, then air into fire: this second fire seems the same as the first, because the same matter, – and it can be that it have the same efficient [cause] with the first fire; and now, through the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044a30-32, “if matter and efficient cause [are] the same, also the effect [is] the same;” if therefore [nature] can bring back the same fire, by equal reason also [the same] man.

160. On the contrary:

Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.6 about the resurrection says, “A thing seen by antiquity<sup>a</sup> against nature, but by me and the truth above nature.”

a. [Interpolation] “Hence all the whole of us, souls – I say – and bodies conjoined, he promises to transpose to an altogether perfect life and to immortality: a thing by antiquity perhaps seen against nature, but to me and to you and the truth even above nature, indeed it which seen – I say – according to us, not the fortune altogether of divine life. For it itself, as being the life of nature of all things and especially of divine things, is neither a life against nature or above nature” [Ps.-Dionysius, *Divine Names*, ch.6]

Here Dionysius means to say that the resurrection of the dead was incredible to antiquity, namely to the ancient folly of the Gentiles, – as against nature and above nature in respect of any agent whatever. And this is false, according to him, because although – as to us and our virtue – it be above nature, yet in respect of God it is not above nor against nature, because as the Commentator of Lincoln says [Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln], what does not fall under the ‘to will’ of divine life itself, falls under its ‘to be able’ immediately, that is, its making of the vessels [sc. creatures, *Romans* 9.19-21]. And therefore, neither is this for it tangential to, nor above, visible nature, nor against nature.

161. Again, a perfect animal is not produced equivocally [sc. by causes specifically different], as the Commentator [Averroes] argues against Avicenna, *Physics* 8 com. 46, whose text [of Aristotle] begins: “Now whether each of the movers;” man, therefore, since he is the most perfect animal, cannot be produced by nature except by univocal production; but resurrection is not univocal production, because it is not generation; therefore etc.

#### I. To the Question

162. Here it needs to be known that since, according to Damascene, bk.IV last chapter [*Orthodox Faith* ch.100], “resurrection is of that which fell (and was dissolved) a second rising” – and the whole man fell in death, and also, positing the form of the mixed [body] there [to be] other than the intellective soul (as I believe to be true), that mixed [body] was dissolved in death or after death – it is necessary for resurrection first indeed in order of nature that that mixed [body] is repaired the same, and second that to that mixed [body] the same intellective soul is reunited so that thus the same man may rise again [cf. *Ord.* IV d.11 nn.279-284].

163. First therefore it must be seen if nature can bring back the form of the mixed body the same in number, – second, if it is possible to reunite with that dissolved mixed body the intellective soul so that it is the same man. The first contains two things: first if [nature] universally can bring back something corruptible the same in number, – second if [it can bring back] this mixed [body] – so that as if specifically [there are] are three articles.

#### A. Whether Universally Nature is Able to bring back Something Corruptible the Same in Number

##### 1. First Opinion, which is that of the Philosophers

###### a. Exposition of the Opinion through Augustine

164. About the first, Augustine, *City of God* 12.14, recites the opinion of the ancient philosophers saying that through the circuit of time the same things in number return; by whom it is put down that after the ‘great year’, that is after a circuit of 36,000 years, everything will return the same in number.

165. Their reason is, because with the cause of them returning the same, the same effect will return; and now all the celestial bodies will return to the same position, because supposing that [view] of Ptolemy in his *Almagest* 9.6 that the starry heaven is moved in a hundred years by one degree, against the daily motion, it follows that this motion from orient to occident will be completed in 36,000 years.

##### b. Rejection of the Opinion

###### α. Through the Authorities of Scripture

166. But this opinion Augustine there rejects [n.164] through the authority of Scripture:

*Romans* 6.9, “Christ being risen from the dead” etc.; secondly, through *I Thessalonians* 4.17, “We shall be always with the Lord;” likewise through that of the Psalmist, *Psalms* 11.8-9: “Thou, O Lord, wilt preserve us,” – hence about those so opining the Psalmist well adds, “In a circuit do the impious walk.”

###### β. By Reason

167. And through reason, about beatitude, because according to this circle there would be no true beatitude, for the fact that the blessed soul would be going to return to the miseries that it had before; and so while it is blessed, either it believes it will never return, and then it is blessed with a false opinion, – or it believes it will return, and then it

fears, and by consequence is not blessed. And he [Augustine] responds there to that of *Ecclesiastes* 1.9-10, “There is nothing new under the sun,” saying [*ibid.*]: “Far be it that we believe that by these words of Solomon these circuits are signified; but either it must be generally taken that the same things have gone before that will be, but not the same in number, – or, as some have understood, that the wise man [Solomon] wanted it to be understood that in the predestination of God everything has already been done, and therefore nothing [is] new under the sun.”

168. This opinion can also be rejected as to its reason [nn.165, 167], because if it be proved that any celestial motion [is] incommensurable with any (which can be proved, if the magnitude over which it is be posited to be incommensurable in magnitude, equal velocity on this side and that being supposed) then – I say – it follows that never will all the motions return to the same; nor is this about ‘the incommensurability of motions’ against the continuity of continuous motion, because if two movables were moved, one over the side of a square and the other over the diagonal, those motions would be incommensurable, – nor in perpetuity, if they lasted, would they return to uniformity. But this would require a long discussion of the individual motions congruent with the epicycles and deferents, if any can with any be found incommensurable in the whole heaven.

169. Again, that foundation, accepted by Ptolemy [n.165], is rejected by Thebit,<sup>9</sup> who proves that the stellated heaven<sup>10</sup> is not thus moved from occident to orient, because – through Thebit – at some time that star would be in the beginning of Cancer of the ninth heaven which otherwise was in the beginning of Capricorn of the ninth heaven; and therefore he posited that the motion of the eighth or stellated heaven is in certain small circles, described on the beginning of Aries and of Libra of the ninth heaven, and that that is a certain motion of accession and recession, according as the starting point of Aries, movable in its circle, is ascending, and – through the opposite – of Libra, movable in its circle, is descending; and elsewhere, conversely, when the head of Aries is descending, the head of Libra is ascending. And thus the stars move in the eighth heaven according to longitude and latitude together. – If therefore this motion were proved in any time completable, in which time all the inferior spheres could not return to the same place that they had at the beginning of the motion, the thing proposed would follow.

170. Again, the reasoning [n.165] is defective, because identity of effect depends not only on the efficient cause, but also on the matter; and the matter can be altogether other, or having another site in comparison to the heaven, because through the action of free choice bodies can be prevented from being in that ‘where’ where they were before. It is also possible through such action that some body is divided, and so the matter dispersed.

171. Again, manifest unacceptable things follow on this position in the human species:

For it follows first that to learn is not but to remember, which the Philosopher touches on in *Posterior Analytics* 1.1.71a1-11, – which is unacceptable, because, as he proves in *Posterior Analytics* 2.19.99b22-27, it is unacceptable that the noblest habits exist in us and escape our notice.

<sup>9</sup> Vatican editors: Thebit [Thâbit] ibn Qurra, died 901, a mathematician of excellent authority in matters astrological. His rejection of the position held by Ptolemy is reported by Roger Bacon, *Communia Naturalium* 2 p.5 ch.19.

<sup>10</sup> The heaven or sphere of the fixed stars in ancient and medieval astronomy.

172. Another is, because the acts of free choice are not subject necessarily to the causality of the heaven, and consequently those will not necessarily return the same, nor consequently any acts dependent necessarily on them; and yet that example does Augustine posit about the saying of the philosophers (where before, n.164), “Just as – he says – in this age Plato, in the school which is called ‘Academic’, taught disciples, so through innumerable ages backwards both the same Plato and the same city and the same school and the same students [are] brought back.” And he adds, “Far be it that we believe these things,” bringing in the disproofs from Scripture before adduced [n.166].

## 2. Second Opinion

173. There is another opinion, [Bonaventure, Albert the Great, Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton], totally to the contrary, that it is impossible for anything to return the same in number through a natural agent.

174. For this is adduced the authority of the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.11.338b161-7, “Of what things the substance perishes, it does not return the same in number.”

175. And his authority is *Physics* 5.4.228a6-12, about health, that it does not return the same in number.

176. And his authority in *Categories* 10.13b20-27 that “from privation to habit regression is impossible,” – which must be understood of privation subsequent to form and of the preceding form, with which agrees that which some allege from *Metaphysics* 8.5.1045a3-6, the chapter about wine and vinegar; and which denies immediate return, even according to species, because it is necessary first for resolution to be made to common matter.

177. Adduced too is his authority in *Ethics* 6.3.1139b9-11 approving the saying of Solon [Agathon]: “Rightly – he says – does Solon say ‘God is deprived of this alone, to make undone what has been done’;” therefore it is not possible to bring back things past, because then it would make them not only not past, but even present.

178. Again, through four reasons:

The first is this: in all corruption the matter of the thing generated is divided, so that not from the whole same matter, which was before in the corrupted thing, is the generated thing generated; and thus, further, always there is made a greater and greater division of the matter; therefore through any circulation whatever, if a return be made to something of the same species as the first thing corrupted, it will not be from the same total matter, and consequently it will not be the same, because for numerical identity there is required identity of matter as also of form, – through the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.5.1071a17-29, and through reason, because it is an essential principle of the whole.

179. Again, a natural agent cannot act except through motion and change; but motion and change cannot return the same, because their unity is continuity, and interruption or iteration is repugnant to continuity; therefore, also to unity of motion and change; neither therefore can the term of it return the same.

This reason is confirmed thus: as ‘this product’ to product, so ‘this production’ to production; therefore, by permutation, as product to production, so ‘this product’ to ‘this production’; but there cannot be a product without production; therefore neither ‘this

product' without 'this production'. And 'this production' cannot return the same, because it is a change; therefore neither 'this product'.

180. Again, the same thing could not return unless for it there could be the same potency; but this is false, because either the same potency always remains, or [is] newly produced:

Not in the first way, because potency is corrupted in the arrival of form, and consequently, after the first reduction to act, there does not remain the same potency. Nor in the second way, because just as to a form another privation succeeds than what preceded it, so a form is resolved into another potency, if it is resolved into any.

It is proved also at the same time that in neither way, because for the past there is no potency; this form is past.

181. Why too is the same thing not at once brought back by nature, if there is a potency for the same thing in the susceptible [subject], and nature can be an active cause?

For in this there is not a reason – since nature acts from impetus – why it may not as immediately bring back the same thing as not immediately, at least when such an order of forms is had, according to which it can bring back the same thing in species. But we manifestly see that not immediately in the first bringing back of the same thing in species is the same thing in number brought back, – which is plain from the accidents altogether other consequent (at least as inseparable) to the supposit. – And this question, posed under 'why', could be the fourth principal reason [n.178].

### 3. Third Opinion

182. The third opinion [Henry of Ghent, William of Ware] is in between which posits that, although not everything can return the same in number through the action of nature, yet something can return the same in number in this way.

183. [First argument] – For this opinion it is argued:

First, through that of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 8 [n.159], "If the agent is the same and the matter the same, the effect will be the same," because he does not assign a possible diversity of effect except because of a diversity of matter or efficient [cause]; but it is possible that there is the same efficient [cause] and the same matter in a second respect of the product that there were in a first respect of the product; therefore it is possible for the secondly produced to be the same as the first produced.

184. The minor is proved, because although frequently there happen in corruption a dispersion or division of matter, yet the opposite is possible in many cases: for example, if fire be included within a urinal and be there corrupted into air, and next from this air there be generated fire through reflection of solar rays or otherwise, the matter included will be the same; similarly, if from a solid there be generated a solid, where precisely the form of the generated can follow the form of the corrupted, it follows that a reason whereby the whole matter was there first under the form of the thing corrupted is equally the reason whereby the same whole will be under the form of the thing to be generated.

185. Response: that of the Philosopher [n.183] must be understood with this addition 'at the same time', because – according to him in *Physics* 5.4.227b21-24 – not only is there a numbering [of effects] because of otherness of species and subject, but also of time.

186. There is another response, and better, that Aristotle means that if the agent be other and the matter other, also the effect will be other; but not from the opposite of the antecedent ‘if agent the same and matter the same, therefore effect the same’. Hence at the end [sc. of the passage from *Metaphysics* 8., n.159] concluding he says: “If therefore it is possible from matter to make the same thing, plainly because the principle that is as moving [is] the same, for if the matter [is] other, also the mover and what is done,” supply: since there the mover is other, also what is done will be other.

187. Against the first response [n.185]: if an agent act now in instant *a*, it will cause this (let it be *p*), – and if it not act now, but cease up to instant *b*, it will cause the same; therefore if it cause in *a*, and in the time intermediate between *a* and *b* that caused thing be destroyed, and again in instant *b* it act, it will cause that same thing. The consequence is plain from this, that continuity of intermediate time does nothing for the identity of a permanent thing, which has the same to be in that time and in the terms of that time.

188. If you deny the assumption, because in instant *b* a second cause cannot have from a universal cause (namely the heaven) the same influence as it had in instant *a*, and therefore it will not be able to cause then the same thing, – against this in two ways:

First because a like influence is sufficient for identity of effect: for if in instant *a* there were another agent approximate to the passive thing, it would produce the same thing in number that this agent produces, and yet that influence would not be the same in number as the influence of this, but only similar; and now in another instant, namely *b*, there is an influence like that which was in instant *a*.

Again, this influence is not anything absolute, received in the second cause, because then the second cause through that thing received could act without the first cause, whose influence it receives, because now it has all that because of which it needs the action of the first cause, – which is unacceptable; therefore, the influence of a superior cause in respect of an inferior is not anything received in the inferior cause. Hence there is only its order in causing to the superior cause, continually – as far as is of itself – co-acting; therefore, there will not be another influence, just as neither another order of superior cause to inferior.

189. [Second argument] – Again, either it is simply impossible for the same thing in number to be otherwise produced, and then it follows that neither does God have power for this; or it is not simply impossible, and then it follows that in the causality of them in which this was possible before, also now it will be; but it was before in the causality of natural causes, therefore also now it will be.

#### 4. Scotus’ own Judgment about these Opinions

190. As to this article, I reply that the third opinion seems more probable. For the first, about the return of all things, is altogether improbable, at least because it is against the faith; nor is the reason for it efficacious, because that about ‘the return of the heaven’ both supposes a dubious antecedent, and the inference is dubious.

191. The second opinion does not sufficiently prove the impossibility of the return of anything at all by nature.

192. And therefore the third opinion can be maintained, because it does not appear why nature cannot bring back something the same in number: for if, when there is

continuous action of a natural agent in respect of a thing produced, just as is in the sun in respect of its ray, the sun be posited in the first instant to produce a ray and in the following time to conserve it, in the ultimate instant (suppose *b*), it will be the same ray, since that ‘identity of a ray in a second instant with itself in a first instant’ does not depend on the existence of it in the intermediate time, because without that existence the same thing in number could have been produced in the same instant. It follows that, with that intermediate ‘to be’ destroyed, the same thing could be in each extreme; and although in other agents, where the agent would be said not to act after the first instant, there would be an evasion as to this in respect of a proximate agent, yet the argument remains the same in respect of a remote agent, on which continually the effect depends, and in this effect dependent on the proximate agent immediately the thing proposed is concluded.

### 5. To the Arguments for the Second and Third Opinions

193. To those [arguments] therefore that are for the second opinion, and consequently against the third:

194. [To the authorities of Aristotle] – To the first [n.174] it was responded in the first question [n.19].

To the second [n.175], the opposite could more be drawn from that doubt in *Physics* 5, because if health continued through the day remains the same, why in the same way will that which was in the morning and interrupted at midday and returned in the evening not be the same? Hence there is not had there expressly the negative that is alleged [in *Physics* 5].

195. To that from the *Categories* [n.176]: if privation, which is the term ‘from which’, cannot return the same, neither the term ‘to which’, – and this speaking of the precise term ‘from which’, and in respect of a natural agent; and now there is not a cause – why that does not return the same – except because the positive, with which it is conjoined, does not return the same: for if the form, according to the order of generation immediately preceding another in the matter, can return, it does not appear why the concomitant privation cannot also return. That proposition therefore from the *Categories* is understood in the order of natural generation according to descent, that after privation there the habit does not return, because the form immediately preceding that habit according to the order of generation does not return. It can briefly be said that that is understood about identity according to species, not about numerical identity, and then about immediate return, – and consequently neither [authority of Aristotle, nn.175, 176] about mediate return.

196. To that from *Ethics* 6 [n.177]: the Philosopher understands “to make undone what has been done,” that is it is not possible to make it that they have not been done; but it does not follow ‘therefore it is not possible to make them present’, because it is not repugnant for them to have been done and now to be present by another doing, even if they have been destroyed between the first action and the second.

197. To the reasons of that opinion:

[To the first reason] – To the first [n.178], it is plain that it should not move [us]:

First because some part of matter remains the same notwithstanding that division of matter; therefore in that part the same form would be brought back as before, if return



of the same form is not impeded because of anything else except because of otherness of matter; and then the new generated thing would in part be numerically the same as what was before, and in part diverse, because, for that part of the matter that remains the same, it would be generated the same as what was before corrupted, but for the other parts of the matter, which have succeeded to those that were before in the corrupted thing and were dispersed, the generated thing would be other than the corrupted thing.

Second because God or an angel could collect all the parts of the matter of the very thing corrupted, and apply them to a natural agent in due proportion, – and thus the same whole in number would return as before, according to this reason.

Similarly, the whole matter can naturally be preserved the same without division, – as that if fire<sup>11</sup> in a urinal be converted into air, and conversely all that air be converted into fire, here there is no dispersion of matter.

The response therefore is that it is not necessary for the matter of what was first corrupted to be divided, – and although it were to remain the same, this would not be the whole idea of the return of the same thing.

198. [To the second reason] – To the other, about motion and change, it was responded in the first question [n.27].

199. To the confirmation, about permutated proportion [n.179], I reply: permutated proportion is taken from *Euclid* 5 prop.16, “if some quantities are proportional, they will also be proportionate quantities” [Euclid: “If four quantities are proportional, when they are permutated, they will be proportional”].

200. And this is carried over, and to arguments of this sort the answer is plain from Aristotle *Prior Analytics* 2.22.68a3-16: “If *a* and *b* are converted, also *c* and *d* are converted; if *a* and *d* contradict, *b* and *c* contradict.” And in this way universally the argument from permutated proportion holds, if the permutation be done as concerns to contradict and to be converted, – but if it be done in accord with to contradict and to follow and to precede, it is not valid, but causes a fallacy of the consequent. Hence it is not valid: ‘as man is disposed to non-man, so animal to non-animal’; therefore, by permutation, ‘as man to animal according to consequence, so non-man to non-animal according to consequence’ [cf. *Ord.* I d.36 nn.56-57].

201. To the matter at hand, what is argued as to this, which is that ‘it cannot be without this’ [n.179: sc. ‘this product cannot be without this production’], the consequence is not valid when a common term determines for itself another common term [as ‘product’ and ‘production’], and an inferior under the common term [sc. ‘this product’ under ‘product’] does not determine for itself some inferior under another common term [sc. ‘this product’ does not determine ‘this production’ under ‘production’]; and this is well possible, because from this that a common term determines for itself another common term, it does not follow but that an inferior determines for itself the same common term. An example: ‘as surface to this surface, so color to this color’ and conversely; therefore, by permutating, ‘as surface cannot be without color, so neither this surface without this color’, – it does not follow, because although one common term determine for itself another common term, not however a singular a singular. Similarly: ‘as body to this body, so place to this place’, therefore, by permutation, ‘as body to place, so this body to this place; but a body cannot be without a place; therefore neither this body without this place’, – the consequence is not valid,

<sup>11</sup> The Vatican text prints ‘signis’ (= ‘for signs’) which must be an error for ‘ignis’ (= ‘fire’), as in the next line.

because this body does not determine for itself this place in the same way as body [does] place; but it does well follow ‘if that which is necessarily required for another cannot be without something, neither [can] that for which it is required [sc. be without that something]. And so, since production is necessarily included in the idea of ‘this production’, if production cannot be without product [cf. n.179: “this reason is confirmed”] it follows that ‘this production’ will not be able to be without ‘this product’; but neither production in common nor product in common necessarily requires ‘this’ production.

202. Briefly: permutation does not hold except according to the same thing according to which the proportion was before, or according to something in which ‘to be a proportion’ is included in the first proposition, just as in this: ‘what is proportional is according to convertibility’ there is included: ‘proportionals are according to repugnance’.<sup>12</sup> But in the matter at hand it is not so, because in this, which is ‘to be proportional according to higher and lower’, is not included universally that proportionals are according to the sort of inseparability in inferiors as there is in superiors.

203. [To the third reason] – To the other [n.180] I say that a potential principle always remains the same, and that suffices for this, that the form be received. Because if beyond this principle you seek another potency, which is [a potency of] respect, that does nothing for reception of form; but if that is required, it can be said that it is now the same.

204. And when you ask, ‘either it remains the same or it returns the same’ [n.180], either can be granted:

The first to be sure, because, speaking absolutely of the potency that states the order of receptive to received, that order remains the same whether before the received be present-in or when the received is present-in, because that [order] follows the nature of the receptive that is of a nature to be perfected by such form. And it is proved that this remains, because if God were to bring back the same form (which is not denied possible for him), that [form] would make a ‘per se one’ with the matter just as before; therefore, in the matter there would be a potency – in respect of it – the same as before.

205. And then, when it is argued that ‘potency is destroyed in the advent of form’ [n.180], it is necessary to say that this is not understood properly of the idea itself of potency, but of a certain respect concomitant with potency which it [potency] has through this that it is before act, which is a certain priority of duration to act; but it is not included per se in the idea of potency, because it can at the same time be with this priority and with simultaneity for act.

206. It could also be said that potency before act remains the same always, even with act, nor yet are opposites together, because a potency before act is not for form for that same ‘now’ for which act is present, but for another, because for that ‘now’ it has act. And potency before act is not present for the same form, but for [a form in the] future.

207. But that one of these two responses be true is proved by this, that if something can have a potency for form, it already has the potency, because the ‘impossible’ cannot become ‘possible’, and consequently there cannot at some time be had a potency for some form but that it now be had, if the susceptible is possible now.

208. Otherwise it would be said that the same potency would return, just as it is also possible that the same act returns. And then it would be said that for the instant for

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<sup>12</sup> Sc. ‘product’ and ‘this product’ agree in being repugnant to ‘without production’ and ‘without this production’ respectively.

which the act is present, there does not remain a potency opposed to act, but it returns when that act ceases.

209. In a last way it might be said that, from the beginning of creation, in the potential principle there are distinct potencies, as many as there are forms receivable; not only distinct in species, but in number; and not precisely so many, but even that for the same form there are as many as there are times when that form can be induced; and each one of these potencies ceases to be when its proper act arrives, nor does that [potency] return; and yet the same form can return, because for that there was not only a single potency, but one and another, according as it was at this time and that time inducible into the same potential principle.

When it is argued, against the second member [n.180], that the same potency cannot return because neither [can] the privation, – it was said above [n.195] that privation can return, if the positive, to which the privation is adjoined, can; and in the same way about potency, if that form prior in the order of generation can return, with which that potency for that second [form] is concomitant.

210. When it is argued, against each member [n.180], that potency is not for the past, – it is true, as it is past; hence there is not properly a potency for that to have been or not to have been, but there is a potency for that which was past, insofar however as it can be future.

And this argument about potency [n.180] not only concludes against a natural agent, but also against a return of the same material form through divine action, because that requires a potency in the matter that it perfects. He who would say that these potencies are nothing, speaking of any potency whatever besides that which states a respect of the recipient to the form received, would briefly free himself from all this dispute, because how many nothings may be posited is not a concern. But that [potency] which is a real relation on the part of matter to form, just as conversely informing is a real relation of form to matter, that – I say – returns the same, if the form returns; or if it were not to return before the composite, it could return the same<sup>13</sup> (it was stated in the first question [n.41]).

211. [To the fourth argument] – To the last [n.181], why not at once, in the first return of the same thing according to species, the same thing in number would return, it can be said that there are some impediments on the part of the passive thing or the agent, because of which inseparable accidents are not at once able to be brought back, and without those [inseparable accidents] the same substance would not be brought back; it is not thus necessary that there are always such impediments.

## B. Whether it is Possible for Nature to Bring Back the Same Mixed Body

212. About the second principal article [n.163], absolutely it is possible for nature to bring back a mixed body the same, on the supposition of the third opinion in the preceding article [n.182]; but it is not possible for nature to bring back the same thing in the way in which it will be brought back.

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<sup>13</sup> The Vatican editors punctuate the Latin here to read: “or if it were not to return before, the composite could return the same,” which to be sure, if it is not just a typo, is a possible reading. But the emphasis seems to be on the form returning the same, whether it returns with or before the composite, and not on the composite being the same (even though it would be).

213. The first conclusion is proved, because if the third opinion in the preceding article be true, whenever the whole same matter is proximate to the same agent without impediments, the same thing can be brought back, – [proximate] not only to the same agent in number, but to the same in species, because identity according to species in an agent is equivalent to numerical identity. Proof, because if in this instant this fire from this wood is generating this fire, if in the same instant that fire were next to the same wood, it would generate the same fire; but it is possible for the whole matter, from which this body was being formed otherwise in natural generation, to be again under the form of sperm and menstrual [fluid] in another womb, as is proved by the statement of Gregory *Moralia* IV ch.31 n.62 (and it is set down in II d.20 nn.18-20 [in the *Lectura*]); therefore then in another womb the same mixed body would be formed.

214. The second conclusion is for me more certain, because it depends on certain things, namely if the third opinion stated be true [nn.182-192]. This second [conclusion] I prove, because the whole of active nature is tied to a certain order of forms in transmutation, such that the whole of nature could not immediately after vinegar induce wine (only God in acting is not limited to this order): and especially is this order necessary in respect of a natural agent, when process is toward the perfect, because [the perfect] cannot be produced in many, but in fewer ways. And now this mixed body is perfect among these corruptible things, and therefore to it there is determined a large order in forms first according to natural order (as namely of seed, of blood, and of flesh etc.). But now such forms do not precede this formation of the body in the way in which it will then be repaired [sc. at the resurrection], because suddenly it will be repaired from ashes or dust or other things, in whatever things it had before been resolved; therefore the whole of nature will not be able to repair the same body in the way in which it will then be repaired.

### C. Whether Nature Can Reunite to that Dissolved Mixed Body an Intellectual Soul so that it is the Same Man

#### 1. Opinion of Others and its Refutation

215. About the third article [n.163]: with that body repaired by whatever, it seems that by nature the soul can be reunited to that body, because this form [the soul] is the disposition that is necessitating in respect of animation; in nature, therefore, there is a disposition necessary for animation; but on such disposition there follows necessarily that for which it disposes.

216. But on the contrary

It is plain that that soul cannot by any creature – other than itself – be reunited to the body; but neither by itself as by effective principle of that union. Proof of each: an equivocal cause is simply nobler than the effect, and it is proved by Augustine 83 *Questions* q.2, “Everything that happens, to that by which it happens, cannot be equal; otherwise justice, which must attribute to each his own, would necessarily be taken away from things.” But he is understanding about an equivocal cause, because justice in a univocal cause requires equality, but in an equivocal cause eminence. The same does Avicenna mean in *Metaphysics* 6.3. The same does Augustine mean, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16 n.33, that ‘the agent is more outstanding than the passive [thing]’: which proposition (as was said elsewhere [*Ord.* I d.3 n.407]), depends on this ‘an agent is

simply more perfect than its formal effect'; but man is simply more perfect than his soul, just as the whole than the part, and than any other bodily substance whatever. It is plain therefore: neither the soul nor any bodily substance – other than man – can be effective cause of man.

217. Again, *Physics* 2, the form and the efficient [cause] do not coincide in the same thing in number; therefore, the soul, which is the formal cause of man, cannot be the effective cause of the same.

218. Again, the first union [of body and soul], done in generation, was not less natural than this done in resurrection; but the soul could not be the effective cause of the former union; therefore, only God creating and infusing [the soul was cause of that union]. – I concede the conclusion, that 'if to active divine virtue alone the production of man is subject, to the same alone will the second production of man be subject'; but that production is in the animation of the organic body.

219. To that for the opposite [n.215] I say that in the whole of nature there is nothing in the susceptible [thing] that may be a disposition necessitating for form, because with any such [disposition] there stands the potency of contradiction [sc. the disposition, qua disposition, can be with or without the form it is the disposition for], since this is necessarily concomitant with the susceptible that is precisely susceptible, for such potency is repugnant to necessity [sc. a potency qua potency is not necessitated to being actualized or to not being actualized].

220. But that wonted word about 'the disposition that is necessitating' [n.215] must be understand thus: not that the disposition be the idea of necessity, but that – with it itself posited – the agent necessarily induces the form for which it is the mere disposition: – either by necessity simply, as when the agent is merely natural, or by necessity in a certain respect, as when the agent is voluntary and disposes thus to act. And in this last way the form of corporeity is a disposition necessitating for the soul, not that from it itself or by virtue of it animation follow, but because – with it itself posited – the agent conditioned by the necessity of its own disposition induces the form for which it is.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

221. To the first principal [argument, n.157], I say that there is not any created passive potency to which there not correspond an active potency in nature, so that there not be posited a passive potency in vain. But in diverse ways is this active [potency] in nature posited according to philosophers and theologians [cf. *Ord.* prol. p.1 q.un. nn.5-89], for [they posit it] by strictly taking active nature for 'created nature'. Not because Aristotle posits the intellect to be immediately induced by God (as was touched on in question 1 of this distinction [n.30]), but by taking nature for an agent 'by natural necessity', thus would the Philosopher say that there is an active potency in nature, because he takes the first cause to be acting 'by natural necessity' on this passive subject.

222. But the theologians deny that in nature there is an active potency even in this way, because they say that the first [thing] acts on this [subject] not by natural necessity but freely; and then, according to them, when it is said 'there corresponds some active [potency] in nature', 'nature' must be taken there commonly, for the whole of being. Nor do they themselves posit more in vain something in being than the Philosopher, because passive potency can be equally reduced to act if it not be reduced by a created agent but

by an uncreated one, and not naturally active but freely, just as if it were posited to be reduced by [an agent] acting in one way and another.

223. To the other [n.158]: the consequence is not valid: ‘it has power for the dissolving process, therefore also for that converse one which is done by composing’. An instance is plain: for I can divide a solid object and yet I cannot make the divided parts continuous again.

224. To the third [n.159]: in one way it is denied that the same matter totally in itself and in its parts can be again made proximate to some agent, because of the division of the parts of matter that happens in corruption; in another way it is denied that the same potency or matter can remain or return. However, this argument touches on that general point which is treated of in the first article of the solution [nn.190-192], and it is for the third opinion, which is not there simply rejected.

## Question Four

### *Whether Resurrection is Natural*

225. Fourth I ask whether resurrection is natural.

226. That so:

Damascene [*Orthodox Faith* ch.58]: “What is common to all (in the same species) is natural;” resurrection is of this sort.

227. Again, a motion is natural that terminates at natural rest, because a movable is naturally moved to that in which it naturally rests; and, by parity of reason, a change is natural which terminates at a form naturally perfecting the changeable; but resurrection is of this sort, because the perfectible will be naturally perfected by that form being reunited.

228. On the contrary:

Dionysius, *Divine Names* ch.6 says of the resurrection, “seen by me and the truth to be above nature” [n.160]; therefore it is not natural.

229. Again, the knowing natural effects can be attained to by natural reason; not so to the resurrection, from the second question of this distinction [n.137].

230. Again, what is ‘natural’ happens for the most part, not only in suppositis but also in times [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.235], because it happens as often as its cause, which is natural, is not impeded; and it is impeded for the least part; but resurrection only happens once.

## I. To the Question

### A. About the Meaning of the Term ‘Natural’

231. Here it is necessary to understand that ‘natural’ is taken equivocally [cf. *Ord.* prol. nn.57-59], – which is plain from this, that it is opposed to diverse things.

232. And this is one doctrine of knowing the multiple, for in *Topics* 1.15.106a9-10 the ‘natural’ is opposed in one way to the ‘supernatural’, in another way to the ‘artificial’ (or the free or voluntary), in a third way to the ‘violent’.

233. For ‘natural’ sometimes pertains to an active principle, and then there are opposed to it the ‘free’ in one way and in another way the ‘supernatural’, – for an agent is called ‘natural’ or [acting] ‘naturally’ (which is opposed to the ‘free’) because it acts

from natural necessity, but ‘voluntary’ or ‘free’, what determines itself to acting. And in this way does the Philosopher speak in *Physics* 2.3.195a27-b6, 5.196b17-22, dividing ‘nature’ against ‘agent by purpose’, and in *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046a22-b2, 5.1047b31-8a8 about active powers irrational and active powers rational or free. In another way, on the part of the active [principle], the ‘natural’ is called what has a natural order of active to passive, – and the ‘supernatural’ what exceeds all such natural order; and in this way any created agent whatever is called ‘natural’, and only the uncreated agent is called ‘supernatural’.

234. On the part of the ‘acted on’, it is called ‘natural’ in one way as it is opposed to ‘violent’, insofar as that is ‘naturally’ said to be moved which is acted on according to the proper inclination of the acted-on; ‘violent’ what is acted on against the inclination of the acted-on. And from this it follows that ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ are not immediate contrary opposites, rather between them there is a mean, when namely the acted-on is disposed in neither way: neither inclined to that which it receives, nor to the opposite (as a surface to whiteness or blackness or in between).

235. It follows too that the violent cannot be in the first thing acted on, namely in prime matter, because [prime matter] is never inclined against anything of which absolutely it is receptive.

236. And this distinction of these opposites and of the middle is taken in the passive thing as it is compared to form. But as the passive is compared to the agent from which it receives the form, it is said to be ‘naturally’ moved when it is moved by an agent naturally corresponding to it, – and ‘supernaturally’ moved when it is moved by an agent above the whole order of agents of this sort naturally proportioned to it.

237. So therefore we have the ‘natural’ in two ways as it pertains to the active [principle]: because as it is distinguished from ‘free’ and ‘supernatural’ [n.233]; – and ‘natural’ or ‘naturally’ in two ways as it pertains to the acted-on: because as it is distinguished from the ‘neutrally’ and from the ‘violent’ [n.234].

#### B. Objection against the Aforesaid and Solution of it

238. But it is argued against the distinction of the two last members [n.236], for in *Ethics* 3.1.1110b15-17 Aristotle says that “the violent is whose principle is outside, with the thing acted-on not conferring force;” therefore in the definition of the ‘violent’ is put a motive principle, and consequently the ‘violent’ essentially is not only taken from the comparison of the ‘violent’ to the thing acted on [cf. *Ord.* IV d.29 n.22].

239. I reply, and to however many such instances, through this proposition: ‘that per se is cause on which, when posited, any other or varied thing being removed, the effect follows’; but now, although a form against which the receptive thing is inclined is not induced except through an agent per se inflicting violence on the subject acted on, yet the per se idea of the ‘violent’ is from the relation of acted-on to form, because with acted-on and form remaining in their idea (to wit, that the form be receivable, yet against the inclination of the acted-on), in whatever way the agent be varied, the acted-on does violently receive.

240. This is plain, because not only in ‘to be induced’ but also in ‘to persist’ it is said that some form violently persists in the passive thing and for a long time, and some naturally, so that, circumscribing the agent, because that it does not have an action after

induction of the form, there is naturalness there or violence, precisely by comparing the form to the receptive subject [cf. *Ord. prol.* nn.58-59].

241. I concede, therefore, that in the description of the ‘violent’ the agent is placed as if extrinsic, but not as per se completing nor as per se constituting the idea of the ‘violent’, but [this idea] is only completed through that [addition] “the passive thing not conferring force,” that is, *contra-ferring*;<sup>14</sup> and the ‘violent’ would remain after all action of the agent (just as if a stone could rest upwards without continuous action of the thing detaining it). There is added however, in the description of the ‘violent’, [the word] “principle” [n.238] as if the extrinsic cause for the most part.

242. Similarly, although the passive subject may receive some form in some way supernatural, and in this could ‘supernaturalness’ state the mode of condition of passive subject to form, yet never is it called ‘supernatural’ except because it receives it from such an agent. Of which the proof is, because if it were to receive a form naturally perfective of it from such an agent, still it would receive it supernaturally; not indeed because of relation to form, because thus it receives naturally, but because of relation to the agent from which it receives.

### C. Conclusion of the Aforesaid

243. To the matter at issue: resurrection signifies an undergoing [lit.: *passion*] to which corresponds for the action resuscitation; therefore, in the question ‘whether resurrection be natural’ [n.225] the ‘naturalness’ is not taken except as far as it pertains to undergoing; but ‘whether active resuscitation be natural’, the ‘natural’ will be taken as it pertains to action and to the active cause.

244. In the first way therefore I say that it will be natural as ‘natural’ is opposed to ‘violent’, but it will not be natural as ‘natural’ is opposed to ‘supernatural’. And the reason for each member is plain from what was said in the first article: reason for the first, because the passive subject is naturally inclined to the form that it receives [nn.234-235]; reason for the second, because it does not receive it from an agent having a natural order for acting on this, but above the whole of this sort of order [n.236].

245. But if it be asked about active resuscitation, whether it will be natural, it must be replied that in each way in which ‘natural’ pertains to action it will not be natural, because in fact by an agent [acting] freely, not by natural necessity, and by an agent above the whole order of created causes that are said to have a natural order of acting on a passive subject.

### III. To the Principal Arguments

246. To the first principal [argument, n.226],

The authority of Damascene needs to be understood: about ‘all’, about that which is common to all in species from an intrinsic principle or a natural cause; not so here. And it is plain that he so understands, because the proposition thus understood he applies to the double operation in Christ, which is in all – in the human species – from a cause intrinsic or at least natural.

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<sup>14</sup> I.e. the passive subject does not cooperate with the agent in bringing action *contra* or against itself as passive subject.



247. To the second [n.227]: it proves only that resurrection is natural as ‘natural’ is opposed to ‘violent’. However, what is touched on there about change contains a doubt, namely whether resurrection is a change, – and about this it will be said in the following question [nn.269-273].

### Question Five

#### *Whether Future Resurrection is in an Instant*

248. Fifth it is asked whether resurrection is in an instant.

249. That not:

*I Thessalonians* 4.16-17, “The dead who are in Christ will rise first, then we who are alive” etc.; therefore, those who are found dead in the advent of Christ will first rise, then those caught up on the way will die and afterwards will rise, – therefore not at the same time will the resurrection be of these and of those; not therefore in an instant.

250. Again, Augustine *City of God* 20 ch.20 n.3 says: “With so ineffable a speed the dust of the most ancient corpses returns to bodily members going to live without end.” And in the same chapter, “To deathlessness through death they will pass with marvelous speed;” the same does the Apostle say most openly [n.249]. But ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ – through the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.5.218b15 – “are determined by time.”

251. Again, in the resurrection something – which was before – will be corrupted, because that matter which will receive a new form was before under another form having to be corrupted. That thing having to be corrupted will have a finite ‘to be’; but every positive everywhere finite has at least two positive terms; therefore that ‘to be’ of that preceding will have two terms, and consequently there is an ultimate instant to grant of the ‘to be’ of that preceding. Therefore, if the resurrection will be immediately after the ‘to be’ of that and in an instant, there will be an instant immediate to an instant, – which is against the Philosopher, *Physics* 5 and 6 [5.3.227a27-32, 6.1.231a22-b10, 232a18-22, 3.234a22-31].

252. Again, the body then to be corrupted will have a permanent ‘to be’; but the permanent does not have ‘to be’ in time, unless because in an instant; therefore if the ‘to be’ of the to be corrupted immediately precede the ‘to be’ of the body to be resuscitated, it follows that it will precede in an instant immediate to that ‘to be’, and then – as before [n.251] – the to be resuscitated will not be able to have a ‘to be’ immediate in an instant.

253. The opposite:

*I Corinthians* 15.52, “In a moment, in the blink of an eye, at the last trump.” Which authority Augustine adduces in *City of God* (where before [n.250]), for proof of the resurrection happening suddenly.

254. Again, generation is in an instant; therefore, also resurrection.

255. Likewise, the Master [Lombard] says in the text that resurrection will be in an instant.

#### I. To the Question

256. Here it needs to be seen, since resurrection, according to Damascene [n.162], “is the iterated rising of that which fell,” – but the whole man fell through separation of the intellective [soul] from the body, and secondarily that mixed body fell through

corruption into some other thing or things; and let the order of generation and corruption be reversed, and thereby let it be necessary first in the order of nature that the body is repaired before the soul is united, and preceding this reparation of the body there is the collection of the parts of matter, which were dispersed through resolution of the body into diverse elements, at once or with a delay, – first it is necessary to see about this preamble to resurrection, which is the collection of the parts of the body, secondly about the induction of the form of the body into that matter, third about the union of the soul to that body.

#### A. About the Collection of the Parts of the Body

257. About the first [n.256] I say that [the collection of the parts of the body] will be done by the ministry of angels, and therefore in time. The antecedent is plain from that statement of the Savior, *Matthew* 24.31, “The Son of Man, with a trumpet and a loud voice, will send forth his angels, and they will gather his elect from the four winds, from the tops of the heavens to the limits of them;” which is to say: whithersoever the parts of the matter of the body have been dispersed into elements, whether into fire or into earth, from the tops of the heavens to the limits of them, whether into any intermediate body (of water, or air, or imperfectly mixed),<sup>15</sup> from the four winds all the parts of matter will be re-collected and re-united.

258. The consequence [sc. the collection will be in time, n.257] is plain through this which was said in [*Rep.* IIA d.8 n.2], that an angel cannot move a body in an instant.

#### B. About the Induction of the Form of the Body into that Matter

259. About the second [n.256] I say that this formation of the body will be in an instant, because it will be done immediately by divine virtue, for an angel will not be able to induce that substantial form into matter. And divine virtue, although it can successively act and successively induce form (just like created virtue), and [although] a substantial form could be successively induced (which some deny [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent]), yet it is more fitting that that [divine] virtue induce a form inducible in an instant in an instant, because never is succession necessary except because of some defect of the agent. For all those causes touched on by the Commentator, *Physics* IV com.71, ch. ‘On the vacuum’, namely of movable to mover and of movable to middle and of middle to mover, are reduced finally – as elsewhere I have touched on [*Ord.* II d.2 nn.428-429] – to the imperfection of the virtue of the agent, because of which imperfection the movable can resist it [sc. the virtue of the agent], not absolutely, but as it respects the terms and the medium through which it must be transferred from term to term. But now this [divine] virtue can have no imperfection; and this form is inducible in an instant, it is plain, because it can perfect in an instant.

260. But here there is a doubt, because then it follows that local motion will be in an instant. Proof, because that body will be formed denser or rarer than the dust from which it will be formed; and whether thus or so, it will occupy a greater or lesser place

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<sup>15</sup> Scotus is proceeding on the assumption, common to the ancient and medieval world, that the elements of matter are the four of fire, air, water, earth (of which fire is naturally at the top and earth at the bottom and the other two in between), and that material bodies are mixtures more or less of these four.

than that from which it will be generated, – and so there will be local motion not only of it, but of the surrounding air.

261. Secondly, because that body will be of different figure than that from which it will be formed, therefore it will occupy a place proportionally corresponding to its figure – and so as before.

262. I concede the conclusion of these arguments [nn.260-261], that by taking generally local motion, according as when generated it succeeds to the corrupted occupying a greater or lesser place than the corrupted, some change of place is stated, because occupation of a greater or lesser place, though not by the same body in act, thus in an instant there is change of place, because occupation of a greater place. Nor only so, but the air standing round it is at once expelled if the body is greater, or follows if the body is lesser, – and indeed in the first instant, when namely it is expelled, I concede that in an instant it is expelled, and this by divine virtue immediately, because that immediately puts a greater body where a lesser was.

263. And now, what effectively moves one body locally, effectively expels another, and not the body itself moved effectively expels another, just as neither does heat in wood effectively expel cold from wood, but the hot itself, which effectively causes heat in wood, effectively expels cold from it.

264. It is possible however for divine virtue to impose this greater body in a ‘where’, and to conserve there the body that was before, – and then two bodies at the same time; but then there would be a new miracle, beyond the sudden position of the greater body here. But if, together with this position of body, this [body] expel that one, there is not but one miracle.

265. Now when the generated body is less than the corrupted body, it is different: for then either God will immediately move the surrounding air so that it touch the surface of the lesser body, or he is able not to move it, because this is not necessary simply for this that a lesser body be here, because God can dismiss nature to itself, and since nature cannot move air in an instant, so that it be supplied to the sides of that lesser body, there will be there a vacuum for a time, until namely nature be able to make the surrounding air contiguous with that body.

266. From which it is plain, on the posit that God suddenly makes a body less (which assuredly does not involve a contradiction) and dismisses the surrounding air to itself and the action of nature, there will be a vacuum for a time. Not therefore does ‘there is a vacuum in the universe’ include a contradiction, rather if nature were to make in an instant a lesser [body] from a greater, it would seem able to be concluded that ‘a vacuum exists for a time’ without any divine miracle.

### C. About Union of Soul with Body

267. About the third [n.256] I say that animation not only is in an instant, because of the reason stated in the second article – because to be sure it is from God alone immediately, whose active virtue nothing resists [n.259] –, but it is necessary for it to be in an instant, because there cannot be succession in reception of form except either because of the parts of the form to be induced, or because of the parts of the body of which one may receive the form before another. But neither can be posited in animation: not the first because this soul in the unique degree – in which it was created – will be

reunited, so that although some [part of the body] can be more perfect than another, yet this does nothing to the purpose for the successive union of the soul itself; nor can the second be granted, at least about the first ensoul-able, – for something is the proportioned ensoul-able first, such that nothing of it can be animated unless at the same time the whole of it is animated; although perhaps about many parts of the body, which are not simply necessary for animation (as are hands and feet and the other exterior parts), one can first be animated before another; but we are speaking about the first animation.

268. I say too, secondly, that, in the same instant in which the body is formed, it is animated, because from whence this form is a disposition necessitating for the soul (not absolutely, but from the necessity of the agent, not simply, but from its own disposition), at once – the form of the body having been induced by [the agent] – from the necessity of the disposed matter the soul is induced.

269. And if you ask ‘is by the same change the form of the body induced and the soul?’, – I say not, rather the induction of the form of the body is through change, but the induction of the soul is not with any change, which may be to soul or animation as to term.

The first is plain, because what is susceptible of the form of corporeity passes from privation to form; the second is plain through the same [fact], because what is susceptible of the soul or of animation is not prime matter, but the body. And that will not have a privation of the soul itself whereby it may pass over to form, nor will it have it at the same time with the soul, because then privation and form would be together, nor will it have it before the form, because it will not be before; therefore, body and soul will be together. And never is there change except when the susceptible of the term ‘to which’ of some induction precedes in duration the very term ‘to which’, and it is then under the privation of term.

270. If you argue ‘therefore there is not animation-action there nor animation-passion, because action is not without passive undergoing nor passive undergoing without change, and change is denied there; therefore both action and passion [are denied there], which seems unacceptable’, – I reply: as was said above [*Ord.* IV d.13 n.54], passive undergoing states a respect of the passive thing to an agent arriving from without, that is not necessarily consequent to the extremes [when] posited; now such can be even if the passive thing never precede in duration the form that it receives, because however much it may at the same time have the potency with itself, yet it can receive it from another; and then – briefly – in the induction of a form coeval with the passive thing itself, there well is passion without change.

271. An example of this, according to Augustine *Confessions* 12.3:<sup>16</sup> by a certain mode of priority, matter is first created before form. And in that prior [instant] matter does not have a respect to God but as of produced to producer, and that respect is intrinsic, arriving indeed necessarily consequent to the nature of the foundation (from the first distinction of book two [*Ord.* II d.1 nn.260-275]). In the second instant it receives form from God, and this respect is not of it as of produced to God as producer, but is of it as of unformed to God as informing and impressing form; and this second respect comes

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<sup>16</sup> “Have you not taught me, O Lord, that before you were forming and distinguishing this unformed matter, it was not anything, not color, not figure, not body, not spirit? But it was not altogether nothing; it was some unformed-ness without any appearance.”

extrinsically to matter, because matter could remain perpetually, God conserving it, without this respect of reception from God.

272. That form therefore is at the same time in duration co-created with matter, but later in nature it is induced indeed or impressed on the matter by a passive undergoing of the genus of passion but without any change, because never does matter pass from privation of that form to form, nor – in brief – is it differently disposed according to it, because ‘differently’ and ‘differently’ presuppose entity [sc. which matter as such is not].

273. From this follows a corollary that, in saying action and passion are abstracted from motion and change, it is not necessary to say that there remains in them only the idea of relation, rather there truly remains the idea of action and passion without any idea whatever of motion or change.

#### D. Two Small Doubts

274. There remain two small doubts: one ‘whether in the same instant there will be a resurrection of everyone’, – which the first argument touches on [n.249]; and the other, ‘in which instant, although not determinate or designated, however by which in comparison to the parts or hours of the natural day, as namely if in an instant of the middle of the night, or some other having a determinate respect to the parts of the natural day...’

275. To the first: Augustine in that whole chapter alleged, namely chapter 20 [*City of God*; n.250] seems of intention to determine that the resurrection of those who will be found dead in the advent of the Judge will precede in duration the resurrection of those who will be found alive; but those alive, according to the words of the Apostle [n.249, *I Thessalonians* 4], “will be taken up to meet him etc.,” and there as is probable – according to Augustine – they will die and afterwards will immediately rise up; and so their resurrection will afterwards follow the resurrection of the former.

276. Hence Augustine says [*ibid.*], “The saints who will be found, when Christ comes, alive and who will be taken up to meet him, if we believe they will in the same rapture exit from their mortal bodies and will soon return to the same [bodies] immortal, we will experience no difficulties in the words of the Apostle.” This also the words of the Apostle seem expressly to utter: “the dead who are in Christ will rise first, then we etc.,” where according to Augustine the Apostle “in himself and in those who were alive with him was exemplifying the persons of those who will be found alive.”

277. About the second doubt, it seems *prima facie* true that any instant at all is possessed of every relation to the parts of the natural day: for what is in one part of the earth an instant of the middle of the night is in another horizon an instant between midnight and midday, and in a horizon opposite the first an instant of midday, – and so about the individual instants able to be assigned in a natural day; therefore the dead will rise in any hour at all of the natural day, when making comparison in this way.

278. But because not without cause is it asked about the hour of the resurrection, it must be understood that those who ask are asking about the hour in comparison to that region where the judgment of the resurrection will be, and to where those who will rise will be transferred so that they may be judged: they will be transferred – I say – either after complete resurrection or before it through transfer of the collected dust. For each is possible for God: so that either they be resuscitated in diverse places, perhaps where they

were buried, or so that the dust may be collected from individual places to one place where all must after the resurrection come together to be judged, and so that in that place the resurrection of everyone may happen.

279. Now I call ‘dust’ any bodies whatever into which ultimately resolution is made, suppose if into so great a part of fire and so great a part of water and so great a part of earth: and let that part of fire be immediately next to the lunar sphere above any point whatever of earth, and another part be directly in the diametrically opposite extreme in the sphere of fire, and let a third part be at the bottom or the middle or the top of water, and the like.

280. All these, although a thousand thousands, are understood when they are called ‘dust’ or ‘ashes’. For when Christ says, “from the ends of the heavens” and “from the four winds” [*Matthew* 24.31], he does not himself mean that the dust, which we usually accept in tombs, has been dispersed up to so great a distance, but he means generally ‘into whatever bodies or parts resolution has been made, they will be collected, and from those collected, that is, from the matter in them which was before the matter of a corrupted body, the same body will again be repaired’.

281. Now that place of general judgment is probably reckoned ‘the land of promise’ [*Genesis* 13.14-17, 17.8] or the valley of Josaphat [*Joel* 3, 2.12], or another determinate part there, or as great a part as will suffice for the reprobate, if indeed the elect will not be on the earth but “will be caught up to meet Christ in the air” [n.249]); and, consequently in respect of that part of the earth must the hour [sc. of general judgment] be understood.

282. But what then is said to be “in the middle of the night” (it is taken from *Matthew* 25.6 and from the Apostle in *I Thessalonians* 5.2, “Now the day of the Lord will come as a thief”), it does not seem it must be understood literally, because, although the Lord could manifest himself to them singly, yet it is more probable – for the confusion of the reprobate (who will be seen by each other and by the good) and for the glory of the elect (who will be seen by each other and the bad) – that they be in an illumined place; and consequently then in the place of resurrection and judgment there will not be the darkness of the middle of the night. In the hour perhaps in which Christ resurrected, in that – I say – in comparison to that region, the dead will be resuscitated, or in the hour in which he was adjudged by Pilate, or in that in which he expired on the cross; since indeed we do not have the certain about this from Scripture, – and whichever of these times be posited, that ‘in the middle of the night’ must be expounded for incertitude.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

283. To the first argument, from the Apostle [n.249], I concede that there will not be the same instant of resurrection for everyone, because, in the first instant of the resurrection of the dead, some will still be living, and this with mortal life; and it is probable that they will pay [the due of] death just as Christ and his Mother, and then they will rise, – and thus later than others, who have already been resuscitated.

284. To the other [n.250], what Augustine says about speed, I say that it can be referred to the collection of dust, not to the other two things following [sc. inducing and uniting the soul, nn.257, 259]; and it has been conceded that that collection will happen in time, but the other two in an instant and in the same instant.

285. The third and fourth [nn.251-252] touch on a great difficulty among those philosophizing about the last instant of a thing permanent in ‘to be’. But if it be said, as was said in *Ord.* II d.2 n.167, “anything whatever permanent in its ‘to be’ is measured by the aevum,” there is no difficulty, because the same aevum measures the body preceding [sc. the resurrection] while it remains, and with that body ceasing, its aevum ceases; and then it is possible to grant an ultimate in the ‘to be’ of that permanent thing, it is true, – and that ultimate and first is the same thing, and the same thing measures the whole by sustaining the indivisibility of the aevum. When therefore it is argued about finite ‘to be’ that it will have two terms [n.251], – it must be denied, because it is not continuous, but indivisible.

286. And if you say, “at least immediately before the ‘to be’ of that needing to be resuscitated there is the ‘to be’ of that needing to be corrupted” – I ask in what or with what [limit] of the time itself? Not with time, because then that time would not be finite with proper terms; therefore, with an instant of time, therefore an instant of time will not succeed immediately, – I reply: the ‘to be’ immediately preceding resurrection is itself in an instant of the aevum, which aevum indeed can coexist with time as also with the ‘now’.

287. And when you ask about the coexistent with it in time, as it immediately precedes resurrection [n.252], – I say that the coexistent with it is time, and not an instant; and so those who speak of things permanent as if they had ‘to be’ in time ought to say that they never have ultimate ‘to be’, but they have ‘to be’ in the whole time, and in the ultimate of that they have ‘not to be’, because then the generated has ‘to be’; however that finite time has its proper terms, because the instant measuring the ‘to be’ of generating is the term of the time measuring the ‘to be’ of corrupting.

288. And if you say “that ‘to be’ is something finite, therefore that ‘to be’ will have proper limits,” – there does not follow “in which it will be saved:” for ‘to have proper limits’ does not correspond to it except by reason of the time measuring it, and the proper terms of that are two instants, whether they measure that ‘to be’ or another.

289. Through this to the other [n.252]: When it is said that the permanent does not have ‘to be’ in time nor with time except because in an instant, – this is false when holding the first way, about ‘to be measured by the aevum’ [n.285].

290. But by holding the other [way: sc. being measured by time, *Ord.* II d.2 n.146], it is necessary to say that it is with the whole time, as that is immediate to an instant just as the continuous [is] to its term; and this immediacy it does not have save as it is in some instant, – and then it is necessary to deny that [statement] “the permanent does not have ‘to be’ in time except because in an instant” [n.252]. True indeed it is that it can be in an instant; if however, it can have ‘to be’ in time, namely durative ‘to be’, also according to this ‘to be’, and not that instantaneous [‘to be’], it is immediate to the instantaneous ‘to be’ following.

291. But the first response [in n.290] seems easier and more rational, because the permanent – although it remain with time – seems however to have a ‘to be’ in itself equally indivisible.

## Forty Fourth Distinction

### First Part

#### *About the Resurrection of the Whole Man in the Truth of Human Nature*

### Single Question

#### *Whether in Any Man at all the Whole will Rise Again that was of the Truth of Human Nature in him*

1. "Now some are accustomed" etc. [Master Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.44 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this forty fourth distinction I ask whether in every man the whole will rise again that was of the truth of the human nature in him.
3. That not:  
*Genesis* 2.21-22, "God took one of Adam's ribs and made it into the woman;" therefore, either Eve will not rise again, because not that which was in her of the truth of human nature from the rib, – or Adam will not rise again with all that which was in him of the truth of human nature, because not with the rib.
4. Again, the same thing will not rise again in diverse [individuals]; but what was of the truth of flesh in one can be nutriment for another, and of the truth of the nature of the other, and so successively be of the truth of nature in two [individuals]; therefore, in one of the two there will not rise again whatever was in him of the truth of human nature.
5. Again, from the same major, taking under it this minor that 'that which was semen in one can, through many transmutations, become semen in another', – and consequently, in him generated by this [man] and him generated by that [man], the same [semen] will be of the truth of nature in both.
6. Again, it is not necessary that in anyone at all there rise again whatever was of the truth of nature in him, except so that simply the same thing in number return that fell. But, by parity of reason, it would be necessary to say the same about individual members or organic parts, and then, in any part at all, that would have to rise again which was of the truth of any part whatever – which is against Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.23 n.89 (and it is put in Lombard's text): "It will not be so repaired that return must be made to the same parts of the body where they had been, otherwise also the hair returns, which so frequent tonsure took away" etc. And he subjoins: "Just as if a statue of metal melted, and the artisan wanted to repair it again from the same matter, it would make no difference to the integrity of it which particles of matter were to which member of the statue returned, provided however the whole thing restored rose up again, – thus will God marvelously, from the whole in which our flesh had existed, restore it or everything with marvelous speed. Nor will anything be of consequence to its integrity whether hairs return to hairs or are called back into other parts, the providence of the Artisan taking care lest anything indecent be done."
7. The opposite does Augustine maintain *ibid.*, that "the flesh will be restored from the whole in which it had existed." And again, *City of God* 22.15 and *Luke* 21.18, "Not a hair of your head will perish."



## I. To the Question

8. About this question, from the fact man is composed of body and soul and the soul always remains the same, it is necessary to see concerning the organic body, how it returns the same. But because that body is composed of many organic parts (which distinction of parts is required because of the multitude of operations of which the soul is the principle, because of its perfection), it is necessary to see about the identity of the organic parts; and because those heterogeneous parts are composed of homogeneous parts, it is necessary to look at identity in homogeneous things: and first, in what way a homogeneous part (as suppose flesh) in continuous nutrition remains and does not remain the same, – second, how what was first in a mortal body may remain the same.

### A. About the Mode of Nutrition

#### 1. First Opinion

##### a. Exposition of the Opinion

9. About the mode of nutrition there is one opinion [Lombard, *Sent.* II d.50 ch.15 n.2], that nothing of the nutriment passes over into the truth of human nature, but that only that is of the truth of human nature which is contracted from the parents; and that is in itself multiplied, so that increase happens (an example from the multiplication of the Gospel loaves [*Matthew* 14.19-21, 35-38]). And what is generated from the nutriment, adheres as if fomentation to the natural heat, so that it not be extinguished (as oil adheres to a wick); and thus is nutriment needed, even if it not be converted into the truth of human nature.

##### b. Rejection of the Opinion

#### 10. Against this:

First, because not less perfect is the vegetative [power] in man than in a brute; therefore, he does not less have power for this operation of the vegetative, which is to nourish in the way in which to nourish is to convert the substance of food into the substance of the thing to be nourished, because so it is in a brute; therefore, through the vegetative in man such conversion can happen. And it is confirmed. For thus man is generated in perfection of quantity just as [is] a brute, and so there happens in him a continuous loss of parts just as there; so there thus must be increase and restoration of what has been lost just as there; and there it is through this, that the term of action is truly something of the substance of the thing needing to be nourished and increased. – It is confirmed: in this way [n.9] we could not posit increase possible in man except by a miracle (as is plain about that multiplication of the loaves, n.9); why therefore would this [human] nature be more deficient than the nature of an ox as to this which is to acquire perfect quantity after imperfect?

11. Again, according to this way it follows that in man there would be some flesh that was simply incorruptible through the whole of his life, or – if it were corrupted – never could it be restored, because not but through nutrition, which is denied. Each is unacceptable: the first, because that incorruptible part would be of a different species

from the rest of the corruptible parts of the flesh; second, because then always there would be less and less in man of the truth of human flesh.

12. Again, the parts of flesh, which are generated from nutriment, are truly animated also by the intellective soul; therefore, they are truly of the substance of what is living with such life. The antecedent, though it may seem manifest, yet can be proved, because any [part of flesh] at all is animated by the sensitive soul, because in any part whatever some operation can be exercised of the sensitive [part] and of touch, and any part whatever is animated with the vegetative soul, because anything at all of due quantity can have some action of the vegetative [soul]; and the sensitive and vegetative soul in man exists with the intellective, *Ord.* II d.1 n.321.

## 2. Second Opinion

### a. Exposition of the Opinion

13. In another way it is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* II q.10] that the flesh first formed, carried on from parents, is of the truth of human nature; the nutriment however afterwards passes over into this which is of the truth [of human nature], – but in this way, because it is converted into what is preexistent, not by receiving a new form, neither according to the whole nor according to a part, but only through this that (the form of food there being deficient) the pre-existing form of flesh succeeds in that matter.

14. This is made clear through an example [Henry, *Quodlibet* IV q.36], because thus it is about the intellective soul, that it newly perfects the matter that was under the form of food, nor yet is it itself in itself new according to the whole nor according to a part.

15. It is made clear also through the authority of the Philosopher, *On Generation* 1.5.321b25-2a4, ch. ‘On increase’: “Flesh according to species is increased, not according to matter, – and flesh according to species remains, but flesh according to matter flows and reflows.” But if a new form of flesh were induced in nutrition, and for equal reason a part of the form of flesh that was before were to cease in loss, then not only would the matter of flesh flow and reflow but also the form – which seems to be against him [the Philosopher].

16. Third, by reason [Henry, *ibid.*, Aristotle, *On Generation* 1.5.321b25-322a4, Averroes, *On Generation* I com.36-38], because if in nutrition the matter of the food were to receive another form of flesh which was not before, therefore with the rest of the pre-existing flesh it would not make a one but a certain thing contiguous or continuous with it, and then nutrition would be a certain juxtaposition of new flesh with pre-existing flesh, – which the Philosopher denies, where before [n.15]. It follows also that not just any part of the nourished would be nourished or of the increased be increased, because not that part to which is juxtaposed the new flesh.

### b. Rejection of the Opinion

17. Against this opinion:

A form, which is in no way extended on its own part otherwise than before, yet does perfect matter in one way or another extended, respects it indivisibly (this is that it does not according to the parts perfect the parts of matter); but the form of flesh does not

in this way respect the matter indivisibly, because then it would be simple just as the intellective soul – , which is not conceded; therefore, since it perfects matter – in another way extended (because much greater than before), – it is necessary that it is otherwise in itself extended; and then, since its prior parts remain, it is necessary that another part of the form be new, otherwise it would not be more extensive now than before. – The major is proved, because a form which, as extended per accidens, respects extended matter, it in another way extended respects matter in another way extended, because – according to Aristotle, *Categories* 6.5b7-8 – “the whiteness is as large as is the surface.” It is also plain by reason, because a part of it is in a part, and so a greater in a greater.

18. Again, it is conceded that after nutrition there are more parts of matter in the whole than before; either therefore some new part of matter is in the whole without form (which is unacceptable), or it is there under a new form, and this is the thing proposed; or under a pre-existing part of the form. And then: either that will cease to perfect the part of matter that it perfected before, and then the same part of the material form will migrate from one part of matter to another part (which is unacceptable), – or that prior same part of form will perfect at the same time the prior part and the new part of matter, and then it follows that it will at the same time perfect two perfectibles, each of which is adequate to it.

19. Again, that flesh is of a nature to be in flux, because it is not incorruptible; but not only is the matter in flux, but the form, because this form cannot remain the same unless it remain informing the matter that [it was informing] before, speaking of the same part of form, because it depends naturally on the perfectible that it perfects; therefore, it must be that the composite is in flux, and consequently that the composite returns through nutrition.

### 3. Scotus' own Response

#### a. First Conclusion

20. As therefore to this article, let this be the first conclusion, that ‘in nutrition there is some generation, extending generation to all induction of substantial form into matter after privation’; because – as was argued [n.18] – the matter of food does not remain under the form of food, nor under any other than under the form of the thing nourished, and it receives that after nutrition, therefore etc.

21. Exposition of this conclusion, that it is not called generation simply, because it is not generation of a per se being insofar as that is said to be per se which is not part of anything. But it can be called ‘aggeneration’, because [it is] the generation of something that through generation becomes the same as something pre-existent to which it is ‘aggenerated’, – or it can be called ‘in-generation’, because generation of a part in a whole of which it was not part.

#### b. Second Conclusion

22. The second conclusion, that ‘in this generation of such sort as it is, the form of flesh, which is induced into the matter of the nutriment, is new, because, as was argued against the preceding opinion [n.17], the pre-existing form could not *de novo* perfect that matter, because this does not belong except to a form altogether un-extended, as is

exemplified there [n.17] about the intellective soul: for any [form] at all extended per accidens has a different part in a different part of matter, and so – if new matter is perfected – it is not perfected by any part [of the form] that before perfected other matter.

23. A declaration of this is through the flow of a part generated in nutrition, because when that flows [away], just as the matter of that part ceases to be something of the whole flesh, so also the form (which perfects that matter) ceases to be, because it cannot remain without that matter, nor migrate.

#### c. Third Conclusion

24. A third conclusion: ‘a part arriving through nutrition is in some way like a part pre-existing, which was present through generation, and in some way unlike: like in specific form, not only intellective, but of corporeity which is presupposed, – unlike in this, because the more an agent merely natural continues action on a contrary, the more its virtue is weakened’.

25. Which is proved, because “every such agent [sc. merely natural] is acted on in acting [Aristotle *On Generation and Corruption* 1.7.324b9-10], and so if it acts on a contrary, it suffers from it some corruptive action; therefore flesh, had before from generation, the more it acts on nutriment as a contrary, so much the more is its virtue weakened, and from this it is called impurer flesh. Therefore, after some time, in which it has continually thus acted on the contrary, it is impurer than at the beginning, and consequently – since the thing generated cannot be more perfect than the thing generating – it follows that the flesh generated by that later flesh, the later it is generated, the more will it regularly be more impure, because generated by the more impure.

26. This conclusion is confirmed by an example of Aristotle, *On Generation I* [1.5.322a31-33]: the more the wine acts on the water mixed with itself, the more it is impurer, so much so that at length, because of the impurity, the whole will become water. This conclusion [n.25] concludes another, that ‘not only is the later generated [flesh] more impure than the prior [generated], but also that the same [flesh] remaining in the whole is later more impure than before – and this is the reason for the impurity in the part of flesh generated later. This conclusion does not assert that the form of flesh receives more and less (if however that were posited, this impurity would be because of remission of form); it can however be posited precisely because of the imperfection of the natural qualities consequent to the form, which are the principle of altering the food, which the more imperfectly it is altered, the more from it is impurer flesh generated.

#### d. Fourth Conclusion

27. A fourth conclusion, about the distinction of flesh according to species and of flesh according to matter, is plain from the third [conclusion], because each part of flesh has a certain period [of time] in the whole, and a greater the purer it is, and a lesser the impurer it is: for it [flesh] can as long keep its ‘to be’ in the whole as it can through its qualities resist what is corrupting. Now this period is greater in a part first generated than later, and in a prior part of the period each same part is more efficacious for acting than in a later. And this difference must be understood other things being equal, that is: if a part of flesh has been generated from the sort of nutriment that was of a nature to be

converted into flesh as equally pure as that from which that flesh was generated, supposing indeed a proportionate alteration be posited, from one food a purer flesh is of a nature to be generated than from another.

28. From these to the fourth conclusion: form gives ‘to be’ and ‘to act’; therefore, a part according to form can be spoken of as long as it has ‘to be’ according to form, or as long as it has ‘to act’ according to form. And the second implies the first, and not conversely; for more quickly is ‘action’ lacking to something because of imperfection than ‘to be’. Whether thus or so, a part according to form is not only a part of form, but includes matter and form.

29. Now in the first way, any part at all, while it remains in the whole, is called a part according to form, namely from the beginning of its period up to the end, because certainly as long as it has ‘to be’.

30. In the second way, it is not for every part of the period called a part according to form, but for that [part] for which it has a virtue so effective that there can belong to it an action according to the form. I do not mean ‘to it’ only as concurrent with the action of the whole, nor ‘to it’ simply separate from the whole, but to it in the whole there is virtue in it for its proper action, which it – as there existing – can have, although it not be considered precisely as concurrent with the action of the whole. And that efficacy of virtue requires a determinate virtue intensive and extensive, because not just any small part in a whole could have in this way its own action, but [it could] only concur with the action of the whole, as Aristotle says *On Sense* [6.445b31-6a1] about the action of a hundred thousandth part of a grain of millet on sense.

31. There is required therefore some determinate extensive quantity [of virtue] for that efficacy of acting in the whole.

32. There is required also an intensive quantity of virtue, because – as has been said [n.30] – after remission of the active virtues, to such an extent that they more yield to contraries than conquer them, it cannot do this by its own action; therefore, in a second way, a part according to species is of so great natural quantity and of so much active virtue that there can belong to it a proper action, not indeed as to a supposit outside the whole, but proper in this way that it does not merely concur with the action of the whole.

33. In the first way [sc. extensive quantity, n.31], a part according to species is not opposed to a part according to matter, except just as to a live man is opposed a dead man; and thus the same part is called a part according to a species while it remains in the whole, and a part according to matter when it flows, just as the same man is called first a living man, and afterwards a dead one.

34. In the second way [sc. intensive quantity, n.32], one is a part according to species, and another according to matter, in the parts remaining in the whole, because some slight part, to which there cannot belong any action, even if it be in the beginning of its period, is a part according to matter; but a part of a quantity sufficient for acting is a part according to species, and this if it have virtue efficacious for an acting which requires a quantity of virtue, – and by the opposite, a part according to matter [is that] which does not have such efficacy of virtue, however much an extensive quantity it may have.

#### 4. To the Foundations of the Second Opinion

35. Through this to the foundations or arguments of the preceding opinion [n.13]  
 [To the first] – The example of the intellective [soul, n.14] is to the opposite effect, because that [soul] regards matter in an inextensible way and inextensibly, and therefore it has no new part through this that it perfects a new part of matter, – but the opposite follows about that extensible form in matter.

36. [To the second] – The authority of the Philosopher [n.15], about flesh according to species and according to matter, is solved in the fourth conclusion [nn.27-34], because he [the Philosopher] does not understand that a part according to matter may flow and reflow (that is, the matter only), and a part according to form may remain (that is, the form according to its whole self), but both a part according to matter and a part according to form is an integral part of the whole and truly composite of matter and form, – hence he calls ‘flesh according to matter’ and ‘flesh according to species’ composite of matter and form, but not ‘the matter of flesh’ and ‘the species of flesh’. Now which part, composed of the matter and form of flesh, is flesh according to species and which according to matter, was said in the fourth conclusion [n.34], – and how flesh according to matter flows is plain according to the first way of distinguishing flesh into flesh according to species and flesh according to matter [n.33]. And according to the second way [n.34], a part according to matter flows, that is, is in proximate disposition to flowing, – and this in speaking of a part according to matter, because of defect of quantity of virtue. But in speaking of a part according to matter, because of defect of quantity of mass, this difference must not be understood of flowing and not flowing, but that part according to species increases, and the part according to matter is not increased, because (as will immediately be said [n.40]) a smallest or any notably large [part] in the whole is not increased, but some [part] of a determinate quantity – which suffices for a part according to species – is increased.

37. The part therefore according to species does not flow: according to the first understanding [nn.34-35], because it remains in the whole; according to the second understanding, because it has the virtue of conserving itself in the whole; according to the third understanding, because it has quantity sufficient that some part for its conservation be generated in addition for it [cf. n.21]; – and, by the opposite, the part according to matter, triply understood, triply flows.

38. [To the third] – To the third [n.16] I say that in nutrition and increase there is a certain juxta-position, and yet for the thing nourished or increased (and this whether the whole or a part) not only is juxtaposition done.

Where it needs to be understood: posit some part of so much quantity and virtue that it not only co-act with the whole but can, existing in the whole, have its own action, – and let it be called *a*: this has a modicum of parts, let it be ten (because perhaps more are required in one than in another, as that in a plant one suffices, in a brute two, in a man three or more, I care not), of which any at all has equal virtue intensively, – let them be called *b*, *c*, etc. If nutriment has, through however many sequestrations or purifyings, been brought down to this, that now it is under a form proximate to the form of nourishing – whether this will have been before it is sent locally to the parts to be nourished, or after it will have been sent through the regulative<sup>17</sup> power of the whole

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<sup>17</sup> The Latin word is ‘regitativus’ from the rare medieval Latin ‘regitare’, which, if it is not a typological error, will mean rule, or in this context regulate. This whole paragraph, along with several of the following ones, is an interesting

itself, and this through certain subtle paths serving such sending (of which sort are the veins in the bodies of animals and other such things corresponding in plants) – now this [food], under a changed or glutinous form, brought near to the part to be nourished, and received within certain pores left behind from the flux of certain parts according to matter (which were there before and now from their flux have left behind pores replete with some more subtle humor), – and so the whole, lacking the density in the parts requisite for the wellbeing of it, is, while existing there, converted into the thing itself to be nourished; and just as, before the conversion, it was juxtaposed by way of contiguity with the parts of the thing to be nourished, so after the conversion it is juxtaposed continuously with some of the parts remaining.

39. Let it be therefore, *a* is a part as great, to which it may belong to be both nourished and increased; in the pores within it are received everywhere the parts of food and, there existing, they are generated into [cf. n.21] the parts *b* and *c*, and to the rest – those pre-existing – they are juxtaposed. But not to the whole, because they are something within the whole itself, although no part newly generated be within another part of that nourished part, let it be that that be the smallest, to which properly it may belong to be nourished or to be increased, such that any part of it at all be nourished or increased. And this is necessary: to posit some smallest part of notable quantity thus increased, because if any part at all in the whole (small however much) were increased properly, it would be necessary that the increased would always increase doubly, or at rate in notable quantity, greater than before – which is manifestly false.

40. So it is therefore plain to that reason [sc. the third, n.16] how in nutrition there is juxtaposition of something and to which or by which, because to the smallest parts, which properly are not nourished. But there is not a juxta-position with that which is properly nourished, namely of which some part has flowed [away] and afterwards another part new is restored, but to it there happens a certain in-generation [cf. n.21], that is an intrinsic generation of a new part in place of the old part that has flowed away.

41. But from these there is still not had [anything] about the mode of increase, because that generation which happens in nutrition is momentary. But increase is not in an instant, since it is a motion; that [sc. nutrition] even can happen without increase, – it is plain from the Philosopher, *On Generation* 1.5.322a31-33. Nor is it necessary here to add the mode of increase, because we are not asking here about nutrition except so that we may get how in nutrition the homogeneous parts remain the same or not the same.

## B. How, in the Resurrection, the Flesh returns the Same

### 1. First Conclusion

42. About the second principal [point, n.8]: on the supposition that to the truth of nature of this man there pertain not the only essential parts, namely matter and form, but also the integral parts, not only the parts heterogeneous but homogeneous, from which the heterogeneous are composed, and briefly whatever was truly animated by the intellectual soul, or per se something of this animated [body], – I state first this conclusion that ‘not whatever was in Peter, for the whole of his life, of the truth of his nature, will rise again in him’.

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example of medieval scientific or biological analysis, which, if lacking in comparison with our contemporary science, does colorfully illustrate the curiosity of medieval thinkers about nature’s mysteries and how they tried to satisfy it.

43. Which is proved, because from whence many such parts flowed in his life and many others returned (from the preceding article [nn.19]), if all those were to return in him, either his body would be of immoderate density or of immoderate quantity.

## 2. Second Conclusion

44. Second conclusion: which parts therefore will rise again, so that they are of due density and due magnitude? And this of as great a quantity as he would be of at the end of thirty years, if he had lived, because whatever has to be re-formed in the resurrection is posited to be of so great a quantity, – which I take to mean: if there had not been deprivation in the subject preventing him attaining, within thirty years, the due quantity that would happen in this nature when not deprived.

45. Here there is a double way:

For this [way] is true, that regularly a prior part in man, that is, in the body of a living man, is purer (from the preceding article [nn.25-26]) – regularly, I say, because from an accidental impediment – either on the part of the container or on the part of a thing fitting and harmful applied – something else can happen.

46. Now this is probable, that that body will be repaired from the purer parts that at some time were parts of this body; therefore, it will have all that which was contracted from the parents (because this was purest), and from other things generated from nutriment always the purer parts, up to a quantity sufficient for the whole body.

47. There is another way, that nutrition is not per se necessary except for the restoration of what has been lost; but growth is per se necessary, so that the thing generated attains to the due quantity of its nature. In any nutrition whatever, therefore, up to the limit of increase, something is precisely converted because of nutrition, namely so that that is restored which flowed [away], – and something because of increase, namely so that due quantity is acquired, even if nothing had flowed [away]. And the first, indeed, is not of the principal intention of nature: for simply nature would more conserve, for the ‘to be’ of the whole, the part that flowed away (if it could conserve it), than in its place restore another [part] more imperfect. But the second is of the principal intention of nature wanting to attain perfect quantity, – so that the second is intended, on account of acquiring perfection; the first as if occasioned, on account of avoiding imperfection.

48. To this is added the probable conclusion that – up to due quantity – those [parts of food] will be parts in the body to be resuscitated which nature has more of intention made to be parts of this body, up to the quantity sufficient for that body; but of this sort are those that have arrived so as to give increase, and not those that have arrived so as to restore.

49. Therefore the body will rise again from that which first was drawn from parents, and from other parts generated from nutriment because of due increase of the body, up to the quantity sufficient for that body.

50. These two ways in this agree, that whatever was drawn from parents will rise again, because – according to the first way [nn.45-46] – that is purest among all the parts of the body, – according to the other way [n.47] – that is most of the intention of nature in this supposit. But they disagree as to the parts generated from the food, because the first posits that to this are adjoined – as to parts – those that were purer in this body, according to the whole flow of its life; the other posits that to this are adjoined the parts that more



from the intention of nature were more of the truth of this body. Now not the same [parts] are purer in the whole flow of time, and more of the intention of nature [are] parts of this [body], because always the parts first generated were regularly purer, whether more or less intended; but always, whether first or later, those parts that were generated over and above the necessary restoration of what has been lost were more of the intention of nature.

51. If you object, against each way: ‘how therefore will he to be resuscitated have the same flesh that he first had here alive?’ – I say that he will not have precisely the same that he had in some instant or in some time of his life. But neither will he have the whole that he had at any time, beside that which he contracted from parents – and that [sc. from parents] he will have whole and other parts [he will have] that he successively had, now this one now that. And so, the body resuscitated will be more the same as the body had in this life than if it were the same that he had in some determinate instant (or part) of his life, because although it would be the same as that for such instant, it would be more other than his body for another instant.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

52. To the arguments:

[To the first] – To the first [n.3] I say that that rib was not of the truth of nature in Adam, because besides that one he had enough ribs, according as they belong to man commonly. And that was given to him as superfluous as to his supposit, but necessary as to the intention of nature, – just as in a male is semen: not as if something of the nature of that supposit, but on account of generation of another supposit it is in him, as if in a vessel; hence it is not animated with his soul; so it was about that rib.

53. Or if it be altogether imagined that that rib was necessary for him [Adam] simply as if an integral part, – I reply: it follows, [God] refilled the flesh for it, that is, in place of it he formed another rib.

54. The first I believe truer; but, given the second, the transferred rib will not rise again in Adam, but another.

55. [To the second] To the second [n.4]: I believe that there never was (nor will be up to the end of the world) anything equally of the truth of human nature in two suppositis; and therefore it will rise again precisely in the one wherein it was more of the truth, – more, I say, either because in it purer, or because more of the intention of nature a part of it.

56. But if it be altogether contended that simply and equally it was of the truth of the nature of each, – I say that it will rise again in that in which it was first animated. And this Augustine says (and it is put in the text [*Sent.* IV d.44 ch.1 n.1; from *Enchiridion* 23.88]): “[the earthly matter] returns to that soul which animated it originally so that a man might come to be.” And this is reasonable because, after the first animation, that flesh of this man was made, and consequently, although afterwards it be as if usurped by another, that first disposition of it to this matter is not lost.

57. But if to that one, in whom it was secondly of the truth of nature, there suffice for due quantity other parts that were of her body in the succession of her life through nutrition, from those will a body of due quantity be repaired, because those were animated by this soul and had a more essential order to this soul, – besides that which

will arise in another, which to another soul had a more essential relation than to this one. But if, besides that which will rise again in another, the nourishable parts – which this [body] successively had – not suffice for the due quantity of this body, the Almighty will supply it whence he will.

58. [To the third] – To the third [n.5]: if it were possible that precisely the same semen would be in two [persons], and consequently the same [semen] would be first of the truth of nature in two suppositis (which however I believe never was in fact nor will be), it will rise again in the first.

59. [To the fourth] – To the other [n.6] I say that there is not a like reason about the whole and about a part, because first there is intended the restoration of the same whole in the resurrection; not so of a part, especially of that part which is not a principal one, without whose identity the whole cannot be the same.

60. And if you argue about a principal part, whose unity is required for the unity of the whole, – I say similarly about that as I said about the whole: that the homogeneous parts, sufficient for the due quantity of it, will rise again in that organic part. And this those which first were of the truth of nature of that part (first, I say, in duration), if they were equally of the truth of nature of another both as to purity and as to the intention of nature, – but if in something else they were more principally of the truth of the nature of it than in either of these ways, in that one they will rise again.

## Second Part

### *About the Condition of Malignant Spirits and Damned Men in Respect of Infernal Fire*

#### Question One

##### *Whether Infernal Fire will Torment the Malignant Spirits*

61. “But if it is asked” [Lombard, *Sent* IV d.44 ch.5]

62. About this part of this forty fourth distinction I ask whether infernal fire will torment malignant spirits.

63. That not:

Augustine, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16, of intention argues thus: “An agent is more excellent than the patient; but the body is not more excellent than the spirit, but conversely;” therefore, no body acts on a spirit.

64. Again, according to him in the same place [16.32], “They are not bodily things but like bodily things that disembodied souls are affected by;” therefore, they are not affected by punishment from a body.

65. Again, [Aristotle] *On Generation* 1.6.322b22-24: a body does not act except by contact; but it cannot touch a spirit, because [323a4-6] “only those things touch themselves whose limits are together.” –And it is confirmed through the Philosopher *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, where he maintains that agent and patient must be together, and nothing between these; but a spirit cannot be together with a body, because in respect of a body it is as if not in place.

66. Again, *On Generation* 1.7.324a9-11: “An agent intends to assimilate the passive thing to itself;” but a body cannot assimilate a spirit to itself, because then a spirit would be capable of some form in which it would be assimilated to a body.

67. On the contrary:

*Matthew* 25.41, “Go, you cursed, into the eternal fire, which is prepared for the devil and his angels.”

68. Again, Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, “If the devil and his angels, although they are incorporeal, are to be tormented by corporeal fire, what wonder if souls, before they receive their bodies, are able to feel bodily torments?”

69. Again, Augustine *City of God* 21.10, “Why may we not say, although in marvelous yet in true ways, that even incorporeal spirits can be afflicted by the pain of bodily fire?” And this he proves there through this that “the incorporeal spirits of men can be indissolubly bound by the chains of their bodies.”

### I. To the Question

#### A. First Opinion and its Rejection

70. Here it is said [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.3 a3, Giles of Rome, *Quodlibet* 2 q.9] that spirits are tormented by fire insofar as they apprehend fire under the idea of the disagreeable. And it is confirmed through Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, “Therein he suffers wherein he sees; and because he looks at himself burning, he is burnt.”

71. For the possibility of this is Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.7, where he exemplifies it about a dream, that someone may be more tormented in sleep from such imaginative apprehension of something disagreeable than he would be afflicted sometimes when awake by the presence of the same thing.

72. Against this, – either by a true apprehension he apprehends fire as disagreeable to him, or by a false one:

If by a true one, it is necessary to posit the mode of this disagreeableness, which does not appear possible, because – as a contrary really corruptive – in no way can it be disagreeable,<sup>18</sup> nor [can it be so] in idea of object because an object as object is agreeable to his power.<sup>19</sup>

If by a false one, it follows first that not by the fire but by his own false reckoning [the spirit] is tormented; second, if that false reckoning is from God, God will be the immediate cause of deception, – but if from the angel himself, this does not appear probable, because, according to Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.4, “the natural endowments in them are most splendid,” therefore they can naturally apprehend that fire is not disagreeable to them; again, Gregory, *supra* [n.70]: “The soul not only in seeing, but also in experiencing, suffers the fire.”

#### B. Second Opinion and its Rejection

<sup>18</sup> That is, to an angel, because an angel is not a body that can be affected by another body, however corruptive that body may be to other bodies.

<sup>19</sup> An apprehended object is agreeable, qua apprehended, to an apprehensive power.

73. In another way it is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.34] that to a spirit is given a certain supernatural habit, because of the demerit of sin, and through that habit he is subjected to a bodily agent so that he can suffer from it.

74. Against this: either that habit is a bodily form or a spiritual one. If bodily, God can as give that habit to an angel so that it inhere in him as that an angel be white or a stone wise, because there is on both sides an equal repugnance of recipient to received; if spiritual, therefore by that no more is the passive thing proportioned to a body as agent than before.

75. Again, a habit is not whereby we are simply able but whereby we are in some way able; therefore, in what there is not simply a potency for acting or being acted on, in that there is not a potency for so acting or for so being acted on; but in this [angelic] nature there is not sufficiently a potency for being acted on, nor is this habit able to give the possibility, because it is not a potency.

76. Again, this punishment would be received immediately in this habit as if in the proximate receptive subject, and not indeed mediately in the nature itself of the angel, if it be repugnant to that nature. And if the first be granted, it follows that this habit separated from the angel could be punished with the same punishment; if the second be granted, it follows that not even now is the angel punished, but only that habit.

### C. Scotus' own Response to the Question

77. To the question I say that according to Augustine *City of God* 14.15 n.2, "pain of flesh is only an aversion of the soul from the flesh and a certain dissent from its suffering, – just as pain of soul, which is called 'passion', is an anguish<sup>20</sup> from those things that happen to us against our will."

78. From this it is plain that pain is a passion, consequent to sense apprehension and in sense appetite, – and anguish is properly in the intellective appetite or will, and consequent to an apprehension of the intellect of some object unwanted.

#### 1. About Pain Properly Said

79. The first, namely pain properly said, one should not look for in spirits, whether angels or separated souls, unless it be imagined that in a separate spirit there is sense appetite, and by parity of reason senses; and that there can be in it both 'passion according to this appetite' and 'passion according to sense', – which is trifling, because according to Aristotle *On the Soul* 1.4.408b11-13, "to say the soul is anguished or joyful is nothing other than to say it weaves or builds;" which indeed is true as far as they are passions of sense appetite, because these passions are of the whole conjunct [sc. of body and soul], just as also to sense – on which such passion follows – is first of the whole conjunct, from *On Sense and Sensible* 1.436a11-b8, and from *On Dreams* 1.453b11-14.

80. Nor yet do I deny that in the sensitive soul there is that perfection which is completive in idea of the sense power, for that is not other than the essence itself of the intellective soul, holding what I held in distinction 16 [*Rep.* II.A d.16 n.17] that the principles of operating on the part of the soul are not accidents of the soul. But that

<sup>20</sup> The Latin word is *tristitia*, which can be and is elsewhere translated as 'sadness'; here however the stronger term 'anguish' seems more suitable, especially as to what follows.

perfection, which remains in the soul (rather is really the nature itself of the soul), is not the visual or auditory power except partially.

81. But the visual power itself is something essentially including this perfection of the soul as well as some perfection of the mixed body, corresponding to this, for common operation; and in the same way sensation itself is first of the whole conjoined from these two, so that the proximate receptive, and the reason for receiving, is not the soul nor anything that precisely is in the soul, nor the form of the mixture in the organ, but the form of the whole composite of mixed body and soul, – and such perfection is the proximate idea of receiving sensation. And therefore, that total form is the sensitive power, neither one part of it (namely the form of the mixture) nor another (namely the form of the intellective soul).

82. Therefore of pain, as it is distinguished from anguish, it is not necessary to inquire after the cause, neither in a separate spirit nor in a separate soul, because it cannot be in them.

## 2. About Anguish

83. But let us see about anguish.

I say that since [anguish] is in the will from apprehension of the existence of an object disagreeable according to reason, either it is necessary to seek an object that is immediately shown as disagreeable by reason, and yet as posited; or if it cannot at once be shown as disagreeable except by an erring reason (because it would not be disagreeable for [the Archangel] Michael), and it does not seem reasonable that this affliction follow erroneous reason, it is necessary to find there an object disagreeable according to reason, because unwilled, and yet posited.

84. Now I say that that [infernal] fire is an object thus disagreeable, and this in two ways: first as detaining a spirit definitively, – second as acting on it objectively.

### a. About the Disagreeable Object or about the Infernal Fire Definitively Detaining a Spirit

85. About the first:

No body as a placing is disagreeable to the placed, except because another body is agreeable to it; now a spirit, just as it has with no body a natural agreement, because then that [body] would be naturally preservative of it, so with no body does it have a natural disagreement, because of which ‘to be detained there’ is disagreeable to its nature. Hence if Michael were conjoined from divine precept to any body whatever in place definitively, even perpetually, and were to apprehend this, in no way would he apprehend that as disagreeable nor as matter for anguish; therefore, for having anguish about the fire as detaining, let there be first found a reason for the unwilled.

86. Thus does a bad angel have an ‘unwilling to be detained perpetually by fire’, and specifically under this idea: the being, from divine sentence or divine will, effectively detained. And to this ‘unwilling’ affection for advantage inclines him, according to which he wants free use of his power, so that as his nature is indifferent to any whatever body, so he could make himself present to any whatever body. But pride pushes him forward, because of which he desires to use his own proper power; envy consumes him, because of

which he wills to be nowhere determinately on account of divine sentence or action. Detention precedes this unwilling and apprehension of detention, but with that 'unwilling' – although inordinate – posited in his will, there follows an apprehension certain about the event of this unwilled thing; and from this third (or fifth, counting those two that precede the unwilling) there follows anguish.

87. If you ask 'does the detaining fire effectively cause this anguish?', – I reply: fire does not detain a spirit effectively, because what does not locate something effectively, nor prevents it being moved away from this place, does not detain it here. This house, to be sure, does not detain me effectively as to the first, because it does not locate me effectively, yet it does prevent me being moved to another place; and therefore it can be said in some way effectively to detain me, as prohibiting another formal detention.

88. But in neither way can any bodily place detain an angel; therefore, that bodily fire only formally detains, such that there is no detention of the fire pertaining to the genus of action but only a respect arriving from without, reducible to the genus of 'where'. And what detains effectively, whether in the first way (because determining actively to that place) or the second way (because preventing moving from that place to another place), is God immediately, because detention against the will of the angel, at least of one not having an angel superior, could not thus be done except by God immediately.

89. But further, the angel not only hates the active detention of God, and his own passive detention by God, but he hates his perpetual formal detention by that fire, nor does he only apprehend this active or passive detention as posited or as having to be continued, but also that formal detention, – and consequently about that formal detention he is anguished.

90. Now that anguishing object is properly cause of anguish, because not the will immediately: for then it would be in its power to be immediately anguished or not anguished, – which is not true, once unwilling is posited and apprehension of the unwilled. Therefore, that formal detention, or that fire detaining formally, does effectively make anguished, and so further, since to be anguished is formally to be tormented (in the way in which it is possible for a spirit to be tormented), it follows that the fire – as formally detaining the spirit – effectively torments him.

91. And according to this way can that statement be saved [nn.70-71], in what way fire is an instrument of God in tormenting, because more principally does [an evil spirit] hate the active detention of God and his own passive [detention] by God than the formal detention of fire, because the second he does not hate except in order to the first; and so what afflicts him objectively in the second, afflicts him in virtue of the first, and so instrumentally. Nor does it follow: 'the fire does not detain him effectively but only formally, therefore it does not afflict him effectively', because it itself – as detaining formally – is an object unwilled and apprehended as posited, and therefore it effectively inflicts anguish.

92. If you say that this is not only because it is unwilled, but because the object is according to itself disagreeable, because to a spirit there belongs freedom and indifference to any bodily place whatever, – the antecedent is false, as was said above about Michael [n.85]: if he were to apprehend himself perpetually determined to a certain place by divine sentence, he would not be saddened, because although he has freedom or

indifference to places, not however to them as in act as if a natural perfection, because just as neither one place, so neither indifference to however many places, naturally perfects an angel; and therefore determination to one place is not against the natural inclination of an angel.

93. An example of this way of being anguished can be in men desiring to die, for whom life is anguishing. In this way they hate that ‘the soul is in its body’ up to the instant of natural death, because of something hateful accompanying mortal life; and secondly they apprehend that that unwilled thing will be; and therefore third there follows sadness about the detention of the soul in the body or about the body as detaining the soul, – not that the body detain the soul effectively, but in whatever way as susceptible of the form, and just as it detains, so is it an object unwilled as apprehended.

94. And this can be had from Gregory *Dialogues* 4.29, “If the incorporeal spirit of a living man is held in the body, why may not after death an incorporeal spirit be held by bodily fire?” And Augustine *City of God*, 21.10 n.11, “If the spirits of men, altogether incorporeal, can now be enclosed in bodily members, also then will they be able by the chains of their bodies to be indissolubly bound.”

#### b. About the Disagreeable Object or About the Infernal Fire Objectively Affecting a Spirit

95. About the second way, namely how [fire] as an affecting object anguishes, the like in some respect must be said:

First, the angel’s intellect is determined perpetually to intensely considering fire in idea of object. Second, he apprehends this determination to such a consideration. Third, he hates it and (as before [n.86]) this hate arises from affection for advantage, from which he wills to consider any object whatever, insofar as it has been delightful to him, now this one now that one; and he is moved forward by pride, whereby he wishes to use his intellective [power] according to the command of his own will; and he is consumed by envy, because of which he hates to be determined by God to some single consideration. Fourth, there follows apprehension, not only bare [apprehension] of this consideration, as in the second [stage], but an apprehension certain of the event of this consideration intense and perpetual. Fifth, from this follows anguish.

96. Now in some respect it is dissimilar here and in the preceding [nn.85-94].

As to the first, because fire here has the idea of agent effectively detaining the angel’s intellect in intense consideration of itself, and not from command of the angel’s will.

97. And if you ask how these can belong to fire, since no body can move the intelligence of a spirit so efficaciously that the intelligence is no more under the will of the spirit himself, than [move it] to the determination of an act of consideration, namely to [considering] this or that [n.95] (as Augustine says that the will turns the intelligence away and turns it toward now this now that [cf. Ord. II d.38 n14]) – it is necessary to say that this does not belong to it [fire] by its own virtue, because, with the whole active virtue of fire posited, an angel left to himself could consider indifferently fire or another body by command of his own will.

98. Therefore, it is necessary to say that this detention in intense and perpetual consideration of fire, and against the angel’s will, is effectively principally from God, and

from the fire, if actively, but less principally. And an example can be set down: just as the agent intellect and the phantasm are disposed to moving the possible intellect in us, so in the matter at hand God has a mode similar to the agent intellect and to the phantasm of the fire; and it would be altogether similar if in us the agent intellect were formally willing, and the possible [intellect] similarly, – and the agent [intellect] were through its own will to determine some certain phantasm for moving effectively the possible intellect against its will.

99. Nor is it a difficulty that the principal agent and the instrument are not in the same supposit here as there the agent intellect and the phantasm [are], because the order of these agents does not require identity of supposit.

100. In the third [way] too [n.95] there is a difference here and before [nn.85-94], because much more does an angel hate the perpetual detention of his intelligence in intense consideration of fire than the formal detention locally of himself definitively by fire, because in the opposite of the first, namely in the free use of his intelligence for the command of his will about any object at all, does his perfection much more consist, and much more is it desired than in the free use of his motive power as to a ‘where’ definitively.

101. And this detention in the most intense consideration of fire impedes the first liberty [n.100], because by this his intellect is impeded from perfectly considering other things that can be considered [n.95]. But definitive detention by fire does not impede but the second [n.100].

102. From this follows a difference in the fifth [stage, n.95], that there will be much more anguish from this second cause than from the preceding [nn.85-94, 100], because where there is a greater unwilling and an equally certain apprehension of the event, there follows a greater anguish.

103. There is also a difference in this and the preceding [nn.85-94] as to this, in some way, that fire can more be said effectively to afflict a spirit in this way than the way preceding, because there it only afflicts effectively, as an unwilld object apprehended causes anguish, but here it effectively causes the first apprehension to which the intellect is determined, which apprehension is unwilld. And therefore here it has as it were a double action on the prior merely simple [apprehension]; but just as in the prior there was not put the disagreeableness of fire from the nature of the thing, but only as of what is unwilld to detain [sc. the bad angel], so here the disagreeableness is not of the fire as of object considered [cf. n.72], but [considered] finally, because it is unwilld that that object is thus considered; yet there is a greater inclination to unwill in this way than in the prior way.

### c. Objections Against Each Way

104. Against each way [n.84] there are objections:

Against the first [nn.85-94], because that fire detains all equally; therefore, all will be equally tormented. The consequent is against Augustine *City of God* 21.16, “In no way must it be denied that the eternal fire itself will be for some lighter, for others heavier, whether the heat of it vary for the punishment fitting to each, or it itself be equally hot but not felt with equal vexation.” From which authority also it seems to be had that the heat will torment them, and not only the detention.



105. Against the second [n.95], because if only intelligibly it impresses such impression, there follows delight, because that [impression] is fitting to an intellective power. It is proved too, because it would delight [the Archangel] Michael.

106. Against both together, because if [a spirit] does not unwill or not hate to be thus detained or affected by the object, he will not be anguished; and thereby, since it is in his power not to unwill, it will be in his power not to be tormented.

107. Again, against both together: [spirits] could equally be afflicted while in a stone or in the sun or in the fiery heaven, if they were detained there definitively and were acted on by them objectively. – To this last, look for the response.<sup>21</sup>

#### d. Response to the Objections

108. To the first [n.104], I concede that formal detention, which is according to the formal definition, is equal; but the ‘to unwill’ is not equal, rather it is more intense in those who have more sinned; and on that account greater anguish.

109. To the second [n.105]: the first impression, which is for the intellection of fire, would be delightful of itself to the intellect itself; but in the fifth instant [n.102], after the unwilling and the apprehension of the event unwilld, from that impression unwilld and apprehended anguish is caused.

110. And if you say ‘at any rate that apprehension, as posited in the first instant, will cause delight’, – I reply: it cannot, because this appetite in the same instant has vehement anguish, and that excludes all joy, not only contrary [joy] but non-pertinent [joy], from *Ethics* 7.15.1154b11-15.

111. If you say ‘the cause of delight is prior naturally to the cause of distress’, – I reply: in things having only a natural order and a real simultaneity, the ‘more efficacious’ excludes the less efficacious, although the ‘more efficacious’ be posterior in nature. And no wonder, because what impedes or prohibits is sometimes posterior naturally to that agent which is impeded through the shortening of it. (An example in what is generative of one thing and alterative into the contrary.)

112. To the third [nn.106] I say that it is not in their power to ‘unwill’ that and ‘not to unwill’ it, as will be touched on about the continuation of the evil act in them [d.46 n.101]. Of which the cause perhaps is the continuous action of the superior cause, acting for something uniform in them because of the demerit preceding, on which ‘uniformly’ follows their uniform affliction. And because of this, someone can more remissly unwill than now he unwilld, because just as the act is not in his power, so neither the mode of the act; and just as the superior cause uniformly acts for the ‘to unwill’ (because of which the inferior cause cannot act difformly from it), so it acts uniformly for the intention of this ‘to unwill’.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

<sup>21</sup> No response by Scotus is given for this objection, and the Vatican editors provide no explanatory note. Perhaps the answer would be that it does not matter, as to the fact of punishment, where evil spirits are detained or afflicted, provided they are so; but it does matter as to the fittingness of this ‘where’ within the whole universe, namely that it should be a lower and debased place (so not the sun or the empyreal heaven), and with an active force (so not a stone).

113. [To the first] – To the first [n.63], that proposition of Augustine depends on this one: ‘the agent is more outstanding than the formal term of action’, and ‘the formal term is more outstanding than what is susceptible of it’.

114. And the second of these is not true except insofar as this is act and that potency. And thus it must be conceded that the agent – insofar as in formal or virtual act – is more outstanding than the passive [thing], insofar as it is in potency to that; but from this it does not follow that it is more outstanding than the absolute nature of that which is susceptible, just as neither about the formal term in respect of the same.

115. But because Augustine intends to conclude through that argument [n.63] that body does not act on spirit, it can be said that his major is true of an equivocal and total or principal agent, otherwise not; and thus is his conclusion true. And it is conceded that fire is not principal agent against a spirit: whether in that detention, because in that it does not act, but formally definitively contains, – or in that affecting [the spirit], because there it [fire] does not act, except as an instrument of God, just as a phantasm is disposed to the agent intellect [nn.88-91].

116. Now in causing anguish in this way or that it [fire] is not the principal agent, but the will itself unwilling that object. For rather from this, that the object is unwilling, does the anguish follow than from the idea of the object in itself, or from the very apprehension of the event of the unwilling object, because the object not only unwilling but, as unwilling, apprehended to be or going to be, is cause of anguish.

117. [To the second] – To the other [n.64], Augustine can be expounded about these that spirits are immediately affected by, because they are like bodily things, because passions in some way caused by bodies; and not about those by which spirits are mediately affected, because those are bodily things. Or – what is the same – let it be expounded about what affects [spirits] formally, not effectively.

118. [To the third] – To the other [n.65], this is universally true, that ‘the agent must be present to the patient, at least according to active virtue’. And from this it follows that where a proportioned presence cannot be had except through contact, contact is required, – but where a truer [presence] can be had, that much more suffices for action; but much truer can be the presence of a spirit to body through coexistence than is that through contact.

119. In another way it can be said that virtual contact is required, not mathematical [cf. *Ord.* II d.9 nn.59, 62]; now virtual contact is that something in this can be the term of virtue in that, which is nothing other than that that has the active virtue of something in this. And in this way God, if he were not within the orb of the moon, would be present to the center of the earth, as was said in *Ord.* I d.37 n.9.

120. [To the fourth] – To the other [n.66], it can be said that an equivocal cause equivocally assimilates, that is according to something that it has in itself, not formally but virtually; and in this way, the object which can be unwilling has anguish in itself, and according to that it [the equivocal cause] assimilates. In another way it can be said that that proposition [n.66 “an agent aims to make the patient like itself”] is true of a principal agent, not an instrumental one; now God is here the principal agent and assimilates the passive thing to himself, because he understands and wills the affliction of that [spirit], and – according to this thing understood and willed – assimilates the passive thing to himself.

## Question Two

### *Whether Damned Men after the Judgment will be Tormented by Infernal Fire*

121. Secondly it is asked, whether damned men after the judgment will be tormented by infernal fire.

122. That not:

*Topics* 6.6.145a3-4, “Every suffering made more, more removes from substance;” therefore if they were continually tormented by that fire, more and more would their substance be lost, and consequently at length it would be altogether consumed, – which is against that of *Job* 20.18, “He will pay everything whatever he has done, and yet will not be consumed,” and against *Revelation* 9.6, “They will desire to die, and death will flee from them.”

123. Again, either they will suffer from that fire really affecting them, or only intentionally:

Not really, because of two things: first, because with the first real motion ceasing [sc. of the heavens at the end of time], any real motion does not seem possible, since a posterior depends on a prior; second, because then that body would be really corrupted, because one contrary is really corruptive of the other. – If it will only be intentional, it will not be afflictive, because the senses of a blessed present there would be affected by that [intentional] passion from the fire.

Therefore, they will suffer no passion.

124. On the contrary:

*Matthew* 25.41, the Judge will say to the men to be damned, “Go you cursed, into the eternal fire.”

## I. To the Question

### A. About the Action of Infernal Fire, Real and Intentional, on the Damned

125. To the question, it is plain that fire present to a corruptible body, animated with a sensitive soul, can have on that a double action: real, which is univocal, – and intentional, which in respect of that is equivocal, because the sensible species is not simply of the same species as the object itself.

126. To the matter at hand, therefore, I say that after the judgment, since the body of man is per se corruptible, the fire present will be able to have on that each action, because they are not repugnant, and there is there both a susceptible [subject] and an active cause of each, – unless you say that the real one is then impeded because of the defect of motion of the heaven, but about this in d.48 n.69.

127. It is also possible then for one to be without the other, speaking of absolute possibility, because neither depends essentially on the other; hence also now they are separable, if something be susceptible of the form really and not intentionally, and another conversely; but then it will not be possible for one not to be present, except because of some impediment, – and this either because God does not co-act with the fire for that action, or because some created agent impedes one action and not another.

### B. About the Sufficiency of Intentional Action for Causing Pain in the Damned

128. Second I say that intentional [action] alone suffices for causing pain; and real [action] without intentional would not suffice for this.

129. The second part is manifest when wood becomes hot, because however much it may excessively heat up, it yet does not suffer pain .

130. The first is proved, because an excelling sensible [object], as it is an excelling sensible [object], is of a nature to inflict pain, because it is disagreeable insofar as such, and yet – insofar as it is an excelling sensible – it does not cause a change except intentionally. For although some real change be concomitant, whereby the organ is removed from the mean proportion in which it consists, yet if without that action it were a disagreeable sensed object, pain would follow.

131. This is also proved, because sometimes, where there is a slight or no real change, there is great pain because of an intentional change: just as if a hand has been made excessively cold from the contact of snow or ice, if at once it be brought close to fire, there is there vehement pain from that object acting on it, and yet a slight or no real action is from the heat into the hand because of the excelling of the contrary, namely of cold in the thing acted on.

132. Now the mode is this: pain, just as also sense delight, is a passion caused in sense appetite by an object apprehended through sense; therefore, just as any object, insofar as object (that is, intentionally moving<sup>22</sup>), is agreeable, so it causes – with sensation posited – delight in sense appetite. Hence it is not easy in any delight (at least of sight and hearing) to imagine any real change for preservation of the supposit itself. In the same way, although accompanying an intentional change of a disagreeable object there is some real change disagreeable to nature (which perhaps is not true in sight and hearing), yet from the intentional change alone there does follow pain caused by that sensed object in sense appetite.

### C. About the Sufficiency of Intentional Change alone

133. Third I say that it seems more probable after the judgment to posit only intentional change, because although then each could be posited (from the first article [nn.125-126]), yet real [change] would not cause any pain without intentional [change], nor even with intentional [change], but intentional change alone would cause pain. Since therefore “plurality is not to be posited without necessity” [Aristotle, *Physics* 1.4.188a17-18], and there is not posited there the suffering of fire except because of the affliction of those by fire, it suffices to posit only the intentional [change], such that the other when posited seems to be superfluous, because it would do nothing for this end.

134. Again, it is fitting to posit concerning the damned as few miracles as possible, since it is not likely that God may want concerning them then to multiply miracles beyond that which seems to be required for their just punishment; but by positing real action, and with this – as is necessary – intentional [action], it seems that it is necessary to posit concerning them more miracles than by positing only intentional [action]; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor: although any way at all has to posit that [the damned] are not then corrupted by an intrinsic cause, and this either through a divine conservation miraculous or non-miraculous but just, because corresponding to the final state in which

<sup>22</sup> Or more clearly: ‘moving as an intention’, namely moving as an object of cognition or awareness.

they now are, – yet if a real action be posited, there is there some corruptive extrinsic cause, and it seems a miracle if that does not corrupt, since a cause that can induce something impossible with something can corrupt it. But that fire can induce a heat altogether impossible with the quality of a mixed [body] requisite for life; if therefore it [the fire] not induce that [heat] to the upmost, and yet it acts really, it is a miracle (as there was in the furnace, where the fire did not have all the action that it could have had from its own nature [*Daniel* 3.49-50; *Ord.* I d.8 n.306]); if again it does induce heat in that degree, it is a miracle that that degree stands along with life.

135. If you say ‘in the same way from another part it is necessary to posit a miracle so that it not be corrupted extrinsically, for naturally that excessive intentional change causes excessive pain, and excessive pain kills (as is plain from Antiochus in 1 *Maccabees* 6.13), rather also excelling fear, about which it is less seen, is sometimes cause of death’, – I reply: no pain simply is repugnant to the mixed quality simply requisite for life.

136. Which is sufficiently plain, because an intention causative of pain more seems repugnant; but it is not repugnant, just as neither one contrary in real ‘to be’ and another in intentional ‘to be’.

137. It is plain also through Augustine *City of God* 21.3 n.2, “Not therefore will those bodies be able to die because they will suffer pain;” and he adds, “Why can bodies inflict pain on souls, but they cannot inflict death, except because it is not a consequence that what causes pain causes death? Pain therefore is not a necessary argument of future death.”

And his reason, placed a little before, stands on this: “It is of the soul to be in pain not the body, even when the cause for it of grieving is from the body; if therefore from pain an argument were taken up for death, it would more pertain to the soul to die to which it more pertains to grieve.” And further, before that, he intimates another reason as if of this sort: “For what reason is to cause pain an argument for death, since rather it is an indication of life? For it is certain that everything lives that is in pain.” As if he is arguing: if to be in pain necessarily entails to live, not necessarily does it entail to die.

138. I say, however, that sometimes, indeed for the most part, on excessive pain there follows death, because there follows a disproportion of some natural quality requisite for life, – and to posit the mode would require to make clear how the imaginative faculty and appetite can have actions on natural qualities. But in whatever way this may be, there is not a formal repugnance there of any sensation or pain to any degree of natural quality requisite for life; therefore, it is not as great a miracle that any pain at all is without death as it is that a real quality simply contrary to the quality of a mixed [body] is with life: for there would be there a quasi-formal repugnance between the quality induced by the contrary and the quality requisite for life, – and if the second were not posited, it would be a miracle for life to be without that mixed quality.

139. But here there is not required any miracle save that pain be suspended from its effect, for the most part, namely so that on it there not follow a distempering, repugnant to life, of the humor of the mixture; and for it [the pain], as to such effect, to be suspended, there is no need to posit a new miracle, but only that it is reduced to the same to which is reduced the suspension of the action of the contraries within so that they do not cause corruption, namely so that, because of the final state to which they have been

reduced, God suspend the causes from their effects, for the most part, which [effects], if they were to follow, would destroy that composite.

140. Besides, third, Scripture seems to say that the same damned [person] suffers from contraries, according to that of *Job* 24.19, “From waters of snow” they will pass “to extremes of heat.” And although – according to this surface of the letter – alternation in these afflictions would be saved, not however could there be probably saved why they [the damned] would at the same time suffer at the extreme and really from contraries. But it can be saved that they would suffer at the same time and at their peak from them, because the species of contraries, even at their peak, are not contraries.

141. Therefore this way [n.142] – about intentional without real change [cf. n.133] – can save more things pertaining to their affliction than another.

#### D. About the More Probable Possibility of Admitting Real Change

142. Fourth, I say that there is not an altogether certain reason for denying there a real change, because from whence it can be posited (as is had in the first article [n.125]), although it not be necessary for pain (as is had in the second article [n.128]), however whatever is argued in the third article [n.133], – if it be ascribed to miracles, it cannot be rejected.

143. God could also co-act with fire for inducing real heat into the body, yet not what would be formally repugnant to the quantity of that mixture or complexion [of the body], and then a miracle could be posited in this, that he [God] does not co-act for the total effect for which fire acts.

144. Also God could co-act with fire for that supreme impossible heat, and then that proportioned mixture [of the body] would be destroyed, nor yet would life be destroyed, God miraculously conserving it.

145. But if it be posited that heat is induced to the extreme, and yet that that quality of the mixed [body] stands in the same [heat], it seems that there is formally a repugnance, just as that middle and extreme were to come to be together in the same thing. And whether this be possible for God – not here but elsewhere, [d.46 nn.103, 105]); yet it is not as known as either of the two aforesaid [nn.143-144].

146. So therefore I say that [the damned] will suffer an afflictive suffering from fire, and therefore necessarily with an intentional suffering, but not necessarily for affliction with a real suffering; but if that be concomitant as if a natural cause proximate to a susceptible subject, it is necessary that the incorruption of this body from what is extrinsic must be saved in any of the aforesaid ways [nn.142-143].

#### E. Objections against the Third Article

147. Against the third article [nn.133-141] it is objected by this, that the sense of the blessed would sense every difference of the sensible; therefore, if there were a blessed in this fire he would be changed intentionally by that just as the damned, and yet he would not suffer an afflictive passion; therefore, that [afflictive passion] is not through intentional passion alone.

148. Again, every operation is delightful to the operating power, because it is a perfection of it; therefore, any sensation at all that accompanies intentional action will be delightful; none therefore painful.

149. Again, sense appetite is only because of nature; therefore, nothing is disagreeable to it except because disagreeable to nature.

## F. Response to the Objections

150. To the first [147]: either to the sense of a blessed no sensible thing would be excelling, or that sense will be so perfect that any sensible thing will not be able, because of the excess, to be disproportionate to it, and then it follows that it would be changed intentionally by that fire, – not however painfully, because not by the disagreeable.

151. Or in another way, since pain is not caused – as was said [n.132] – in sense itself but in sense appetite, and the sense appetite of a blessed is totally quietened (or completely satisfied) by sense delight, and excelling delight excludes any sadness whatever (*Ethics* 7 [n.110]), – in this appetite of a blessed no pain could be caused.

It would therefore have to be conceded, if that sensible [object] were excelling for his sense, that pain would be caused in his appetite, unless because from a more efficacious cause there is in that appetite what excludes all pain.

152. To the second [n.148]: a disproportionate operation is not delightful; such is sensation of an excelling object; and no wonder, because an operation is not delightful except because about a delightful object; but this object is disagreeable, therefore cause of sadness or pain.

153. To the third [n.149]: it is true that nature makes something to be disagreeable to sense appetite, because that thing, or what accompanies it, is commonly corruptive of nature; however, let it be that such a thing sometimes not be concomitant, always there remains the first disagreeableness. Thus, in the matter at hand, although there not be here an immoderate heating, concomitant with the species of an excelling hot thing, however there remains the disagreeableness of the hot thing – as impressing the species – to sense appetite.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

154. To the first principal argument [n.122]: the authority of *Topics* VI seems to reject a real action of fire on body, but not an intentional one, because about that the Philosopher's statement is not understood; but if a real [action] be posited, it is necessary to say that the proposition is true as far as is on the part of a natural cause dismissed to itself in acting, because then through continuation it becomes more and more the throwing off of the fitting from the substance to which that is fitting; but in the matter at hand a natural cause is not dismissed to itself.

155. Or, in another way, [the authority is true, n.154] the more [fire] throws off from the substance dispositively that for which it is the disposition; but here it does not thus throw off more from the substance dispositively in this way, because it has no power for the effect of that disposition, which to be sure according to itself would be a disposition for natural causes dismissed to themselves.

156. To the second [n.123] it is plain which action, namely intentional or real, is there necessarily to be posited, and which can there be posited, – and to the objections to the contrary [nn.123-124], [find the answer] from the second and third articles [nn.128-132, 133-141, 146-153].

## Forty Fifth Distinction

### Question One

*Whether the Separated Soul can Understand the Quiddities Habitually Known to itself before Separation*

1. “Further, it must be known etc.” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.45].

2. About this forty fifth distinction I ask four [questions]:

First, whether the separated soul can understand the quiddities habitually known to it before separation.

3. That not:

*On the Soul* 3.7.431a14-17, 8.432a9-10, “Phantasms are to the intellect as sensibles to sense” [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.343]; but the senses cannot have any sensation unless moved by a sensible object; therefore, neither the intellect any intellection unless moved by a phantasm. But then [sc. after separation] it will not be moved by a phantasm, – therefore etc.

4. Further, *On the Soul* III.431a14-17: “The intellect is corrupted when something within is corrupted;” that ‘within’ cannot be but the organ of imagination; but that is corrupted in death, – therefore also the intellect.

5. Again, no intellect understands except the possible [intellect], because the agent intellect does not understand; but the possible [intellect] does not remain after death, because *On the Soul* 3.5.430a23-25, “the passive intellect is corrupted;” the possible is the passive, – therefore etc.

6. On the contrary:

*On the Soul* 3.4.429a27-28, “The soul is the place of species, not the whole [soul], but the intellect;” it belongs to place to preserve the placed; therefore, the intellect saves the species, – therefore etc.

7. Further, Boethius *Consolation of Philosophy* 5 prose 4 n.25, “The received is in the receiver through the mode of the receiver;” but the soul receiving the sensible species is incorruptible; therefore, it receives them incorruptibly.

8. Further, Avicenna *On the Soul* p.5 ch.6, “The separated soul will more clearly see truth than the conjoined [soul];” and it agrees with that of *Wisdom* 9.15: “The body that is corrupted weighs down the soul.”

### I. To the Question

#### A. Opinions of Others

9. Here there is one opinion [Aquinas] about the intellection of the separated soul through species inflowed from God; but the treatment of it is more proper in the following question [nn.39-44].



10. About a species not inflowed, or in natural way acquired, it seems to be the opinion of Avicenna *On the Soul* p.5 ch.6, that it does not remain without an act of understanding. For this Augustine is adduced *On the Trinity* 11.3 n.6, that, with the act of thinking ceasing, nothing of the form remains in the intelligence than it before – having turned to memory – received from it. These [words] imply that no intelligible species remains in the intellect habitually, the act having ceased.

11. Another opinion [Henry of Ghent] is that in the intellect there is no intelligible species but only a phantasm in the imaginative faculty.

### B. Scotus' own Response

12. About this is diffusely had a treatment in *Ord.* I d.3 nn.340-345, II d.3 nn.355-363.

Hence from the things proved there [*ibid.* and cf. I d.3 nn.348-378, II d.3 nn.388-394] let this be supposed: first that an intelligible species is to be posited, – second that it remain in the intellect with all act of understanding ceasing, nor only remain as rapidly transient, but had as to idea of permanence. Now whether it is a habit was touched on there, because speaking of a habit ordinarily for some quality inclining to considering [things] easily, a species is not a habit, but precedes it, indeed precedes the act by which that habit properly said is generated [*Ord.* I. d.3 n.378, II d.3 nn.378-387].

13. But how Augustine and Avicenna [n.10] are to be expounded is plain there, because Augustine does not speak but of a sensitive sharpness which he calls the 'sharpness of cogitation' [*On the Trinity* 15.22 n.42], which will not remain in the separated soul [*Ord.* I d.3 n.393]; but Avicenna seems to posit a double mode of understanding: by an inferior and by a superior, as is said there [cf. Scotus, *Rep.* IA d.3 nn.236-238], – and by the inferior indeed a knowledge persisting, by the superior not.<sup>23</sup>

14. From these suppositions we have this conclusion, that 'in the intellect according to itself the intelligible species remains after the act of understanding'.

15. From this it is argued: in the intellect, as it is the subject of the intelligible species, there is not per se requisite – nor necessarily – a conjunction of it with the body; therefore through 'not being conjoined to the body' it is not disposed otherwise in receiving the intelligible species.

The consequence is plain, because a subject is not otherwise disposed in receiving because of a variation of that which is not the idea of receiving that nor in any way necessary in the receiving.

The antecedent I prove, because that species is a form simply immaterial or spiritual, at least in that it is un-extended and un-extendable. Hence the Commentator [Averroes] says [*On the Soul* III com.18] that the object is transferred from order to order when from the phantasm it is transferred by the agent intellect to the order of the possible intellect [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.359]. Which I do not understand except of the order of the material and extendable to the order of the immaterial and in-extendable; but nothing simply immaterial is received in the intellect insofar as it [the intellect] is simply conjoined to the body, because – if insofar as so – either therefore in the whole first, or

<sup>23</sup> The Latin for 'persisting' is 'permansivus' and seems here to refer to knowledge permanent in the memory but not always actualized, which would only hold of men, whose exercise, but not whose possession, of knowledge is interrupted (as in sleep), while in angels exercise is never thus interrupted.

this conjunction will be some idea of receiving; whether thus or so, the received will not be altogether immaterial in this way.

16. From this I have that the intelligible species can in the same way inform the intellect separated just as united [sc. with the body]. And then further, since the intelligible species, conjoined to the agent intellect and to the possible [intellect], in the same way constitutes the idea of perfect memory (in the way in which it was elsewhere said about intellective memory, that it contains the intelligible object and the generative intellect [*Ord.* I d.3 nn.375, 395]), it follows that in the separated intellect there will be able to be a memory of the same idea as that [memory] which was in the conjoined [intellect], – and further, since a memory equally perfect is equally parent of a perfect act in intelligence, it follows that in the separated intellect there will equally be able to be had the sort of generating as in the conjoined intellect; therefore, the separated soul – through a retained intelligible species of anything whatever that it was capable of before – will be able to have actual intellection.

17. With this is consonant the intention of the Philosopher, who maintains in *On the Soul* 1.1.403a3-10 that if [the soul] cannot have operation when separated, neither [can it have] ‘to be’ [sc. when separated]. He puts also knowledge properly in the intellect, *On the Soul* 3.8.431b21-23, saying that “just as the soul through the senses is sensible, so through knowledge it is knowable.” Now knowledge on its own part is of a nature to remain incorruptibly, – and consequently on the part of the subject, since the subject is incorruptible, and having it [science] is in accidental potency to considering it, from *ibid.* 3.4.429b31-30a2, *Physics* 8.4.255a30-b5. Therefore, the separated soul is in accidental potency to understanding the objects habitually known to it; therefore, it can of itself exit into act.

18. With this also is consonant that of Jerome in his prologue to the Bible [*Epistle 53 to Paulinus* n.9], “Let us learn on earth the things of which for us the knowledge will remain in heaven.” For it would be exceedingly unworthy to labor so much over science and truths if they were to cease to be in death, and it is exceedingly irrational that they remain but that their acts not be able to be had.

### C. Doubts about Scotus’ Response

19. Against this there seem some doubts.

First, because if many intelligible species be conserved in the intellect, either each of them will move [the intellect] to considering the object represented by it, or none [will]; the first is unacceptable, because it is not acceptable to understand many things at the same time distinct, – therefore the second is left, that it will turn out that it understands nothing.

20. Besides, understanding without a phantasm is more perfect than understanding with a phantasm (whose proof is because it more agrees with the understanding of God and angels, which is simply more perfect in the genus of understandings); therefore, if the intellect when separated can understand without a phantasm, it would have an understanding simply more perfect than when conjoined, – which is unacceptable.

21. Further, in a conjoined intellect the intelligible species does not suffice for understanding without a phantasm, because [a conjoined intellect] must be turned toward phantasms, *On the Soul* 3.8.432a8-9; but that intelligible species is equally perfect in the

conjoined intellect as in the separated one; therefore, it alone in the separated [intellect] will not suffice for understanding, nor will a phantasm be able then to be had; therefore etc.

22. Further, an operation proper to the whole cannot be an operation proper to a part, because neither will the whole ‘to be’ of the whole be able to be of a part; but ‘to understand’ is the proper operation of man, from *Ethics* 1.6.1098a3-4, 7. And it is proved through reason: because the proper operation of this species [man] is not other than this [operation]; therefore this cannot be the operation of the soul, which is only a part of the species.

#### D. Response to the Doubts

23. To the first [n.19]: this difficulty – about the understanding of many or no object first – is common, yet in the matter at hand it has a special difficulty, because here recourse cannot be had to particular senses perceiving sensibles, nor to phantasms more efficaciously or less efficaciously moving the intellect, as about the conjoined intellect.

I say therefore briefly to this here (and consequently everywhere about this non-simultaneity), that objects present habitually either are equally motive of the intellect or one of them is a more efficacious motive of it than another. If in the first way, and since with this there would be posited an equal inclination of the intellect to any at all of them, none of them would the intellect understand first before another – but the hypothesis is impossible. And if any of them be a more efficacious motive, the greater inclination to one object than to another having been taken away, that which is a more efficacious motive will first move and first be understood; but with an inclination posited equal to this and to that, the motive force and inclination hence and thither having been weighed, it is apparent what will first be understood.

24. To the second [n.20] I say that something can be called more perfect than something else either positively or permissively. An example: animal is more perfect than fly permissively, because the idea of animal allows that ‘animal’ be saved in man; but fly is more perfect positively, because any species posits a perfection over and above the genus.<sup>24</sup>

To the matter at hand, ‘to understand without a phantasm is more perfect than to understand with a phantasm’ is true permissively but not positively, that is it does not posit more of perfection. Which is proved because an agent able to use an instrument does not positively more perfectly act if it not use an instrument; yet it is possible that ‘action without an instrument’ is more perfect than action that is with an instrument. So here about a phantasm, which is as an instrument. I concede therefore that intellection without a phantasm does have some condition of perfection that intellection with a phantasm does not have, because the former has a certain likeness with the intellection simply perfect of a separate substance. But it does not follow from this that any of this sort [sc. intellection without a phantasm] is positively more perfect than any of this sort [sc. intellection with a phantasm].<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The term ‘animal’ is here being used to include flies and snakes and not just what we typically call animals.

<sup>25</sup> Intellection without a phantasm, while simply more perfect, is not more perfect in man’s case than intellection with a phantasm. Note that the punctuation of the English in this paragraph differs from that in the Latin edition. The latter seems to produce a confused if not indeed impossible sense.

25. To the third [n.21] I say that although the intelligible species in the conjoined [intellect] not suffice without a phantasm, this however is not because of this that a phantasm is required there as some principle of an act of understanding, but it is precisely required there as the principle of operation of the imaginative power; and this operation is required for intellection because of the connection of the powers – of the superior namely and the inferior – in acting, since indeed the superior does not perfectly operate about any object unless the inferior [powers] – which are able to operate – operate about the same [object]. And this is the reason why distractions of the powers of the soul about diverse objects impede the operations of them.

26. There is however some perfection that a phantasm bestows on intellection through this, that it intends the intelligible species regularly in any intellection whatever, as was made clear in d.1 nn.44-49 [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 nn.499-500]; but this perfection cannot be had without a phantasm; and therefore as to this it would have to be conceded that separated intellection would be less perfect than conjoined, unless there were something else re-forming it, which would suffice for restoring an equal perfection.

27. And from this it is plain how necessary is conversion to phantasms, not as if to the principle of understanding, but as if to that whereby it is necessary to use an inferior power for this, that a superior [power] have its operation; and this because of the order of powers in acting, which for perfectly acting must come together in acting about the same object.

28. To the fourth [n.22]: of whatever whole the form is not of a nature to be per se, of it there can be some proper action which cannot be of its form. But through the opposite, of what the form, namely the specific form, is of a nature to be per se, of that whole there cannot be any perfect operation which cannot be of the form as operating, because the most perfect operation could not be in it unless it be in it according to the most perfect form; and it cannot be in it according to a form possible to be per se unless it be possible for that [form] to be per se in it, because it itself will be the immediate receptive of it – and so, if it per se is, it per se can receive.

29. I concede therefore that intellection is the proper operation of the whole man, but according to the most perfect form in him as through the proper idea of operating; nor this alone, but, because this form is separable, it [intellection] is so in it according to it that it can be of it, and therefore it is so proper to the whole that it can be of a part. I deny therefore the major in the thing proposed [n.22 *init.*].

30. To the proof about ‘to be’ [n.22 *ibid.*]: although some say [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.1 a.1] that the ‘to be’ of the whole is the ‘to be’ of the soul, yet this was rejected above in d.43 [nn.12-25]. Hence, I concede that the ‘to be’ of the whole cannot be the ‘to be’ of the soul, – nor conversely, speaking of ‘to be’ total and precise [d.43 n.12]; and yet it is the most perfect operation of the whole this, because it cannot be in it except according to the soul; and it cannot be in it according to it, as proximate receptive, unless it can be of it when it per se is. It follows that the operation of the whole can be the operation of that soul; hence I deny the consequence: ‘the ‘to be’ of this [the whole] cannot be the ‘to be’ of that [the part], therefore neither can the operation of it [the part] be the operation of this’ [the whole].

To the proof [n.22], ‘to operate presupposes to be’: it is true, but not as the precise idea of receiving.<sup>26</sup>

## II. To the Principal Arguments

31. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.3]: that authority, *On the Soul* III, must be understood as to the acquisition of intellection, and this the first [acquisition] and firstly [acquired], – but as to use it must not be understood. And the reason is because the intellect can use a form previously acquired, although those things not be had which were first necessary for acquiring that form; not so can sense, speaking of exterior sense, use some form previously acquired, because it is not conservative of a form or species previously received for later operating. In another way it could be said that this proposition [of the Philosopher] is understood for this [present] state, because an intellection suitable for us through experience the Philosopher did not know except for this life; for he experienced no other.

32. To the second [n.4]: the intellect is corrupted, that is impeded as to operation, and as if ‘it is reckoned corrupted when something interior is corrupted’, because without the operation of imagination it has no power for its own operation. But from this it does not follow that it is in itself corrupted or corruptible, nor that that something else is necessarily required for its act, but only that it is required according to the order of powers that is now found in human nature in operating about the same object.

33. To the third [n.5] I say that the ‘passive intellect’ is not understood there [to be] the ‘possible intellect’ but some sense power, which some call the ‘cogitative’; and it is true that every sense [power] is corrupted and therefore the passive intellect, taken in this way; not however the passive intellect in the way in which we say the possible intellect is passive.

### Question Two

*Whether the Separated Soul can Acquire Knowledge of Something Previously Unknown*

34. Second I ask whether the separated soul can acquire knowledge of anything previously unknown.

35. That not:

[Because if it could] then it would in vain be united to the body. Proof of the consequence: it is not united because of the perfection of the body, because form is not because of matter but conversely, *Physics* 2.8.199a30-32; it is united therefore because of acquiring its own perfection, namely so that through use of the senses in the body it may acquire knowledge; but this would be in vain if – separated without use of the senses – it could acquire it [knowledge]; therefore etc.

36. Again, there cannot be passage from extreme to extreme except through the middle; the thing outside exists altogether materially, in the intellect altogether immaterially; therefore, it is necessary that it pass through the middle, in which in some

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<sup>26</sup> A thing cannot operate unless it exists, but the precise reason why it has the operation need not be its existence. The soul, which is not the existence of man but a part of that existence, can yet be the precise reason why he has the relevant operation.

way it exists materially and in some way immaterially. And so it is in the senses in some way materially, because according to individual conditions; and immaterially, because, according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.12.424a17-19, “sense is receptive of species without matter,” – without matter, I say, of the sort that a form really existing outside requires.

37. Again, if it [the separated soul] could acquire knowledge of one unknown, therefore likewise also of any at all, and so the local distance of an object would not impede knowledge of it, – which seems against Augustine in his book *On Care for the Dead* ch.15 n.18, where he maintains that separated souls do not know the things that are done here, unless to them there be expressed – by angels or souls coming to them – the things that they knew here.

38. On the contrary:

Nature is not without its proper specific operation, and it is taken from *On the Heavens* 2.3.286a8-9 and through Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.59 [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.209]. Now the human soul is the most perfect form, and its proper operation according to the possible intellect is to understand, according to the agent [intellect] to abstract, according to the will to will; therefore, no mode of being can belong to the soul according to its nature wherein it does not have power for these operations. And according to its nature [the soul is] such that it can have a ‘to be’ separate, and this is from the perfection of its nature (hence it does not belong to other, imperfect forms); therefore, in that ‘to be’ it has power for these operations. But it is possible that it has not acquired before the species of objects, as is plain of the soul of a deceased child; therefore, it will be able then to acquire them.

## I. To the Question

### A. Opinion of Others

#### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

39. Here the negative [opinion] is held, because of the second reason [n.36]: in virtue [n.49].

40. For it argues [Aquinas, *Sent* IV d.50 q.1 a.1] that “there must be some agreement between recipient and received; now the species existing in the senses have agreement with the intellect insofar as they are without matter, and with material things insofar as they are with material conditions; and therefore agreeably does sense receive from material things, and intellect from sense, – and not the intellect immediately from material things,” because there is not there such an agreement; and therefore “for this, that after separation from the body [the intellect] may understand, there are not required any forms taken from things either then or before.”

41. How therefore will it [the intellect] understand?

They say that “through influence from superior substances, from God namely or from the angels,” – and this in speaking of natural influence and the natural knowledge of it.

42. Which is shown thus:

“The intellect seems to be a mean between intellectual substances and corporeal things (hence it is said ‘the soul is created on the horizon of eternity’, *Book of Causes*, prop.2 n.22), and this therefore because [the soul] through the intellect attains to

intellectual substances, but insofar as it is an act of the body it attains corporeal things; now every middle, to the extent it approaches one extreme, to that extent it more recedes from the other, and conversely.”

43. “Hence, when our soul in the state of the way [sc. for this present life] comes maximally close to the body, inasmuch as being the act of it, it does not have a respect to intellectual things, – and therefore it does not receive influence from the higher substances in order to know, but it knows through species received from the senses. And therefore – even in this life –, to the extent the soul is more abstracted from the body, to that extent it more receives from spiritual substances the influx of knowledge, and hence it is that it knows certain occult things in sleeping and in excess of mind. Whence, when it will be separated in act from the body, it will be most ready for receiving the influence from higher substances, namely from God and angels, – and so, according to influence of this sort, it will have a greater or lesser knowledge according to the mode of its own capacity.”

44. “And thus does the Commentator [Averroes] speak, *On the Soul* 3 com.5, because he posits the possible intellect [cf. *Ord.* I d.3 n.548] to be a separate substance; and although in this he err, yet –as to this – he does speak rightly, because from this, that it is posited a separate substance, it has a respect to the higher intellectual substances, so as to understand them. But according to this respect, in which it is compared to our intellect in receiving species from phantasms, it is not conjoined with the higher substances.”

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

### a. Against the Opinion in Itself

45. Against this position, and if<sup>27</sup> there were not another reason except from these two principles: of which the first is that “more things are not to be posited without necessity” (*Physics* 1.4.188a17-18); the second is that “of no nature must be posited what derogates from its dignity unless it be evident from something agreeing with such nature”, which can be taken from the Philosopher, *On Generation* 2.10.336b27-29: “we always say that nature desires that which is better;” and just as in the whole universe, so in any part at all, more is that to be posited which is better for it and if<sup>28</sup> it not evidently appear that that does not belong to it. But now a plurality is being posited, because such species infused by God or angels [are being posited] – and without necessity, because this nature sufficiently has in itself whence it can attain to its proper perfection without such givens infused by God or angels. Hence here there seems only to be a certain recourse to God or angels for the reason that the perfection of that nature in itself is not being grasped.

46. This opinion also cheapens the nature of the intellective soul: for just as a nature is simply cheaper that has power for no operation or only for a cheaper one, so proportionally is that one cheaper which has no power for an operation belonging to it than one which does. Now the separated soul, for you [Aquinas], from the things intrinsic to it, even with extrinsic objects concurring, has no power for any operation belonging to

<sup>27</sup> Reading *et si* (‘and if’) and not *etsi* (‘although’ or ‘even if’) with the Vatican editors.

<sup>28</sup> Reading *et si* (‘and if’) and not *etsi* (‘although’) with the Vatican editors. Note too that the inverted commas indicating the citation from Aristotle seem incorrectly placed in the Vatican text.

it unless God or an angel give it such species, – but a stone from things intrinsic to it, without such a begged-for inflow, has power for the operation proportioned to it, because to descend to the center and there rest. Therefore, the soul is more cheapened in proportion to its nobility – from this position – than the nature of a stone.

47. Again, he so opining holds elsewhere [Aquinas, *On Metaphysics* 5 lect.12] that two accidents of the same species cannot be together; but that species of a stone as object, the one inflowed, is of the same species as the intelligible species acquired by the soul here in the body; therefore, either that one inflowed will not be able to remain, or it must be that this one acquired here not remain. But the second is false, because since the proper subject of this species is incorruptible, and the species itself can of itself incorruptibly remain, it follows that it will remain; therefore, there will not be given to this [subject] by God or an angel another species of stone and – consequently – either never will it be able to understand a stone, or it will be able to understand through the prior species received from things – which they [Aquinas and his followers] deny.

48. If you say that a species is not given to [a soul] having it before, – it does not seem reasonable, because that perfect species, of the sort that is given to another [soul] not having [it before], this soul may lack; and at least this is held against the opinion, that some intellection will then be through a species previously received from the thing.<sup>29</sup>

49. If you say that infused and acquired species differ in species just as acquired and infused virtue, which are together – this is an axiom, about which in *Ord.* III d.26 n.11, 22, 24-26, 102-111. But let it be that it [the axiom] be conceded to them about the virtues, the proposed conclusion here does not follow, because infused virtue will have another proper rule than acquired [virtue], and from otherness of rule another virtue in species will be able to be posited, because a virtue – in essential idea of virtue – depends on the rule to which it is conformed. And here a difference will not be able to be imagined specific to an inflowed species and to one previously acquired, because there is not here a difference except only of effective principle or of effecting mode; and such difference does not distinguish effects in species, Augustine, *On the Trinity* 3.9 n.20<sup>30</sup> [cf. *Ord.* III d.27 n.11].

#### b. Against the Reasons of the Opinion

##### 50. The reasons of the opinion do not conclude

[To the first reason] – The first [n.40] – for the negative part [n.39] – will either be from four terms, or will not prove the thing proposed, or one proposition will be false.

For if you take for major ‘there must be agreement between receiver and received’ and for minor ‘a material thing outside does not have agreement with the

<sup>29</sup> The translation given here rejects the punctuation and grammatical markings in the printed text, which are hard to make sense of. The argument seems anyway to be that if an infused species is only given to a separated soul that does not have the species already, then first: the separated soul that does not receive the infused species (because it already has the species acquired from things) will lack this perfect infused species, though other souls will have it, which seems unreasonable; and second: this separated soul, which does not receive the infused species (because it has the acquired one), will understand, if it understands, through the acquired species, and this is opposed to the opinion being defended here, that separated souls understand through infused species.

<sup>30</sup> “What is understood from each of two things, perhaps it is one, but those from which it is understood are diverse, as if the name of ‘the Lord’ be written both in gold and in black ink. That one is more precious, that one cheaper; what however is signified by each, it is that thing itself.”



intellect', what follows? Therefore 'the intellect does not receive the material thing outside', – nor conversely; but if you conclude that 'it [the intellect] does not receive *from* the material thing outside', four terms; because this predicate ['does not receive *from* the material thing outside'] was not in the major. But if you take this major – which however you do not put in the *Scriptum*<sup>31</sup> but the first – namely 'there must be agreement between receiver and that from which it receives', I say that there would more properly be said to be proportion than agreement, because the receiver has the idea of acted on, and that from which it receives [has] the idea of agent. Now agent and acted on are proportional, but not properly in agreement, except by extending 'agreement' to 'proportion'; indeed, the proportion of them requires disagreement, because it is required that one be in act such, and the other in potency such.

51. So therefore this new major either will be false, if it be understood of agreement properly speaking, or if it extend agreement to proportion, let it be conceded. And then the minor – 'the external thing does not have agreement in this way [sc. by proportion] with the intellect' – is false: for it is in act, at least virtual, of such sort as formally the intellect is in potency.

52. This is confirmed first, because you concede that the phantasm has such agreement with the intellect, and yet the phantasm is of a condition opposite to that which is received in the intellect, in this that it does not represent but the object as here and now, which [object] is understood, under its universal idea, abstracted from these conditions. Nor does that other agreement, namely that the phantasm is without extrinsic matter, make it that the phantasm is active: for it is truly in matter, that is in an extended organ, and it would as much prevent action on the immaterial intellect from existing in this extended matter [sc. the extended organ] as from existing in that extended matter [sc. the external thing]; but only through this does a phantasm act on the intellect, because it is representative of the object; therefore this the thing itself is equally capable of in itself, because it is equally representative of itself. And this I believe to be true, that although the intellect can abstract from a phantasm remaining without the thing, yet it can immediately take knowledge from the thing outside, as is had in a certain comment in *On the Soul* 3.<sup>32</sup>

53. It is confirmed second, because it follows that an angel could not receive knowledge from the thing, – which was rejected in *Ord.* II d.3 n.383.

54. [To the second reason] – The second reason [n.42] – which is for the affirmative conclusion about that inflow [n.41] – either it is at fault according to a diverse understanding of the middle [term], or it has one premise false. For when you take in the major '[every] middle, to the extent it approaches one extreme, to that extent it more recedes from the other', – if you understand uniformly the middle both to approach and to recede, I concede it; if difformly, it is false. As namely, if it is a middle in being, and it recedes from this extreme in being, it approaches the other extreme in being; likewise, if it is a mean in operating, and it recedes from this one in operating, it approaches the other in operating. But if it is a mean in operating or being, and it recedes from one extreme in being, not because of this will it accede to the other in operating.

<sup>31</sup> Sc. a written version of the commentary on the *Sentences*.

<sup>32</sup> No further reference is given here by the Vatican editors.

55. Now the minor can be understood either of the middle in being, – and it is true, because in some way the soul (even when conjoined [to the body]) has a middle ‘to be’ between separate substance and bodily ‘to be’, and then conclude: ‘therefore the separated soul, when it recedes from the body in being, approaches more to separate substance in mode of being’ (I concede [this]); but from this nothing as to *b*, that ‘it more approaches in receiving the inflow of it pertaining to operation’. And if to this the reasoning were deduced, it is manifest that it does not conclude: for then the soul separated would be more capable of such inflowing than itself conjoined to a glorious body, because conjoined to a glorious body it more approaches to body according to ‘to be’ than itself separated, indeed more so, that is more perfectly, than itself conjoined to a corruptible body.

56. But if you take in the minor that ‘the separated soul more recedes from the body in operating than the conjoined [does]’, – it is false, as from the object about which it operates: for the separated [soul] is as able to know the body as the conjoined is; and therefore it does not follow that it approaches more to separate substance as to knowable object, or as from which it may receive the knowable object.

57. What are adduced for confirmation of this position – one about dream and ecstasy [n.43], another about the statement of the Commentator *On the Soul* 3 [n.44]) – appear figments.

58. For not for this reason are some true things seen in a dream because the soul recedes from the body in operating as from an object: for then the more the dream is deeper, the more would such things more be seen; but this is false, because dreams do not happen in the deepest sleep but in light sleep; then too epileptics would regularly see true things by those spirits.

59. Hence, this foundation seems to be taken from the fictions of Mahomet, who is said to have been an epileptic, and for mendaciously covering over his wretchedness, he said it was necessary for him to fall down when the angel was speaking to him. And according to this fiction of his, Avicenna, reverently speaking of his [Mahomet’s] law, imagines in *Metaphysics* 9 ch.7 such abstractions from sense so that revelation be made by angels.

60. But we Christians do not say that anyone in sleep or ecstasy sees anything, unless there be there some positive cause, as namely that God then act on his intellect; and fittingly is he more then disposed through removal of impediment, because namely he is not distracted about other objects, and vehement occupation about another object impedes intensely operating about this one; indeed, it more seems a miracle that in sleep truth may be revealed than in wakefulness, and this in an intellect not too intent about sensibles, because it is natural that in wakefulness man have use of reason, in sleep not.

61. That second [example], from Averroes [n.44], it is plain that the whole is a figment for the purpose, that that separate substance may receive from higher ones, and yet – as it is conjoined with us – it may not receive. For it is a contradiction that a separate nature could be conjoined with us except in idea of efficient or moving cause; but something active, if in its being it receive something from a superior, insofar as it is active, it is recipient by the same.

#### B. Scotus’ own Opinion

62. To the question therefore I say that the separated soul can acquire knowledge of an object before unknown, and this both knowledge abstractive and intuitive. The meanings of these terms have been stated elsewhere [*Rep.* IVA d.45 q.2].

### 1. About Abstractive Knowledge

63. The first I prove, because on an active and passive [factor] sufficiently approximate an effect can follow, – and if the agent be naturally acting, the effect does follow; and now in a separated soul, having a stone or some object proportionate to it present, there concur here an agent sufficient and a passive object sufficient in respect of abstractive knowledge, or of an intelligible species of such object through which is had abstractive knowledge; therefore etc.

64. The minor is proved, because the agent intellect with an object is sufficient active cause of an intelligible species, and no less with an object outside than with a phantasm (about which these [persons, nn.39-44] concede), because, as was said in arguing against the opinion [n.52], there is nothing in a phantasm, because of which it may be sufficient for causing an intelligible species, without it being more eminently of the thing of which it is the phantasm; and the possible intellect is sufficiently receptive.

### 2. About Intuitive Knowledge

65. Through this reason the second is proved, namely about intuitive knowledge. For the sufficient causes of that are the object in actual existence present, and the agent and possible intellect; all these are able to concur. And so, as it seems, it is proved that it must be that the thing itself immediately suffices for having intellectual knowledge of it, because the phantasm alone does not suffice for intuitive knowledge of an object, because the phantasm represents the thing existing or non-existing, present or non-present, – and consequently through it there cannot be had knowledge of the thing as existing, present in its proper existence. Now this sort of knowledge which is called ‘intuitive’ can be intellective, otherwise the intellect would not be certain about any existence of any object; but neither can this intuitive intellection be had through the species present, because that represents the thing – indifferently – existing and non-existing, present and non-present.

66. And from this it follows that through species alone, infused by God or angels, both intellections are not possible for a separated intellect, because not the second;<sup>33</sup> if therefore that is possible, because even now it is possible, it follows that it will be of the thing in itself, not through such inflow.

67. But the excessive distance of the object impedes this intuitive intellection of the object, because according to Augustine *On Care for the Dead* 15 n.18, “those souls do not know what things are done here unless they learn it from angels or from other souls newly coming to them, who can tell them the things that they knew here,” – in the way that John the Baptist predicted to the holy souls in limbo that Christ would descend to them, as Gregory [*Ten Homilies on the Gospels*, 1.6 n.1]<sup>34</sup> expounds that question of

<sup>33</sup> The second kind is intuitive intellection and the first kind is abstractive, and on the second the first depends.

<sup>34</sup> “John says therefore, ‘Are you he who is to come or do we wait for another?’, as if he were to say openly, ‘As you deigned to be born for men, indicate whether you deign also to die for men, so that I who have arisen as precursor of

his [John's] in *Matthew* 11.31, "Are you he who is to come etc.?" But now, if through infused species they were to know these conditions of the existence of things, there was no need for such things to be announced to them by the saints, angels or souls, knowing these things.<sup>a</sup>

a. [*Interpolated text*]. Now I especially believe that it is impossible for any intelligible species to be equalled in the soul through influx from an angel, because I do not believe that an angel could cause in these lower things any real form, which I understand distinct in location, nor consequently [cause] in the soul an intelligible species (which is a form and a perfect one, though in respect of the object it be called intrinsic): because for the reason [an angel] could impress this [form], it could impress an intellection on the intellect, because an intellection too is a certain form of intention in respect of a real object. Yet in itself it could impress a volition – which none concedes.

## II. To the Principal Arguments

68. To the first principal [argument, n.35] I say that it does not follow the soul is in vain united to the body. For let it be that on account of perfection of the soul this union came about, so that namely it acquired its perfection from such union, it does not follow that it is united in vain if in another way it can acquire it. For if something is ordered to an end, it is not done in vain if in another way the end can be acquired: just as if health can be acquired through surgery and medicine, not in vain is surgery done although health can be had through medicine; so if knowledge can be acquired through the use of the senses and in another way by the separated soul, union is not done in vain, from the fact it fits one way of acquiring knowledge.

69. In another way, and more to the purpose, that the union of soul with body is not finally on account of the perfection of the body nor on account of the perfection alone of the soul, but on account of the perfection of the whole consisting of these parts; and therefore although no perfection can accrue to this part or to that which could not be had without such union, yet not in vain is the union made, because the perfection of the whole, which is principally intended by nature, could not be had unless in this way.

70. To the second [n.36] I say that something is a mean necessary for one virtue which is not a mean for another, speaking of a necessary mean: just as in transferring a body from place to place, where there is some medium necessary for the natural motive power, so that the natural power cannot transfer it from a remote 'where' to another 'where' except<sup>35</sup> through a middle 'where'; and yet that is not a middle for divine power, which can at once transfer it from any 'where' at all to any 'where' at all. So, in the matter at hand, for a perfect abstractive virtue a middle is necessary between the sensible outside and the pure intelligible, namely an imaginable 'to be'; but for a more perfect abstractive virtue this middle is not necessary. Hence the argument [n.36] can be drawn to the opposite, that if the virtue of the separated intellect were more perfect than that of the conjoined, it could without such a middle transfer the object from extreme to extreme.

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your birth am also to be precursor of your death, and am to announce that you are to come in hell whom I have announced are already come in the world'."

<sup>35</sup> The word 'except' or 'nisi' seems necessary for the sense here, though the printed text omits it.

71. Or in another way it could be said that under one of the two extremes falls imaginable ‘to be’, because that is simply sensible ‘to be’. But that extreme has under it diverse things and in diverse degrees, because in some way the sensible thing outside is in a sensible degree more remote from the intelligible than the sensible as it is in imaginable being; but now in some degree in the extreme some virtue can act, and some – a lesser – cannot act, but from some degree nearer. So here, although the abstractive virtue of our conjoined [intellect] cannot act by abstracting the intelligible from the sensible save from this lowest sensible degree, namely the imaginable, yet that higher or more efficacious virtue can abstract from a degree more distant, namely of the sensible thing outside.

72. To the third [n.37]: it is conceded that of anything at all, *ceteris paribus*, knowledge can be acquired

73. And when you say about distance in place that it does not impede, – I reply that it does not follow, because there is required a determinate presence of the object to the power; now this determinate presence a disproportionate distance impedes. And no wonder, because at least ‘an object that is in some way here active’ cannot act on a passive object however far distant; and consequently I concede that knowledge of an object however far distant cannot be caused in a separate intellect, just as neither in a conjoined one.

74. If against this it is objected that, according to Boethius *De Hebdomadibus* [PL 64, 1311], “it is known per se that incorporeal things are not in place” [cf. Aquinas, *ST Ia* q.2 a.1], therefore that not in their operation either do they require distance in place, – I reply: the Philosopher seems to posit that a determinate distance is required for action, even of a separated substance; hence in *Physics* 8.1.267b6-9 he seems to posit that the Intelligence moving the orb is in some part of that orb, from which motion begins, as if, for the action of moving, the local presence – at least definitive – of the mover were doing something. Likewise, in *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6 [*On Generation* 1.6.323a22-31] he means, of intention, that agent and patient are together, – which either is understood of togetherness through contact, where it cannot be greater,<sup>36</sup> just as it is in bodies, according to him, – or where this is not possible, but the other major, namely mutual presence,<sup>37</sup> may be understood of that. But a spirit with a body can have a greater presence than through contact; therefore – of his [Aristotle’s] express intention – the simultaneity through contact will be from mutual presence, and consequently too great a distance impedes action.

### Question Three

*Whether the Separated Soul can Remember Past Things which it Knew when Conjoined*

75. Third I ask whether the separated soul can remember past things that it knew when conjoined.

76. That not:

The Philosopher, *On Memory* 1.450a11-14, posits that memory is a sense power, – and Damascene, *Orthodox Faith* ch.34, ‘On the memorative’, posits the same; but no

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<sup>36</sup> Of two bodies in contact, one body cannot be more in contact with the other than the other with it.

<sup>37</sup> Sc. just above: “a determinate distance is required for action, even of a separated substance”.

sense power remains in the separated soul as to possibility of having the act; therefore etc.

77. Again, the object of the intellect is the universal, *Physics* 1.5.189a5-8 and *On the Soul* 2.5.417b20-22; but the universal abstracts from ‘here’ and ‘now’, ‘has been’ and ‘will be’, and from conditions of this sort respecting existence; and memory respects a determinate condition, pertaining to existence, namely passing by, – therefore memory is repugnant to the intellective part; therefore it does not remain in the separated soul.

78. Again, then it follows that by parity of reason blessed souls would have recollection of all past things, and consequently the soul of a blessed would have recollection of sin committed. The consequent is false, because *Isaiah* 65.16-17: “Behold I make a new heaven,” and there follows “former tribulations shall be handed over to oblivion;” and Gregory [*Moralia* 4.35 nn.71-72], expounding that dictum,<sup>a</sup> because a blessed will suffer no misery; and this memory [of sin committed] would be cause of great misery, because [cause] of great displeasure: for a blessed could not be pleased about any [sin] committed, nor be disposed in neither way, as if neither pleased nor displeased, because neither would this stand with perfect charity, – therefore [a blessed] would have displeasure about something irrevocable, therefore also sadness.

a. [*Interpolated text*] which Gregory expounds [in fact Jerome, on *Isaiah* 18.65, nn.17-18, as cited by Lombard *Sent.* IV d.43 ch.5 n.3], saying, “Perhaps, in the future, memory of former behavior will be altogether destroyed, with every eternal good succeeding, lest there be a part of the evils of former tribulation to remember.”

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79. On the contrary:

*Luke* 16.25, “Son, remember that you received good things in your life, and Lazarus bad things in like manner.”

80. Again, Augustine maintains this on *Psalms* 108.17 “Let his sons be orphans,” and in *Confessions* 9.10 nn.23-25, 4.4. n.8, where he says that the dead have memory of us.

81. Again, if [the dead] did not remember, then they would not have ground for giving thanks to God for his mercy; and this is the argument of Gregory *Moralia* 4.36 n.72 who, basing himself on *Psalms* 88.2 “I will sing the mercies of God forever,” says, “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?”

### I. To the Question

82. As to this question one must ask first whether memory properly speaking (namely, memory that has the job of remembering the past) is in the sensitive part of the soul; second whether it is in the intellective part.

#### A. Things Needing to be Noted Beforehand about Memory Properly Speaking

##### 1. There Exists in us an Act of Knowing the Past as Past.

83. Now, presupposed to these two questions [n.82] is something certain common to both, namely that there is in us some act of knowing the past as past.

84. The fact is plain, because otherwise we would lack the first part of prudence, which according to Tully [*On Invention* 2 n.53] is memory of the past.

85. Second it would follow that the virtuous could not rightly know that they are to be justly rewarded, nor the vicious that they are to be justly punished, for reward and punishment are so carried out because of past good or bad; and, *ex hypothesi*, neither the former nor the latter have knowledge of the past within themselves; therefore justice neither in reward nor in punishment would be known. This conclusion destroys all political life [cf. *Ethics* 8.12.1160a31-36], because it destroys all agreement as to the just imposition of reward or punishment according to law.

86. Again, the past has more of truth than the future (the proof of which is that the truth of the future is contingent, of the past necessary – according to *Ethics* 6.2.1139b10-11: “God is deprived of this alone: to make undone what has been done”). But we can have some knowledge of the future as future (as we experience), otherwise we could not have foresight for ourselves and procure what is suitable for our life and avoid what is unsuitable. Therefore, much more can we have some knowledge, and so memory, of the past as it is past.

87. Taking this supposition as certain (that there can exist in us an act of knowing the ‘past as past’ as object of knowing), I add that the act called ‘remembering’ is not directly of just any past, but only of an act that was present in the one supposed to be remembering and that was in him a human act (to exclude acts of the vegetative power and casual acts or acts generally imperceptible); for I only remember the fact that you sat down because I remember that I saw or knew that you sat down. Hence, although I know I was born or that the world was created, yet I do not remember the one or the other, because I do not know any act of mine in the past being about the one or the other.

88. From this meaning of the term, then, ‘memory’ is knowledge of some past act, and of it insofar as it is past, by the very one who remembers.

89. And certain things follow from the fact that memory is said to be of the past, and some follow from the fact that it is memory of this sort of past object [sc. a past object as past].

## 2. Four Certainties Consequent to Memory, or to Knowledge of a Past Act

90. Now from the fact that memory is of the past, four things follow that are certain.

The first of these is this, that the remembering power acts after passage of time, otherwise it would not be of the past as past, and this is what the Philosopher says in *On Memory* 1.449b27-28. The fact that memory acts after passage of time must be understood per se, so that the act of remembering per se follows the remembered thing; and the Philosopher’s words are: “all memory happens after passage of time.”

91. The second is that the remembering power perceives the flow of time between the instant or time when the object remembered existed and the instant of present perception.

92. The third is that the object of memory, when it is the object of memory, is not in itself present, because then there would be no memory of it as past.

93. The fourth is that since the object must in some way be present to the act of memory, and it cannot be present in itself, it must be present through its species, and then



the remembering power will be a power of conserving the species, and this in the sense of the total power required for memory. For whether there are two powers, one of which conserves the species and the other remembers, or a single one that performs both acts, I care not; at least there is required for remembering the conserving of the species of the object that can be remembered.

### 3. Three Certainties Consequent to Knowledge of this Sort of Past Act

94. Now from the idea of ‘this special object’, namely the past act of the very one remembering, three things follow that are certain:

The first is that memory will be of a double object: one as remote or ultimate object, namely the thing about which the one remembering at some point performed a human act; and the next as proximate object, namely the human and past act tending toward that other object.

95. The second thing is that, since the act of remembering must possess the species [of the object] (and by this meaning the whole complete species required for remembering), the species could not be impressed by the object when the object does not exist or is not present; but the proximate object is the past human act; therefore, while this act existed the necessary species was being impressed. Therefore, since the species of the past human act could not be impressed on any power save the power of which this act was the object, it follows that the act of knowing the past is the object of the remembering power.

96. The third is that no one can have a memory save of his own act, and this a human act, because only through the act as proximate object known is its object as remote object known – and consequently there cannot be memory of an act in another of the same idea as the act there is memory of in oneself.

#### B. First Article: about the Memory of the Past in the Sense Part of the Soul

##### 1. Whether the Remembering Power Knows the Act while it Exists

97. In this regard a doubt can be introduced, and it is whether the remembering power knows the act while it exists, of which act as past, as of immediate object, it is the memory. For it seems that if it does not then know it, neither will it remember it afterwards. But the proof is not necessary, because one sense does not seem to reflect on the act of another sense; and though it not perceive the act of another sense while it is present, there is no clear proof that it will not be able to perceive that act as past after it has passed. At any rate, let the conclusion of this article be examined on the supposition of the above certainties [nn.90-96].

98. It seems that memory cannot be set down as an act of the sense part.

First, from the condition that it perceives time; but “time is nothing but the number of motion according to before and after,” *Physics* 4.11.219b1-2, and this cannot be perceived without collating the after with the before; but the senses are not able to collate, because this is proper to the intellect.

99. Again, it was said in the fourth inference [n.93] that the remembering power must perceive the act while it is present. But the sense power cannot perceive the act of sensing while it is present (at least not universally), because the act of the supreme sense

power cannot be perceived by any sense, neither by a lower nor a higher one (as is plain), nor by itself, because that power does not reflect back on itself or its act, and yet there can be memory of any sensation in us (as we experience); therefore this remembering does not generally belong to any sense power.

100. But since the argument here is from something that was earlier said to be doubtful [n.97], the argument therefore is taken from something else supposed certain as follows: not only does the sense power not perceive first anything but some sensible quality (hence the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.425b17-20, in order to concede that vision is in some way perceived by sight, says that vision is in some way colored), but also it does not receive the proper species of anything other than some such quality. But the sensation of which it is the remembering cannot in any way be set down as a sense quality, because any sensation (whether of color, or sound, or flavor) can equally be remembered; therefore the species required for remembering is not that of any sense as of the receptive power.

## 2. It Seems that No Sense Operation is to be Posited in the Sense Part that Cannot be Conceded to a Brute

101. Again, one should not posit in the sense part any sense operation that cannot be conceded to a brute (the proof of this is that there can be a sense part in some brute that excels as to all the sense acts that we experience); but this remembering cannot be proved to exist in a brute from a brute's acts.

102. Proof of the minor [n.101]:

There are all these acts of brutes we see from which the conclusion [sc. brutes have remembering] could the more be drawn, as those that seem to be acts of prudence or foresight, as is plain of ants gathering grain to the same place and at a definite time (as in summer).

103. Similarly, acts of revenge or exacting justice, as it were, such as yielding to benefactors and punishing those that offend, seem to belong to brutes insofar as they know the past as past.

104. Likewise, third, about acts pertaining to preservation of the species (as the nest-building of birds and feeding young and the like), which do not seem regularly to belong to them without knowledge of the past as past.

105. Fourth, because some brutes are teachable (as the Philosopher maintains *On Memory* 1.430a15-22 and *On Sense* 1.437a9-14), but teaching is not without memory of the past as past.

106. Now all these acts can be carried out without remembrance of the past as past; therefore, no act proves that this act of remembrance exists in brutes.

107. The minor of this argument [n.106] is proved by running through the acts in question.

For as to uniformity with respect to place and time (as appears in ants [n.102]), this can be saved by mere apprehension and retention of a species of what is delightful, without apprehension of the past as past. For if it was delightful to this ant to deposit grain here, and if the delightful species remains in imagination, it will move the sense appetite to seeking it as delightful, and so to coming again to this place. But as to why ants gather at one time and not at another, explanation must be given from the side of

their [bodily] complexion, or why it is delightful for them to gather grain in this way and not in that. And whether this is attributed to natural industry or some other cause, at least this does not prove remembrance of time, for although an ant born this year has never experienced want in winter it gathers in summer just like an ant ten years old (if an ant could live so long); therefore it does not get this act for such time from the remembrance of the past. But if the frequenting of the same place shows it comes from the past, the response is that it comes from the delightful previously apprehended, without apprehension of the past as past.

108. Similarly to the second [n.103], about revenge or benefit from a wounded or placated animal for, in brief, the delightful image of what pleases, or the saddening image of what offends, is formally impressed and always pushes the sense appetite to motion in conformity with the object (namely of avenging or benefiting), at least when any other delightful or saddening thing ceases that was moving more strongly. Therefore, if in the intermediate time this action is suspended by something present, at the end of the time the phantasm at once moves, and there follows in the sense appetite a motion proportioned to the object, which motion did not follow before because it was impeded by some object moving more strongly. There is here, then, no apprehension of the past as past but only of the thing that is past, whose persisting species moves to revenge or thanks when some other thing that was moving more strongly ceases.

109. Likewise about the third [n.104]: because [building nests and feeding young] is delightful to these brutes wherever they are from, it is necessary that at least some intrinsic cause (from a [bodily] complexion disposed or altered now in this way) must convince them to gather such and such twigs for making a nest and for constructing it in such and such way; and this is not delightful otherwise, when their complexion is disposed differently; and from this delight they operate, not from the apprehension of the past as past. The proof of this is that if there were a brute animal propagated in its first year, it would just as much provide for itself things necessary for building a nest as if it were however many years in age; therefore nest building is not from knowledge of the past as past.

110. Fourth, about learning [n.105], this is more easily solved, as it goes along with the second [nn.103, 108]. And it is solved by the fact that, from frequent sensing of things delightful and saddening conjoined, there is impressed on the animal a delightful and saddening phantasm, and in the following way, that when one of them moves it, the other from the conjunction at once moves it. Therefore, when present food moves the appetite to consume, at once the phantasm of a rod beating it moves it at the same time, and consequently moves it as something saddening to be fled from; and if from much frequency the phantasm of the latter is impressed on it as very saddening, the brute withdraws itself from the delightful thing more than the delightful thing attracts it.

### 3. The Contrary Position of Aristotle, which is more Probable

111. These arguments can be responded to by upholding the intention of the Philosopher in *On Memory* [n.76], that memory is in the sense part, and by turning the arguments to the opposite.

112. For first about the perception of time [n.107], the Philosopher concedes it there saying that by the first sense part by which we perceive magnitude we also perceive

time. Nor is it an objection that time is successive, because motion is successive and yet motion is of itself sensible (from *On the Soul* 2.6.17-21); nor is it an objection that time is number, because number is of itself sensible (*ibid.*). Also, the Commentator maintains, *Physics* 4 com.98 ‘On Time’, that if the motion alone of phantasms is perceived, time is perceived. But the exposition of this could be that such motion is perceived by the intellect, not by the power of imagination.

113. To the next [n.108] it will be possible to say that some sense can receive the species of the act of sensing and retain that species after the act passes away and, consequently, it can by that species have an act after passage of time and so remember.

114. And when you make objection about the act of the supreme sense power [nn.108, 99], one can concede that memory of its proper act does not belong to a sense, just as neither does it belong to any other sense to remember its proper act (as is taken from Augustine *Free Will* 2.3 n.9-10), but this belongs only to a superior sense with respect to the act of a lower sensitive part.

115. It can be said in another way, as the Philosopher seems to think (*On the Soul* 3.2.425b17-25), that sight in some way senses that it sees, because sight is in some way colored; and so it could be conceded that the sensing of the supreme sense part is in some way continued under the object of the supreme remembering part. And if you evidence the reflecting of that sense part on itself, this proves no more than Aristotle proves about sight perceiving vision.

116. To the final one [n.109], although the acts of brutes could probably be saved by positing, not memory properly in them, but only imaginative knowledge of the object that is past (though not as past), yet the things we see in their acts are more easily saved by positing memory in them.

### C. Second Article: about Memory of the Past in the Intellective Part

#### 1. About the Authorities of the Ancients

117. About the second principal article, Aristotle seems to say certain things in the book [*On Memory* 1.449b18-21] from which it follows that memory is in the intellective part. For he says that we remember certain intelligibilities, as that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles etc. “because we have learnt and considered them.”

118. A response is given [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 6 q.8] according to Aristotle’s own remark, for later in the same place [*ibid.* 1.449a12-13] he says “memory of intelligibilities is not without a phantasm.”

119. On the contrary: not for this reason must memory be denied to be in the intellect, just as understanding is not denied to be in the intellect and yet, according to his opinion there, we do not understand without a phantasm.

120. Another response [Henry, *ibid.* q.8] is that we remember intelligibilities per accidens; hence Aristotle says there [*On Memory* 1.450a12-13], when speaking of intelligibilities, that intellection will be per accidens. And Damascene (as cited before, n.76), “we remember intelligibilities just as we learn them, but we do not have memory of the substance of them.”

121. On the contrary: any power that knows an act as the act is of an object, in some way knows the object; but this object ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right

angles' as it is a demonstrated and known truth can only be known by the intellect, such that no sense is similarly able to know this act 'I have considered the fact that a triangle has etc.'

122. Again the Philosopher concedes there [*On Memory* 1.450a16-18, 2.453a8-10] that recollection is present only in man (and Avicenna maintains this above [nn.8, 10; *On the Soul* p.4 ch.3;]), because there is a sort of syllogizing in it. From this there is a twofold argument. First, that the knowledge proper to man himself seems to belong to the intellect itself; second, more efficaciously, that knowledge through syllogistic discourse pertains to the intellect alone; of this sort is recollection, for recollection proceeds discursively from certain known things to what has in some way fallen away, which it wants to recover the memory of. And although, because syllogism is always from premises to conclusion, there is no syllogism there (for recollection proceeds from contraries or similars, or from something that has, in its being sensed, an ordering toward what we are looking for), nevertheless neither can such conferring belong to the sense power, as it seems; rather the discursive process and the cognition that terminates it belong to the same power, and recollection terminates this discursive process; therefore etc.

123. An objection against this reasoning [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.4 q.4] is as follows:

The Philosopher [*On Memory* 1.449b6-8, 450b5-12; *Book of Six Principles* 4 nn.46-47] says that some are good at recollection and others bad, because of diversity in the organ; therefore he attributes recollection to the sense part.

124. Again [Henry, *ibid.* a.1 q.10] an argument that recollection is impossible is taken from Themistius [*On Posterior Analytics* 1 ch.1] about a fugitive slave, whereby it is proved that it is impossible to learn anything, because either it was something already known and so it is not learnt, or it was not and so, if it occurs to the intellect, the intellect does not know it to be what it is looking for.

125. This argument there indeed [n.124] lacks evidence, because whatever is necessarily inferred from necessary premises is known by this very fact; nor is it necessary for me to know [sc. first] what I [sc. later] acquired knowledge of, or not necessary for me to know it save in general, because I sought to know whatever I could infer from things I knew.

126. But in the issue at hand there is a difficulty. For the argument goes as follows: has he [the one recollecting] completely forgotten the thing that *a* is [sc. the thing he is looking for] or not? If he has then, if he could through recollection get back to the memory of it, he does not know it to be what he sought the memory of, and consequently he does not recollect it; because in recollecting he remembers it anew, as a thing having been remembered before and forgotten in the meantime. If he has not completely forgotten *a*, then he cannot recollect *a*.

127. The first member of this argument is confirmed by Avicenna from before [n.122]: the desire to remember in particular belongs to no brute, "for if brutes do not remember, neither do they desire to remember." Likewise the Philosopher [*On Memory* 1.450a27-30] seems to posit that memory belongs to the imaginative part, "the habit of which," he says, "we assert to be memory."<sup>a</sup> And Damascene, as above [n.76] says, "Memory is imagination left behind by actualized sense."

a. [*Interpolation*] namely, it is manifest that memory is a part of the soul: when and of what there is imagination, of that there is also memory.

128. For the understanding of these authorities [n.127] I say (as was said before [n.94]) that the act of memory has a double object, namely proximate and remote. Now past-ness is sometimes required in each object as it is object, and sometimes in one of them only.

129. Because the senses do not know their object according to any condition save the one they have when they are sensing, according to *Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a6-7, “when sensible objects are away from the senses, it is not clear whether these objects are or are not,” and so they cannot have memory of their past act as past without also having memory of the sensed object as past, because they have memory of it only in the way it was as sensed when the act of sensing remained.

130. Now the intellect does not require past-ness in each object but only in the proximate one. For because its act can be of something as that something is necessary, as considering ‘a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles’, so its act of remembering this act of considering can have a remote object, not as past, but as always being the same way.

131. As concerns the condition, then, of ‘regarding a past object as past’ [n.88], that is, both remote and proximate object, such that both are known precisely and necessarily as past – memory as concerns this condition belongs necessarily to the sense part and not necessarily to the intellective part, although it could belong to the intellective part, as will immediately be said in the solution [n.136ff.].

132. Another thing [sc. to understand, [n.128] is that memory in the sense part is enough for operation without the intellect, as is plain in brutes; but, conversely, the intellective memory is not enough for operation without the sense memory, just as we cannot understand without a phantasm. And therefore Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 7.10.1036a6-7] would not say that a man is good or bad at remembering because his intellect is good or bad at conserving the species of something previously understood, but because his sense memory (which goes along also with the intellective memory for intellective remembering) is good or bad at retention. For perhaps any intellective memory always conserves the species, but it has not the power for act because the species has been destroyed from sense memory, without which the intellective memory is not enough for operation.

133. Proof of this:

First because what is received seems to be in the receiver according to the manner of the receiver, and consequently, since the intellect is an immaterial power and not changeable by these bodily undergoings [sc. of the senses], it does not seem that its species remains indelibly. For this reason, therefore, Aristotle [n.129] assigns a falling away of species in the sense memory only, because the sense organ is affected or moved in this way or that.

134. The same is proved secondly because, when someone remembers, he must have something remaining in himself through which he knows that thing to be what he first remembered and later forgot (in the way the argument about the fugitive slave proceeded [n.124]). But this something that remains cannot be placed in the sense part, because it has been destroyed, at least it does not remain perfectly or sufficiently for an act of remembering; therefore it is probable that it is the species remaining perfectly in

the intellect. And thus when the species that somehow fell away has been recovered in the sense memory then, by collation of it with the intelligible species that remains, this 'remembered object' is known to be that which was known in memory before.

135. So therefore, as concerns primacy or radicality or sufficiency in itself for acting, memory is not in the intellective part but the sense part, even in our case.

## 2. Scotus' own Explication

136. I say therefore as to this article [nn.117, 82] that memory and the act of remembering properly speaking are in the intellective part.

137. For given that the intellect not only knows universals (which indeed is true of abstractive intellection, about which the Philosopher is speaking, because this alone is scientific intellection), but also knows intuitively what the senses know (for a more perfect and higher cognitive power in the same thing knows what the lower power knows), and also knows sensations (and both these points are proved by the fact that the intellect knows contingently true propositions, and from them it forms syllogisms; but to form propositions and to syllogize is proper to the intellect; and the truth of these propositions is about objects as intuitively known, namely known under the idea of existence under which they are known by the senses) – given all this, it follows that in the intellect can be found all the conditions previously said to belong to remembering: for it can perceive time and has an act after passage of time, and so of the rest [nn.90-96].

138. And the intellect can, in brief, remember any object that sense memory can remember, because it can intuitively know the act (which is the proximate object) when it exists, and so can remember it after it has existed. It can also remember many proximate objects that the sense part cannot remember (as every past intellection and volition). For the proof that man remembers such things is that otherwise he could not repent of evil volitions, nor too could he collate a past intellection as past with a future one, nor consequently direct himself, from the fact that he has studied them, to study other things that follow from them; and in brief, if we do not remember past intellections and volitions, they are destroyed.

139. But no sense can remember these things, because they do not fall under the object of any sense; therefore this remembering is proper to the intellect, and this by reason of its proximate object. There is also another remembering proper to the intellect, not by reason only of proximate object but also of remote object, namely the remembering that tends to the necessary as necessary as to its remote object, of which sort is the remembering that has for remote object 'a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles'; for the proximate object of remembrance, namely the act that tends to such [remote] object, can only be an act of the intellective part.

140. Thus therefore it is plain that some remembering is proper to the intellect by reason of both objects of its act, namely both the proximate and the remote object; also some remembering is, by reason of proximate object, so proper to the intellect that it could not belong to the senses, and some remembering belongs, by reason of proximate object, to the intellect, yet it can belong to the senses (as would be if the intellect has intuitively understood that I am seeing white, and the intellect afterwards understands or remembers that I saw white). Here indeed both the proximate and the remote object could be the object of intellective remembering (for also sometimes there occurs a discursive

collating from such remembering to syllogistic conclusion of something else); however, the past sensation in some sense part, namely the supreme part, cannot be the proximate object save only of intellective remembering, as was touched on in the preceding article [n.98].

141. However, no remembering belongs to the intellect insofar as it understands precisely by abstraction; also no remembering requires, from the fact that it belongs to the intellect, a double past, namely a past in both objects; also no remembering belongs to the intellect as primarily and radically sufficient for an act of remembering.

142. And it is on account of these three conditions, or some of them, that all the authorities of Aristotle and others denying that memory is in the intellective part [nn.118, 123-124] must be understood and expounded.

143. When therefore objection is made against the second argument in this article (which proceeds from the act of remembering, [n.122]), by the fact that the Philosopher posits that there are rememberers and non-rememberers because of disposition of organ [n.123] – the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.125, 128-131], and especially from the third condition [n.116], and it was sufficiently explained above [nn.139-141].

144. As to the objection about the fugitive slave [n.124], it has been solved if it is true that the intelligible species always remains, and the sense species that has in some way been lost is perfectly recovered through a certain collating or use of other like species; for then the fact that this thing now remembered is that thing before remembered (and afterwards forgotten) is known through the species resting in the intellect. It is just as if some species of Peter as seen is resting in the imaginative power, though I never use it, and afterwards when Peter comes into sight I at once recognize it to be Peter by collation with this knowledge (as Augustine teaches *On the Trinity* 9.6 n.10, 8.6 n.9). But if nothing were set down as remaining in such forgetting, by collation with which it could be known that this is what through recollecting was being sought after, it does not seem that it could in the end be known that it is this, more than in the case of the unknown fugitive slave.

145. To the next objection that is set down [n.127], a habit of imagination at any rate is only got from it as to sense memory. For the fact that, besides sense memory, there is some firmness of intellect is plain later from *On Memory* 2.451b2-3, where Aristotle says, “science or sense, the habit of which we say is memory,” ‘science’ stands for the intellect, ‘sense’ for imagination, of which he said before that memory was the habit. However, this authority would require expounding if sense memory were posited to be a power distinct from imagination; but it is not to the purpose to discuss this here.

146. And as to what is adduced from Damascene [n.120] “we do not have memory of the substance of them” – it is true as of past objects, and in this way there is no remembering of them that requires a double pastness.<sup>38</sup>

#### D. Scotus’ own Conclusion

147. As to the question, then, it is plain that, since in the soul conjoined with the body there is an intellective memory, that memory remains in the separated soul, and consequently so does habitual knowledge of everything that remained in the soul up to

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<sup>38</sup> That is, pastness of proximate and remote object. For we have memory of *learning* them (proximate object), but we have knowledge, not memory, of *them* (remote object), n.130.



separation. Consequently too, the separated soul can use what remains for acts of remembering, just as the conjoined soul could, because (as was said in the preceding question [n.16]) all the intelligible forms and consequent operations that could have been had by the conjoined soul will be able to be had by the separated soul. But the sense memory (speaking of the whole power of it) does not remain in the separated soul, just as no sense power remains either. I said ‘whole power’, however, because although the soul is that which is formal in the sense power, yet the sense power formally includes a certain form of the whole that is composed of this sort of mixed body and a soul that perfects it proportionally for acts corresponding to such a whole; and consequently, since remembering belongs to the whole sense part, it cannot belong to the separate soul.

148. Briefly, then, the separate soul can remember all the things that the conjoined soul remembers, because there exists intellective memory of whatever there was sense memory of, on account of the intuitive knowledge that accompanies all sense perceived knowledge; but the separate soul cannot remember with every remembering that the conjoined soul could remember with.

149. If it is objected that the mere species in the intellective memory was not sufficient for remembering in the conjoined soul without another species in the sense memory (as was said in the second article [n.132]), so it is not sufficient now, because it is not more perfect now than before – the response is in the preceding question, in the like case [n.27], because neither can we now use the intelligible species without a phantasm, but then we will be able to, not because of a new perfection but because the order of powers in operating will not exist that exists now.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

### A. To the First

150. As to the first main argument [n.76], I concede that there is sense memory in man, but from this does not follow that there is no intellective memory in him; for what belongs to the perfection of a lower cognitive power should not be denied to a higher cognitive power. Hence if God could have an act after passage of time (and would not have an act stationary in eternity), he could remember; and thus does Scripture concede that he remembers, “Remember, Lord, what has happened to us” (*Lamentations* 5.1), namely insofar as the act that is not in him after passage of time is considered as coexistent with a prior time, and as coexistent now with this ‘now’ as if after passage of time. But the angels, because they do not have all their intellections permanently, can absolutely remember; for it is fatuous to say that Lucifer does not remember that he sinned, or that the good angels do not remember that they had such and such intelligible acts, or had also some exterior acts about a body.

### B. To the Second

151. As to the second [n.77], that authority is speaking of the intellect as it has scientific intellection, of the sort that is abstractive only – and yet the precise cause does not thus come from the nature of the intellect, because the singular can also be understood by that abstractive knowledge, although not by us now (on which elsewhere, *Ord.* II d.9 n.122, d.3 nn.320-321).

152. If you object that a power that does not know the singular as singular does not remember, because a rememberer cognizes something as it is here and now, which is proper to a singular – I reply: actual existence belongs to nature first; hence ‘this nature’ is not formally existent because it is ‘this’, but because of nature; now nature, as existent, is what the intellect intuitively knows, and the knowledge of an existent as existent is sufficient for remembrance of it to be possible. When, therefore, you say that the remembering power knows this as this, I deny it. When you give as proof that it knows something as it is here and now, if by ‘now’ you mean ‘existent’ and by ‘here’ you mean ‘present in itself’, I concede that it knows something as existent in its presence in itself. If so, then there are proper singulars beyond the ‘here’ and ‘now’, so that they can be singulars of nature but not as of a singular – though they are not of anything save what is singular by intrinsic or adjunct singularity; however, they do not include, nor do they per se presuppose, singularity as the precise reason whereby they are present.

### C. To the Third

153. To the third [n.78] it is said in one way [Richard of Middleton] that the blessed remember the sins they committed, and yet it is not a punishment for them but they rejoice in the mercy of God remitting sin and in their freedom from punishment. And this is proved by *Psalm* 88.2, “The mercies of God,” where Gregory says [*Moralia* 4.36 n.72], “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?”

154. On the contrary: although the fact that God remitted Peter his sin includes the fact that Peter sinned, yet these are simply distinct intelligibilities, and the second does not include the first in being (the fact is plain about when Peter did the sin), nor consequently does it include it in being understood; therefore it is possible for Peter’s intellect to stop thus at his having sinned without considering that God has forgiven these sins. And though you may contend one act was never without the other in Peter, yet there are at least two objects and two distinct intellections, and also the intellection that Peter sinned is prior in nature.

155. I ask a question therefore about this remembering by which he remembers that he sinned: which act of will does it follow? Either the willing it or being pleased, or the not willing it and being displeased – or neither, not pleased nor displeased? If the first Peter is evil, because he is pleased with the sin he has committed; if the second, he is wretched, because his not wanting to have happened what he knows did happen causes sadness (from Augustine, *On the Trinity* 14.15 n.21, “Sadness comes from things that have happened against our will” [cf. *Ord.* IV d.14 n.48]). If neither the one nor the other, he is again bad; for if the wayfarer cannot remember with full remembrance the sin he committed without detesting it or being displeased at it (otherwise he sins at least by omission), how much more are the blessed held to do this! For the common reason binds the blessed more than the wayfarer, which reason is perfect love of God, and this love always impels one to hate what is contrary to God when it is actually thought on.

156. But as to what is added from the *Psalm*, and Gregory’s argument from this “How does he sing mercies forever who does not remember his misery?” [nn.153, 78, 81] – I reply: he remembers his misery in general terms, because he now knows he is blessed.

157. I say it is possible for God to destroy every sin totally from the memory of the blessed; nor in this is anything taken from the blessed; rather it would seem to belong

to some accidental blessedness in them. For if the innocent will rejoice over their innocence with a special joy (as was touched on in *Ord.* IV d.1 n.356), though these others not be able to rejoice over innocence (because this would be a false joy), yet their guilt can be destroyed from their memory so that they not have any matter for sadness about it.

158. Also, God is able, while habitual memory of committed sin remains, to preserve the blessed from ever proceeding to actually considering they committed it; and this again would suffice to exclude the proximate occasion for sadness, though not the remote one. Nor would privation of such habitual knowledge make one imperfect in anything because, according to the Philosopher [*Topics* 3.6.119b11-15], it is better to forget certain things, as base things, than to remember them, and this is especially true when speaking of something base one did, the memory of which is penal. Scripture too [*Isaiah* 43.25, *Jeremiah* 31.34, *Hebrews* 10.17, *Psalms* 31.1] says that God forgets sins and that they are covered up for God. And although one should give exposition of this, because of the infinity of the divine intellection which nothing positively or privatively knowable can escape, yet that they are really hidden or forgotten for those who committed them would not be at all unacceptable.

159. If this view does not satisfy, but it is held that there will always remain habitual memory of sins in them and that they will sometimes proceed to actual remembering, then, to avoid sadness, one must say that either God suspends the causality that memory would be of a nature to exercise with respect to sadness (and this is indeed possible, just as God suspended the natural action of fire with respect to the young men in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50]), and then it is a miracle that they are not saddened as often as they remember. Or if a miracle is eschewed, one must say that a natural cause can be impeded by a contrary that excels it so that it not cause its effect, and especially when the contrary totally fills the capacity of the passive thing.

160. Thus, in the issue at hand, joy in the beatific object totally fills the capacity of the blessed, and therefore they are not capable of the sadness that is of a nature to follow this memory. For the beatific object in causing joy overcomes the power of the memory in causing sadness, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 7.15.1154b13-14, "Strong delight expels every sadness, not only the contrary sadness but also any chance sadness."

161. On the contrary: the blessed have a 'not wanting' with respect to the remembered thing, therefore they do not have what they want; therefore they are not blessed, from *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8.

162. I reply: the blessed have whatever they want as regard the present or the future; but as regard the past they do not have whatever they want, that is their wanting it not to have been; and this does not argue misery, because it is impossible for the past not to have been.

#### Question Four

##### *Whether the Blessed Know the Prayers we Offer to Them*

163. Lastly I ask whether the blessed know the prayers that we offer to them.

164. That they do not:

*Isaiah* 63.16, “Abraham did not know us and Israel has ignored us.”<sup>a</sup> And Jerome *On Isaiah* there (look in the original).<sup>39</sup>

a. [Interpolation] There “Augustine says that the dead do not know, indeed the saints do not know, what the living do, even their sons” [*Gloss*, from Nicholas of Lyra].

165. Again, God alone knows secrets; mental prayer, which is most acceptable to God, is of this sort; therefore etc.

166. Again, they do not need to know save for the purpose that they may pray for us; but the consequent is unacceptable, because they are not in state of merit; therefore they cannot pray, because in prayer, per se, consists merit.

167. On the contrary:

This is an error that Jerome touches on in his *Epistle to Vigilantius* chs.4-11.

### I. To the Question

168. Here three things must be looked at:

First, whether the blessed know our prayers by natural cognition; second, whether by supernatural cognition; third, whether, as knowing them, they pray for us.

#### A. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Natural Cognition

169. The first was touched on in the solution of the second question of this distinction [nn.62-67], about how the separate soul can acquire knowledge not only abstractive but also intuitive, not only of sensibles (as the conjoined soul can [n.50]) but also of any intelligibles that are proportioned and proportionately present. What is proportioned to the separate soul is any created intelligible; therefore prayer, whether vocal (which the conjoined soul too could know through the bodily senses) or also mental (which will then be proportioned to the separate soul), it will be able to know intuitively for that ‘then’, provided however that extreme distance not get in the way, which was touched on in the second question [n.67].

170. Nor is it valid to say that the intellect’s own proper act is hidden from every creature, and its act of will hidden for equal reason, because these acts are intimate to the creature and consequently nothing can know them save what is intimate to the creature; such is God alone, who is immanent [in creatures]. This argument is not sound, because it is manifest that my intellect can know every act of my will; but another intellect, created more perfect, has power for the object that my intellect has power for, if a determinate order to other intelligibles, or defect of proportioned presence, does not get in the way.

171. Now the separate intellect is as equally perfect as the conjoined intellect, or more perfect, and it is not by any order determined to not knowing the operations of another intellect or will; nor is the requisite presence necessarily lacking, because this can exist without immanence; otherwise an angel could have no presence made demonstrable

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<sup>39</sup> “You, Lord, who have bestowed so much on your people...that you considered us worthy to be fellows also of your Spirit, now too hear from heaven and see our works, if yet they are worthy of you. Why do you turn your face from us?”

in respect of another than himself, since an angel is immanent to none, for this is repugnant to a creature.

172. As to your saying ‘such operation is intimate’ [n.170] – I reply: essence is more intimate to the intellect than operation, and yet another separate intellect can understand this essence. Nor is it valid to say ‘this is intimate by inherence or, what is more, by being, therefore nothing knows it save what is intimate by immanence’. Indeed, the reasoning seems to proceed as if what is extrinsic to a thing more than what is intrinsic and spiritual could be known by a separate intellect, which is not true; indeed the intelligible essence of a thing or its intrinsic operation is an object more proportioned to the separate intellect than any sense object, because to a pure intellect a pure intelligible is a more proportioned intelligible, provided however it is finite.

173. If you object that the conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object, but operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect, therefore not under the object of the separate intellect either – I reply: it was said elsewhere that the first object of the intellect as it is such a power is more general than the object that moves it in this present state; and<sup>40</sup> any created being is contained under the first object taken in the first way but not under the object taken in the second way. And the reason is that now it is determinately moved by sensibles, or by what is abstracted from them, because of its immediate order to the imaginative power, which will not exist then. Taking first object in the first way, then, the major [sc. ‘conjoined and separate intellect have the same first object’] is true and the minor [sc. ‘operation is not contained under the first object of the conjoined intellect’] is false; taking it in the second way, the minor is true and the major false.

#### B. Whether the Blessed Know our Prayers by Supernatural Cognition

174. About the second article [n.168] I say that it is not necessary by reason of beatitude that the blessed regularly or universally see our prayers: not in the Word (because seeing our prayers is not something that is as it were a necessary accompaniment of beatitude), nor that the prayers be revealed to the blessed (because neither does such revelation necessarily follow beatitude). For beatitude of intellect in created objects does not go beyond quiddities, or things whose seen essence is the necessary reason for seeing them.

175. However, because it is fitting for the blessed to be fellow helpers of God in procuring the salvation of the elect, or leading them to salvation, and to do so in the way that this can belong to them – and for this is required that our prayers be revealed to them, especially those that are offered to them, because these prayers specifically rely on the merits of the blessed as on one who is a mediator leading us to the salvation that is being requested; therefore it is probable that God reveal to the blessed the prayers offered to them or to God in their name.

#### C. Whether, Knowing our Prayers, the Blessed Pray for us

176. About the third article [n.168] I say it seems doubtful, because if it is revealed to them that such and such a person is seeking salvation through them, or

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<sup>40</sup> Punctuating the Latin as in the translation and not as in the printed text, whose sense is obscure.

anything pertaining to salvation, then either they see that God wills such a person to be saved or wills against it or non-wills;<sup>41</sup> if God wills it, then they know such a one will be saved, so they pray in vain; if God wills against it, they won't pray for anything willed against by God; if God non-wills, they know it would not happen, so they would pray in vain.

I reply: the statement 'the blessed pray for someone' can be understood either of habitual prayer or of actual prayer (and we are speaking here only of mental prayer, which is desire offered to God with the intention that it be held as accepted by him). If of habitual prayer, this is perpetual and general for all the elect (but about this there is no difficulty); if of actual prayer, some saint has this prayer specifically when it is revealed to him that someone is invoking him, because it is reasonable that he should want his merits to avail the latter for salvation when he specifically invokes God to help this latter through his merits.

177. Now this prayer is not repugnant to beatitude, because someone who has attained supreme perfection can very well wish that, through his own merits whereby he has attained that perfection, another should attain it by his prayer, so that his merits should be proper not only to himself alone but should, by the benevolence of God's acceptance, avail for another. Just like someone who has attained by his services the supreme degree in friendship of a king could want to pray for others, not so that through that prayer he may attain a greater degree of friendship [sc. for himself], but so that the merits by which he attains such degree may be of aid to others, who have recourse to those merits – and this, on the supposition of his liberality, namely the king's, in accepting them, not only for him but (by the king's liberality) for others, whereby for a lesser good he returns not only a greater good but also more goods, provided however that, by a new act of will, many apply this good to themselves and, as it were, make it their own.

178. When therefore you argue "the blessed see that God either wills or non-wills or wills against" [n.176], I reply: it is not necessary to grant any of these options – not, surely, as to the final salvation of him who prays, but not even as to the hearing of the prayer that he now prays. For this does not follow: God reveals to Peter that John is now asking for *a* through the merits of Peter, therefore it is revealed to Peter that John is to be saved or not to be saved; nor does this follow: therefore it is revealed that John is to be heard or not to be heard in this petition. However let it be that it were revealed to him that this person is to be heard or not heard in this petition; it does not follow that therefore he prays in vain, because just as God wants to save him, or hear him, so he wants to achieve this through determinate means (namely through the prayer of such a blessed). But if it be revealed to Peter determinately that God wills against hearing this prayer, Peter would not be a mediator for John in praying; but if it not be revealed to Peter that God wills nor revealed that he wills against, Peter prays expecting that a determinate revelation of his being heard would follow his prayer, or at least a determinate effect of his being heard as to his own asking.

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<sup>41</sup> Latin has two ways of negating 'to will' or *velle*, namely *non velle* and *nolle*. Scotus uses the first to mean simple negation, or not having an act of will, and the second for positive negation, or having an act of will against something. The English 'I do not want/will' is ambiguous as between these two. To bring out the difference where it is relevant for Scotus' meaning (for *nolle* can sometimes connote simple negation), the translation uses, perhaps a little awkwardly, 'will against' for *nolle* and 'not want/will' for *non velle*.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

179. To the first principal argument [n.164] I say that Abraham, at the time for which *Isaiah* 63.16 is meant, was in limbo, and consequently not blessed, and therefore he did not know his Jewish sons living in the land of Israel; for he did not know by intuitive knowledge (which was impeded by the extreme distance, as was said in that second question, nn.169, 67), nor by knowledge of special revelation, because he did not have that vision in the Word which such revelation regularly accompanies. The argument, therefore, does not hold of the blessed, to whom are regularly revealed in the Word the things that concern them, whether as increasing their beatitude or as pertaining to their causality with respect to the beatitude of others.

180. To the second [n.165] I say that there is not anything in the mind, namely any operation of intellect or will and any property or real condition of either of them, without the whole of it lying open to an unimpeded angel proportionally present, or to an unimpeded soul proportionally present – just as a present whiteness is apparent to a conjoined soul through the senses.

The statement, then, that “God alone knows the hidden things of the heart” [n.165, *Psalms* 43.22] is true universally and by his proper perfection, such that it is impossible that they be hid from him by any impediment. He also knows them as universal Judge of all such hidden things, in this way knowing them as neither the good angels nor the bad angels nor separate souls know them. Indeed, as a matter of fact, the blessed do not know many such movements because of lack of due presence, and the bad angels do not know many such things, even those that are proportionally present, as God prevents them and, because of his prevention, they cannot do many things that yet could not be naturally prevented.

181. To the third [n.166] I say that our prayer now has a double effect: one because it is meritorious for him who prays, indeed is a natural meritorious work; the other because, from the fact it is directed specifically on behalf of another, it is meritorious for him for whom it is offered. And the blessed do not have prayer in the first way but in the second. Nor is it unacceptable for someone, who is now, as to himself, at his final goal, to merit for another by his prayer; just as we see in politics, where a king gives what he wants but he wants to give it through the intercession of another to someone who would not be worthy to be heard immediately; and he most wants to give it if someone intercedes who has most acceptance with him, which accepted person yet merits no greater degree of friendship with him.

182. It could be said in another way (and it returns as it were to the same) that just as someone blessed obtains things for others and not for himself, so he causes merit for others and not for himself; for his prayer is a disposition by way of congruity, so that through it God grants to him for whom he asks what he obtains; and so his merit is not for himself but for him to whom is rendered what, as if in place of an immediate reward, corresponds to this merit.

## Forty Sixth Distinction Overview of Questions

1. “But there is a question here about the very bad...” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.46 ch.1 n.1].

2. Since in this forty sixth distinction God’s justice and mercy are treated of as they come together in the punishment of the bad, four questions are therefore asked: first, whether there is justice in God; second, whether there is mercy in God; third, whether in God justice is distinguished from mercy; fourth, whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.

### Question One

#### *Whether in God there is Justice*

3. As to the first question, argument is given that there is not [justice in God]:

Because in *Ethics* 5.10.1134b9-11 it is said that there is no justice from a lord to a servant because there is no equality between them; therefore much more is there none between God and creatures or conversely, because this Lord most of all could say to his servant what is said in *I Corinthians* 4.7, “What do you have that you did not receive” from me?

4. Again, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b8-27 says that it is unfitting to praise separate substances for works of virtue, as Aristotle argues there specifically about justice [cf. *Ethics* 5.3.1129b25-30a9]; and it is confirmed by a likeness, that there is not temperance in God, therefore similarly not justice either.

5. Again, justice inclines one to render what is owed, but God is debtor to no one.

6. On the contrary:

*Psalms* 47.11, “His right hand is full of justice.”

#### I. To the Question

##### A. First Opinion about the Definition of Justice and its Distinctions

7. Here first about the definition of justice:

8. Its most general idea is posited by Anselm *On Truth* 12, that “justice is rectitude of will, kept for its own sake.”

9. This idea is made specific by justice as Aristotle treats of it in *Ethics* 5.3.1129b30-30a9, who adds (in addition to the above idea) that it is ‘toward another’.

10. And taken in both ways, it is clear that justice belongs to God.

For, in the first way, he has rectitude of will, indeed un-pervertible will, because the first rule is ‘kept for its own sake’ [n.8]. Now insofar as it is ‘kept’, it states a receiving or undergoing with respect to someone who does the keeping, but it is ‘kept for its own sake’, that is always spontaneously held for its own sake.

11. In the second way too the point is plain, because God can have rectitude toward another, and therefore in every act of his toward another there is rectitude.

12. This second rectitude is subdivided, because either it is as it were universal to another, namely as to legislator and law insofar as law is determined by the legislator (and this is called legal justice by some); or it is particular, namely in something determinate belonging to the law, that is, rectitude toward another.



13. And this second one is subdivided, because it can either be ‘simply toward another’ or ‘toward one’s self as other’. And this second member is plain from what is said in the material about penance [*Ord.* IV d.14 n.154, d.16 nn.18-24], that it is punitive justice not only with respect to another simply, but with respect to oneself as other, because punishment of oneself as guilty is conceded to oneself as minister of the judge.

14. The first of these, namely legal justice, could be posited in God if there were another law prior to the determination of his will, with which law (that is, with which legislator as other) his will would rightly agree. And it is indeed this law: ‘God is to be loved’ – if however it is rightly called law, and not a practical principle of law. At least it is a practical truth, preceding every determination of the divine will.

15. Now particular justice, justice ‘to oneself as other’, exists in God, because his will is determined by rectitude toward willing what befits his goodness. And this is as it were the rendering of what is due to himself and to his goodness as other – if however it could be called particular, because it is in some way universal, namely virtually.

16. And these two members, namely legal justice and particular justice toward oneself as other [nn.14-15], are as it were identical in God, because they are rectitude of the divine will with respect to his goodness.

17. If we speak then of the remaining part of justice, which is justice simply to another, it is divided into commutative and distributive – and thus is justice in us distinguished, as is plain from *Ethics* 5.5.1130b10-31a9. In distributive justice equality of proportion is required, not equality of quantity; in commutative justice, according to some, equality of quantity is required not equality of proportion (these are expounded in Aristotle *ibid.*).

18. To the issue at hand:

Commutative justice properly concerns punishment and reward, namely so that rewards may be rendered for merits (as by mutual exchange) and punishment for sins.

19. Distributive justice has regard to superadded natures and perfections, as it were, namely so that the perfection proportioned to nature be distributed to them. Just as in the case of our distributive justice, persons according to their ranks in a republic have proportionally distributed to them the goods pertaining to those ranks, so in the hierarchy of the universe a nobler nature has distributed to it by the hierarchy, that is, by God as prince, nobler perfections or perfections agreeing with that sort of nature, and an inferior nature has distributed to it the perfections agreeing with it.

20. The first of these justices [sc. commutative justice] cannot simply be in God with respect to creatures, because equality simply cannot be in him; but it can in some way be in him according to proportion, as between master and slave. For it befits a generous master to give a greater good than the slave could merit, provided however there is the following sort of proportion: that as the slave does what is his, so the master gives what is his, and does the same by punishing less than deserved.

21. But the second justice [distributive justice, n.19] can exist simply in God, because he can simply give to natures the perfections due to or agreeing with them according to the degrees that perfect them.

22. Thus, therefore, the whole distinction of justice in its genus [nn.10-17], in the way it can belong to God, can be reduced to the two members, so that justice in the first way is called ‘rectitude of will in its order to what befits the divine will’; in the other way ‘rectitude of will in its order to the exigencies of what there is in the creature’. This

distinction can be got from Anselm *Proslogion* 10 where, speaking to God, he says, “When you punish the bad, it is just, because it befits their merits.” As to the second member he adds at once, “when you spare the bad it is just, not because it is appropriate to their merits but to your goodness.”

23. And a distinction so great is put between these members because God cannot operate against the first justice nor operate tangentially to it, but he can act tangentially to the second, though not universally, because he cannot damn the just or the blessed.

24. If it is objected that this and that justice cannot be different in God, because then one justice would be rule (as the first justice) and the other would be ruled (as the second); but in the divine will there cannot be any ruled rectitude. – And there is proof of this in us: the same thing inclines to the end and to what is for the end as it is for the end; therefore if what inclines to the end were simply perfect, it would simply perfectly incline to what is for the end, as is plain of the charity of the blessed; but the first divine justice is simply perfect; therefore no other justice beside it is required in the divine will.

25. As to the remark that sometimes God is not able to act tangentially to the second justice [n.19], it does not seem probable, because he can simply do, and thus will, whatever does not involve a contradiction; but he cannot will anything that he could not will rightly, because his will is the first rule; therefore God can rightly will whatever does not include a contradiction. And so, since this justice determines to something whose opposite does not include a contradiction, God can will and rightly well and act tangentially to this second justice.

26. As to the first of these points [n.24], the objectors would perhaps concede that there is not a double justice in God but only a single one, having however as it were different effects, as ‘willing in accord with what fits his own goodness’ and ‘willing in accord with the exigency of the creator.’

27. But the second argument [n.25] seems clearly to prove that whatever the first justice inclines the divine will toward, the second justice will be able to incline it toward, since it inclines determinately and by way of nature. But it does not so incline without the divine will being able to will against it and tangentially to it; and so there will not be a distinction between these willings as to ‘being able to act tangentially to it’ and ‘not being able to act tangentially to it’.

### B. Scotus’ own Response

28. Without rejecting the distinctions, I say in brief to the question that in God there is only one justice in being and in idea. However, beside this justice, there can, by extension of the term, be a justice, or rather something just, in the case of creatures.

#### 1. About the Justice that is in God

29. The first is made clear in that, since justice properly is habituated rectitude of will, and since it inclines as it were naturally toward another or to oneself as other, and since the divine will does not have a rectitude inclining it determinately to anything save to its own goodness as other (for as to any different object whatever, it is merely contingently disposed, such that it has power equally for this and for its opposite) – since

this is so, the consequence is that the divine will has no justice save to render to its goodness what befits its goodness.

30. Thus too it has one act in being and in idea, to which this justice, which is in reference to its will, determinately inclines; but this act has regard by consequence to many secondary objects (and this in the way stated in *Ord.* 1 d.35 nn.28-33), because the divine intellect, besides having one first object and one first act, has regard to many secondary objects. But the difference between there and here is in this, that there the intellect has regard to secondary objects necessarily, while here the will has regard to secondary objects contingently alone. And therefore, not only does the act here of will, as there of intellect, not depend on those secondary objects, but neither is it necessarily determined to them, as neither is the act of intellect necessarily determined to them.

31. Now if we want to distinguish the act one in being into many acts in idea, (just as there an intellection one in being is distinguished into many intellections in idea as it passes over many secondary objects) – I say that in respect of these acts there are no justices distinct as it were in idea; but neither is there one justice however distinct or indistinct, because a habit inclines to one thing by way of nature (and thus determinately), so that, by this fact, tending to the opposite is repugnant to a power habituated by the habit.

32. But to no secondary object is the divine will thus determined by anything in itself, so that it be repugnant to it to be justly inclined to the opposite of the secondary object; because as it can without contradiction will the opposite of the secondary object, so can it justly will the secondary object, otherwise it could will absolutely and not justly, which is unacceptable.

33. And this is what Anselm says *Proslogion* ch.11, “That alone is just which you want, and that not just which you do not want,” so that in this way, if there be posited in the divine intellect some habit intellective with respect to itself and other things, the divine intellect could be by reason distinguished so as to incline to many secondary objects more than [could the divine will] in the case at hand, because the intellect there is determinately inclined to many secondary objects, not so the will here.

34. However, it can be said that this single justice, which inclines determinately only to first act, regulates the secondary acts, although none of them necessarily, such that it not be able to regulate the opposite; and it does not, as it were, precede the will, inclining it by way of nature to some secondary act. Rather the will first determines itself to any secondary object, and thereby is this act regulated by first justice, because consonant with the will it is made adequate to – first justice inclining it, as it were, in favor of rectitude.

## 2. About Justice in Creatures

35. In a second way, ‘the just in creatures’ is called so from the correspondence of one created thing to another – the way it is just, on the part of the creature, that fire is hot and water cold, that fire goes up and water down, and the like, because the created nature requires this as something correspondent to it; and the way we could say in the case of politics that, though there were justice in the prince alone, yet there would be a just in some way in things to be ordered, namely so that these sorts of things may be disposed in

this way and those sort in that way, because the things themselves, as they are of a nature to come into the use of citizens, demand this.

36. But the first intrinsic divine justice makes no determination for this just [in creatures], whether in respect of first act (in the way this act does not regard this object [the just in creatures]) or in respect of second act, because this divine justice inclines determinately as it regards this object (as was said [nn.31-33]).

### C. Difficulties as to the Definition of Divine Justice, and the Solution of Them

37. Against these conclusions:

First, because this justice cannot be in any will unless this will be inclined agreeably to the dictate of prudence, and consequently to the conclusion of a practical syllogism; but the divine intellect does not syllogize since it does not proceed discursively.

38. Again, the divine intellect apprehends the doable first before the will wills it, and the will cannot disagree with the apprehending intellect; but the intellect apprehends this doable thing determinately, such that it does not apprehend this and that doable thing indifferently, because then it would have erred; therefore the will determinately wills this doable thing, such that it cannot will the opposite if it wills rightly.

39. Again, if it is just for Peter to be saved and God justly wills this, then it is unjust for Peter to be damned, and so, if God can will this, he can will something unjust.

40. To the first [n.37] I say that if in us there can be some moral virtue inclining us to agree with the conclusion of a practical syllogism, much more is there in us a practical habit of appetite that inclines us to agree with the first practical principle, because this principle is truer and consequently more right. But justice, which is in God single in reality and in idea (as was said [n.28]), inclines agreeably to the first practical principle, namely 'God is to be loved'.

41. But if you take this justice strictly, that it does not incline agreeably to the conclusion of a practical syllogism, therefore it is not any special virtue – I concede that the justice that is in God is only as it were a universal and radical virtue, from whose rectitude all the particular justices are of a nature to proceed, though not by necessity.

42. To the second [n.38] I say that the [divine] intellect apprehends the doable thing before the will wills it, but it does not determinately apprehend 'this is to be done', which apprehending is called commanding; rather it offers it as something neutral to the divine will, from which will as a result, when the will determines through its volition that 'this is to be done', the intellect apprehends 'this is to be done' as true, as was said in the material about future contingents, *Ord.* I d.39, *Lectura* I d.39.

43. However, on the supposition that the intellect were to apprehend a 'this is to be done' about something before the will were to will it, just as it apprehends it about this, 'God is to be loved', the inference does not by natural necessity follow that 'it apprehends this and the will cannot disagree, therefore the will by natural necessity wills this'. For the will cannot disagree as to the object (namely so that it will against or will for what the intellect shows to be willed), but in manner of tending toward that object it disagrees or, more properly, is distinguished, because the intellect tends toward the object in its way (that is, naturally) and the will in its way (that is, freely). And those powers always agree that always tend to the same object in their own ways of tending, as

imagination and intellect do not disagree if the imagination tends to the object as a singular and the intellect to it as a universal.

44. To the third [n.39] I say it is like in polities, that the legislator has regard to the simply just in itself (which is the just of the public good), but does in a certain respect have regard to some partial justs, always to be sure in proportionate relation to the former just [of the public good] – and therefore in certain cases it is not just to keep just laws concerning these partial justs, namely when observation of them would tend to the detriment of the public just, namely the well-being of the republic. So God is determined simply toward the public good, not by commonness of aggregation, as in a city, but by commonness of eminent containing, which is the just that befits his goodness. But everything else that is just is particular, and now this is just, now that is just, according as it is ordered toward or fits in with this just [of the common good].

45. I say, therefore, that God can will Peter to be damned and justly will it, because this particular just thing, ‘Peter is saved’, is not required for the public good necessarily so that its opposite could not be ordered to the same public good, namely to fitness with God’s own divine goodness; for that goodness is indeed an end which requires for the end no entity with determinate necessity.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

46. To the first main argument [n.3] I say that there is no equality there simply save to oneself; so neither is there justice there simply save to oneself as other; but the sort of equality can be posited there that can belong to a greatly excelling lord to an exceeded servant.

47. To the second [n.4] I say that there are no virtues there according to what belongs to the imperfection that is in them, but after that which belongs to imperfection is taken away, as is plain in the example adduced about temperance; for the example requires that in a tempered nature there can be some immoderate delight, and this belongs to imperfection. And for this reason we can more properly posit justice there [sc. in God] than temperance, because justice does not require any excess in passion or any such imperfection as temperance requires. However, whether justice as it exists there is a virtue as regard this idea, that it be ‘distinct formally from the will and as it were the rule of it’, or is only ‘the will under the idea of the first rule determining itself’ [n.24], is a doubt; because if the second is posited the argument is solved more, since then justice is not there under the idea of moral virtue.

48. To the third [n.5] I say that God is not debtor simply save to his own goodness, to love it. But to creatures he is a debtor by his own liberality, to communicate to them what their nature demands, and this exigency in them is posited to be something just as a secondary object of his justice. However, in truth, nothing is determinately just, even outside God, save in a certain respect, namely with the modification: ‘as concerns the part of the creature’. But what is simply just is related only to the first justice, namely because it is actually willed by the divine will.

## Question Two

*Whether in God there is Mercy*

49. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the second question: argument is made that there is not:

Because, according to Damascene ch.28, “mercy is compassion for another’s ill;” in God there is no compassion because there is no passion; therefore etc.

50. Again, mercy is prompt to take away another’s misery and to have compassion on him; but God is not thus prompt to take away misery, because since he could take it all away, he would take it all away.

51. On the contrary:

*Psalm* 102.8, “Patient and full of mercy.”

### I. To the Question

52. I reply: mercy in us is a habit or, however it may be called, a form whereby we do not want the misery of another, such that it first inclines us to an act of not wanting misery in another, and this either misery in the future (and then it preserves the other from misery, if it can), or misery in the present (and then it relieves from misery, if it can); and, as a consequence, after this operation it disposes us to passion, namely displeasure at imminent or present misery.

53. As to the second, namely insofar as mercy inclines us to this passion, mercy is not in God. And the name of mercy seems principally to be imposed on the basis of this passion, going by etymological exposition of *miseri-cord* [Latin for ‘mercy’], that is, having a heart [*cor*] for misery [*miseria*], because by sharing another’s misery one has in this a heart for misery, that is, a heart communicating in misery.

54. But as to the operation ‘not wanting misery’ whether present or to come, mercy is properly in God.

55. Proof of this as to imminent misery:

For just as no good happens unless God wills it, so nothing is prevented from happening unless God wills against it; but many miseries capable of happening are prevented from happening; therefore God has an adverse will with respect to them.

Likewise about present misery:

For no misery is taken away unless God’s will is opposed to the misery being present; but many miseries are often taken away; therefore etc.

56. A distinction can be made about this misery, as also about willing misery not to be present; because just as we distinguish in God an antecedent willing and a consequent willing, so could a double ‘willing-against’ be distinguished in him with respect to misery. And just as he always has an antecedent willing as regard the good of a creature, so he always as an antecedent willing-against as regard the bad of a creature, prohibiting it or taking it away, according to the statement of the Apostle *I Timothy* 2.4, “He wants all men to be saved.” But just as he does not always have a consequent willing with respect to good, so neither a non-willing with respect to removing evil. The first [antecedent] non-willing does not belong to someone merciful, but the second [consequent] one does.

57. And it can be distinguished thus, that he has a non-willing in respect of an imminent evil either totally or partially. If in the first way, the mercy is said to be ‘liberating’ mercy, namely mercy that excludes all evil, whether imminent or already present; in the second way the mercy is called partial or mitigating mercy, namely mercy

that does not exclude the whole evil but some part of the evil that is due to this or that man according to his merits. Now mercy in both ways exists in God, because he comes also to the aid of some by prohibiting all imminent evil or by relieving present evil or at least by diminishing the misery due.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

58. As to the first argument [n.49] it is plain that that description of mercy holds as to the remote or ultimate effect of it, namely the ordered passion of suffering along with, which follows from the ordered action of not-willing evil to one's neighbor. But it has been conceded that mercy is not in God as to that remote effect but only as to the proximate effect, which is not-willing misery to be present.

59. To the second [n.50]: mercy does not inflict misery save according to right reason; but now right reason sometimes commands that misery is to be inflicted on some people, so that (according to some) justice in the damnation of the reprobate may appear; and therefore God does not inflict punishment save in the way he has made determination, along with mercy or the command of right reason, that it be inflicted.

### Question Three

#### *Whether in God Justice is Distinguished from Mercy*

60. Proceeding thus [n.2] to the third question; it seems that it is:

Cassiodorus *Exposition on Psalm* 50.16, "These two things are adjoined," and he is speaking of mercy and justice.

61. Again, if they were not distinct but were the same, then both would have the same effect. The consequence is plain, because the same formal principle has only the same effect; but the consequent is false, because the effect of mercy is to set free without merits, the effect of justice is to condemn where there are no merits or to save on behalf of merits.

62. On the contrary:

Augustine *City of God* 11 ch.10, "God is so far simple that he is whatever he has," and this holds of what is said in respect of himself; of this sort are mercy and justice; therefore, God is justice, God is mercy – therefore the one is the other.

## I. To the Question

63. To the question:

When upholding the first opinion set down in the first question [nn.9-27] it is stated [Aquinas, Richard of Middleton] that mercy is a certain part of justice said in the first way, namely the justice that is fittingness with God's goodness [n.26], because it fits his goodness to have mercy.

64. However, when upholding the second approach [nn.28-36], it is plain that justice and mercy are not formally the same, because justice in relation to the first object has regard to divine goodness, but mercy has regard to something in the creature (after having also set aside the just that can be in the creature, namely exigency, because mercy is not in God in this respect, when there is thus something just in the creature). But this

object [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice] do not have a primary regard to this thing [sc. mercy] and that thing [sc. justice] unless in this thing [sc. mercy] and that [sc. justice] there is some distinction or formal non-identity in this thing [sc. object of mercy] and that [sc. object of justice].<sup>42</sup> However, along with this non-identity formally there stands an identity simply, as was said in *Ord.* I d.13 nn.40-43, d.8 n.209 [also d.2 nn.388-410, d.5 n.118].

65. But if a question is asked about the order of justice (taken in this way) in this thing and in that, justice is simply prior by comparison with the objects, in the way object is simply prior to object.

66. But on the side of them between themselves, as they are intrinsic to God, they only have an order in the way that other perfections (which are not formally the same) are posited to have an order – by the fact that one is said to be present really (if the distinction were a real distinction) prior to another, and consequently one is prior, according to this distinction they have, to the other. And with this possible priority is justice prior to mercy, according to the remark of Anselm *Proslogion* 11, “From justice mercy is born.”

## II. To the Initial Arguments

67. [To the first] – As to the first argument [n.60]: Cassiodorus is using ‘two things’ in an extended sense for dualities in a certain respect, according to what was stated in the aforesaid [n.64] *Ord.* d.8 n.209. Nor is it necessary to expound ‘things’ as realities and formalities, because the distinction between thing and thing is like that between reality and reality, or formality and formality.

68. [To the second] – As to the second [n.61], it is said [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.46 pr.2 qq.1, 3] that mercy connotes something other than justice, although the two are simply the same between themselves.

69. But to the contrary: the sort of distinction from it required by connotation is not from it as it is in itself but as it is taken and meant, because for this is connotation required. But the argument requires that there be some distinction between them in themselves as they are causes of distinct effects.

70. Nor is a difference of reason, as is said [by Richard of Middleton, *ibid.*], sufficient for this, because a relation of reason is that by which any effect is really effected. Rather, no real distinction in an effect depends on a relation of reason in the cause, as was proved in *Ord.* I d.13 n.39; but this distinction of effects essentially depends on a distinction in the cause; therefore, the distinction is not one of reason only.

71. I concede therefore, as to the argument, that just as intellect in God is not formally the will, nor conversely (though one is the same as the other by the most true identity of simplicity), so too is justice in God not formally the same as mercy, or conversely. And because of this formal non-identity, this [sc. justice] can be the proximate principle of some effect extrinsically [sc. mercy], the remainder of which effect is not a formal principle in the way in which it would be if this and that were two things; because ‘being a formal principle’ belongs to something as it is formally such.

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<sup>42</sup> The square brackets here indicate my sense of what ‘this’ and ‘that’ in this passage must refer to. They do not represent anything in the Latin text.



72. Against this: the divine ‘to be’ is most actual, therefore it includes all divine perfections; but it would not include them all if there were such a formal distinction there, because whatever is distinct from it formally is there actually, and consequently it is, as distinct, act there, and so the [divine] essence, as it is distinct, does not include every act.

73. Again, if distinct real formalities are there, then distinct realities are there, and so distinct things. Proof of the first consequence: because every proper formality is distinct in reality.

74. As to the first point [n.72], the divine ‘to be’ contains unitively every actuality of the divine essence; things that are contained without any distinction are not contained unitively, because unity is not without all distinction; nor are things that are simply really distinct contained unitively, because they are contained multiply or in dispersed fashion. This term ‘unitively’, then, includes some sort of distinction in the things contained that suffices for union, and yet for such union as is repugnant to all composition and aggregation of distinct things; this cannot be unless a formal non-identity is set down along with a real identity.

75. As to the argument [n.72], then, I concede that the essence contains every actuality, and consequently every formality, but not as they are formally the same, because then it would not contain them unitively.

76. And if you say that it contains as much as can be contained – this is true according to the ‘to be’ of one idea; but nothing of one idea can in a more perfect way than unitively contain many things that are not formally the same.

77. To the second [objection, n.73] one could say that there are as many formalities there as there are realities and things there, as was shown in *Ord.* I d.13 nn.34-35 [cited supra n.70]. In another way, the consequence ‘many real formalities, therefore many realities’ could be denied, just as ‘many divine persons, therefore many deities’ is denied; but the first response is more real.

78. [To the argument for the opposite] – As to the argument for the opposite [n.62], it proves the true identity in God of anything with anything (speaking of what is intrinsic to God himself); but from this does not follow ‘therefore anything whatever [in him] is formally the same as anything else [in him]’, because a true identity, nay the most true identity, that suffices for what is altogether simple, can stand along with formal non-identity, as was said in the cited distinction [n.64; *Ord.* I d.8 n.209].

#### Question Four

*Whether, in the Punishment of the Bad, Mercy Goes Along with Justice on the Part of God as Punisher*

79. Fourth [n.2], the question is asked whether in the punishment of the bad justice goes along with mercy on the part of God as punisher.

80. Argument that it does not:

Augustine 83 *Questions* q.3 says, “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is in authority, since God is greater than any sage, does man not become worse. But he who adds bad to bad makes the whole worse, just as he who adds good to good makes the whole better, *Topics* 3.5.119a23; therefore etc. [sc. therefore God does not add bad to bad; punishment adds bad to bad; therefore God does not punish, therefore *a fortiori* not justly and mercifully either].

81. Again, *Deuteronomy* 25.2: “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be;” but the fault of any sinner at all is temporal and finite; therefore, according to justice, the punishment of anyone at all will be of such sort. So there is no justice in eternal punishment for a temporal and passing fault.

82. Again, just punishment is for correction of the one punished; but no one who is damned is corrected by his punishment. The first statement is proved by the Philosopher *Rhetoric* 1.10.1369b12-14 [cf. *Ord.* IV d.14 n.105].

83. Again, *James* 2.13, “Judgment without mercy will be done to him who did not show mercy;” and Augustine on *Psalms*, *Psalm* 118.151, “You are near, Lord,” in sermon 29, “When God does not pity, vengeance is given;” therefore, in the damned there is justice without mercy.

84. Again, *Revelation* 18.7, “Give to Babylon as much torment and grief as she gave glory to herself and was in delights;” so there is a strict correspondence of punishment with guilt without any remission and mercy.

85. On the contrary:

In *Psalm* 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth;” where Cassiodorus [n.60] says, “These two things are always adjoined in the ways of the Lord.” And in Scripture enough is said about both, as *Psalm* 10.8, “The Lord is just and has loved justice etc.,” and *Psalm* 76.8-10, “God will not forget to be merciful.”

## I. To the Question

### A. The Common Response

#### 1. Exposition of It

86. As to this question, the opinion is with probability held [Bonaventure, Richard of Middleton, Innocent V, Cassiodorus et al.] that in every divine work mercy is found along with justice, according to *Psalm* 24.10, “All the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth.”

87. The reason for this is that an artisan, when voluntarily producing an effect conformably to his own rule, is just, for ‘justice renders to each what is due’ [Cicero, *Nature of the Gods* 3.15, Justin *Institutes* I tit.1 ch.10]; what is most due to an artifact is that it agree with its rule; but God is such an artisan for every creature.

88. Likewise mercy exists in coming to the aid of present need to stop it, and of impending future need to prevent it; but God, when producing each creature thus and so, is coming to the aid of what is in need; therefore etc.

89. In favor of the presence of these two [justice and mercy] together, there is the following sort of congruity: The more that several virtues incline toward some one and the same work, the more is that work perfect, just as, by opposition, the more a work is blamable, the more is it against the inclination or rectitude of the several virtues. Every work of God, as it is his, is most perfect; therefore it comes from every virtue that can come together in the same work. But mercy and justice can come together in the same work, as is plain from the solution of questions 1-3 of this distinction [nn.29-36, 40-45, 56-57, 64-66].

#### 2. Weighing of It

90. But the first reason [n.87], which proceeds from the idea of justice and mercy, takes the works of them very generally; for if justice consists properly in returning what is due, and if nothing is due to an artifact save according to the will of the artisan, it follows that in the production of the artifact there will be no justice strictly speaking; but God is such an artisan with respect to the creature. Therefore, what is taken in the phrase ‘it is due to an artifact to be conformed to its rule’ must be denied when ‘due’ is taken strictly, because God is not in debt to this artifact. But if the phrase is taken to mean that this is required in an artifact for it to be duly fashioned, from this no justice in the producer follows, if he only give freely to the artifact that it be so conformed, without any previous exigency on the part of the artifact – as is the case here.

91. And the reason about mercy [n.88] overly extends mercy to the alleviation or exclusion of any defect whatever, although mercy is only properly for alleviating or supplying defects that belong to misery, and not everything defective is capable of misery.

92. The congruence too about the coming together of several virtues involves a doubt, because it is not certain that in the divine will there can be any idea of any virtue – not only of a virtue non-distinct in reality (this is certain), but of one not distinct formally either, for the will, because it is infinite, suffices for all rectitude of act more than any superadded virtue however distinct in reality or in idea. But if a virtue that is distinct formally from the will be granted there, as wisdom or some intellectual virtue in the intellect, it is not clear that the coming together of several virtues for the same work is required for the highest perfection of the work.

93. Let it be, too, that these reasonings [nn.87-89] prove the conclusion generally about God’s positive works (because manifest rectitude is there, and even exclusion of need), yet, because some evil is inflicted in the punishment of the bad (such that the one punished becomes needier after punishment than before), it does not seem that these reasons equally prove the conclusion in this issue at hand.

### B. Scotus’ own Response

94. Therefore, as to the question, one must see first what the punishment of the bad is; second, whether it is from God; third, whether justice concurs with it; fourth whether mercy does.

#### 1. What the Punishment of the Bad is

##### a. About the Essence of Punishment or about Sadness

95. About the first [n.94]:

Punishment is ‘a perceivable lack of an agreeable good in an intellectual nature’, or ‘a perceivable presence of a disagreeable evil’ in the same. Now the good of intellectual nature is double in kind: namely the good of advantage and the good of the honorable. The useful good, indeed, which is posited as a third, is reduced to either other of these, according as it is ordered toward it. And although sometimes the ideas of the advantageous and the honorable good come together in the same thing (as in the enjoyment of God in the fatherland), indeed although generally everything honorable is advantageous (but not conversely), yet the supreme advantage is beatitude and it would

be advantageous even if, per impossibile, it were not honorable; also, the supreme good is charity and it would be honorable even if, per impossibile, it were not advantageous. Therefore in an intellectual nature there is a double punishment by privation of this double good: the first is called the bad of injustice or of guilt, and it can be called obstinacy in sin; the second is called the punishment of loss, or either loss or damnation.

96. The disagreeable bad in a nature merely intellectual cannot be any operation of that nature taken in itself, because any operation of it at all is agreeable. Indeed, every act of understanding, taken in itself, agrees with the intellect, and every act of willing agrees with the will; and likewise every act of willing-against, taken in itself, agrees with the will, because the will has willing-against as freely as it has willing, and so even when comparing this power with the former [sc. understanding], the operation of one is not disagreeable to the other. So, nothing will be found there [sc. in an intellectual nature] that is disagreeable positively to such nature save a distinct suffering opposite to its operation, or a disagreeable operation – not disagreeable in itself but because it is unwanted; such a passion is sadness. An unwanted operation, and indeed any unwanted thing generally, is cause, when put into effect, of sadness. Such sort of unwanted operation is immoderate consideration of fire, as was said before in d.44 n.7, which is against the command of the will that wills freely to use its intelligence for application now to this object, now to that; but now the intelligence is, contrary to this willing, detained always in intense consideration of fire, whereby it is impeded from perfect consideration of other objects, as was said there [*ibid.*]

#### b. About the Four Forms of Sadness

##### α. About the Privation of the Honorable Good, or of Grace, by Guilt

97. Now the sadness is there [in an intellectual nature] in a fourfold way in genus: double sadness about privation of double good.

One sadness indeed is about privation of the honorable good, or of grace, through guilt. For there is sadness about its own obstinacy in sin, which is the first privation – or at least about the sin committed in life, wherein it is now without remission left abandoned. The sadness is not indeed about this or that sin in itself as the sin is the sort of thing it is, but because the sin is a demerit with respect to punishment of loss; that is, the sadness is not because God is offended, but because, thinking on the fact it was immoderate in appetite, it deprived itself by sinning. And this sadness can properly be called the ‘pain of the worm’, namely sadness arising from remorse about sin committed, not because it is sin but because it is a demeriting cause with respect to the pain of loss.

##### β. About the Privation of the Advantageous Good, namely Beatitude

98. Sadness about the lack of the advantageous good, namely beatitude – this either has no name but can be called all-absorbing sadness, because that of which the desire is most of all present in nature, and specifically in it along with restraint by the justice it abandoned – the perpetual lack of this object of desire, when perceived, saddens totally by way of absorption; or its name is ‘pain of loss’, taken so as to be transitive in construal, that is pain about loss; for to call the mere lack of what is advantageous the ‘pain of loss’ is an intransitive construal.

### γ. About the Double Positive Disagreeable

99. And there is a double sadness about what is positively disagreeable: one about the perpetual detention of fire as definitively locating it [sc. intellectual nature] in a place; another about the detention of the intellect in intense consideration of fire as object. Which two positives, namely two detentions, are not wanted and are therefore disagreeable – not so as to destroy the nature of the power they are in, but in the way it is disagreeable for the heavy to be above and in the way this would be sad for it if it were perceived by it. And these two sadnesses about double detention can be named as follows: the first as ‘penalty of incarceration’, the second as ‘penalty of blinding’ – read as transitive in construal, taking penalty for sadness and the term added in the genitive for the object that causes sadness.

100. In this way, therefore, we have two punishments in genus by privation of a double good, and a quadruple punishment by positing a quadruple sadness, with respect to which there are two positive causes (two unwanted detentions) and two privations (the unwanted and perceived privations).

## 2. Whether the Punishment of the Bad is from God, or about the Four Penalties

### a. About the First and Second Penalty or Punishment

101. About the second article [n.94]:

The first penalty [n.97], namely the continuation of guilt without intermission, which continuation can be called ‘obstinacy’, does not have God for positive cause. For just as guilt, when committed, does not, as guilt, have any positive cause, so neither does it to the extent that guilt as guilt is continued; and, as guilt, it is the first penalty, according to the remark of Augustine *Confessions* 1.12 n.19, “You have commanded, Lord, and so it is, that every sinner should be a punishment to himself;” and there was discussion of this in *Ord.* II d.7 n.92. Now this guilt, as continued, is from God as negative cause, namely as not remitting it. He is not, however, the first cause, but the will itself voluntarily continuing it is the demeritorious cause that God does not remit it – or at least the will itself, when it committed it, demerited, though it not always continue it after the act of the sin.

102. The second penalty likewise, since it is a privation, has no positive cause, but does have God as negative cause, because having him as not conferring beatitude; but this ‘not causing’ of God’s has another cause, a cause of demerit, in the [one punished], namely guilt, whereby it was said [n.97] that this advantage is not conferred on him.

### b. About the Third and Fourth Penalty or Punishment

103. But the two unwanted punishments, namely the two detentions [n.99], are from God, because they are positive realities and consequently good.

And the first detention is from God immediately, at least as it is perpetual, because although fire may detain a spirit as if formally, yet it does not effectively locate him in place, namely neither by effectively detaining him in this ‘where’ nor by

prohibiting him from that ‘where’; nor does a spirit locate himself, at least not perpetually. Therefore God is immediately cause of this definitive, perpetual detention.

And of the other detention, namely of the intelligence in intense consideration of fire, the proximate but partial cause is the fire. Now God is the remaining and immediate cause, because according to the common order of causes, an object should, in acting on someone’s intelligence, have a causality subordinate with respect to his will; but here the object is not subordinate to the will of the spirit himself, rather it moves against his will, as if immediately subordinate to the divine will.

104. These four sadnesses, then, since they are positive effects, are from God, but all are so mediately, namely through the medium of apprehension of the unwanted object.

### 3. Whether Justice Goes Along with the Aforesaid Punishments or Penalties of the Bad

105. About the third article [n.94] I say that since justice is taken in two ways in God (as was said in this distinction, question 1 [n.22]), there is in this punishment not only the first justice, namely because it befits divine goodness to punish thus, but also the second, because this punishment is a certain exigency or just correspondence of penalty to guilt.

106. And this can become clear by running through the aforesaid punishments.

#### a. About God’s Justice in the First Penalty

107. The first punishment [n.97] indeed is not inflicted, nor could it be inflicted justly, since it is guilt formally but a penalty left afterwards, as Augustine says *On Psalms, Psalm 5* n.10, “When God punishes sinners, he does not inflict his evil on them but leaves the bad to their evils.” I understand this of the first penalty, which is the guilt left afterwards, or not remitted, or the abandonment of the sinner in this sort of guilt; and this, in the way it was said to be from God in the preceding article [n.101], is thus justly from him. For he justly abandons or does not remit, whether because the will voluntarily continues to will badly, or because it remained in sin without penance to the end (which time, however, was precisely reckoned to it for penance), or, third, because in wayfaring it sinned, where it deserved by demerit to be thus left behind.

108. Just indeed it is that he who continues malice not be freed from malice by another – and not this case only but he who could have left malice behind and had time precisely reckoned for this and is not corrected in that time but perseveres in evil; for it is just that, when the time has elapsed, he be left to that evil. Third too (which is less evident), if someone by his guilt has thrown himself into an incapacity of escaping, not only of escaping by himself but also by anyone’s help save his whom he then offends, he justly deserves to be abandoned in his incapacity – in the way that, if someone were to throw himself voluntarily into a pit from which he could not get out by himself, or in any way, save by the help of another whom he despises and offends by throwing himself therein, he can justly be left behind in it.

109. These three points are sufficiently clear as to the issue at hand, because someone damned is continually in some bad act of will (as seems probable), and persists impenitent up to the end of life, and offends as wayfarer by tottering into sin from which he cannot escape by himself save only by disposing himself with congruous merit, and

that for this state of life, through the whole of which state he passed fruitlessly without such merit.

b. About God's Justice in the Second Penalty  
α. Exposition

110. The second penalty too [n.98] is from God in this way, that is, negatively, because it is from him as not conferring beatitude. Justly is it from him, because as he justly requires the honorable good in order that the advantageous good be given in return for it, so he justly requires a sin that takes away the honorable good in order that the privation of the advantageous good be given in return for it. And this just correspondence of the privation of the advantageous good with the privation of the honorable good puts that guilt in order, the way guilt can, while it remains, be put in order; for, absolutely, guilt is against order, and therefore it cannot remain in the whole along with the order that can exist in the whole, while the whole remains, unless something be added that the order of the whole requires to be added. An example: rottenness in a bodily member is simply against the good order of the body, because, if it is not taken away, the better order of body that is able to be had cannot stand while the rottenness stands, unless something is applied to it, namely something else that corresponds to the rotten member according to the natural order of the body, that is to say, unless something else is applied that would prevent the sort of communication between the rotten member and the other members that there would be if there were no rottenness.

111. In favor of this is Boethius *Consolation* 4 prose 4 n.21, "The base are more unhappy when given unjust impunity than when punished with just punishment." And no wonder, because in the first place there is no good save the good of nature, which good however is vitiated by the evil of guilt; in the second place, beyond the good of nature there is a good which reforms guilt, that is, the just correspondence with it of the penalty.

β. Two Objections and Response to the First

112. On the contrary:

Between bad and bad there does not seem to be any relation in which goodness may exist.

113. Again, it would be better at any rate if the first bad were taken away than if it remained and another corresponding bad were added, as is apparent in the example about the rotten member [n.110], where expulsion of the rottenness were simply better for the body than were the prohibition of communication between that member and the other ones.

114. As to the first [n.112]: there is a necessary correspondence between false and false, so there is a just correspondence between the bad of the dishonorable and the bad of the disadvantageous.

γ. Response to the Second

115. [Others' response] – As to the second it is said [Aquinas, *ST*, Ia q.22 a.2 ad 2, q.48 a.2 ad 3] that the universe's being better requires that some evils be allowed in it;

and this is taken from Augustine, *Enchiridion*, 8 n.27: “The Omnipotent One judged it better to allow evils to come to be, because he is able from those evils to elicit greater goods.”

116. Again *ibid.*, 3 n.11, “evils suitably placed do the more eminently commend goods.”

117. And this conclusion is drawn specifically in the issue at hand [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.2 a.1, q.1 a.2], because, by the allowance of faults and of punishment for them, the justice in divine effects is apparent, and it would not be apparent if no fault were allowed. Augustine says this in *City of God* 21.12, “The human race is separated into parts, so that in some may be shown what merciful grace is capable of, in the rest what just vengeance is capable of; for neither would both be shown in all of them.”

118. Further, this commending of the good by the juxtaposition of evil is referred back to the glory of the saints [Aquinas, *ibid.* d.46 q.1 a.3], about whom *Isaiah* 66.24 says, “They will go out and will see the corpses of men, and it will be for the satiety of all flesh,” in accord with *Psalms* 57.11, “The just will be happy since he has seen vengeance.”

119. And Augustine treats of this in *City of God* 20.21.

120. It would therefore have to be denied [sc. by those, nn.115-119, who thus respond to the objection, n.113] that it would be better for the universe that the bad of guilt be taken away from the bad [n.113], because then the goodness would be taken away that there is in just punishment, and punishment cannot be just or good if all guilt were taken away.

121. Nor is the example about the rotten member valid [n.110], on the ground that, just as removal of rottenness would be better for the body than the withering of the member with its rottenness remaining, so it would be better for this person that his guilt and punishment be taken away than that the double privation along with such mutual correspondence remain in him, because each privation is bad in itself and bad for him, and worse than the correspondence of this to that would be good for him.

But that correspondence is better in the universe than no such correspondence being in the universe, because a plurality of degrees of goodness belongs to the perfection of the universe – just as it would be better for the moon to have the light of the sun [sc. as its own], if it could have it while its nature remained, but not better for the universe, because then there would not be all degrees of luminaries in the universe.

122. [Scotus’ Response] – Against this:

Neither has the highest nature possible been made in the universe nor will it be made, as is maintained with probability, nor will all possible degrees of beatitude in beatifiable nature be in the kingdom of heaven. If then God will not make, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, all the degrees of goodness that are not only good for the universe but good in themselves and good for those who have them, what necessity is there that, for the sake of the perfection of the universe, there be this lowest goodness, which is in itself bad and bad for him who has it? Indeed, it is worse than any goodness that is in itself good and good for him who has it. Surely it would be better that all such [lowest goods] are taken away and that in their place goods are given that would be good in themselves and good for those who have them, namely their blessedness?



123. This excludes the first reason [n.115]: for greater goods are not elicited from the bad, as it seems, than are the goods that are taken away by the bad. For this depriving punishment is not simply better than the charity or beatitude that is deprived.

124. As to the other point touched on, that ‘evil suitably ordered the more eminently commends the good’ [n.116], it seems that eminent commendation of the good does not require that what is also evil is suitably ordered, since all of it is evil because against order. Nor is there a likeness about diverse colors in pictures, because every color is something positive and moves sight in its own way; but if a painter could leave in one place a vacuum, not for this reason would the picture be more beautiful.

125. The next point, about the manifestation of divine justice [n.117], does not seem to prove the conclusion; for it is a more eminent act, even of justice, to reward him who deserves well than to punish him who deserves ill. Indeed, the lowest justice is vindictive justice, hence its act should never be purely elective, as in the case of reward or exchange, but as it were elective with a certain displeasure. And that act of will is less perfect, because in order for it to be good it should be less voluntary; for a robust choice for revenge is cruelty. Now this inference does not follow: ‘divine justice does not appear in the lowest act that can belong to justice, therefore it does not appear’; rather it more eminently appears in other more eminent acts of justice.

126. The fourth point, namely about the happiness of the blessed [n.118], does not seem it should move us; for just as, according to Gregory *Dialogues* 4, “God, because he is pious, does not feed on torment; because he is just, he is not assuaged by vengeance on the wicked,” so is it much more repugnant to the blessed to feed on torment, because this is attributed to God precisely because of justice, and justice sometimes compels the judge to avenge when another, not a judge, feels compassion for the one punished. But let it be that the blessed are now conformed to divine justice and therefore are happy about the punishment of Judas, surely they would be happier about his glorification if he were beatified? It is plain that they would be; for now Peter rejoices more in the beatitude of Linus [Bishop of Rome after Peter] than in the damnation of Judas; but if Judas were beatified, Peter would be happy about his beatitude just as he is now about the beatitude of Linus.

#### c. About God’s Justice in the Third Penalty

127. Excluding these views then [nn.115-121], and confirming the reasons taken from the words of Augustine [nn.115-118], it can be said that in the third penalty [n.99] the justice of exigency sufficiently appears; for, just as fitting the good is a ‘where’ in the noblest body (a ‘where’ circumscriptively for the bodies of the blessed and definitively for the good angels), but with liberty for another ‘where’ at will (because it is a feature of glory to be able to use one’s motive power for any ‘where’ that is not repugnant to glory), so is it just that the reprobate be placed in the most vile body, which is the earth, and to be limited to that ‘where’ in which they are deprived of motive power – which power they would use badly if they could, because of the malice of their will.

#### d. About God’s Justice in the Fourth Penalty

128. In the fourth penalty too [n.99] there is justice, because as the intellect of the blessed is determined toward seeing the noblest object, that is, the divine essence, and as concomitantly their will is determined toward enjoying that object (with liberty remaining, however, to consider and love other objects, the consideration and love of which do not impede that good), so is the intellect of the bad determined toward intensely considering an object that is disagreeable, because not wanted, and imperfect, because corporeal, and their will determined toward something placed in existence that is saddening, and the liberty to consider and will other things is taken away, by which, when considered and willed, this punishment could be lessened. And the reason both in the case of the good and in that of the bad is that they merited precisely through their intellect and will. And these powers are the noblest of an intellectual nature, in whose perfection or imperfection, by consequence, consists precisely the perfection or imperfection of such nature.

#### e. About God's Justice in the Other Four Penalties

129. Now in the other four penalties, namely the sadnesses [n.100], justice sufficiently appears, because the consummation of the penalty requires sadness.<sup>43</sup> But if about damned men after the judgment there is put, in place of the second detention [sc. the devils' intense consideration of fire, nn.99, 103], burning in fire, and in place of the fourth sadness [sc. sadness about such intense consideration of fire, n.128] pain in sense appetite, then there is justice from the correspondence of this bitterness with the inordinate delight it had in sin.

#### 4. Whether Mercy Goes Along with the Punishment of the Bad

130. As to the fourth article [n.94], as was said in d.46 q.2 [n.57], liberating mercy removes the whole of misery; mitigating but not liberating mercy removes part of what is due. The first is not relevant here, but the second.

##### a. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas α. Exposition of the Opinion

131. For this the following reason is given [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.2 a.2]: "Agent and patient always correspond to each other proportionally, such that the agent is related to action as the patient to passion. Now things unequal among themselves do not have the same proportion to other things unless the other things are unequal among themselves – the way that six and four, because unequal, have the proportion of double to the similarly unequal three and two. Therefore, when the agent exceeds the patient, the action must exceed the passion."

132. And there is confirmation of this conclusion, because we see in all equivocal agents that the patient does not receive the whole of the effect.

133. From this conclusion to the issue at hand the inference is as follows [Aquinas, *ibid.*]: "The giver is disposed the way an agent is, and the receiver is disposed

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<sup>43</sup> There are four penalties of sadness, corresponding respectively to the two penalties of privation and the two of detention [nn.97-99]).

the way a patient is; therefore, when the giver exceeds beyond the receiver, it is fitting that the giving exceed the receiving that is proportionate to the receiver. Now ‘less bad’ and ‘more good’ are reckoned as the same, as is said in *Ethics* 5.7.1131b22-23; therefore as God always gives beyond desert, so he always inflicts bad less than desert.”

### β. Refutation of the Opinion

134. Against this position. First as follows:

If two things have the same proportion to two other things, then, to the extent that one term of the first pair exceeds the other term of that first pair, to that extent one term of the second pair is exceeded by the other term of that second pair; and this holds when speaking of ‘so much’ and ‘as much’ according to proportion, not according to quantity. The point is plain in his example [n.131]: for just as six is one and half times four, so three is one and half times two. But never because the agent or giver in the issue at hand infinitely exceeds the sufferer or receiver does the agent exceed the patient, or the action exceed the passion, nor yet the act of giving go infinitely beyond desert.

135. If you say that, on the contrary, divine action and giving, as far as concerns God himself, is infinite because it is his act of willing – then the argument [n.131] is not to the purpose. For from this does not follow that the agent has some extrinsic causation greater than the passive thing is suited to receive, nor does it follow that something be extrinsically given that is greater than the receiver is fitted to receive; but it only follows that the agent’s action, as it remains in itself, is something more perfect than the reception of it; such would be the case if in the effect were given to the recipient nothing save the minimum that was proportioned to the recipient.

136. Again, his example is to the opposite purpose [n.131]: for if the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent, then: either some other passive object does, and in that case an equivocal agent would always require several passive objects at once; or no passive object does, and in that case the agent will have, along with the effect in the passive object, another effect standing by itself – both of which results are manifestly unacceptable.<sup>44</sup>

137. Hence, although the argument, when it speaks of the action, could be qualified by raising a difficulty in this way, that an action is taken that remains in God himself as agent, yet when it speaks of the effect (in the way the argument here says that the passive object does not receive the total effect of an equivocal agent [n.132]), it is manifestly false; and thus is it false also when it speaks of the action as it is in the passive object [n.133] (the way the Philosopher speaks in *Physics* [3.3.202b19-22]). 138. To the reasoning then [n.131]: either the major is false or the minor,<sup>45</sup> or it equivocates over ‘proportion’, and this when speaking of action as it is something in the passive object.

<sup>44</sup> This argument assumes the premise of the example, namely that the proportion of the inequality is the same on the side of both cause and effect. For if so and if there is no such proportion between God’s action and creatures, then there is an overplus on the side of God’s action that remains to be accounted for, namely the overplus that creatures are unable to receive. This overplus would therefore have to be explained away either by saying that the cause must always have many more things to work on, or by saying that the cause has an effect that stands by itself and is not an effect produced in anything. Both these results seem absurd and ad hoc.

<sup>45</sup> The minor is: “Agent and patient always correspond to each other proportionally, such that the agent is related to action as the patient to passion.” The major is: “Now things unequal among themselves do not have the same proportion to other things unless the other things are unequal among themselves.”

For if [the minor] takes proportion properly, and thus takes it that there is a similar proportion between agent and action and between patient and passion, the proposition is false, as is this proposition ‘the patient exceeds the form received in it as much as the agent exceeds the form given by it’. Nor does this understanding of a like proportion between these four terms follow from the antecedent, that ‘the agent is proportioned to the patient’; for they are proportioned in this respect, that the one is such actually as the other is potentially, where the two are the extremes of one proportion. How can from this be inferred that these two terms have a like proportion to the other two terms, namely action and passion, save by supposing that action is such actually as the passion is potentially? – which is false. But if it takes ‘proportion’ in some way improperly, namely not according to exceeding and exceeded, but in some other way, according to which the major could perhaps have an appearance in some way of truth, then thus is the second [sc. the major] not true, that ‘unequals have a similar proportion only to unequals’ [n.101].

#### b. Scotus’ own Opinion

139. I say therefore that for this conclusion, namely that there is mitigating mercy in punishment, a better foundation is obtained from *James* 2.13, “Mercy triumphs over justice,” because, as was said at the beginning of the solution [n.89], “the more that several virtues come together in some work, the more perfect is that work;” thus, if judgment is from justice and, along with this, from mercy, it is so much the more perfect. Such is the case if, when inflicting something that justice commands to be inflicted, something is remitted that mercy inclines toward remitting; and so mercy triumphs over divine judgment to the extent that divine judgment is more perfect coming from mercy than it would be coming from justice alone.

140. Against this: on the contrary, mercy seems to destroy just judgment, for as vengeance is to be exacted by justice, so must it be exacted in proportion to the fault; therefore, as it would be against justice not to avenge, so would it be against justice not to avenge totally.

141. I reply: to give an undue good is not against justice because it is an act of liberality, and the act of one virtue is not repugnant to another; but to take away a due good is against justice. Now as it is, ‘to give good’ and ‘not to inflict bad’ keep pace with each other as far as justice is concerned; therefore ‘to inflict bad beyond what is due’ is against justice because it is to subtract a due good; but ‘to inflict bad less than what is due’ is not against justice, as neither is ‘to give an undue good’ against justice.

142. On the contrary: the argument still stands, because then ‘to inflict no bad’ would not be against justice, nor would ‘to confer or give the maximum undue good’ be against justice.

143. There is a confirmation, that to this guilt with three degrees of intensity there corresponds, in strict justice, a penalty having three dimensions or parts, *a*, *b*, *c*. From what has been granted, it is consistent with justice that *c* not be inflicted. From this follows, first, that, by parity of reasoning, it would be consistent with justice that *b* not be inflicted (because *b* is not more necessarily commanded to be inflicted than *c* is), and so on about *a*. Secondly, it follows that if justice permits one degree in the sin to go unpunished with its own proper punishment, then by parity of reasoning justice can permit another degree to go unpunished, and so the whole to go unpunished.

144. Look for the response.<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] One must say that justice has a latitude in its degrees beyond which, if God did not punish, he would not be using justice. Therefore, although he could dismiss one degree of the penalty or two, yet it does not follow that he could therefore dismiss any degree, because then he would pass beyond the latitude required for justice. And thus is the response to these two arguments plain [nn.142-43].

It could be said in another way that if he were to dismiss [any degree] he would not be acting against justice absolutely considered, because whatever he did he would justly do, since his will is justice itself, and his will would be acting according to justice, though not ordained justice.

The first solution [first paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from *Ord.* IV dd.18-19 nn.24-26; and the second solution [second paragraph in this interpolation] is taken from the present distinction [nn.29-34].

## II. To the Initial Arguments

145. As to the first main argument [n.80], Augustine speaks of the evil of guilt, not of penalty, because God is indeed the judge of the bad, *Deuteronomy* 32.35, “Vengeance is mine; I will repay.”

146. On the contrary: the proof of Augustine does stand at least, that “A man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority;” therefore much more when God is not in authority, as Augustine himself argues; but a man becomes worse through punishment, because bad is added to bad.

147. I reply: when a first bad stands, the second added bad, though it be worse than it, yet is not worse simply, because not worse in comparison with the universe, whose order requires that the first bad, while it remains, be put in order by another bad. An example: it would have been better for the man born blind in *John* 9.1-41 to have had sight from the beginning, but not better in its ordering to the manifestation of the divine wisdom and goodness. When therefore the phrase “a man becomes worse when no wise man is in authority” is taken, either it must be expounded of the evil of guilt or, if it is about bad simply, one should say that this man does not become simply worse through the added penalty, though he have a more multiple evil, because the proportion of the second bad to the first in him is just.

148. As to the second [n.81], it is said [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.46 q.1 a.1] that if the bad man had lived perpetually he would have sinned perpetually, and therefore he is perpetually punished because in his will he has sinned perpetually. And this is the reasoning of Gregory, *Moralia* ch.19 n.36.

149. On the contrary: someone sins with the intention of repenting; therefore, neither implicitly nor explicitly does he sin with perpetual willingness.

Response: he exposes himself to the perpetuity of sin, as was said in the solution about someone throwing himself into a pit [n.108], and especially so when he remains without penance for the whole time of his life.

150. There is another way of speaking, which seems to be Augustine’s in *City of God* 21.11, where he seems to say that justice does not require a perpetual penalty to be inflicted in order for it to be sufficient for the guilt, but the penalty is perpetual for the reason that the person is perpetual and remains perpetually in guilt. For Augustine says, “What holds of the removal of men from this mortal city by the penalty of the first death, holds of the removal of men from that immortal city by the penalty of the second death.”

And a little before, about certain penalties inflicted in this city, he says, “Surely penalties similar to eternal ones are seen to hold for the manner of this life? Indeed, that they cannot be eternal is for the reason that the life too itself that is punished by them does not stretch into eternity.” He means to say that there is a sort of guilt that does not merit total exclusion from the city, and that this is temporal even in respect of civic life; but some guilt is so great that it merits total exclusion from this civic life, and the intensity of it corresponds to the guilt – but the extension happens to be finite because the life is finite. So, in the issue at hand, mortal guilt deserves total exclusion from the supernal city, but for this reason precisely is it perpetual, that the life is perpetual along with the guilt.

151. The reason for this seems to be that it would be possible for God, according even to the strict rigor of justice, to reckon out a penalty so intense that it would sufficiently correspond to the guilt even if nature were to be at once annihilated; therefore, the fact that an eternal penalty is now inflicted is not because eternity belongs per se to the idea of the penalty insofar as a penalty is equally punitive [sc. gives punishment equal to the fault], but the penalty happens to be eternal because of the eternity of the person punished and of the persisting guilt. And this reason better preserves how “according to the manner of the fault will the manner of the beatings be” [n.81], speaking of the intensity that is per se required in a penalty – infinite extension is accidental to it, for the aforesaid reasons [nn.150-151].

152. To the next [n.82] I say that medicine is double: curative and preservative. Thus is punishment a double medicine: it is inflicted on the corrigible to cure him, and inflicted on the incorrigible to preserve, not him indeed, but others, if it is for the good of the community that some penalties be made determinate by the legislator, and that they be inflicted on the delinquent. And not only in the determination but also in the infliction are medicines preservative for those who are in a state of preservation. But that they are medicines in neither way for the one punished is not repugnant to justice; the point is plain in the civic penalties that are exterminating or determinate for great guilt.

153. To the next [n.83] I say that James’s meaning is about liberating mercy, and likewise Augustine’s.

154. To the next [n.84]: the ‘as much...as’ does not deny equality of quantity but equality of proportion;<sup>46</sup> that is: let him who has glorified himself more inordinately than another be punished more than another in like proportion. Thus, even if the reward exceed merit, he who has merited more than another is proportionately rewarded more – “which may He grant us who lives and reigns God for ever and ever.”

## Forty Seventh Distinction

### Question One

#### *Whether there is a Future Universal Judgment*

1. “A question also accustomed to be asked is how sentence of judgment will be given” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.47 ch.1 n.1].

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<sup>46</sup> An obscure point and argument.

2. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether there is a future universal judgment.

3. That there is not:

*John* 12.31, "Now is the judgment of the world."

4. Again, *Nahum* 1.9, "God will not inflict punishment on that very thing twice."

5. Again, Augustine *Epist.* 99 to Hesychius ch.1 n.2, "The state in which a person's last day will find him is the state in which the world's last day will find him."

From all these authorities, along with the addition that each one's judgment is when he dies [cf. *Hebrews* 9.27, "It is appointed for man once to die, and after that the judgment"], it follows that no other judgment may be expected.

6. The thing is proved by reason, because a sentence is only handed over to be carried out after the final judgment, for in vain would judgment follow the carrying out of the sentence; but the damned will be damned and the blessed will be blessed before the day of judgment; therefore, execution will happen before judgment of the sentence that is then to happen; so the judgment would happen then in vain.

7. Again, *Psalms* 1.5, "The impious will not rise up in judgment."

8. Again, *Matthew* 19.28, Christ says to his Apostles, "You will sit on twelve thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel;" therefore the Apostles will not be judged.

9. And in favor of this is Gregory, *Moralia* 26.27 on *Job* 36.6 (and it is in Lombard's text here in d.47), that "in the judgment there will be four orders;" one of the orders is those who will judge and not be judged.

10. On the contrary:

Augustine *City of God* 20.21, speaking of the end of the book of the Prophet *Isaiah* [66.22-24] says, "The prophet himself promises the ends of the Church, which will be reached through the last judgment when distinction has been made between good and bad." There he treats at length of the words, "All flesh will come to adore in Jerusalem in my sight, and they will go out and see the members of the men who sinned against me," using the *Septuagint* translation that he commonly used. And at the end he adds, "In the good 'flesh' and in the bad 'members' or 'corpses' are spoken of; assuredly it is made clear that after the resurrection (faith in which is wholly confirmed by these words for the things) there is a future judgment when the good and bad will be separated in their confines."

## I. To the Question

### A. About the Divisions of Judgment

11. I reply:

Judgement is taken in general for any certain knowledge, and in this way are the senses called a judgment when they distinctly apprehend an object or distinguish an object from an object (where perhaps a more distinct apprehension is required). Hence in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b12-15, the common sense is said to judge of the sensible objects of the diverse senses.

12. In another way is a judgment said to be a certain intellectual apprehension, even any apprehension at all; and in this way definitive knowledge of anything can be called a judgment about the quiddity of the thing, according to the remark in *Ethics*

1.1.1094b27-28 that “Each person judges well what he knows, and of these things is he a good judge.”

13. Judgement is said still more properly of any true proposition, for, according to Augustine, *On Free Choice* 2 ch.14 n.152, “no one judges about eternal rules but in accord with them judges other things;” therefore a judgment is a certain apprehension of something through something else. Now every true proposition is apprehended to be true through something else, because if it is an immediate proposition it is still judged true through the ideas of the terms, according to *Posterior Analytics* I.3.72b24-25, “We know the principles insofar as we know the terms.”

14. More properly still is judgment said of a proposition that is a conclusion, because judgment is passed on a conclusion not only through the terms but through a principle.

15. Judgment is said of a practical conclusion yet more specially than of a speculative one, because a judgment is a dictate of the practical intellect consonant with justice, and justice does not regard matters of speculation but of practice.

16. Again more specially: since a law not only determines things to be done and avoided, but determines the rewards to be given for good merits and the punishments to be given for bad merits (so that from love of rewards men may be drawn to acting well, and from fear of penalties or punishments drawn away from acting badly), judgement is more properly taken as a certain determination about rewards or punishments to be given than as a determination about other practical truths. Now although anyone could elicit these truths from practical principles and thus make judgment by a process of reasoning, as it were, yet still judgment is more strictly taken as it pertains to him who has authority to make determinations, according to the remark (Gregory, *Decretals* II tit.1 ch.4, Gratian, *Decretals* p.2 cause 11 q.1 ch.49, Justinian, *Code* 7 ch.48 nn.1, 4), “A sentence passed by one who is not judge of it is null.”

17. The most complete idea, then, of judgment rests in this, that it is ‘complete and authentic determination of rewarding someone according to his merits’. I say ‘complete’ as to firm determination of the intellect and effective determination of the will, that is, of a will that is able and intends to reward according to the determination of the intellect. And this is what is specified by the word ‘authentic’, because by this is understood that it belongs to him who, according to his effective volition, can bring into effect the determination of the intellect and the determination of the will.

18. From this is in general plain the division of judgment into that of approval and that of condemnation; because certain things can be manifest to a judge from which things it follows in particular that this man is to be rewarded (namely because he merited well) or to be punished (because he merited badly); and the first sentence is one of approval and the second one of condemnation.

19. Next to these, two other sentences sometimes follow in us: namely if worthy merits be asserted for someone and the judge find the things asserted not true, a sentence follows rejecting him from the reward; likewise if some things worthy of punishment are asserted against someone and they are found not to be true, a sentence follows of absolution or of absolving him (namely, ‘we pronounce such a one, accused before us, to be innocent’).

## B. About the General Judgment



20. On the second point,<sup>47</sup> I say that when judgment is taken most properly [sc. as practical judgment about reward and punishment, n.17], and according to each member of the division [sc. approval and condemnation, nn.18-19], there will be a general judgment. No demonstrative proof can be had for this, because it is less known than the resurrection and yet, as was said above [n.18], the resurrection cannot be demonstrated.

21. But elements of congruity can be set down.

The first is of this sort, that it is congruous for all the bad to be finally separated from the good, for ‘the bad does not live with the good save either for the purpose that the bad be corrected or that the good be exercised by the bad’, according to the remark of Augustine [*On the Psalms*, ps. 54 n.4]. But now there will come a final determination, where neither the good are to be exercised nor the bad corrected, so it is congruous for a general sentence to be finally passed; therefore congruous too for there to be a general judgment so that this general separation may appear just.

22. The second congruity is that although there is justice in the secret judgments that are made about individual persons, yet it is not manifest to everyone; therefore, it is reasonable that God have some general judgment in which the sentence or justice may be manifest that he has used in particular judgments.

23. The third congruity is that just as things come from the first efficient cause, so are they led back to the first as to their end. But besides the special goings forth of things from God through the operation that Christ speaks of in *John* 5.17, “My Father works until now, and I work,” there was one universal going forth in the first creation of things. Therefore, by similarity, it is congruous that besides individual returns to their end, there is one final return to their end and, in consequence of this, one final sentence of separating out, because the bad are not made to return.

24. The fourth, and it is nobler, is that besides the fact that each one is ascribed for the kingdom or to jail, the whole multitude foreseen to be for the kingdom and the whole other multitude for the jail should at some point be determined for the possessing of it, so that there may thus be a separating of the two families or two cities, as Augustine treats of through the whole of *City of God*.

25. So although now this person and that are individually ascribed for the kingdom, now this one and now that one for the jail, yet it is congruous for there to be a general judgment by which the whole multitude foreseen for the kingdom be sent to possess that kingdom, and the whole other multitude be left behind for the gloomy jail.

### C. About the Acts of Judgment to be Passed that Precede and Complete it

26. About the third:<sup>48</sup> in this judgment there will be something preceding it, namely the making known of the merits and demerits because of which such and such a sentence will be passed; and something else that completes it, namely the bringing in of the sentence and execution of it (though the passing and execution could be distinct).

<sup>47</sup> The three points [per n.26], which are not expressly explained by Scotus, seem to refer to the three parts of the topic: future, general (universal), judgment. So the first point is about what is meant here by judgment [nn.11-19]; the second is about its generality; the third [n.26] is about its future being, or about how it will be carried out.

<sup>48</sup> See previous note.

## D. Doubts about the Universal Judgment

### 1. First Doubt

27. The first doubt is whether the judgment happen in time or in an instant and, if in time, whether brief or not brief.

It is possible, indeed, that all the merits of each individual are made known to everyone, so that, as regard the manifestation of them, it is a miracle. However, let each intellect be dismissed to its own natural mode of understanding – and then, in such manifestation, a long time would be required for successive understanding of the merits first of this one, second of that one, and so on about each.

28. It is, secondly, possible that to each will be made manifest his own merits or demerits in particular, and the merits and demerits of others in general.

29. And this in two ways:

Either such that each does consider individuals, yet this one as just and to be rewarded because of merits conceived in general, and that one as unjust and to be punished because of demerits conceived in general.

30. Or, in another way: not by conceiving individual persons in particular and their merits in general but conceiving both persons and merits in general, namely by conceiving that all those left behind on earth are reprobate and justly to be condemned, but that all those caught up with Christ in the clouds are just and to be rewarded.

And of these two ways the first would require a long succession, because the consideration of all persons one by one (though without consideration of all the merits) could not be done at once by the created common intellect without a miracle.

31. In a third way in general, or fourth in particular,<sup>49</sup> it would be possible that, by the divine power (not only as manifesting things but as causing an act or acts of knowing), distinct understandings of all merits (and this as to all persons) exist simultaneously in each intellect; for things that are not repugnant formally and that can be received by some intellect successively can, by divine power, be received simultaneously by the same intellect.

32. And if this last be posited [n.31], then the preliminary stage need only be in an instant, and next the following completion, namely the sentence passed, if pronounced vocally, must be in time. If passed only mentally, it will be possible for it to be in an instant, not only as to Christ pronouncing it but as to those for whom or against whom the sentence is pronounced; for Christ would be able to make them conceive in an instant such and such a sentence.

33. About this fourth way [n.31], if the verdict there will be vocal, or the pronouncement of sentence vocal, the thing will be in time; but if it will be in an instant, both must be merely mental. And the possibility of it was already stated [n.8], because it seems more in agreement with the Gospel [*Matthew* 25.28-46] that the verdict and the pronouncement of the sentence will be vocal – whether the verdict is made manifest to individuals suddenly, or in a short time or a long time.

### 2. Second Doubt

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<sup>49</sup> The first possibility, n.27, is particular only. The next two, nn.28-30, are both particular and general. Hence this next way, n.31, is fourth in particular and third in general, provided the distinct understandings in question are of merits shown either in particular or in general.

34. Now as to the place, some say [Richard of Middleton] that it will be in the valley of Josaphat, according to *Joel* 3.12.

35. But the Apostle *I Thessalonians* 4.17 plainly holds that “the good will be caught up to meet Christ in the air;” the bad will be left behind on the earth, and consequently the good will not be in the valley of Josaphat. Perhaps the bad will be there, or round about in as much space as will be able to contain them. For it is perhaps conjectured by someone [Richard of Middleton] that the Judge will not go lower down in the air that he was at the Transfiguration or the place where he was transfigured before his apostles, in which transfiguration he displayed a sign of his future glory.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

36. As to the first argument [n.3], there follows in that place, “Now will the prince of this world be cast out” – the prince, namely the devil, who up to the coming of Christ ruled as prince in the world, although tyrannically. Therefore, the judgment of the world, which Christ says is ‘now’, was for that casting out, because sentence was pronounced that the devil was to be cast out through Christ’s passion.

37. As to the second from *Nahum* [n.4], and likewise as to Augustine [n.5] and the argument that follows [n.6], I say that each individual, insofar as he is a private person, is judged, even finally, when he is at the end of the life pre-established for him. But insofar as he is a part of the family destined for the royal court, or of the family destined for prison, he will be judged along with others in the final judgment.

38. And hereby is plain the response to the statement of Gregory about the four orders in judgment [n.9]:

The perfect, indeed, as regard the verdict preceding the sentence, will not be judged; nor will they, or others, be judged in the judgment that pertains to them as private persons; but the sons of the Kingdom will, in the saying from *Matthew* [25.34], “Come, you blessed of my Father, inherit the Kingdom,” be judged in the general judgment as heirs of that kingdom.

Infidels likewise, will not be judged as to the preceding verdict, for they will not be judged in the general judgment; but in the saying [*Matthew* 25.41], “Depart, you cursed,” they and others, against whom the verdict is pronounced, will be judged in common as members of the prison. And then will joy accrue to each of the elect, beyond what he had in the particular judgment, because each one will rejoice in the integrity of his city; and some punishment will accrue to each of the damned, beyond the particular judgment assigned him, because the completeness or fullness of the prison will crowd each of the prisoners in.

39. As to the passage [n.7] from the psalm “The impious will not rise up in judgment,” it is true – they will not rise up “to life,” according to what was said to Antiochus in *II Maccabees* 7.14, “But for you there will be no resurrection to life.” And this is plain from what is added in the psalm, “nor will sinners rise up in the council of the just” – whether what is taken there is ‘of the just’, that is, ‘God’s counsel about the just is that they be perpetually beatified’, or whether what is taken is ‘council of the just wherein they take counsel’, the ‘council of the just’ is in all things to agree with the divine will, and in that council the impious will not rise.

## Question Two

### *Whether the World is to be Purged by Fire*

40. Secondly I ask whether the world is to be purged by fire.

41. That it is not:

Because then fire, the same fire, would be purged by fire, and so the same thing would purge itself, which is unacceptable.

42. On the contrary:

In *Psalm* 96.3, “Fire will go before him,” (and it is adduced in Lombard’s text).

#### I. To the Question

##### A. Needed Preliminaries

43. I reply:

This conflagration, or purgation by conflagration, which is predicted in many authorities and especially *II Peter* 3.11-12, is possible for God in many ways, because it is possible for him in every way that does not involve a contradiction.

44. But let inquiry be about what way is more consonant with the nature of the parts of the universe:

It can be that some fire be newly created and of great or small size; and it can be that it is at once in some total breadth and thickness about the earth, and only everywhere by motion round the earth.

45. And both of them can be: namely the first, that fire be generated, and the second, that it be generated in some determinate part above the earth and not everywhere save by motion round the earth. Let enquiry, then, be about these two points, namely production of the fire and the place of the production or conservation or continuation.

##### B. About the Production of Infernal Fire

46. About the first point: If the fire is posited as created, it is necessary to posit that an equal amount of some other corruptible body is annihilated; or that in the whole corporeal or incorporeal substance a compressing occurs that corresponds to the quantity of this created fire; or it is necessary to posit that this created fire is together with some other body. Also, if it is posited as created, and consequently created from some other thicker body (for fire is the most subtle body among corruptible bodies), it is necessary to say that some other corruptible body is as much compressed as the body from which it is generated is rarer, or that, conversely, a rarer body is converted into a denser one proportionate to this quantity.

47. Therefore, if it were generated from air, either air would have to be converted into water, or water into earth, in as great proportion as would cover the spreading of the generated fire.

48. The thing is plain in an example: For let it be that the whole sphere of air be divided into ten parts, from one of which the fire is generated; and the fire has ten parts each one of which is equal to that [one part of air] from which the whole fire is generated – where will the nine parts [of the remaining air] have their location? Either two bodies

must be together, or they must be compressed (or other bodies standing around must be) until they do not fill up the place of nine parts [of air]. But if this happen by the conversion of these nine parts into water, a place for the converted fire will be obtained even though there be no compression of anything else; because those nine [parts of air] do not generate one part of water, but almost do,<sup>50</sup> which [one part of water], along with nine previously generated parts of fire (one of the parts is located in the place of the air corrupted into fire), fill the whole place of the ten parts of air. And then there would be a flood of water along with the flaming of the fire, though not in as great a quantity as is the flaming of the fire; for the water would exceed the preexisting water in a part that is a tenth of the generated new fire.<sup>51</sup>

### C. About the Place of Infernal Fire

48. On the second point [n.45]: Since fire only remains outside its sphere in continuous generation (according to the remark of the Philosopher, *On Youth and Old Age* [5.470a3-5], “it is always coming to be”), how would it persist in any complete sphere round the earth? How also would it purify things, since purification is only by the consuming of something impure, as of vapors or other such mixed bodies, in which there is impurity of air?

### D. More Probable Solution

50. Briefly, then, as to the first article, it seems more probable that, just as fire can exist outside its sphere in foreign matter, namely in an ignited body, as burning coal or flame (not that the form of fire is truly in the solid parts, unless it be posited that disparate specific parts together perfect the same matter, which seems unacceptable), so can the vapors existing in the air be ignited by juxtaposition [sc. with the sphere of fire]. And this successive ignition, now of these vapors, now of those (at least for all the air placed above the habitable region of men), can be called the conflagration.

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<sup>50</sup> If ten parts of air are assumed to produce, on conversion, one part of water, then nine parts of air will produce, on conversion, something less than one part of water.

<sup>51</sup> Scotus follows the prevailing view, derived from philosophical tradition, that the elements of the physical world are the four of earth, water, air, and fire, with earth being the grossest and fire the subtlest, and with earth at the center and the others round it (in progressive order of subtlety) at different levels or spheres. His example is complex, nevertheless, in expression, but it seems to amount to the following. The whole of the existing air is divided into ten parts and one of these parts is converted into fire. The converted fire itself has ten parts and, being less dense than air, these ten parts together fill up the space of all ten parts of air even though only one part of air was used to generate the ten parts of fire. So, there are nine parts of air remaining that have no place left to exist in. Either then they occupy the same place as the generated fire (so that more than one body is in the same place), or the air is compressed, or other surrounding bodies are, until the nine parts of air no longer fill up the same place as before. If this compression happens by conversion of the nine parts of air into water, and this water fills the same place as one part of air or a bit less (and so the same as one part of fire or a bit less), there will be a flood of water that exceeds any pre-existing water by a part that is equivalent to a tenth part, or a bit less, of the generated fire.

The oddity here is that this new water will be in the same place as a tenth part, or almost, of the fire. For the fire converted from one part of air occupies the place of all ten parts of air, so that the nine parts of air not converted into fire and now assumed to be converted into one part or less of water (and so compressed into the equivalent of the place previously occupied by one part or less of air) must occupy the place occupied by one part or less of fire. The flood will indeed be a flood.

51. And by it is the air well purified, because ignited bodies are converted at once into true and pure air. Since the air is predominant in its region, and since the ignited body, because of mutual contrary qualities in it, namely fire and vapor, resists the air a little (for it also in a way acts for the destruction of itself, but non-ignited vapor was not thus at once convertible by fire into pure air), it is apparent how flame thus has power for purifying gross air. For by the preceding action of an ignited body, and a body having a fiery quality in its watery self and having substantially the quality of water, the gross air is disposed by the containing body so as to be at once converted into what contains it. And thus is pure air generated, which was not able thus to convert into itself a larger amount of gross vapor.<sup>52</sup>

## II. To the Initial Arguments

52. To the argument [n.41] I say that fire always remains pure in itself with natural purity, because it is supremely active (such that it would at once convert into itself anything of an extraneous nature that would ascend to that region [of fire]), and because nothing rises by the action of heavenly bodies to the region of pure fire, so as thus to make fire impure. Now it is specifically this impurity from the smoke of sacrifices offered to idols and from infection from the sins of men that does not ascend to the sphere of fire, because neither that smoke nor any other infection from impure acts can ascend to the fire. But this purifying is posited because of the impurity of the air that is contracted from acts of human sin; therefore, it does not follow that the fire purifies itself.

## Forty Eighth Distinction

### Question One

#### *Whether Christ will Judge in Human Form*

1. “A question also accustomed to be asked is what form Christ will judge in” [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.1 n.1].

2. About this forty eighth distinction I ask whether Christ will judge in human form.

3. That he will not:

Judging belongs only to someone who has power and lordship over the one judged; Christ as to his human nature is our brother; therefore he is not lord.

4. Again, Augustine *On John's Gospel* tr.19 n.15 [or *Gloss ad loc.*, Nicholas of Lyra], commenting on *John* 5.21, “The Son makes alive those whom he will” (and it is in Lombard's text [*Sent.* IV d.48 ch.3 n.2]), says, “Not the Father but the Son raises bodies,

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<sup>52</sup> According to the traditional theory of the disposition of the four elements in their pure state, earth is naturally below water which is naturally below air which is naturally below fire. Impure air is impure by containing earthly elements, but when earthly elements (body) are burning, they take on the quality of water (dissipating and becoming fissile, even exuding water), and so rise from the earthly to the watery element, that is, to the element next to the element of air. The previously impure air is now without most of its grosser elements and also now next to the element of air, by contact with which it becomes at once pure air. Thus can fire purify air of its grosser elements so that it becomes pure air.

according to the dispensation of his humanity, wherein he is less than the Father.” And he adds, “But according as he is God he makes souls alive.” But judging pertains more to the soul than the body; therefore, it does not belong to Christ save as he is God.

5. Again, if he will judge in human form, then either in glorious form or in non-glorious form.

If in glorious form, two unacceptable things follow: first that the glorious body could be seen by bodily eye, and that a non-glorious bodily eye, because the damned will see him, according to *John* 19.37, “They will see him whom they pierced;” second, that then the damned would delight in the vision of that glorious form (for what is delightful, present, and perceived by sense, causes delight); but the damned will have no delight in seeing the Judge, but grief and fear.

If the second [in non-glorious form], this seems contrary to *Luke* 21.27, that he will come “in great power and majesty.”

6. On the contrary:

*John* 5.27, “He has given him power to judge, because he is the Son of man.” Therefore, the power of judging is given him as to his human nature.

7. Again, *Job* 36.17, “Your cause has been judged as that of someone wicked; therefore, may you undertake the judgment and the cause,” is said of Christ, and the first part is only true according to his human nature; therefore etc.

## I. To the Question

### A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

#### 1. Exposition of the Opinion

8. Here it is said [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.48 q.1 a.1] that Christ will judge in the form of a servant.

9. The reason is of this sort, that: “judgment requires lordship in the one who judges, according to *Romans* 14.4, ‘Who are you, who judge the servant of another?’ Therefore, it belongs to Christ to judge in the respect in which he has lordship over men; but he is lord of men not only by reason of creation but also by reason of redemption. Hence *Romans* 14.9, ‘For Christ died and rose for this, that he might be lord of the living and the dead’. Therefore, power of judging belongs to him in the nature in which he is redeemer.”

10. Again: “The judgment is ordered toward this, that some may be admitted to the kingdom and some excluded. But the attaining of the Kingdom does not belong to man because of the goods of creation by themselves, for the impediment coming from the sin of the first parent has supervened on them, and if this impediment were not removed by the merit of the redemption, no one would be admitted to the Kingdom. Therefore, it is fitting that Christ, insofar as he is redeemer, should preside over that judgment in his human nature, just as that judgment, by the favor of the redemption displayed in that nature, introduces into the Kingdom.”

11. This is confirmed by *Acts* 10.42, “He has been constituted by God judge of the living and the dead.”

12. And from this is deduced further that: “since by the redemption of the human race in general the whole of human nature is made better, as is contained in *Colossians* 1.20, ‘Making peace by the blood of his cross, whether things in heaven or things that are

on earth', therefore has Christ through his cross merited lordship, and so judiciary power, not only over men but over every creature; hence *Matthew* 28.18, 'All power has been given to me in heaven and on earth'."

13. But it is added that he will not in his deity appear terrible to everyone in judgment, because he could not appear without joy, and the impious then will have no joy.

14. The proof of the first point [n.13, sc. he could not appear without joy] is that: "in something delightful can be considered the thing that is delightful and the reason for its delightfulness. And just as, according to Boethius *De Hebdomadibus*, 'that which is can have something over and above its 'to be', but the 'to be' has nothing admixed with it besides itself', so can 'the thing that is delightful' have something admixed with it because of which it is not delightful; but that which is the reason for delightfulness can have nothing because of which it not be delightful. Therefore, the things that are delightful by participation in goodness, which is the reason for delightfulness, are able not to give delight when apprehended; but it is impossible that that which is goodness in its essence not give delight when apprehended."

15. This [n.13, sc. the impious will then have no joy] can be confirmed through the *John* 17.3, "This is eternal life, to know thee;" therefore eternal life consists in that vision. But eternal life cannot be had without joy; therefore, in no way is conceded to the reprobate that which eternal life consists in.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion in Itself

16. Against the first conclusion of this opinion [n.8]. It is one thing to say 'Christ will judge *in* human form' and another to say 'Christ will judge *according to* human form'. For this proposition is true, that 'Christ in human form creates souls', but not this one, 'Christ according to human form creates [souls]'. Rather, whatever he made (namely whatever the Word made from the time he assumed human nature, because he did not, in his act of making, set aside his human nature), he made in his human nature, unless you restrict the phrase 'in his human nature' to mean what is meant by 'according to his human nature', where is to be noted not only the concomitance of the human nature with the act, but the causality of the human nature with respect to the act.

17. If you understand the remark 'Christ will judge in human nature' in the first way, the question is not other than the same as this one, 'whether, when he judges, he will set aside his human nature'.

18. Therefore, in order for there to be a question, another understanding must be obtained, which is more properly expressed thus, 'Christ will judge according to his human nature'. But this is false when speaking of 'to judge as principal judge'. Proof: principal judgment (as can be got from what was said above in the preceding distinction [d.47, n.17]) is the perfect and proper determination of what is to be rendered to someone according to his merits; but this perfect determination includes a perfect dictate of the intellect that this is to be so rendered, and a complete determination of the will through an efficacious willing that is sufficient of itself for the execution of what has been determined.

19. But Christ according to his human nature cannot have such a willing with respect to the reward to be rendered to a person judged, because he cannot have principal



command efficacious for uniting any soul to the beatific object, for according to Augustine *On Seeing God* 6.18 [quoting Ambrose *On Luke*] “It is in God’s power to be seen; for if he wills, he is seen; if he does not will, he is not seen.”

### 3. Rejection of the Conclusions of the Opinion

20. As to the reasons for this conclusion [nn.9-15], they do not prove it as regard principal judgment [n.18], because Christ did not, through the act of redemption, merit principal lordship with respect to man [n.9].

21. Proof: for Christ as he is redeemer possessed the idea of a cause that is meritorious for us; but a cause that is only meritorious cannot be a principal cause; for it only causes because it is accepted by some more principal cause, which principal cause, because of what it has accepted, does the principal causing. Therefore, let it be that, because of the redemption, we are bound to the Trinity as to supreme Lord by some new right, beyond the right of lordship that the Trinity has from creation (which would be true if redemption, as accepted by the Trinity, were as great a good for us as creation) – still, it does not follow that it is by reason of the redemption that we are obliged to Christ as supreme Lord according to his human nature.

22. Likewise as to the second point [nn.10-12, 19], because, insofar as he is redeemer, he does not introduce as principal introducer but only as meritorious cause.

23. Against the second conclusion [n.13]: an absolute naturally prior to something else can without contradiction exist without that something else; the vision of the divine essence is something absolute, at least as to any relation to joy, and is naturally prior to that joy, for an object does not cause delight if it is not first apprehended. Therefore, the vision of the essence could, without contradiction, exist in someone without delight.

24. Nor would the Philosopher deny this save because he would posit a simply necessary conjunction of causes in the universe, such that (according to him) it is simply necessary for the first cause to act along with second causes, according as it can act along with them. But by acting along with an intellectual nature (to the extent it can act along with it), an intellectual nature that already sees the divine essence, delight follows, because by acting along with the proximate cause of that effect it is, as far as it itself is concerned, necessitated to that effect.

25. But theologians deny this proposition: ‘whatever a second cause, as far as concerns itself, is necessitated to, the first cause is necessitated to’; because they deny that the first necessarily acts, as far as it can, along with the second.

26. The reasoning [n.14] is not valid; for it only proves that the idea of delightfulness, which is goodness, cannot not be delightful. But the conclusion does not hold that ‘therefore it cannot not cause delight’, because ‘the delightful’ asserts something in itself, or if it states a respect, only an aptitudinal one, which necessarily follows the foundation; but ‘to cause delight’ states a contingently causable later effect, especially because of the divine will’s contingent determination for acting along with the delightful thing itself.

27. To the confirmation from John 17 [n.15], I reply (without the authority’s gloss [sc. Aquinas’ gloss there]), according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b26-27, “An act of intellect is life;” therefore an act of an eternal intellect is eternal life – if actually so, actually; if aptitudinally so, aptitudinally. But now the vision of the divine

essence, if it were conceded to the damned, although it would not be eternal actually, yet it would be so aptitudinally (as far as concerns the side of the possible act or power), or it would be apt to be eternal, and therefore to be eternal life; but if you infer from this, ‘therefore it would be beatitude’, the conclusion does not follow.

28. Rather, if you say that Christ says that ‘in this is beatitude [sc. and not ‘eternal life’], that they know you etc.’, then you do not accept the text of the Gospel but a certain gloss of a more particular understanding of the letter of it. So if you wish to weigh the word precisely without any gloss, the solution is that the word is ‘eternal life’; but if you wish to argue through certain glosses that it is speaking of beatitude, then it is permitted for me likewise to add a gloss that does not distract the text: ‘to know you’ by loving and enjoying.

#### B. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

29. To the question. Taking as supposition (from d.47 n.17) that judgment is a complete determination of that which is to be rendered to someone for his merits, and that this complete determination includes a perfect determination of the intellect about it and a perfect ‘willing’ of the will (efficacious willing [nn.18-19] not just any willing), it follows that ‘to judge as principal’ includes ‘to dictate as principal’ and ‘to have efficacious willing as principal’. But nothing is said to do something as principal that is subordinate, in its acting, to some second thing as principal; therefore, ‘to judge as principal’ only belongs to an intellectual nature whose intellect is not subordinate to some other in its dictating, and whose will is not subordinate to something in its efficacious willing – which efficacious willing can be said to consist in so commanding the willed thing that on the command the effect follow.

30. But as it is, the intellect of Christ’s soul is subordinate to divine truth in dictating, and especially about things about which there can only be a certain dictating if it follows from rules determined by a divine will contingently disposed with respect to them (of which sort are all things that regard the beatitude and misery of those to be judged). But the will of the soul of Christ is subordinate to the divine will in rightly willing; and to the extent it efficaciously wills something by commanding it efficaciously (such that by its command the thing come about), it is necessarily subordinate to the divine will, because the will of his soul is not omnipotent. Therefore, it is impossible for Christ according to his human nature to judge as principal. For, in brief, the whole of created nature together does not have efficacious command with respect to the fact that ‘this soul sees God’. I call ‘efficacious command’ a command on which, from the command itself in itself, and not from another cause, the effect follow. Nor would the will of Christ presume to command as principal that Peter will be blessed, but only to command in subjection to the true author, as that the command become efficacious from another as the superior, in virtue of whom the command is made.

31. In another way ‘to command’ can be taken, not as being such altogether principal commanding, but as a commanding by commission or in subjection to the true author, a command excelling with a singular excellence, namely an excellence by which there could not be by commission any authority that is higher.

32. And in this way I concede that Christ judges according to his soul, for although it could be committed to a pure creature that its intellect would rightly dictate

about retribution, and that its will would rightly will, and that on its right willing would always follow the happening of the thing willed (although not causally from itself, but from the divine will always enforcing that efficacious willing) – yet it could not be committed to a pure creature that its every willing would be fulfilled by the same [created] person, because then a pure creature would be omnipotent. Therefore, the highest commission possible is that not only would everything that was determined by the will infallibly come about, but that it would come about by the same person whose will it was, so that thus that person would have an efficacious command, whose created will determines in its own order as much as it can the coming about of something.

33. In this way does the will of Christ's soul make determination with subordinate authority and with this sort of subordinate commission, because although that will not command as principal, just as it is not lord as principal, however it does well give command (as having lordship with respect to what is commanded) but it commands as commissioned (because it commands as having lordship subordinate to the supreme lordship of God) – and yet it does so command that its command has, from that person, complete efficacy. And if someone attribute another authority of judging to the soul of Christ, it seems to be blasphemy, by attributing to created nature what is proper to the Creator.

34. Now this way, just as it does not concede omnipotence to the soul of Christ, so neither does it deny to it the highest excellence that can belong to a creature.

35. Nor should the authorities adduced for the opinion (*Romans*, “that he may be lord of living and dead,” and *Acts*, “judge of living and dead,” and *Matthew*, “all power has been given to me” [nn.9, 11, 12]) be understood of principal, but of subordinate, lordship and judiciary authority or power, yet of the most eminent kind that can exist under the principal.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

36. To the first argument [n.3] I say that Christ as man has power the most eminent by commission, but not principal power; and so it does not belong to him as man to be principal judge.

37. As to the second [n.4], the remark of Augustine is stated by way of appropriation, as the Master expounds in the text [*Sent.* IV d.48 ch.3 n.3]; or one can say that the making alive of souls belongs to the deity alone, and this whether as to first life, which is justification, or as to perfect life, which is beatitude. But the resuscitating of bodies and judgement can belong to the man Christ as commanding, although with command subject to the true author, because he can have a less principal dominion with respect to bodies, at any rate when taking ‘resurrection’ for the preparatory stages that are carried out by the ministry of angels; for Christ has efficacious command with respect to the power of angels. Similarly, he will have himself, even according to his human nature, efficacious command for passing sentences.

38. To the next [n.5] I say that he will appear in glorious form, because from the fact of his having been once glorified, he will never be not glorified, just as after his resurrection he will never be not immortal (*Romans* 6.9, “Death will no longer have dominion over him”) – and so on about the other things that belong to the glory of the body. But if you take the ‘appear’ not for ‘what sort of body he will have in himself’, but

for ‘what sort of body will be seen by those to be judged’, one can say that the glorious form will be seen by the blessed; for they will already in the judgment be blessed who were even in the body the elect.

38. But about the bad there is a difficulty. It can be said either that they will not see the glorious form, indeed not any form (and then it will be necessary to give some exposition for ‘they will see him whom they pierced’), or that they will see Christ in his glorious body. Nor does any delight follow from this, because it is very possible for the vision of an agreeable object to be separated from delight, as was touched on against the other opinion [of Aquinas, n.26]; nor is it unacceptable for a non-glorious eye to see a glorious body (see on this the material about endowments in d.49 [*Rep.* IVA d.49 q.11, esp. nn.3-4]).

40. But against this: if the verse is brought forward from *Isaiah* 26.10, “Let the impious be taken away, lest he see the glory of God” – there is a sort of dialogue there between God and the prophet, which latter brings allegation against the impious ‘lest he see the glory of God’ [cf. Jerome *On Isaiah* VIII 26 nn.10-21]; and this remark from that place, “within the land of the saints let them see,” is the word of the prophet, according to those who read the text as falling under the same prophet.

41. In another way there is a better reading, such that there is an allegation by the prophet against the impious, “he has done iniquity in the land of the saints,” and then follows as a question a word of the Lord, “and they will not see the glory of the Lord?”, as if he is saying, “may they not see?” The prophet replies, “Lord, let your hand be exalted so that they do not see.” God replies, “Let them see, so that the zealous of the people be confounded.” And this last ‘let them see’ is referred to the eternal vision, not only to vision in the judgment; and then the ‘let them see, so that they be confounded’ does not belong to the same thing, but ‘let them see’, supply: ‘let the impious converted through mercy see’, and from this comes ‘let the zealous of the people be confounded’, because by a sort of zeal they do not want mercy to be shown to the impious.

42. But if the passage be taken only about vision during judgment, then the understanding can be that ‘the impious even then are not adjudged fit to see glory’, that is, the glorious form of Christ’s body, ‘and let them be confounded’, because the vision will rather cause confusion and sadness than delight. However, the sense of the text is more about vision in the form of deity than of humanity.

## Question Two

### *Whether in or after the Judgment the Motion of the Heavenly Bodies will Cease*

43. I ask second whether in or after the judgment the motion of the heavenly bodies will cease.

44. That it will not:

In *Genesis* 1.14 it is said: “Let there be lights etc., and let them be for signs and for times, and for days and years,” and they seem to have been made for this end; but this cannot be had without the motion of them.

45. Again in *Genesis* 8.22, “For all the days of the earth, summer and winter, night and day, will not rest.”

46. Again, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b22-24, “The sun always acts, and the stars and the whole heaven; and there is no need to fear lest they should at any point stop, which some fear about nature.” And he adds a double proof as it were:

47. The first is this [*ibid.* 24-30]: “Nor do things that always act always labor.” And he treats more of this reason in *On the Heavens* 2.1.284a14-18, which reason rests, as it were, on this: ‘No agent ceases to move unless it is wearied in doing so’.

48. Another reason he touches on there [*Metaphysics, ibid.*], “For motion is not in these corruptible things as to potency of contradiction [sc. motion is not in them as something that could either be or not be], so that the continuing of the motion be laborious,” as if the minor were as follows: ‘These movements are not fatiguing, because there is no potency of contradiction in them’. And further he proves this supposition there [*ibid.* 27-28], “For matter, substance, and potency (and not potency in act) are cause of this, namely of contradiction.”

49. Again, the universe will not be more imperfect after the judgment than it is now; therefore, the principal bodies of the universe will not then lose any of their proper perfection; but motion is a proper perfection of the supra-heavenly bodies, or it is required for their perfection, because otherwise their motion would be vain.

50. Again, the motion of the heaven is either natural or violent; it is not violent, because “nothing violent is perpetual,” *On the Heavens* 1.2.269b7-9. Such motion, if it is natural, can be perpetual; therefore, the opposing rest is violent, and consequently it will not be perpetual.

51. On the contrary:

In the text [of Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.4], “Then there will not be change of day and night;” and he proves it from *Zechariah* 14.7, “There will be one day that is known to the Lord; not day and not night.”

52. Again, Isidore [Ps.-Isidore, *On the Order of Creatures*, 5. nn.6-7] and it is in the text [of Lombard, *ibid.* ch.5 n.6]: “After the judgment the sun will receive the reward of his labor; and neither sun nor moon will set, but will stand in the order in which they were created, lest the impious in prison, placed beneath the earth, enjoy their light; hence *Habbakuk* 3.11, ‘Sun and moon have stopped in their habitation’.” So Isidore.

## I. To the Question

53. In this question one must see first what the Philosopher thought, second what the theologians thought.

### A. About the Opinion of Aristotle

54. About the first point the answer is sufficiently plain from his intention, in diverse places, that he thought the motion of the heaven would last perpetually. For this he posited one reason, in *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a17-23, as follows: “If it is necessary to reckon that every impassible substance has been allotted the best end, there will be no other impassible substance besides these,” besides these that are active causes of local motion.

55. From this the argument goes: if the best end of a separate substance is in causing the local motion of a celestial body, and if any such substance cannot lack its end, then it cannot not move.

56. This reasoning is derided by some [Richard of Middleton] who do not understand it as the Philosopher posed it, because even according to the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-8, *Metaphysics* 11.7.1064a33-b5, the perfection of these separate substances consists in speculation of truth; so their end even according to him is not, the way he seems to take it here, to move a body

57. But the procedure in this objection begins from an equivocation:

For the end in one way is the end that perfects, and thus is beatitude in the intellect or the will posited as the internal end of a separate substance, and the object of that act is posited as the external end (and this is what Aristotle himself understood in the *Ethics*, *ibid.*); and this end is the end simply.

58. In another way the end is said to be the ultimate result of the perfection of a thing, although it not be perfective of the thing. And in this way the Philosopher would say that not only are those separate substances perfect in themselves, but that from the fullness of their perfection it is necessary that they communicate that perfection to others; and thus are they allotted not only a first end but a second. This second end cannot be had without the motion of some celestial body.

59. This reasoning [n.55], thus understood [nn.57-58], can be formulated as follows: the most perfect substance does not lack anything that belongs to substance from the perfection of substance, whether that is the intrinsic perfection of it or the communication of its perfection outwardly; but to substance from the perfection of substance belongs that it not only be perfected in itself but that it communicate its perfection to another – by producing it; therefore this belongs most of all to impassible substances.

60. But they cannot produce any substance save by moving the heaven. This Aristotle himself supposes as having been made clear, in *Metaphysics* 7.2.1028b18-21, against the ideas of Plato.

61. That this is the mind of Aristotle and of the philosophers is accepted by Avicenna in his *Metaphysics* 1 ch.3, where he maintains that, in one way, metaphysics is useful for the other sciences because it directs and rules them (in which way too it can be conceded that a lord is useful to a servant, according to Avicenna there). But conversely, when taking ‘utility’ properly, it only belongs to another thing in view of an end; and in this way are the other sciences useful to metaphysics, and the servant useful to the lord. Therefore in the same way it will be possible, since ‘utility’ is equivocal, for ‘end’ also to be equivocal, so that to utility said in the first way there correspond the end that is the term and not the end that consummates, and to utility said in the second way there correspond the end of perfection.

Hence no philosopher posits that a necessity of externally acting belongs to the separate substances as if the things produced were to perfect the producing substances in some way; but that it is from the fullness of the perfection of those substances that they necessarily diffuse themselves to other substances.

62. The second reason of the Philosopher is as follows: anything that is permanent and sempiternal in relation to anything else that is permanent and sempiternal always and necessarily is disposed in the same way (the proof of this is that a relation between

certain things cannot vary save by variation in one or other extreme; the extremes are thus [invariable] extremes if the sempiternal things are invariable). But the Intelligence that moves [the heaven] is a certain permanent and sempiternal substance, and the heaven is likewise; therefore, the sempiternal thing here has the same disposition to the other thing, as mover to moved.

63. If you object, “so when will a different disposition of the sempiternal to anything else begin?” – I reply: according to Aristotle, the first difference is in the parts of the uniform sempiternal motion (or uniform as a whole according to him); for because the motion is uniform from the uniform relation of a movable to a mover, therefore it has new different parts, and from this difference of parts another difference or variety can follow in the substances that are generated in this way. And thus from uniform causes, namely the Intelligence and the heaven and their being in uniform relation to each other, some uniform thing consisting of different parts, as motion, is first caused, and by means of that motion other things simply different are caused.

64. The third reason: whatever is in beings is either simply necessary in being or is for the most part or for the least part or open to either side. In the heavens nothing is open to either side nor for the least part, because both these would be marks of imperfection repugnant to such a body. Nor is anything there for the most part, because then sometimes the opposite would chance to be, albeit for the least part, which has never been seen (for never has the opposite of anything belonging to those regular motions come about<sup>53</sup>); therefore, whatever is there is simply necessary.

#### B. About the Opinion of the Theologians

65. The theologians commonly maintain the opposite.

66. For this they adduce authorities and reasons:

One authority is *Isaiah* 60.19 (and it is in Lombard’s text, *Sent.* IV d.48 ch.5 n.5), “For you there will be sun no more to give light through the day.” But this authority, as Master Lombard replies adducing Jerome *On Isaiah* XVII.60 19, “does not say that sun and moon do not then shine (which however the words seem to indicate), but what is signified is that there is no use of light for those who will then be in eternal life and beatitude.” Hence Jerome says, “The office of sun and moon will cease, and the Lord himself will be the light in perpetuity for his own.” The like meaning has the authority from *Revelation* 21.23, “The city does not need light.”

67. Another authority adduced is from *Revelation* 10.6-7, “The angel swore an oath that, after this, there will be no more time.” But it could be given an exposition, that ‘there will be no more time’ for the fulfilment of prophecy, because now all will be fulfilled.

68. The reason is brought forward of this sort: the motion of the heavens is for generation and corruption as though for its end; therefore when generation ceases, such

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<sup>53</sup> The observation at any rate of irregularities among the regularities has led to the replacement of this philosophical and Aristotelian system of necessities with our modern quantum mechanical and Einsteinian relative system of necessities. There is still necessity and still system, but a different system. The possibility of thinking a different system, however, was provided, not so much by different observations, as by the theologians next discussed who thought that this system, however consistent with observations, was not inevitable but optional and could, by divine omnipotence, be otherwise.

motion will be vain. And this is confirmed by *On Generation* 2.11.338b1-5, where the Philosopher maintains that the carrying round of the sun in an oblique circle by the daily motion is necessary so that the generation and corruption of things here below may be continuous; and by *Physics* 2.2.194a34-35, “For we are in a way the end of all things.”

69. But the Philosopher would deride this reasoning. For never would he posit a more ignoble thing as the end of a more noble thing, when speaking of a perfecting end, but only of a consequent or terminating end in some way or other. And then from the failing of such end, which failing however he would deny, he would posit that there will be a future end of the more noble thing, because he posits perpetual generation just as also motion of the heaven. However, from this failing, if it were posited, the failing of the motion of the heaven would not follow, just as neither does the failing of the cause follow from the failing of the effect, especially if the failing of the effect is not because of the failing of this cause but of some other cause – the way a theologian must say that generation does not fail because of the failing of the heaven in its causality, but because of the divine will.

70. And when it is said the motion is vain [n.68], this has no plausibility, because a thing is not vain if it has its perfecting end, even though no further extrinsic end, which is not a perfecting end, come from it – just as neither was God vain from eternity though he had not created things externally, which things are in a way an end.

71. The authority from *Physics* 2 [n.68] can be given exposition: ‘end of all things’, supply ‘of all generable and corruptible things’, because man is noblest among those, and is in this respect in some way a perfecting end.

### C. Scotus’ own Response

#### 1. Neither Way or Conclusion is Proved Necessarily

72. To the question it can be said that the Philosopher fails to prove his conclusion necessarily and the theologians fail as well, not to say failing to do so by necessary reason, but even failing to do so by evident authority of Scripture.

73. And it is plain from what has been said how what is adduced for the second way [sc. that of the theologians] is solved. But the reasons for the Philosopher’s way will be solved later [nn.97-102].

74. What then? The first part [sc. that of the Philosopher] seems to be proved more than the second; although the second part [sc. that of the theologians] is not got expressly from Scripture, it does seem to agree more with the words of the saints and of Scripture.

So the *possibility* of each part can be proved.

#### 2. A More Probable Proof of Both Ways

75. The first part [n.74] is proved easily, and that commonly according to both the theologians and the philosophers. For just as the moving second causes are sufficient to cause motion for all time from the beginning of the world to the judgment, so are they able to cause movement infinitely: for the virtue of the infinite mover [sc. God] is sufficient for causing motion of itself in its order as first cause, and the other virtues are, by virtue of the infinite mover, sufficient for causing motion sempiternally.



76. The possibility of the second part [sc. of the theologians, n.74] is proved, but not from what the philosophers concede but only from what the theologians concede, namely that the will of God is contingently disposed toward moving the heaven and not moving the heaven. When the first cause is contingently disposed to the effect, the effect is simply contingent, and the effect is able simply not to be from the fact that the [first] cause is simply able in its own order not to cause; and when it does not cause, nothing else will cause.

77. This [possibility of both parts] is proved in another way from the side of the movable itself, because the motion of the heaven is neither natural nor violent [sc. forced].

It is not natural, as Avicenna proves, *Metaphysics* 9 ch.2, first because, when it reached what it was naturally moved toward, it would naturally come to rest, because natural motion is toward natural rest in that toward which the motion is; and consequently motion away from that would be violent. And then further, since it is always the case that while there is approaching of one part [of the heaven] to some 'where', there is a receding of another part from that same 'where' (indeed, after any part has passed that 'where', it is, while it is approaching another 'where', receding from that [first] 'where' according to the diverse parts of the circle in which it is moved) – [since this is so] it follows that the same thing is moved naturally and violently at the same time.

78. Nor is the motion of the heaven violent, because then the receding from it would be natural, and then, as before, it would be natural and violent at the same time.

79. Therefore, on the part of the movable itself, there is no repugnance either to its motion being continued or to its motion coming to an end.

### 3. Objections against the Second Way

80. Against the second way, which is that of the theologians, objection is made as follows:

After the judgment there will be succession in the thoughts of the saints, or at least of the damned, and also in acts of the imaginative power; such succession cannot be without time, because according to Averroes, *Physics* 4 com.98, 100, 106, 'On Time', if anyone were not to perceive any change save only in an act of imagining, he would still perceive time; so if time will then be, and time will not be able to be without the motion of the heaven (because time is a property of the first motion, *Physics* 4.12.220b24-28), then etc.

81. Again, if the celestial bodies were to stop, they would have an excessive action on the bodies placed beneath them; because when the sun approaches, more is generated from the higher elements and more is corrupted from the inferior elements; conversely when it recedes. Therefore, when the sun is standing perpetually above some part of the hemisphere, excessively more of fire would be generated in that part and more of water and earth would be corrupted; and so, in the region placed beneath it, the distinct order of the elementary spheres would not stand. Nor similarly would this order stand in the opposite part either, because the opposite manner of generation and corruption would be there. Or, alternatively, two bodies would exist together, or there would be excessive

compression.<sup>54</sup> The same result would hold of the mixed bodies – provided however that some mixed bodies were posited as then remaining; for the celestial bodies that are standing directly above that region would corrupt the mixed bodies, and at length corrupt them all (placed beneath the virtue of the celestial bodies) into things agreeing to the virtue of their elements.

82. Again, in any essential order, when the first is destroyed, everything after it is destroyed, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a18-19; the celestial motion is the simply first motion (from *Physics* 8.9.265a13); therefore, when it is destroyed, it is impossible for any other motion to exist. But it will be possible for some other motion to exist, namely the local motion of blessed men, and also some other motion in these inferior parts; for if an active force come close to a passive object, as fire to anything combustible, there is no reason for it not to be able to act on it. And in favor of this is an article [of the magisterium]: the statement “when the heaven is at a standstill, if fire be applied to tallow, it will not be able to burn it” is an error.<sup>55</sup>

83. Again, if the sun were to stand always on the opposite side of the earth, there would always be darkness, for since the earth is an opaque body, it is necessary that, when obstructing that luminary body [sc. the sun], it would create beyond itself a cone of shadow.

#### 4. Rejection of the Aforesaid Objections

84. To the first [n.80] reply is stated as follows, that time is not in the motion of the heaven as one quantity in another quantity, because there is no need to posit two such quantities in the same permanent quantum, one of which is as it were the subject and the other as it were the property. Therefore, time adds over and above motion (as motion includes its own succession) only the idea formally of measure, and adds only those ideas that are fundamentally required for measurement, which ideas are uniformity or regularity and velocity; because measure is what is most certain as to the first idea, namely regularity or uniformity, and least as to the second idea, namely velocity. But there will not then [sc. at the judgment] remain any quickest motion, or at any rate not a uniform or regular one; and then in no motion will there be based the idea of a measure for all other motion. And therefore time will not exist in the way in which it is now posited to be a property of the first motion.

85. If you argue that a thing measured cannot be without a measure, I say that this is true of the measure of a thing in its quidditative essence. And the reason is that ‘this sort of measured thing depends on this sort of measure’ (*Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b30-31, on ‘relation’); for the measured thing is referred to the measure and not conversely, just as the knowable is the measure of knowledge because knowledge depends on the knowable. Now this assumption is true of an accidental measure, which measures a thing by application to it or by co-existence with it, the way an arm measures cloth; for it is plain that the amount of cloth does not depend on the size of the arm; and in this second way, the first motion, taken according to its own successive extension along with its relation of measurement to other motions, is the measure of them by application or co-

<sup>54</sup> Sc. if there were generation but no corruption, the increase in the amount of material bodies would mean either that several bodies were in the same place or that they were excessively compressed together.

<sup>55</sup> One of the propositions condemned by Stephen Tempier, bishop of Paris, in 1277.

existence, and not by being the term of dependence. In favor of this response, *Joshua* 10-12-13 is brought forward, because Joshua fought while sun and moon stood still, and consequently while the whole heaven stood still, so that, with sun and moon standing still and all the other bodies moving, there would not be too much irregularity in the motion of the other celestial bodies. For this view there is also Augustine, *Confessions* 11 ch.23 n.29, where he maintains that if the heaven stood still the potter's wheel would still move. (Look for argument contrary to this.)

86. To the second [n.81]: this reasoning should not move us to posit, for the sake of avoiding such excessive action in the elements, that the heaven stands still; because there will then too be the same idea for acting as there is now (though not equally uniformly); and there is now the same idea for not acting excessively on things below as there will also be then.

87. Proof of the first part [sc. there will then too be the same idea for acting as there is now]: because there is then an idea for acting on the part of a particular cause only because the particular cause has a sufficiently active form and a passive object close to it; or if you say 'along with this I want another universal agent, namely the heaven', not insofar as it is moved locally, because local motion is not the reason for its acting in its order ("for local motion does nothing," according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a16-18, "save that it brings the generator forward," that is, through local motion the agent, possessing its proper virtue, comes close to the passive object). But all these things, namely the particular agent (having its own active virtue), and nearness to the passive subject, and relation or aspect toward the celestial body (possessing the determinate virtue of the higher cause), can then be posited, because the celestial body at rest has the same virtue of the higher cause with respect to the lower cause placed beneath it as if it would have if it were moved; therefore the things required for action exist then as now.

88. Proof of the second part [n.86, "there is the same idea now for not acting excessively on things below as there will also be then"]: for the reason that there is not excessive action now is either on the part of the proximate causes mutually resisting it in their actions (even for the time now when each is sufficiently close to the passive object, as the sun from here and Saturn from there on a fistful of earth) – and this resistance could be found in both, whether at rest or in motion; or the non-destruction is on the part of the whole heaven, because such harmony exists in all the celestial bodies when related to any part of things active and passive that they do not permit an excessive consumption repugnant to the perfect existence of the elements in their spheres, and this cause will exist then as now; or if a cause of this prevention could not be found in the heaven itself, or in the elements themselves, it could be posited in the conserving divine will.

89. To the third [n.82]. The priority of celestial motion to the other motions is not the priority of cause, or of anything on which other things essentially depend, but only the priority of something more perfect in certain of the conditions of motion, which conditions are regularity and velocity. For it is plain that the action of the celestial body on something below does not depend on the motion of the body, because according to the Philosopher *On Generation* [n.87], "transfer in place does nothing for generation save by bringing the generator closer;" therefore if the generator were as equally close without that motion, it would act as equally.

90. To the fourth [n.83]. The point about the cone of shadow is not held to be unacceptable; and hence is derided the authority of Isidore [n.52] adduced for the claim that ‘the sun and moon will stand still so that the damned under the earth may not have any light’. For the damned are not under the earth in the way some imagine the antipodes to be, being as it were on the surface opposite our habitation; but they are under the earth, that is, in the center of the earth or within the concavity of the earth, and so they would no more have light if the sun were carried round than if the sun always stood still in one part. Likewise too the other part of the authority, that ‘sun and moon will stand in the order in which they were created’ [n.52], seems irrational enough. However, since from when they have once left that [original] place, they do not return again before the space of 36,000 years [d.43 nn.164-165], therefore the judgment would have to be put off for that long after the creation of the world – which is not probable. Likewise, they were created in a place most fitting for the production of new things. And they will stand in a place most fitting for the conservation of things without new production. Therefore the latter place cannot be the former.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

91. To the first main argument [n.44]: That they may be lights “for days and years etc.” is not the principal end but an end under that end, namely for the time of the mortal life of men, who need such distinction of times.

92. The answer to the second [n.45] is plain from the same point: “For all the days etc.,” that is, all the days for which seed-time and harvest is useful, which is only for mortal life. Or in another way: “for all the days of the earth,” that is, all the days of the earthly life of man.

93. As to the next [nn.46-47], it is plain the conclusion was the Philosopher’s intention, but the proof ‘because the agent is not wearied’ is bad; for an agent, although not wearied in acting, can voluntarily stop acting; hence this must be conceded, that ‘every agent that is wearied in acting at some time stops’. But if it is not wearied there is no necessity that it [not]<sup>56</sup> stop, because there is a reason for stopping or ceasing other than weariness.

As to the other proofs from *Metaphysics* 9, that there is no potency of contradiction there [n.48], and this because there is no matter there: if these proofs are adduced for proving indefatigability, I concede that the issue at hand [sc. the heaven does not cease moving] does not follow from indefatigability; but if they are adduced for proving the main conclusion [sc. there is no potency of contradiction there], they are not valid, because whether the matter that is a part of a substance is in the heaven or not, there is at any rate in the heaven a potency for ‘where’, namely a movable subject; and one would have to prove that this subject is not of itself in potency of contradiction to motion and non-motion. For the opposite seems more probable, since it does not have in itself any potency save the receptive potency of a movable thing for motion, and every potency precisely receptive seems to be a potency of contradiction.

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<sup>56</sup> This extra ‘not’ is a variant noted by the Vatican editors in the apparatus criticus but not inserted in the text. The context of the argument, however, suggests it should be so inserted.

94. To the next [n.49], I say that motion is only a perfection of the heaven in a certain respect, and the sort of stopping [in question here] is not unacceptable, especially since perpetual rest is a greater perfection for it.

95. And if you argue ‘then its moving now would be altogether vain’, and further ‘motion is related to rest as potency to privation’ – As to the first I say: the heaven is not moved because of some intrinsic perfection complete of it that would consist in motion or be acquired by motion; but while the non-imperfection of the heaven stands (because it is in a potency that is indifferent to moving and resting), nevertheless the perfection of the heaven for the present state of things requires rather that the heaven move, on account of the state of corruptible things. As to the second: when taking ‘rest’ as it states precisely lack of *motion*, then rest is thus more imperfect, because to the extent that what motion states is something positive rest would be more imperfect. However, the lack of motion, as *lack*, is not thus imperfect but there is something that is substrate in rest, namely uniformity or identity in being, and this is simply more perfect than the positive thing in motion, namely motion’s being now this way and now that.

96. To the next [n.50] Avicenna replies [nn.77-78] that the motion of the heaven is neither natural nor violent but, on the part of the agent, voluntary, though with a will of the sort that (according to him and to Aristotle) it is determined necessarily to acting. But on the part of the passive subject the motion must be posited to be neither, in the way that it was said elsewhere [e.g. d.43 n.234] that surface is in neutral potency to whiteness. And universally, when a subject is determinately inclined to neither contrary, it receives neither of them naturally or violently. However, there is in the heaven a certain aptitude for circular motion because of the fact it is of spherical shape; but this aptitude does not suffice for naturalness, but only for non-violence.<sup>57</sup>

### III. To the Reasons for Aristotle’s Opinion

97. To the reasons for the opinion of the Philosopher:

As to the first [nn.54-59], a theologian would perhaps refuse to the Intelligence all potency productive of substance, and then the difficulty would seem to be how this potency would not belong to the Intelligence and yet does belong to a more imperfect substance. And even if a substance would not in this [potency] be made perfect in itself, yet this does belong to substance because of perfection, as was argued [n.59].

98. If again it were said to the Philosopher that this substance is communicative of itself by producing substance, the consequent does not hold that therefore it produces necessarily or sempiternally, because actual production of another substance is not for the good of this [producing] substance but of the universe; and the good of the universe does not require such production infinitely. And here the theologian would have to take his stand if he wanted to argue for his side from matters of belief, or even from things in some way probable according to natural reason – by showing that the perfection of the universe requires rather, or is equally compatible with, the ceasing of generation than the continuing of generation.

99. And further, from this is still not got the proposed conclusion about motion, as was replied to the reason for the opinion of the theologians [nn.68-69], but it would be

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<sup>57</sup> A concession, however implicit on Scotus’ part, that the motion of heavenly bodies, however circular these bodies are or appear to be, need not by nature, or at all, be circular (and in fact it is not).

necessary to show that the perfection of the universe rather requires, or equally permits, the resting of some bodies.

100. As to the second [n.62], one must deny the major in the case of an agent acting voluntarily, because [such an agent] can, by its old and immovable will, act in different ways on a passive object that is in itself old and unchangeable. And then as to the proof of the major: the extremes of this new relation are not the absolute nature of the agent and the absolute nature of the passive object (which are uniform), but are the agent and passive object as having a new form caused by the agent; and this foundation is new and therefore it can found a new relation to the agent.

101. If you ask whether this new caused thing has any new relation of passive object to agent [n.63], I say that there is none, because just as the first newness in the passive object is in its having this form, so the first new relation of it to the agent is according to this new form.

102. As to the third [n.64], I say that a thing can be contingent to either side in such a way that there is no repugnance to this contingency on the part of the heaven itself, because the thing of itself is in potency of contradiction; but the completion of the contingency to either side comes from contingency on the part of a cause moving voluntarily, such that its will is not necessarily determined to moving or to not moving.

## Forty Ninth Distinction

### First Part

#### *About the Natural Quality of Beatitude*

### Question One

#### *Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Operation*

1. "But after the resurrection," [Lombard, *Sent.* IV d.49 ch.1 n.1].
2. About this forty ninth distinction I ask whether beatitude consists per se in operation.
3. That it does not:  
Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII.5.8 (after rejecting other definitions [*ibid.* 4.7-5.8]) infers this one: "Therefore the blessed is he who both has everything that he wants and wants nothing wrongly." Therefore, beatitude consists in having everything that is willed well; many things are willed well that are different from operation; therefore etc. This is confirmed from Boethius *Consolation* 3 prose 2 n.3, "Beatitude is a state perfect by aggregation of all goods;" then, as before, this does not consist in operation alone; therefore etc.
4. Again, beatitude consists in being conjoined with the beatific object; that conjoining is a relation; operation is something absolute; therefore etc. There is a confirmation: an absolute can remain, without contradiction, in the absence of a respect founded on it, because it is naturally prior to such respect; a respect to an object is founded on operation; therefore operation can remain without such respect to an object. But without it [such respect] there is no beatitude, otherwise there would be beatitude and not in a beatific object.

5. There is argument from the idea of beatitude: first from the definition; second from the object; third from permanence; it could, fourth, be argued from the subject, but this will be touched on in the next question [nn.61-65]. From operation the argument is: first from the agent cause; second from the proximate cause, which is a habit.

6. Again, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 1.13.1102a5-6, it belongs to the idea of beatitude that it be present in a complete life (otherwise the happy man could become wretched, and otherwise too the blessed would not have the end of all his desires); because not only does anyone desire well-being but also to be in that good state permanently. Operation however is transient and in a state of becoming, and so it does not have in its idea that it is present in a complete life; therefore etc.

7. Again, no agent is more perfect from the fact that it produces something by its action; but he who operates is in some way a producing cause of his operation; therefore he is not more perfect simply through his operation. But the blessed is more perfect simply through his, namely, through beatitude; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is that the effect is not the perfection simply of the agent, since the agent is either equally perfect (namely if it is univocal with the effect) or more perfect than the effect (if it is equivocal with the effect). There is a confirmation, that if what is more perfect should thus come from what is more imperfect, then it is changed simply; but it is unacceptable for an agent, in the respect it is agent, to change, according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 3.1.201a27-b4, because then it would be in potency in the respect it would be in act. There is also a confirmation, that the blessed is not the effective cause of his beatitude, because then he would beatify himself; but he is the effective cause of his operation; therefore etc.

8. Again, a habit is a perfection simply more perfect than act; beatitude is the noblest perfection; therefore beatitude consists more in habit than in act. Proof of the first point: first because, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 3.1.116a13-14, “a more lasting good is better;” a habit is a good more lasting or permanent than act, because a habit is difficult to move, an act passes at once; and second because habit is a cause of act, otherwise he who has the habit would not act more easily or perfectly than he who does not have it. But it is only a cause as efficient cause (as is plain by running through the causes), and is not an univocal efficient cause (as is plain); therefore it is an equivocal efficient cause; so it is nobler.

9. To the opposite:

*Ethics* 1.9.1099a30-31, 5.1097a15-b6, “Happiness is the best operation etc.”

10. *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-22 Aristotle makes this specific by the operation it consists in, when he deduces that the gods, whom we judge most happy, have operation because of the fact that “everyone supposes them to be alive (and not to be sleeping), therefore supposes them to operate; wherefore the operation of God will be excelling in speculative happiness.”

11. Likewise, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-18, when speaking about divine understanding, he says, “If God does not understand, what will be striking or worthy of veneration in him? But he is disposed as one sleeping.” *Ibid.* 7.1072b24, “and speculation is a thing most delightful and best.” And a little later [1072b26-28], “and life exists [for God], for the act of the intellect is life” and he adds, “the divine is the very act, and the act is the best life.”

12. Likewise *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b4-50a3, “Act is prior simply to potency,” not only prior in time and definition, but also in substance, that is, in perfection; and this third member he proves [1050a4-b16] by the fact that potency is for the sake of act, as he shows by induction in both natural and artificial things; therefore act is ultimate, not for the sake of anything else, but especially when it is operation and not making. Hence he concludes “wherefore happiness too” (supply: consists in operation); and he proves it, “for [happiness] is a certain sort of life.”

13. Again *On the Heaven* 2.3.286a8-9, “Every substance that has an operation is for the sake of its operation.”

14. Likewise Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1.32 n35, “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him,” namely God; but the supreme reward is blessedness according to him, and to enjoy God is an operation.

## Question Two

*Whether Beatitude Perfects the Essence of the Blessed more Immediately than the Power*

15. Following on from this I ask whether beatitude more immediately perfects the essence than the power of the blessed himself.

16. It seems that it more immediately perfects the essence:

To a nobler perfection corresponds a nobler perfectible as proper to it; beatitude is the noblest perfection; but essence is nobler than power if they differ in reality, or nobler at least in idea if they differ in idea; for the sort of order that distinct things have really is the sort of order that the same things have in idea, when they are distinct in idea.

As to the first proposition [sc. to a nobler perfection corresponds a nobler perfectible], although there is an objection to it in the case of perfections of different idea in genus, as with substantial and accidental perfection (since a substantial perfection, because it bestows being simply, has for perfectible a being in potency simply; but an accidental perfection, because it gives being in a certain respect, requires a perfectible that is simply being in act), yet, in the case of accidental perfections compared among themselves, it seems true when comparing them to the perfectibles that are receptive of accidents; because if something more imperfect is capable of some accident that most of all perfects it accidentally, something higher cannot be supremely perfected accidentally by that perfection, nor by any other perfection save a more excellent one.

17. Again, whatever is the most immediate receptive subject of some accident, if it could exist per se, could per se receive that accident; but no other subject could receive it save by the mediation of that one. Therefore, if the power of the soul could exist separate from the essence, it could receive beatitude and consequently be blessed, but the essence could not be blessed without the power; and so a nature that is not intellectual or alive could be blessed, because it is an accident [sc. of what is intellectual and alive] – and an intellectual nature, though it abides in itself, could not be blessed, because lacking the immediate subject of beatitude. This argument does at least seem to have a difficulty in positing power to be different from essence in reality; but the argument can be proportionally maintained about a distinction of reason, if such a distinction be posited there.

18. Again, third, an intellectual nature will not be blessed save per accidents, the way wood heats because it is hot; the consequent is unacceptable, because a perfection



per accidens is not essentially the perfection of that to which it belongs per accidens. The proof of the consequence is that beatitude would be present per accidens in a beatifiable nature through some medium (according to one opinion about power [Henry of Ghent]), the way the action of heating is in hot wood by means of heat; or at any rate it would be present accidentally as it were (according to another opinion), because present through something distinct in idea, for if it were different in reality it would truly per accidens exist.

19. On the contrary:

Blessedness per se consists in operation (from the authorities brought forward for the opposite of the first question [nn.9-14]); but operation more immediately perfects power than essence, because operation does not belong to essence save through a power, from *On the Soul* 2.1.412a27-28, and *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b31-48a24.

I. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

1. Exposition of the Opinion

a. About the Opinion Itself and the Manner of Positing it

20. As to this second question the assertion is made [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 13 q.12] that beatitude perfects the essence more principally than the power.

21. The way of stating it is as follows: “Beatitude consists more principally in the object, which is uncreated beatitude, insofar as this is the good of the created will. Now the soul or the angelic nature is transformed by means of the will, so that, to the extent possible for it, it is converted into the object, and this by force of love, according to what Dionysius [*Divine Names* ch.4] says, that ‘love is a virtue that transforms and converts the lover into the beloved’; and Hugh of St. Victor says about ‘acute and super-fervent heat’ [*Commentary on Celestial Hierarchy* 6 ch.7] that ‘love wants to make you one with it’, namely the beloved; and later, ‘love inserts itself so that, if it could be done, the lover would be what the beloved is’, namely the one he loves, ‘and thus in a certain marvelous way it begins, by the force of love, to be expelled and go outside itself’.”

22. From this as follows: “That the nature which loves should go out of itself and begin to be what it loves can only come about by circumincession, a circumincession not of the soul and of a created nature that in-flows into deity, but rather the converse, so that in such created nature nothing should appear save divine dispositions, indeed, so that it should not appear to be anything other than God – just as iron glowing in fire shines and burns the way fire does, as if it not be, and not appear to be, other than fire.”

b. Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

23. From this way of understanding things an argument is made for the conclusion:

Since beatitude is by the in-flowing or circumincession of the beatific object in respect of the beatifiable subject, and since this in-flowing or circumincession is more in the essence than in the powers (for from the in-flowing into the essence there is a redounding or derivation into the powers, and not conversely, because derivation or redounding is from the prior to the posterior, not conversely, whether the order is one of

being or of reason; for that is principally such by which something else is such, and not conversely) – therefore etc. The proposed conclusion thus follows.

24. Again, and it is as it were the same point: God, who is beatitude in its essence, is more principally possessed in his essence than in his powers; for he perfects essence in some way through essence, namely by in-flowing in the manner stated; but he only perfects the powers through operations terminating in the essence under the idea of the good and true. Now he perfects more principally what he perfects per se under his proper idea than what he perfects only terminatively under the idea of an attribute.

25. Again, grace is consummate glory; but grace is principally in the essence of the soul, and redounds, under the idea of habit and virtue, to the powers; therefore etc. [cf. *Ord.* II d.26 nn.11-23].

26. Again, distributive justice has regard to the worth of the receiver according to geometrical proportion, namely so that to the more worthy more good be distributed; but an intellectual nature is, in reality and in idea, more noble and more worthy than its power; therefore etc.

27. And this argument coincides with the first reason for this question [n.16]. But the addition is made that “perception of this perfection only belongs to the essence through the powers: through the intellect indeed in knowing the essence, through the will as tasting it, as Hugh says on the above cited chapter 7 [n.21], ‘Two there are: knowledge and love; knowledge illumines, love (as feeding) satisfies; in this does beatitude consist: to know and love the good’,” or it consists in knowledge and love of the good.

28. But as to the authorities of the philosophers for the opposite [nn.9-13], the response is made [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 13 q.12] that according to the intention of the philosophers “the beatitude of man or angel does not concern their essence but only their power, through the medium of its operation. And they said this because they did not see true beatitude, which true beatitude consists not only in act of will and intellect but principally in the object itself” – and this by in-flowing or circumincession in the way stated [n.23].

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

### a. Against the Opinion in Itself

29. Against these views:

First as follows: God is not disposed in himself differently now than before, nor does he in-flow into this soul or angel differently now than before (if one considers essence precisely on each side), because there is always uniformity as to the in-flowing of the divine essence into the creature’s essence while the essence of the creature remains; so, if there is some newness in the beatified soul, it must be through some effect caused by God in the soul’s essence. The effect is said to be the beatitude of the soul formally, and this effect cannot be principally in the essence as the essence is distinguished from the power, because then it would be first act; but by no first act, distinct from second act, can a creature immediately attain the beatific essence.

There is a confirmation: nothing is properly speaking changed unless something new formally inhere in it; someone blessed is disposed now so differently than someone non-blessed before that he changes from misery to beatitude; but the divine essence is not

by any in-flowing the essence of the blessed; therefore, something else must be in the blessed whereby he is formally blessed.

30. Again, in-flowing is prior in nature to any operation, since it is according to some first act, as was argued [nn.23-24, 29]; therefore it could, without contradiction, exist without operation, and consequently someone who is not operating but disposed as someone asleep could be principally blessed – which Aristotle considers unacceptable, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-18 [n.11]

31. Again a creature is blessed in some way proportionally to the way that God is blessed; but God is not blessed precisely by the fact he is the same as himself, but by the fact he understands and wills himself as object – otherwise, from the fact that he is blessed it could not be inferred that he is intelligent, because if he did not have an intellect he would still be the same as himself, just as a stone is the same as itself.

32. This point is argued briefly as follows: if divine beatitude does not consist, by way of its completion, in the identity of the beatifiable thing with the beatific object, then neither does the beatitude of the creature consist in any identity or internalizing of the beatific object through in-flowing; because if operation is required there [in God], over and above identity, much more is it required here [in the creature] over and above in-flowing; because whatever were posited here as beatitude, something corresponding to it eminently would be beatitude principally there; but to the in-flowing by which the soul is said to be deified, as it were, identity corresponds there far more eminently.

#### b. Against the Reasons Adduced for the Opinion

33. As to the reasons adduced for the opinion [nn.21-28], some are against the opinion, and those for it are not compelling.

##### α. About the First Reason

34. For first, the way of positing it [n.21] seems to concede that this in-flowing is first in the power, and thus that beatitude is principally in the power.

Proof of the antecedent: for this way of positing states that through love, which is a transformative force, the lover begins to go out of itself and to be what it loves, and that this can only come about by circumincession or in-flowing. From this it follows that, through love, a circumincession or in-flowing of the beloved into the lover comes to be. But it is plain that love or affection, which Hugh is speaking about [n.21], are per se powers of the will.

35. Also the phrase ‘to go out of itself’ is metaphorical, as is apparent from the Philosopher in *Politics* 2.4.1262b7-13, for a thing is no less what it was because it loves something else [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 n.179]. But the reality of this sort of metaphor, and of all metaphors like it is this: that by receiving or valuing the beloved and by resting in the beloved the lover is more truly the beloved than it is itself. And this meaning is plainly stated by Hugh in the cited passage [n.21]: “He who longs only for what he loves even despises himself in comparison with what the loves.”

And this is what Augustine says *City of God* 14.28, “The city of God was made by a love of God proceeding to contempt of self (namely of the lover).” To this extent, therefore, does the lover go out of himself, because he thinks little of his own being in

comparison with the beloved, so that he would prefer his own being rather than that of the beloved to be destroyed. But from this does not follow any circumincession or in-flowing such as he argues for [Henry of Ghent, n.23].

36. The first reason [n.23] is not compelling, because it proceeds from the idea of this in-flowing [nn.34-35]. This in-flowing too, that in beatitude there be a certain special in-flowing – it is not an in-flowing of the divine essence into this [creaturely] essence as the divine essence is essence, but it is an in-flowing of the divine essence as beatific object into this [creaturely] essence as this essence attains the divine essence as object; but it attains the object more principally and immediately through the power.

37. What is argued there about redounding [n.23], that it takes place from the prior to the posterior and not conversely, is not compelling, because nothing prevents something being prior and posterior with respect to the same thing in different ways; and, in the way in which something is prior, it is possible for what is proper to this something to redound from it into something else which, in that sort of way, is posterior (just as, although ‘being’ redounds into heat from substance, yet conversely ‘to cause heat’ belongs to substance from heat). So, if there were a priority of the essence with respect to the power, and this by a redounding of a first act perfecting the essence (if there were any), the essence would come to be in the power; yet the second act, which belongs first to the power, will redound from it into the essence.

From this then the opposite can be argued as follows: that thing is more principal from which something redounds into another thing; but beatitude redounds into the essence as it is essence from beatitude as it is power, just as the attaining of the beatific object too belongs in this sort of order to the essence and the power.

### β. About the Second Reason

38. The second reason [n.24] is not compelling. For, when speaking of ‘to perfect formally’, this proposition is false: ‘the divine essence more principally perfects the essence than it perfects the power’, because God does not, as in-flowing into the essence, perfect it formally but only as an extrinsic cause. But when in-flowing into the power he perfects it (as it is an extrinsic cause) the way an object does, and he perfects it formally by a created form, which created form is the operation that attains it [= the divine essence] as object. But if you speak of a ‘to perfect’ that perfects by in-forming in some way or other, and if you take it that the divine essence more truly perfects the soul than the power by in-flowing– if this were conceded, the proposed conclusion does not follow. For the ‘to perfect’ in question belongs to first act; it is not therefore the ‘to perfect’ that is the perfecting of the beatified person.

39. And if you say “it is enough for me that it be more truly a ‘to perfect’ than is any ‘to perfect’ of second act” (for from this follows that the essence will be more principally perfect with a nobler perfection than the power is, and therefore it will also be nobler, even more perfect, with beatitude, or with something, than beatitude is) – I reply: substance is more a being than any accident (*Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a33-b6); therefore the essence of an angel or a soul is more perfect simply than its inherent beatitude, which is an accident; therefore, it is not unacceptable that some perfection that is the first act of a soul or angel in substantial being be a truer perfection of it because more intimate. And let it also be a nobler perfection than beatitude or anything pertaining to second act;

however, beatitude is the noblest second perfection, as was said in the preceding solution [nn.36-37, also nn.16, 21]; but some first perfection is simply nobler in creatures than any second perfection, where the first and second perfection are distinct in reality.

40. The proposition can also be denied that [n.24] ‘the deity by in-flowing more truly perfects the essence than the power [n.24]’, because the in-flowing into the essence as essence is in a way general to every creature, though in proportion to each according to its grade of being; but the in-flowing that is of the essence as object into the power is of a special most noble nature. There is therefore some in-flowing into the power nobler than the in-flowing that is into the essence, though that which is into the essence as to existence is more principal to the essence than to the power, just as also the existence is.

41. If it is argued against this that the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as object presupposes the in-flowing of the [divine] essence as making itself intimate to [creaturely] essence, and that that is more perfect on which another depends than conversely – I reply: “not everything prior in generation is prior in perfection” (*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a2-10); but the preceding of the in-flowing that is by intimacy [into the essence] to the in-flowing that is in idea of object [into the power] [n.40] is not proved to be prior save in generation; for it is not a necessary active cause of the later in-flowing, because it exists when the second cannot be had, as in the wayfarer.

42. Of these two responses to the second reason [nn.38, 40] the first seems truer, and it sufficiently solves the fact that some simply more perfect in-flowing is not beatific and that another simply less perfect in-flowing is beatific. An example: the most perfect in-flowing is into human nature as it is united in person to the Word, and yet this in-flowing is not formally beatific, as is plain in *Ord.* III d.2 nn.10-23, though this doctor [Henry] say the opposite, as was said there; but the in-flowing of the Triune God into Michael, which is simply less perfect, is simply beatific.

#### γ. About the Third Reason

43. The third reason [n.25] is taken to the opposite, because grace immediately perfects the power, not the essence, as was said in *Ord.* II d.26 n.24; for a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited and indifferent to several things perfects it indifferently in its order to those several things (just as that, if some form were to perfect the sun insofar as the sun is unlimited in action with respect to all things inferior to it, it would perfect it indifferently in its order to one action and another); but grace does not perfect the soul indifferently in its order to intellection and volition, but only in its order to volition; proof: for volition is graced primarily and nothing else is graced save by it.

44. If objection be made to the major [n.43] on account of the term ‘indifferently’, at least this proposition is true, that ‘a form perfecting an active principle as that principle is unlimited to several actions does not perfect it precisely in its order to one action’, because at once the opposite of the subject term follows, namely that the form perfects it as it is limited and determinate to one action; but grace perfects the soul precisely for intellection and volition such that an intellection preceding volition is not graced nor meritorious, and an intellection following volition is only graced because it is commanded by graced volition.

45. If objection be raised against the minor of the first reason [n.43], because ‘essence is not active but passive, with these powers being intermediaries’ – although this is false of the will at least, as was said in *Ord.* II d.25 nn.69-73, yet a similar minor can be taken about passive power, ‘no form perfects a receptive subject insofar as it is indifferent to several thing which perfects it precisely in its order to one of them’; grace is of this sort, as before [n.43]. Indeed, no habit seems to perfect essence save as essence has the idea of power.

46. Let there, at length, be a stand in this: ‘no form perfects something insofar as it is unlimited or indifferent to several things which would precisely perfect it if it were determinate to one of them’; but if the soul were only the intellect, it could not be perfected by grace because, even if it had an act, it could not have a graced act; but if, *per impossibile*, the soul were only the will, it could be perfected by grace, because if, *per impossibile*, it had an act, it would have that act a graced one.

#### δ. About the Fourth Reason

47. The fourth reason [n.26] is taken to the opposite, because he to whom a greater good is due should have it rendered to him in the way in which it can more be a good for him; but beatitude can more be a good for the soul if it is in the power than if it were immediately in the essence. Just as it is a greater good for the soul to see God through the intellect than through the essence (as it is essence), because ‘to see’ is not of a nature to be good for the soul save through the intellect, just as ‘to have the beatific object as beatific’ is not of a nature to be the soul’s good save through the power that, by operation, attains that object.

48. The point that is there added [n.27], that perception of beatitude principally belongs to the power, seems to prove the opposite of the proposed conclusion, because perception of the beatific object (by seeing and tasting it) is not accidental or adventitious to beatitude, as Hugh says in the authority that he brings forward, “In these,” he says, “does beatitude consist: to love and know the good” [n.27].

49. There is also proof by reason, because misery essentially includes perception of a disagreeable object, speaking of the complete misery that is accompanied with penalty; for the principal penalty, which consists in sadness (as was said in d.44 nn.83-112), is *per se* consequent to the perception of a disagreeable object; therefore perception of an agreeable object does not follow beatitude [*sc.* as something not essentially included in it], because then beatitude would not delight as equally necessarily as misery torments.

50. As to what is added from the philosophers [n.28], it does not seem probable that it contradicts them as regard this first mark of beatitude, that it consist in operation or not; for though they did err, or rather did not attain what object beatitude is in, or rather what idea it is under, yet this first mark of it wherein it is the fundamental perfection of a rational creature – namely whether it is in the power or the essence (whose distinction we get from them), whether too it is in operation or in habit (which we similarly get from them) – does not seem likely to have escaped their notice.

#### B. Scotus’ own Response

##### 1. A Double Understanding of the Question is Possible

51. To the question, therefore, I say that there is a double understanding of the question:

One is: if the supposition is made that the perfection of essence is one thing and the perfection of power another, which of these is beatitude principally? And in this way does the aforesaid opinion [of Henry, nn.23-24] seem to say that the in-flowing that is in the essence as it is essence (which is prior in a way to the operation that is the perfection of power) is beatitude principally.

52. According to this understanding I say that beatitude does not consist principally in the essence, because nothing that perfects essence, as it is essence distinct in whatever way from power, can be other than first act, and perhaps not a habit. Now nothing such can be beatitude principally; indeed that 'beatitude exists without operation' includes a contradiction, but that 'first act is without any second act whatever' does not.

53. The other understanding of the question can be of this sort:

By positing that the perfection is the same and unique for the essence and power (wherein unique beatitude consists), does that unique beatitude perfect the essence more principally than the power?

54. And in the first understanding [nn.51-52] there is a comparison of two perfections perfecting the essence and the power – which of them is more principal?

55. In the second understanding [n.53] there is a comparison of the same perfection to two receptive subjects – which of them is more principally perfected by that perfection?

56. In this second understanding it would seem that diverse answers must be given according to diverse opinions about powers. Because if the powers be posited to be accidents, since that is 'more principal' by which something else is and not conversely, and since the 'by which' can be taken equivocally for prior and more remote cause or for posterior and more immediate cause – in the first way the essence is more principally perfected by any power whatever; in the second way not so, because the essence is the more remote cause with respect to anything of which the power is cause, but the power is the nearer cause.

## 2. What View Should be Held

57. Because, however, I do not believe this opinion [n.56] to be true (as was said [in *Rep.* IIA d.16 nn.11, 18-19]), neither also is it clear that it is the same thing to be more principal with respect to 'being' and with respect to any perfection consequent to 'being', since something can be cause of something in being and yet that other thing receives [perfections] through no other cause; rather, if it were uncaused, it would receive [them] – just as God is cause of a triangle in being, yet, if a triangle were uncaused, it would by itself have three angles equal to two right angles.

58. And this is most of all true where there is no process in the same order, as suppose if one thing be prior in order of active principle and after that the second thing is prior to a third in order of passive principle. Even in the same order this only holds if the priority is essential, understanding this as follows, that it be impossible for the second to be prior to the third unless the first be prior to the second and to the third (as is plain in

efficient causes, where a posterior can cause without a prior that is not essentially or necessarily prior in this way).

59. But, in the issue at hand, there is in the idea of the receptive subject no such essential priority thus of essence to power in the receiving, because if the immediate receptive subject could exist per se without an intermediate, it could per se receive, with the intermediate receiving neither mediately nor immediately. But a hypothesis is necessary (on the supposition that this hypothesis is necessary for many things), that, in the case of things distinct in absolute being, either one of them can, without contradiction, exist without the other.

60. It seems, therefore, that if the opinion were probable [n.59], yet in no way would it have to be conceded that the essence received the operation more principally than the power.

61. Dismissing, therefore, these and other opinions about powers, and dismissing the equivocations about what is 'more principal', I say that that is simply more principal with respect to *a* which, when anything else whatever has been per possibile or per impossibile removed, would be disposed in the same way toward *a*, and that nothing else, with it removed, would be thus disposed toward *a*.

62. This reasoning is proved from the idea of firstness, that that is first with respect to something, which when taken away there is nothing that is of this sort with respect to that something; but, when anything else is taken away, it is disposed in the same way toward that something; and it simply is simply more principal. These clarifications are made on behalf of the major [n.61].

63. But now, whether a power is a perfection that is unitively contained in the essence, or whether it is an essential part of the essence, or whether it is disposed differently in this way and that (according to different opinions), the essence would not receive beatitude when the power is, per possibile or per impossibile, taken away; but when the essence is per possibile or per impossibile taken away, the power would receive beatitude. Therefore, in the way in which firstness is, in fact or in idea, possible there, the power receives beatitude more principally, and consequently beatitude perfects the power more principally.

64. The proof of the minor [n.63] is from the preceding solution [n.52], that beatitude, according to that solution, consists in operation; now operation would perfect the power if it existed alone without the essence, but would in no way perfect the essence if it existed alone without the power.

65. If to this proof of the minor an objection is drawn from the fact that no accident perfects another accident but perfects only a substance, yet one accident is prior to another – according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 4.4.1007b2-4, 12-13, "For an accident is an accident of an accident only because both are accident to the same thing," and later, "for this is no more an accident of that than that is of this" [cf. *Ord.* IV d.12 n.108]. So, if the power is an accident of the essence, then in whatever way it were, per possibile or per impossibile, to exist without the essence, it could not receive an accident; but the essence could receive a mediated accident, whether it received it afterwards or before, because it is receptive of both accidents, and immediately so under the idea of being the subject.



66. The minor of this objection [sc. the power is an accident of the essence] I do not reckon to be true, as I said [n.63], but let it be. The major, however [sc. no accident perfects another accident], is false, as was said in [*Ord.* IV d.12 nn.146-151].

67. And the fact is plain from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* II ch.1, because fast and slow are accidents of motion, and curved and straight accidents of line.

68. And it is plain too by reason, because whatever belongs to something per se in the second mode [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-b18] is an accident of it, for in that mode the subject is put in the definition of the predicate as something added on that does not belong [to a definition] with respect to an accident save as to the subject of it. But there are many accidents that are present per se in the second mode in accidents and in no substance, as is plain of all the properties of the mathematical sciences, none of which is about any substance as about its first subject [*Ord.* IV d.12 n.143].

69. But what is adduced from the Philosopher [n.65] needs expounding, because if he means precisely that ‘because two accidents are accident of the same subject, therefore one is accident of the other’, it follows that surface is as accident of whiteness as whiteness is of surface.

70. The same follows from the second authority, that ‘this is no more accident of that than that is of this’ [n.65].

71. His understanding then is not about ordered accidents, one of which is the idea of receiving the other, but about the disparate accidents of which he gives examples, as ‘white’ and ‘musical’.

72. Now this suffices for his purpose there, as he wants it to be impossible for there to be an infinite regress in predications per accidens, as I have elsewhere expounded his intention [*Ord.* IV d.12 n.158].

### C. To the Initial Arguments of the Second Question

#### 1. Response to the Individual Arguments

73. As to the first argument [n.16]: the major could be conceded about perfectible things and perfections of the same order, but not when comparing something perfectible by a perfection of one order with something perfectible by a perfection of another order (and I mean here by ‘perfections of another order’ first act and second act). And when taking the inference in this way, all that follows is that the essence, if it have some perfection that is first act, will be more perfect than any perfection that is second act; now beatitude is not the noblest perfection simply, but the noblest among second acts.

74. Alternatively, and it reduces in a way to the same, the statement that ‘to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a nobler perfection’ is true in the order of perfections which have regard to that perfectible thing; now beatitude does not have regard to the essence, as essence, for first perfectible thing. But if you compare the order of perfections to the order of perfectible things, I concede that to a simply nobler perfectible thing there corresponds a simply nobler perfection, intrinsic or extrinsic; but there is no need to concede this determinately of something accidental or extrinsic if it is not capable, under the idea under which it is a nobler perfectible thing, of the accidental perfection. So it is in the issue at hand, even as to the accidental perfection that is a habit, which does not perfect the essence as it is essence – and much more so as to the accidental perfection that is operation.

75. As to the second argument [n.17], I concede that if the power could exist per se it could be perfected by operation, and the essence could not be perfected without the power. And therefore the argument does conclude well against those who say that the power is really other than the essence [nn.20-28]. But it is nothing to us who say that the same real thing is under one idea essence, and has the perfections that are first acts, and is under another idea power, and has the perfections that are second acts; nor do I say that these different ideas are caused only by an act of intellect, but they come from the nature of the thing, as was said in the question about the powers of the soul [*Rep.* IIA d.16 nn.11-13].

76. As to the third [n.18], I say that it is not unacceptable to concede that intellectual nature is beatified per accidens, that is, not first or not immediately, and this when speaking of priority or immediacy according to idea; though it would be unacceptable to say that it was beatified per accidens when speaking of an accident in some way real.

## 2. An Objection to these Responses and its Solution

77. Against these responses [nn.73-76]: the idea according to which God is blessed is no less noble than the idea according to which he beatifies. But he beatifies under the idea of essence; therefore under no less noble an idea is [anyone]<sup>58</sup> beatified; the idea of power is less noble.

78. I reply: speaking of the fundamental idea under which [anyone] is beatified, it is true that the idea according to which [God] beatifies is not less noble in its fundamental and formal idea. Speaking of the proximate formal idea according to which [anyone] is beatified and of the formal idea according to which [God] beatifies (which, according to some [Richard of Middleton], is the idea of the true and good [n.24]), there is still no greater nobility on this side than on that. But by positing, in a third way, that [God] beatifies objectively according to the idea of essence, not only fundamentally but formally (and [anyone] would be beatified immediately according to idea of intellect and will), it is consistent to say that he beatifies immediately according to a nobler idea than [the idea according to which anyone] is immediately beatified. Nor is this unacceptable, that something receive a second perfection according to a less noble idea than it is perfect [by] with a first perfection.

## II. To the First Question

79. To the first question: first as to the thing, second as to the name.

### A. About the Thing of Beatitude

#### 1. First Conclusion

80. Let this be the first conclusion as to the thing [of beatitude]: among all that is desirable to intellectual nature there is something essentially and simply supreme.

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<sup>58</sup> The Latin says simply 'he is beatified', where the 'he', in grammatical context, would refer to God. The text can be read in this way, since God as subject may be said to be beatified by himself as object. However, it seems it might be better read, in logical context, as about any creature who is beatified by God.

81. The proof of this is that there is an essential order in desirable things, and in such an order it is impossible to proceed to infinity (as was proved in *Ord.* I d.2 nn.52-53); therefore, the proposed conclusion [sc. something in the order is first or supreme, n.80] follows.

82. If there is not an essential order there, the proposed conclusion again follows, because whichever [member] is given it is essentially supreme, in the sense that nothing is essentially superior to it.

83. But this hypothesis is false because, as was shown there, *Ord.* I d.2 n.54, no process in things ordered accidentally can proceed to infinity, or can proceed through a continuing diversity [of things], save in virtue of something essentially superior to the whole diversity.

84. Corollary: that thing [sc. the thing essentially superior to the whole diversity] is infinite, because whatever infinity is not repugnant to is not simply supreme unless it is formally infinite; infinity is not repugnant to the desirable or wantable, since this is either perfection simply, or it convertibly accompanies some perfection simply, because it belongs to the whole of being, and whatever so belongs is perfection simply. Now infinity is not repugnant to perfection simply, because [if it were], then in the case of something, that is, something simply infinite, not-it would be simply better than it, which is against the idea of perfection simply (as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* 14-15).

85. From this corollary too the first conclusion [n.80] can, conversely, be inferred, because if something desirable or wantable can be infinite, and the infinite cannot be exceeded, then something can be a simply supreme wantable; and if it can be then it is, because if it were not and could be, it could only be by something different in essence, and so it would not be simply supreme in some perfection simply.

## 2. Second Conclusion

86. Second conclusion: the supreme desirable or wantable, and only it, is to be wanted by any intellectual nature simply because of itself.

87. My exposition of 'simply because of itself' is, namely: that to which it is repugnant, by its nature, to be wanted because of something else. Hence if the sensitive appetite desires anything because of itself (so as not to will it because of something else), this holds 'in a certain respect', because it comes from an imperfection in the power, which is not able to desire it because of something else, and not from an imperfection in the object to which being desired because of something else is repugnant.

88. My exposition of the other part is: 'to be wanted by any intellectual nature' and 'by any will' are convertible relative to the issue at hand, because 'to have will' and 'to be an intellectual nature' are convertible.

89. For the proof then of this second conclusion I argue as follows: anything for which the supreme wantable thing is a wantable object is something for which that object is alone to be wanted simply because of itself; but for any will the supreme wantable thing is a wantable object; therefore etc.

90. The proof of the major is that among wantable things there is something that is to be wanted because of itself, for if everything is because of something else there will be an infinite regress and nothing will be supreme; for a thing that is to be wanted because of something else is to be wanted less than that because of which it is to be

wanted (from *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-20). Therefore, if there is something that is a simply supreme to-be-wanted (from the first [conclusion, n.80]), it is to be wanted simply because of itself (speaking on the part of the objects). And from this follows that it is to be wanted because of itself by any [subject] for which it is a wantable object; for [it is to be wanted] either by none, or by all, or by one and not another. But not the first ['by none'], from what has been proved [sc. n.90 *init.*, that the supremely wantable is to be supremely wanted by whatever has it as a wantable]; nor the third [sc. 'by one and not another'], because there is no greater reason for it to be so by one rather than by another; [sc. therefore the second].

91. The same [major] is proved a priori, because although it be in the power of the will to will this or that, yet that which is to be wanted, and especially that which is to be supremely wanted, is not in the will's power (for this precedes every determination of any will); therefore whatever will it is compared to, it always remains something that is to be wanted because of itself, and hence it is that it is to be wanted also by this will, because it is wantable by this will.

92. And this is proved in brief by application [of the argument] to wills, as also about willing in itself; because for any will there is something that is to be willed, since any will could will something rightly, and only that which is for it something to be willed, and no will can will something that is to be willed by it because of another thing and another thing and so on infinitely.

93. It is also proved from precision [of terms], namely that it alone is to be willed because of itself, for it is not repugnant to anything else that it be desired because of another thing (since nothing else is a simply supreme desirable thing); and a lesser good could rightly be desired because of a greater good.

94. The proof of the minor is that any will regards as its object the wantable thing under its most common idea; for the will is an immaterial power and consequently a power that regards the whole of being, or something of equal extent as being. This can be called the ultimate end with respect to such will, because any other to-be-willed thing is willed because of that.

### 3. Third Conclusion

95. Third conclusion: no intellectual nature is ultimately and completely perfected save in possessing the supreme desirable thing, and possessing it perfectly according to the way it can possess it.

96. This is proved from the second conclusion [n.86], because an intellectual nature is of a nature to be ultimately and maximally perfected in that alone which is for it something to be willed for its own sake; therefore, it can only be ultimately perfected in that thing when possessed by it in the way it can be possessed by it.

97. The third conclusion is also proved by the fact that the nature remains ultimately imperfect when what is supremely to be wanted is not possessed.

98. The conclusion is proved, third, by a more universal middle term, that in things possessing any appetite (whether animal or natural) the ultimate perfection is not had unless that is had which is desired because of itself by such an appetite. Hence a heavy object has some imperfection when away from the center [of the earth], and so does a sense appetite when lacking the highest agreeable thing.

99. However, one must understand about this conclusion that there is in beings a first perfection, a second perfection, or as it were a second perfection. The first perfection is when nothing is lacking that belongs to the first being, namely the essential being, of the thing; the second perfection is when nothing is lacking that belongs to the thing's second being. Also, this second perfection is a certain intrinsic perfection and is not conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing. But there is thus a certain second perfection, because it makes perfect by the fact that it is conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing. Nor is it surprising that something be perfected in what is extrinsic, because by attaining what is extrinsic (and especially if this be more perfect than itself), it has a further perfection than it could have in itself or for itself or from itself.

For in this way are more ignoble things perfected by nobler things – not by being these things really, nor by having them formally inherent, but by attaining them, and so by having them in the way possible for them to have them. Hence a thing whose appetite is in relation to something more ignoble than is its nature itself, is not perfected by something extrinsic save in a certain respect.

100. In the case of a nobler thing, too, although there be some perfection for a more ignoble appetite of it, yet this is not its supreme extrinsic perfection. But if some nature be perfected in something non-supreme nobler than itself, there must be some nature that is immediately perfected by the supreme perfective extrinsic thing; for there is no infinite regress in things perfect and perfectible. Therefore, at least the supreme perfectible thing is not perfected save in the supreme extrinsic perfective thing.

101. Now the whole of intellectual nature is supreme according to this idea, as is plain from the second conclusion.

102. Nor is it necessary, according to the order of natures, that there are extrinsic perfective things that perfect completely, but it is enough that second extrinsic perfections, joining with the extrinsic perfective, correspond the same with the degrees of first perfections. Now although the first perfection in substances is simply more perfect than any intrinsic second perfection yet it is not the ultimate perfection because, when it is obtained, there is still expected and desired a further perfection. The second perfection, even if it conjoin with the more perfect thing not formally in itself but as more immediate to it, is in a way a more desirable perfection than the first perfection, to the extent that it is more immediately conjoint with the extrinsic desirable thing, which is more desired than its proper intrinsic being.

103. This however is especially true of the will, for any other extrinsic appetite desires the extrinsic thing because of the nature of that of which it is the desire, and therefore it does not join with anything simply more desirable than is the being of the nature it belongs to. But the will loves something more desirable than itself, and more than the nature it belongs to, and therefore it conjoins with something more desirable, both in itself and for the will, than is the nature it belongs to.

104. This conclusion, therefore, at least as to the will, is not only true as to what is meant by 'to be ultimately perfected', but also as to what is meant by 'to be perfected with the most desirable perfection, and even with the greatest perfection' [nn.95-96] – speaking of the extrinsic perfective thing and, by participation, of the intrinsic perfective thing insofar as it conjoins with the extrinsic one. The way the perfect is distinguished is also how the good is distinguished; hence although any being is, in its own goodness, good with first goodness, yet not with second goodness. And on this does Boethius

especially seem to touch in his book *De Hebdomadibus*, where he maintains that goodness is an accident, and that things are not good by the fact that they are.<sup>59</sup>

105. Now these facts (second goodness) we thus significantly express: ‘things are going well for it’. Hence, according to the third conclusion, this is plain, that for no will do things ultimately and completely go well save when that is had which is to be wanted because of itself, and had perfectly, in the way in which it can be had.

## B. About the Name of Beatitude

106. About the second point, that is, the name of beatitude [n.79], this is taken as something known among philosophers and those who speak about beatitude [e.g. Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.5-6.1097a15-8a20]: that beatitude is the sufficient good, namely excluding defect and need; it is the perfect or complete good, excluding imperfection or diminution; it is the ultimate good excluding tending or orderability to another more complete good; it is the good that, when completely possessed, things go well with the possessor. In this way complete misery is need that is fixed; it is also lack of second perfection, and in this regard the diminution of the second good; it is also the exclusion of that which one would love because of itself if it were possessed; finally, things go completely badly for the person in misery.

107. Now although sufficiency, perfection, completeness, and goodness could belong to the first or second being of the thing, they could also include the things that belong as well to first or to second being yet, because what is sufficient is sufficient for someone and thereby supposes that for which it is sufficient, completion too completes what has already preceded and would, without it, be as it were a full or half full vacuum [sc. an absurdity].

108. The perfect also excludes defect, which is lack of what is of a nature to be present. ‘Things going well’ also only belongs to something already existent through something superadded to it as it were.

109. Therefore all these things belong more to second perfection than to first.

110. Also that a thing is only ultimately and completely perfected in an extrinsic perfective thing, because it is of a nature to be thus perfected; so these belong more to second perfection to the extent it is conjoint with the extrinsic perfective thing.

111. On the basis of these things beatitude could be distinguished into beatitude simply and in a certain respect, so that that would be beatitude simply which is second perfection immediately conjoining to the noblest extrinsic perfective object; but beatitude in a certain respect would conjoin with a less noble perfective object, and if indeed to an object more noble than the nature that is conjoined it comes closer to the idea of beatitude simply, but if to a less noble object it departs further from it.

112. The name ‘beatitude’ could also be distinguished in another way, because it can be taken for the conjunction with the extrinsic perfective object or for the proximate

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<sup>59</sup> “Hence, I observe that it is one thing in them that they are good, another thing that they are. For let one and the same substance be posited to be good, white, heavy, round. Then the substance itself would be one thing, its roundness another, its color another, its goodness another; for if these were individually the same as the substance itself, heaviness would be the same as color, color the same as good, and good the same as heavy, which nature does not allow to happen.”

foundation of that conjunction – for indeed many denominations can be made in a certain order from relations, and abstractions made from those denominations.

### C. Response to the Question

113. To the question I say, therefore, that beatitude consists in operation: either essentially, if beatitude be taken for the perfection that is the idea of conjunction with the beatific object, or proximately fundamentally, if beatitude be taken for the conjunction itself, so that, with the exception of the relation to the beatific object, the ultimate perfection intrinsic to the blessed and proximate to the beatific object is operation.

114. The proof of this: no intrinsic perfection is beatitude save insofar as it conjoins immediately to the extrinsic perfective object, which is the beatific object; but, with the exception of the relation, what immediately conjoins to the beatific object is operation; therefore etc.

115. The major is plain from the first article [nn.80-85; cf. nn.95-58, 104-105], because things cannot go completely and ultimately well for anything save when it possesses that which is for it supremely to be wanted; this is the extrinsic or quasi-extrinsic perfective thing, which is my statement for God, where the beatific object is the same as the Blessed One himself. But this supremely to-be-wanted thing is not possessed most perfectly unless it is conjoined immediately to the possessor. To be blessed is for things to go supremely well for oneself, from the second article [nn.86-94]; therefore no one's beatitude consists in anything save in that by which he is more perfectly and more immediately conjoined with the supremely to-be-wanted thing.

116. The proof of the minor [n.114] is that neither essence nor power is conjoined with the extrinsic perfective object save through operation, which is the intrinsic such perfection. However, this operation does not abide in itself or for itself, but tends per se and immediately to the object, to the exclusion of any intermediary absolute form [nn.95-99].

### D. To the Initial Arguments of the First Question

#### 1. To the First Argument

117. As to the first argument [n.3] I say that it is not a definition of the blessed but a description, and truer than the rejected others, because it is given through what is necessarily concomitant to the blessed, unlike the other descriptions that are rejected by Augustine. An abstract [formulation] then, cannot be inferred about an abstract, because such a consequence holds only when in the antecedent there is predication of a concrete about a concrete in the first mode per se [n.68].<sup>60</sup>

118. It can be said in another way that 'everything that he wants' is not taken divisively there for the things formally wanted, but for some one thing in which exist

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<sup>60</sup> In the first mode per se the predicate falls into the definition of the subject (as in 'man is a rational animal'), and here the abstract formulation ('humanity is rational animality') does follow the concrete one. But not so in the case, say, of the description 'man is capable of laughter', which does not entail the abstract formulation 'humanity is capability of laughter'. So, just because the blessed has everything he wants and wants nothing badly [n.3], it does not follow that blessedness is the having everything that is willed or wanted well. Some things wanted well (e.g. a blessed body) are not part of the definition or essence of beatitude but do accompany the blessed in fact.

unitively all things that are rightly wanted, so that the sense is: the blessed is he who has perfectly, in the way possible for him, some object willed because of itself, in which object he has unitively and eminently whatever he can rightly will. And from this understanding the proposed conclusion follows, because in this way he has through operation whatever he wants.

119. As to the authority from Boethius [n.3], one must give as exposition either (1) that the name of 'beatitude' is equivocal, either (1a) for final or completive perfection taken extensively or (1b) taken intensively; and the former description (1a) is of beatitude taken according to its extensive totality, or one must say, if it is taken for its intensive totality (1b), that it is a state perfect by aggregation of all goods within one good eminently and unitively containing them. Or (2) if there is no aggregation in it because of its simplicity, then (in a third way) 'by aggregation' must be understood as what precedes or is concomitant to the perfect state but is not part of the essence of it.

## 2. To the Second Argument

120. To the second [n.4] the answer is plain from the distinction set down in the second article [n.112], that the name of 'beatitude' can be taken for the relation of conjoining, or for the proximate foundation of that conjoining. And as to the confirmation [n.4], I concede that any second perfection in a creature (which perfection however is an absolute form), can, without contradiction, exist without a relation of conjunction to the beatific object.

121. If, however, that sort of idea of intrinsic beatitude be posited here, since it could not exist without conjunction to the beatific object, it follows that beatitude is either a relation or includes an absolute and a relation. For if 'to be blessed quidditatively' is to have the beatific object, then beatitude is such a having of the object; but such a having of the object either includes the absolute and relative together, or it essentially states the relative and necessarily connotes the absolute; for if it were essentially to state the absolute, it would not necessarily connote the relative, which is something posterior to the absolute.

## 3. To the Third and Fourth

122. Answer to the third [n.6] will be stated below [question 6, nn.310, 327, 329].

123. As to the fourth [n.7], I concede that beatitude does not consist in an action of the category of action, because it is not simply the perfection of the agent, as is proved [there, n.7]; now operation is not such action but is action taken equivocally, as said in *Ord.* I d.3 n.604.

124. As to the first confirmation [n.7], the answer is plain through the same point, that the change from non-blessed to blessed is not from non-agent to agent, but is from non-operating to operating.

125. As to the second confirmation [n.7], a certain person says [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.2] that "in an act are two things, namely the substance of the act and the form by which it has its perfection; according to substance the principle is the natural power, but according to form the principle of it is the habit. If therefore the habit is acquired, we will be totally cause of our act; if it is infused, the perfection will be from the exterior



cause that causes the habit. Now our act is not posited to be beatitude save by reason of its perfection; therefore, we are not cause of our beatitude but God is.”

126. Against this: the essentially prior cannot depend on any cause that the essentially posterior does not depend on; an act is essentially prior to its form, otherwise the form would not necessarily require the act for its being;<sup>61</sup> therefore if we are the cause of the substance [of the act], the form will depend on us, and only in some class of cause, because nothing seems to depend essentially on what is not a cause of it, speaking of any first act.

127. Again, the form is only a condition of the act; now the power that elicits the act does not elicit it bare, but with such and such a condition or circumstance; therefore, it is cause not only of the substance of the act but also of the form of the act.

128. Again, that the habit be a cause distinct from the power and a cause of something distinct (namely distinct from the power) does not seem probable; first because it is only a second cause in respect of the power (now second and first cause do not have distinct acts proper to them, because then with respect to neither would the former be first cause and the latter second); second because the effect, proper to the habit, would necessarily be an absolute form, if relation is not per se the term of an agent or an action; and it is not probable that the action is formed in this way, because then the action that reaches the beatific object would have to include two absolutes.

129. There is, then, another response, that the blessed is the second active cause of his beatitude as far as concerns the absolute that is in beatitude, and this if the will is the active cause of its beatific volition (about which later [in *Rep.* IVA d.49 q.10 nn.7-9, q.11 nn.3-9]).

#### 4. To the Fifth

130. To the fifth [n.8] I say that the act is simply more perfect than the habit, both in idea of final perfection, because it more immediately attains the final object, and in idea of formal perfection, because there could not belong to the habit at its peak as great a perfection as belongs to such act at its peak.

131. To the Philosopher in the *Topics* [n.8], therefore, I say, in one way, that the consideration in question must be understood ‘other things being equal’. Hence he himself maintains (at the beginning of the book [*Topics* 3.1.116a4-6]) that he is not considering it “in things far apart,” that is, “in things having many differences,” but in things that have only that difference for which his considerations hold universally. And then the minor is false ‘habit and act are distinct in this alone’, namely ‘according to being more permanent or lasting and less lasting’.

But there is another response in the issue at hand, that this act is as equally lasting as the habit – on the part of the power and on the part of the object and on the part of the nature of this one and of that.

132. As to the second proof [n.8 “second because habit is a cause of act”], the answer is plain elsewhere, *Ord.* I d.17 n.32 (on charity), that a habit is only a partial cause of an act; and it is not unacceptable for a partial equivocal cause to be less noble than its

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<sup>61</sup> The act of a habit, or the form here, falls into the definition of the habit, since a habit is the habit of such and such an act. But what falls into the definition of a thing is essentially prior to it.

effect, and especially as concerns a partial secondary cause, though the total or partial principal equivocal cause is nobler than its effect.

133. Briefly as follows:

Things go simply perfectly well for the blessed; things do not go thus well for anyone save in the simply perfect good, perfectly possessed, in the way possible for him; things cannot, from that good, go well for anyone else in that good save in his immediately attaining it; but he cannot attain it save by operation. Therefore, in this immediate attaining of that good, or in immediate conjoining with that good, does beatitude in its completion consist, and in the operation as in the proximate foundation.

134. The first proposition [n.133] is plain, because beatitude is the second perfection of a thing. For it is not the first perfection, because a thing is more perfect according to its first perfection (and by that first perfection alone can it be more wretched than others); now second perfection is properly expressed by the fact that ‘things go well’, for ‘things going well’ presupposes the first perfection of anything for which things go well. Further, there is an order in second perfections as in first perfections, because there is a correspondence of the latter to the former. And again, in the second perfections of any same thing there is an order such that some perfection is ultimate, short of which the thing is imperfect by way of privation, because it is of a nature to receive a further perfection; but when its ultimate perfection is obtained, if it is not simply perfect, its ultimate perfection remains something imperfect negatively, because lacking a perfection, though not a perfection of a nature to be received by it. To exclude further second perfection of the same thing, ‘perfectly’ is added to ‘well’; but to exclude further second perfection simply, at least in its kind, to ‘perfectly’ is added ‘simply well’, such that beatitude states a second perfection that excludes imperfection (both of privation and of negation), as being a supreme second perfection, at least in its kind.

135. The second proposition [n.133] is plain, because things do not go perfectly well for what can have that good if it does not have it, but go imperfectly for it by way of privation; and if it cannot have it, then things do not go perfectly well for it but imperfectly, at least negatively.

136. The third proposition is proved by the three conclusions of the first article [nn.80, 86, 95], that the whole of intellectual nature is of a nature thus to have that good, and it is imperfect unless it thus have it; but non-intellectual nature, as being inferior, if it is not of a nature to have it, then it remains imperfect, but not privatively so but negatively, that is, from the imperfection of its nature.

137. The fourth proposition is proved because there is no second perfection by which the perfect good may be more immediately attained than by operation, which of itself seems to be not for its own sake but for the sake of the object; and first perfection does not attain it save through the mediation of second perfection.

### Question Three

#### *Whether Beatitude Consists per se in Several Operations Together*

138. Whether beatitude consists per se in several operations together.

139. That it does:

Augustine *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, “The blessed is he who has whatever he wills etc.” [n.3]; but man wills rightly not only one operation but several, because if he rightly

wills enjoyment, he rightly wills vision, without which there is no enjoyment. Also, if he rightly wills vision he rightly wills enjoyment, because according to Anselm *Why God Man?* 2.1, “intellectual nature has received intellect for this purpose, to discriminate good from bad so that by his will he may love good and hate bad” (Anselm’s opinion, not his own worlds).

140. Again, from the same authority [Augustine] as follows: if by one operation he can have whatever he wills, therefore either through an operation of the will, and then it follows that Augustine’s description is equivalent to this: ‘the blessed is he who wills whatever he wills’ (because ‘to have’ is ‘to will’, since every operation of the will is a ‘to will’); but the wayfarer wills whatever he wills, therefore he has whatever he wills, therefore he is blessed. And if ‘to have’ is by act of intellect, then it follows that the blessed will understand whatever he wills, and then it follows, as before, that the wayfarer will be blessed, because he understands whatever he wills. One must say, therefore, that ‘to have this’ does not consist in one or other act alone, nor consequently in any single operation.

141. Again, beatitude consists in whatever the blessed is from the non-blessed per se distinguished by. But the blessed is distinguished by act of intellect, because the blessed sees, the non-blessed does not see, the beatific object. He is also distinguished by act of will, because if causes be distinct, acts are too; an act of intellect seems to be cause of an act of will, because when that cause is in place, the act is in place, and when that cause is removed, the act is removed.

142. On the contrary: in any essential order a stand is made at some one thing; therefore in the order of ends there will not only be one act for one extrinsic end, but also among intrinsic ends there will be thus some one supreme end; therefore, from the idea of intrinsic end, there are not two operations.

143. Response: to one simply first thing in one order there can be two things immediate to it, and consequently each is equally first – though not simply first but first in second place (example about efficient causes and effects).

144. On the contrary: *On Generation* 2.10.336a27-28, “The same thing, insofar as it is the same, is of a nature to do the same thing” [cf. *Ord.* II d.1 n.54]; therefore, to the same efficient cause only a single effect is of a nature to be proximate; therefore, by similarity, in the case of ends.

145. Response: unless an essential order of species prove that two species cannot be equally proximate to a first essence (and so unless the impossibility of a plurality be proved from the products themselves), it does not appear how this result could be produced from the unity of the producer, because it is not always necessary to assign two causes for two effects if every multitude is to be reduced to one thing as to the cause of the multitude.

146. An argument to the contrary in another way is that in things essentially prior in some order there is not a lesser unity essentially but rather a greater one; and, as it is, some simply extrinsic end under the end is attained through the single intrinsic end corresponding to it.

I. To the Question  
A. Opinions of Others  
1. Opinion of Richard of Middleton

147. Here is said [by Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.6] that “beatitude consists in the act of intellect and will together.”

148. The reason for this is that “beatitude consists in the perfect union of the beatifiable person with God; now this includes union according to every power according to which the nature is able to be immediately one with God. Of this sort [of power] are both intellect and will, because just as God (under the idea of supreme truth) is the immediate object of the intellect, so is he (under the idea of supreme good) the immediate object of the will.”

149. Again, “the virtue through which anything is moved to its term is the same virtue by which it rests in its term; but intellectual nature is moved to God through both intellect and will; therefore it rests in him through both powers. But beatitude is perfect resting of intellectual nature in God.”

150. I add a third reason: when several things are required for the perfection of something in first act, several things, proportionable to those first ones, will also be required for the perfection of the same thing in second act; but intellect and will are required for the perfection of intellectual nature in first act, because intellectual nature would be perfect in first act when it lacks neither; therefore second acts corresponding to the first ones are required for the perfection of it in second act; beatitude, therefore, which is completive perfection of intellectual nature in second act, will include these two second acts.

151. The proof of the major is that nature cannot be perfectly at rest unless whatever belongs per se to its natural perfection be at rest; for grant that some such not be at rest, then nature, according to something or other intrinsic to it, is not at rest; therefore it is not perfectly at rest; therefore the resting perfection of the whole nature includes per se the resting of any first act belonging per se to that nature.

## 2. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

152. Another opinion [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] is in the opposite extreme, that beatitude consists only in a single operation, because, from the definition of the Philosopher, *Ethics* [1.13.1102a5-6, 6.1098a16, 18-20, 10.1100a1-5], “happiness is the best operation according to the best virtue and in a perfect life;” and then it is impossible for there to be several operations of the same thing that are simply best, because neither are they of the same species, since one such perfect operation suffices in one thing.

153. It is plain too that the operations of intellect and will would not be of the same species, nor can there be several best operations of another species, because “species are disposed like numbers,” *Metaphysics* 8.5.1044a10-11. And especially is this true of the species proximate to the first, because this species is only one; for it is first in genus with respect to the others, just as the ‘simply first’ is first outside the genus.

154. Likewise it is not possible for there to be several best virtues of the same nature, whether ‘virtue’ is taken there for natural potency (because the supreme power of one nature is single), or whether virtue is taken there for an acquired or supernatural habit; for always, this way or that, the best is only one.

## B. Scotus’ own Response

155. To the question it can in a way be said (by mediating between the opinions) that, by speaking of beatitude not as it states an aggregation of all goods belonging to beatitude [n.152, Aquinas *ibid.* a.5; Boethius, *Consolation* III pr.2 n.3; Richard of Middleton *ibid.* n.147], but as it states that by which the beatific object is immediately attained ultimately [n.148], a distinction can be drawn as to beatitude of intellectual nature and beatitude of power. Because although nature is only beatified through a power yet, as nature, it is a beatifiable power, whose beatitude is not simply beatitude of nature, for things do not go simply perfectly well for the nature in that but in something else more noble than it, though things do, from this, go simply well for the power.

156. According to this, then, it can be said that the beatitude of intellectual nature consists in a single operation alone, because only in a single operation do things go simply perfectly well for it such that nothing is lacking to it – not as if this include everything belonging to the ‘going well’ of nature, but as it state in ‘going well’ the fulfilment of everything. The proof of this is that just as the beatific object, single in thing and idea, is that in which, as in the extrinsic perfecting cause, things go perfectly well for this nature and do so only insofar as the beatific object is attained by this nature simply immediately by operation – so such operation will be simply one.

157. In a second way [n.155], when saying that every power is beatifiable that can immediately attain the beatific object [n.155], one must draw a distinction in ‘immediately’; for either this excludes a medium of the same order (which, namely, would be for it a medium for attaining [the beatific object] in its own order, as operation is a medium for the power in attaining the object), or it excludes a medium of another order (because, namely, nothing would attain the object more immediately or perfectly than it, or be for it the reason for its attaining the object or not). An example of this distinction: a prior and posterior cause immediately attain the same passive subject, such that neither agent cause is a medium through which the other cause attains the common passive subject; yet the prior cause attains it more immediately, because more intimately and perfectly, for the whole attaining by the posterior cause is in the virtue of the prior cause.

158. In the first way [n.157, ‘excludes a medium of the same order’], one must concede that both intellect and will are beatified, because the term more immediately of the operation of each power is the object itself, such that neither is medium as regard the other in idea of object, nor in idea of attaining the object as it is attained by the act. And thus, the total extensive beatitude that is possible in an intellectual nature (because it is the beatitude of its two powers, each of which is beatifiable in its own way) – this, I say, consists in several operations.

159. And in this way, if there could be ten powers in intellectual nature, each of which would, through operation, attain God immediately, the total extensive beatitude would consist in ten operations. Nor is this a problem unless it be said that God is the beatific object under a single idea alone, and cannot be attained under that idea save by a single power and a single operation, and so a power attaining that idea according to another operation, though doing so immediately, is yet not beatified save in a certain respect.

160. And according to this, it would have to be said that beatitude, simply and as a whole according to its powers, consists, like beatitude simply, in a single operation of that very nature.

161. Speaking of immediacy in the second way [n.157, 'excludes a medium of another order'], it is plain that beatitude consists only in a single operation, because only a single power in nature most perfectly attains the object. Speaking thus, then, about the beatitude of nature, namely the beatitude by which things go simply best for nature itself, at least on the part of the object and of the best object (and as the best that nature is conjoined to), beatitude is only in a single operation of a single power –

162. – likewise too when speaking of the beatitude of the power as it includes immediacy in both ways stated [n.157].

163. In no way, then, can beatitude be said to consist in two operations save by positing that, for the beatific operation, a single operation suffice without another,<sup>62</sup> which however is a doubtful matter.

### C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Richard

164. To the arguments for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.148]: the minor is not true save of one immediacy without the other, and from this does not follow save that beatitude is only in one or other of them, to the extent beatitude includes each immediacy. Likewise, beatitude of nature only consists in that by which nature most immediately attains the object; but that is single, though some power of it may, through another operation, attain it most immediately with the immediacy possible for that power.

165. To the second argument [n.149] it can be said that 'to tend to the end' only belongs to appetite properly, and this as the 'to tend' is compared to motion; because although the intellect tend to an object present, here however, when taking the 'to tend' equivocally, it yet never tends to anything as to acquiring, namely through motion, a term of motion.

166. In another way, having conceded that there is a tending to the beatific object through both powers, namely by a certain imperfect operation that can be had about something absent, the point can be conceded: one tendency is that whereby nature tends to it principally, and thus does a single resting follow it, which is the resting of nature principally; but the other tendency is a less principal tendency of it, and in this way does the resting follow. Also, when comparing the powers with each other, these tendencies are not to the object with a double immediacy most immediately, but only one is, and so that one will be the immediate resting which follows. The beatitude then is the beatitude of nature, to the extent that beatitude includes a double immediacy of operation to object.

167. To the third [n.150] I say that the total resting of nature, speaking of extensive totality, requires that whatever is restable in nature be at rest; and in this way the beatitude of man is not without resumption of, and reunion of the soul with, the body, because some appetite is in the soul for the body as for its proper perfectible object, or at least because conversely there is some appetite in matter (as in what is properly perfectible) for form, namely for the soul. But among these restings there is one resting of

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<sup>62</sup> That is, beatitude could consist in two operations if each of the two operations was individually sufficient for the beatific operation, so that, though in fact both go together, each would be enough by itself.

the nature simply, which namely is the resting of what is simply noblest in that nature, insofar as it is restable.

168. I say therefore that, just as there are some many things pertaining to the first act of something, so there can be many restings of those many, and one total resting, with extensive totality, of the whole, which includes those many restings. But there is of them all a single resting, which is the ultimate rest in the object, which also is alone the simply total resting of nature, speaking of intensive resting.

#### D. To the Reason for the Opinion of Thomas

169. The reasoning for the other opinion [n.152] can be conceded when understanding the conclusion of the single beatific operation (as to each immediacy) simply; when speaking too of the completive beatific operation of the whole nature. But if it be understood of the beatitude of the whole with extensive totality, the reasoning is not compelling, because many operations, one of which is simply nobler than the other, can come together in the best in this way, namely extensively.

#### II. To the Initial Arguments for Each Part

170. To the first main argument [n.139] I say that the ‘whatever’ is not taken there for all desirable things separately, but for one desirable thing in which all are unitedly contained; and thus, in having the beatific object, by whatever act it be said to be had, ‘he has whatever he wants’, because he has it eminently in that act on account of which alone it is rightly to be wanted; and in this act he has every act rightly to be wanted. When, therefore, you take under the minor that this and that operation are rightly to be wanted in themselves, it is plain that it is not rightly taken under the major.

171. To the next [n.140] I say, as will be said in the following question [nn.271, 304], that ‘to have’ is taken there for an act of willing, not for any act of willing whatever, but for the perfect act of willing, which follows bare vision; and he who by such act has whatever he wants, that is, has the one thing that is eminently everything wantable, is blessed. But it does not follow that ‘therefore whoever wants whatever he wants is blessed’, because a definition or description proper to something can be given through a lower level predicate but not through a higher level one, because a higher level one belongs to more things; hence in the form [sc. of the argument] a consequent is drawn from a lower to a higher level along with distribution [sc. at that higher level – which is fallacious].

172. As to the third [n.141], I deny the major, because many aspects in something can be distinctive of it from something [else], nor yet is each of them of the essence of that something insofar as it is distinct, but only that which first and essentially distinguishes it – and if you take this to be the understanding from the fact that ‘per se’ is stated in the major, namely essentially and per se in the first mode [cf. footnote to n.117], I concede the major; and then the minor is false, because by act of will alone is the blessed distinguished in this per se mode from the non-blessed – about which more in the following question, ‘On Enjoyment’ [nn.297-299].

173. As to the argument for the opposite [nn.142-146], it can be conceded when one understands it about beatitude simply of the nature, and about any operation simply

beatific, namely in each way of immediacy in immediately attaining the object. And this appears probable since, when people posit beatitude to be in each operation or in both, they say that one of them is per se ordered to the other [nn.155-163]; and consequently, neither are each nor both one ultimate perfection simply of the nature, since even a single one of them is simply the ultimate perfection of the power.

### Question Four

#### *Whether Beatitude Consists per se in an Act of Intellect or of Will*

174. Whether beatitude consists per se in an act of intellect or of will.

175. Proof that it consists in an act of intellect:

*John* 17.3, "This is life eternal, to know you etc."

176. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.9 n.18, "Vision is the whole reward."

177. Again, the Philosopher, *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-32, proves by express intention that the happiness of separate substances consists in contemplation, and from this he concludes that our happiness is in contemplation, because in this are we made more like them.

178. Again, *Ethics* 1.5.1097b14-16, "Beatitude is the sufficient good;" but of this sort is vision, according to the remark of Philip, *John* 14.8, "Lord, show us the Father, and it is sufficient for us."

179. On the contrary:

Augustine, *On the Trinity* 1.10 n.20, "To be enlightened and have joy in that alone [sc. the intellect] will suffice."

180. Again, *On the Trinity* 13.5 n.8, "The blessed is he who has whatever he wills" [cf. nn.3, 139]; therefore, beatitude consists most of all in willed action. The will more wills its own operation than the operation of the intellect, because it is its proper perfection, and each thing desires more its own perfection than the perfection that per se belongs to another, although it be in some way its own.

181. Again, Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1.32 n.35 "The supreme reward is that we enjoy him [sc. God];" but to enjoy is an act of the will, because it is to "inhere with love" [*ibid.* 1.4 n.4]; our supreme reward is beatitude; therefore, it should consist in the will.

#### I. To the Question

182. In this question all who hold that beatitude consists in operation agree in holding that it consists only in some operation of the intellective part [of the soul] as distinguished from the sensitive part, because only an immaterial power can by its operation attain the perfect good, in which alone (as in its object) is beatitude. But as to the operation of which of these powers alone it consist in (if it consists in a single one), or principally consist in (if it consists in both), opinions arise.

#### A. Opinion of Thomas Aquinas

##### 1. Exposition of the Opinion



183. One opinion [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] posits that beatitude consists in an act of intellect principally and essentially, and in act of will as in a certain perfection extrinsic to and supervening on vision – in which vision is the substance of beatitude.

184. The reason for this is of the following sort: beatitude either is the ultimate extrinsic end, which a thing attains by its operation, or is the ultimate intrinsic end, and is that operation alone which conjoins first with the exterior end; an act of will is the ultimate end in neither way; therefore beatitude too does not consist, in this way or that, in the will as an act of it – though it is in the will as object, because the idea of good is the object of the will, and beatitude, as it is the ultimate end, has most of all the idea of good.

185. Proof of the minor [n.184]:

As to its first part [‘an act of will is not the ultimate extrinsic end’]: first because the object of the will is the end, so every willing is a certain being ordered to the end; second because willing cannot be the first thing willed (for it presupposes that something other than willing is willed first, because a reflected act presupposes a direct act that has its term in something other than an act of the power, otherwise there would be an infinite regress). Something like this appears in the intellect, because [an act of] understanding cannot be the first thing understood, but something other than the very [act of] understanding is the object first of a direct act of understanding.

186. Proof of the second part of the minor [n.184, ‘an act of will is not the ultimate intrinsic end’], because the operation that first conjoins with the exterior end is the operation by which the attainment of the exterior end first comes about; an act of will is not of such sort, because there is one act of will before attainment of the end, namely desire, which is a sort of motion toward something not possessed, and another act of will is a sort of resting in the end. It is plain that the will does not first attain the end through the first act, because it lacks the end when it has that act. Nor does it do so through the second act; the proof is that the second act follows attainment; for the will is only now at rest in the thing it was tending to before because it is disposed differently now to the thing than before, or conversely. Therefore, what makes the will to be thus disposed to the end, so as to be (in it or through it) at rest in that which before it was tending toward, is the ultimate attainment of the end; such is the act of vision, because through this a certain contact of God with the intellect comes about (for the thing known is in the knower). Through this contact the object is so disposed to the will that the will can now be at rest in what before it could not.

187. This is confirmed by an example in the sense appetite, that if the sensible object is the extrinsic end, sensation is the intrinsic end, because the sensible object is first possessed through the sensation in such a way that the sense appetite can be at rest in it.

188. This is plain too in another example, that if money is the extrinsic end, possession of money is the intrinsic end, which intrinsic end is followed by the resting of the will in the loved money.

## 2. Rejection of the Opinion

189. Against this:

The extrinsic end is simply best and supremely to be willed, therefore, among the things that are for it, what is more immediate to it is more to be willed; but willing is

more immediate to it, because it immediately tends to it as to ultimate end, since the ultimate end, as such, is the proper object of the willing.

190. Proof of the major:

That is more to be willed by a free will which is naturally more to be desired by natural appetite; of this sort is what is closer to the ultimate, because it is simply more desired naturally.

191. Again, the will can will its own act just as the intellect can understand its own act; either then it wills its willing on account of understanding, or conversely, or it wills neither on account of the other (and I am speaking of ordered willing). Not the first because, according to Anselm *Why God Man* 2.1, it would be a perverse order to will to love in order to understand;<sup>63</sup> nor the third, because, in the case of things ordered per se to the same end, there is some order among them as if to an end under the end; therefore the second – and this is what Anselm maintains in the above cited place.

192. Again, if extrinsic beatitude were simply supremely to be willed, then that most of all is intrinsic beatitude, which, among things intrinsic, is supremely to be willed; of this sort is some willing; for the will more desires its own perfection in the ultimate end than the perfection of the intellect (and this, when speaking of correct free appetite, it does rightly), just as it naturally more desires it by natural appetite.

193. To the reasoning [n.184-85], then, I concede the first part of the minor and the first part of the conclusion, namely that the act of will is not the ultimate end altogether.

194. But neither so is the act of the intellect (according to them [n.185]); however, the act of will does approach more to the simply ultimate end – just as the first reason [n.184] proves about attaining, through this act, the end as proper object, and the third [n.184] about the greater wantability of this act, and the second about the idea of end in this act in respect of the act of intellect [n.184].

195. Nor do the proofs for the first part [n.185] prove more than is given:

For the act of will is ordered or orderable thus to the end simply because it is more immediate to it in the order of the things that are for the end; but the act of intellect, if it is not ordered, is yet orderable and mediately so, and for this reason it participates less of the idea of end.

196. The second proof [n.185] shows that something is willed prior to the willing itself; and I concede this, because the object is extrinsic; but the object is not intellection, at least when speaking of what is willed first in perfection, whatever may be true of firstness in generation; for that firstness does not prove anything for the proposed conclusion, namely that what is first willed is more an end.

The second part of the minor [n.184] I deny.

As to the proof [n.186] I concede that through an act of desire, which is for something absent, there is no attainment of the end; but through another act, which namely is the love of the thing present, there is attainment of the end first, speaking of the firstness of perfection, though through an act of intellect there is some sort of prior attaining of the end by priority of generation. But now, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, “things posterior in generation are prior in perfection,” which

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<sup>63</sup> Anselm, “For this purpose has man received the power of discriminating, so that he might hate and avoid the bad and love and choose the good... For otherwise in vain would God have given this power of discriminating, because man would discriminate in vain if...he did not love the good and hate the bad.”

is true of the posterior that is simply more immediate to the ultimate, which ultimate is what is simply perfect. So it is here.

197. When the proposed conclusion is proved about second act, that it is a resting in the end and consequently posterior to the attaining of the end [n.186], I say that resting can be understood either for delight properly speaking (which is a perfection supervenient to operation, as beauty to youth), and thus do some [Richard of Middleton] understand this reasoning, as if this opinion [of Thomas, nn.183-188] posit that with respect to the present object the will have only a delight consequent to the vision of the intellect; and if resting be thus taken for delight, I concede that it follows the attainment of the end, and the attainment first not only in generation but in perfection, because it follows the act of loving or enjoying the end seen, which is truly an elicited act of the will. But it is false that the will not elicit any act but have only passive delight about the lovable object present. Therefore does Augustine say *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, “The appetite of the seeker becomes the love of the enjoyer.”

198. Now this appetite or desire is not passion only: first because “we are not praised or blamed for our passions,” *Ethics* 2.4.1105b31-32 (but the greatest part of the merit and laudability of the just wayfarer consists in holy desires), second because for an object presented in the same way the will elicits desire sometimes more intensely, sometimes more laxly, according as it elicits it with greater or lesser effort.

199. It is also reasonable that if the will in desiring elicit an act, as is said in *Lectura* II d.25 n.36 (for which there is the authority of Augustine, *City of God* 14.6, about two similarly affected people,<sup>64</sup> and of Anselm *Virginal Conception* 1<sup>65</sup>), that it also elicit an act about the end present, because if by acting it move itself toward a thing not possessed, it is reasonable that by acting it give itself rest in the thing present.

200. If then ‘resting’ is taken in another way for the quietening act elicited by the will, which act namely conjoins immediately with the ultimate end, in the way ultimate rest is in it, I concede that the resting is a second act of the will [n.197]. But I deny that it follows the first attainment of the end, I mean first in firstness of perfection; rather, in this way is it the first attainment, though it does follow some attainment, that is, the presence of this enjoyable object, which presence is by act of intellect.

201. But when speaking of first attainment in this way, namely the first presence of the object so that the will might be able, through its own act, to rest itself in it, I deny that this operation is the ultimate intrinsic end, through which is the first attainment of the extrinsic end; because the operation that is in this way first in attaining does not conjoin with the extrinsic end immediately, to the exclusion of all mediation of anything else nearer to the end.

202. If against this be adduced the proof that the will can now, not before, be at rest, therefore ‘it is disposed differently now to the end than before, or conversely’ [n.186], I reply that the consequence does not hold, but it is enough that some power, prior to the will in operating, be differently disposed to the object, by the positing,

<sup>64</sup> “For if two people, equally affected in mind and body, see the beauty of a single body and, when it is seen, one of them is moved to illicit enjoyment, the other perseveres settled in chaste will, what do we think is the cause that a bad will come to be in the former and not in the latter?”

<sup>65</sup> “God has subjected us and what is in us to the will, so that on its command we not be able not to move and do what it wills. Indeed, it moves us as its instruments and does the deeds that we are seen to do. Nor are we able to resist it by ourselves, nor can the works that it does not come to be. The mistress, which God has given us, we neither should, nor can we, not obey.”

namely, of whose different disposition the will has power for the act for which it did not have power before, not by alteration of itself but of what was previous to it in acting.

203. Briefly then: the first part of the deduction [n.185] is not against any opinion, because no one posits that the act of the created will is God; nor is the second part [n.186] about the first act of will, namely desire, doubtful to anyone. The force then [of the deduction] rests in this: whether any act of will, other than desire, could be first in reaching the ultimate end.

204. And the proof adduced there about resting [nn.197, 186] is a failure of equivocation. For if resting is taken for the delight consequent to perfect operation, I concede that perfect reaching of the end precedes that resting; but if resting is taken for the act of resting in the end, I say that the act of loving, which naturally precedes delight, gives rest in this way, because an operative power only rests in an object through the perfect operation through which it attains the object. And then the proposition 'the first, that is, the perfect, attainment of the object precedes resting in the object' is false, though having an appearance of truth from comparison with the motion by which a movable thing attains the term and attains rest in that term, since movement to the term precedes rest in the term.

205. But this comparison with the proposed conclusion is not valid, because the same operation is here perfectly attaining, and perfectly giving, rest, because the resting is in the perfect attainment of the object. And universally, when applying such likenesses taken from motions to operations, one must give up what, because it is a mark of imperfection, is therefore proper to motion. But so is here its distinction from rest; and, by opposition to it, the following are in operation in a unitive way: attainment of the object (as if by motion, or rather by tendency toward it), and resting in the object (since indeed such tendency toward it gives rest in it).

206. But if every operation of the will about a present object be denied other than delight – this is irrational, because if the will is operative about an absent object, but an object known imperfectly because obscurely, much more perfectly will it be able to operate about an object present perfectly, because seen.

207. If it is argued that the will can be at rest in the object now, not before, therefore it is differently disposed to the object (or conversely) than before [n.186] – I reply: the consequence is not valid, but it is enough that some power, a different one prior in operating, be disposed differently to the object than before [cf. n.202, repetition]; nor is it a wonder that a power, which in operating requires another operating power, is not altogether in proximate potency to operating save when the other is operating.

208. If it is argued that at any rate through that new thing, through which as new the will can be at rest now, the will was not able to be so then, therefore the attaining of the end is through that and is prior to the resting of the will (as is plain), therefore the first attainment of the end will be in that other act – I reply: first by firstness of generation, not by firstness of perfection; but beatitude is first attainment by firstness of perfection.

209. But if you argue that altogether, before any resting of the power, the possession or attainment of the end precedes, namely because the power can operate now and was not able to before, because it is not without some change, which change is only to possessing of the object – it follows that in no operation, even of the intellect, could there be a first attainment of the object, and so not beatitude either. And then the reasoning goes to the other opinion, that beatitude is not in operation but in some

possessing of the object preceding all operation, which was spoken about in the first question [n.121].

### B. Scotus' own Response to Each Part of the Question

210. As to this question, argument from a number of middle terms is made for each part.

#### 1. Argumentation from the First Middle Term, namely from the Object, and the Weighing of it

211. One middle term is from the object.

On behalf of the understanding, as follows: the true is nearer to being than the good is.

212. On behalf of the will, as follows: the idea of good is nobler because it is good by its essence, the true is good by participation; likewise, the universal good is nobler than a particular good, the true is a particular good because the good is an object of the intellect.

213. This middle term seems efficacious for neither opinion, because the major in both cases seems false, for the true and good are not really distinct, and consequently neither is one really nobler than the other.

214. But if one of them is said to be nobler than the other in idea (understanding 'idea' for something caused by the intellect), this is a relation of reason arising from the intellect comparing these things to others – this nobility does not make for the proposed conclusion, because a relation of reason is not the formal idea of the first object of intellect or will.

215. Likewise, to what will the comparison be made? If to the divine persons (to the Son, namely, to whom true corresponds in being, and to the Holy Spirit, to whom good corresponds), the divine persons are not different in nobility. But if they [the true and good] be compared to things posterior to them, namely to the acts of which they are the objects, there is now a circle in the reasoning.

216. And if they are posited to differ in real idea, as was said of the attributes in *Ord.* I d.8 nn.192-193, then some nobility in one of them (according to the proper idea of it) with respect to the other can well be preserved, and this before an act of intellect; because just as there is a distinction between things of a different idea, so is there inequality between them, especially if the distinction is quidditative, not hypostatic, and between absolutes. But perhaps neither true nor good assert absolute ideas beyond being.

217. The minor, too, of each reason is dubious as to the part that says 'the good is the object of the will' and false as to the part that says 'the true is the object of the intellect', as was said in *Ord.* I d.3 nn.171-174.

218. Both the major, then, and the minor require a lengthier discussion than may concern the present question.

219. Giving weight, then, to this middle term [sc. 'from the object'] in favor of neither side, I respond to the reasons taken from this middle term:

As to the first [n.211] the inference is to the opposite effect, because just as being is potential with respect to any particular idea so what is more potential will be closer to it.

220. But against this: the idea of being precisely taken is nobler than any idea superadded to it precisely taken, just as the idea of the subject is nobler than the idea of the accident; therefore, what is closer to it as it is most perfect will be more perfect. Hence it is false that being is disposed to other things as matter is to form, but rather it is as it were an active potency (as subject to property).

221. In another way it is said that something can be closer in one order to what is most perfect and another thing closer in another order; just as quantity is more immediate to substance than quality in one order, and yet quality is a more perfect thing and consequently closer [to substance] in another order. But that is simply more perfect which is in a nobler order, or according to a nobler condition, closer to what is most perfect, as good is closer to being in the order of communicating perfections or being the term and completing the perfection of another (because of which good is said, in one way, to be communicative, according to Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.31-32, in another way to be the end, *Physics* 2.3. 24-25, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b25-27, *Ethics* 1.4.1097a33-34) – though true be nearer to being in its order to powers operative about the whole of being.

222. As to the reason to the contrary [n.212], a first objection is that one could argue similarly about the true. For the true is true by essence, but the good is true by participation; therefore, the true is truer, therefore also greater, because thus does Augustine negatively argue *On the Trinity* 8.1 n.2, “if not truer, not greater,” where the context is only about things convertible.

223. Therefore I reply that all these transcendentals [sc. good, true] denominate each other mutually, and for this reason ‘being essentially true’ is of equal perfection as ‘being essentially good’, unless it be proved that the idea of true is nobler than the idea of good, and conversely.

224. Another response is realer, because the ‘more’ [sc. in ‘nobler’, ‘closer’ etc.] can be referred to the inherence or to the predicate; inherence follows the identity of the extremes. Therefore, what is essentially present is more present to the extent it determines inherence or identity, but not to the extent it determines the inhering extreme (an example: a white animal is not a more white thing than a man who is white).<sup>66</sup>

## 2. Argumentation from the Second Middle Term, namely from the Habit, and the Weighing of it

225. Argument is made, second, from habit, because an act is nobler than a nobler habit disposes to. Some habit of the intellect is nobler than any habit of the will because, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 1.2.983a4-7, wisdom is the noblest habit and the same is expressly said in *Ethics* 6.7.1141a16-20 and 10.7.1177a22-25. But no habit [of the will] is nobler, in the Philosopher, than justice or at any rate than friendship, about which it is plain that they are, according to him, far below wisdom.

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<sup>66</sup> The term ‘white’ in the phrase ‘a white animal’ inheres in the term ‘animal’ more than ‘white’ in the phrase ‘a man who is white’ inheres in the term ‘man’ (for in the first the noun is directly qualified and in the second only by apposition); but the white animal is not thereby said to be a whiter thing than the man.

226. To the contrary, *I Corinthians* 13.13, “But the greater of these is love;” and Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.37, “Among the gifts of God no gift is greater than charity, nor equal to it” (plainly speaking about a gift of a different idea).

227. The response [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] made to the Apostle and Augustine is that their understanding holds for the state of this life, but for the state of the fatherland the light of glory is nobler. The proof is that that to which, because of its perfection, belonging to something imperfect is repugnant is more perfect than that to which this is not repugnant; the light of glory, because of its perfection, is repugnant to being present in a wayfarer but not to being present in charity.

A confirmation: what distinguishes the perfect from the imperfect is more perfect than what is common to both; the light of glory distinguishes the comprehender [in heaven] from the wayfarer; charity is common.

228. Argument against this response:

First from the authority of Hugh [of St. Victor] *On the Celestial Hierarchy* 6.7 [supra n.21], about the “acute, super-fervent, hot,” says “love is supreme over knowledge;” hence the supreme order [of angels] is denominated from its ardor, the next to it from its knowledge.

229. Again, by reason:

The most perfect habit of will on the way [for the wayfarer] perfects the will according to the capacity that it has at that time; therefore, if it is nobler than any habit of intellect [as the response to the Apostle and Augustine conceded, nn.226-227], the capacity of the will on the way is greater (or for something greater) than the capacity of the intellect; therefore it is greater in the fatherland too, because either there is the same capacity here as there (speaking of remote capacity, which is according to the rank of the nature with the capacity), or the capacity there will correspond proportionally to the capacity here (speaking of proximate capacity); for the first capacity [capacity on the way] can only be totally satisfied by something proportionally perfecting it, so only by something more noble than it; but it is for something more noble [sc. than the intellect is for, as was conceded, nn.226-227].

230. This middle term [n.225] seems rather to conclude in favor of the will, especially when speaking of infused habits, which dispose to the true beatitude that the theologians speak of.

231. As to the authority of the Philosopher [n.225], it could be said that, although wisdom were a nobler acquired habit, it does not follow that it dispose to a nobler act, speaking of supernatural act, of which sort is beatitude.

232. But to the contrary [sc. to the concession, n.231, that wisdom is a nobler acquired habit]: the will is a power able to be habituated by an acquired habit just as the intellect is; therefore, the supreme acquired habit of the will can exceed wisdom just as its supreme infused habit exceeds the supreme habit infused in the intellect.

233. It could also be said that the Philosopher commonly did not distinguish intellect from will in idea of operative principle, or operative in extrinsic operation; hence he holds this principle, as it is distinct from nature, to be the same, now art or intellect, now intention [*Ord.* I d.2 n.351]. Likewise, neither does he distinguish the principle in its intrinsic operation in regard to the end; hence too he does not distinguish wisdom’s speculation from love, but rather its speculation includes love – or at any rate he does not assert that intellection suffices without volition, because, as intellection is distinguished

from this other act (which act [of volition] is less manifest), he neither affirms nor denies it.

### 3. Argumentation from the Third Middle Term, namely from the Comparison of Act with Act, and the Weighing of it

234. The third middle term is from comparison of act with act.

First as follows: an equivocal efficient cause is nobler than the effect; an act of intellect in respect of an end is cause of an act in respect of the will, because when the former is posited the latter is, and when the former is removed the latter is – and it is plainly an equivocal cause.

235. To the contrary, from the same middle term [n.234]: the will gives commands to the intellect; therefore, an act of will is an equivocal efficient cause in respect of intellection.

It is confirmed by Anselm, *Virginal Conception* 4 [n.199].<sup>a</sup>

a. [Interpolation] where he says that the will moves itself against the judgement of the other powers, and that it moves all other powers according to its own command; and Augustine *City of God* 19.14 [in fact 14.5-6, 28] says that the will uses all the other powers.

236. Similarly, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, “What is posterior in generation is prior in perfection;” volition is posterior in generation; nor is it this alone, but it has the idea of end with respect to intellection, according to Anselm *Why God Man* 2.1; and Augustine *City of God* 19.14, “The rational soul is present in man so that he may contemplate something in his mind and do something accordingly,” and later, “so that he may cognize something useful and manage his life and morals according to that knowledge.”

237. I reply: neither is an act of intellect total cause of an act of will, but a partial cause (if it is any cause), nor conversely is the will total cause of intellection.

238. The major [sc. “an equivocal efficient cause is nobler than the effect,” n.234] is true of a total equivocal efficient cause, but if it is about a partial cause this will be [true] about a cause of a higher order. And in this way is the will, in commanding the intellect, a superior cause of the intellect’s act; but the intellect, if it is a cause of volition, is a cause subservient to the will, as having an action first in the order of generation.

239. And so this middle term concludes probably on behalf of the will, but proves nothing on behalf of the intellect.

240. But that intellection is not the total cause of volition [n.237] is plain, because, since the first intellection is caused by a cause merely natural, intellection too is not free; further, it would cause with like necessity whatever it would cause, and thus, however many circularities may occur in acts of intellect and will, the whole process would merely be by natural necessity – which however is unacceptable. But, in order that freedom in man may be preserved, one must say that, after intellection has been posited, a total cause of volition is not obtained, but the will is more principal with respect to volition – and the will alone is free.

241. As to the proof that “when the former is posited the latter is, and when the former is removed the latter is” [n.234] – the antecedent was rejected in *Ord.* I d.1. nn.100-146.



242. An argument in another way is given [Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1; cf. Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.7 arg.5]: that is better which, without anything else, would be more choice-worthy; but intellection alone is more choice-worthy than volition alone, because intellection alone would be a perfect act and an act proper to intellectual nature; volition alone would be only a certain inclination (as of a heavy thing to the center [of the earth]).

243. On the contrary, from the same consideration: that by which what has it is simply good is more choice-worthy than that by which what has it is not simply good; but Augustine, *On the Trinity* 11.28, “neither is a man rightly called good who knows what the good is, but he is who loves the good,” and from this he concludes there that “in the case of men who are rightly loved, the love itself is more loved,” which is the conclusion here intended.

244. Again, in the case of goods that do not include each other, that good is more choice-worthy whose opposite is more to be hated. But prescinding from these things, namely how they do not include each other, the opposite of intellection cannot be as hateful as the opposite of love.

245. Proof of this:

First about the contrary opposite: because no ignorance of God, even the ignorance of infidelity, can be as hateful as hatred of God, if it could be present in the will.

Second about the contradictory opposite: because not to love God is blamable and a sin, when namely it can be had by the proximate power [sc. power of loving]; because he who actually understands God and in no way loves him sins, and he who actually thinks of sin, and does so without any displeasure, sins. But not to understand when, however, one is in proximate power to understanding, is not blamable or a sin.

246. This middle term [n.244] concludes probably in favor of the will.

247 To the argument in favor of the intellect [n.242], I reply: if love were alone it would not only be a natural inclination, as of the heavy to the center of the earth, but it would be an operation proper to intellectual nature; for the fact that it is now operation, and is this sort of operation, it does not have from the intellect formally but concomitantly.

248. An argument is given in another way [Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.82 a.3; Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ. 1 q.7]: that is more perfect which in its perfection is less dependent, because ‘to depend’ is a mark of imperfection; an act of intellect does not depend on the will, but conversely.

249. I reply: things posterior in generation depend on things prior, and yet they are more perfect, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-7 [n.236].

250. Similarly, the end depends in its being on that which is for the end and not conversely [n.236]; form also depends on matter and not conversely; bodily quality depends too on quantity insofar as, according to them, ‘being white without a surface’ is a contradiction; and still in all these cases the greater opposite is true, and universally in these generations, where there is dependence on something prior in order of generation. However, it is true that the simply most perfect thing is altogether independent, because as there is first in perfection so also in generation, *Metaphysics* 9 [nn.249, 236]. Act precedes in time every power, because if there be a circle in the priority of act to power

and conversely, yet there is a stand at him who is always moving first; but where two priorities do not come together, the greater opposite is more commonly true.

251. Likewise it could be said that the intellect depends on volition as on a partial but superior cause; conversely volition depends on intellect as on a partial but subservient cause.

252. Another way of arguing is as follows [Thomas Aquinas, *ST Ia* q.82 a.3]: the act of intellect is purer because it contracts no impurity from the object, because ‘to understand evil’ is not evil; but an act of will contracts impurity, because ‘to will evil’ is evil.

253. Besides this, there is another impurity in the volition [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* IV d.49 princ.1 q.7], because it is a movement of the soul to the thing in itself; intellection is not so but is a movement of the thing to the soul or of the thing as it is in the soul, from *On the Soul* 1.4.408a34-b18 and *Metaphysics* 6.4.25-31, “True and false are in the soul, good and bad in things outside.”

254. To the contrary: from *Topics* 2.9.114b20-22, that is purer and better whose corruption is impurer and worse; but the corruption of the will is such, because ‘to will evil’ is evil for you [Thomas, n.252], not so ‘to understand’.

255. Similarly, the reasoning [n.252] is otherwise at fault in two ways:

In one way because it should compare understanding the corrupt thing, which is false [understanding], with willing the corrupt thing, which is evil [willing], and then the proposed conclusion follows through the reason already stated [n.252, sc. the intellect contracts impurity from the object, because it contracts falsity, therefore it is not purer than the will].

256. In another way because the will can have a good act about any object whatever [sc. including an evil object], just as can also the intellect; for the will can hate evil well, just as the intellect can understand well that evil is to be hated.

257. If, finally, this proposition be taken, ‘that act is impurer which is rendered impure by impurity of object’ – I reply: an act of the intellect is such, because it is necessarily false from the fact it is of a false object [a false object is not a thing but a proposition about a thing, and if the intellect has a false proposition for its object it is necessarily false]; but an act of will is not impure and evil because it is of an evil object, save concomitantly [sc. because an evil object is not evil as an object, but as willed in an evil way].

258. But if you say that an act of will is impure from its object, by impurity of malice, not so an act of intellect – the conclusion does not follow, because then an act of sense would be nobler than an act of will, because it is less impure [sc. therefore lack of impurity, as per n.252, is not a good way to prove nobility].

259. The second reason [n.253], namely about tendency to the thing in itself, concludes to the opposite:

First from their own statements [Thomas and Richard], because they concede that an act of will in respect of things superior to the will itself is nobler than an act of intellect. From this follows, ‘therefore this act in genus is nobler than that act in genus’, because, if the best is nobler than the best, the genus too is nobler than the genus and the species than the species, for a whole species together is superior to any other whole species.

260. Second: an act is not perfect unless it conjoins with a perfect object; but an act of will conjoins with the object in itself as it is in itself, and an act of intellect conjoins with it only as the object is in the knower. Now the beatific object is simply nobler in itself than as it is in the knower; therefore, an act of will conjoins with the beatific object simply under a nobler idea.

261. As to the authority of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* [n.253], I say that both intuitive knowledge and the love that follows it tend to an object as it is existent in itself; but abstractive knowledge and the consequent love tend to an object that has known being; so in this respect there is no difference between intellect and will, because each power can tend to its object as it is in itself and to the object as it has diminished being in the intellect. However, the Philosopher was speaking in common of abstractive intellection and of will as it is desiderative, how it tends to a thing not now existing but future (and this as to the term or effect of the act of desire). But to the same thing, as to its object, the will only tends as the thing has being in the intellect, because when it is desired the thing has no other being that it could be object by.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

262. To the first main reason [n.175] I say, according to what was said in the preceding question [n.11], *Metaphysics* 12.9.1072b26-28, that “the act of the intellect is life, and eternal life if it is eternal.” If you take it that it is eternal *blessed* life, this is not in the Gospel [n.175] but is added. So I add “to know you *and to love you*,” and the second addition is no more against the text than the first.

263. To the next [n.176], which is from Augustine, I concede that vision is the whole reward, that is, the supreme reward, of the intellective power; but it is not the supreme reward of the whole man. And in this way can many authorities that are verbally for the intellect be glossed, that they are meant for the supreme power or about nature according to its power, but not simply about the supreme perfection of nature.

264. To the third [n.177], about habit, the answer is plain in the second way that proceeded from the middle term taken from habit [n.225].

265. To the next [n.178] I say that love is a good more sufficient than intellection, because when it is had the haver of it needs less.

266. For proof of the minor [n.265] I say that Philip’s statement [n.178] must be understood as it concerns instruction about the Trinity, for he had not then completely understood it. For he (namely Philip) had frequently heard talk about the Father, and so he conceived that when the Father was shown to him he, and others with him, would sufficiently grasp the truth of the faith about the Trinity. But he was not speaking of the beatific vision, as if that would suffice without love, as is plain from Christ’s response [*John* 14.9], “Am I so long with you etc. Philip, he who sees me...,” as if Christ is saying, “if you have already seen me in my deity, also with the perfect vision of faith, you have seen my Father too with similar vision.” But he did not mean that the Apostles had seen him in the beatific vision; for then he would be supposing them to have been blessed.

## Question Five

*Whether Beatitude Simply Consists in the Act of Will that is Enjoyment*

267. Whether beatitude simply consists in the act of will that is enjoyment.

That it does not:

268. The act of enjoyment does not distinguish the blessed from the non-blessed because, by the definition of ‘to enjoy’ [n.181], the act belongs to the wayfarer.

269. But I say that the wayfarer has only desire, which is relative to what is not had, and therefore he does not enjoy.

270. On the contrary: the wayfarer no more wills God a good not present in him than the comprehender does; therefore he no more has an act of love of friendship with respect to a good not possessed by the beloved than the comprehender does; but ‘to enjoy’ is an act of friendship, not concupiscence.

271. Again, if someone who does not have charity see the divine essence bare (which does not involve a contradiction) he can enjoy it; and yet without charity he cannot be blessed, Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.18 n.32, “[Charity] alone is what makes division between the sons of the kingdom and the sons of perdition.”

272. Again, all things lower than intellectual nature are in their own way (that is, in a certain respect) made blessed in completing an act of concupiscence; therefore the will too [is made blessed] in a like act, though a more perfect one; but enjoyment is not any act of concupiscence.

273. Again, possessing succeeds to hope, therefore possessing is an act of will; therefore beatitude is in that act, because the will is of itself the power according to which intellectual nature is beatified; but possessing is not enjoyment.

274. To the contrary:<sup>b</sup>

[That it does] because beatitude is not actively elicited by the will; first because the will would beatify itself; second because a reward is conferred on the rewarded by the rewarder; third because a gratuitous act of love is of itself meritorious (for it is of the same idea as what is meritorious, because it makes itself worthy with him whom it thus loves, though no one may merit because of his state); fourth because nothing that is or can be a merit as concerns what is from itself is essentially a reward; fifth because a more intense act of enjoyment is preserved if it is from God. Proof in general: because the passive capacity in creatures is for a greater perfection than is their active virtue; proof in particular, about the soul of Christ [sc. who received by incarnation, not by act of will, supreme beatitude].

b. [Text canceled by Scotus]: On the contrary, Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1 [n.181], “The supreme reward is that we enjoy him.”

## I. To the Question

### A. Two Possible Conclusions

275. There are two conclusions for the question: first, that the beatitude simply of intellectual nature consists in the sole act that is enjoyment; second what enjoyment it consists in, because not in every enjoyment.

#### 1. About the First Conclusion

276. The first conclusion is made clear by division thus: in genus there is only a twofold act of will: ‘to will’ and ‘to will-against’.<sup>67</sup> ‘To will’ too is double in genus: either because of the thing, or the good of the thing, willed; or because of the thing, or the good of the thing, that wills.

277. The first ‘to will’ is said to be the willing of the love of friendship, the second the willing of the love of concupiscence; and only the first is enjoyment, for to enjoy is to inhere with love [n.181] because of the thing itself, namely the thing loved.

278. Against this second distinction an objection is made through Augustine, *On the Trinity* 9.12 n.18, “The appetite of the seeker becomes the love of the enjoyer” [n.197]; the appetite of the seeker belongs to the love of concupiscence; therefore etc.

279. I reply: the wayfarer, as to the willing of concupiscence, wills a good for himself and, as to the willing of friendship, he wills well-being for God. The first appetite, in respect of a good to be possessed [sc. the love of concupiscence, or ‘the appetite of the seeker’], becomes the love of satisfaction for him in the good possessed, and so it becomes ‘the love of the enjoyer’ – it does not, however, become the love by which he formally enjoys, but it becomes his love who, by the other love [sc. the love of friendship], enjoys the same object in itself that, by this love [sc. the love of concupiscence], he loves for himself. The second appetite [love of satisfaction], that is, imperfect love, becomes the perfect love of the enjoyer by which, namely, he enjoys.

280. Having set down the division [nn.276-277] I give proof of the principal conclusion, not including nor excluding the passions (about which there will be question later, nn.413, 426, 431-433), but only speaking here of these acts of will [n.277].

281. It is plain that beatitude cannot consist in any willing-against; first because willing-against has evil for per se object, which cannot be the beatific object; second because the beatific act is first and immediate in respect of the ultimate end, and so is not had by virtue of any prior act of will. But it is plain that willing-against is not first with respect to the ultimate end; indeed it is not simply first among acts of will, but is either not had or not commonly had save by virtue of some willing, according to Anselm *Fall of the Devil* 4, “No one deserts justice save by wanting something else that does not stand with justice,” as he exemplifies about a miser and coin and bread.<sup>68</sup>

282. Second, beatitude does not consist in an act of concupiscence:

First because although [such act] could be good when duly circumstanced, yet it is not good by reason of itself or by its object, even by God, because it can be immoderate. This is plain from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.30, “Perversity lies in using what is to be enjoyed” (just as above, in *Ord.* II d.6 nn.34-73, it was said that the angel first sinned by immoderate concupiscence of the beatific object for himself), as Anselm maintains in *Fall of the Devil* 6, where he maintains that the [fallen] angels desired what they would have had if they had stood; but they desired nothing before, or more than, beatitude, because to that does the affection of advantage first and supremely incline. Now an act of friendship in regard to God is good by reason of itself and of its object, at least because it cannot be immoderate by excess, though perhaps by deficiency.

<sup>67</sup> Or, more colloquially, ‘to will’ and ‘to refuse’. Not to will at all, or to be indifferent, which is possible, is not an act but an absence of act.

<sup>68</sup> “For a miser, when he wants to keep the coin and prefers bread, which he cannot have unless he gives the coin, first wants to give it, that is, to give up the coin, before he does not want to keep it.”

283. Second, because an act of concupiscence is not and cannot be the first act of the will in regard to the end, for every act of concupiscence is in virtue of some act of friendship; for I desire a good for this [person] with concupiscence because I love him for whom I desire it.

284. Third, because an act of friendship is in the will according as it has an affection for justice; for if it had only affection for advantage, it could only supremely will things of advantage, according to Anselm [*ibid.* n.282, chs. 12, 14]. But an act of concupiscence is present in the will according as the will has an affection for advantage, because it is necessarily present according to that affection, even were that affection alone present; but the affection of justice is nobler in idea than the affection of advantage, because the former is ruler and moderator of the latter, according to Anselm [*On Concord* q.3 n.11], and is proper to the will insofar as the will is free, because the affection of advantage would belong to the will even if the will were not free.

285. Then, fourth, because the act of friendship tends to the object as it is good in itself, but an act of concupiscence tends to it as it is good for me; but nobler is an object in itself than as had by something else – at least this relation of the object to the haver, which is in an object as desired by concupiscence its formal idea, diminishes the objective perfection that this good has as it is in itself.

## 2. About the Second Conclusion

286. The second main conclusion is plain, for a wayfarer can enjoy God since he can inhere in him by love because of himself [n.277].

287. If you say ‘not by love but by desire’ [n.269], this is false, because although God is not had by the [wayfaring] lover, and therefore could be desired as something to be had, yet not by desiring some good to be had by God that God does not have, but his infinite goodness only is pleasing to me, which, by accepting and being pleased with, I will every good to be present in that is present in it.

288. The proposed conclusion is also plain from Augustine *83 Questions* q.30 [n.282], that virtue consists in enjoying what is to be enjoyed.

### B. A Difficulty

289. But there is a difficulty here as to how beatific enjoyment and non-beatific enjoyment are distinguished.

#### 1. First Solution

290. Not in species it seems, because when per se sufficient causes are of the same species the effects are too. So it is in the issue at hand, because the same will, the same charity, the same enjoyable object, and under the same idea on the part of the object. In accord with this, then, it would be posited that they only differ as greater and lesser in the same species.

291. Against this is objected that then the wayfarer would be blessed, though less blessed than the comprehender.

292. I reply: the consequence is not valid, because ‘beatitude’ is not imposed to signify the nature as to its species the way the name enjoyment is. Hence it is well conceded that both [sc. wayfarer and comprehender] enjoy, but one more, the other less; however, the name ‘beatitude’ is imposed to signify enjoyment in a determinate degree, so as not to be below that degree. And this degree the wayfarer never has, neither as to more nor less.

293. But [sc. to the contrary], diverse comprehenders have it thus [sc. more and less], and so one of them is more blessed than another.

294. This<sup>69</sup> is shown as follows, that if there are only degrees there of the same species, let the lowest degree of a blessed be taken and the highest degree of a wayfarer; if they are equal, then the wayfarer is blessed.

295. But this act [sc. of the wayfarer] does not fall short of that act [sc. of the blessed] to an infinite degree, as is plain. Posit then that it fails short to four degrees. It is possible for the enjoyment of the wayfarer to increase through four degrees, because knowledge also can. Since then too knowledge of the same species may have as many degrees as enjoyment also has, yet, once intensification of the knowledge is posited, the enjoyment of the knower can be intensified proportionately; therefore, it is still possible for the wayfarer to be blessed; therefore, it is also possible for a wayfarer to reach that degree [of enjoyment] and be blessed.

296. A similar argument can be made about a given degree of beatific enjoyment, from which the supreme degree of a wayfarer (suppose the blessed Mary) is distant by a certain number of degrees; yet if it is of the same species within the species of beatific enjoyment, let a descent be made to lower and lower degrees – a length there will be some beatific enjoyment equal to the non-beatific enjoyment, or less than it.

## 2. Another Solution

297. It can be said in another way, and more probably, that beatific and non-beatific enjoyment differ in species – formally indeed in themselves, but causally from their causes, or the disposition of their causes.

298. For if it be posited that the intellect is cause, though a partial cause, of volition, and the intellection of the wayfarer and the vision of the blessed differ in species, then the effects that necessarily require these diverse causes differ in species; for never does an individual of the same species necessarily require a cause of a different species from the cause that another individual requires.

299. But if intellection be said to be a cause *sine qua non*, it is at least essentially required, and then, as before, diverse things of the same species do not necessarily require in their causes any of a different species. So this opinion too [n.297] has to concede that volitions are distinguished in species by their objects, and yet the object, according to them [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* I q.15], is a cause *sine qua non*. But then the distinction of enjoyments can be saved by distinction of visions, just as an effect varies by the differing closeness of the agent to the passive subject (for an agent that is opposite to the passive subject in a direct line acts differently from one that is opposite to it in a reflex or broken line), and cognition here is as it were the coming close of the object to the will.

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<sup>69</sup> Paragraphs 294-296 are an added extra in Scotus’ own ms.

### 3. Conclusion

300. Holding to this second way then [nn.297, 299] one need not concede that, by God's absolute power, can be caused in the soul of a wayfarer, at least of one not seeing God bare, any enjoyment equal to the lowest enjoyment possible for any blessed; because the supreme of the lowest species cannot be made equal to the lowest of the higher species, for the whole of the former is below the whole of the latter.

301. But it is difficult according to the first way to prevent in the soul of the wayfarer (while his obscure knowledge persists intense to such and such a degree) the possibility of some enjoyment being there equal to some given beatific enjoyment.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

302. The answer to the first main argument [n.268] is plain from the second article [nn.286-287].

303. To the second [n.271] it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines, Henry of Ghent] that if someone without charity see God, he would not have supernatural enjoyment because neither any first supernatural act, without which he is not able to be acted on nor to act, and consequently he would not have beatific enjoying either [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 n.88].

304. Another answer was stated in *Ord.* I d.1 nn.141-142, that a habit is not that whereby the haver can simply elicit the act; and so, after the presence as it were of the object is posited, the will can proceed to some act about the object, and the supernatural act [n.303] comes from the object and the presence of the object, but not from something that is in potency eliciting it. Nor yet is that enjoyment beatific, because it is not as great as is of a nature to be had by such a will about an object thus shown to it; for a greater enjoyment would be had if the charity were present by which the act is in some way intensified, as was said in *Ord.* I d.17 nn.202-205. But beatitude of will is not in any act save the highest that the will can have about an object represented to it in such a way.

305. To the third [n.272] I say that the will alone among all appetites can will a good for something because of the thing willed. And so there is no likeness here between other appetites and it, as neither is there generally when what the argument is about is the sole thing such. On the contrary, the argument is to the opposite when it is about something pertaining to the perfection of this sole thing; for it agrees with things more imperfect than itself in some respect and differs from them in some respect proper to itself: it is more perfect according to what is proper to it than according to what is common, because the common cannot be more perfect than any imperfect thing that includes it. And so, if excelling perfection, as beatitude, belongs to that sole thing, the conclusion that beatitude agrees with it not according to that in which it is like the inferiors is more drawn than the opposite conclusion is.

306. To the fourth [n.273], not everything that succeeds to the theological virtues in the wayfarer, or to their acts, is of the essence of beatitude, but only the most perfect unique act; therefore, let it be that possessing is the act of will that succeeds to hope, it does not follow that beatitude consist in it, but it suffices if it be concomitant to beatitude.

## Question Six



*Whether Perpetual Security of Possession Belongs to the Essence of Beatitude*

307. Whether perpetual security of possession belongs to the essence of beatitude.

308. That it does:

Augustine, *On the Trinity* 13.4 n.7-7 n.10 adds after other things belonging to beatitude: “And because it is altogether most blessed, so will it be most certain that it will always be.”

309. Again, it is of the essence of beatitude that it is the ultimate perfection; therefore, by its idea, it excludes from the subject all opposed privation; therefore, by its idea, it makes the subject incorruptible and unchangeable in respect of that perfection.

310. Again, Aristotle *Ethics* [1.13.1102a5-6, 6.1098a16-20, 10.1100a1-5], “the best activity in a complete life is happiness;” this, according to him, includes a certain perpetuity, otherwise a happy man could become wretched, which he considers unacceptable [*ibid.* 6.1098a19-20, 11.1100a27-29]; therefore etc.

311. Again, faith, hope, and charity come together essentially for the wayfarer’s first perfection, and actions according to them come together for his second perfection [n.39]. So, for the perfection of him who comprehends, the perfect acts corresponding to those acts come together essentially. The proof of the consequence is that the second perfection of the blessed in its degree does not require a lesser integrity of perfection than the second perfection of the wayfarer in its degree, otherwise the blessed, by that wherewith they are blessed, would not have all the perfection per se of which they would be capable. But, as it is, to the act of hope only possession succeeds; but possession seems to be nothing but security; therefore etc.

312. On the contrary:

Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.4.1096b3-5, “Nothing is more perfect from the fact that it is more lasting” (he gives an example of a white thing lasting one day and one year); and this point is altogether true of permanent perfection, because to such perfection time, or any greater or lesser duration, is an accident. Therefore, security of possession, which includes perpetuity of duration, does not per se belong to beatitude, which is total simultaneous perfection.

313. Again, this security of possession, if it is an act, is an act of intellect or of will; if an act of intellect it does not belong to beatitude save as being the way to it (from questions 3 and 4 of this distinction [nn.156, 194-202]); if an act of will, it is not enjoyment; rather it has enjoyment for object; but beatitude is in enjoyment alone (from the preceding question [nn.275-288]); therefore etc.

## I. To the Question

314. Here two things need to be looked at: first the perpetuity of beatitude; second the security of the blessed.

### A. About the Perpetuity of Beatitude

#### 1. About the Reality of Such Perpetuity

315. About the first point [n.314] the thing is plain because it is so from Scripture, *Matthew* 25.46, “The just will go to eternal life;” and *id.* 22.30, “They will be like the

angels of God;” and *Psalms* 83.5, “They will praise you for ages of ages;” and it is repeated elsewhere.

316. Similarly there are many sayings of the saints to the same effect. Let it be enough to adduce Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.8 n.11, “There cannot be blessed life if it is not immortal.” He proves this by the fact that, if such life can be lost, then the blessed loses it willingly (and then he is not blessed because he does not have what he wants), or he loses it unwillingly, or neither willingly nor unwillingly. And on each of these last two members it follows that he is not blessed; for he does not have beatitude, but rather: if he loses it willingly, he hates it; if he loses it neither willingly nor unwillingly then he does not value it; therefore it is not blessed life either. The like can be argued if beatitude is lost through loss of natural life; for if he loses life, he loses it either willingly or unwillingly or in neither way.

317. And this three-membered distinction of Augustine’s must not be understood to hold for the moment at which blessedness is posited as being lost (because the result, namely that he is not then blessed, would not be unacceptable); but it must be understood for the ‘now’, or the time, for which he is blessed. For if he then does not want to lose blest life and yet does lose it, he does not have whatever he wants. Whether, then, he wants to lose it, or he does not care about it, he does not love that life for the future, even while he has it; therefore he is not blessed.

318. Nor is it reasonable to object that he may lose it but that he does not, while he is blessed, consider the fact, and so he is neutral as regard his will – not indeed by not caring about the apprehended good’s being possessed forever, but by not understanding anything about that ‘being possessed forever’. This, I say, is unreasonable, because how is it he would never consider the perpetuity of the life that he supremely loves if that life is blessed life? Or if he does consider it and believes the life to be perpetual, then he is deceived. But nothing is more unacceptable than that someone be blessed by a false opinion, according to Augustine *City of God* XI.4.

319. And with this also agrees the authority of the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.1033b27-29, “We say that in all things nature desires what is better; but it is better always to be than not to be,” at least in the way in which it is possible ‘to be always’; but it is possible for a perpetual nature to be ultimately perpetually perfect; therefore it naturally desires this. And so, in the case of beatitude, where natural desire is completed so as not to be vain, this condition will be obtained.

## 2. Doubts about Such Perpetuity

320. But what the cause is of this perpetuity is matter for doubt; likewise too what sort of thing is this perpetuity; and third how it is present in beatitude.

### a. Three Positions or Opinions are Set Down About the First Doubt

#### 321. About the First

Either [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* VIII q.9] the position is that beatitude is essentially necessary of itself, and then beatitude cannot not be perpetual – of itself indeed formally, but causally by a causality other than extrinsic cause [cf. *Ord.* I d.8 nn.232-249].

322. Or, second [Aquinas *ST IaIIae* q.5 a.4], the position is that beatitude is perpetual from the fact that the will necessarily enjoys the object seen, for there is not any idea of evil or deficiency of good shown in the object. And this position differs from the first [n.321] in the way opinions about the heavens differ – the opinion that posits the heavens to be moved necessarily because of the uniform relation that the mover has to the movable [n.322], and the opinion that would posit the motion of the heavens to be formally necessary of itself [n.321]. The first opinion but not the second would be the one posited by a philosopher, as is plain from Averroes *Metaphysics* 12 com.41 [cf. *Ord.* I d.8 nn.232-293].

323. Or, third [Aquinas *ST Ia IIae* q.2 a.8, q.3 a.8, q.10 a.3; Richard of Middleton, *Sent. IV* d.49 Princ.1 q.6], the position is that the power is determined to action and is so by a necessary habit, namely that the intellect is determined to seeing by the light of glory, and the will is determined to enjoyment by consummate charity.

#### α. Reasons for and against the First Opinion

324. Argument for the first of these positions [n.321] is as follows: some bodily form is simply incorruptible, not only some substantial bodily form (as the form of the heavens) but also some accidental one, provided it is the proper perfection of an incorruptible body (as perspicuity in the heavens and luminosity in the stars); therefore the supreme perfection of spiritual nature will be formally incorruptible.

325. Again, a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite (the point is clear about the heavens [below, n.417]); but beatitude takes away every privation from a nature capable of beatitude, because it takes away imperfection and potentiality, since beatitude is ultimate act in its own order more than is the form of the heaven in the order of substantial forms.

326. There is a confirmation of the reason in that, to the extent an extrinsic end includes eminently the perfection of every other end, it removes, as regards the extrinsic end, all privation or lack; for no extrinsic end is here lacking to him who perfectly has that end. Therefore similarly (or by way of causality) the ultimate intrinsic end, because it joins one to the ultimate extrinsic end, takes away all privation of a further intrinsic end, and so it will constitute a composite that is formally incorruptible intrinsically and in its conjunction with the extrinsic end.

327. Again, third, if beatitude were of itself a potential form, then it could be destroyed (and yet be so while nature remains, because the nature is incorruptible), and consequently someone blessed could become wretched, and thus someone blessed would not be blessed, because he would not have whatever he wants (for he wants never to become wretched [nn.3, 118]).

328. Against this [n.327]: created beatitude is an accident; therefore it is not less dependent than its subject is; but the subject depends on being conserved by God contingently conserving it, and consequently the subject does not have necessary existence formally; therefore much less does an accident have it.

329. I reply: although beatitude have an absolutely contingent being yet, from the fact of its once existing in a nature, it necessarily remains while the nature remains; and so it has necessary existence from its having been brought into being – and this as it is in its

own order of being (although, as the argument proves [n.328], it is not absolutely necessary).

330. Against this [n.329]: God can conserve the essentially prior without the posterior; the nature, because it is the subject, is essentially prior to beatitude; indeed it is prior in time. There is a confirmation: a third has no greater necessity in relation to a first than a third has in relation to a second; but here the relation of the third to the second is a contingent relation only; (as is plain from the idea of the terms); therefore etc. [cf. *Ord.* I d.1 nn.139-140].

331. I concede, therefore, that, other than God, nothing has formally necessary existence, but simply contingent existence. Nevertheless, a created thing is said to have incorruptible being insofar as it does not have a contrary, or insofar as it cannot be destroyed by any created thing but can only be annihilated by God not conserving it. And in this way can it be conceded that beatitude is incorruptible. But what is thus incorruptible is only perpetual of itself in possibility; because just as it has its existence from God contingently conserving of it, so too does it have its perpetuity.

### β. Reply to the Aforesaid Reasons

332. To the reasons for the first opinion:

To the first argument [n.324] the answer is plain from what has been said, that neither the heavens nor any accident of them is incorruptible save in the aforesaid way [n.331].

333. To the second [n.325] I say that no form can take away privation from a subject susceptible of it (namely a subject that is of a nature to receive another form) save to the extent the subject is of a nature to receive that other form, because, while the subject remains in some aptitude for receiving, a lack cannot be taken away unless that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is posited, and it is not removed in another way save as that [sc. the subject being of a nature to receive] is removed.<sup>70</sup> Since the form of the heaven, therefore, does not include in itself the forms of inferior things simply (but neither does it include them eminently, the way that infinite being includes all other things), the result is that the form does not take away from its matter the privations of those forms (provided, however, its matter has the capacity for those forms<sup>71</sup>). Hence this seems an irrational way of positing that the heaven is incorruptible, because corruptibility is not in this way removed as far as concerns the intrinsic principles it comes from –

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<sup>70</sup> The Latin here is obscure. The sense seems to turn on what it means for a subject to have a privation, namely that a subject can only be deprived of something if it is of a nature to receive that something. A blind man, for instance, is deprived of sight because a man is of a nature to receive sight, but a stone is not deprived of sight because it is not of such a nature. So, if a form is to take away a privation from a subject, the subject must first be posited as being of a nature to receive that form. The only other way of removing a privation would be to remove from the subject its being of a nature to receive the relevant form, for then the absence of the form would no longer be a privation.

<sup>71</sup> There is a view, derived from Aristotle, that the matter of the heaven is matter only for the form of the heaven, in which case the heaven would be incorruptible because its matter would be incapable of receiving another form. But then the analogy between the form of the heaven and beatitude would cease to hold, since the argument says that beatitude, like the heaven, is incorruptible because it includes everything else one could want just as the form of the heaven is incorruptible because it includes all forms. But the heaven will not be incorruptible for this reason if its matter is incapable of other forms.

although the view is saved that the heavens could not be corrupted by a natural agent, for this form so contains others that it cannot be expelled by any natural agent.<sup>72</sup>

334. An example of this is plain: the intellective soul, which is a more perfect form than the form of the heaven, does not take away from matter the privation of other forms; indeed, it does not even constitute something incorruptible with respect to a natural agent, insofar as it requires some concomitant form [sc. bodily form] that a natural agent, by corrupting, can reach to. Only an infinite form, then, if it could perfect matter, could in this way (that is, by taking away privation), constitute an incorruptible composite. Yet there would still be a doubt whether the susceptible subject would be in potency to the forms in their proper ideas which, in that infinite form, it possesses eminently. Therefore, it is plain that the antecedent is false [sc. “a form that takes away every privation from its matter constitutes an incorruptible composite,” n.325], speaking of what is incorruptible, that is, indestructible; but if the discussion be about something not corruptible by a natural agent as by something contrary to it, I concede the antecedent, and thus concede the conclusion.

335. To the next [n.326] I say that, as regard the intrinsic end, the consequence does not hold that the intrinsic end removes every privation formally from a subject as the extrinsic end removes every defect of the extrinsic end. For the extrinsic end is formally infinite while the intrinsic end is finite, and so the latter cannot include intrinsic things the way the former includes extrinsic things.

336. On the contrary: another intrinsic end cannot succeed to this intrinsic end unless it join one to another extrinsic end; therefore if it joins one to an extrinsic end that excludes every defect, it will also intrinsically exclude every defect of the [intrinsic] end that does the joining.<sup>73</sup>

337. I reply: this [intrinsic] end, while it remains, excludes defect (as whiteness, while it is present, excludes the defect of blackness); but it is not simply present necessarily, because it is not in itself necessary; but the extrinsic end is in itself necessary.

338. And when you say that ‘another intrinsic end can join one to another extrinsic end’ [n.336], I concede the fact; but then the extrinsic end is not the end for it,<sup>74</sup> nor an end supplying every defect of any extrinsic end whatever. The response to the confirmation [n.326] is plain from this, because then it [the ultimate intrinsic end] is not in conjunction with it [the ultimate extrinsic end].

339. To the third argument [n.327] I say that if the nature remain the same, the nature is always capable of beatitude and misery, and consequently it is not contradictory that, with the cessation of beatitude (which is a per accidens accident in that nature),

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<sup>72</sup> The form of the heaven does not remove privations by supply of what is lacking, for it does not contain simply or eminently the inferior forms that the matter of the heaven is of a nature to receive. Neither does the form of the heaven remove privations by taking from the matter of the heaven its being of a nature to receive other forms (for the aptitude for other forms remains in the matter). So the heaven remains corruptible in principle, because it remains still of a nature to receive forms other than the form it has. The heaven is only incorruptible, then, in the sense that no natural agent could corrupt it (no natural agent could remove from the heaven its form), but not in the sense that the heaven is intrinsically incorruptible. For its matter still has a nature to receive other forms and so, in principle, to lose the form it has in favor of those other forms.

<sup>73</sup> An intrinsic end is the condition in the subject that joins it to the extrinsic end. This paragraph and the next ones are about arguments to show that an intrinsic end joining one to an extrinsic end that is without defect will itself be without defect. The arguments, their responses, and the Latin are obscure in their terseness.

<sup>74</sup> Sc. the extrinsic end is not the intrinsic end for the subject – nor is it an intrinsic end supplying all defects of any extrinsic end.

misery should be present. And when you say that ‘then it did not have before whatever it wanted’, I reply that it did have whatever it wanted when the ‘whatever’ is taken unitively, not when taken distributively, in the way expounded above [n.334], that is, that it had God in whom it had eminently everything rightly want-able.

#### γ. What is to be Said about the Second Opinion

340. Against the second position [n.322] argument is given in *Ord.* 1 d.1 nn.139-140.

341. And I concede that although the intellect see, with natural necessity, a proportioned object present to it, yet the will does not, with natural necessity, enjoy this seen object, as was stated there [*ibid.*, n.340].

342. Nor too is the necessity of seeing a necessity simply but only a necessity if the object remain present – and this supposing the object is merely contingent, because the object moves any created intellect voluntarily and contingently. If too the will contingently enjoys the thing seen, it also contingently joins intelligence with memory, provided however the will there has its act.

343. As to the argument that in the object nothing of evil nor any defect of good is shown, response was given before [*ibid.* n.340].

#### δ. What is to be Said about the Third Opinion

344. Against the third position [n.323] it can be argued that the habit cannot be a cause of operation before the power is, but it is always second, because a power is that whereby we have the ability simply. Hence the habit does not use the power, but the power uses the habit as second cause and as instrument; now a prior cause is not determined to act, nor consequently is it necessitated, by a second cause, but the reverse holds.

345. Again, the Blessed Virgin had as wayfarer a greater charity than the charity of any of the blessed of lower degree, and yet her charity did not necessitate her to enjoyment, even when she was contemplating God.

346. Again, let it be that the light of glory necessitate the intellect to seeing the object present to it, yet if the will is the cause that commands the seeing, the will is able not to command it; for it contingently conjoins the intelligence to the memory of the object that it contingently loves. But it seems that it would there [sc. according to this position] have to conjoin it thus, because, from Augustine in many places of *On the Trinity* [9.8 nn.13-14; 15.10 n.19, 27 n.50], the will in the generation of a perfect word concurs in joining it thus; now the seeing is the perfect word, according to Augustine *ibid.* [15.12 n.22].

347. I concede, therefore, that no necessity or necessary perpetuity arises from the habits determining powers to their acts, but that from the habit of glory there is only a necessity in a certain respect, because the habit has its natural inclination from charity; and there is no such necessity in the will, because the will can freely use or not use charity.

#### ε. Scotus’ own Opinion

348. I say, therefore, that the cause of this perpetuity is neither the form of beatitude (as if beatitude thereby be formally necessary), nor the nature of these powers (as if it necessarily operate perpetually about the object), nor the habit in the powers (as if it necessarily determines the powers to operating perpetually), but the cause is from the divine will alone, which just as it perfects such nature intensively so it conserves it in such perfection perpetually.

#### ζ. A Doubt and its Solution

349. But now occurs a doubt how Blessed Michael will be impeccable, because by nothing intrinsic to himself is he able to prevent his enjoyment from being contingent, and consequently he is able not to enjoy and so to sin. The consequent is false, since Augustine says in *Against Maximinus* 2.13 n.2, “To whatever nature is given that it not be able to sin – this comes not of nature proper but the grace of God” (and it is in Lombard I d.8 ch.2 n.3). The same Augustine in *Enchiridion* ch.28 n.105, “Just as our soul now has ‘not wanting unhappiness’, so will it always have ‘not wanting iniquity’.” But now our soul so has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ that it cannot want unhappiness; hence Augustine says *ibid.*, “not only do we not want to be miserable, but in no way can we want it.”

350. I reply: it is plain that Blessed Michael is impeccable in the sense of composition, that is, he cannot be blessed and at the same time sin. But in the sense of division, that while he remains blessed he not have power and possibility for sinning, this can be understood in two ways: either by something intrinsic to him that would remove such power, or by an extrinsic cause that would remove proximate power from him. For example: although someone possessed of sight have the intrinsic power to see any material body, yet through some extrinsic cause he can be made perpetually incapable of seeing with proximate power, as that if the power [sc. extrinsic cause] makes distance of sight from that body perpetual, as would be if there were a perpetual obstacle between the empyreal heaven and the eye of the damned. That eye would not be able to see the empyreal heaven, speaking of proximate power, and this by an extrinsic cause perpetually hindering the power; yet it could by remote and intrinsic power see it, so that there would be no intrinsic cause of impotency.

351. So I say that there is no intrinsic cause in the will of Michael, now blessed, by which the power otherwise to sin would, in the sense of division, be removed; there is no intrinsic cause altogether preventing the power from being altogether reduced to act. But by extrinsic power does the intrinsic power to sin lack possibility, namely by the will of God forestalling the will so that it always continue the act of enjoyment and so can never reduce to act its remote power of not enjoying, or of sinning – since indeed a second cause, hindered by a superior cause that is acting for one of a pair of opposites, can never, by its proximate power, issue in the other opposite.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> It is easy enough to see how an extrinsic barrier can prevent the damned from seeing the heaven, though they have the intrinsic power to see it. It is less easy to see how God’s extrinsic power can put a barrier in the way of Michael exercising his intrinsic power to sin. Perhaps it is simply that God makes himself always so present to Michael that this presence is itself the barrier to Michael’s sinning. At all events Michael retains the power freely to sin but God ensures, extrinsically, that he never exercises it. There is some similarity here to so-called ‘Frankfurt cases’, where a person is free to choose between *a* and *b* but, if he is about to choose *b*, some outside agent intervenes to prevent it and ensure choice of *a*. In fact, however, the person chooses *a* without ever being about to choose *b*, and the agent

352. I concede, therefore, the inference that, when one speaks of remote power, beatified Michael is, in the sense of division, capable of sin.

η. To the Authorities from Augustine

353. To the authorities of Augustine:

To the first [n.349] I say Augustine means ‘that it not be able’ by proximate power ‘to sin’; ‘this comes not of nature but the grace of God’, that is, of God gratuitously forestalling and conserving the nature in right action.

354. As to the next [n.349], Augustine does not say that just as now the soul necessarily has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then does it necessarily have ‘not wanting iniquity’ – for neither is true when speaking of ‘not wanting’ as it is an elicited act; but just as now the soul perpetually has ‘not wanting unhappiness’ so then will it have ‘not wanting iniquity’.

355. And when you argue: “now our soul so has ‘not wanting’ that it cannot ‘want’,” I say that our soul is not able to want unhappiness, not<sup>76</sup> for the reason that it necessarily has ‘not wanting it’, but because unhappiness cannot be the object of an act of willing. On the other hand, it does not follow that thus our soul could never want iniquity, because iniquity – speaking of what is the substrate in sin – can be the object of a created will. Or one could say briefly that just as now the soul never wants unhappiness but always has ‘habitually not wanting’, so will it then never want [iniquity] – and thus the cases are alike *de facto* on this side and that.

356. And if you argue, “the soul now is not able to want unhappiness, therefore it will then not be able to want iniquity” – the consequence is not valid, because there can well be a likeness on this side and that as regard ‘is not’ although not as regard ‘cannot’.<sup>77</sup>

357. Against this: the indifference of the will is taken away by its determination by a higher cause no less than by a lower cause; therefore if, by reason of its own causality, the will is indeterminate as to operation, it is as repugnant to its nature that this indifference be taken away by a superior cause as by an inferior cause; just as, therefore, it is against the nature of the will that a habit necessarily determine it, so is it against its nature that God determine it.

358. There is a confirmation, that a superior cause more determines an inferior cause than the reverse; therefore, a superior determining cause takes away the indifference in acting of an inferior cause more than if the inferior cause were to do the determining.

359. Again, it is not in the power of the will to act thus or not to act thus, because what a thing is determined to by a superior cause cannot be in the power of the determined

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does not have to intervene. The person, then, freely chooses *a* without in fact being able to do otherwise and choose *b*. Blessed Michael’s case, on Scotus’ view, seems similar: Michael actually chooses enjoyment, but remains free not to choose it and to sin, save that God would prevent that choice – not intrinsically by removing the power, but extrinsically by preventing its exercise. Or, as Scotus puts it [n.352], Michael remains able by remote power to do otherwise and sin, but not by proximate power [n.353].

<sup>76</sup> Removing the misleading punctuation ‘...non. Ideo non potest...’ in the printed text, and replacing it with ‘...non ideo non potest...’

<sup>77</sup> Sc. the likeness between the soul not wanting unhappiness now and not wanting iniquity then carries over only as regard the fact and not as regard the ability. The soul now both does not and cannot want unhappiness; the soul then does not but can want iniquity (in the way explained above in n.351).



thing, for the determined thing acts as it is moved by what determines it; therefore, its act will not be praiseworthy, nor properly voluntary.

360. I reply: the fact that the will in its order of causing causes this thing is proper to this cause [sc. the will]. I reply further that, since contingency on the part of the will is in every way contingency on the part of the effect, this requires the contingency of everything else that concurs in the effect. Now it is repugnant to the will's nature (or to its freedom) that the contingency that exists necessarily on its part not simply posit the contingency of the effect (as far as the side of all the lower concurring factors is concerned), because this takes away from it its being a cause in an order superior [to those lower factors]. But there is no repugnance to the will's nature that its own contingency not posit contingency simply in the effect as far as the side of a superior cause is concerned, because a superior cause is not determined by the will. Therefore, it is not simply against the will's nature that it be determined by a superior cause (that is, that doing the opposite not be against its nature<sup>78</sup>), as it would be against its nature to be determined by a habit or by an inferior nature.

361. To the form of the argument then: it is against the will's nature to be determined in its own order, and nothing else is primarily repugnant to it; but, as a result, it is against the will's nature to be determined by an inferior cause, because then it would itself not be the superior cause. Yet it is not against its nature to be determined by a superior cause, because there stands along with this that it is cause in its own order.

362. On the contrary: if the superior cause determines it, then the will is determined in its own order of causing; therefore, in its own order of causing it is not contingent.

363. I reply: by its nature, or because of its determination in its own order, the contingency is as equal as that of the effect which proceeds from it and from other causes. But that the will is not altogether contingent comes from its own contingency, that is, because some prior cause is determinate for that effect.

#### θ. Further Explanation of the Aforesaid, to Make it More Evident

364. Note [added by Scotus]: operative power does not prove that the possessor of it can operate, unless one understands 'can in a certain respect', namely as far as its own part is concerned. But 'can simply' requires that there be possibility on the part of all the other concurring factors, namely that these requisite factors can come together and put a stop to impediments. But, over and above this possibility, the proximate power, or rather possibility, requires that the appropriate things be present and that impediments cease. For just as nothing is in proximate passive potency save (*Metaphysics* 9.7.1049a8-14) "when nothing stands in the way, nor must anything be added or removed or changed" (understand anything other than the form to be induced), so an operative thing is not in proximate power to operating save when nothing extrinsic is lacking to its operating.

365. As to the matter at issue: a will that is blessed is the same power as it was when it was not beatified, and consequently he who has it is, as far as the part of the power is concerned, capable of the act he was capable of before. Further, it is simply possible for him to act, because nothing simply necessarily gets in the way or, being required, is lacking. But he is not able with proximate possibility to sin, because

<sup>78</sup> The meaning of this remark here is obscure.

proximate possibility is impeded or prevented (not suspended) on account of the action of a superior cause preventing him and continually acting for the opposite, namely for the beatific act. And just as a superior cause is, with absolute power (yet not with ordained power), able not to act for the opposite, so it is simply possible for the impediment to cease and for the will to sin. But it is not possible for what is an impediment by ordained power to cease, nor even is it in the proximate power of the will to sin; for it is not in its power that the impediment cease, just as the action of a first cause is not in the power of a second cause.

366. It is contrary to the liberty of a cause that it so be necessarily determined that the opposite to willing well through the habit of charity not be in its power. For you, therefore, it is equally contrary to liberty that the will be thus determined by a superior cause.

367. I reply: to be absolutely determined to willing well, such that the opposite not be under the will's power, is simply not against its liberty (thus is the will determined now by the divine will, otherwise it could now simply proceed to act, just as it can while a wayfarer, though it never will exit into act – and let this be fixed by law, and so let it be against [divine] ordained power). But that it thus were determined to willing well through an inherent habit – this would not be against its liberty in this way. Because the will would not be the will unless it were a prior cause as regard its own habit, and so of a nature to use habit and to determine it to acting and not to be determined by it such that the opposite is not in its power; for then it would (as far as this is concerned) be totally under the habit. But it is not thus against the will's liberty or its nature, that it be impeded from one action and determined to another by a cause prior to itself, of which sort is the divine will.

368. But does it not have the power of sinning?

I reply: an abstract term indicating the principle of an act construed with the gerundive<sup>79</sup> signifies the principle of an act as the act proceeds from the supposit; and if the power is with the gerundive it signifies the proximate power. Thus *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a16-19: “there is no need to add ‘with no exterior thing standing in the way’. For it has power as it is a power of doing. Now this is not in all but in certain circumstances, where external impediments are excluded.” In other respects, ‘the visual (or seeing) power’ and ‘the power of seeing’ do not say the same thing, because the first states the principle for seeing and the second the possibility for seeing, and then distinctly the remote and the proximate power.<sup>80</sup>

369. As to the second [n.359], the act is praiseworthy to the extent the will in its own order contingently determines itself.

370. In another way can it be said that the contingency of the will in its own order entails the contingency simply of its effect, because the contingency of any cause proves a contingent effect, and consequently it is simply contingent that the will does not sin, although this never happens, because the superior cause always preserves it.

371. If you say ‘it is at least in the power of the will that it happen’, one can say that the will is not for this reason less blessed if the happening of it be in the will's power,

<sup>79</sup> Such a case is ‘the power of sinning’ itself: ‘the power’ is here the abstract term (the concrete term would be the thing having the power), and ‘of sinning’ is the gerundive. A power without the gerundive would be, for example, ‘the seeing power’ or ‘the visual power’, as later in this paragraph.

<sup>80</sup> That is, ‘visual power’ states the remote power and ‘power of seeing’ the proximate power.

provided however it never do happen; but for this reason will it never happen, because the divine will always will prevent it.

#### b. About the Second Doubt

372. About the second doubt [n.320], namely what sort of thing this perpetuity is, whether one of aevum or of time: it is plain that it is not perpetuity of time, because time belongs to something successive.

373. The assertion is made [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.2 q.3] that it is not perpetuity of aevum, “because the aevum, as it is distinguished from eternity, belongs to immutable creatures; now beatitude exceeds the natural potency of a creature, since no creature can attain to it by its natural resources; hence the proper measure of beatitude is eternity; therefore beatitude is eternal life.”

374 Against this, first from this person’s statements: in the next question he says that “the principle of an act as to substance is the power, but as to form its principle is the habit; and if the habit is infused, the perfection of the act is from the exterior cause that causes the habit.”

375. From this the argument is:

It is impossible for an act, insofar as it has been formed (according to which idea, he says, the act is beatific), to be more, or more immutably, permanent than being according to substance, because it is impossible for that which something is in per accidens to be more immutable than that in which it is [as to substance]. Therefore, if an act is as to substance measured by the aevum, because its being (according to him) is measured by the aevum, the result [sc. according to him] is that the act insofar as it has been formed, or insofar as it is beatified, would have a greater immutability than the aevum [sc. which however, as just stated, is impossible].

376. Again, as to the thing [that beatitude is], it seems manifestly false, because ‘something created, as it is distinct from eternity, would be measured by the aevum’; for whether the aevum includes succession or possibility of failing, it seems to belong to any created thing whatever that is not properly temporal (for the eternal, as it is a whole in act at once, lacks thus the potency for not being).

377. His reasoning does not prove the conclusion, for this inference does not hold: ‘the intellectual creature has no power for beatitude from its natural resources; therefore, beatitude is in its nature something of greater permanence than is an intellectual creature’ [n.373]. For beatitude is an accident of the creature, and yet such accident – which does not follow the principles, nor is subject to the causality, of this subject – is nevertheless something less noble in itself and less permanent.

378. As to the addition [n.373], ‘beatitude is eternal life’ – ‘eternal’ is not there taken strictly as it is distinguished from ‘aeviternal’, but for the aeviternal that is perpetually permanent. Thus indeed is ‘eternal’ often taken in Scripture, as in *Matthew* 25.41, 46 there, “Go, you cursed, into eternal fire,” and immediately afterwards, “these will go into eternal punishment,” although it is not eternal with an eternity distinct from the aevum or perpetual time.

#### α. Scotus’ own Response

379. I say, therefore, that this perpetuity is not that of eternity nor of necessary existence; rather it is the eternity of an aevum able to be and not to be but yet perpetually conserved.

And if you ask what this perpetuity adds over and above the aevum itself, this requires another question first: whether the aevum include succession. For if it does, perpetuity states a certain greater increase of quantity in the aevum itself, indeed a quasi-infinite increase, by acquisition always of one thing after another. But if the aevum is indivisible, then its perpetuity does not seem to state some positive new thing over and above that, but only negation of failing or of ceasing to be. And then one would have to say that God gives to Michael, whom he conserves blessed for eternity, nothing more positive or greater, by way of what is intrinsically greater, than he would if he were to annihilate him at once. On this see *Ord.* II d.2 p.1 [also *Lectura* II d.2 p.1].

### c. About the Third Doubt

380. About the third doubt [n.320], namely how this perpetuity is related to beatitude, it seems one must say that it is included in the idea of beatitude:

First because [Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.49 q.1 a.1] “beatitude includes the fact that it is the end of all desires” and consequently, when it is obtained, every other appetite ceases; therefore “it is necessary that beatitude thus include everything desirable, because nothing further remains to be desired; but anyone at all naturally desires to remain in good” and perpetually so, just as his nature is perpetual; therefore beatitude includes this permanence.

381. Second because [Aquinas, *ibid.* a.3] “eternity belongs to the idea of the punishment of damnation,” because “it must be infinite so as to correspond to the guilt, which is infinite in malice, for it turns away from the infinite Good; but it cannot be infinite in intensity; therefore included in the idea of punishment, insofar as punishment is proportioned in desert to guilt, is extensive infinity or eternity” [cf. *Ord.* IV d.46 nn.105, 150-151]; therefore similarly eternity is included in the idea of beatitude as reward.

### α. Rejection of Thomas’ Reasons

382. About this, then, it is certain that, if blessedness be taken for some permanent perfection, however intense it is as permanent, perpetuity is not included in its idea; for a permanent perfection, and one that is however much the same and essential, can for an instant, or for some brief time, be what and how much it is for the whole time: “the whiteness of one day is as equally perfect as that of one year,” *Ethics* 1.4.1096b3-5.

383. Beatitude can, in another way, be taken for some permanent and intense perfection, not however by precisely stopping at the perfection of intensity but by including also the perfection of extension – and this either properly when positing the aevum to be successive, or eminently, namely by denying all cessation, when positing the aevum to be indivisible. And in this second way nothing is perfect by extension save because it endures as much as it can endure, whether the duration be extended really or virtually or imaginatively.

384. Now beatitude is plainly of a nature to abide perpetually; therefore, as taken for supreme perfection thus intensively and extensively, it includes perpetuity. But

beatitude in this second way is not anything per se one, as neither is perfect operation and the whole aevum, if it is successive, or operation and negation of defect or of cessation of existence.

385. However, many seem to speak of beatitude in this second way [Aquinas, Godfrey of Fontaines, Richard of Middleton], because natural desire is not only for intense perfection but also for having it as extensively as the desire also is; it is not only for natural 'good being' but for as 'always being' as can belong to nature.

386. Hereby to the first argument [n.380]: beatitude taken in the first way is 'the end of all desires' such that unitively, on the part of the object, 'it includes everything desirable' – as has often been said [nn.171, 180, 339], because in Augustine's definition [*On the Trinity* 13 ch.5 n.8] the 'whatever' in "whatever he wants" is not taken there distributively [sc. for everything] but for one thing unitively, containing everything rightly wantable.

387. Beatitude in the second way includes the end of desires not only intensively in this way but also extensively as to duration, understanding extension either real or virtual, that is, as not failing to be [n.383].

388. Briefly however, though the argument [n.380] belong to a certain doctor, it is at fault in form: 'beatitude is the end of all desires, therefore it includes all desired things' does not follow; but what follows is: 'therefore it includes or pre-demands whatever is necessarily requisite in order to the completing of desires'.

389. To the other argument [n.381], about reward, there is a doubt whether this extensive perfection, namely perpetuity or not failing in being, is included in the idea of beatitude in itself insofar as it is the reward for merits – namely doubt whether it falls per se under merit or is only something annexed to that which per se falls under merit.

390. And I say that, speaking of strict justice, God is debtor to none of us, for any merits at all, to return perfection so intensely, on account of the surpassing excess of that perfection beyond those merits – but let it be that, of his liberality, he had determined to confer so perfect an act as reward for merits, indeed with such justice, so supererogatory in reward, as befits him. Yet it does not necessarily follow from this that perennial perfection should, by that justice, be returned as reward; nay, return would be abundantly made with beatitude of a single moment. If therefore perennity pertains to reward as falling under merit, it must be that the correspondence is determined by justice and overflowing liberality.

Nor is it more unacceptable to say that God made disposition to reward man perpetually because man merited the end perpetually for his merit, and that by a liberal such justice, than to say that God made disposition in justice to render such intense perfection for merits, and that, over and above this, as if not from justice but from sheer liberality, he should add perpetuity.

391. The argument adduced, however, about the perpetuity of damnation [n.381], is not compelling, because perpetuity does not fall under merit as congruously there as it does here. For it is well congruous with the divine will that, by law, it determined to return for merits a perfection not only intense but also perennial; not so that it acted thus by returning for demerits a punishment not only severe but also perennial. On this matter there was discussion above, *Ord.* IV d.46 q.4 nn.105, 150-151.

## B. On the Secure Possession of the Blessed

392. About the second principal question [n.314]:

To security is opposed fear; now fear is about inflicting evil or about the continuing of evil inflicted, with however apprehension of such evil; and it is not necessary that this apprehension be doubtful. Hence doubt and fear are far distant, not only because doubt pertains to intellect and fear to appetite, but because fear in the appetite does not necessarily pre-require doubtful apprehension of such evil. But whatever may be the case here, security is placed in the will as something opposed to fear, and certitude about conferring good, or continuing the good conferred, precedes it in the intellect.

393. Such certitude about beatitude is had by the blessed, not indeed because they see beatitude to be of itself perpetual (as was proved when arguing against the first position about the cause of perpetuity, in the preceding article [nn.328-331]). Nor even do the blessed have such certitude by natural reason only, because to no creature can that be known by natural reason which contingently depends on the divine will alone; the continuation of beatitude already conferred is of this sort (and this is plain from that article [nn.328-331]); therefore this certitude is only in the intellect of someone blessed by a revelation made to him by God.

Now whether certitude is made thus to the damned about the continuance of their damnation is not equally as certain.

394. From what has been said the solution of the question is plain, that security is not of the essence of beatitude.

395. First, because security presupposes certitude about the continuation of beatitude; but that certain apprehension follows, in the order of nature, the whole of beatitude, since it is an act not tending to the beatific object but is a reflecting on the act; and consequently the whole of beatitude will be essentially able to be without certitude – much more, therefore, without security.

Second because perpetuity, which this certitude is about that security follows, is not of the essence of beatitude, in the way stated in the preceding article in the solution of the third doubt [nn.382-385].

396. This reasoning, however, does not prove the conclusion when beatitude is taken in the second way stated there [n.383], because in this second way beatitude includes not only intensive but also extensive or never-failing perfection. Also, when taking beatitude in the first way [n.382], perpetuity is not anything added as an accident of the act. The first reason, then [n.395], is valid and this third reason here, that security is in the irascible power, as is also the fear opposed to it, if indeed opposites are in the same subject; but beatitude is in the concupiscible power, since it is the love of friendship.

### 1. Explication of Possession, Taken in Four Ways

397. Because of certain arguments and words that are asserted about possession [nn.273, 306, 311; *Ord.* III d.26 n.33], one must understand that ‘possession’ can be taken in four ways:

In one way properly memory possesses the object, and this either by impressed form (if the object is there in species) or by impressed habit, or at least by falling back on actual existence – at least memory possesses the object in the way the object comes together for idea of parent.

398. In another way intelligence can be said to possess the object in actual consideration, and to this can pertain the fact that the will is said to possess intelligence's keen look turned back to memory [implicit references to Augustine *On the Trinity* 11.8 n.15].

399. In a third way possession pertains to the will as the will is concupiscible, and it is said to succeed to hope in the way that the will by hope desires the good to be had for itself, and that it loves by possession the good when added to it – and in this way possession is love of concupiscence of the present good [*ibid.* 10.11 n.17].

400. In a fourth way possession is said to be a certain act of keeping hold of, or a passion consequent to hope as a passion, and in this way it is in the irascible power.

401. In none of these ways does possession belong to the essence of beatitude.

In the first way it precedes beatitude, precedes indeed every second act; in the second way it is second act, pertaining to intelligence and preceding the beatitude that is in the will, or it is an act of will with respect to that preceding act; in the third way it is love of a present advantage, and plain it is from the preceding question [nn.282-284] that this love does not pertain to beatitude, but that the love of good in itself does; in the fourth way possession is in the irascible power, and in this way it approaches more to the security that succeeds to hope as a passion, not to hope as a virtue.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

402. To the first argument [n.308] one can say that Augustine understands by it that what is 'most blessed', that is the greatest perfection of beatitude, "is what is most certain always to be thus," – greatest, I say, in extension. And what follows is not taken for the act of certitude but for the object, as though Augustine were to say 'perpetual continuation itself, about which certitude is had, is something greatest in beatitude, because it is quantity of extension superadded to quantity of intension; and it is called 'greatest' because it includes something and superadds something further. Thus this extension includes perfection of intension.

403. As to the next [n.309], the answer is plain from the first article of the solution [nn.325-326], because no finite form can exclude all privation from the susceptible subject. Yet beatitude, to the extent it is most perfect, does most of all exclude from its subject privation of perfection; and this suffices for it to be the intrinsic end (which is necessarily finite), but does not suffice for incorruptibility.

404. To the next [n.310], about the Philosopher, I say that his genius was never able to attain to the true felicity of human nature, whether by denying it or affirming it; not by denying it because what is false cannot be demonstrated; not by affirming it because things of sense do not sufficiently lead to it. Hence he seems, as if in doubt, now to think that what misery could succeed to would not be true happiness, and now that there cannot be another happiness for man; for he did not know about a life other than this one, and in this life happiness is not impossible of being lost. Therefore, one should not rely on his authority in this matter.

405. As to the next [n.311], I concede that to the three theological virtues in the wayfarer succeed three perfections in the blessed, whether virtues or acts I care not. But it is not necessary that this succeeding be of the essence of beatitude in the way we take

beatitude for the supreme perfection of a beatifiable nature, joining it supremely to its most perfect object.

### Notice from the Editors

The Quarrachi editors write that in the text at this point (between question 6 and the second part of distinction 49) a scribe noted the absence in the *Ordinatio* of a number of questions that Scotus nevertheless dealt with in his lectures. The text of these questions was supplied in the *Ordinatio* mss. from student reports of the lectures now preserved in the *Reportatio* [Rep. IV A]. Distinction 50 and its several questions, which are also missing in the *Ordinatio*, were again supplied from the *Reportatio*. For sake of completeness, the editors give the titles of these missing questions.

First, those that would have come between question 6 and the second part of d.49:

- Q.7: Whether Joy in the Beatific Object is of the Essence, or Pertains to the Essence, of Beatitude.
- Q.8: Whether Human Nature is the Lowest Nature Capable of Beatitude
- Q.9: Whether All Men of Necessity and Supremely Will Beatitude
- Q.10: Whether Everything that is Desired is Desired for the sake of Beatitude
- Q.11: Whether Man Could Attain Beatitude by his Purely Natural Resources
- Q.12: Whether Man could Attain Beatitude in this Mortal Life

Second, those that would have come in d.50:

- Q.1: Whether Anyone Could, by Right Reason, Desire not to Exist so as to Escape Misery
- Q.2: Whether the Damned Desire not to Exist for the sake of Escaping Misery
- Q.3: Whether the Blessed See the Punishments of the Damned
- Q.4: Whether the Punishment of the Damned is Equal
- Q.5: Whether the Beatitude of all the Blessed is Equal
- Q.6: Whether the Beatitude of the Bodies is Equal

## Second Part

### *About the Qualities of Body of a Blessed Man*

#### Single Question

*Whether the Body of a Blessed Man will, after the Resurrection, be Impassible*

406. As to the four endowments of the body,<sup>81</sup> I ask whether the body of a blessed man will, after the resurrection, be impassible.

407. That it will not be:

Gregory [*Homily 40 on John*] on *John* 20.27, “Put your finger here etc.,” says, “What is touched is necessarily corrupted.” The glorious body will be touchable, as the body of Christ was, as appears in *Luke* 24.39, “Touch and see etc.”

408. Again if the body be impassible, then the blessed cannot sense anything sensible; the consequent is false, for sensation, since it is a perfect operation of an animal, will not be lacking to a blessed man. The proof of the consequence: because everything sensitive can be corrupted by a surpassing sensible object [*Aristotle On the Soul*]

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<sup>81</sup> The four endowments are that the body will be impassible, agile, clear, and subtle.



2.1.424a28, 3.13.435b15-19]; but what is corrupted by an excelling corruptible is affected by a lower one, just as what is corrupted by something very hot is affected by what is less hot.

409. Again, nothing forced is perpetual [*Ord.* IV d.43 n.126], but that body [sc. of a blessed man], since it is a mixed body, has in itself four elements, each of which (except one at least) is outside its proper region,<sup>82</sup> therefore it is violent; at some point it will return to its proper place; and thus the whole will be corrupted.

410. Again, *On the Heaven* 1.12.282a21-24, the Philosopher argues against Plato that the heaven cannot be corruptible and yet be perpetuated by something else; because a thing cannot be of itself possible and corruptible and yet be perpetuated by something other. And argument can be made in like manner about this body [here]. The Commentator also maintains this, Averroes, *Metaphysics* XI com.41, where he maintains that only motion can be a possible and yet be perpetuated by something else.

411. On the contrary *I Corinthians* 15.53, “This mortal will put on immortality,” and this corruptible incorruption. And in the same place [15.42-44], “It is sown in corruption, it will rise in incorruption...”

### I. To the Question

412. I reply:

That it is so is plain from the preceding question,<sup>83</sup> because man cannot be blessed in this mortal life; but the whole man will be blessed because the whole merited; therefore the whole will be blessed in an immortal body.

413. For this too there is the fact that a blessed man will have the perfection that belongs to his nature; immortality is such, because it is not repugnant to an immortal soul to perfect perpetually its own perfectible [body]. Hence, just as the resurrection is inferred from the immortality of the soul, so is the immortality of the man, and consequently of the body, inferred with probability from the same fact – and so is impassibility inferred, speaking of real passion as opposed to intentional passion, which will be touched on in responding to the second argument [nn.408, 451-453].

#### A. A Doubt about the Cause of Impassibility, and its Rejection

414. But about the cause of impassibility there is a doubt. For it is not for this reason, that the qualities consequent to a mixed body do not remain then in the body, because in that case the body would not remain mixed nor would it be proportioned to the soul, just as now too the soul could not animate an element. Nor is it for this reason, that the qualities will not remain contraries; for since a form is contrary to a form in its own species, and the same qualities in species that are in the body now will remain in the body then, it follows that they will be contraries, just as they are now.

<sup>82</sup> The four traditional elements are earth, air, fire, and water, and only the earth in the human body is in its proper place, namely down level with the earth.

<sup>83</sup> This preceding question (number 12, about whether beatitude could be obtained in mortal life) is missing in the *Ordinatio* (see notice from the editors above). Its place was supplied by editors after Scotus' death from his oral treatment of it preserved in the *Reportatio*.

415. Nor is the reasoning [Bonaventure, *Sent.* IV d.49 p.2 sect.2 q.2 a.1] for proving they are not contraries valid – the reasoning that: contraries are of a nature to arise about the same thing, and consequently to succeed each other in the same thing; but one quality will not succeed to another there, and so the reason for their contrariety will not be taken away.<sup>84</sup>

The reasoning is first indeed not valid because it is circular in proving the premise from the conclusion.<sup>85</sup>

Second that description of contraries [from *Categories* 5.3b24-4a21] is being badly understood, because it should not be understood of any contraries whatever taken numerically, nor of anything numerically the same, but of contraries taken specifically and of something the same in species; and if taken of a contrary numerically the same, not of all of them but some.

416. These facts are evident because this whiteness, which is now in this thing, and that whiteness, which is in that thing, never succeed to themselves; therefore not here either, for otherwise one of them would migrate [from one thing to the other]. But a different whiteness and a different blackness in this thing can succeed to themselves; but not in every subject, because then no subject would determine for itself one of the contraries. Nor, third, can it be posited that this susceptible subject not then be of a nature to receive contrary after contrary, because the susceptible subject remains the same as it is now, and consequently is susceptible of specifically the same thing.

417. If it be said that it remains then without privation, now with privation, on the contrary: this involves the contradiction, ‘the privation of form is taken away from the subject if the form is not present in it’. For the aptitude for receiving cannot be taken away while the nature of the susceptible subject remains; but the lack, which privation adds over and above aptitude, cannot be taken away unless that is posited of which there is a lack.<sup>86</sup>

418. If you say that the higher form takes away the privation of lower forms, as the form of heaven takes away the privation of corruptible forms [n.325; *Ord.* II d.14 n.14, III d.16 n.5]; on the contrary – the lack is not taken away save as the habit is posited; and the superior does not include in itself the inferior in its proper idea but only virtually; therefore it does not take away the lack of it in its proper idea; therefore not the privation of it either, if it be of a nature to be present [sc. in a subject that naturally has the contrasting habit and suffers privation if it does not have it].

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<sup>84</sup> Or, following other ms. readings, “...will be taken away.” In either event the point seems to be that contraries will not then function as contraries because, whether the reason for their being contraries remains or not, they will not then be in the same thing successively replacing each other.

<sup>85</sup> To argue that contraries will not then be (or function as) contraries, because they will not be in the same thing successively replacing each other, is to argue in a circle. For ‘being in the same thing successively replacing each other’ is how, in this argument, ‘contrary’ is being defined, so to say that contraries will not then be contraries because this definition will not apply to them is to say that they will not then be contraries because they will not then be contraries.

<sup>86</sup> If a subject lacks a property or form, as when water lacks warmth, it has the lack (or privation) of that property, as the lack of warmth. So if, conversely, one says of some water that it lacks the lack of warmth, one is saying that it has the lack of the lack of that property or form, or in short that it has the property and is warm. Accordingly, it is a contradiction to say of water that it lacks this lack of warmth and yet is not warm. But such is what one ends up saying if one says that the impassible body, unlike the passible body, does not receive warmth (or cold) because it lacks the lack of them.

419. This is also plain specifically in the issue at hand, because the noblest form, which will then be in the whole, will be the intellectual soul; but it will then be the same as it also is now and equally perfect substantially; so it will also not take away privation then, just as it does not now either.

### 1. Scotus' own Explanation of the Reasons about Impassibility

420. Whence then will this impassibility be?

421. I reply: no intrinsic cause of this impassibility can be found on the part of the susceptible subject; either then it is found from a defect of agent, or from an impediment of agent absolutely, namely both intrinsic and extrinsic agent.

422. A defect cannot be posited because "to every passive power there corresponds an active power" [*Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a14-16], either intrinsic or extrinsic; however perhaps a lack of power of the intrinsic agent could be posited by positing that these qualities in the body [sc. of the blessed] are reduced to such equality that one could not be the principle for one to act on another.

423. This is persuasive because, notwithstanding the contrariety of the elements, if they were taken in such equality of bulk and virtue that none of them could overcome any other (or any others), or be overcome by another (or by others), and if they were, thus proportioned, included perpetually in any body whatever – never would there be corruption of any of them there, because although there was contrariety, there was yet proportioned equality.

424. It seems to be similar now among the elements; for as to why fire does not burn up all the elements, though it is of greater activity, there does not seem to be a reason save from the proportion or adequacy of the other elements in resisting fire's power in acting, at least while the heaven concurs in cooperating with the others in resisting it.

425. But because this cause [n.422-425] perhaps supposes something false, for the qualities will not then be thus reduced to equality to such an extent that none could be the principle for acting on another, wherein some qualities must be overcome also in virtue – which appears to be the case, because the human body is more in flux as to its material parts than the body of any animate or inanimate inferior, and this is only from the dominance of some quality that requires such an animal.

426. Likewise, this cause could not posit impassibility with respect to an extrinsic corruptive cause; and therefore, if it were to exclude corruption from within, it would still be diminished; and so one must posit impassibility through something that impedes corruptive suffering. Either a positive or a privative such impediment can be posited; the positive is double (namely the soul or a gift in the body); the privative is double (cessation of heavenly motion, and God's non-cooperation with the corruptive second cause).

#### a. About the First Opinion of Others

427. Argument [Richard of Middleton] for the first is that the soul is constituted in the middle between God and corporeal creatures; therefore just as the soul will be then

perfectly subject to God as to its superior, so will it then perfectly dominate over its body as inferior.

428. To the contrary:

The soul is not repugnant to these qualities [of the body], even insofar as the qualities are contraries and are not reduced to the mean wherein they are active. This is plain because it supposes them thus to be in their susceptible subject, and nothing is repugnant to what it requires in its susceptible subject. Nor even is it repugnant to their effects, because although they act mutually, they only act by univocal action. At any rate their effects up to a considerable intensity are not repugnant to the soul, because they stand along with the soul now though they be intense to a considerable degree; therefore they will not be repugnant to it then as it is the 'informing form'.

429. So if the soul prohibits the actions of these qualities then, it is not because of its repugnance to the action of them, but because of command through act of its will, with full dominion, as it were, over the body. This does not seem probable, because the highest angel cannot, through sole command of his will, impede the action of any natural cause; for bodily causes do not, as to their action or alteration, obey angels' wish.

#### b. About the Second Opinion of Others

430. For the second opinion (namely a gift in the body [n.426], [Thomas Aquinas]) argument is given from the remark of Augustine *Letter 118 To Dioscorus* 3 n.14, "So powerful has God made the soul that from its full happiness there redounds to the body perpetual health and incorruptible vigor." The manner is as follows [Henry of Ghent]: as hardness is a certain impassibility [cf. *Ord.* IV d.1 n.319], namely one that prevents a certain suffering (as being easily cut), so is it possible for there to be a quality in the body that prevents all corruptive suffering.

431. Against this:

This quality is not a heavenly quality, first because it is not transparency nor light nor luminosity, second because, since the human body is a mixed body, it is not capable of a heavenly quality. Either then it will be a quality of an element or a quality proper to a mixed body; but whether this or that, it is not an impediment to all action or suffering. The thing is plain in their example, because although hardness prevents cutting, yet it does not prevent burning or some other destructive suffering.

432. There is also proof of it through reason, that all forms of the same proximate susceptible subject are of the same physical genus, from *Metaphysics* 5.28.1024a29-b9; but all such forms are contraries or intermediates, and all forms of this sort do not prevent mutual action; rather they are principles of mutual action as is said in *Metaphysics*, 10.7.1057a18-19, 30-31, b2-4. Therefore, this quality, whether it belongs to an element or a mixed body and consequently to the same susceptible subject, does not prevent all corruptive passion, but is rather a principle of acting or suffering.

433. Again, this quality is either repugnant to other qualities (and then it does not prevent all action, because it is of the same genus), or is not repugnant (and then it does not prevent an action of any of them on another, because those others are repugnant to each other and so principles of mutual action) – and thus is it not repugnant to any action of them.

### c. About the Third Opinion of Others

434. For the third opinion argument is given as follows: when a first is taken away anything posterior is taken away; the heavenly motion is the first of motions [*Physics*, 8.9.265a13]; therefore, when it ceases there will be no other motion [cf. d.48 nn.82-83, 89].

435. Against this is the article [one of the 219 articles condemned in 1274 by the Bishop of Paris]: When the heaven stops and fire is next to flax [candle tow], to say that fire does not burn the flax is an error

436. Again by the argument of the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a16-18: “motion is to this extent cause of generation, that it brings forward the generator;” but it only acts for the presence or nearness of the generator as regard matter. Therefore if the same presence or nearness were had without motion, the form would act just as much. An example: if the sun suddenly by divine power came to be at midday the way it does so now by motion, it would illuminate and heat opposites in the same way as it heats them now; indeed it would then heat more strongly, because it would not cease to act until it had totally corrupted, if it could corrupt, what was in front of it or placed beneath it; but as it is, because it does not linger over the passive and supposed object, it acts on it less effectively.

### B. Scotus’ own Response

437. I say, therefore, that the cause of impassibility is the divine will not acting along with the corruptive second cause. And by this is it [the body] impassible: not by remote but proximate power, not by an intrinsic cause but an extrinsic impeding cause (as was said about impeccability in this distinction above, in the question about secure possession, nn.348-353). An example from the fire in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.19-24, 92], which did not act to consume the three boys – not indeed because of any impassibility intrinsic to the boys, nor from the lack of passive potency, nor from an impeding intrinsic contrary, but because God by his own will did not cooperate with the fire in its action.

#### 1. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

438. Against this: impassibility would then not be a gift of the blessed body, for the gift is something intrinsic to him whose it is; but the fact that God wills to prevent second causes from causing corruption is not something intrinsic to the body; the consequent is false because it seems contrary to the authority of Augustine above [n.430].

439. Again, according to this position, the gift of impassibility will be as much in the elements as in the body of Peter; equally too in the bodies of the damned [n.381], because both the elements and the bodies of the damned will then be preserved from corruption.

440. Again, third, there then seems to be a miracle in the preservation, as there was in the guarding of the three boys from harm; but it does not seem that perpetual divine works are miraculous, according to Augustine’s remark, *City of God* 7.30, “God so administers the things he has established that he allows them to perform their own motions.”

## 2. Confutation of the Objections

### a. To the First Objection

441. To the first of these [n.438]: it is very possible for a gift not to be present really in the person gifted. Just as there is not present in a bride what is given her by her spouse, which is wont to be called the gift of dowry, as is contained in *Genesis* 34.12, where Sichen says to Jacob and his sons, “Increase the dowry and demand gifts...”

442. Also, if the dowry-gift is said to be what is given by the father of the bride, it is indeed for the spouse, for his use, but it remains property of the bride. Just as it usually now is called a gift, plainly it is not really present either in the spouse or the bride; rather it is only something possessed in some way by reason of the marriage. And so in the resurrection, by reason of consummating the spiritual marriage, there will be given to each blessed for gift this divine assistance that preserves him from all corruptive forces, although this guarding not be in him really.

443. In another way it could be said that the one gifted has a right over what is assigned him as gift; so here the blessed by his merits has a right over the dispensing to him of this divine guarding; and this right of preservation of the body from every corruptive force by divine guarding is a gift in the blessed and as concerns his body, because it is for protection of the body.

### b. To the Second Objection

444. To the next [n.439], it is plain from this that neither do the elements have a right to be preserved from corruption, nor do the bodies of the damned, but they are preserved for affliction because of their past demerits; but the bodies [of the blessed], because of their past merits, do have the right, and this for the advantage of these bodies.

445. And accordingly it can be said to the authority of Augustine [nn.430, 438] that this health and vigor flow from the soul to the body, because there is a certain ordering in the body whereby vigor and health are preserved for it by God. And this ordering belongs to the body for thereby preserving what is animated by this sort of soul, which soul was the principle for meriting that such health is preserved for its body by God – so that to say ‘this incorruptibility flows from the soul to the body’ is nothing else than to say ‘this reward, which is preservation of health, is a reward of the body by mediation of the soul’, and this soul, as it was more principal in meriting, so is it more principally in nature rewarded.

### c. To the Third Objection

446. To the third [n.440] I say that [God’s] acting along with the body of the blessed for preserving it against any corrupting force is more natural than his acting along with the contrary in corrupting it, because a superior cause acts more perfectly with a more perfect second cause. And although this were now as to the body of someone just a thing miraculous, because now is the time of change and action, yet then it will be the time of rest and changelessness in bodies, and for the time then it will be natural and

customary (according to the common course of things) that [God] act for rest, just as he now acts for motion

### 3. Scotus' own Response to Others' Reasons

447. To the reasons for these three positions [nn.427-436].

To the first [nn.427-429], about the lordship of the soul over the body, I reply that God will not then make the will of the soul omnipotent, and so not powerful either to do whatever it wish to do; but sufficient for it is that whatever it wish be done will be done; and thus its body will be perfectly subject to its will (that is, it will be as the will wishes it to be), just as it is perfectly subject to God. But this subjection of its body will be from the divine will effectively.

448. To the reason for the second [nn.430-433], it was said what Augustine's understanding [nn.430, 438] is about that gift: that it is a certain right possessed in the body, insofar as it is animated by this sort of soul, for such passive preservation from all corruption

449. To the third [nn.434-436]: the motion of the heaven has a certain priority relative to the others, namely of uniformity and velocity, but not a priority of causality, save insofar as it brings forward the generator [n.436], which is per accidens – the way the motion of fire to wood has a priority, namely of burning the wood, and without such prior there cannot be a posterior; [there can be] if<sup>87</sup> something supply the place of such prior.

## II. To the Initial Arguments

450. To the first main argument [n.407]: [yes] if the authority of Gregory be conceded, which however does not seem necessary; for why could the heaven not be touched by a finger that existed there?<sup>88</sup> – understanding touching in this way, that the body were sufficiently resistant to touch, though not through any sensible quality (neither as hard nor as soft, nor as hot nor as cold etc.). But as to what is touched according to some sensible quality, something corruptible is, by its affect on touch, very well left behind by it.<sup>89</sup> And so not more follows than that the body, were it not preserved by God, would be corruptible by a corrupting passion.

451. To the second [n.408] it is said that all the senses of the blessed are within his act. The reason for this is that each sensation is a proper perfection of the sensitive power. However, I do not see the necessity that the senses pertaining to nutrition be among the blessed's acts, since nutrition is not necessary then, because the body will not be an animal one, that is, a body in need of food. Some senses, however, can well be posited among his acts – those senses whose acts do not require a concomitant imperfection, such as sight and hearing, which are more spiritual. About sight no one

<sup>87</sup> Instead of 'if' another ms. has 'unless', which is required if the '[there can be]' is not taken to be implied

<sup>88</sup> The sphere of the heaven was understood to be physical, and so in principle touchable, but not corruptible.

<sup>89</sup> That is, when something touches, or is touched, by something according to some sense quality, it leaves something of itself behind (some quanta of energy, we might now say), and so is progressively corrupted by such acts of touching.

doubts, nor about hearing, if there is sound there and sound capable of being propagated and of affecting the hearing.

452. When it is argued that such affecting is not without a real corruptive affecting, I deny it, because sometimes there is a greater intentional affecting and a lesser real affecting, as was said elsewhere [supra d.44 nn.130-131].

453. As to the proof [n.408], that a surpassing sensible object can corrupt sense, I concede that these two affectings do now come together, because the active object is able to act with both actions [sc. real and intentional, n.452] and the passive subject (either the same or conjoined) is receptive of both actions. And for this reason is each action now conjoined together in the same passive subject (although sometimes one action is greater and the other less, according to the disposition of the passive subject to this action or that). But God will not then keep the organs of the senses away from one of the passions [sc. the intentional one], because it does not serve their perfection to be so kept away; but he will then keep the whole body away from the other action [sc. the real one], because this keeping away is for the well-being that the body has merited through the mediation of the soul, or the soul has merited for the body, or the whole has merited for the body principally through the soul.

454. To the third [n.409]: if it be denied that the elements are really in the mixed body, the response is plain [sc. because the problem ceases to arise]. But if this is not denied, I say that that is simply violent which is opposed to what is simply natural, and that that is more violent which is opposed to what is a more perfect natural, and that that is less violent which is opposed to what is less natural.

455. An example: that there is water above [e.g. in clouds] so that a plenum may be kept in the universe is not simply violent; rather what would then descend, with a vacuum left remaining above, would be violent, and natural in a certain respect, because the nature of the whole universe is more a principle of naturalness than is this particular nature, and more natural because it belongs to such a whole than what belongs properly to this part. Now the mixed body, and especially the human body, is more perfectly something natural than is any of the elements; and so, what is natural for that [mixed] body, this is simply more natural than what would be natural for any of the elements in itself. More natural, then, is that the body of man be conserved and the elements in it than that the body of man be violently dissolved and each element tend by its own naturalness to its own proper place.

456. The proposition too of the Philosopher, that nothing violent is perpetual [n.409], is not necessary for theologians, speaking of the violent that is against the particular nature of this body; because God can preserve some particular perpetually under the opposite of that to which it is naturally inclined. But with Aristotle the proposition was true [supra d.43 nn.157, 221-222; cf. Aquinas, *SG* III ch.45], because he posits that to every passive potency there corresponds, in the whole coordination of active causes, some cause that would sometimes necessarily reduce it to act. Therefore, this natural potency will sometime be reduced to act, and thus will its violent opposite be corrupted.

457. To the next [n.410] from *On the Heaven* [1.12.282a21-24], I say that when one act is repugnant to another, although the possibility for this act stand with that act (and more with the possibility for that act), yet the possibility for this act does not stand with the necessity of that act; because if this act is necessary, that act is impossible,



because what is repugnant to the necessary is impossible. Therefore if Plato said that the heaven is in contingent disposition to being corrupted and to ceasing, and also is in contingent disposition to being perpetually conserved by God [supra d.43 n.102], the argument [n.410] is of no avail against him, because no impossibility follows when the possible is posited; because in such things, where each act is contingent separately [sc. neither is necessary by itself though one or other must hold], from the positing of the possible no new impossibility arises [sc. if of two possibles contradictory to each other one is posited, the other cannot be posited; but the other does not thereby cease to be possible; it just ceases ever to be actual].

458. An example: let 'I will run tomorrow, I am able not to run tomorrow' be posited in existence; no new impossibility arises. And if [Plato] posited one of the two statements to be necessary, namely, that God necessarily conserve things, or it be proved that from the possibility [sc. of things ceasing] (which Plato concedes) a necessity follow because of matter [sc. that material things must necessarily cease to be at some point] – then, by positing the other possibility to be existent in fact, no new impossibility is got; but the impossibility that is now manifest between 'the necessary is present' and 'the opposite is present' was before between 'the necessary is present' and 'the possible is present'.<sup>90</sup>

459. In this way must the argument of Aristotle be expounded:

Namely either by accepting from Plato, if he granted it, that 'the heaven will be necessarily perpetuated by God', and then to posit in being that 'it is possible for the heaven to be corrupted and cease', and the impossible follows [sc. the heaven will last forever, and the heaven will cease] – not because of the positing of the 'possible', since by making comparison with the opposite 'necessary' there is no new impossibility.

Or if Plato did not grant it, it needs to be proved that there follows from what was granted that which is indeed true according to the Philosopher; and according to him, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8, whatever is sempiternal is necessary; and so, if it can be sempiternal, it is necessarily sempiternal.

460. And thus does the Commentator seem to treat of this proof in *On the Heaven* I com.138, that nature would change if from being possible it became sempiternal, or two opposite natures would be together in the same thing (which was expounded above in *Ord.1* d.8 nn.236-258).

461. In another way is proved to follow, from what is granted, that whatever God immediately does he necessarily does, according to the Philosopher; from this does he proceed at the beginning of *Physics* 8.1.251a8-b10, 252a3-22, 6.259b32-60a19. And this second proof proves a different necessity (because an inevitability) from the first (which proves an intrinsic necessity); in this latter way is the motion of the heaven necessary, not in the first way,<sup>91</sup> Averroes *Metaphysics* 11 com.30; Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b13-20.

<sup>90</sup> The point seems to be that Plato's position (the heaven is in principle corruptible but God will prevent it ever being corrupted in fact) does not, contrary to the objection [n.410], involve a contradiction. For the two possibilities are not contradictory as they stand, and though one becomes impossible if the other is posited, this is not a new necessity in the things (*de re*) but only a necessity in the statements (*de dicto*). For both statements assert something possible in itself, but if one is asserted the other is necessarily denied.

<sup>91</sup> In the first way the necessity is about what God must do to the heaven extrinsically from without; in the second way the necessity is about what the heaven must undergo intrinsically from within. This intrinsic condition, however, can be prevented from every being realized extrinsically by God.

462. In each way (by deducing the necessary from act or from the possible granted by Plato) the positing of the other possible in being shows the positing to be unacceptable, for it includes contradictories; because just as now there is a contradiction of act with necessity, so before it was of the possible with the same necessity, though a less manifest one.<sup>92</sup>

463. The necessity of the other opposite, namely, to cease or to be corrupted [n.459], can be proved thus; that to every passive power there corresponds in being some active power [n.455], (but if not, then our will sometimes will be necessarily reduced to act).<sup>93</sup> Similarly, ‘everything corruptible will necessarily be corrupted’, and then the remaining part must be posited in being, namely that it be perpetually conserved [sc. by God]; and there will be a manifest contradiction, which however before was because of the necessity of one of the opposites.<sup>94</sup> This second [sc. way of taking the contradiction] seems to agree less with the text [sc. of the objection, n.410].

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<sup>92</sup> Before the contradiction was not in the things but in the statements, that while both were possible yet if one was true (or even necessary) the other could not be true. But once one of the statements is posited to hold in reality (being), the other is necessarily shown not to hold in reality.

<sup>93</sup> The will is a free power so must be reduced to act by a free cause. If there is no free cause, it will be reduced to act necessarily.

<sup>94</sup> Hitherto the contradiction has concerned the necessity of things being conserved by God and the possibility of things ceasing to be. This contradiction has arisen because of necessity in one of the opposites (namely that if God necessarily conserves things, the possibility of their ceasing to be is removed). The contradiction now is because of necessity in the other opposite as well, namely not only that God necessarily conserves things but also that corruptible things must at some time necessarily be corrupted. The contradiction in this case is more manifest because there is an opposed necessity on both sides, whereas the contradiction before was between necessity on one side and possibility on the other. Scotus is, however, not disturbed by either contradiction, because it is in the statements rather than the things – for if God conserves things, even necessarily, the possibility of things ceasing to be is only removed in fact and not in idea [nn.458-459].