This translation of Book I Distinctions 1 and 2 of the Ordinatio (aka Opus Oxoniense) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. The Latin text used is that of volume two of the critical edition of the Ordinatio by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Frati Quaracchi.

Scotus’ Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome.

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The translation is now updated; some looseness of translation has been corrected and some omissions supplied.

December, 2021
THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

Book One

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First Distinction
First Part
On the Object of Enjoyment
Question 1

Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

1. On the first distinction, where the Master treats of enjoying and using, I ask first about the object of enjoyment itself, and first whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end.

Argument that it is not:

First, by the authority of Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.30: “Invisible goods are what is to be enjoyed;” but there are many invisible goods; therefore the ultimate end is not the only thing that is to be enjoyed.

2. Again, by reason: the capacity of the enjoyer is finite because the idea or nature of the subject is finite; therefore that capacity can be satisfied by something finite. But whatever satisfies the capacity of the enjoyer should be enjoyed; therefore etc.

3. Again, there is something greater than the capacity of the soul, as God, who is sufficient for himself, and something less than the capacity of it, as the body; therefore there is something in the middle, namely what is equal to the capacity of it; that thing is less than God; therefore I have the thing proposed, that not only God or the ultimate end is to be enjoyed.

4. Again, any form at all satisfies the capacity of matter; therefore any object at all satisfies the capacity of a power. The proof of the consequence is that a power relates to the object through a form received in itself; and if one received form satisfies intrinsically, it follows that the object that the power relates to through the form satisfies extrinsically or terminatively. The proof of the antecedent is that if any form were not to satisfy the capacity of the matter, then the matter, while that form is persisting in the matter, would be naturally inclined to another form, and consequently it would violently be at rest under the first form; for whatever prohibits something from what it has a natural inclination to is violent for it, as is plain about the resting of a heavy body away from the center.

5. Again, the intellect assents more firmly to a truth other than the first truth; therefore, by similarity of reasoning, the will can assent more firmly to a good other than the first good.

a. [Interpolation] Again, Ambrose [Ambrosiaster On Galatians ch.5, 22] on the verse of Galatians 5.22-23: ‘Now the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy,’ etc., says that here he names not ‘works’ but ‘fruits’, because they are to be desired for their own sake; but what is to be desired for its own sake is the enjoyable; therefore it is fitting to enjoy the virtues; but they are not the ultimate end; therefore etc. And there is a confirmation of the reason, because the good by its essence is the due object of enjoyment; but the virtues are good by their essence.

1 Rubric by Scotus: “On the object of enjoyment two questions are asked, on the act of enjoying itself two questions are asked, and on the one who enjoys five questions are asked.”

2 Master Peter Lombard, the author of the Sentences, around which the Ordinatio is organized.
6. To the opposite is Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.5 n.5: “The things one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one thing,” therefore etc.

I. To the Question

7. As to this question I will first make a distinction about ordered enjoyment and enjoyment taken generally, second I will speak of the first object of ordered enjoyment, third of the object of enjoyment in general, fourth, how one must understand enjoyment to be about the end – whether about the end truly ultimate, as in the second article, or about the end not truly ultimate, as in the third article.

8. [Article 1] – On the first point I say that enjoyment in general exceeds ordered enjoyment, because whenever some power is not of itself determined to an ordered act, its act in general is more universal than its special ordered act; now the will of itself is not determined to ordered enjoyment, as is plain, because supreme perversity can exist in it, as when things to be enjoyed are used and things to be used are enjoyed, according to Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30. Now ordered enjoyment is the sort that is of a nature to be right, namely when it is ordered according to the due circumstances, but enjoyment in general is whether it have those due circumstances or not.

9. [Article 2] – As to the second [n.7] it seems to be the opinion of Avicenna that ordered enjoyment can be about something other than the ultimate end. The proof is from his statements in *Metaphysics* 9 ch.4 (104vb-105rb), where he wants the higher intelligence to cause through its act of understanding the lower intelligence; and it then seems that the thing produced is perfect when it attains its own productive principle, according to the proposition of Proclus *Theological Education* ch.34 that: “each thing is of a nature to be turned back to that from which it proceeds;” and in such a return there seems to be a complete circle and so perfection; therefore the produced intelligence is perfectly at rest in the producing intelligence.

10. There is an argument against this as follows: a power does not rest except where its object is found to exist most perfectly and at its highest; now the object of the enjoying power is being in general, according to Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.6 (72rb); therefore the enjoying power does not rest except where the most perfect being is. This is the supreme being.\(^3\)

11. There is a confirmation by a likeness from matter to form: matter only rests under a form that contains the others, yet something intrinsic does not satisfy as the object does [supra n.4].

12. Again, an inferior intelligence seeing a superior intelligence either sees it to be finite, or believes it to be infinite, or sees neither its finitude nor its infinity. If it believes it to be infinite then it is not beatified in it because “nothing more stupid can be asserted than that a soul might be blessed in false opinion,” according to Augustine *City of God*

\(^3\) Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, a power that is inclined to many objects does not rest *per se* in any one object perfectly unless that object include all the *per se* objects as far as they can be most perfectly included in any one object; but the enjoying power is inclined to all being as to its *per se* object; therefore it does not most perfectly rest in any single being unless that being include all other beings as far as these can be included in some single one. But they can be most perfectly included in one infinite being; therefore the power can only rest there in the supreme being.”
XI ch.4 n.2. But if it sees neither its finitude nor its infinity it does not see it perfectly and so is not blessed. But if it sees it finite, then it can understand that something else can exceed it; now we thus experience in ourselves that we can desire a greater good beyond any finite good at all that is shown to us, or that we can desire beyond any good another good which is shown to be a greater good, and consequently the will can desire to love that greater good, and so it does not rest in that intelligence.  

13. Others argue against this opinion as follows: the soul is the image of God, therefore it has a capacity for him and can participate him, because according to Augustine On the Trinity XIV ch.8 n.11: “the soul is the image of God by the fact it has a capacity for him and can participate him;” but whatever has a capacity for God can be satisfied by nothing less than God; therefore etc.

But this reason does not proceed against the philosophers, because the assumed premise about the image is only something believed and is not known by natural reason; therefore the idea of image which we conceive is only something believed, and is not naturally known by reason, because the idea of image that we conceive is founded on the soul as to God as Triune, and therefore is not naturally known, because neither is the extreme it is related to naturally known to us.

14. Others argue against his opinion [n.9] thus: the soul is created immediately by God, therefore in him it immediately rests and is quietened.

But the antecedent of this reason is only something believed, and it would be denied by them [sc. followers of Avicenna] because he himself [Avicenna] lays down that the soul is immediately created by the last and lowest intelligence. Likewise the consequence is not here valid, nor the like one either made [n.9] on behalf of the opinion of Avicenna: for it is accidental that the idea of first efficient and the idea of end are conjoined in the same thing, not does it give rest as far as it is the first efficient but as far as it is the most perfect object, otherwise our sensitive power, which according to one opinion is created by God, could not perfectly rest save in God; in the matter at hand, then, the same thing is efficient cause and end because in the efficient cause is the fullness of perfection of the object, and in the idea of efficient cause whereby it is efficient cause is not included the idea of end and of giving rest.

15. Therefore as to this article I hold this conclusion, namely that ordered enjoyment has only the ultimate end for object, because just as assent by the intellect should only be given to the first truth for its own sake, so assent by the will should only be given to the first good for its own sake.

16. [Article 3] – About the third article [n.7] I say that the object of enjoyment in general, as it abstracts from ordered and disordered end, is the ultimate end: either the true end, namely which is from the nature of the thing the ultimate end, or the apparent end, namely the ultimate end which is shown by an erring reason to be ultimate end, or the proposed end, namely which the will of its own freedom wills as ultimate end.

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4 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, I reduce his [Avicenna’s] reason [n.9] to the opposite, because the second intelligence only causes a third intelligence – if it be conceded to him that it does cause it – in virtue of the first intelligence; therefore it does not complete it by its own virtue but by another’s. Now what completes something by reason of another does not bring that something to rest, nor does that something rest save in the other thing; therefore etc.”

5 Bonaventure, Sent. I d.1 a.3 q.1 ad 1.
The first two members are sufficiently plain. The proof of the third is that just as to will or not to will is in the power of the will, so the mode of willing is in its power, namely to refer or not to refer; therefore it is in its power to will some good for its own sake without referring it to some other good, and thus by proposing the end for itself in that.

a. [Interpolation] because within the power of any agent whatever is acting and the mode of acting.

17. [Article 4] – About the fourth article [n.7] I say that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable object, neither in the case of ordered enjoyment nor in the case of enjoyment taken generally. That it is not so in the case of ordered enjoyment is plain: both because a respect [sc. to another] is not included in the beatific object per se as far as it is the beatific object; and because that respect is a respect of reason only, just as is any respect of God to creatures (but a respect of reason cannot be the per se object or the idea of the per se object of enjoyment); and because if per impossibile there were some supreme object to which this will were not ordered as to its end, that object would still quiten it, wherein however there is, by supposition, no idea of the end. In respect therefore of ordered enjoyment the idea of end is not, in truth, the proper idea of the enjoyable object, but it is a concomitant of the enjoyable object; in disordered enjoyment of an apparent end the idea of end is a concomitant of the enjoyable object (perhaps in apprehension it precedes the enjoyment to be elicited, as the enticing idea of the object, in some other way), but in the case of enjoyment of the prefixed end the idea of end follows the act, because ‘prefixed end’ states either the mode of the act or the mode of the object as such prefixed end actually terminates the act, because the will by willing it for its own sake attributes to it the idea of end.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘to enjoy’ is taken in an extended sense for a love of the honorable that is distinct from love of the useful or of the pleasant; or ‘things honorable’ [sc. invisible goods] are there spoken of in the plural, not because of a plurality of essences, but because of a plurality of enjoyable perfections in God.

19. To the second [n.2] I say that some finite relation is necessarily to a term or object simply infinite, because what is for an end is, insofar as it is such, finite, even when taken as altogether proximate to the end, namely along with everything that suffices for immediately attaining the ultimate end; and yet the relation of the end, to which it immediately is, is based only on the infinite. And this frequently happens in relations of proportions or of proportionalities, but not of likenesses, because in the former the first extremes are most dissimilar. Thus in the matter at hand I say that between power and object there is a relation not of likeness but of proportion, and therefore a finite capacity can well be finite in nature, just as its nature is finite, and yet be to a term or object simply infinite, as to a correlative.

a. [Interpolation] just as any being whatever for an end, however finite it may be, is yet never referred to an ultimate end unless that ultimate end be infinite. Or in another way, and it comes back to the same, one should say that although the appetite of the creature is, in its
subject, finite, yet it is not so in its object, because it is for the infinite. – And if an argument is made about adequacy, namely that an adequate object satisfies, one should say that adequacy is twofold, namely in entity, and this requires a likeness in the nature of the things that are made adequate, and there is no such adequacy between the created power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object; another is adequacy according to proportion and correspondence, which necessarily requires a diversity in the natures that are adequate, and such adequacy does exist between the power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object. An example, about adequacy between matter and form [n.21].

On the contrary, an adequate object satisfies. – I reply: not one adequate really but in idea of object; such adequacy accords with proportion and correspondence.

20. In the same way to the other argument [n.3] I say that nothing is greater in idea of object than the object proportioned to the soul; yet there is something greater, that is, something attainable in a greater or better way than can be attained by the soul, but this ‘greater’ is not in the object but in the act. I explain this by an example: if some white object be posited with ten grades of visibility, and if a sight be posited that grasps that white thing and another whiteness according to one grade, and if another more perfect sight be posited that grasps them according to ten grades, the second sight will perfectly grasp that white thing as to all grades of its visibility, because it will see that object with as much whiteness as is visible on the part of the object; and yet if there were a third sight, more perfect than the second and more acute, it will see that white thing more perfectly. Hence there will not there be an excess on the part of the visible thing and of the object in itself or of the grades of the object, because it is the same simply and in uniform disposition, but the excess will be on the part of the seers and the acts of seeing.

21. To the fourth [n.4] I say that not just any form satisfies the appetite of matter totally in extent, because there are as many appetites of matter to forms as there are forms that can be received in matter; therefore no one form can satisfy all its appetites, but one form satisfies most perfectly, namely the most perfect form; but that form does not satisfy all the appetites of matter unless in that one form were included all the others. To the matter in hand, then, I say that one object can include all objects in some way, and therefore only that object quietens the power to the extent the power can be quietened. But things are not altogether alike as to internal and external rest, because anything that is receptive is at rest internally when some finite thing has been received; but externally or terminatively it need not be that it rest in something finite, because it can be ordered to something more perfect than it can receive formally in itself; because a finite thing can only receive a finite form yet it does very well have an infinite object. – When it is proved that any form brings matter to rest, because otherwise it would be violently at rest under any form whatever [n.4]. I say that violent rest never happens except when the thing at rest be determinately inclined to the opposite, as in the example of a heavy object with respect to descent downwards and its being at rest on a beam [n.4]; but prime matter is inclined thus determinately to no form, and therefore it is at rest under any form at all; it is not violently at rest but naturally, because of its indeterminate inclination to any form.

22. To the fifth [n.5] I say that the intellect assents to any truth because of the evidence of the truth itself – the evidence which it is of a nature to produce of itself in the intellect – and therefore it is not in the power of the intellect to assent to a truth more or

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6 Text cancelled by Scotus: “as was argued in the second article against Avicenna [n.10: canceled text in footnote 3].”
less firmly but only according to the proportion of the very truth that moves it; but it is in the power of the will to assent more intensely to the good, or not to assent, although less perfectly than when the good is seen, and therefore the consequence does not hold of the true with respect to the intellect as it does of the good with respect to the will.a

a. [Interpolation] To the sixth [interpolation to n.5] one must say that 'to desire for its own sake' is double, either formally, and in this way the virtues of which Ambrose speaks are to be desired, or finally, and in this way only God is. And to the confirmation one should say that being by its essence, or being such by its essence, is in one way distinguished from 'accidentally', and in this way any thing is what it is by its essence; in another way existing by its essence is distinguished from that which exists by another, and thus only God exists by his essence; for he is not reduced to any other prior being that might be more perfect than he or be his measure, and thus too only God is good by his essence.

Question 2

Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

23. Second I ask whether the ultimate end has only one idea of being enjoyable, or whether there is in it some distinction according to which the will could enjoy it according to one idea and not according to another.

And that there is in it such a distinction the proof is:

Because in Ethics 1.4.1096a23-27, in the paragraph, “But further, because the ultimate good…” the Philosopher says, and the Commentator [Eustratius Explanations on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1 ch.6 (17E)], that, just as being and one are in every genus, so also is good, and he speaks there specifically of relation; therefore just as it has its own goodness, so its own enjoyability, and consequently, since there are different relations in God, there will be in him different ideas of being enjoyable.

24. Again, just as one is convertible with being, so also is good; therefore, when they are transferred to divine reality, they are transferred equally. Therefore just as one is an essential and a personal feature there, so also is good and goodness; therefore just as there are three unities in divine reality, so are there three goodnesses, and the intended proposition is as a result obtained.

25. Further, an act does not terminate at an object insofar as the object is numbered unless the object be numbered as it is the formal object; but the act of enjoying terminates at the three persons insofar as they are three; therefore the object of enjoyment is numbered insofar as it is the formal object.

26. Proof of the minor: we believe in God insofar as he is three; therefore we will see God insofar as he is three, because vision succeeds to faith according to the total perfection of it [Prologue n.217]; therefore we will enjoy God insofar as he is three.

27. To the opposite:

In every essential order there is only one first, therefore in the order of ends there is only one end; but enjoyment is in respect of the end; therefore etc.

28. Again, to the first efficient cause the ultimate end corresponds; but there is only one first efficient cause, and under a single idea; therefore there is only one end. – The reason is confirmed too, because the unity of the efficient cause is so great that one person cannot cause without another causing; therefore similarly the unity of the end is so
great that one person will not be able to be end without another person being end, and the intended proposition follows. – This second reason is confirmed by Augustine On the Trinity V ch.14 n.15: “The Father,” he says, “and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit as they are one Creator with respect to the creature.”

29. Again, just as there is in God one majesty, so also one goodness; but there is owed to him because of his majesty only one adoration, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.8, such that it is not possible to adore one person without adoring another; therefore it is not possible to enjoy one person without enjoying another.

a. [Interpolation] as it seems

I. To the Question

30. This question could have a fourfold difficulty according to a fourfold distinction in divine reality, the first of which is the distinction of essence from person, the second the distinction of person from person, the third the distinction of essence from attributes, and the fourth the distinction of essence from ideas. About the third and fourth I will not now speak, because it has not been shown what sort that distinction is nor whether the things distinguished pertain to enjoyment [cf. 1 d.8 p.1 q.4 nn.1-26; d.35 q.un nn.12-16]. Therefore one must only see now about the first two distinctions.

And as concerns those two distinctions one must first see about the enjoyment of the wayfarer as to its possibility, second one must see about the enjoyment of the comprehender and this when speaking of absolute divine power, third about the enjoyment of the comprehender and this when speaking of the power of the creature, fourth when speaking of the enjoyment of the wayfarer and the comprehender in fact.

A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

31. About the first I say that it is possible for the wayfarer to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person, and this is also possible as to ordered enjoyment. My proof for this is that according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2: “if essence is said relatively it is not essence, because every essence which is said relatively is something after the relative has been removed;” from which he concludes, ibid.: “wherefore, if the Father is not something in himself, he is not something which may be said relative to another.” The divine essence, then, is some conceivable object in whose concept relation is not included, therefore it can be thus conceived by the wayfarer; but essence thus conceived has the idea of the supreme good, therefore also the perfect idea of enjoyability; therefore it is possible to enjoy it too in ordered way.

32. A confirmation of this reason is because it can be deduced from purely natural facts that there is one supreme good, and yet from those natural facts we do not conceive God as he is three; therefore about the supreme good thus known it is possible to have some act of will, and not necessarily a non-ordered act; therefore it will have an ordered act of enjoyment about the essence and not about the person as we conceive person. The converse, however, is not possible, namely that one enjoy the person in an ordered way without enjoying the essence, because the person includes the essence in the idea of itself.

33. Second I say also that the wayfarer can enjoy in an ordered way one person without enjoying another. I prove this, because with respect to the three persons there are
three distinct articles of faith; therefore one person can be conceived to whom one article corresponds while another person is not conceived to whom another article corresponds, and then in the former person the idea of the supreme good is conceived; one can therefore enjoy the person thus conceived without enjoying another.

If you say that ‘person’ is relative, therefore it cannot be conceived unless its correlative be conceived, I reply: although the knowledge of a relative require knowledge of its correlative, it is nevertheless not necessary that the knower and enjoyer of one relative know and enjoy the other relative, because it is possible to enjoy God insofar as he is Creator without enjoying the creature that is nevertheless the term of that relation. – Likewise, although the Father is said correlatively to the Son and therefore cannot be understood insofar as he is Father without the Son being understood, yet he is not said relatively to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Father; therefore it will be possible to conceive the Father as Father and to enjoy him without conceiving and enjoying the Holy Spirit.

B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

34. About the second article [n. 30] it is asserted that it is not possible, when speaking of the absolute power of God, that anyone who comprehends should enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person.

The proof of this is first about vision [about enjoyment see nn. 40-41], namely that it is not possible absolutely for any intellect to see the divine essence without seeing the person:

The first proof is as follows, because confused knowledge is imperfect knowledge; the vision of that essence cannot be imperfect; therefore visive knowledge of it cannot be confused. But if it were only knowledge or vision about the essence and not the person, or of the essence and not the person, it would be confused vision, because it would be of something common to the persons and would not be of the persons, which seems unacceptable.

35. The second is as follows: vision is of the existent as it is existent and as it is present to the seer according to its existence; and in this respect vision is distinguished from abstractive understanding, which latter can be of what is not existent or of what is existent not insofar as it is present in itself; and this distinction between intuitive and abstractive understanding is in the intellect as the distinction between the act of vision and the act of imagination is in the sensitive part. There is then an intuitive knowledge of the divine essence different from that which is abstractive knowledge, and the former is vision of the existence of it as it is existent and present according to its existence to the knowing power; but the divine essence only exists in a person; therefore there can only be vision of it in the person.

36. Again, something in which there are many things distinct by the nature of the thing cannot be known by intuitive knowledge unless all those things also be distinctly and perfectly seen. An example: whiteness is not seen distinctly unless all the parts that are at the base of a pyramid be seen, which parts are distinct by the nature of the thing. But the persons are in the essence and are distinct by the nature of the thing; therefore the essence is not distinctly seen unless the persons be seen.
37. From this there is an argument to the intended proposition [n.34] as concerns the second distinction, namely of the persons between themselves [n.30], because if the essence cannot be seen save in the person – and it is not seen more in one person than in another, because it is seen with equal immediacy to be related to any person whatever – therefore it cannot be seen unless it be seen in any person whatever, and so it is not seen in one person unless it be seen in another.

38. There is also further argument as to the enjoying proposed [n.34], because the will cannot abstract its object more than the intellect can show it; therefore if the intellect cannot distinctly show essence without person or person without person, then neither will the will be able to enjoy them distinctly.

39. And there is confirmation too as follows, because the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of the object unless a distinction either real or in idea is posited on the part of the object; but if the intellect apprehend the essence and person indistinctly, there will not be on the part of the object a distinction either of the thing or of the idea; therefore the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of a distinction in the first object. That there is not a real distinction on the part of the object is plain; that there is not a distinction in idea the proof is because the intellect does not distinctly comprehend, or does not distinctly apprehend, this and that; therefore it does not distinguish this and that.

40. On the part of enjoyment the argument is as follows: enjoyment gives rest to the enjoyer; one person without another does not give rest perfectly to the enjoyment of the enjoyer, nor does the essence without the person, because then the power at rest in it could not be made to be at further rest; nor can it be made to be at rest in anything else, because what is at ultimate rest cannot be made to be at further rest, and consequently that power could not be made to be at rest in another person or to enjoy it, which is false.

41. Again, if it were at rest in this person alone, and it is plain that it can enjoy another, then either the enjoyment of the other person can exist with the enjoyment of this person, or they will be incompossible, so that one of them will not exist with the other; if in the first way then two acts of the same species will exist at the same time in the same power, each of which acts is equal to the capacity of the power, which is impossible; if in the second way then neither act will be enjoyment, because neither act will be able to be perpetual.7

42. [Scotus’ own opinion] – As to this article [n.34] I say that, speaking about the absolute power of God, there seems to be no contradiction in the possibility that, on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will, the act of each be terminated by the essence and not the person, or terminated by one person and not another, to wit that the intellect see the essence and not the person, or see one person and not another, and that the will enjoy the essence and not the person or enjoy one person and not another.

43. Proof for this is as follows:8 any act has a first object on which it essentially depends, and it has a second object on which it does not essentially depend but does tend

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7 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, in our soul there is naturally the image of the Trinity; therefore it cannot be made to rest except in the Trinity; therefore it cannot enjoy anything in ordered way except the Triune God.”

8 Text cancelled by Scotus: “The Father is first in origin perfectly blessed before he generates the Son, because he gets from the person produced no perfection intrinsic to himself. Blessedness is a perfection intrinsic to the blessed person. But if in the prior stage the Father be perfectly blessed, then in the prior stage he has the object as perfectly beatifying; but he does not seem in that prior stage to have the essence communicated to the three persons as object, but the essence absolutely, or the essence as it is in one person
only; *per se* then it is not of the idea of the essence as it is the beatific object that it beatify insofar as it is communicated to the three persons, and so there seems to be no contradiction, either as to enjoyment or as to vision.

Response: the Father has the essence for object as it is in the three persons, and yet he has it first according to origin, because he has it of himself as an object for himself, and this is to be first in origin; but there is no other priority there according to which his essence, as it exists in one person and not as it exists in another, is an object for himself, just as neither in any prior stage of nature is it an object for one person and not for another, but it is an object only for one person from himself and an object for another person not from himself.

On the contrary: any of the persons whatever understands formally with the intellect as it exists in that person, not as it exists in another person, nor as it exists in all three, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore in this way it seems that each person understands by perfectly understanding the essence as it exists formally in itself; therefore perfect understanding, which is beatific understanding, does not necessarily of itself require that the essence is understood as it exists in the three persons.

Proof of the consequence: the intelligible thing is required for understanding no less than the intellect is; therefore in one who understands perfectly of himself there is required no less that he have in himself the object as it is formally intelligible than that he have in himself the intellect as that whereby he understands.

The reason is confirmed because if the Father were by the beatific vision to understand the essence as it is in the Son, then he would as it were receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son. The consequence is proved by the argument of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b28-35, whereby he proves that God does not understand something other than himself, because then his understanding would be cheapened since it would receive perfection from the intelligible thing; therefore so it is here, nay rather, something that is more unacceptable, the Father would as it were receive perfection simply, as beatific vision, from the three persons as from three objects, or from something as it exists in the three. And then two absurdities seem to follow: first that the Father does not have all perfection from himself, second that the whole and essential perfection simply is not in any way prior to the properties, but some is as it were posterior to the persons themselves, namely that which is from the object as it exists in the three.

Again, if the intellect as it is in something produced were the principle of the Father's beatitude, the Father would not be blessed of himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore if the essence as it exists in something produced be the *per se* object of beatitude, the Father will not be blessed of himself. The proof of the consequence is that the object as object is no less required for beatitude than is the intellect.

Response: it is required as present but not as existent within; the intellect is required as existent within, because by it one formally understands; not so by the object. An example: [the Archangel] Michael is not blessed except by his intellect existing within him; but he is blessed by an object that does not exist within him, and he would be naturally blessed if he naturally had the object present to him although not existent in him; not so about the intellect.

On the contrary: of whatever sort something is of itself, it would be of that sort even if, *per impossibile*, any other thing whatever did not exist.

Again, the Father would receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son, as from the object of his beatitude; that which exists of itself does not necessarily require for its being anything which is not from itself, and this with a necessity as great as the necessity with which a dependent thing requires what it depends on.

This reason well concludes that the Father has of himself, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the object, the source whereby he is blessed, and consequently that he has of himself the essence as it is what beatifies; not, however, as it exists in the three, because in this way an object present of itself is required just as an intellect of itself is required, so that he might be blessed of himself. Let there be a brief enthymeme: he is blessed of himself; therefore he has of himself the object as it is the beatific object; but he does not of himself have it as it exists in the three for beatific object, because then as it exists in the Son it would *per se* as it were act for the beatitude of the Father.

Response: in comparison with the Father, the essence as essence is the first beatifying object, although it be at the same time necessarily beatified in the three; thus too does it necessarily understand creatures, although it does not expect understanding from them but from the essence which it has of itself;
toward it in virtue of the first object; although, therefore, the same act could not remain in
the same place unless it have a relation to the first object, yet it can stay the same without
a relation to the second object, because it does not depend on the second object. An
example: the act of vision of the divine essence and of other things in the divine essence
is the same, but the essence is the first object and the seen things are the secondary object;
now the seeing could not stay the same unless it were of the same essence, but it could
stay the same without the fact of being of the things seen in the essence. Just as God, then,
can without contradiction cooperate with that act insofar as it tends to the first object and
not insofar as it tends to the second object, and yet it will be the same act, so he can
without contradiction cooperate with the seeing of the essence, because the essence has
the idea of the first object, while not cooperating with the same act of seeing or of
enjoying insofar as it tends to a person, and, by parity of reasoning, insofar as it tends to
one person and not to another.

44. Hereby to the arguments against this way [n.34]. When a statement is first
made about confused vision [n.34], I say that the universal in creatures is divided through
its singular instances; but this thing, which is ‘to be divided’, is a mark of imperfection,
and so it does not belong to what is common in God, nay the divine essence, which is
common to the three persons, is of itself ‘this’. So that is why knowledge of some
universal abstracted from singulars is confused and imperfect, because the object is
confused, being divided in the things which are confusedly conceived in it. But this
knowledge of the divine essence is distinct, because its object is what is of itself ‘this’,
and yet there is no need that in the distinctly conceived concept the person be distinctly
conceived or known, because the person is not the first term of enjoyment or of vision, as
has been said [n.32].

45. To the second, when argument is made about existent essence etc. [n.35], I
say that it is necessary that the term of vision be existent as far as it is existent, but it is
not necessary that subsistence, that is, incommunicable essence, belong to the idea of the
term of vision. But the divine essence is of itself ‘this’ and actually existent, although it
not of its idea include incommunicable subsistence, and therefore it can as ‘this’ be the
term of vision without the persons being seen. An example: a white thing is seen
intuitively insofar as it is existent and is present to vision according to its existence; but it
is not necessary that the white thing be seen as subsistent or insofar as it has the idea of a
supposit, because it does not have the idea of a supposit nor have the supposit in which it
exists or is seen. As to the form of the argument, then, it is plain that although vision is
only of the existent insofar as it is existent and is existent only in the person, yet the
inference does not follow ‘therefore it is of the existent insofar as it is in the person’, but
what should be inferred is only that it is of what subsists, or of what exists in a
subsistent.

46. To the third [n.36] I say that the first proposition is false except when in those
things that are distinct by the nature of the thing the first thing seen is distinct, as is clear
in your example about the base of a pyramid, for whiteness and a seen white thing are
distinguished into the parts in which they are seen, and therefore the white thing is not
distinctly seen unless these parts in which the seen white thing is distinguished be
distinctly seen. But in the matter at hand, although the divine persons are distinct by the

thus the first object can, in comparison with the created intellect, be posited without the second object. The
manner of positing it is as follows: etc. [as in the body of the text].
nature of the thing, yet the seen essence is not distinct in them, because it is of itself ‘this’; therefore the essence can be distinctly seen without those that subsist in it being seen.

47. As to the further deduction about the will [n.38], although there be no need to reply to it, because the antecedent must be denied, yet a reply can be made because the consequence does not seem to be necessary. When it is said that ‘the will does not abstract more than the intellect shows’, I say that the intellect can show some first object to the will and show in this first object some per se and not first object (and here the whole of that in which the act of the power terminates is called ‘first object’, and what is included per se in the object that first terminates is called ‘per se object’). Now each idea there shown [the idea of first object and of per se object] suffices for the will to have its own act with respect to it; for there is no need that the will wills the whole of the first object shown, but it can will the first object shown and not will what is shown in that first object shown. Let the following sort of example be posited: in bishop-hood is shown priesthood; such showing suffices for the will to have an act of willing or of not willing with respect to priesthood, so that it could from such showing have an act of willing with respect to bishop-hood and not with respect to priesthood; and yet there is only one showing, and a showing of one first object, in which first object however is included something as per se object. I say that the will does not abstract the universal from the singular, but there are many willed things shown to the will by understanding, which understanding is of some several things included in the first object, each of which, as thus shown, the will can will.

48. To the confirmation, when it is said that ‘the object differs either in reality or in idea’ [n.39], I say that it differs in idea. And when the criticism is made that it does not, ‘because the intellect does not conceive this distinctly from that’ [n.39], I say that for a distinction of reason it is not necessary that the intellect possess them as distinct objects, but it is enough that it conceive them in the first object.

49. To the other point about rest [n.40] I say that the Father rests in his essence as it is in himself; nor does it follow that ‘therefore he cannot rest in it as it is in the Son or the Holy Spirit’, rather he rests in the essence as communicated to them and does so with the same rest with which he rests in the essence as it is in himself. For that which rests first in some object rests in it as to whatever it is according to that mode; so here, if the blessed first enjoy the essence and then the person, he does not rest with a further rest beyond what he was resting with first but with the same rest, insofar as the object giving rest is the term as it is in any of them, and was not first the term as it is in that one.

50. Hereby to the fifth argument [n.41] I say that there will not be two acts there, because whatever act there is there of enjoyment or of vision, it is of the first object under one formal idea; but that one act can be of all of them or of the object per se by virtue of the first object, or it can be only of the first object itself; there will not then be two acts, at the same time or in succession, of the same species.⁹

C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

51. As to the third article about the power of the creature [n.30] I say that the intellect cannot by its own natural power see the essence without seeing the person,

⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “To the other point about the image [in footnote 7 above] the response is clear from what has been said [n.13].”
because, since the intellect is of itself a natural and not a free power, when the object acts the intellect acts as much as it can; therefore if the object on its own part acts by manifesting the three persons to the intellect, it is not in the power of the intellect that it see something shown and something not see.

52. Likewise neither is it in the power of the will to have ordered enjoyment in this way without having enjoyment in that way, because just as it is not in the power of the will not to enjoy in ordered way (for if it were not enjoying when not impeded in this respect, it would be sinning and deserving not to enjoy), so it is not in the power of the will to enjoy something in ordered way and not to enjoy whatever it can enjoy; and therefore it is not in its power, while remaining in ordered state, not to enjoy under any idea under which it can enjoy.

53. On the contrary: whatever is not necessarily concomitant to an act is in the power of the will that elicits it; or in this way: whatever things the act of will does not at the same time necessarily regard, the will itself as it elicits the act also does not regard; or in this way: whatever things can be separated as they are the term of the act of will can also be separated in respect of the power as eliciting the act.

D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact

54. As to the article about the fact [n.30] I say that in fact there will be one vision and one enjoyment of the essence in three persons. And this is what Augustine says On the Trinity I ch.8 n.17: “Neither can be shown without the other,” and he is speaking of the Father and the Son; and the remark is to be understood of ordained power, of which Philip spoke when wanting the Father to be shown to him [John 14.8], as if he could in fact have seen the Son without the Father. And Augustine treats there of the words of

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10 Text cancelled by Scotus: “But about the absolute power of the will there is more doubt. However it can be said there that it is not in the power of the will to enjoy in this way and not to enjoy in that way, because although some act be in the power of the will for being posited or not being posited, yet it is not in its power that an act posited in being should or should not have the condition that naturally belongs to the act from the idea of the object. An example: although it be in the power of the will to elicit or not to elicit a sinful act, yet if the act posited in being is disordered, it is not in the power of the will that the act so posited be or not be disordered; now the act of enjoyment, as far as depends on the nature of its first object, is of a nature to be of the three persons in the essence, because on the part of the object — barring some miracle — it will of itself be of the three persons; therefore it does not seem to be in the power of the will that an act posited in being should be of the essence as it is or is not in the three persons.

If you say that this reasoning concludes that it is not in the power of God that an act be of the essence and not of the three persons, I say that it does not follow, for the elicited act is in the power of God as to any condition that might naturally belong to it from the object, and yet the act as to that condition is not within created power. An example: it is in the power of God that an act elicited by a sinning will be referred to God because God refers it to himself, yet it is not in the power of the will, once the act has been posited in being, that the will use it for God because the creature is enjoying that act; and it cannot at the same time enjoy the same thing other than God and use it for God. – This example does not, however, seem a good one, because that act of the sinner is referred by one power and not by another. Let the example be dismissed then, and let the reasoning [above] be held onto, because an accident necessarily consequent to a posited act cannot not be in the act while the act persists, and this is subject to the divine will though not to the created will which elicits the act; so let it be said of a condition that the act is of a nature to have in respect of a secondary object necessarily, as far as depends on itself, but not essentially; therefore that the condition not be present is subject to the divine will.”
Philip and of Christ’s response. Augustine also means this in *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps we will see the whole of our knowledge in one view all at once.” And the fact that he says ‘perhaps’ is not referred to the beatific object but to seeing other things in it.

55. Likewise about the wayfarer I say that in fact necessarily the habitual, though not the actual, ordered enjoyment is of the three persons together; for no wayfarer or comprehender can have ordered enjoyment of one person without enjoying another (that is, unless he habitually enjoy another, namely that he is in proximate disposition to enjoying another), if this person is conceived distinctly from that; and therefore enjoyment of one person does not stand with hatred of another person, because, as the Savior says, *John* 15.23: “he who hates me hates my Father also.”

II. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

56. To the principal arguments. To the first from the *Ethics* [n.23] I say that good is in one way convertible with being, and that in this way it can be placed in any genus; but good in this sense does not have the idea of enjoyable object, and therefore it is not necessary that the idea of enjoyable object should properly be wherever good taken in this way exists. For the idea of enjoyable object is not the idea of good in general but of perfect good, which is good without any defect, or is so at least in appearance or according to what has been prefixed by the will [n.16], and of such sort a relation is not.

57. To the second [n.24] it is said that things that regard in a uniform way the essence and the person are only the essential features, if those that belong only to a person are precisely the personal features; but things that under one idea regard the person and under another the essence are essential and personal features. ‘Good’ is related in the first way while ‘one’ is related in the second, namely ‘indivision’, which under one proper idea pertains to the essence and under another proper idea pertains to the person.

But on the contrary: the cause of this fact is what the argument [n.24] is looking for; for it argues: since these two things seem to be equally convertible with being and equally transferred to divine reality, therefore each will be equally essential features only, or each will be personal and essential features.a

a. [No reply by Scotus to this argument is given in the Ordinatio. Replies are, however, given in the following interpolations] Therefore there is another response, that it is necessary for the object of enjoyment to be some quidditative good and not a perfection of a supposit, because the perfection of a supposit, as it is distinguished from quidditative perfection, is not the formal idea of acting, nor is it the formal idea of the term of any action; but quidditative perfection is only a perfection abstracted from a supposit, which of itself indifferently states or regards any supposit. And therefore it is necessary that goodness, as it is the term of the act of enjoying, be only a quidditative perfection; but unity can be both a quidditative idea and an idea of the supposit, because it does not of itself state the idea of the principle of an act nor the formal idea of the term of any act. The good, then, is not the term of enjoyment when taken in any way at all but when taken quidditatively, because it is a quidditative perfection, which is an essential feature and not the idea of the supposit. But unity is in one way an essential idea and is in another way the idea of a supposit; in the second way it is not the formal idea nor the formal term of the act of enjoyment.”
[Interpolation in place of this interpolation, starting at 'to be some quidditative good and not a perfection...' (from Appendix A)] But relation is not another thing or another goodness than the essence, therefore [the argument] is not valid. Therefore it can in another way be said that in the consequent of the first consequence only one sense can, by the force of the words, be held to, namely that this predicate, which is 'being another thing than the essence', is present in the property; and therefore the sense is false, because in this way a false thing, that which is inferred in the second consequence, well follows. And therefore I likewise deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are false and the consequent is false.

To the proof of the consequence I say that 'the same' and 'other' are not immediate in any predicate as said per se of a subject, nay not even contradictories are as it were immediates; for man is not per se white nor per se not-white. However between contradictories said absolutely of anything there is no middle; thus, if a property is a thing, 'it is the same or other' is true because it is the same; but with 'per se' it is not valid that it is 'per se the same' or 'per se other'.

[Two further interpolations follow on these interpolations (from Appendix A). The first interpolation:] Therefore I say that being in its first division is divided into quidditative being and into being having quiddity, which is subsistent being. But now whatever is a formal perfection is quidditative being and quidditative entity; for formal perfection is what in any being is better existing than not existing. But nothing is such unless it is a quidditative entity insofar as it abstracts from subsisting. But subsistent being that possesses quiddity is what contracts that perfection, and it is not formally that quidditative perfection. But now things are such that one, which is converted with being, is both quidditative being and subsistent being; and therefore it is both essential and notional. But good – as we are here speaking of it – in the way it states the formal idea of terminating an act of will, is quidditative essence; and therefore it is only an essential. Etc.

[The Second interpolation] To the third it can be said that, although necessarily an act of will follow an act of intellect, yet the mode of the will does not necessarily follow the mode of the intellect, because the intellect can make many formations about things that are not in the things, because it can divide what is united and unite what is divided, and thus it can form diverse ideas. But the will is borne to the thing not according to the mode which it has in the intellect but according to the mode of the thing. However, after a preceding showing by the intellect, enjoyment now states an act of will that is terminated in some object, beyond which act it is not appropriate to proceed.

But in the terminating of something there are two things to consider, that which terminates and the idea of terminating, – just as light does not terminate but is the idea of terminating, while the colored thing terminates. In the same way the idea of terminating in respect of the act of enjoyment is the divine essence as it is a certain absolute form, on which the idea of true and good follow, because from the idea by which it terminates the intellect the idea of the true follows, and from the idea by which it terminates the will the idea of good follows; but that which terminates is the essence existing in the three persons.

Then to the remark 'we enjoy God under one idea' [nn.34, 30]: that idea is the essence; what terminates is the essence existing in the three persons; one person cannot terminate without another – and he is speaking about ordered enjoyment.

Responses to the arguments are plain from what has been said.

The concept of essence is other than the concept of relation. The mode of the will does not follow the mode of the intellect, as has been said. Hence the intellect can form many ideas, and the will does not have to follow. Hence the respect of an idea is a respect of reason, but it is not an object of enjoyment.

That 'God can make a creature see the essence and not the person' [nn.51, 30], the proof is because the vision of the essence and of the person, and of the attributes and of the creatures or the ideas, in the essence, whether they are two acts or one, come freely from
God, and both, each, namely *per se*, are the same. Because, once the first has been produced, the other is producible freely and not by any necessity, therefore one is producible without the other. The consequence is plain.

The proof of the antecedent, because it is not repugnant by way of contradiction for the vision of the essence to be created and no vision with respect to the persons or with respect to the creatures in the essence to be created; the proof is because since the essence is an absolute and first and distinct object, different from creature or relation or person (Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: ‘everything that is said relatively is something’, etc.), it can, as taken precisely and distinct from all the aforesaid predicated objects, none of which it includes quidditatively as an essential or integral part, be the total object of an act of a created and limited intellect, whether intuitively or abstractly, although not of an uncreated and unlimited intellect (but this is because of the infinity of the intellecction, not because of the distinction of that object from others). Thus is it plain because the intellect can distinguish this object from all the others; therefore it can also have an act only about it. Again, the intellect can abstractively understand it taken precisely, and therefore it can likewise do so intuitively. Again if, once the essence is seen, it cannot not see the attributes, then it cannot not see the infinite perfections shining out in it, and so it does comprehend, which is false.

Through this is plain the solution to the argument ‘he who sees something white sees all the parts of it’ [n.36], because these parts are something of that white object, because they are integral parts, – just as, when seeing a man, perhaps animal that is included in him is seen, but not risibility.

On the contrary: the essence as distinct from the will represents itself to the blessed intellect, therefore it does so naturally; therefore as to the persons and the creatables shining out.

Again, to the same: the same principle has one mode of acting. But the divine essence represents itself naturally to the divine intellect, therefore to whomever it represents itself it naturally represents itself and all the things that are in God.

58. To the third [n.25] I say that the ‘insofar as’ can denote only the fact that what follows is taken according to its formal idea or, in another way, it can beyond this denote that it is the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. In the second way reduplication is taken most properly, because the reduplicated thing, whether it is taken for the whole of what it itself first is or for something that is included in the understanding of it, taking reduplication formally to be always that for which it is taken, is marked out as being the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject.

To the matter at hand, then, I say that if this reduplication be taken as to both these ways in the major, the major is true and the minor is false; but if it is taken in the first way and not in the second, the minor is true and the major is false.

And when the proof of the minor is given [n.26], I say that in the first way of taking it we will see the three insofar as they are three, that is, the formal idea of the Trinity will be seen, but the Trinity itself is not the formal idea of seeing or the formal cause of the inherence of the predicate, namely of ‘enjoyment’ or ‘vision’, but the unity of the essence is. And when proof is given further through the act of faith [n.26], which is of the three insofar as they are three, or triune insofar as triune, I say that the case is not similar, because the divine essence does not cause in us immediately the act of believing as it will cause in us immediately the act of seeing, and this is because of the imperfection of our understanding for the present state, because we understand the distinct persons from creatures and distinct acts. And therefore, as far as concerns our knowledge now, the Trinity can be the formal idea of knowing; but then the Trinity will be precisely
known as it is and will not be the formal idea of knowing, because then it will be seen through the idea of the essence in itself precisely as through the idea of the first object.

B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

59. To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n.27] I say that there is only one ultimate end in itself, yet it has several distinct ideas which are not formally ideas of the ultimate end, and so one can enjoy it under the idea of the ultimate end without enjoying it under those ideas.

60. To the second [n.28] I say that, as was said in the preceding question [n.14], that it is *per accidens* that the idea of efficient cause and the idea of end come together in the same thing, yet in fact one is the formal idea of the end itself just as one is the formal idea of the efficient cause itself, but in that one idea the power can be at rest although it is not at rest in the personal ideas that are in the end.

As to the confirmation when it is said that ‘one person cannot cause unless the other cause, therefore one person cannot terminate the act of enjoyment unless the other terminate it’ [n.28], I say that the conclusion does not follow; for it does well follow that one person from the nature of the thing is not the end unless another person is the end, but it does not follow about the end of the act as the act is elicited by the power, because the end of the act as elicited is the one to which the power as eliciting orders the act and because of which it elicits the act. But the end from the nature of the thing is the good, to which the act of its own nature is of a nature to be ordered, not indeed in idea of the object which is attained by the act, but in the way that all created natures are in their degree ordered to the ultimate end.

To the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.28], it is plain that he is speaking there of the fact and of the formal idea of it.

61. To the final point about adoration [n.29] I say that there is one habitual adoration of the three persons, because whoever adores one of them habitually is subjecting himself to the whole Trinity; but this need not be the case actually; for he need not think actually of another person when he adores one of them, as is plain about someone praying to one of the persons by a prayer that is not directed actually to another person, as is plain of the hymn ‘Come, Creator Spirit’, and of many prayers established in the Church. Hence the prayers of the Church are frequently directed to the Father and at the end the Son is brought in as mediator; therefore while someone is actually directing his intention to adoring the Father, he need not then actually think of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, until after he introduces the Son in his adoration and thought, namely as mediator. And just as it is the same adoration in habit but not in act, so it is the same enjoyment in habit although not necessarily the same in act.
First Distinction
Second Part
On Enjoying in Itself
Question 1

Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

62. Next in order I ask about enjoying in itself, and first – on the supposition that it is something precisely of the will – I ask whether it is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit some delight.

That it is delight my proof is:

Because the fruit is the final thing expected from a tree, and ‘enjoying’ is named from ‘fruit’;¹¹ but the ultimate in fruit is not the eating itself but delight, because of which fruit is eaten and for which fruit is sought. So it is similar in spiritual matters, namely that fruit is the final thing expected from the object; but such is delight, because delight too follows act, Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33, therefore it is the final thing; therefore etc.

63. Again, Galatians 5.22: “The fruits of the Spirit are peace, joy, etc.” All these are passions – and especially joy, which is delight – or they are at least not acts but things consequent to act; but fruit we per se enjoy; therefore enjoying is something per se consequent to the act, as it seems.

a. [Interpolation] Thirdly, Augustine On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: ‘We enjoy things known, in which the very will in itself rests delighted’. So delight either is the same as enjoyment, and the point in question is gained, or it is something consequent and posterior (as a certain property), and thus the definition given of enjoying [n.62] is not acceptable, because the posterior is not put in the definition of the prior nor a property in the definition of the subject [n.72].

64. On the contrary:

The will loves God by an elicited act; so either for the sake of something else, and then it uses God and so is perverse, or for its own sake, and then it enjoys him (from the definition of ‘enjoying’ [n.62]), and so enjoying is an act.

I. To the Question

65. In this question one must see first about the concepts themselves and second about the thing signified by the name.

66. As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition – one by which assent is given to something true for its own sake, as to a principle, another by which assent is given to some true proposition, not for its own sake, but for the sake of something else true, as to a conclusion – so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which assent is given to some good for its own sake, another by which assent is given to some good for the sake of something else to which that good is referred, just as assent is given to the conclusion because of the principle, because the conclusion gets its truth from the principle. This likeness can be taken from the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139a21-22, where is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further,

¹¹ The Latin word for enjoyment is ‘frui’ and for fruit ‘fructus’.
just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, because of itself and because of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, both because of itself and because of another.

67. There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and that truth, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. Here however these assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free power accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said before [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so distinct proper objects do not correspond to these acts, but any willable good at all can the will have as object according to this act or according to that.

The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect constitute a sufficient division of the assent of the intellect in general, nor is there any middle between them, because there is on the part of the object no intermediate evidence from which could be received a truth other than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some intermediate assent, because to the will can be shown some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have some act of willing the good absolutely, without relation to something else, or without enjoyment for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort of good that is and how it should be willed, and then can it thus assent to it, — and the whole idea of the difference on this side and on that is the freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.

68. From this further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from Ethics 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows.

We have, therefore, as to the matter in hand four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.

69. On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of these the term ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine, nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not a neutral act, nor is an act of use an act of enjoying, but there is only dispute about perfect act and the delight that follows it.

I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is this perfect act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is per se one but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being per accidens: nor is it unacceptable that one name signify many things, because the Iliad, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.

70. That it is only the act is seen from the authority of Augustine 83 Questions q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is
only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say On Christian Doctrine I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere with love in some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which this name ‘inhere’ there is adopted) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.12

71. But that enjoying is only delight seems to be said by the authority of Augustine On the Trinity I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged before from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we take pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to take pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.

72. But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in On the Trinity X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy things known, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it.

Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. This minor is stated by the authority of Augustine in On Christian Doctrine I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme reward is that we enjoy him himself.”13

73. But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine Retractions I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69]; some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, – or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking causally or concomitantly.

II. To the Principal Arguments

12 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Likewise ‘inhesion in something for its own sake’ does not seem to be through delight, because the efficient cause of delight seems to be the delightful object and not the end, and thus the one who delights does not tend to the object for its own sake. But this reason does not entail the conclusion – for it proceeds as if the object could not be the efficient cause and end of delight – and it has to be solved by him who holds that delight is of the essence of beatitude, see 4 Suppl. d.49 p.1 q.7 nn.2-7.”

13 Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it be the more proper signification of the word is difficult to prove, yet it can in some way be conjectured from the use of the word: for this word ‘to enjoy’ is construed with the ablative case signifying the object in transitive sense, which sort of construal is appropriated to verbs signifying act, but it is not construed with an object in the ablative case in causal sense, which sort of construal is due to passions signified by verbs that are passive first; for one does not say ‘I am joyed by God’ as one says ‘I am delighted by God’ or ‘God delights me’, but I am said ‘to enjoy God’ transatively in the way I am said ‘to love God’, and this seems to be the more proper signification of the word.” Scotus is here commenting on a peculiarity of Latin grammar, that the phrase ‘I enjoy God’ has a verb in passive voice (a deponent verb) and an object in indirect or causal case (‘fruor Deo’), but in meaning it is active and the object is direct, as in ‘I love God’ (‘amo Deum”).
74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as something to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as something to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore fruit be said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not fruit but that which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, – which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea, under which it is expected as needing to be attained by the power.

75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be thus the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but some act, able to have those passions for objects as it were proximate to its first object. – And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit per se’, this is not to be understood as formal principal idea, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the idea of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in idea of formal cause, we have joy by. But the authority does not say that something consequent to act is enjoyment but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

76. The opinion that love and delight are the same, for four reasons: first, of the same power about the same object there is a single act; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves also the same; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. – Love and delight differ in idea as from this to that and conversely; also as union and rest, privation of division and privation of motion.

On the contrary: the definition of love in Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in Rhetoric 1.11.1369b33-35 are different.

Response:
On the contrary about sadness in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; most intense not-wanting before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want.

On the contrary about love: delight is per se the object of love, as also of the preceding desire, Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.”

Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine On the City of God XIV ch. 28 and Anselm On the Fall of the Devil ch.4.

Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. Ethics 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death].

Against the first distinction of the idea [n.76, end of first paragraph], different agent; against the second, union is a relation [ibid.]. The solution is in Ethics 10.2.1174a4-8.a
a. Interpolation 1 (from Appendix A) Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in idea.

The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about the same object there is one act. The proof, because the distinction of an act is only by the power or the object. – Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object is possessed, love and delight immediately follow. – Again: things whose opposites are the same are also themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. It is plain, because each imports a certain inquietude. – Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. It is plain, because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect.

The second is shown thus, because love is asserted according as it is from the power to the object, but delight conversely. Also, delight imports rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in idea.

But to the contrary. Firstly, because the opposites of these are not the same. Proof, because hatred is a certain not-willing, but not-willing does not require an existing object, while sadness does. – Secondly, because the most intense not-willing precedes the event of the thing, but from the event of such thing sadness arises. – Thirdly, because delight is per se the object of enjoyment, but love is not. – Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. It is plain from Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.28: “Two loves” etc. – Fifthly, because in Ethics 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1237b35ff] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. – Again, the definition of love and of delight differ. It is plain from Rhetoric 2.4.1380b35-81a2. – Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. It is plain in the devoted.

To the first of these: the major is false. – To the second: the minor is false. – To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. – To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from Ethics 10.4.1174b31-33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.

Interpolation 2 Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian Lectura [Rep. IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment or love and delight are the same really.

The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct.

His proof for this is that to hate something is to not-want it; now not-wanting and being sad are not the same thing, because the act of not-wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing that makes one sad, according to Augustine On the City of God XIV ch.6.

He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being said while the not-wanting remains equal, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of the thing not wanted. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited in being, the not-wanting will not be more intense and it is then necessarily sad but before not.

Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not-wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not-wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is because when the will reflects on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that reflects on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc.

The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things.

The third reason: delight can be the per se object of some love of which love cannot be the per se object. The proof of this is because the will can love to be delighted in the
delightful thing when that delightful thing is absent, and of this love delight is the *per se* object, but love is not, because then the will would reflect back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will reflect back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will be present; therefore when by an act of love it loves the delightful thing or to be delighted, it is not necessary that it reflect back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which there is not love.

Again, a bad angel can love himself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine *On the City of God* ibid. ch.28.

Again, a more intense love is compatible with a weaker delight, as in the case of the devoted.
Question 2

Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

77. Second with respect to enjoying I inquire into the mode of eliciting this act, namely whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it.

Argument that it must:

Avicenna in Metaphysics 8 ch.7 (101rb): “Delight is the conjunction of agreeable with agreeable;” the end necessarily agrees with the will; therefore from the conjunction of it with the will there is delight, therefore enjoyment.

78. Again, the end moves metaphorically as the efficient cause moves properly [cf. Metaphysics 5.2.1013b9-11; 12.7.1072a26-27, 1076b3]; but an efficient cause proximate to the passive thing does, when not impeded, of necessity move properly; therefore the end that is proximate, that is, present to the will, does, when not impeded, necessarily move metaphorically.

79. Again, everything changeable presupposes something unchangeable [Physics 8.5.256a13-b3]; therefore various and changeable acts of the will presuppose some unchangeable act; such an act is only about the end, therefore that act is necessarily unchangeable.

80. To the opposite:

Natural necessity does not stand along with liberty. I prove it: because nature and will are active principles possessing an opposite mode of acting as principles [Physics 2.5.196b17-22], therefore nature’s mode of acting as a principle does not stand along with the will’s mode of acting as a principle; but the will wills the end freely, therefore it cannot will the end by natural necessity, nor, as a result, in any necessary way.

The assumption, namely that the will wills the end freely, is proved: because it is the same power that wills the end and what is for the end, therefore it has the same mode of acting, because diverse modes of working argue diverse powers; but the will works freely in respect of what is for the end, therefore etc. – Now that there is the same power for both is plain.a because otherwise there would be no power of a thing for the end willing it for the sake of the end; for the power must be one, having an act about both extremes, as the Philosopher argues about the knowledge of the common sense, On the Soul 3.2.426b15-29.

a. [Interpolation] because the act of using is per se one act, therefore it is per se of one power, respecting per se each extreme.

81. Note, this reason [n.80] does not reject all necessity of unchangeableness but only natural necessity; therefore let there be a more general reason proving the opposite, – and then in the first article [n.83] it is set down that it does [sc.act by natural necessity], but Henry sets down that it tends freely to the end, others that it does so naturally; they agree in this common term ‘necessary’, therefore against them in general are the reasons given here against the opinion in the first article [below, nn.91-133], but against the mode ‘naturally’ in particular there is this reason [n.80], as well as Augustine in Handbook on the Faith ch.105 n.28 (Lombard, Sentences 2 d.25 chs.3-4; here see 1 d.10 q. un. n.10).
I. To the Question

82. This question can be understood either about the end obscurely apprehended in general, as we conceive beatitude in general, or about it obscurely apprehended in particular, as we conceive beatitude in the Triune God; or about the end clearly seen in one who has his will supernaturally elevated, as in the case of one who has a perfect will by supernatural habit, or fourth about the end clearly seen in one who does not have a supernatural habit in his will, and this on the position that God would, of his absolute will, show himself to an intellect without giving any supernatural habit to the will.

A. The Opinion of Others

83. [Article 1] – About these four articles [n.82] it is said first, as to the first, that the will of necessity enjoys the ultimate end thus apprehended obscurely and in general. There is a triple proof:

First by the remark at Physics 2.9.200a15-16: “As the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in doable things;” but the intellect of necessity assents to the first speculative principles; therefore the will of necessity assents to the ultimate end in things doable.

84. There is a second proof for the same thing, because the will necessarily wills that by participation in which it wills whatever it wills; but by participation in the ultimate end does it will whatever it wills; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is because it wills nothing else except insofar as it is a certain good; but every other good seems to be a certain participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good, as seems to be proved by Augustine On the Trinity VIII ch.3 n.4: “Take away this good and that good,” etc., “and see the good itself if you can, the good of every good.”

85. Third, the same thing is proved in this way: the will cannot not will something unless in it there is some defect of good or some idea of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended in general there is not any defect of good or any idea of evil; therefore etc.

a. [Interpolation] Again, Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.3 n.6, says that a certain mimic actor said that he knew about the many people present in a certain theatre what they all wanted, meaning to understand this of happiness; but not all those people would want happiness or their ultimate end if they contingently wanted it; therefore they necessarily wanted it.

86. [Article 2] – As to the second article [n.82] it is said that, when the end is thus obscurely apprehended in particular, the will is able not to enjoy it; which can be proved because it can enjoy something which it knows to be incompossible with such end, as is clear of someone sinning mortally.

87. [Article 3] – As to the third article [n.82] it is said that the will necessarily enjoys the end thus seen because of the third reason to the first article [n.85], since no idea of evil is found in it, no defect too of good discovered in it, – and this if it see the end with practical vision, whatever may be true of speculative vision; and added here is that the connection, or the necessity of the connection, is so great that God by his absolute power cannot separate practical vision of him from enjoyment.
88. [Article 4] – As to the fourth article [n.82] it is said that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when seen, because acting presupposes being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being; but a will of this sort does not have supernatural being, therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.

89. Again, it would then be possible for such a will to be blessed. The consequent is false, because then charity would not be necessary for beatitude of the will. The consequence is proved as follows, because to enjoy the end when seen in particular seems to be beatitude, or to include beatitude formally.

90. An argument is also given in another way thus: when vision is posited, enjoyment is necessarily posited, when it is not posited, enjoyment is taken away; therefore vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore it is simply nobler. Proof of the first consequence: otherwise is taken away all knowledge what the cause is whose ‘through’, the sine qua non, anything at all will act on itself. Proof of the second consequence, because a total equivocal cause is more perfect.

B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

91. [Against article 1] – Against the first article I argue. First as follows:

Augustine in Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4 says that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act.

92. From this, two conclusions: first, therefore the act of the will is more in the power of the will than any other act; second, therefore that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but immediately.

From the first conclusion further as follows: the act of the intellect about the end is in the power of the will; therefore the act of the will is too.

From the second conclusion there comes further as follows: therefore if an act of the will is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of some other power, much more is it immediately in the power of the will; but to will or not to will the end by the mediation of an act of the intellect is in the power of the will; therefore this is immediately in the power of the will. The minor is plain, because it is in the power of the will to turn the intellect away from consideration of the end, which when done, the will will not will the end, because it cannot have an act about something unknown.

Response: it is supremely in its power because it is immediately in its freedom; everything else is in its power by the mediation of some volition, even what is not free but is not in possibility of contradiction.

93. There is a confirmation of this reason, namely the first against the opinion [nn.91-92], and it can be the second reason, because what, when not impeded, is compelled to act, of necessity removes, if it can, what prohibits its action; therefore if the will when not impeded is necessitated of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can do so, everything prohibiting the volition; but what prohibits this volition is non-consideration of the end, and this the will can remove by making the intellect stand in consideration of the end; therefore the will of necessity will make the intellect stand in consideration of the end. – The major of this argument is plain, because that which of itself is necessitated to act will never be prohibited except by something repugnant to it that overcomes its active virtue, as is apparent about a heavy object; for a heavy object is prevented from falling because of something repugnant to it that
overcomes its [downward] inclination, and, by parity of reasoning, the heavy object removes, if it can, what is prohibiting it, and once that thing is removed it descends unimpeded, because the heavy object removes what is repugnant to its effect as necessarily as it brings about the effect which that thing is repugnant to.

14 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Confirmation for the reason [n.93]: wherever there is a necessary connection of the extremes [sc. the terms], there is also a necessary connection of the intermediates necessarily required for the union of the extremes, otherwise the necessary would depend on the contingent; but if the will necessarily enjoys an end shown to it, there will be a necessary connection of the terms among themselves and by the nature of those very extremes, therefore also of all the intermediates; but the one intermediate necessarily required for the union of those extremes is understanding of the end, therefore etc. Proof of the minor: if there is a necessary connection of the will to the end, it is as of the principal agent to the object about which it is acting; but necessity for acting cannot exist in the principal agent save through that by which it formally acts; but the will acts of its very self, therefore in itself will this necessity to the object exist. Therefore the first minor is plain. – The minor of the prosyllogism is proved in this way: a principal agent acts as a principal by nothing necessary save by what it principally acts, otherwise it would act by the necessity by which it is impossible for it to act; and it does not act principally save by that which is its formal idea of acting.

This confirmation seems to exclude a certain response that might be given to the principal reason, about necessity simply and conditioned necessity; for it proves that if the will also necessarily enjoys the end shown to it, that it does this on account of the proper reasons of these extremes, which reasons have of themselves a necessary connection; therefore the will does not depend on anything other than the extremes, and so it is absolute, although there will be a necessary connection of the extremes between themselves, and therefore of all the intermediates in their order.

Response: the first minor is false unless it is understood of conditioned necessity, that is that, once understanding is presupposed, the necessity of enjoying which follows – which is a necessity in a certain respect, because it depends on the showing of the thing – that necessity, I say, is from the nature of the extremes; which is to say briefly: there is a necessary connection of the extremes if the showing precedes. But the minor is proved of absolute necessity by the nature of the extremes, therefore, in order to prove this, I reply to the minor and say that in a principal agent acting simply necessarily there is nothing by which it necessarily acts, and there is nothing required either for its acting necessarily, save only that by which it principally acts, because in a simply necessary agent the whole idea of its necessity is in it by that by which it is an agent. But in something principally acting necessarily in a certain respect or conditionally the reason of its acting is not a sufficient reason for its acting necessarily but something else is required on which that necessity depends, because it is not from the idea of the agent alone. The second minor is therefore denied, because the conditioned necessity in something’s acting is not through that alone by which it principally acts but through that along with the presupposition of something else. – To the proof of the second minor I say that in that ‘act necessarily’ two things are included, and with respect to ‘act’ there exists one ‘by which’, namely the formal reason of acting in the principal agent; with respect to ‘necessity’ there does not exist that reason alone but along with it the presupposition of something else. To the form [sc. of the argument], therefore, I say that one should not concede that there is something by which it necessarily acts, but that for that necessity there is required both that by which it acts and something else by which it does not act. But because in the proposed case that on which the necessity depends is the same as that on which the action also depends, and that by which it acts is that by which it acts with some mode of acting (either necessarily therefore or contingently), so in order to prove the second minor one can say in another way that that by which it is active is not that by which it itself acts except on the presupposition of something else, but when the other thing is presupposed then there exists that by which it necessarily acts. [The preceding paragraphs of this cancelled text are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.]

On the contrary: in the first instant of nature there is the preceding action, in the second the principal action. I ask how the principal acts in the second instant. If contingently, we have the intended proposition; if necessarily, then since it acts precisely through its proper form, both because it is acting principally and because what precedes is in no way its reason of acting, it follows that the form is then the idea of necessarily acting; but this is only from the determination of the form to the object and to action on the object; therefore the extremes have of their nature a necessary connection, and so with the necessary intermediates. – Again, nothing makes for doing that which is placed under a condition, therefore neither
94. If objection be made to this reason [n.93] by saying that the will does not simply necessarily enjoy the end but with a conditioned necessity, namely that the end be shown to it, and if the major be said to be true of something acting simply necessarily, I reply: this is not a solution, because things that can be impeded do not act simply necessarily but only with conditioned necessity, namely if they not be impeded, and in these cases the major is true; therefore what is taken in the major is not 'whatever necessarily acts necessarily removes, if it can, what prevents it' but: 'whatever is not impeded necessarily acts', etc. [n.93], where a specification is made in the major about conditioned necessity.

95. If it be objected in another way that the major [n.93] is true of those things that have a like necessity with respect to what is principally intended and with respect to things that are necessary for that of which there are agents merely natural, which agents throughout the whole process up to the ultimate thing intended act merely of natural necessity – but the will in another way regards the end in which all goodness exists, and for that reason necessarily, and regards otherwise any other being in which there is a defect of good, and therefore regards anything else contingently – on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard another extreme with any necessity and not to regard with so much necessity any middle necessarily required between those extremes, otherwise a necessary thing would depend necessarily on a non-necessary thing; therefore the will tends to the end with the necessity with which it necessarily tends to the showing of the end, without which it is impossible for it to tend to the end.15

96. If, thirdly, an objection be made to the minor [n.93], that non-consideration does not properly prohibit the will from enjoying, it can be argued otherwise as follows: whatever necessarily rests in something present to itself, necessarily holds it present to itself if it has it and can; the will for you necessarily rests in the end presented; therefore it necessarily holds it once presented so that it might always be present to itself. – The major is proved by induction: if a heavy object necessarily rests at the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center if it can, and the center present to it, and necessarily holds onto that presence as much as it can. The thing is apparent in sensitive appetite: if it necessarily rests in a present delightful thing, it necessarily as much as it can keeps the sense in that sensible object so that the object might be present to it to delight it. – The major is also proved by reason because the fact that something necessarily rests in something present is on account of the perfect agreement of the latter

Response to the first [objection on the contrary]: it acts in the second 'now' of nature necessarily, that is necessarily in a certain respect, because as second, namely as presupposing something else.

On the contrary: that which, when it acts, necessarily acts, simply necessarily acts, because 'necessarily' and 'contingently' determine action for the time when the cause acts; for the generator necessarily generates, although on the presupposition of alteration, as much as is from its active form. And then further: so it is determined simply necessarily, as much as in its form, to every necessary intermediate; it tends to this necessarily when it can, therefore it tends to every intermediate necessarily as much as or when it can.

Perhaps it is not in proximate potency save to operating about the thing known. – On the contrary: therefore it necessarily wills the understanding of the end if the end is presented to it as an understood object.

15 The text here from n.94 to n.95 is marked by Scotus with the letters: a—a

16 Scotus places as a superscript here the letter k. See n.112.
to the former; on account of the same agreement it seems equally necessarily to desire it to be conjoined to itself as much as possible; but this conjunction takes place in the presence of the latter to the former.17

97. A response is made in another way to the major of the first reason [n.93], that it is true of what is said properly to be impeded, namely that it is prohibited from acting because of something else that overcomes its active virtue; it is not so here, but there is something else acting whose action is previous to the action of the will, and therefore the cessation of this something else is by extension said to prevent the will from willing, and about such the major is false. For although an agent that presupposes to its own action the action of another could move that other to act and, with that other acting first, would itself necessarily act by conditioned or concomitant necessity, yet it does not necessarily move that other to act first, because it does not simply necessarily act, just as that which is said properly to be impeded would simply necessarily act as much as depends on itself, but it only acts with conditioned necessity, namely once the previous action is in place; an example is about a power acting contingently, and yet once the act that generates the habit is in place, it acts with the necessity of concomitance.18

98. On the contrary: the necessity of acting only comes through something intrinsic to the active principle; the previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle; therefore, with that circumscribed, there is a necessity of acting, and so absolute necessity. – And then as before: if there is a simple necessity for acting, then there is for doing that without which it cannot act, provided however this is in its power; but here it is; therefore etc.

Confirmation: here the necessity is not of action to action, because one action is not the active idea with respect to another; therefore the necessity is on account of the inclination of the power to the action; therefore the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between the extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection of the extremes.

99. Response to these and to the principal argument [n.93]: here the necessity is conditioned, namely on the presupposition of something else; and I concede that the necessity is through what is intrinsic to the principal agent and that it is for the intermediates as of extremes among themselves, but the whole is conditioned, namely with the showing of the object presupposed.

On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act simply necessarily but conditionally, ‘if it is not impeded’ [n.94], but yet it necessarily removes the impediment if it can; therefore so here. Nor is the first response valid about what is properly impeded, ‘the will is not properly impeded by non-understanding’ [n.97].19

17 This paragraph 96 is marked by Scotus with the mark e—e. This text cancelled by Scotus follows: “It is proved in another way, because what necessarily rests in a thing when present, necessarily as far as depends on itself moves toward it when absent, at any rate it is apt to do so, although it may be impeded by something; therefore just as it would by that necessity be actually moved if it were not impeded, so if it is a superior mover it moves anything inferior to itself whereby it can take away the impediments; such a movable inferior to the will is in the present case an intellect movable to the consideration of the end” [this cancelled text is marked by Scotus with the letter: q].
18 This paragraph, n.97, is marked by Scotus with the letters: b—b.
19 The preceding paragraphs, nn.98-99, are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.
100. [Again, propositions against article 1] g. Whatever power operates necessarily about the most perfect object, and not about something else, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.133].

a. [Note by Duns Scotus, for the text from here to n.110] And they are against the first article of the opinion [n.83].

b. [Interpolation in place of nn.100-114] Again against the first article [n.83] there is first the following argument: whatever power necessarily operates about the most perfect object presented to it and not about anything else, necessarily continues its operation about the same object as much as it can [n.100]; but the will necessarily operates about the ultimate end, which is the most perfect object, therefore it necessarily continues its operation as much as it can; the contrary of which we experience, because the will turns the intellect away from consideration of the ultimate end just as it turns it away from the consideration of other things. – There is proof of the major, and first in this way: the reason for necessarily operating is the same as for necessarily continuing the operation, if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can. Secondly, because if the power principally necessarily operates about the object when present, there is in the power itself an idea of always necessarily acting about it as far as depends on itself, or whenever it can if it can. Thirdly, because we see this in the sensitive appetite, and in the sense and the intellect. But it seems to be particularly true in the will, because the will does not cease to act of itself about any object save by converting itself away to some other object, whether a more agreeable or a more perfect one, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which prevents it operating at the same time about the first object; but the end is the most perfect and the most agreeable object; to it alone is it necessitated, to it is it most inclined, in it does it most rest, and in it is it most pleased; the willing of it stands along with the willing of any other thing.

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to the supremely most perfect apprehended object alone, necessarily determines itself, if it can, to continuing the apprehension posited of it. The virtue of this argument depends immediately on the preceding reason. But will necessarily tends to the apprehended end that is the most perfect object, therefore etc.

Again, whatever necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can [n.105]; but once the previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will necessarily tends to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of it. The virtue of this reason is because necessity for an intermediate thing is the same as necessity for the extreme.

Again, whatever acts necessarily about a present object necessarily determines itself to the presence of it if it can [n.107].

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can [n.108].

To what is adduced against the first article, when it is said ‘whatever power necessarily etc.’ [at the beginning of this note], because the reason [which is about necessarily etc., as at n.114 below].

[Interpolation to the interpolation for nn.100-110, from Appendix A] a. Anything that, when not impeded, necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can.

b. Whatever necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can.

c. A principal agent that, when everything is in place in a secondary agent, necessarily acts, is necessitated by the principal active principle.

d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object when present necessarily determines itself, if it can, to the presence of it.
e. If a power principally necessarily operates about an object when present, there is in the power the idea, as far as depends on itself, of always necessarily acting on the object, or whenever it can if it can.

f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends toward the object when it is known, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can.

g. Whatever power necessarily tends toward the sole supreme and most perfect object when apprehended, necessarily determines itself to the apprehension of it if it can.

h. Whatever power operates about an object present to it that is most perfect, necessarily continues the action as much as it can.

i. Whatever power necessarily operates- rests in about an object when present, is necessarily moved, as far as depends on itself, toward that object when it is absent; agreement is the common cause.

k. If there is a necessity, simply or as far as depends on itself, of an extreme to an extreme, there will be a like necessity in it to any simply necessary intermediate between them.

101. n. Whatever power necessarily rests-operates about an object present to it, necessarily moves toward it when absent as much as it can; agreement is the common cause [n.96].

102. t. If a power principally necessarily acts-operates about an object present to it, in that power is the idea, as much as depends on itself, of always necessarily about it, either whenever it can or if it can [n.96].

103. m. If there is a necessity simply, or as much as depends on itself, of extreme to extreme, there will be a similar necessity of it to any simply necessary intermediate between them [n.95].

104. a. Whatever when not impeded necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can [n.93].

105. b. Whatever necessarily acts when a preceding action is in place, necessarily makes determination for that preceding action if it can [nn.97, 98].

106. c. A principal agent that necessarily acts whatever is placed in a secondary agent, is necessitated by an active principal principle [n.98].

107. d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object present to it, necessarily determines that it be present if it can [n.96].

108. e. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to knowledge of it if it can [n.96].

109. f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to the sole supremely most perfect object when apprehended, necessarily determines itself to apprehension of the object if it can [n.96].

110. g. Whatever power necessarily operates about the sole most perfect object, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.100].

111. Note, a g [nn.100, 110] appears to be truer among these: first because there seems generally to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating as for necessarily continuing – if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can; next because of t above [n.102]; next because we see this by sense and understanding in sensitive appetite; next it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object except by turning itself to some other object, either one more perfect or more agreeable, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which object prevents it operating about this [other] object at the same time; but the end is the most perfect, most
agreeable object: to it alone is the will necessitated, to it it is most inclined and in it does it most delight; the volition of it stands with the volition of anything else.

112. From the proof of g. there follows f. [n.109], at any rate if one understands in the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ that being already posited it needs to be continued. If it be taken that ‘to apprehension of it’ must be posited if it has not been posited, in this way it does not follow from g. but is proved by the reason given above a a, “on the contrary: it is impossible for an extreme to regard...” [n.95]; but there is a necessity that the appetite tend to the object when it can, because it cannot save in the present; therefore in this way there is a necessity with respect to any intermediate when the proximate power is able. – Not so now e. [n.108]; it is more universal, because it does not specify the object as ‘most perfect’ nor as ‘only’ [n.109]; it is proved however in a universal manner. – d. [n.107] and b. [n.105] are very universal, hence let them be proved: a. [n.104] is sufficiently dealt with [nn.93-95, 97-99], and is improper; what is proper returns in b.; but b. and d. are proved from c. [n.106], along with the major ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme...’ [n.95]; the deduction is made here under ‘Confirmation for the reason...’ [footnote to n.93]. – Therefore g. stands; c. is disputed; k. and q. are probable.

113. Note the following four points as a gloss on the many things posited above [nn.94-112]: g. is well proved [n.111], and is a more evident way to a negative conclusion in the first article of the question [n.82]; g. can also be proved from c. here [n.106], and c is proved hereunder, namely on the appended sheet [n.98, first paragraph], at c c [nn.98-99]. – From m. here [n.103], major, and from c. here [n.106], made major [n.98, first clause], a. follows, b. follows, d. and e. and f. follow, each of which can serve as major for a negative conclusion of the first article. – From n. here [n.101] follows e., which is a more particular major than a. or b. or d. – g. entails that a willing and an understanding already posited are necessarily continued, two other reasons (the first from m. and c., the second from n. [n.112]) entail that what is not posited must necessarily be posited; the second entailment is more unacceptable but it less manifestly follows, the first contrariwise.

114. To the first way g. [nn.100, 110, 111], for the negative conclusion to the first article [n.82], which is about necessarily continuing the willing as much as the will can:
Let the conclusion be conceded, nor does the will ever stop unless the intellect first at least in nature stop considering the end, etc.

115. And if it be argued that the will necessarily will continue that understanding as much as it can, by commanding it [n.93], – response: it does not follow, because the will does not necessarily will the understanding as it does will the end [n.95].

116. It is argued in another way: at least the will would never turn away from this understanding, because the will, when necessarily continuing dependently, does not by commanding destroy that on which it depends.

Response: while the consideration of the end stands, and as a result the willing of it, something else is offered confusedly, the consideration of which is commanded by the will, and thus indirectly the will turns the intellect from consideration of the end; and for the ‘now’ for which it is averted the consideration first in nature ceases and next in nature the volition itself.

117. Against the first response [n.115]: the necessity that is of extreme to extreme is the same as to any necessary intermediate [n.103].

But here there is the reply on the preceding page above [n.95] that there is not the like relationship to any intermediate as there is to the end, and then it might be conceded that I can will this and not will that without which I cannot will this [n.95].

118. Against the other response [n.116]: the fourth proof of g. [n.111], because no other object is more perfect nor to which it is equally, or more necessarily, inclined as it is to this; a more perfect and necessary volition of what is both more perfect and more agreeable more impedes a volition when less such than conversely.

119. Again, a superior power inclines an inferior in a concordant way; therefore where it is more superior it more inclines.

120. Again, if an object is necessarily willed, then the willing of it is more determinately to be willed than any other willing; so also the understanding of it more than any other understanding. The proof of both consequences is because the will wills to will on account of the object, and to understand on account of the willing.

121. Again, we experience that the will impels us to the understanding of the object to which the will is more prone.

122. Therefore it is conceded that it never turns [us] away from it [n.116] but only an occurrent phantasm does, which is not in the power of the will, Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.25 n.74.

Here against the second response [n.116], also against the first [n.115]; it always continues as much as it can, but it cannot continue when another phantasm occurs whose movement is not subject to it.

Confirmation: the separated intellect will always persist in consideration of the ultimate end and in the volition of it, although sometimes of something else; they do indeed stand well together [n.111].

123. On the contrary: we experience that the will as freely turns the understanding from consideration of the end to a different object as it does in the case of other objects.

124. Again, the intellect would, as much as depends on itself, always persist in consideration of the end, because the end is the maximally moving object; therefore if it sometimes cease, this will be by command of the will.

125. Response: if the end were the object that moves in itself or even in its proper species, it is true that it would maximally move. But now, according to some, it moves
only in something else that is more of a nature to move toward itself in itself than to that.
Or, for you, many phantasms together move it to the concept of a description of it as
taken from common notions; therefore less than to other objects, for two reasons: first,
because it is difficult to persist in consideration of a transcendent universal [Ord. 1 d.3
p.1 q.3 n.26], for a phantasm moves rather to the most specific species [Ord. 1 d.3 p.3 q.1
n.9], Augustine On the Trinity 8 ch.2 n.3: “When you begin to think what truth is, at once
phantasms will present themselves to you;” second, because it is more difficult to use the
many common notions at the same time for a description than to use individual ones
separately.

126. Against this response: at any rate the separated intellect always considers
these common notions at the same time; likewise, according to Henry [of Ghent] it has a
proper concept of God.

127. Again, to the principal, for a negative conclusion of the first article [n.82]:
The damned apprehend the ultimate end. If they necessarily will it, then they do
so by the love or willing of friendship or of concupiscence. Not in the first way, for that
enjoyment is supremely right; nor in the second way, because they apprehend it as
impossible for them.

128. Again, if loving the end is necessarily elicited once practical understanding is
in place, and yet there is there the supreme idea of right and merit by congruity: because
every other act of the will is acceptable and laudable only by virtue of it, then there would
stand with any merit whatever the fact that the will would necessarily follow practical
understanding, – against Anselm On the Virginal Conception ch.4.

129. Again, in something necessitated to acting of itself or whenever it can act
[n.102], there cannot be a habit; for thus there could be a habit in a stone, which is not
simply necessitated to fall but as much as depends on itself [nn.93, and footnote].
Therefore in the will with respect to the end there can be no habit. There is a confirmation
about acquired habit: because it is only generated by act, but then when the will acts it
has a necessity to act in sensu diviso.

The conclusion is conceded about acquired habit. – But this agrees with the
Philosopher, that wisdom is the supreme habit [Ethics 6.7.1141a16-20, Metaphysics
1.2.983a6-7].

A proof that neither can there be a supernatural habit with respect to it, because it
is not capable of another habit with respect to an act to which it is necessitated.

Response: it is not necessitated to love now of the end in particular, nor of it when
seen in the fatherland unless it be elevated. – The first is rejected as below against the
second article [nn.134-135], the second as below against the third article [nn.136-140].

130. Against the reason [n.129] there is an objection, because it rejects a habit in
the intellect. – It is conceded that the intellect as inclining has no habit but not the
intellect as displaying.ª

ª [Interpolation] if the reason is valid, no habit will be posited in the intellect. – I say that neither
should an inclining habit be posited, but a displaying habit is very well required, which habit
cannot be posited in the will but only the inclining one; therefore the reason is good about the will,
not about the intellect. I hold therefore that the will is able not to will the end in whatever way it is
apprehended, obscurely or clearly, whether universally or in particular.
131. Again, *a priori*, every single power, as it has one first object, so also one mode with respect to the first object; therefore it has the same mode with respect to anything whatever in which its first object is *per se* included.

Response: it has some one mode which is *per se*, but the ensuing modes can vary, which modes belong to the power in its acting from the idea of special objects; of this sort are ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’. – But the *per se* mode is ‘freely’ as this is contradistinguished from ‘naturally’; ‘freely’ however does not entail ‘contingently’.

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: ‘naturally’ and ‘contingently’ do not imply ‘freely’ in the way inferiors imply their superior; therefore they are not special modes contained under the first mode, which is ‘freely’. – It is said that they are so as compared with the will, although simply speaking they are disposed ‘necessarily’ and ‘freely’ as things exceeding and things exceeded.

132. Again, *a priori*, whatever any will wills necessarily if shown to it, this it simply necessarily wills; the thing is clear about the will of God, where infinity is as simply the idea of necessity as if the object be shown.

133. Again, a power free by participation does not tend more to a perfect object than to any object; therefore neither a power free by essence; but there is no difference between the end that is willed and other things that are willed except on the part of the perfection of the object. The antecedent is plain, because sight, which is a free power by participation, namely insofar as its act is subject to the command of the will, does not more necessarily see a very beautiful thing than a less beautiful thing; therefore it is turned away from each equally and each it sees equally contingently.

The response is that the major is true of the cognitive power but is not true of the appetitive power tending to the object apprehended by its cognitive power; for more necessarily does a very beautiful thing seen delight the seeing appetite than a less beautiful one does, and if the appetite could carry itself to that seen thing by an elicited act, it would more necessarily carry itself or be carried to a more beautiful thing seen than to a less beautiful one.

134. [Against article 2] – Against the second article [n.86]. It seems that the reasons of the first article destroy the second article, because the reasoning that in the ultimate end there is not any defect of good nor any malice [n.85], seems to be conclusive with equal efficacy about the ultimate end apprehended in particular, or with more efficacy, because in the ultimate end in particular there is apprehended the whole idea of the end in general, nay it is also shown that in it alone can the perfection of the end in general exist, and thus no defect of good nor any malice either.

a. [Interpolation] which I concede to be true, but

135. Likewise the second reason for the first member about participation [n.83] concludes more about the end apprehended in particular, for created goods, if they be good by participation, are more truly goods by participation in the ultimate end in

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20 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, against the first article [n.83], everything acting necessarily acts of necessity according to the ultimate of its power, because just as action is not in its power, so neither its mode of acting, namely to act intensely or not intensely; therefore the will of necessity wills the end always most intensely and as much as it can, the opposite of which we experience. – The conclusion is conceded when the apprehension is equal and there is nothing pulling it back.”
particular than by participation in it in general; for they do not participate in it in general
save because they participate in it in particular, since the participator has the participated
for the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and the dependence of a real
being is only on a real being, and so on some singular.

136. [Against article 3] Against the third article [n.87]. When an elicitive
principle does not elicit necessarily, what has that principle does not necessarily act; nor
does an elicitive principle, while being disposed in the same way, elicit necessarily now
what before it was eliciting contingently, therefore neither will what has that principle
necessarily act. But a will having the same charity that it has now was before eliciting
contingently the act of enjoying, therefore it does not now necessarily elicit that act, since
no change has been made on its part. This is plain in the rapture of Paul. If before he had
a charity equal with that which he had during the rapture, there was no change on the part
of his will nor on the part of the elicitive principle; therefore there was no necessity then
for eliciting it more than before.\[a\] At any rate there could have been an equal charity
during the rapture and prior to it.

a. [Interpolation] nor consequently for acting.

137. Or let the reason be formed in this way: the necessity of acting can only be
through something intrinsic to the active principle; but, by the fact that the intellect now
sees the object, there is nothing new intrinsic to the active principle in enjoymen;
therefore not a new necessity of acting either. – Proof of the major: otherwise the
necessity of acting would not be through the idea of the active principle, and so it would
be by nothing or by something extrinsic; and if by something extrinsic, the acting would
be through that, because the acting is through that through which is the necessity of
acting. – The minor is plain: if vision in accord with this does not have the idea of active
principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect nor anything in the intellect;
also if vision in some other way has some idea of active principle, though not of the
principal one but of the secondary one, then let the major be taken determined thus: ‘the
necessity of acting is only through something intrinsic to the principal active principle’;
for a secondary principle does not give necessity to a principal one, just as neither does it
determine it to acting, but conversely the principal agent of itself uses the secondary one
in its own way, so that if nothing in the principal one exclude contingency, the whole
action will be contingent. The minor is thus plain, because through enjoyment nothing is
intrinsic to the principal active principle; therefore etc.

138. Again, either the end moves to th
is
act or the power does. If the end, it is
plain there is no necessity, because the end moves necessarily to no created act. If the will
moves,\[21\] then I argue: the diverse proximity of the passive thing to the agent does not
cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain of the hot with respect to
heatable things that are more and less proximate; but the diverse presence of a known
object, to wit seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the
will of what the act of will should be about; therefore this does not diversify necessity
and non-necessity, but only makes the act more or less intense.\[a\]

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\[a\] Text cancelled by Scotus: “and it does not have a difference on the part of the object except that of
greater or lesser proximity.”
139. Again, what it says in this article, that it is altogether impossible for an act of vision to be without enjoyment [n.87], does not seem true, because any absolute distinct natures at all are so disposed that a prior nature can essentially exist without a later without contradiction; those acts ‘vision’ and ‘enjoyment’ are two absolute natures; therefore without contradiction can vision, which is naturally prior, exist without the later, namely enjoyment.

140. A response is that the major is true of those absolutes neither of which depends on the other nor both on a third; but in the proposed case both depend on a third, as on the causing and moving object.

On the contrary: if they do not depend on a third necessarily causing both, nor necessarily causing one though it cause the other, the major will still be true, because the prior will without contradiction be able to exist without the later. But they do not depend on a third necessarily causing them both simply, it is clear, nor necessarily causing the later if it cause the prior, because any absolute thing that is able non-necessarily to cause immediately is able non-necessarily to cause through an intermediate cause that is also caused, because that intermediate caused cause does not necessitate it to causing the absolute effect of the intermediate cause; therefore if it not necessarily cause a later absolute, it does not necessarily cause it even when the prior cause is in place, if in any respect it be cause.

a. Interpolation, from Appendix A, which however is virtually word for word the same as the previous paragraph starting at “the diverse proximity of the passive thing...” to the end.

141. Against article 4 – Against the fourth article [n.88] the argument goes: that by which someone can simply act is the power; therefore if the will is not able from its natural properties to have an act about a seen end but it can when it has charity, charity is either simply a power of volition about that object or a part of the power of volition, each of which is false.

142. Again, if a willable object less sufficiently proximate or made present to the will can sufficiently terminate an act of will, much more so if the same object is more perfectly proximate or made present to the will; therefore if some good obscurely apprehended can be willed by a will not elevated by a supernatural habit, much more so can the same object clearly seen be willed in some act by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these reasons [nn.141-142].

C. Scotus’ own Opinion
143. As for the first article [n.82] I say that just as the will does not enjoy necessarily the things that are for the end, so not an end either apprehended obscurely or in general.

144. As to the second article [n.82] I concede along with the first opinion [n.86] that the will does not necessarily enjoy an end obscurely seen and in particular; nor as to the conclusion is there nor should there be an argument against it, but that the reasons put in the first article do conclude against the second article if they are valid [nn.134-135], which however I do not reckon to conclude simply. But how will someone who relies on them in the first article solve them in the second? Nay also the reasoning of them in the second article [n.86] seems to contradict the first article [n.83].

145. As to the third article [n.82] I say that an elevated will does not necessarily enjoy, as concerns its own part, the end thus seen.

146. As for the fourth [n.82] I say that a will not supernaturally elevated can enjoy the end.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

147. To the arguments for the opinion [nn.83-90]. To the first [n.83] I say that the likeness would entail many false things, because it would entail that just as we assent necessarily to the conclusions because of the principles, so we would assent necessarily to the things for the end because of the end, which is false. Therefore I say that the likeness holds as to two things, namely as to the order of these things and of those by comparing them among themselves, and as to the order of those by comparing them to powers that tend toward them in ordered fashion; I understand it thus, that as there is an order between those true things in themselves, so also between these good things, and just as those true things are in ordered fashion thus known, so also would these good things be thus in ordered fashion to be willed. But there is no likeness as to the order of necessity in one and in the other, comparing them to powers absolutely. For it is not necessary that the will keep the sort of order in its own acts that willable things are of a nature to have from their nature; nor is the assent alike on this side and on that, because necessity is in the intellect because of the evidence of the object necessarily causing assent in the intellect: but no goodness of the object necessarily causes assent of the will, but the will freely assents to any good at all, and so it freely assents to a greater good as it does to a lesser.

148. To the second, when the argument is about participation [n.84], I say that the major is false because the will wills nothing necessarily; and therefore it need not be that it necessarily will that thing by reason of which it wills everything else, if there were anything such. The minor is false also because by virtue of and participation in the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills, because ‘by participation in or by virtue of something the will wills things’ can be understood in two ways: either by virtue of or participation in it as efficient cause or as what contains it virtually, or by virtue of it as the first object because of which as willed it wills other things. If it be understood in the first way, the minor assumed with the major is not to the purpose, because that by virtue of which as efficient cause something is willed need not be willed, just as that which is the efficient cause of something seen need not be seen; for it need not be that I first see God with my bodily eye if I see a color, which is a certain participation of God as
efficient cause. If it be understood in the second way, namely about participation of it as first willed object, then the minor is false; for it is not by virtue of God willed that I will whatever is willed, because then every act of the will would be actual using, by referring it to the first willed object.a

149. To the third [n.85] it is said in one way that, although there be no defect there of any good nor any malice and therefore perhaps the will would not be able not to will it, because the object of an act of not willing is the bad or the defective, yet it is able not to will that perfect good, because it is in the power of the will not only to will thus and so, but also to will and not to will, because its freedom is for acting or not acting. For if it can by commanding move other powers to act, not only thus and so but also to determinately acting and not acting, it does not seem that there be less freedom of it in respect of itself as to determination of act. And this seems capable of being shown through Augustine Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4, where he is of opinion that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act [n.91].

150. It could, however, be said that the will itself, through some elicited willing, commands or prohibits the action of an inferior power. But it cannot thus suspend all willing, because then it would at the same time will nothing and will something. But however it may be about the suspension of all willing, the will can at least suspend every

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22 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this response I prove that if the will is able not to will, it can refuse to will, because if it cannot refuse to will, this is because it necessarily has in itself something to which that refusing is opposed. But that can only be actual willing; the proof is because no habitual or aptitudinal inclination to willing is repugnant to the very refusing. Even if it be granted that it is a not-refusing to will, this does not avoid the problem, because a negation agrees necessarily to nothing positive save on account of some positing necessarily agreeing with that positive thing on which the negation follows; and then that positing in the proposed case cannot be any habitual or aptitudinal inclination, because not-refusing does not follow on it, just as neither is refusing opposed to it, because the positive necessarily agreeing with the will, on account of which refusing is repugnant to it, will be actual willing. If therefore it cannot refuse to will, it necessarily wills. – And this reason generally shows that to nothing susceptible of contraries and of intermediates, if they have intermediates, is any form of that genus repugnant, or that it is impossible for a form to be present in it, unless some form of that genus is necessarily present in the same thing, or something else is, to which that which cannot be present in it is virtually repugnant. Such a positive that is virtually repugnant to a very refusing cannot be found in the proposed case.

Response: the thing repugnant to the refusing is the will, because the will only has a capacity for possible willing and refusing to will; but to refuse to will the end includes a contradiction, because that is not a possible object of this act. An example: to see a sound includes a contradiction by reason of the act and the object, therefore it is repugnant to sight and sight to it, and it determines for itself not to see this, because sight is of sight. So here. Nor is it unacceptable to deny that the end can be an object of hatred and beatitude of flight, but neither can misery be an object of concupiscence, because according to Augustine in Handbook of the Faith ch.105 n.28: “nor can we will to be wretched” [Lombard, Sentences II d.25 ch.3-4; Scotus I d.10 q. un n.10] [n.81].”
act about this object through some elicited willing, and in this way do I refuse now to elicit anything about this object until it be more distinctly shown to me. And this refusing to will is a certain elicited act, a sort of reflecting back on willing the object, not an object that is present or was present, but one that could be present; which, although it is not shown in itself, is however shown in its cause, namely in the object shown, which is of a nature to be, in some genus of principle, the principle of the act.

151. It is in another way said to the third preceding reason [nn.149, 85] that it has not been proved that the will could not refuse to will a good in which there is found no idea of evil or of defect of good, just as it has not been proved that it could not will that in which is found no idea of good, and this either in reality or in apprehension before that thing is the term of the act of willing. About this perhaps there will be discussion elsewhere [2 d.6 q.2 n.13, d.43 q. un; 4 Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.2 nn.4-10].

152. To the authority of Augustine On the Trinity [n.84], that everyone wants to be blessed, therefore everyone necessarily wills the ultimate end in where there is beatitude, I say that he does not mean actual volition. For his intention is that the mimic actor, of whom he is speaking, would have spoken the truth about what everyone coming together wanted had he said to them all: “You all want to be blessed.” But not everyone who was then coming together to the spectacle had then actually the appetite for beatitude, because they did not all have actual thought about it. So he is speaking of habitual or aptitudinal volition, namely that whereby the will itself is ready for immediately inclining to an act of willing beatitude if beatitude be actually offered by the intellect.

153. Likewise, the authority is not to the purpose. Because if it is certain that everyone wills beatitude, this is not in an act of friendship, by willing the beatific good be well for him, but in an act of concupiscence, by willing the good for himself as a sufficient good, because it is not certain that disordered wills have ordered delight of the first good in itself, but all wills, whether ordered or disordered, have the concupiscence of willing, or the will of concupiscence, for what is good for them. But an act of concupiscence cannot be an act of enjoyment, because everyone who desires with concupiscence desires for someone else what he loves with the love of friendship, and so the act of concupiscence is not an act of enjoyment but only the act of friendship is. Therefore, although Augustine is speaking of the act of willing beatitude, not however of an act of friendship but of an act of concupiscence, and thus not of enjoyment, and so it is not to the purpose.

154. To the argument for their fourth article, when they argue about doing and being [n.88], I say that the act would not be supernatural but natural, because the will can naturally elicit some act about an object in whatever way it is shown by the intellect; and because the act does not exceed the faculty of the power, so neither does the object as it is the term of the act of that power.

155. When it is said, second, that then such a will could be blessed [n.89], I say no, according to Augustine On the Trinity XIII ch.5 n.8: “The blessed have whatever they want and want nothing evil.” This definition must be understood in this way, that the blessed person is he who has whatever he can will in an ordered way, not merely whatever he now actually wills; for then some wayfarer could be blessed for the time when he is thinking about only one thing that he has in an ordered way. But the will can wish in an ordered way to have charity, because it can will not only to have the substance of the act of enjoying, but it can will to have an enjoyment accepted by God; if therefore
it does not have it, it does not have whatever it can will in ordered way. Also, the way charity is required, not only for gratification of act but for some grade of perfection intrinsic to the act, will be discussed later [1 d.17 p.1 qq.1-2].

II. To the Principal Arguments

156. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.77] I say that a thing is agreeable aptitudinally or agreeable actually. Agreeable aptitudinally is what agrees with someone of itself and as much as depends on the nature of the thing, and such agrees actually with everyone who does not have it in his power that something actually agree or disagree with him; and therefore whatever agrees with someone naturally or aptitudinally, with his natural appetite or his sensitive appetite, agrees with him also actually. But it is in the power of the will that something actually agree or not agree with it; for nothing actually agrees with it save what actually pleases. For this reason I deny the minor, when it is said that ‘the end necessarily agrees with the will’; for this is not true of actual agreement but of aptitudinal agreement.

Or in another way: if aptitudinal agreement alone suffice for delight, yet not for enjoyment; rather it becomes actually agreeable in enjoyment, whether it agree aptitudinally or not. If the first thing supposed in this response is true, one must deny the consequence ‘delight, therefore enjoyment’.

To the second [n.78] I say that there is a different mode of acting in the action; ‘properly’ and ‘metaphorically’ destroy the likeness as far as necessity is concerned.

157. Or in another way: just as something properly acting necessarily moves something else contingently, thus something metaphorically acting necessarily moves something contingently. For the end which necessarily moves the efficient cause, to wit the natural agent, moves necessarily metaphorically, because it is necessarily loved or naturally desired; but the end which moves the efficient cause contingently, moves contingently metaphorically. And here the efficient cause causes contingently and the end moves contingently metaphorically.

158. To the third [n.79] I say that that immovable does not have to be some elicited act. For several different and movable heatings do not presuppose some one immovable heating, but they presuppose a first act, namely heat, which is a sufficient principle for eliciting all those various acts. So here, the volitions do not presuppose some one immovable volition, because then the will willing something for the end would always be under two acts, or at any rate under one act that is referring this to that, but they presuppose a first act, to wit the will, which is a sufficient reason for eliciting the various volitions.
First Distinction  
Third Part  
On the Enjoyer  
Question 1  
*Whether enjoying belongs to God*

159. Lastly in regard to this first distinction I ask about the enjoyer, namely to whom as subject enjoyment belongs, and first whether enjoying belong to God.

It seems not:
Because enjoyment is with respect to the end; but God does not have an end; therefore enjoying does not belong to God.

160. On the contrary:
God loves himself; and he does not love himself because of something else, because then he would be using himself; therefore he enjoys himself. The consequence is plain, because if he loves himself, either by using or enjoying.

**Question 2**  
*Whether the wayfarer enjoys*

161. Second I ask whether the wayfarer enjoys.

It seems that he does not:
Because the wayfarer has only an act of desire in respect of the absent good; but an act of desire is not an act of enjoyment. The proof of this is because desire is an act of concupiscence, but enjoyment is an act of friendship; therefore etc.

162. On the contrary:
“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [Lombard *Sentences* 1 d.1 ch.2, from Augustines’s *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.4 n.4]; but the wayfarer thus inhere s to God; therefore he can enjoy God.

**Question 3**  
*Whether the sinner enjoys*

163. Third the question is asked whether the sinner enjoys.

And it seems he does not:
Because what does not rely on something immovable does not enjoy nor rest; but the sinner does not rely on any immovable good; the proof, because he relies on a creature, which is movable, for “every creature is subject to vanity” [*Romans* 8.20, *Ecclesiastes* 3.19]; therefore he does not rest nor enjoy.

164. Again, he who wants another for use of his own act does not enjoy him; but the sinner wants God for use of his own act; therefore he does not enjoy him. The major is shown because he who wants another for use of his own act does not value him as the supreme good; therefore he does not enjoy him. The minor is clear because the sinner wants his own act to be; therefore he wants it to be from God, since nothing could exist
except from God; therefore he wants God to use him, because God uses everything that is from him.

165. On the contrary:
Augustine *83 Diverse Questions* q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used” [n.70]; therefore it is possible for the sinner to enjoy things he should use.

**Question 4**
*Whether the brutes enjoy*

166. Fourth the question is asked whether the brutes enjoy.
And it seems that they do, from Augustine, where as before, *83 Diverse Questions* q.30, he says that: “to enjoy any corporal pleasure the beasts too are not absurdly judged to do.”

167. On the contrary:
“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake” [nn.70, 162]; but the brutes do not have love, because neither do they have will nor do they adhere to anything for its own sake but for their own good; therefore they do not enjoy.

**Question 5**
*Whether all things enjoy*

168. Fifth the question is asked whether all things enjoy.
It seems that they do:
Because all things desire the good with natural love, *Ethics* 1.1.1094a2-3; and they desire some good not for the sake of something else [*Ethics* 1.4.1096b13-14]; therefore they enjoy.

169. On the contrary:
“We enjoy things known” [n72; Augustine *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13]; but not all things have cognition; therefore etc.

I. To the Questions Together

170. To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely how bodies rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate term of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate term, a heavy body adheres *per se* and first, to wit earth which does not adhere by the nature of another body from which it participates heaviness and the adhering in question.

171. Now a body adheres to the center immovably and *per se*, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering participated from the earth. However it does adhere *per se*, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly or immovably, because it is as it were intrinsic to the earth, which does rest first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet rest perfectly, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of what first rests, to which they are, as it were, perfectly united.
172. In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the medium of the earth to which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rest for a time, is yet not as determined to rest as a body resting in the second way.

173. In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it to which it adheres is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying in a ship; although it would be in the power of the body to rest itself, that heavy body, which would finally rest in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it does not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

174. Applying the example to the matter at hand, the will corresponds in spiritual things to the weight of a body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine *On the City of God* 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus *Book of 24 Philosophers* prop.2] – according to truth. To this center the divine will first and *per se*, because not by participation in anything other than itself, immovably and necessarily adheres,⁴ for this will, not by habit nor by a different act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

a. [Interpolation] Hence the Commentator *Physics* II com.88 says that the disposition of a simply necessary being is that it not exist because of its action but action because of it, and this mode is found in simply eternal things.

175. In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet *per se*, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and this because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

176. In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although he relies on the divine will and, by its mediation, on the supreme good, in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of the will; hence now it adheres to the good and now it turns away from the good. – But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there while the form remains by which the body rests the body is able itself not to be at rest, but here the form, by which it rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time with aversion of the will from the center.

177. In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is resting itself, he adhere vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is he adhering to God, yet on the part of the object he cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center [of the earth], is not simply at rest, because not with respect to what in the universe ultimately brings rest, so the will, which is resting itself, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at
rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in it by loving it for its own sake.

178. On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the resting of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the resting, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake: so that the divine will enjoys simply and necessarily and per se and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and per se but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and per se but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not cause rest as a power by its act makes itself rest in it, therefore is the enjoyment disordered.

179. But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his act or the object of his act.

I reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by love of friendship, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom as loved with love of friendship he has concupiscence of that object. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need for there to be a reflecting back first. This is the opinion of Augustine On the City of God 14 ch.28: “Two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God,” and Literal Commentary on Genesis 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root there is this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

180. To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet contrarily, because the object is not valued as non-referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of non-relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, because loving does not properly belong to it. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], it could be said that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is as it were fixed by the adamantine force of the adamant attracting it, and thus neither mediately nor immediately at rest in the center, nor in anything else, by the force that would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by the force of something extrinsic giving it rest. So here, the force of the object gives it rest, but not the
intrinsic force of giving rest in the center or as if in the center, which force is as if freedom alone, which does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

181. To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from the above. Because, if enjoying proper be denied of sensitive appetite, which however more agrees with the will of which there is enjoyment than natural appetite does, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing, just as the act of will – not so, however, the act of natural appetite, if there is any act of it – it follows that enjoyment proper does not belong to what has only natural appetite, indeed not even as abusively as it agrees with sense appetite.

II. To the Principal Arguments

182. To the arguments. To the argument of the first question [n.159] I say just as was said in the first question of this distinction in the fourth article [n.17], that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable, but the idea of the absolute good is to which the idea of end belongs. Although, therefore, God is not the end of himself, yet with respect to his will he is that absolute object to which naturally belongs the idea of end, because he is the supreme good; but the idea of end cannot belong to him with respect to himself (just as neither is he the end with respect to himself) but with respect to all enjoyable things, of which sort are all the goods that can be ordered to another.

If the objection be raised how God then is said to act for an end, and also that a superior agent has a superior end, I reply: with respect to nothing is there any final cause unless with respect to it there is an efficient cause, because the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act; God then, not being something that can be effected, has no final cause. But that first common saying [God acts for an end] must be understood to mean that he acts for the end of the effect; but not for the end of himself, because he is not an agent of himself. Likewise the second common saying [a superior agent has a superior end] must be understood of the end of the effect, because a superior agent orders, not himself, but his effect to a more universal end; and so the superior end is the agent’s, not as his end, but as that to which he orders what he does.

183. To the argument of the second question [n.161] I say that, besides the act of desire which is with respect to something not possessed, by which the just wayfarer desires God for himself with an act of concupiscence, the just wayfarer has another act of friendship, by wanting well being for God in himself, and this act of friendship is enjoyment, but not the act which is of desire; and this second act is properly the act of charity, but not the first, which is the act of desiring, as will be said in 3 Suppl. d.26 q. un n.17. The major then is false.

184. To the first argument of the third question [n.163] an exposition of the minor can be given, because what adheres to a movable thing does not rest simply, although as far as depends on its own part it makes itself rest in it, and so the conclusion is to be conceded, because the mortal sinner does not simply rest, although as far as depends on his own part, by his own act of ultimate rest, he rests himself in a movable thing. If it be added that nothing enjoys a thing unless it rest simply in that thing, this must be denied, but one must add: ‘unless it be at rest as far as depends on the part of the act itself,’ namely the act by which he adheres to the object; and also: ‘as far as depends on the part of the object’, in ordered enjoyment. Nor ought supreme rest to be understood here,
because to all rest on the way there follows the greater rest of the fatherland, but because of an act accepting the object not referable to another.

185. As to the second [n.164], the major can be denied, because although by ordered love no one enjoys anything save what he does not wish anyone to use but to enjoy, yet with disordered love someone can well enjoy what he does not wish another to enjoy but only to use, or to love it in no way, as is evident about inordinate jealousy. – To the proof of the major one can say that although the enjoyer values the enjoyable as the supreme good, yet he does not wish it to be thus valued by everyone when he is enjoying it inordinately; therefore the conclusion does not follow: ‘he wishes it to be the supreme good or he loves it as the supreme good, therefore he wishes others thus to love it’.

One can reply in another way by denying the minor. – To the proof, when it is said ‘he wishes the enjoyable to be, therefore he wishes it to be from God’, the conclusion does not follow. Nor does this follow either: ‘he wishes it to be from God, therefore he wishes God to use the act’. And the cause of the defect of each consequence is because he who wills the antecedent need not will the consequent when the consequent is not per se included in the antecedent but only follows through an extrinsic topic. So it is in the proposed case.

186. As to the authority of Augustine for the fourth question [n.166], it is clear that his authority is to be expounded of abusive enjoyment, or by extending the term enjoyment, because the sensitive appetite does not refer by understanding negatively, nor by contrariety, because it does not inhere in the object as something that cannot be referred, because, although the thing cannot be referred by it, this belongs to its natural impotency, not the goodness objectively or in the acceptation of the power. About the difference between these, namely not being referred negatively, by contrariety, and by privation, there will be discussion at 2 d.41 q. un n.3.

187. As to the argument of the final question [n.168], it is plain that although natural appetite inhere to something for its own sake negatively, not however by contrariety for the most part, and if sometimes by contrariety, yet it does not inhere by love; nor does it properly inhere either, but by itself giving the nature it is fixed as it were in the object itself, not indeed by an elicited act other than nature, as is the case with even the sensitive appetite, but by habitual inclination of nature. Hence as was said [n.181], enjoyment belongs less to it than to the sensitive appetite which by an elicited act inheres as to an object now known, though not freely; but natural appetite is perpetually inclined without any cognition.

From what has been said about enjoying, and especially in the third question of this distinction (namely ‘whether enjoying be an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight’ [nn.62-76]), use can be made plain, which is a more imperfect act of the will ordered to enjoying as to a more perfect act of the same power.
Book One  
Second Distinction  
First Part  
On the Existence of God and his Unity  
Question 1  
*Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite*

1. About the second distinction I inquire first about what pertains to the unity of God, and first\(^a\) whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite.\(^b\)

  a. [Interpolation] This therefore is to be held by true and pious faith. About this second distinction, wherein the Master deals with the existence and unity of God and the plurality of the persons, there are seven questions [nn.1, 10, 157, 191, 197, 201, 212]; for there are three questions about the first part, two about God’s essence and one about his unity. The first is.

  b. [Interpolation] Whether there is some being simply first. That there is not: beings are related as numbers, and there is no number first in perfection because neither is there a greatest number. On the contrary: *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a11-19, there is a first efficient cause, therefore a first actuality; there is a first end, therefore a first good. – Second, whether priority could simply belong to essences of different idea. That it could: posteriority so belongs, and as one correlative is multiplied so is the other. On the contrary: every multitude is reduced to a unity. – Third, whether a being simply first is infinite in intensity. Here below [nn.1-9]. – Solution: first, as to what the order of questions is, because in a ‘demonstration-that’ existence is proved first of relatives; from the second will be got priority with respect to all causable things, from this the solution of the third, to the first as below [nn.41-73].

That there is not is argued as follows:

  1. If one contrary were actually infinite, there would be nothing in nature contrary to it; therefore if there were some good actually infinite, there would be nothing of evil in the universe.

  2. The response is made that the major is true of contraries formally; but nothing evil is formally contrary to God.

  3. On the contrary: whether it is formally or virtually contrary, if it is infinite, it suffers nothing contrary to its effect, because it will, on account of its infinite virtue, destroy everything incompossible with its effect. The major is true, then, of a contrary virtually as of one formally. An example: if the sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would leave nothing cold in the universe, just as if it were infinitely hot formally.

  4. Again, an infinite body allows of no other body along with it, therefore neither does an infinite being allow of any other being along with it. Proof of the consequence, first because, just as dimension opposes dimension, so actuality seems to oppose actuality; second because, just as a body different from the infinite would produce along with it something greater than the infinite, so a being other than the infinite seems to produce something greater than the infinite.

  5. Further, what is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere is finite with respect to ‘where’, and what is now in such a way that it is not at another time, is finite with respect to ‘when’, and thus with each category. What does this thing in such a way that it
does not do another is finite as to action, therefore what is a this something in such a way that it is not something else is finite in entity; God is supremely a this, because he is of himself singularity; therefore he is not infinite.

6. Again, from *Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6, if there were an infinite virtue, it would move in non-time; no virtue can move in non-time, because if it did motion would exist in an instant; therefore no virtue is infinite.

7. On the contrary:

In the same place of the *Physics* [266a10-24, b6-20, 7b17-26] the Philosopher proves that the first mover is of infinite power because it moves with an infinite motion. But this conclusion cannot be understood only of infinity of duration, because he proves, on account of its infinity of power, that it cannot exist in magnitude; but it is not repugnant to magnitude, in his view, that there is a power in it infinite in duration, the way he would posit about the heaven.

8. Again *Psalm* 47.2: “Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised.”

9. Again Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.9: “He is a sea, etc.”

**Question 2**

*Whether some infinite being is self-evidently known*

10. Whether some infinite being is self-evidently known, as that God exists.

It seems that it is so:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.1: “Knowledge of the fact that God exists is naturally implanted in everyone;” but that is self-evidently known the knowledge of which is implanted in everyone, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5, because the first principles, which are as it were the entrance doors, are self-evidently known; therefore etc.

11. Further, that than which nothing greater can be thought is self-evidently known to exist; God is of this sort, according to Anselm *Proslogion* ch.5; therefore etc. This thing is also not anything finite, therefore it is infinite. – The proof of the major is that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if the subject does not exist, it is not that than which nothing greater can be thought, because, if it were in reality, it would be greater than if it were not in reality but in the intellect.

12. Again, that truth exists is self-evidently known; God is truth; therefore that God exists is self-evidently known. The proof of the major is because it follows from its opposite: for if there were no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth; therefore there is truth.

13. Again, propositions that have necessity in a certain respect from terms that have entity in a certain respect, namely from the fact that they are in the intellect, are self-evidently known, like first principles, which are self-evidently known from terms that have existence in the intellect; therefore much more will that be self-evidently known which has necessity from terms simply necessary, of which sort is the proposition ‘God exists’. The assumption is plain because the necessity of the first principles and their knowability is not because of the existence of the terms in reality but only because of the connection of the extremes as this connection exists in the conceiving intellect.

14. On the contrary:
What is self-evidently known cannot be denied by anyone’s mind; but ‘the fool has said in his heart, there is no God,’ Psalm 13.1, 52.1; therefore etc.ª

a. [Interpolation] Again, Avicenna Metaphysics 1 ch.1 (70rb): “That God exists is not known per se, nor is it beyond hope of being known.”

I. To the Second Question

15. Because according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 2.3.995a13-14: “it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time,” I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing this proposition ‘God exists’. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I state as follows:

When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, by the phrase ‘self-evidently’ is not excluded every cause whatever, because the terms of the proposition are not excluded; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded. Therefore a self-evidently known proposition does not exclude knowledge of the terms, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is every cause and idea that is outside the concept of the terms of a self-evidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms, which are part of it.ª

a. [Interpolation] that is, from no other propositional truth but from itself alone does ‘every whole is greater than its part’ get its evidence.

16. Further, what are those proper terms from which it must be evident? – I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.ª

a. [Interpolation] some are to be taken for the thing defined and others for the definition.

17. I prove this from the Posterior Analytics 1.6.75a25-27, because the ‘what it is’ or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only there be two terms, which is false.

18. This is proved, second, as follows, through Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a26-b3, that names bear to the definition what the whole does to the parts, that is, that a confused name is known prior to the definition; and a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its elements; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before the concept of it as introduced distinctly by the definition is
known, and so it is another concept and another extreme term. – From this further: since a proposition is self-evidently known that gets evident truth from its own terms, and other terms are concepts of the quiddity distinctly (as imported by the definition) and concepts of the quiddity confusedly (as imported by the name), it follows that a proposition will not be self-evidently known of a quiddity confusedly taken, a quiddity which is only known if the same be conceived distinctly through a definition.

a. [Interpolation] The reason can also be formed thus: it is impossible for the same concept to be prior and posterior and to be had and not had about the same thing; but the same thing can be conceived, and is conceived, according to the name before it is so according to the definition, Averroes Physics 1 com.5; therefore the concept introduced by the name and by the definition is not the same.

19. There is also proof of this conclusion because otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and per se in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, up to ‘[man is] a substance’), would be self-evidently known; for if the idea of each extreme is assigned by the ideas of the distinctly conceived extremes, it appears manifestly that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician could possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth when not yet distinctly conceiving, in the way considered by the metaphysician, what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and one of this sort — such propositions are not possessed by the geometer as self-evidently known.

20. This is clear, third, because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known of the definition.

a. [Interpolation] just as having three angles [equal to two right angles] is demonstrated of a triangle when there is knowledge of its definition, which is: ‘plain figure’ etc.

21. Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived as they are the terms of the proposition, have or are of a nature to have the evident truth of the combined proposition.

a. [Interpolation] That proposition, then, is known per se which gets its evidence, not from another proposition more known in its truth, but from its own intrinsic terms.

[Interpolation to the interpolation]...as they are its. And I say ‘as its’ they are either confused concepts as confused, or distinct concepts as distinct; for definition and thing defined are not the same terms, because the thing defined is known before the definition is, by the fact that the confused thing or things are known first, Physics 1.1.184a21-22; hence the name of the defined thing imports the intelligible thing in a confused way and in a confused concept, but by the definition is imported a discrete concept about the same thing; and therefore something can be known per se according to one term, namely the defined thing, which is not known according to the definition.

Again, a definition is the middle term in demonstration, and the defined thing is the conclusion; and therefore did I say ‘as they are its’, namely confusedly if they be confused
and distinctly if the concepts be distinct. Hence the definition as it is the middle is not as declarative or more evident to us than the thing defined, but the major proposition or the minor is more evident than the conclusion.

22. From this is plain that one is to distinguish between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, because they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as concerns the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to have the evident truth contained in the terms also in any intellect that conceives the terms. But if some intellect not conceive the terms, and so not conceive the proposition, the proposition is, as far as concerns itself, no less self-evidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of things self-evidently known.

23. From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself and to nature and to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, though not actually known, is yet as far as concerns the terms evidently true and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known. 

a. [Interpolation] as is plain of the perfect syllogism, which needs nothing for its necessity to be evident, Prior Analytics 1.1.24b2-24; and Reportatio IA d.3 n.62. But this evidence is from the relation of the principles or the suppositions to the conclusion, which is the relation of necessity.

24. Nor is the distinction valid that some propositions are self-evidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions self-evidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.

25. From these points I say to the question that that proposition is self-evidently known which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as it is this, or God and his proper existence, in which way God sees that essence and existence under the most proper idea by which it is in God, in which way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now but by God himself and by the blessed; because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not per se in the second mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a37-b5], as if the predicate be outside the idea of the subject, but is per se in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions of anything about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition ‘God exists’ or ‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes are of a nature to make this proposition evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this proposition, because existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. By thus understanding, therefore, by the name of ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know nor conceive as this divine essence, is ‘God exists’ thus self-evidently known.

23 Text cancelled by Scotus: “For the same reason the distinction is not valid that something is self-evidently known to the wise or the unwise, because this only pertains to the conception of the terms which is presupposed to the understanding of a self-evidently known proposition, although Boethius, On the Seven Days PL 64, 1311, does thus distinguish a common conception; but either a self-evidently known proposition and a common conception are not the same, or Boethius’ understanding is about what is conceived, not what is conceivable or is distinctly by reason of the terms.”
26. But if it be inquired whether existence is present in any concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, can in our intellect be a concept said of God, but not one common to him and creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and of such a concept we can predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, – I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:

27. First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: whatever first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in it\(^a\) by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through a middle term.\(^b\) An example: if the triangle first have three angles equal to two right angles, it can be demonstrated of whatever is contained in triangle that it has three angles etc. by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is ‘triangle’, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to…] etc., also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles etc., although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this in the way the divine essence is seen by the blessed; therefore of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through a middle term by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three etc.’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three etc.; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstration-why’.\(^c\)

a. [Interpolation] whether in a superior or inferior, or about a property.

b. [Interpolation] about a superior particularly or about a particular universally.

c. [Interpolation] Or let the reason be made in briefer form thus: what belongs to something first does not belong to another save by the nature of that to which it belongs first; but existence belongs first to this divine essence, therefore it will not belong to any property or anything else save by the nature of the essence. Therefore no proposition in which existence is asserted of some property of this essence that we conceive about God is true first, but is true through something else, and consequently it is not first and known per se.

28. Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from known terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and in that prior stage it is not evident to us; for we hold it from the terms with certitude only by faith or demonstration.

29. Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is self-evidently known unless it be self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple; therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two [earlier] reasons [nn.27-28].
a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This minor is set down on the basis of the opinion about the univocality of the concept that is common to God and creatures, but if this opinion is changed let this minor be taken: ‘many concepts in which we conceive God are not simply simple’, and a particular conclusion follows, not a universal one as by the two reasons [nn.27-28]. The minor can be taken in another way thus: ‘no concept of ours that is proper to God and that we perceive to be proper to God is simply simple’, because although the concept of being made from the creature is simply simple and proper to God according to another opinion [sc. the opinion that being is analogical, not univocal, to God and creatures], yet it is not a proper percept, because according to Henry [of Ghent] it seems that in that concept, because of its likeness and simplicity, we do not distinguish God from other things, – understand: we do not distinguish in a perceptible way, because although the concept be distinct, yet it is not perceived by us as a distinct concept.

30. The major is manifest from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.29.1024b31-32, because an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true of anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for it to be known that something is true of some account, or for the account to be true about something, one must know that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contain the other, so one must know as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition ‘irrational man is an animal’ is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so this proposition ‘man is white’ is not self-evidently known if it not be self-evidently known that man and white are actually per se conjoined; because if they not be conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true ‘nothing is a white man’, and consequently its converse will be true ‘no white man is’; therefore its contradictory is false ‘a white man is’.

31. Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a concept proper to God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.

32. From this last reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made ‘this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists’ (proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if it does not exist, it is not ‘necessary existence’), ‘this too is self-evidently known, God exists’, because, according to every exposition posited by Damascene On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.9, ‘God’ is named from actual operation, that is, from warming or burning or seeing,24 therefore, according to every acceptation [of the term], ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘what is actually operating exists’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.25

24 Damascene derived the Greek for ‘God’ (Theos) from Greek words signifying these operations.
25 Text cancelled by Scotus: “It is said that this proposition ‘what is actually operating is [exists]’ the ‘to be’ can be predicated as an additional third thing, or as a second thing, and such that the ‘to be’ is predicated as present being or as habitual being [= the difference between ‘a man is just’ – where ‘is’ is a third thing, namely the copula joining subject and predicate in present union – and ‘a man is’ – where ‘is’ is a second thing, namely a predicate asserting existence of the subject in habitual union]; in the first way the proposition is not self-evidently known, in the second way it is self-evidently known. But this is not logically said, because according to the Philosopher On Interpretation 10.19b19-22, ‘to be’ is not
33. For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that none of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘what is actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is self-evidently known unless the repugnance is evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.26

II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

34. To the principal argument of Damascene [n.10]: it can be expounded of the cognitive power naturally given to us by which we can know from creatures that God exists, at rate in general ideas (he subjoins there how he is known from creatures! On the Orthodox Faith 1 ch.3), or it can be expounded of knowledge of God under common ideas that agree with himself and with creatures, which are known more perfectly and eminently in God than in other things. But that Damascene is not speaking of actual and distinct knowledge of God is clear from what he says there: “no one knows him save as to how much he himself has revealed.”

35. To the second [n.11] I say that Anselm does not say that this proposition is self-evidently known, as is clear, because from his deduction it cannot be inferred that this proposition is true save through at least two syllogisms, one of which is this: ‘being

26 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this: if the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject, then the consequence is good when putting the subject in some antecedent and the predicate in some consequent, inferring the consequent from an antecedent of that kind, to wit ‘a is necessarily existent, therefore a exists’, because the opposite of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent. But every necessary consequence holds by virtue of some necessary categorical proposition, and thus the categorical is what unites the extremes, by reason of which the consequence holds; therefore such a proposition is necessary, to wit this one ‘necessary existence exists’ and ‘the one who is actually operating exists’.

I reply: when in the antecedent are included two opposites and a consequent is inferred, it is not inferred by reason of the whole antecedent extreme, because the whole extreme does not make any single concept, but only by reason of one part of the extreme, to wit the inference ‘an irrational man exists, therefore an animal exists’. The reason for the consequence is not ‘irrational man’, because it does not make a concept, but ‘man’ in the antecedent and ‘animal’ in the consequent does; and therefore a categorical proposition that is per se true must be formed from those extremes, namely these: ‘man’ is ‘animal’. So in the matter at hand: if the proposition has an extreme that is not simply simple, whose parts are not self-evidently known to be united, and something is inferred by reason of such non-simply simple extreme, it is inferred by reason of another part of it which includes what is inferred in the consequent; and therefore it holds by virtue of a categorical proposition which conjoins these two things, namely one part of the extreme of the antecedent and one part of the consequent. This categorical is this ‘existence exists’, but not ‘necessary existence exists’. The same response is made to ‘if it does not actually exist, it is not operating,’ and to the reverse ‘if it is operating, it is a being in actuality’: for in the subject several things are included, one of which is precisely the reason for the consequence, but the whole subject is not; and therefore there is no necessary proposition uniting the whole extreme of the antecedent with the extreme of the consequent.”
is greater than any non-being, nothing is greater than the supreme thing, therefore the
supreme being is not a non-being’, from oblique forms in the second mood of the second
figure [of syllogism]; the other syllogism is this: ‘what is not a non-being is a being, the
supreme thing is not a non-being, therefore etc.’ But how his reasoning is valid will be
explained in the following question, in the sixth argument [n.137], about proving infinity.

36. As to the proof of the major [n.11] (I say the major is false when ‘that it exists
is self-evidently known’ is taken; however the major is true, though not self-evidently
known), when it is proved that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’,
I say that it is neither self-evident that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the
subject nor is it self-evident that the subject possesses a simply simple concept or that its
parts are united in fact; and both these are required for that proposition to be self-
evidently known.

37. To the third [n.12] I say that the inference ‘that truth in general exists is self-
evidently known, therefore that God exists’ does not follow but is the fallacy of the
consequent; alternatively, the major can be denied. And when it is proved ‘if there is no
truth, it is true that there is no truth’, the consequence is not valid, because truth is taken
either for the foundation of truth in reality, or for truth in the act of the intellect
combining and dividing; but if there is no truth, neither is it true that there is no truth,
whether by the truth of reality, because there is nothing, or by the truth in the intellect
combining and dividing, because there is no intellect. However the inference does well
follow, ‘if there is no truth, therefore it is not true that there is any truth’, but the further
inference does not follow, ‘therefore it is true that there is not any truth’; it is the fallacy
of the consequent, from a negative having two causes of truth to an affirmative which is
one of those causes.

38. To the last principal argument [n.13] I say that propositions are not said to be
self-evidently known because the extremes have a greater necessity in themselves, or a
greater necessity in reality outside the intellect, but because the extremes, as they are the
extremes of such a proposition, show evidently that their combination is in conformity
with the ideas of the terms and with the relation of them, and this whatever being the
terms have, whether in reality or in the intellect; for the evidence of this conformity is the
evidence of the truth in the proposition, which is the proposition’s being self-evidently
known. But, as it is, the proposition ‘every whole is greater than its part’, or anything
similar, in any intellect that conceives the terms, naturally has such evidence from the
terms, because from the terms it is evident that the proposition is in conformity with the
relation and idea of the terms, whatever being the terms have; and therefore although
there is less necessity in the terms, it does not follow that there is less evidence in the
propositions.

a. [Interpolation] in my intellect the proposition ‘infinite being is’ is of a nature to be evident from
the terms, but…

27 The argument in n.12 is: ‘that truth exists is self-evidently known; God is truth; therefore that God exists
is self-evidently known’. So perhaps the point is that to assert ‘God is truth’ is already to assert that God
exists, and so amounts to asserting the consequent to prove the consequent.

28 The conditional ‘if there is no truth, it is not true that there is any truth’, is a double negative; the
conclusion ‘it is true that there is no truth’ is an affirmation of the antecedent. But to conclude to the
affirmation of the antecedent of a conditional is to commit the fallacy of the consequent.
III. To the First Question

39. To the first question [nn.1-9] I proceed as follows, because about an infinite being it cannot thus be demonstrated that it exists by a ‘demonstration-why’ for us, although from the nature of the terms the proposition is demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-why’. But for us the proposition can well be demonstrated by a ‘demonstration-that’ from creatures [Posterior Analytics 1.13.78a22-b34]. Now the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are disposed more immediately to things that are the middles in a ‘demonstration-that’ than are absolute terms, so that about the relative properties it can more immediately be concluded that an infinite being exists through what are middle terms in such a demonstration than about the absolute properties, for immediately from the existence of one relative the existence of its correlative follows; therefore I will first make existence clear about the relative properties of an infinite being, and second I will make existence clear about the infinite being, because the relative properties belong only to an infinite being; and thus there will be two principal articles.

40. As to the first article I say: the properties of an infinite being relative to creatures are properties either of causality or of eminence; of a double causality is, either efficient or final. As to what is added about the exemplar cause, it is not a genus of cause other than the efficient cause, because then there would be five genera of causes; hence the exemplar cause is a certain efficient cause, because it acts through intellect, distinct from what acts through nature, about which elsewhere [1 d.36 q. un n.5].

A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

41. In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply first in efficient causality, and that there is something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature alone such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.

a. [Interpolation] …with every primacy that does not include any imperfection. For the part is more imperfect than the whole and yet is prior; for a part shares in the entity of the whole and is not the whole itself. But there are other primacies that do not include any imperfection, as the primacy of eminence and of triple causal independence, namely, efficient, formal or exemplar, and final. But the primacy of eminence is not the primacy of causality; for one being is not the cause of another from the fact that it is preeminent over it, for the first and the supreme in any genus is preeminent over any other posterior in that genus and yet it is not the cause of it. Also exemplar primacy is not distinguished from the primacy of efficient causality, because a principle that is the exemplar of other things in intelligible being is only an efficient principle through the intellect; for just as a natural efficient cause does not distinguish efficient causality but is contained under it, so neither is the exemplar cause distinguished from the efficient cause. So there are two causalities, distinct from each other, namely of efficient and final causa. And all those primacies that we attribute to God include no imperfection. – Hence first I will show that there exists something in fact among beings that is simply first.
42. [First partial article] – The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, through a triple primacy; and each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists among beings. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal ones.

43. Now the first conclusion of these nine is this, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor does it by virtue of something other than itself cause an effect. The proof is because some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine On the Trinity 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let that something else be \(a\). If \(a\) is first in the way expounded [n.43 ini.], I have what was proposed; if it is not first, then it is effective secondarily, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted.\(^{29}\) Let that other be granted and let it be \(b\), about which one argues as was argued about \(a\), and thus either one proceeds \(ad\) \(infinitum\), where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is unacceptable.\(^{a}\)

\(^{a}\) [Interpolation] because then the same thing would be prior and posterior to itself.

44. Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first,\(^{a}\) that according to philosophers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations,\(^{b}\) where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.

\(^{a}\) [Interpolation] because it seeks a stand in causes.

\(^{b}\) [Interpolation] none of which is first but each is second, because according to them an infinite process is not unacceptable in the case of productions of the same nature.

45. Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.\(^{a}\)

\(^{a}\) [Interpolation] likewise, it proceeds from contingents, because it proceeds from the ideas of producer and produced, which are only contingent terms.

46. To exclude the first instance \(n.44\) I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in Metaphysics 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

\(^{29}\) To deny that a thing cannot be an effect or cause an effect by virtue of another is to assert that it can be an effect and cause an effect by virtue of another.
47. And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes per se and per accidens, and another to speak of causes per se or essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with one thing, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause per se is one that causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to it, and a cause per accidens the converse; in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.

a. [Interpolation] as the subject is the per se cause with respect to its own property, and in other cases, as ‘the white disperses [sight]’ and ‘a builder builds’.

b. [Interpolation] as ‘Polycleitus builds’.

48. And causes that are per se or essentially ordered differ from causes that are per accidens or accidentally ordered in three ways.

49. The first difference is that in per se ordered causes the second, to the extent it causes, depends on the first, but not in a per accidens ordered cause, though it may depend in being or in something else.

a. [Interpolation] for although the son depends for his existence on his father, yet he does not so depend in causing, because he can act when his father is dead just as when his father is alive.

50. The second difference is that in per se ordered causes there is a causality of another idea and another order, because the superior is more perfect, but not in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends in its causing on a cause of the same idea, because in the causing of something one thing of one idea is enough.

51. The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and per se are necessarily required together for the causing, otherwise some essential and per se causality would be lacking to the effect; but it is not so in accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.

a. [Interpolation] because any cause has its own perfect causality without another in respect of its effect; for it is enough that one cause successively causes after the other.

[Interpolation to the interpolation]: “From the three differences are three reasons: from the first, the totality of causes is dependent in causing, therefore dependent on something that is not anything of the totality; from the second, the infinitely superior will be infinitely more perfect; from the third, infinite things are actual together. A fourth is added, which proves that a possible thing which does not include imperfection is already shown to be in existence. – But if an essential order is denied, because an accidental order is sufficient for the sense, on the contrary: the proof is, a is being caused by something; a nature that can be produced in one supposit can be produced in any supposit; therefore, the reason it is now in this supposit is a reason it was before in that one and that one. No succession of things goes on continually save by virtue of something permanent; that permanent thing is no part of the succession; therefore besides the individual in the species doing the generating there is some other superior agent. – From this result I infer that that agent is the surpassing first thing, because an equivocal agent is more actual and independent and that on which the other things depend. It is the first end, because it is an end on account of which it per se acts,
Physics 25.196b17-22; not on account of any of the effects other than itself, because these are less good. Likewise, nothing else does it naturally or by reason most of all love. Fourth, it is the first thing that explains, because it is a per se agent; so either it acts for an end that it knows or for an end it is directed to by something that knows; also it knows everything that can be made, because it orders them to the end and wills them for the end.

Solution to the second question: there are not two eminent things. – Again, there are always as many essentials as there are coordinations, hence and thence and in different species, because they do not have one idea here and there, nor here to one and there to two first totalities.

Note the process of this solution, which is as follows: the first conclusion is that there is some first efficient thing; this conclusion is first proved in a confused way [n.43], second in a distinct way (through the three propositions [nn.53-55], the first of which is proved after five manners [n.53]), and two instances against it are ruled out [nn.44-46, 56]. The second conclusion is that the first thing cannot be caused [n.57]. The third conclusion: thus is the first thing actually existent [n.58]. Hence follow three similar conclusions about the first end [nn.60-62]. Hence three similar ones about the first eminent thing [nn.64-66]. Hence, that the first efficient cause is first in two other ways; two conclusions [nn.68-69]. Hence, that thus the first thing is one nature; which is shown in four ways, namely because it necessarily exists, because it is highest, because it is ultimate end, because it is the term of dependency [nn.70-73].

In the second principal article the preliminaries are first proved, and there are three conclusions [nn.75, 89, 98; a fourth conclusion in n.105]; hence, that the first thing has intelligence and will, by three reasons [nn.76-79]; hence that its understanding itself is the same as its essence [n.89]; hence, that no understanding is an accident of it, by four reasons [nn.98-101]. Hence is the principal intention proved, namely infinity; first, through efficient causality, by treatment of Aristotle’s reason in Physics 8.10.266a10-24, b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, [nn.111-124]; second, through actual knowledge of infinites [nn.125-127] and, in line with this, an argument about intuitive knowledge of an effect [nn.128-129]; third, through the idea of the end [n.130]; fourth, through the idea of preeminence [nn.131-139].

52. From these points the proposed conclusion is shown, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. – Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called a, the second b, and the third c.

53. Proof of the them.

First a, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first because a totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality. b Second because an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51], c which no philosopher has posited. – Next, third, because the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, Metaphysics 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. – Next, fourth, because the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because
anything such causes imperfectly, because dependent in causing on another cause. – Next, fifth, because an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection.\textsuperscript{4} But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and that nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is a made plain.

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a. [Interpolation] in essentially ordered causes, where the adversary posits an infinity of them, a second cause, insofar as it causes, depends on a first (from the first difference [n.49]). So if there were an infinity of causes such that not only any later cause but any cause at all depends on its own proximate prior cause, therefore etc.

b. [Interpolation] and this thing I call the first efficient cause. So if there are infinite causes, they still depend on some other cause that is not part of the totality.

c. [Interpolation, replacing the second argument in the text] if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes were to come together in the production of some effect, and if, from the third difference [n.51], all essentially ordered causes exist together, it follows that an infinite number of things exist together in causing this effect.

d. [Interpolation] because what includes no imperfection can be supposed to exist without imperfection among things.

54. Proof of b [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on it in causing; for it can cause when it does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deformity is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same idea;\textsuperscript{4} but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession.\textsuperscript{5} So b is plain.

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a. [Interpolation] and because no part of a succession can persist along with the whole succession, by the fact it would not be part of the succession.

b. [Interpolation] Everything therefore that depends on a cause accidentally ordered depends more essentially on a cause \textit{per se} and essentially ordered; rather, when an essential order is denied the accidental order will be denied, because accidents do not have an order save by means of something fixed and permanent, nor consequently are they multiplied to infinity.\textsuperscript{30}

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\textsuperscript{30} Tr. In other words, an infinite series of accidentally ordered causes must at least have an abiding matter underlying it, and this matter will underlie it as a \textit{per se} and essentially ordered cause.
55. There is proof too of c [n.52], namely that if an essential order be denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is because, since from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then that nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about the nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied by denying the essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to another nature.

56. To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43], I respond that one could argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but manifest. – However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this is true, ‘some nature is effective, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is because some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [Prior Analytics 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from things necessary. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But of that of which possibility is being proved now, actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion [n.58].

a. [Interpolation] when I say ‘some nature has been truly brought about, therefore something is the efficient cause’.

57. The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is because it is a non-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some non-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and something else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is non-effectible then it is un-causable, because it cannot have final, or material, or form cause. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is non-effectible then it cannot have final cause, is that a final cause only causes because the cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to causing its effect, for the entity of an end-ed thing does not in another way depend on itself as on something prior; but nothing is a cause per se save as the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. – Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is non-effectible then it does not have material or formal cause, are proved together, because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause states perfection without imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily states an imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the idea of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the idea of an intrinsic cause. Therefore when the prior is denied so is the posterior. – The same consequences are also proved because
intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, either in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. – From these statements the second conclusion is plain.

58. The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and is a nature truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. The proof of this: if that to whose idea it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the idea of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for a was set down [n.53], which proof seems less to conclude and yet it concludes this. But the other proofs for the a [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of a, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be of itself. But what is not by itself cannot be by itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. – This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is unacceptable.

59. Next to the three conclusions made clear about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary which contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else’s being prior, so to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as before [n.58]; for being un-causable is most of all included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.

60. Next to the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause.

Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].

61. The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof, because it cannot have an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is because every per se agent acts for an end, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no per se efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the per accidens be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting per accidens, which are chance and fortune, which according to Aristotle, Physics 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting per se as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect or deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is not any per se agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is not an end there is not any per se agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what can have an end is excelled by the end in goodness and consequently in perfection, – and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].
62. The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].

63. A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that it is impossible for there to be a prior, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].

64. To the three conclusions already posited about both orders of extrinsic causality, I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence.

Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because among essences there is an essential order, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways that are above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].

65. The second conclusion is that the supreme nature is uncausable. The proof is that it is unendable, from the preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is uneffectible and, further, therefore uncausable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about effective causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is uneffectible is proved because everything effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of b itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; now an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.

66. The third conclusion is that the supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].

67. Corollary: that there is some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; it is proved as is the corollary about the efficient cause and the end [nn.59, 63].

68. [Second partial article] – As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.\footnote{Cf. Averroes *Metaphysics* 10 com.7, 12 com.6: “the formal, final, and moving principles are not three in number, but one in subject and three in idea.”} The proof is because every efficient cause *per se* acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.\footnote{a. [Interpolation] For if it were to act *per se* for an end other than itself, then there would be something more noble than the first efficient cause, because an end which is something remote from the agent intending the end is more noble than it.}

69. Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is because the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is the most eminent.

70. [Third partial article] – As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are in too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion.

Now a preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is because it is through and through
uncausale, for there is a contradiction involved in something’s being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all; therefore it is altogether uncausale. From this I argue: nothing is able not to be unless something positively or privatively incompossible with it can be; but for that which is from itself and is through and through uncausale, there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively incompossible with it; therefore etc. The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively incompossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that incompossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if from itself and it is from itself, then two incompossible things will be at the same time, or neither of is, because each destroys the being of the other; if from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.

71. Further to the intended proposition, from this is proved the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons.

First in this way, because if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called a and b. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are,\(^a\) then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons \textit{per se} includes the other, each of the natures, taken separately, would be necessarily existent.\(^b\) But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither is included in necessary existence, because whatever entity is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.\(^c\)

\begin{itemize}
\item[a.] \textit{Interpolation} and, beside this, the two natures are formally necessary through that in which they agree.
\item[b.] \textit{Interpolation} through the other nature, and so there would be something necessarily existent through that which, when taken away, it would no less be necessarily existent \[n.177\].
\item[c.] \textit{Interpolation} because necessary existence includes nothing that is not necessarily existent or the reason for necessarily existing \[n.177\].
\end{itemize}

72. The second proof is because there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; so not two first effective things either. The proof of the antecedent is because species are related as numbers, \textit{Metaphysics} 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.

73. This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because two ultimate ends, if they existed, would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings would have no order to those, because not to their end either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another, because there being two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing is
impossible; for then something would be in some order a per se cause that, when not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. – There is also a general confirmation of this, because there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some same thing, because then that thing would be the term of a dependence that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore no two natures can be first the terms of other beings according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has this triple primacy.

B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

74. Having shown existence of the relative properties of the first being, I proceed further as follows to show the infinity of the first being and consequently the existence of an infinite being: first I show that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will such that its intelligence is of infinites distinctly and that its essence is representative of infinites (which essence indeed is its intelligence), and from this, secondly, will its infinity be concluded. And thus, along with the triple primacy already shown, there will be a fourfold means for showing its infinity. But yet as to the fourth means, namely that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will, from which, as from a means added to the other three, its infinity is proved, I make a certain assumption with respect to it until distinction 35 [Ord. I d.35 q. un. n.2].

1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

75. Now, that the first being has intelligence and will I argue thus: some agent is a per se first agent, because to every cause per accidens some cause per se is prior, Physics 2.6.198a8-9, where Aristotle means this of nature, about which it is less evident; but every agent per se acts for an end.

76. And from this there is a twofold argument. First as follows: every natural agent, precisely considered, would act of necessity and just as much if it were not to act for any other end but was acting independently; therefore if it does not act save for an end, this is because it depends on an agent that loves the end; of such a sort is the first efficient cause, therefore etc.

77. Again, if the first agent acts for an end, then that end moves the first efficient cause as loved by an act of will or as only naturally loved. If as loved by an act of will, the intended conclusion is gained. If only naturally loved, this is false, because it does not naturally love an end other than itself, in the way the heavy loves the center and matter loves form; for then it would in some way be in relation to an end because inclined to an end. But if it only naturally loves the end which is itself, this is nothing save itself being itself, for this does not preserve the doubleness of idea in itself.

78. Another argument, by as it were bringing together the reason already made, is as follows: the first efficient cause directs its effect to an end; therefore it directs either
naturally or by knowing and loving the end. Not naturally, because a non-knower directs nothing save in virtue of a knower; for it belongs first to the wise to order things, *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a17-18; but the first efficient cause directs in virtue of nothing else, just as neither does it cause in virtue of anything else, – for then it would not be first; therefore etc.

79. Again, something is contingently caused; therefore the first cause causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly.

80. Proof of the first consequence: any second cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first cause; therefore if the first cause moves necessarily, any other cause is moved necessarily and anything else is caused necessarily; therefore if some second cause moves contingently, the first cause too will move contingently, because the second cause, does not cause save in virtue of the first cause to the extent it is moved by it.

81. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of contingent operation save the will or something concomitant to will, because any other thing acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently; therefore etc.

82. There is objection against this reason, and first against the first consequence the argument is as follows, because our own willing could still cause something contingently, and so there is no requirement that the first cause contingently cause it.

83. Again, the Philosopher conceded the antecedent, namely that something is contingently caused, and he denied the consequent by understanding it of will, namely that the first cause causes contingently, by positing contingency in inferior things, not because God wills contingently, but as a result of motion, which causes necessarily insofar as it is uniform, but deformity, and so contingency, follows from its parts.

84. Against the second consequence, ‘if it causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly’: this does not seem to hold, because some of the things that are moved naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite can – contingently and violently – can come about.

85. To the first [n.82] one must say that if God is the first moving or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about it as about other things, because he either necessarily moves the will immediately or he moves another thing immediately and this other thing, having been necessarily moved, would necessarily move the will, because this other thing only moves from the fact that it is moved. The ultimate result is that what is proximate to the will would necessarily move the will, even if what is proximate to the will is the will itself; and so it will necessarily will, and it will be necessarily willing. And further the impossibility follows that he necessarily causes whatever is caused.

86. To the second [n.83] I say that I do not call the contingent here whatever is non-necessary or non-eternal, but something whose opposite might happen when that something happens; therefore I said ‘something is contingently caused’ [n.79], and not ‘something is contingent’. Now I say that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent by saving the antecedent through recourse to motion [n.83], because if that whole motion is from its cause necessarily, any part at all of it is necessarily caused when it is caused, that is, it is caused inevitably, so that the opposite cannot then be caused; and further, what is caused by any part of the motion is caused necessarily and unavoidably. Either therefore nothing happens contingently, that is avoidably, or the first thing causes immediately in such a way that it could also not cause.
87. To the third [n.84] I say that if some cause can impede it, this is only in virtue of a superior cause, and so on up to the first cause, and if the first cause necessarily moves the cause immediate to itself, there will be necessity up to the last one; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can naturally cause.\textsuperscript{a}

\textsuperscript{a} [Interpolation] and that just as the first cause does everything by necessity of causality (as everyone supposes, for otherwise it would be a changeable cause), so also do all other causes. – These things that he [i.e. Scotus] says do not seem to be true, because one could use the same reasoning to argue that nothing exists by chance or fortune in caused things unless the first cause acts by chance or fortune, and that just as everything happens determinately in respect of the first cause so also in respect of other causes. Therefore one could reply to what he says, that causes moved by the first mover do not receive motion in a uniform way so that of necessity they secondarily move as they are moved by the first cause, such that the ‘as’ state the manner on the part of God who makes them move; for they are indeed moved as they are moved by the first cause if the ‘as’ state the manner on the part of the causes that are moved. For the manner of the moving cause is not always received in the moved cause, but the motion in the latter is received according to the mode of the receiver; therefore motion exists in it in a way other than it does in the first cause.

88. Thus therefore it seems to have been shown in a triple way that the first agent has intelligence and will, the first of which ways is that nature acts for an end and only because it is dependent and directed to the end by a knower [n.76]; the second is that the first agent itself for an end [nn.77-78], and the third that some effect comes about contingently when it is caused [nn.79-87].

89. Further, as to the question preliminary to infinity, I prove second that its understanding and will are the same as its essence, and first of the volition of itself as of an object such that to love the first cause is essentially the same as the nature of the cause and of every act of its will.

Proof. The causality and causation of the final cause is simply first, according to Avicenna \textit{Metaphysics} 6 ch.5 (95rb), who says that “if there were knowledge about any cause whatever, knowledge about the final cause would be noblest;” for this cause, as concerns its causality, precedes the efficient cause, because it moves the efficient cause to act, – and therefore the causality of the first cause and the causation of it is, according to any causation in any genus of cause, through and through uncausable. But the causality of the first end is to move the efficient cause as a thing loved; but it is the same thing for the first end to move the first efficient cause as a thing loved by it and for the first efficient cause to love the first end, because for an object to be loved by the will is nothing other than for the will to love the object. Therefore that the first efficient cause loves the first end is through and through uncausable, and so is necessary of itself, and so it will be the same as the first nature. And there is as it were a conversion of the reasoning from the opposite of the conclusion, because if the first loving is other than the first nature, then it is causable, and consequently effectible; therefore it is from some \textit{per se} efficient cause which loves the end. Therefore the first loving would be caused by some love of the end prior to this caused first loving, which is impossible.

90. Aristotle shows this fact about intelligence, \textit{Metaphysics} 12.9.1074b17-21, because otherwise the first thing will not be the best substance, for it is through understanding that it is honorable.
91. Second, because otherwise its continuance will be laborious for it. Again, if it is not that [sc. the same as its essence], it will be in potency of contradiction to it; on that nature labor follows, according to him. ⁴²

92. These reasons can be made clear by reason.

The first [n.90] thus: since the ultimate perfection of every being in first act exists in the second act whereby it is conjoined to what is best, especially if the best acts and does not merely make (for every intelligible is active, and the first nature is intelligible, from the premise [nn.75-88]), the consequence is that its ultimate perfection will be in second act; therefore if this act is not the substance of it, its substance is not best, because its best is something else.

93. The second reason [n.91] can be made clear thus: a potency merely receptive is a potency of contradiction; therefore since it is not of this sort, therefore etc. – But because according to Aristotle this reason is not demonstrative but only probable, let the intended proposition be shown in another way, from the identity of the power and of the object in itself; therefore they will have the same act. But the consequence, plainly, is not valid; an instance is that an angel understands itself and loves itself and yet an angel’s act of loving and of understanding are not the same as its substance.

94. This conclusion, namely that the divine essence is the same as its willing itself, is true from corollaries: for it follows first that that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing exists only in the will; therefore the will whose willing is uncausable is also uncausable; therefore etc. And likewise, willing is understood to be as it were posterior to the will; yet willing is the same as that nature; therefore the will more so.

95. Again, second, it follows that understanding itself is the same as that nature, because nothing is loved unless it is known; therefore if loving itself is necessarily existent from itself, the consequence is that understanding itself is necessarily existent from itself.

96. And if understanding is closer to that nature than willing, then the consequence further is that the intellect is the same as that nature, as was just argued about the will from willing [n.94].

97. There is a fourth consequence too, that the idea of understanding itself is the same as itself, because it necessarily exists of itself if understanding necessarily exist of itself and the idea of understanding itself is as it were pre-understood to the intellect.

98. Having shown of self-understanding and self-willing that they are the same as the essence of the first being, I show from other things the proposition intended, namely about all its understanding and willing.

And let the third conclusion be this: no understanding can be an accident of the first nature. The proof is because it has been shown of the first nature that it is in itself the first effective thing [nn.43-56]; therefore it has from itself the resources whence, after everything else has been removed, it could cause anything causable, at least as first cause of the causable. But with its knowledge removed it does not have the resources whence it could cause the causable; therefore knowledge of anything else whatever is not other than its nature. – The proof of the assumption is because nothing can cause except from love of the end, by willing it, because it cannot otherwise be a per se agent, because neither can it act, for an end; as it is, however, there is pre-understood to its willing of anything.

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⁴² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b28-29: “If [the first mover] is not intelligence but potentiality, the continuing of its understanding will reasonably be laborious for it.”
for the end its understanding of it; therefore before the first moment in which it is understood to be causing or willing \( a \), necessarily it is pre-understood to be understanding \( a \); so without this it cannot \textit{per se} bring \( a \) about, and so in the case of other things.

99. Again, the same thing is proved because all understandings of the same intellect have a like relation to the intellect, according to their essential identity or accidental identity (as is clear of every created intellect and its understandings), because they seem to be perfections of the same genus; therefore if some of them have a subject receptive of them, then all of them do, and if one of them is an accident each of them also is. But some cannot be an accident in the first thing, from the preceding conclusion [n.89], because there cannot be a non-understanding of itself; therefore none of them will there be an accident.

100. Again, understanding, if it is what can be an accident, will be received in the intellect as in a subject; therefore also in the understanding which is the same as the intellect, and thus a more perfect understanding will be in receptive potency in respect of a more imperfect understanding.

101. Again, the same understanding can be about setting several objects in order, therefore the more perfect it is the more the objects; therefore the most perfect understanding, with which a more perfect degree of being understood is incompossible, will be the same as the understanding of all objects. The understanding of the first thing is most perfect in this way; therefore it is the same as all intelligible objects, and that which is of itself is the same as itself, from what has just preceded [n.89]; therefore the understanding of all things is the same. And I intend the same conclusion to be understood about willing.

102. Again, this intellect is nothing but a certain understanding; but this intellect is the same for all things, and so is what cannot be of any other object; therefore neither can it understand another thing. Therefore there is the intellect for all things. – It is the fallacy of the accident to conclude from the identity of certain things among themselves to their identity with respect to a third thing with respect to which they are extraneous; and it is plain from a similitude: to understand is the same as to will; ‘if therefore to understand itself belongs to something, then willing too belongs to the same thing’, does not follow, but it only follows because it is a willing; which willing indeed is something that belongs to the same thing, because one must so understand ‘of the same thing’ that the inference can be drawn in a divided, not a conjoined, manner, on account of an accident.

103. Again, the intellect of the first thing has one act that is adequate to itself and coeternal, because understanding itself is the same as itself; therefore it cannot have any other understanding. – The consequence is not valid. An example about the blessed who at the same time see God and something else even if they see God according to the utmost of their capacity, as is posited about the soul of Christ, and still it can see something else.

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33 The point seems to be that one cannot conclude from identity of intellect in respect of all things to its identity with its act of understanding all things.

34 The point seems to be that one cannot infer from identity of understanding and will to identity of objects understood and willed, for objects are logically extraneous to acts, and so to infer identity of the first from an identity of the second is to commit the fallacy of the accident.
104. Again an argument: this intellect has in itself through identity the greatest perfection of understanding; therefore it has every other understanding. – Response: this does not follow, because an understanding that is lesser can be causable and therefore can differ from the uncausable, but the greatest understanding cannot.

105. The fourth principal conclusion about the intellect and the will of God is this: the intellect of the first thing understands always and with a distinct and necessary act any intelligible thing naturally before that thing exists in itself.

106. The proof of the first part is because the first thing can know what is thus intelligible; for this belongs to perfection in the intellect, being able distinctly and actually to know any intelligible thing; rather, to posit this is necessary for the idea of intellect, because every intellect is of the whole of being taken in the most common way, as will be determined d.3 [I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.3, 8-12, 24]. But the intellect of the first thing can only have an understanding the same as itself, from what was just said [n.98]; therefore it has actual and distinct understanding of any intelligible whatever, and this the same as itself and so always and necessarily.

107. The second part, about priority, is proved thus, that whatever is the same as itself is necessarily existent, as was plain above [n.106]; but the being of things other than itself is non-necessarily existent. Necessary existence is of itself prior in nature to everything non-necessary.

108. It is proved in another way, that the existence of anything else depends on the first thing as on a cause and, as a cause is of something causable, knowledge of the causable on the part of the cause is necessarily included; therefore the knowledge will be naturally prior to the very existence of the known thing.

109. The first part of the conclusion is also proved in another way, because a perfect artisan distinctly knows everything to be done before it is done, otherwise he would not operate perfectly, because knowledge is the measure by which he operates; therefore God is in possession of distinct and actual knowledge, or at any rate habitual knowledge, of all things producible by him prior to those things.

110. Against this: there is an instance about art, that universal art suffices for producing universal things [Scotus, Metaphysics I q.5 nn.3-4, VII p.2 q.15 n.1] – Look there for a response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9]. response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9].

2. The infinity of God is proved directly

111. Having shown these preliminaries I argue for infinity in four ways.

[First way] – First by way of efficacy, where the intended proposition will be shown in a twofold way: first because it is the first efficient cause of all things, second because it, to wit the efficient cause, knows distinctly all make-able things. Third, infinity will be shown by way of end, and fourth by way of eminence.

The first way, on the part of the cause, is touched on by the Philosopher, Physics 8.10.266a10-24, 266b6-20, 267b17-26 and Metaphysics 12.7.1073a3-13, because it moves with an infinite motion; therefore it has an infinite power.

112. This reason is strengthened as to the antecedent as follows: the intended proposition is proved just as much if it can move through the infinite as if it were to move through the infinite, because it must be as equally in act as its power is; the thing is clear of the first thing to the extent it exists of itself [n.58]. Although therefore it not move with
an infinite motion in the way Aristotle understands, yet if this antecedent be taken that, as far as it is of itself, it can move, a true antecedent is had and one equally sufficient for inferring the intended proposition.

113. The consequence [n.111] is proved thus, because if it is of itself, it moves with an infinite motion not by virtue of another; therefore it does not receive its moving thus from another, but it has in its own active virtue its whole effect all at once, because it has it independently. But what has in its virtue an infinite effect all at once is infinite; therefore etc.

114. The first consequence [n.111] is strengthened in another way as follows: the first mover has all at once in its virtue all the effects that can be produced by motion; but those effects are infinite if the motion is infinite; therefore etc.

115. Against these declarations of Aristotle, whatever may be true of the antecedent, yet the first consequence does not seem well proved.

Not in the first way [n.113], because a greater duration adds nothing of perfection, for a whiteness that persists for one year is not more perfect than if it persisted for only one day; therefore a motion of however long a duration is not a more perfect effect than the motion of one day. Therefore from the fact that the agent has all at once in its active virtue a moving with an infinite motion, a greater perfection is not proved here than in there, save that the agent moves for a longer time, and of itself; and so one would need to show that the eternity of the agent would prove its infinity, otherwise it could not be proved from the infinity of its motion. – Then as to the form of the argument: the final proposition of the confirmation [n.113] is denied, save of infinity of duration.a

116. The second confirmation [n.114] of the consequence is also refuted, because a greater intensive perfection is not proved by the fact that any agent of the same species can go on producing successively as many times as long as it lasts, because what has power for one such thing in one time has power by the same virtue for a thousand such things if it last a thousand times. And, among philosophers, an infinity is not possible save a numerical one of effects producible by motion (namely of things that can come to be and pass away), because in species they posited a finitude. Therefore an intensive infinity in an agent no more follows from the fact that it has power for an infinite number of things in succession than if it has power for two things only; for only a numerical infinity is possible according to philosophers. – But if someone prove a infinity of species possible, by proving some of the heavenly motions to be incommensurable and so never able to return to uniformity, even if they were to endure an infinite time and even if conjunctions infinite in species were to cause generable things infinite in species, whatever may be about this in itself, yet it is nothing to the intention of the philosopher, who denied an infinity of species.

117. The last probability that occurs for making clear the consequence of the Philosopher is this: whatever has power for some many things at once, any one of which requires some perfection proper to itself, is shown by the plurality of such things to be more perfect. Thus it seems one should conclude about the first agent that if it could

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a. [Interpolation] Let us inquire, therefore, how the aforesaid reasoning of the Philosopher [n.111] is conclusive! If the way of efficient causality is stronger than the other ways (the point is plain above where the ways are compared, because this way entails the others [n.111]), if by it infinity is not proved, how will it proved by the other ways?
cause infinite things all at once, that its virtue would be infinite, and consequently that if the first agent has all at once the virtue to cause infinite things, then, as far depends on itself, it could produce them all at once; although the nature of the effect does not permit it, yet the infinity of the thing’s virtue follows. The proof of this ultimate consequence is because what cannot cause a white and a black thing is not less perfect, because they are not simultaneously causable; for this non-simultaneity comes from a repugnance in them and not from a defect in the agent.

118. And from this I prove infinity as follows: if the first thing had all causality formally at the same time, although the causable things could not be put into being all at once, it would be infinite, because, as far as depends on itself, it could produce infinite things all at once; and having power for several things at once proves a greater power intensively; therefore if it has this power more perfectly than if it had all causality formally, its intensive infinity follows all the more. But it does have all the causality of anything whatever as to the whole of what exists in reality itself more eminently than if it existed formally.

119. Although, therefore, I believe that omnipotence properly speaking, according to the intention of theologians, is a matter of belief only and cannot be proved by natural reason, as will be said in I d.42 [q. un. nn.2-3; below n.178], nevertheless an infinite potency can be naturally proved that at once, as far as depends on itself, has all the causality that would be at once capable of infinite things, if they were makeable at once.

120. If you object, the first thing does not of itself have power for infinite things all at once, because it has not been proved to be the total cause of infinite things, this puts nothing in the way, because if it had all at once that whereby it was the total cause, it would be nothing more perfect than it is now when it has that whereby it is first cause. – Also because the second causes are not required because of perfection in causing, because then what is more removed from the first cause would be more perfect, because it would require a more perfect cause. But if second causes are, according to the philosophers, required together with the first cause, this is because of the imperfection of the effect, so that the first thing along with some imperfect cause could cause an imperfect thing, which according to them it could not cause immediately. – Also because, according to Aristotle [Metaphysics 5.16.1021b31-32, 12.7.1072b28-34], the totality of perfections is more eminent in the first thing than if their formalities themselves were present in it, if they could be present in it; the proof of which is because a second cause proximate to the first cause has the whole of its causative perfection from the first cause alone; therefore the first cause has that whole perfection more eminently than the second cause that has it formally. The consequence is plain, because the first cause is the total and equivocal cause with respect to the second cause [n.69]. One may ask a similar
question of the third cause with respect to the second cause or with respect to the first; if with respect to the first [sc. that the third has its whole causative perfection from the first cause], the proposition intended is gained; if with respect to the second, it follows that the second contains eminently the total perfection which is formally in the third. But the second has from the first that it thus contains the perfection of the third, from what has just been shown above [n.120]; therefore the first has to contain more eminently the perfection of the third than the second does, and so on in all other cases right up to the last cause. Wherefore that the first cause possesses eminently the whole causative perfection of all the causes, and possesses it more perfectly than if it had the causality of all of them formally, were that possible, seems in my judgment capable of being proved by the argument of Aristotle posited above [n.111] about the infinite substance, which is taken from the Physics and Metaphysics.\(^b\)

a. [Interpolation] although it have all the causality of the second cause more eminently than this causality exists in the second cause, yet it does not, of itself, have power for the effects of all the second causes, because through that more eminent way of possessing causality it is not clear that without the second causes it can be the total and immediate cause of all the effects, and so the minor premise is not gained, that the first cause has of itself power for infinite effects.

b. [Interpolation] In addition to the proof just stated, which deduces the infinite virtue of the first thing from the infinity of effects that that first thing, as far as depends on itself, is at the same time capable of, one can take a similar proof from the infinity of causes as follows: if the first thing were able to possess formally in itself all the secondary causalities along with the first causality, it would, as far as depends on itself, be of infinite virtue in some way; therefore much more will it be infinite if it has more eminently than formally all those secondary causalities.

But a reply can be made to these two proofs of Aristotle of the consequence:

As to the first I concede that when any one of several things requires some proper formal or at least virtual perfection in its cause, a cause that is capable of more things is more perfect than what is capable of fewer \(^{[n.117]}\), because at the very least more formal perfections that would be proper to those more would be contained virtually in such a cause; only what possesses more formal perfections virtually is infinite in perfection. But whether the cause is at once or successively capable of several things none of which requires a proper formal or virtual perfection in that cause, one cannot from those more deduce a greater perfection. Such is what the philosophers would say in the proposed case, because the infinite number of things that the first thing is capable of, as far as concerns itself, would only posit an infinity of things in number but a finitude of things in specific natures \(^{[n.116]}\); as it is, however, only a distinction of specific nature in the effect, and not a distinction of number, requires some other formal or virtual perfection in the cause.

From this there is a response to the second proof, because second causes are not infinite in species according to Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2.994a1-2; therefore what has virtue for all those causes is not proved by this alone to be infinite in intensity.

Against the first response: what is capable at the same time of more things is more powerful than what is capable of fewer things, whether these things are of different species or of the same species; therefore what is of itself capable at the same time of an infinity of things is infinite and possessed of infinite power.

Against the second response: if all the second causalities existed formally in the first cause, there would be some virtual infinity, at least in extent, in that first cause; therefore if they exist in it more eminently, it will have some infinity in it. But not an infinity in extent, because eminence, on account of which the secondary causalities are unitive, takes away extensive infinity; therefore there will be some infinity there other than extensive; therefore an intensive infinity.
To the first counter-argument [sc. against the first response]: one should deny the antecedent and say that simultaneity does nothing to prove greater power; the case is like this fire which, if there were an infinite number of bodies in due proximity spherically surrounding it, would act on them all at the same time just as it acts now on the finite parts of the body spherically surrounding it.

To the second counter-argument [sc. against the second response]: it would follow from that that the sun, rather any perpetual cause capable of an infinite number of effects in succession, would be infinite. Therefore the reasoning, although it seem probable, is nevertheless sophistical, because the proposition on which the reasoning rests seems false in itself, namely this: ‘all things that posit in themselves an extensive infinity posit, so as to be possessed more eminently, some virtual infinity’. This proposition is false, because they can be possessed more eminently in a finite equivocal cause; nor can it be proved by this proposition, because when things are lacking in all infinity, they are lacking in eminence with respect to their infinite effects; for this proposition is false, because eminence produces unity and so takes away the material extensive infinity that was there; yet neither does it posit an intensive formal infinity, because a finite formality sufficiently contains eminently a material and extensive infinity.

121. According to this way of efficacy there is an argument\(^{35}\) that it has infinite power because it creates, for\(^a\) between the extremes in the case of creation [sc. the extremes of creator and created] there is an infinite distance.\(^b\) But this antecedent is set down only as something believed [n.119], and it is true that\(^c\) not-being would in duration as it were precede being,\(^d\) not however in nature as it were, after the way of Avicenna.\(^{36}\) – The antecedent is shown\(^e\) by the fact that at least the first nature after God is from him and not from itself, nor does it receive being on the presupposition of anything else; therefore it is created.\(^f\) But if one takes being and not-being as in this way prior in nature, then they are in that case not extremes of a change which that virtue would cause, nor does its being effected require its being changed.

a. [Interpolation] a virtue that has power over extremes infinitely distant is infinite; but divine virtue is of this sort in creation.

b. [Interpolation] just as there is between something and nothing.

c. [Interpolation] [it is true] about creation in the real order, namely such that…

d. [Interpolation] the real being of the creature’s existence

e. [Interpolation, after ‘not however’]: it is [not however] less believed about creation in the order of nature in which being follows not-being, the way Avicenna speaks of creation in Metaphysics 6 [quoted in previous footnote], but it has been sufficiently demonstrated [Reportatio IA d.2 n.59].

f. [Interpolation] For if it is the first efficient cause, then anything else other than it has its whole being from it, because otherwise that other thing would, in respect of some part of

\(^{35}\) The argument is found in St. Thomas Aquinas, ST Ia q.45 a.5 ad 3, and also in Henry of Ghent.

\(^{36}\) Metaphysics 6 ch.2 (92ra): “Creation...is the giving of being to a thing after its absolute non-being; for a caused thing as far as concerns itself is that it not exist, but as far as concerns its cause existence belongs to it. But what belongs to a thing of itself in the intellect is prior in essence, not in time, because it belongs to it from something other than itself; therefore every created thing is a being after non-being by posterity of essence.”
itself, not depend on it, and then it would not be the first efficient cause; but what thus takes its whole being from something, such that it receives by its nature being after not-being, is created; therefore etc.

But whatever be true of the antecedent, the consequence is not proved, because when there is no distance intermediate between the extremes but the extremes are said to be distant precisely by reason of being extremes between each other, then there is as much distance as there is an extreme is greater. An example: God is infinitely distant from the creature, even than the highest possible creature, not because of any distance between the extremes but because of the infinity of one extreme.

a. [Interpolation] as in the case of the continuous, whose extremes are two points [n.60].

122. It is in this way, then, that contradictories are not separate by any intermediates, because contradictories are immediate [Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a12-13] – such that however little something recedes from one extreme it is at once under the other extreme – but they are distant because of the extremes in themselves. Therefore this distance is as great as the extreme which is more perfect; it is finite; therefore etc.

123. There is a confirmation, because the total power over the positive term of a distance of this sort is power over the distance or the transition from extreme to extreme; therefore, from power over this transition infinity does not follow unless it follow from total power over its positive term. That term is finite.

a. [Interpolation] Therefore power over transition to this term does not demonstratively prove an active infinite virtue.

124. Now as for what is commonly said, that contradictories are infinitely distant, it can be understood thus, that is, indeterminately, because just as there is no distance so small that it does not suffice for contradictories, so there is no distance so great that, even if it were greater than the greatest possible, it would not extend itself to the contradictories. Their distance then is infinite, that is, indeterminate as to any distance, great or small; and therefore from such an infinity of distance the consequent about an infinite power intensively does not follow, just as neither does it follow on the smallest distance in which an infinite distance is thus preserved; and what does not follow on the antecedent does not follow on the consequent either.

a. [Interpolation] Contradiction therefore is the greatest distance and opposition, but by way of privation and indeterminately; contrariety however is the greatest distance positively, as is plain from Metaphysics 10.4.1055a9-10, 38-b4.

125. [The second way] – Having shown the intended proposition by way of the first efficient cause because the first efficient cause implies infinity, the second way follows, from the fact that it distinctly understands all make-able things. Here I argue as follows: intelligibles are infinite, and this actually, in an intellect that understands

37 Some mss. say ‘infinite’, but see the following paragraphs.
everything; therefore the intellect that understands them actually all at once is infinite. Of this sort is the intellect of the first thing.

126. Of this sort of enthymeme I prove the antecedent and the consequent.

As to all things that are infinite in potency, such that in taking one after another no end can be reached, if all those things are actual at once, they are actually infinite; intelligibles are of this sort with respect to a created intellect, as is plain, and in the divine intellect all things are at once understood actually that are understood successively by a created intellect; therefore an infinity of things is in the divine intellect actually understood. Of this sort of syllogism I prove the major (although it seems sufficiently evident), because all such things that can be taken [one after another] are, when they are simultaneously existent, either actually finite or actually infinite; if they are actually finite, then by taking one after another one can in the end actually take them all; therefore if they cannot all be actually taken, then if such things are actually simultaneous, they are actually infinite.

127. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.125] I prove thus, because where plurality requires or implies a greater perfection than fewness does, there a numerical infinite implies infinite perfection. An example: being able to carry ten things requires a greater perfection of moving virtue than being able to carry five; therefore being able to carry an infinite number of things implies an infinite moving virtue. Therefore, in the matter at hand, since to understand $a$ is a perfection and to understand $b$ is similarly a perfection, never is there the same understanding of the $a$ and $b$ and equally distinctly as two understandings would be, unless the perfections of the two understandings are included eminently in the one, and so on about three understandings, and further about an infinite number.a It might also be argued in a like way about the idea itself of understanding as has been argued about the intellect and act, because a greater perfection in an act of understanding is inferred from the plurality of the things of which there is an idea of understanding them distinctly, because it is necessary that it include eminently the perfections of all the proper operations of understanding, each of which, according to its proper idea, posits some perfection; therefore infinite operations imply infinite perfection.

a. [Interpolation] Response: numerical difference does not imply any other perfection.

128. Second, following on this way about the understanding of the first thing I show the thing proposed thus: a first cause to which, in accord with the utmost of its causality, a second cause adds something of perfection in causing, does not seem able on its own to cause as perfect an effect as it can cause along with the second, because the causality of the first cause alone is lessened in respect of the causality of both; therefore if that which is naturally from the second cause and from the first together be much more perfectly from the first alone, the second cause adds nothing of perfection to the first; but every finite thing adds some perfection to a finite thing; therefore such first cause is infinite.

129. To the matter at hand: the knowledge of a thing is naturally generated by that thing as from the proximate cause, and especially the knowledge which is vision or intuitive understanding; therefore if that knowledge is in any intellect, without any action of such an object, merely by virtue of another prior object which is of a nature to be a superior cause with respect to such knowledge, the result is that that superior object is infinite in knowability, because an inferior object adds nothing in knowability to it; such
a superior object is the first nature, because from the mere presence of it in the intellect of the first thing, without any other objection accompanying it, there is in the intellect of the first thing knowledge of any object whatever. Therefore no other intelligible adds anything to it in knowability; therefore it is infinite in knowability. Thus therefore is it in entity, because as each thing is related to existence so is it to knowability, from Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31.

130. [Third way] – Again in the third way, namely on the part of the end [n.111], the argument is as follows: our will can desire and love, as the intellect can understand, some other thing greater than any finite thing; and it seems that the inclination to loving an infinite good supremely is more natural, for thence is argued a natural inclination in the will to something, because free will of itself, without a habit, promptly and with delight wants it; thus does it seem that we experience an infinite good in an act of loving, nay it does not seem that the will perfectly rests in anything else. And how would it not naturally hate that thing if it were the opposite of its object, just as it naturally hates not-being (according to Augustine On Free Choice of the Will 3 ch.6 n.18, ch.8 n.23)? It also seems that, if the infinite were repugnant to good, the will would, under the idea of the infinite, in no way rest in good, nor would it easily tend to it, just as neither to what is repugnant to its object. This reason will be confirmed in the next way [n.136], about the intellect.

131. [The fourth way] – Again, fourth, the intended proposition is shown by way of eminence [n.111], and I argue thus: it is incompossible with the most eminent thing that something else be more perfect, as is plain before [n.67]; but it is not incompossible to a finite thing that there be something more perfect; wherefore etc.

132. The proof of the minor is because an infinite thing is not repugnant to being; but the infinite is greater than everything finite. There is another way of arguing for this and it is the same: that to which it is not repugnant to be intensively infinite is not supremely perfect unless it is infinite, because if it is finite it can be exceeded or excelled, because to be infinite is not repugnant to it; to being infinity is not repugnant; therefore the most perfect being is infinite. The minor here, which is accepted in the preceding argument, does not seem capable of being shown a priori, because as contradictories contradict by their proper ideas and as this fact cannot be proved by anything more manifest, so non-repugnant things are non-repugnant by their proper ideas and it does not seem possible for this to be shown save by explaining their ideas. Being is not explained by anything more known, the infinite we understand through the finite (I explain this in vulgar manner thus: the infinite is that which no given finite thing exceeds precisely by any finite relation, but it exceeds still any such assignable relation).

133. In this way, however, is the intended proposition proved: just as anything whose impossibility is not apparent must be posited as possible, so also must that whose incompossibility is not apparent be set down as compossible; here no incompossibility is apparent, because finitude is not of the idea of being, nor does it appear from the idea of being that finitude is a property convertible with being. One or other of these is required for the aforesaid repugnance; for the properties that belong to the first being, and are convertible with it, seem sufficiently known to be present in it.
134. Again there is proof thus: the infinite is not in its mode repugnant to quantity, that is, by taking part after part; therefore neither is the infinite in its mode repugnant to being, that is, by existing in perfection all at once.

135. Again, if quantity of virtue is simply more perfect than quantity of bulk, why will an infinite be possible in bulk and not in virtue? But if it is possible, it is actual, as is plain from the third conclusion above, about effective primacy [n.58], and it will also be proved below [n.138].

136. Again, because the intellect, whose object is being, finds no repugnance in understanding something infinite, rather the infinite seems to be the most perfect intelligible. Now it is remarkable if to no intellect is a contradiction of this sort about its first object made plain although discord in sound so easily offends hearing; for if the disagreeable offends as soon as it is perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee from an intelligible infinite as from something not agreeable that thus destroys its first object?

137. Hereby can be colored the reasoning of Anselm about the highest thinkable good in the Proslogion, [nn.11, 35], and his description must be understood in this way:

- a. [Interpolation, in place of what follows in the text] There is a supreme thinkable; the supreme thinkable is infinite; therefore there is an infinite. Proof of the major: a supreme thinkable can be thought to exist in reality, and it cannot be thought to exist from another; therefore from itself; therefore it is from itself. Therefore, that a greater than all that exists only in the intellect can be thought that exists in reality must be understood not to be about the same thing [n.138]; but because the merely thinkable is merely possible, something of itself necessary is greater than every possible. – Alternatively, the highest thinkable is intuitable; not in another; therefore in itself [n.139].

- b. [Interpolation] hence, that man is irrational is unthinkable. Hence, just as in reality nothing exists unless it be simple or composed of potency and act, so in concepts; but contradictories make nothing that is one, whether simple or complex.

138. The aforesaid highest thinkable without contradiction can exist in reality. This is proved first about quidditative being, because in such a thinkable supremely the intellect rests; therefore in that thinkable is the idea of the first object of the intellect, namely the idea of being, and this in the highest degree. – And then the further argument is made that it exists, speaking of the being of existence: the supremely thinkable is not in the thinking intellect only, because then it could exist (because it is a possible thinkable) and could not exist (because existing by some cause is repugnant to its idea), as was clear before in the second conclusion [n.57] about the way of efficacy; therefore what

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38 Tr. A fallacy of equivocation over the term ‘possible’ seems to lurk in Scotus’ reasoning here. The existence of an infinite being is possible intrinsically because its idea involves no contradiction (unlike, say, a round square, which does involve contradiction); but if it does not in fact exist its existence is not possible extrinsically, because nothing extrinsic could make it to exist. Yet such a non-existent infinite being, although it could never in fact exist, would still, in its idea, contain no contradiction (unlike square circle). So there is no problem in supposing that an infinite being is both able and not able to exist since the ‘able’ in each case is different.
exists in reality is a greater thinkable than what exists in the intellect only. But this is not to be so understood that the same thing, if it is thought on, is thereby a greater thinkable if it exist, but rather that anything which exists is greater than everything which is in the intellect only.

139. Or it [Anselm’s reasoning] is colored in another way thus: what exists is a greater thinkable; that is, it is more perfectly thinkable because visible or intelligible to intuitive intellection; when it does not exist, whether in itself or in something nobler to which it adds nothing, it is not visible. But what is visible is more perfectly thinkable than what is not visible but intelligible only in the abstract; therefore the most perfect thinkable exists. – The difference between intuitive and abstract intellection, and how the intuitive is more perfect, will be touched on later [I d.3 p.1 q.1-2 nn.29, 11, 18-19; q.3 nn.24, 10, 28], and elsewhere when there will be place for it [e.g. n.394 below, d.1 n.35 above].

140. Finally the intended proposition is shown from negation of an extrinsic cause, because form is limited [or: made finite] through matter; therefore what is not of a nature to be in matter is infinite. c 39

a. [Interpolation] matter is limited by form as potency by act and by the perfection and formal existence of it, and conversely.

b. [Interpolation] as act by potency; form...

c. [Interpolation] of which sort is God.

141. This reasoning is not valid, because according to them an angel is immaterial; therefore it is in nature infinite. – Nor can they say that the existence of an angel limits its essence, because according to them existence is an accident of essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence in itself, as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite, and consequently it will, in the second moment of nature, not be limitable by existence.

142. I respond briefly to the argument, for any being has intrinsic to it a grade of its own perfection, in which grade it is finite if it is finite and in which it is infinite if it can be infinite, and not by any accident to it.

143. There is also an argument ‘if form is limited in relation to matter, then if it is not in relation to matter it is not limited’; it is the fallacy of the consequent, 40 just like ‘body is limited in relation to body, therefore if it is not in relation to body it will be infinite’; ‘therefore the furthest heaven will be actually infinite’. The sophism is the one in Physics 3.4.203b20-22, that just as body is limited first in itself, a so a finite form is finite first in itself before it is limited in relation to matter, because of such a sort is nature in beings, that it is limited, that is, before it is united to matter, for a second finitude presupposes a first and does not cause it. Therefore in some moment of nature it will be finite in essence, therefore not made finite by existence; therefore it is not, in a second moment, made finite by existence.

39 This reasoning seems to be taken from St. Thomas Aquinas.

40 The phrase ‘form is limited in relation to matter’ is really equivalent to ‘if form is in relation to matter it is limited’, so to argue ‘but some form is not in relation to matter, therefore it is not limited’ is to argue from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent, which is a fallacy.
144. I assert briefly one proposition, that any absolute essence finite in itself is finite as pre-understood to every comparison of itself to another essence.

145. [Epilogue] – From what has been said the solution to the question is plain. For from the first article [nn.41-73] one gets that some existent being is simply first with a triple primacy, namely of efficacy, of end, and of eminence [nn.42-58, 60-61, 64-66], and so simply that it is incompossible that there is something prior [nn.59, 63, 67]. And herein is existence proved of God as to the properties of God in respect of creatures, or insofar as he determines the dependence of the relation of creatures to himself [n.39].

146. From the second article [nn.74-144] one gets in a fourfold way that the first thing is infinite: namely first because it is the first efficient thing [nn.111-120], second because it is the first knower of all make-able things (the second way [nn.125-127] contains four conclusions about the intelligibility of the first thing [nn.75-110]), third because it is the ultimate end [n.130], fourth because it is eminent [n.131-136]. According to the first way there is excluded a certain useless way about creation [nn.121-124], according to the second another way is touched on about the perfection and intelligibility of the first object [nn.128-129], according to the fourth exposition is given of the argument of Anselm in Proslogion, ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [nn.137-139, 11, 35]; lastly there is excluded a useless way inferring infinity from immateriality [nn.140-144].

147. From the premised conclusions, proved and shown, the argument to the question goes as follows: some being triply first among beings exists in act [nn.41-73, 145]; and that triply first thing is infinite [nn.111-141, 146]; therefore some infinite real being exists in act [n.1]. And it is the most perfect conceivable, and the most perfect, absolute concept that we can naturally have about God, that he is infinite, as will be said in I d.3 [p.1 qq.1-2 n.17].

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

148. To the arguments of this question.
To the first [n.1] I say that an infinite cause, active by necessity of nature, does not suffer anything contrary to it, whether something be contrary to it formally, that is, according as something agrees with it essentially, or virtually, that is, according to the
idea of its effect which it virtually includes. For in each way it would impede whatever was incompossible with its effect, as was argued before [n.3].

a. [Interpolation] God acts freely and voluntarily with respect to everything that is extrinsic to himself.

149. On the contrary: is it really the case that the philosophers, when positing that God acts from necessity of nature, did not posit that there was anything bad in the universe?
150. I reply: as was made evident in the proof that God is an agent through knowledge [n.86], the philosophers could not save the idea that something evil can happen contingently in the universe, but only that one order of courses would produce something that was receptive of a perfection, while another order would of necessity produce the opposite of that perfection; such that this perfection could not then be induced when all the causes come together, although absolutely a thing produced by some of the causes, when considered according to the idea of its species, would be receptive of the perfection whose opposite necessarily comes about. But what the philosophers can say about our free choice and about badness of morals must be discussed elsewhere.

a. [Interpolation] Therefore, according to them, just as efficient causes in one order act necessarily, so impeding efficient causes in another order act necessarily in impeding; hence Saturn acts to condense things with the same necessity that the sun acts to dissipate them. Since therefore every defect of matter is reduced to efficient causes that are defective in virtue, then, if any efficient cause whatever acts necessarily, no defect whether of monstrosity or of malice will exist in the universe without happening necessarily.

150. To the second [n.4] I say that the consequence is not valid. For proof of the consequence I say that there is not a like incompossibility of dimensions in filling up a place and of essences in existing simultaneously. For a single entity does not so fill up the whole nature of being that no other entity can stand along with it (but this must not be understood of spatial filling up but of, as it were, essential commensuration), but one dimension fills up the same place according to the utmost of its capacity. Therefore one entity can exist at the same time along with another, just as, in respect of place, there could exist along with a body filling the place another body not filling the place. Likewise the other consequence [n.4] is not valid, because an infinite body, if it existed along with another body, would become a greater whole than either by reason of dimensions, because the dimensions of the second body would be different from the dimensions of the infinite body, and of the same nature as them; and therefore the whole would be greater because of the diversity of dimensions, and the whole would not be greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded. Here, however, the whole quantity of infinite perfection receives, in the idea of such quantity, no addition from the coexistence of another thing finite in such quantity.

151. To the third [n.5] I say that the consequence is not valid unless that which is pointed to in the antecedent, from which other things are separate, is finite. An example: if there were, per impossibile, some infinite ‘where’, and an infinite body were to fill up that ‘where’, it would not follow that ‘this body is here such that it is not elsewhere, therefore it is finite according to where’, because the ‘here’ points only to something
infinite; so, according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time were infinite, it does not follow that ‘this motion is in this time and not in another time, therefore it is finite according to time’. So, as to the intended proposition, it would be necessary to prove that what is pointed to by the ‘here’ is finite; but if it is assumed, the conclusion is being begged in the premises.

152. To the final one [n.6] I say that the Philosopher infers that ‘it is moved in non-time’ from this antecedent, that ‘infinite power exists in a magnitude’, and he understands ‘it is moved’ properly in the consequent, in the way motion is distinguished from mutation; and in this way the consequent involves a contradiction, and the antecedent too, according to him. But how the consequence hold I make clear in this way: if a power is infinite and acts from necessity of nature, therefore it acts in non-time. For, if it acts in time, let it be \(a\). And let some other virtue be taken, a finite one, which acts in a finite time; let it be \(b\). And let the finite virtue which is \(b\) be increased according to the proportion which \(b\) has to \(a\), to wit, if \(b\) is a hundred or a thousand times \(a\), let a hundred or a thousand times virtue be taken for that given finite virtue. Therefore the virtue so increased will move in the time \(a\), and so that virtue and the infinite one will move in an equal time, which is impossible if an infinite virtue moves according to the utmost of its power and necessarily.

a. [Interpolation] The Philosopher infers: ‘God is of infinite power; therefore he moves in non-time.’ The declaration of the consequence is:

153. From this, then, that the virtue is infinite it follows that, if it act of necessity, it does not act in time; but from this, that in the antecedent is posited what exists in a magnitude [n.152], it follows that, if it act on a body, it properly moves that body, which speaks of virtue extensive \(^a\) per accidens. But such virtue, if it were to act about a body, would have the parts of such a body at different distances with respect to it, to wit, one part of the body closer and another part further away; it also has some resistance in the body on which it acts; which two causes, namely resistance and the diverse approximation of the parts of the moveable thing to the mover, make there to be succession in the motion and make the body to be properly moved. Therefore from the fact that in the antecedent the virtue is placed in a magnitude, it follows that it will properly move. And so by joining the two things together, namely that it is infinite and that it is in a magnitude, it follows that it will move properly in non-time, which is a contradiction.

a. [Interpolation] because the Philosopher calls virtue in a magnitude extensive virtue [n.6].

154. But that does not follow of an infinite virtue which is not in a magnitude; for although it act in a non-time if it acts necessarily, because this is consequent to infinity, yet it will not properly move, because it will not have in the thing it acts on those two ideas of succession [n.153]. The Philosopher, therefore, does not intend that an infinite power properly move in non-time, in the way the argument proceeds [n.6], but that an infinite power in a magnitude properly move and in non-time [n.152], which are contradictories; and from this it follows that such an antecedent involves contradictories, namely that an infinite virtue exist in a magnitude.
155. But in that case there is a doubt. Since he posits a motive power that is infinite and naturally acting, it seems to follow that it would necessarily act in non-time although it would not move in non-time, rather then will nothing move another thing, properly speaking; and that this follows is plain, because the thing was proved before through the idea of an infinite power acting necessarily [nn.152-153].

156. Averroes replies, *Metaphysics* 12 com.41, that in addition to the first mover which is of infinite power there is required a conjoint mover of finite power, such that from the first mover there is infinite motion and from the second there is succession, because there could not otherwise be succession unless the finite thing acted along with it, because if the infinite thing alone acted it would act in non-time. This is refuted later in I d.8 [p.2 q. un nn.3, 8-20], where argument on this point is made against the philosophers, who posit that the first thing does of necessity whatever it does immediately. But the argument is not difficult for Christians, who say that God acts contingently; for they can easily reply that, although an infinite power acting necessarily do according to the utmost of itself, and so in non-time, whatever it immediately does, yet not an infinite virtue acting contingently and freely; for just as it is in its power to act or not to act, so it is in its power to act in time or to act in non-time; and so it is easy to save the fact that the first thing moves a body in time although it be of infinite power, because it does not act necessarily, nor according to the utmost of its power, namely as much as it could act, nor in as brief a time as it could act.

**Question 3**

*Whether there is only one God*

157. I ask whether there is only one God.

Argument that there is not:

I Corinthians 8.5: “As there be gods many and lords many.”

158. Again thus: God is; therefore Gods are.

The proof of the consequence is that singular and plural indicate the same thing although they differ in mode of signification; therefore they include the same predicate taken proportionally. Therefore as the singular includes the singular predicate so the plural includes the plural.\(^{41}\)

Proof in a second way is that just as God is that than which a greater cannot be thought [n.11], so Gods are that than which greaters cannot be thought; but things than which greaters cannot be thought exist in fact, as it seems, because if they did not exist in fact greaters than them could be thought; therefore etc.

159. In addition, every real being by participation is reduced to something such by essence; created individuals in any species are real by participation, otherwise they would not be many; therefore they are reduced to something such by essence; therefore there is some man, some ox by essence, etc. But whatever is by essence and not by participation is God; therefore etc.

\(^{41}\) The point seems to be that if ‘God’ includes the predicate ‘is’ then ‘Gods’ must include the predicate ‘are’ because the difference between singular and plural is in mode and not in thing signified. A parallel might be ‘God is masculine’ (‘Deus’ is a masculine word in Latin) therefore ‘Gods are masculine’ (i.e. each occurrence of ‘Deus’ is an occurrence of a masculine). The error here is exposed below n.185.
160. Again, more goods are better than fewer; but whatever is better should be posited in the universe; therefore etc.

161. Again, anything that, if it is, is a necessary being is simply a necessary being; but another God, if he is, is a necessary being; therefore etc. Proof of the major: grant the opposite of the predicate, ‘he is not a necessary being simply’, and the opposite of the subject follows, namely that, if he is, he is a possible being and a non-necessary being.

Response: the opposite of the subject should be inferred in this way, ‘he is not a necessary being if he exists’, where let the relation between antecedent and consequent be denied.

162. To the contrary: Deuteronomy 6.4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God;” and Isaiah 45.5: “Beside me there is no God.”

a. [Interpolation] The argument for this is by means of the Philosopher Metaphysics 12.8.1074a31-37: if there are two [gods], one of them would have matter. And (ibid. 1076a4): a plurality of principles is not good; therefore one ruler. And Damascene De Fide Orthodoxa 1.5 sets down three reasons: this god would lack that one, that one differs from this; second, neither would be everywhere; third, they would regenerate things badly – and this agrees with the second reason. The Master [Lombard, I d.3 ch.3]: one of them would be superfluous. – Again, by reason, because as he [Aristotle] says above, unity is the principle of duality and of every multitude; Porculus Institutio Theologica ch.21. – Again, how would they come together under a genus or a species? Composition follows either way. This agrees with the first reason of the Philosopher.

I. To the Question

163. [The opinion of others] – In this question the conclusion is certain. But some say that this conclusion is not demonstrable but only accepted on faith; and for this there follows the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides], Guide of the Perplexed I ch.75: “the unity of God is received from the Law.”

a. [Interpolation] When setting down this concept of God in this question, that he necessarily exists of himself, or is independent in existence, or is an uncreated being, or the immovable first mover, one will be able to make use of the opinion of Aristotle about the intelligences [Metaphysics 12.8.1073a14-74b14], if they are thus Gods, which is dealt with in I d.8 p.2 q. un. nn.3-11. – As to the fourth concept, there is no demonstration of the affirmative if, according to Aristotle [ibid. 12.6-7.1072a9-23], one of them moves with a diurnal motion and the other moves the zodiac and each exists of itself. But this is solved by setting down this concept or description of God: a being of infinite intellectuality, will, goodness, power; a necessary being, existing of itself. Hence, before this question, one must prove all the following things of God: that, that some being is altogether first with a triple primacy was shown in the preceding question [nn.42-67], and that it necessarily exists [n.70], and is infinite [nn.111-136]; and the same about the intellect, will, and power, in the same place [nn.75-100]. Thus no question is not begged here.

164. This is also argued by reason, because if it could be known by natural reason that God is one, then it could be known that God is a singular naturally; therefore the singularity of God and his essence as singular could be known, which is false, and the contrary was said before in the question about the subject of theology [Prol. nn.167-168].
165 [Scotus’ own opinion] – However it seems that the unity could be shown by
natural reason, and this by taking up the way, first, from infinite intellect, second from
infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth
from the idea of the infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary being, seventh
from the idea of omnipotence.

166. [First way, from infinite intellect] – On the part of infinite intellect the
argument is first as follows: an infinite intellect knows most perfectly any intelligible
whatever insofar as it is intelligible in itself; therefore, if there are Gods – let them be a
and b – a knows b most perfectly, namely insofar as b is knowable. But this is impossible.
The proof is that either it knows b through the essence of b or it does not. If it does not
and b is knowable through its essence, then a does not know b most perfectly and insofar,
that is, it is knowable. For nothing knowable through its essence is most perfectly
known unless it is known through its essence, or through something more perfect that
includes its own essence which it is in itself; but the essence of b is included in nothing
more perfectly than in b, because then b would not be God. But if a knows b through the
essence of b itself, then the act of a itself is naturally posterior to the essence of b itself,
and so a will not be God. Now the proof that the act of a itself is posterior to b itself is
because every act of knowing which is not the same as the object is posterior to the object;
for an act is neither prior to nor simultaneous in nature with anything other than the act,
because then the act might be understood without the object, just as conversely.

a. [Interpolation] because it is the whole of being, for a finite intellect has this power, although not
most perfectly nor all at once.

167. If it be said that a understands b by the essence of a itself, which is most
similar to b itself, namely in this way, that a understands b in the idea of a species
common to a itself and to b itself, on the contrary: neither response saves the fact that a
understand b most perfectly, and consequently a is not God, because the knowledge of
something in a likeness only and universally is not a knowledge most perfect and
intuitive of that thing, and so a would not know b intuitively nor most perfectly, which is
the conclusion intended.

168. The argument second on the part of the intellect is as follows: the same act
cannot have two adequate objects; a is the adequate object of its own intellection, and b
would be the adequate object of the same intellection if a could understand b; therefore it
is impossible that a understand in a single intellection perfectly all at once both a and b.
If a have intellections that are really distinct, then it is not God. The major is plain,
because otherwise the act would be adequated to an object which, when removed, the act
would no less be at rest and adequate, and so such an object would be in vain.

a. [Interpolation] because a has its own essence for adequate object; therefore it does not have
essence b for adequate object. But b would be the adequate object for intellection a if it could
understand a and b perfectly together.

169. [The second way, from infinite will] – As to the second way the argument is
as follows: an infinite will is a right will, therefore it loves whatever is lovable insofar as
it is lovable; if b is another God it is to be loved infinitely (since it is an infinite good)
and to be loved infinitely by a will that is able thus to love it; therefore the will a loves b
infinitely. But this is impossible because \( a \) naturally loves itself more than \( b \). Proof: for anything whatever naturally loves its own being more than the being of something else of which it is not a part or an effect; but \( a \) is nothing of \( b \) whether as a part or as an effect; therefore \( a \) naturally loves itself more than it loves \( b \). But a free will, when it is right, is in conformity with natural will; otherwise natural will would not always be right; therefore if \( a \) has this right will it loves itself with an elicited act more than it loves \( b \); therefore it does not love \( b \) infinitely.

\[ \text{a. [Interpolation, in place of `if } b \text{ is another...since'] and with as much love as it can if it is infinite; but } b \text{ is to be loved to infinity when it is set down as being another God, and consequently...} \]

170. A second argument about will is as follows: \( a \) either enjoys \( b \) or uses it; if it uses it then \( a \) has a disordered will; if it enjoys \( b \) and enjoys \( a \) then \( a \) is blessed in two objects neither of which depends on the other, because just as \( a \) is blessed in itself, so also in \( b \). But the consequent is impossible, because nothing can be actually blessed in two total beatifying objects; the proof is because, when either is destroyed, it would nevertheless be blessed; therefore it is blessed in neither.\(^a\)

\[ \text{a. [Interpolation] Also it seems reasonable that what is completely at rest in one adequate object could not be at rest in another object.} \]

171. [Third way, from infinite goodness] – About the third way, namely about the idea of infinite good, the argument is as follows: the will can in an ordered way desire a greater good and love more a greater good; but several infinite goods, if they were possible, include more goodness than one infinite good; therefore the will could in an ordered way love several infinites more than one infinite, and consequently it would not rest in any single infinite good. But this is contrary to the idea of good – that it be infinite and not give rest to any will whatever.

172. [The fourth way, from infinite power] – As to the fourth way, about infinite power, I argue thus: there cannot be two total causes of the same effect in the same order of cause [n.73]; but infinite power is the total cause, in idea of first cause, with respect to any effect, so there can be no other power in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, and so no other cause infinite in power.

173. The proof of the first proposition is because then it would be possible for something to be the cause of something on which [the latter] would not depend. Proof: on no thing does something essentially depend that, when the thing does not exist, would no less exist; but if \( c \) has two total causes, \( a \) and \( b \), and in the same order, then, when one of two does not exist, \( c \) would no less exist on the other, because when \( a \) does not exist \( c \) no less exists on \( b \), and when \( b \) does not exist \( c \) exists no less on \( a \).

174. Next to this is an argument about the unity of any first thing in any of the aforesaid primacies [n.41]; for nothing is exceeded by two first exceeding things, or no finite thing is essentially ordered to two first ends; for there would be something in relation to an end such that, when the end did not exist, it would no less have an end, as was argued before [nn.173, 73], and it would be essentially exceeded by something such that, when that thing did not exist, it would no less have an essential exceder by which it would be essentially measured, and from which it would essentially receive its perfection,
which is impossible; therefore it is impossible for there to be two first ends of any two finite things, or two first eminents of two exceeded things.

175. [The fifth way, from the infinite absolutely] – About the fifth way I say that an infinite cannot be exceeded, and I argue as follows: whatever perfection can be enumerated in diverse things has more perfection in several of them than in one, as is said in On the Trinity VIII ch.1 n.2; therefore the infinite cannot at all be enumerated in many things.

176. [The sixth way, from necessary being] – About the sixth way I argue first thus: a species that can be multiplied, namely in individuals, is not of itself determined to a definite number of individuals but, as far as concerns itself, it allows of an infinity of individuals, as is plain in all corruptible species; therefore if the idea of ‘necessary being’ is multipliable in individuals, it does not determine itself to a definite number, but, as far as concerns itself, allows of an infinity. But if there could be infinite necessary beings, there are infinite necessary beings; therefore etc. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent from which it follows.a

a. [Interpolation] Let this reason be stated in another form from the idea of primacy as follows: one thing of one idea that is disposed to many things of one idea is not determinate to that plurality, or to a definite determination of them; there is no instance in nature with respect to suppositus nor in cause with respect to things caused, unless you make an instance in the proposed case. But deity will be one thing of one idea, and according to you it is related to many things of one idea; therefore of itself it is not determinate to a definite plurality of singulars, nor can it be made determinate from elsewhere, because that is repugnant to the first thing; therefore deity exists in infinite supposit. This reasoning seems to be founded on the fact that primacy is of itself indeterminate.

177. Secondly I argue thus, and according to this way: if there be several necessary beings they are distinguished by some real perfections [n.71]; let those perfections be a and b. Then as follows: either the two things distinct by a and b are formally necessary beings by a and b or they are not. If they are not then a is not the formal idea of necessarily existing, and consequently not b either; therefore also what includes them is not necessary first, because it includes some entity which is not formally the necessity of existing nor is necessary of itself. But if the two things are formally necessary beings by a and b, and if in addition to this each of them is a necessary being by that in which one of them agrees with the other, then each of them has in itself two ideas each of which is formally necessary being, but this is impossible, because neither of them includes the other; therefore each of them, when removed, would be this sort of necessary being by the other, and so something would be formally a necessary being by an idea such that, when the idea was removed, it would nevertheless be a necessary being, which is impossible [n.71].

178. [The seventh way, from omnipotence] – About the seventh way, namely omnipotence, it seems that it is not demonstrable by natural reason, because omnipotence as will be plain elsewhere [n.119] – cannot be proved by natural reason in the way Catholics understand omnipotence, nor can it be proved by reason of infinite power.

179. Yet from omnipotence believed the intended proposition may be argued for in this way: if a is omnipotent then it can cause the being and not being in the case of anything else, and so it could destroy b, and so might make b capable of nothing, and so it follows that b is not God.
180. This reasoning is not valid as some reply to it, because \( b \) is not an object of omnipotence since omnipotence has regard to the possible for its object; but \( b \) was posited as necessary \([n.177]\) just like \( a \). Therefore one argues in another way by thus declaring the reasoning of Richard \([\text{of St. Victor}]\) in *On the Trinity* I ch.25:\(^a\) just as the omnipotent by its willing can produce whatever is possible, so by its non-willing it can impede or destroy anything possible; but if \( a \) is omnipotent it can will everything other than itself to exist, and so by its willing them to bring them into existence. But it is not necessary that \( b \) will all the things that \( a \) wills, because the will of \( b \) is contingently related to them, just as the will of \( a \) is to the things that \( b \) wills, if it is God \([n.156]\). But if \( b \) does not will them to be, then none of them is. Therefore if there are two omnipotents, each of them would make the other impotent, not by destroying it, but by preventing by its non-willing the being of the things willed by the other.

\[\text{a. [Interpolation]}\] where he speaks thus: ‘Any omnipotent that was such that everything else could do nothing will be able easily to effect things’.

181. But if you say, by playing the sophist as it were, that they may agree in their will, although there is no necessity \([n.180]\), but they would as it were make a pact, still I argue that neither of them will be omnipotent; for if \( a \) is omnipotent it can produce by its willing any producible willed thing other than itself; from this it follows that \( b \) will be able to produce nothing by its own willing, and so is not omnipotent. Now that this follows is plain from the fourth way \([n.172]\), because it is impossible for there to be two total causes of one effect, because from the fact that it is totally caused by one, it is impossible that it be caused by the other.\(^a\)

\[\text{a. [Interpolation]}\] I do not wish to adduce here certain arguments of some people relative to the question, on which one should not rely because they can be solved, and perhaps they prove just as much that there is a single angel in a single species, if an angel is simple in its essence \(\text{[an implicit reference perhaps to St. Thomas Aquinas]}\); or if they are proofs yet they do not proceed from what is naturally known to us. Nor is it necessary to bring them forward as in need of being solved, because they are not opposed to the conclusion that I maintain.

II. To the Arguments
   A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

   182. To the arguments \([\text{nn.163-164, 157-160]}\) – For first to those that are for the other opinion. I reply to the authority of Rabbi Moses \([n.163]\) and I say that God’s being one is handed down in the Law; for because the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry, therefore they needed to be instructed by the Law about the unity of God, although it could by natural reason be demonstrated. For it is also thus received from the Law that God exists (*Exodus* 3.14: “I am who am”, and the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 11.6: that “he who comes to God must believe that he is”), and yet it is not denied that God is demonstrable; therefore by parity of reasoning it should not be denied either that it could be demonstrated by reason that God is one, although it be ‘received’ from the Law. Also, it is useful for things which can be demonstrated to be handed down to the community also by way of authority – both because of the negligence of the community in inquiring into truth, and also because of the impotence of intellect and the errors of those who
make inquiry by demonstration, because they mix many false things in with their truths, as Augustine says in The City of God XVIII ch.41 n.2. And therefore, because the simple who follow such demonstrators could be in doubt as to what to assent to, so an authority is a safe and stable and common way about the things it can neither deceive nor be deceived about.

183. To the second reason about the singular [n.164] I say that it is one thing for singularity to be conceived either as an object or as part of an object, and another thing for singularity to be precisely the mode of conceiving or that under which the object is conceived. An example: when I say ‘universal’, the object conceived is a plurality, but the mode of conceiving, that is, the mode under which it is conceived, is singularity; thus in the case of logical intentions, when I say ‘singular’, what is conceived is singularity, but the mode under which it is conceived is universality, because what is conceived, as it is conceived, is indifferent to many things. Thus I say in the proposed case that the divine essence can be conceived as singular such that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object; yet it does not follow that the essence can be known as it is singular, such that singularity be the mode of the concept; for thus to know something as singular is to know it as this, as a white thing is seen as this, and in this way it was said before [n.164] that the divine essence is not known under the idea of singularity; and therefore there is in the argument a fallacy of figure of speech [Aristotle, Sophistical Refutations 1.4.166b10-14], by changing thing to mode.

B. To the Principal Arguments

184. To the principal reasons [nn.157-160]. – I say that the Apostle [n.157] is speaking of idols, and so of ‘gods’ in name only; and he adds there: “but for us there is one God,” because “all the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”

185. I say to the second [n.158] that the consequence is not valid, because number is not the sort of grammatical mode of signifying as are other grammatical modes that state precisely a mode of conceiving a thing without any reality corresponding to that sort of mode of conceiving; hence they state precisely some aspect in a thing by which the intellect can be moved to conceive such a thing.\(^a\) But number truly includes the thing subtracted; hence the inference follows ‘men are running, therefore several men are running’. But it is not so in the case of the other co-signified things of a noun or a verb, because this inference does not follow ‘God exists, therefore God is masculine’\(^b\) [in Latin the word for ‘God’ is a masculine noun], because it suffices for the masculine that there is something in the thing from which this mode of conceiving could be taken, to wit activity. I say therefore that only ‘Gods’ conceived in the plural mode includes a contradiction, because the mode of conceiving is repugnant to that which is conceived under the mode. – When therefore the consequence is proved because the same thing includes the singular and plural [n.158], I say that the singular includes it under a mode of conceiving fitting the concept but the plural includes it under a mode impossible to that concept; and therefore the singular, insofar as it includes the concept and the mode of conceiving, includes an idea that is as it were in itself true, but the plural, insofar as it includes these two things, includes an idea that is as it were in itself false. And so it does not follow that the plural is true of a plural as the singular is of a singular, because about that whose idea is in itself false nothing is true [n.30].
a. [Interpolation] although that which moves [the intellect] is not something in reality; for masculinity does not require anything masculine in reality but something corresponding to masculinity, namely active power or something of the sort.

b. [Interpolation] the inference 'there are several men, therefore that are several rational animals' holds, but the inference 'God is a generator, therefore God is of the masculine gender' does not hold.

186. Through this is plain the response to the other proof ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [n.158] because Gods are not thinkable without contradiction, because the mode is repugnant to the thing conceived; and therefore the major is to be glossed as was said before in the preceding question [n.137]. Now for sense and truth it is required that the idea of the subject does not include a contradiction, as was said in the second question of this distinction [n.30].

187. To the third [n.159] I say that the major proposition is not the first but is reduced to this ‘everything imperfect is reduced to the perfect’; and because every being by participation is imperfect, and only that being is perfect which is a being by essence, therefore does that proposition follow. But this major about ‘the imperfect’ has to be distinguished in this way: something is imperfect according to a perfection simply that does not necessarily have an accompanying imperfection, because it does not include in itself a limitation, as ‘this good’, ‘this true’, ‘this being’; and an imperfect of this sort is reduced to a perfect of the same nature, namely ‘good’, ‘being’, and ‘true’, which import perfections simply. But something is imperfect according to a perfection non-simply that of its idea includes a limitation, and so it necessarily has an annexed imperfection, as ‘this man’, ‘this ass’; and imperfects of this sort are not reduced to a perfect by essence absolutely of the same idea as to specific idea, because it still includes imperfection because it includes limitation, but they are reduced to a first perfect that contains them super-eminently and equivocally. What is imperfect then in the first way is reduced to a perfect simply according to a perfection of the same nature, because something can according to that nature be simply perfect. But what is imperfect in the second way is not reduced to something perfect according to a perfection of the same idea; for because that idea includes imperfection, therefore it cannot be a perfect thing simply, because of the limitation, but it is reduced to something simply equivocal perfect, eminently including that perfection. And for this reason an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but a stone, which is imperfect, is not reduced to a simply perfect stone, but to supreme being and to supreme good, which include that perfection virtually [n.69].

a. [Interpolation] namely that ‘every being by participation is reduced to a being by essence’ which is perfect. So that the conclusion, then, could truly follow…

188. To the final one [160] the response is that many finite goods are better than fewer finite goods, but many infinite goods are not.

189. But this does not seem to respond to the argument, because all things that would be better if they existed should be posited in beings, and most of all in the supreme being, which is a ‘necessary being’, because there whatever could exist is good and must necessarily be there; but many infinite goods, if they existed, would be better; therefore it seems that many infinite goods should be posited in the nature of the supreme good.
190. To this I reply that when it is said in the major ‘things which would be better if they existed should be posited there’, I say that by the ‘if’ either a possible positing is implied or a positing of incompossibles is. If in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false, because the implication in the minor is not possible but is of incompossibles. But if the ‘if’ implies a positing of incompossibles then the minor is true and the major false; for things that would only be better from a positing of incompossibles would not be better, nor are they even good, just as that which only exists from the positing of incompossibles altogether does not exist, just as neither does the posited thing on which it depends.
Book One
Second Distinction
Second Part
On the Persons and Productions in God

Question 1

Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

191. About the second part of this distinction a question is raised first whether, along with the unity of the divine essence, there can be a plurality of persons.

That there cannot be:

Because all things that simply with one and the same thing are simply the same are altogether the same among themselves. And ‘simply’ is added because if they are the same as the same not simply but in a certain respect, or if they are simply the same as the same only in a certain respect, they need not be simply the same among themselves. But the divine persons are simply and altogether the same as the divine essence, which in itself is altogether and simply the same; therefore etc. The major is plain because every syllogistic form holds on the basis of it, and this of the perfect syllogism [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.25b32-35]; it is evident of itself, because in the premises the extreme terms are known to be conjoined in the middle term, and from this only is concluded the identity of the extremes with each other in the conclusion; also because the opposite of the predicate destroys the subject, because if they are not the same as each other, they are not simply the same in a third. The minor too is plain, that the essence itself is simply the same, for it is whatever it has because of its supreme simplicity, according to the Master of the *Sentences* I d.8 ch.8, and Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1.

192. Again, essential and accidental divide the whole of being. So whatever is in something is the same as it either essentially or accidentally. But what distinguishes the persons is not an accident of the essence (because nothing is an accident of itself), therefore it is essential; therefore it is the same as it essentially. But when what is essentially the same as the essence is multiplied the essence is multiplied; therefore if there are several persons there are several essences.

193. Again, nothing is to be posited in beings – and especially not in the highest good – such that when it is not posited nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; but if some divine person does not exist in the divine essence, nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; therefore a plurality of such things is not to be posited in God. Proof of the minor: if the second person did not exist, whatever perfection is posited in it would exist in the first person; also, no perfection would be lacking to the universe if the second person did not exist, because whatever of perfection exists simply in one person exists also in another. Therefore when one person is removed and another remains, nothing of perfection is taken from the universe.

194. You say it is not the case under every mode that ‘whatever of perfection is in one is also in another’.

On the contrary, that mode of having or of being is either a perfection or not a perfection. If it is it will exist in God, and consequently the first person, which will not
have that mode, will not be simply perfect. If it is not then the argument stands that, when the second person does not exist, the whole of his perfection remains in the first; therefore nothing of perfection will perish from the universe with the second person removed.

195. Again, that there be several necessary beings includes a contradiction, because if there are several necessary beings I ask by what are they formally distinguished? Let these be $a$ and $b$. Either then these ideas by which they are distinguished are necessary beings and necessities of being, and then there will be two necessary beings; also they agree in necessary being and consequently they are not distinguished by necessary being. Or if those ideas are possible, then the things distinguished by them are not necessary beings [n.177].

196. To the opposite:
That is possible which does not include a contradiction. But there is no contradiction included in there being one essence in three persons, because contradiction is according to the same respect. But here there is no contradiction according to the same respect, because here there is unity of essence and plurality of relative supposit, therefore etc.

**Question 2**

*Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence*

197. Along with this I ask whether there are only three persons in the divine essence. I argue that there are not:

Opposite relations are of equal dignity; therefore if the relation of the first producer constitutes only one person, there will correspond to it another relation constituting only one produced person, and so there will be only one produced person.

198. Further, to two relations of things produced there correspond two relations of things producing and these latter extremes are distinguished among themselves as equally as the former are; therefore if these two relations of produced things constitute two persons, the other two will also constitute two persons, and so there will be four divine persons.

199. Further, a finite power lasting for an infinite time could have successively infinite effects, as is plain about the sun according to the way of the Philosopher *On Generation and Corruption* 2.10.336a23-337a33, 11.337b25-338b19; therefore an infinite power can have infinite produced things all at once. The proof of the consequence is that the fact a finite power is not able to do all at once as many things as it can do successively is because of the finitude because of which this effect is for now sufficient for it; therefore an infinite power can do all at once as many things as it can do successively; it can do infinite things successively, as is plain, because a finite power can thus do infinite things.

200. The opposite is shown in the last chapter of *Matthew* 28.19: “In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit;” and in *I John* 5.7: “There are three that give testimony in heaven etc.;” and Augustine [in fact Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.5, and it is in the text [sc. of the *Sentences*].
Question 3

*Whether being Produced can Stand in Something along with the Divine Essence*

201. And, because a plurality of divine persons is made clear from production, I therefore ask about production in the divine nature, and first in general, whether being produced can stand in something along with the divine essence; and in the *Lectura Reportatio* I A d.2 n.107 in this way: whether any real intrinsic production is repugnant to the divine essence.

I argue no as to the first form of the question, and this is to argue yes according to the second form, because nothing produced is of itself necessary; but whatever subsists in the divine essence is of itself necessary; therefore etc.

202. The major is plain in five ways:

First, because nothing is at the same time necessary of itself and by another; but what is produced, if it is necessary, is necessary by another; therefore it is not necessary of itself. My proof of the major of this syllogism is because if it is necessary of itself then it is necessary when everything else is removed; but if it is necessary from another it is not necessary when that other is removed.

203. Second, a proof of the first major [n.201], because everything produced was able to be produced, otherwise what is incapable of being produced is produced; therefore everything produced includes in it some possibility, because also all possibility is repugnant to what is necessary of itself; therefore etc.

204. Again, third, a produced term is posterior in some way to the producer, because production cannot be understood without some order; in that prior stage in which the producer is understood the produced is not understood, because then the producer would not be first; therefore it is understood in that prior stage that the thing produced does not exist, and in the posterior stage it is understood to exist; therefore there is a change from not-being to being.

205. There is a proof fourth, because the divine essence, when all production is removed, does not have the thing produced; but it has the thing produced by production; therefore by production the divine essence becomes from not having the thing produced to having it, and so there is change.

206. Fifth, because generation seems to be essentially a change, in the way a species essentially includes the genus; but production into being by way of nature is generation; therefore production cannot be understood without change.

207. Again to the principal point, second, in this way: if it is produced therefore it is dependent; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. The proof of the consequence, because if the produced depends in no way on the producer, then each would have its nature on an equal basis; and from this further, the produced would no more require first for its production and existence that the producer have its nature first than the reverse, which is contrary to the nature of production.

208. Again third to the principal point, because other changes, which do not posit by their idea as much imperfection as generation posits, could not exist in divine reality; therefore not generation either.

The consequence is plain, because we remove from God whatever there is of imperfection. The proof of the antecedent is because local motion and alteration according to Aristotle, *Physics* 8.7.260a26-261a20, do not posit as much imperfection as
generation, and that is why many perfect beings can be altered and locally moved that cannot be generated [to wit the heavenly bodies]; but no change of place or alteration is conceded to exist in God; therefore etc.

209. To the opposite is Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” only by production.

210. Again *Psalm* 2.7: “The Lord said to me: Thou art my son, today have I begotten thee.”

211. Look for other authorities in the text [*Sentences* I d.2 ch.4-5].

**Question 4**

*Whether in the Divine Essence there are only Two Intrinsic Productions*

212. Next I ask in particular whether there are there only two intrinsic productions. That there are not two I argue thus, because of one nature there seems to be one mode of communicating, according to Averroes, *Physics* VIII com.46.

213. This is proved by his reasons in the same place:

First, because of a second matter there is a second form, otherwise there would not be a proper form for this matter; a but matters corresponding to diverse agents and productions belong to diverse ideas, which is plain in generation by propagation and putrefaction, because the thing propagated is generated from semen, while the other is not but from some putrefied body; therefore etc.

a. [Interpolation] and then anything might be generated from anything, and then matters would be universally otiose.

214. Second he argues in this way, by inferring from that supposition [n.213] that the same species would then be from nature and from chance; from which he infers that a man could be generated from the seed of an ass and from an infinite number of matters. Now he proves the first consequence to be unacceptable because what happens by chance is opposed to what happens by nature, and for that reason no species is by chance, because things found to exist by chance are monstrous. All of this is manifest of itself. But if a nature were to have diverse modes of communicating, then according to one mode of communicating a species can be by nature and according to another mode of communicating it can be by chance or by fortune. a

a. [Interpolation] as follows: this generable thing is generated equivocally, not from seed; either therefore of necessity, or for the most part, or rarely. If it is equivocally generated of necessity then it is never generated from seed, which is false. But if it is generated for the most part, it is equivocally generated from putrefaction; but things that happen for the most part happen naturally; therefore it is naturally generated equivocally, and further it follows that they are rarely propagated from seed, which seems false. But if it is generated rarely, it is generated equivocally; but what happens rarely happens by chance and fortuitously, and because they are fortuitous they are monstrous. And things that are of this sort, this thing and that thing, are not of the same species; therefore nature is not communicable save in one way.

215. Again, an argument for the conclusion of the Commentator [n.212] is as follows, because of changes diverse in species there are terms diverse in species;
therefore if there are communications or productions of another nature there are also terms of another nature.

216. Again that there are not only two productions I prove because the Philosopher, Physics 5.1.224b7-8, distinguishes nature and intellect as diverse active principles; the idea of both is truly found in God, because neither includes imperfection, and internally, because neither is productive externally; therefore besides the production of will there will be another two productions internally.

217. This is also proved by the Philosopher, Metaphysics 9.2.1046b1-11, where he expressly seems to say that a rational potency is capable of opposites, because science is of opposites. If then the intellect of its nature is indeterminate as to opposites, and nature is determined to one thing, then the intellect will have a different idea of being principle than nature does; therefore etc.

218. Further, the power of the will is free, therefore its production too is free; therefore it is not determined to one thing, but it can of its liberty be to opposites or of opposites; but only a creature can be and not be, not however a divine person; therefore the will is only a principle of producing creatures, but not a divine person.

219. To the opposite:

If there are not two produced persons only, then there will either be more persons than three or fewer persons than three, which is false. Therefore those authorities by which it is shown that there are only three persons in divine reality show that there are only two produced persons.

I. To the Third Question

220. Because, as I said [n.201], plurality is made clear from production, therefore I respond first to the question about production, which is the third in order [nn.191, 201], and I say that in divine reality there is and can be production.

A. Scotus’ own Proofs

221. I prove this as follows:

[The first principal reason] – Whatever is of its formal nature a productive principle is, in whatever it is, without imperfection; but perfect memory or, what is the same, this whole ‘intellect having the intelligible object present to itself’, is of its formal nature a productive principle of generated knowledge [n.310], and it is plain that such memory is in some divine person and is so of itself, because some divine person is not produced; therefore that person will be able through such perfect principle to produce perfectly.a

a. [Text cancelled by Scotus with an interpolation following] therefore in whatever there is this ‘intellect having an actually intelligible object present to it’, in that there will be a productive principle of generated knowledge, and this according to the proportion of its perfection. But in God this exists according to the true idea of itself; therefore in God there is production of generated knowledge. [Interpolation] Or one can argue in this way: any supposit that has of itself a sufficient and formal principle of producing can produce a supposit or product adequate to that principle, namely, the most perfect supposit that can be produced for such a principle; but not a product adequate in nature, because this would be a begging of the question, but a product adequate to the active virtue of the producer, just as
the sun, when it produces a most perfect effect, is said to produce an effect most perfect not in nature but to its active virtue. The following is the minor: some divine supposit has from itself a principle of producing, which principle is perfect memory; therefore etc. The major and minor are made plain in what follows [nn.223-224].

222. I argue further: no production through perfect memory is perfect unless it be of knowledge adequate to that memory or that intellect with respect to such object; but to the memory or intellect of an infinite divine person no knowledge is adequate with respect to the divine essence as intelligible save an infinite one; because that intellect comprehends the infinite object, therefore some divine person can through memory produce infinite knowledge. Further, but the knowledge will exist only in the divine nature, because no other thing is infinite; therefore in divine reality there can through memory be a production inwardly. But, further, if it can be then it is; both because there ‘possible being’ is ‘necessary being’, and because that principle is productive by way of nature; therefore necessarily. The consequence is plain, because it cannot be impeded, nor does it depend on something else in acting; but everything acting from necessity of nature necessarily acts, unless it is impeded or depends on another in acting.

223. The major of the first syllogism [n.221]⁴² is clear, because what does not of itself agree with a productive principle that is productive in it, can exist only for one of two reasons: either because of the principle’s imperfection in it,⁴ or because the principle, as received in it, exists by a production adequate to it, as is true of the generative power if it exist in the Son, and of the inspiriting power if it exist in the Holy Spirit; but each of these reasons is excluded by what is said in the major⁴ of itself [*of its own formal nature*], because nothing has of itself a productive principle unless it have it without imperfection and also not communicated by a production belonging to such a principle.

a. [Interpolation] as an imperfect hot thing that imperfectly possesses heat is not sufficient for heating according to that thing.

b. [Interpolated note to interpolation n.221] the major of the second syllogism which was...
[as in the interpolation to the cancelled text after n.221].

224. The proof of the minor of the first syllogism [n.221]⁴³ is because this belongs to every created memory; not however whence it is created or imperfect, because imperfection is never the idea of producing or communicating being, because this belongs to it from perfection, not from imperfection.⁴⁴

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⁴² A reference to part of the interpolated text following on from the cancelled text after n.221.

⁴³ Or the reference may again be to the interpolated text, where the minor is stated thus: “some divine supposit has of itself a principle of producing, which principle is perfect memory; therefore etc.”

⁴⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The conclusion absolutely inferred, namely that memory in the first divine person is a principle for it of producing or simply communicating, proves the intended proposition [n.220], because it is only a productive principle by way of nature; but such a production is only internal [n.222]. – It proves the intended proposition more in another way, because it is a productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore internally [n.224]. And then the major [n.221] ought to be taken in this way: ‘Whatever of its own formal nature is a productive principle of something according to its formal nature, is a productive principle, in whatever it is of itself, of such a thing’. In a third way it proves most of all the intended proposition thus:…” Here Scotus breaks off and cancels the note, because he has not yet made clear (he does it next in n.225) the major of the second syllogism [n.222].
a. [Interpolation] the thing is plain as to the first part, because unless some person in divine reality were to have of himself perfect memory there would be a process to infinity; the other part of the minor, namely that perfect memory in a supposit possessing of itself that memory is a principle of producing generated knowledge...

b. [Interpolation] every created memory, not whereby it is created nor whereby it is limited or imperfect, is a principle of producing generated knowledge, because imperfection is never a reason for producing or communicating being; and therefore the fact that it is a perfect principle of producing a generated knowledge corresponding to it, this belongs to it not from imperfection but from its own natural perfection. A further interpolation follows: Therefore this too belongs to it most perfectly where there is memory most perfect and most perfectly; so it is in the uncreated supposit of the Father; therefore etc.

225. The major of the second syllogism [n.222] is made clear thus: for just as there is no perfect memory with respect to anything intelligible unless the object is present in its idea of being actually intelligible, insofar as it can be present to it as an intelligible, so there is no perfect offspring of such memory unless there is as much actual knowledge of the object as can belong to such an intellect with respect to such an object; and I call that knowledge adequate to such an intellect with respect to such an object.

226. This [n.221] can be argued of the will, because the will that has an actually known object present to it is, by its own idea, productive of love of such a produced object.

227. [Response to the first principal reason] – On the contrary I bring an instance against this reason [n.221], so as to make it clearer. And the major indeed of the reason I concede. But to the minor let it be said that the whole thing is not of its elf a productive principle, but only when the intellect can have of itself a produced knowledge; but this is when it can have a knowledge other than itself by which it is perfected; but an infinite intellect cannot have a knowledge distinct from itself by which it is perfected, and so it does not seem that a productive principle should be there posited.

228. And this reason [n.227] is confirmed, first because a generated knowledge would be posited in vain, second because it is impossible to posit it.

229. Proof of the first point [n.228]: in us there is a necessary generated knowledge, because by it the intellect is perfected, which would without it be imperfect; but an infinite intellect, although it have an object present to it, is however not formally perfected by generated knowledge but by ungenerated knowledge, the same as it really, by which it formally understands.

230. The second point, namely impossibility [n.228], I prove because a productive thing that has an adequate product cannot produce another; therefore since that whole “an intellect having an object actually present to itself”, or a memory, has in the paternal intellect an ungenerated knowledge adequate to itself quasi-produced from itself (because posterior in some way, according to idea of understanding, to such memory or to such presence of an object), it seems that it has no further virtue for producing a distinct knowledge, different from this one.45

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45 Text cancelled by Scotus: “This is proved secondly because the intellect is a power of acting not of making, as is said in Metaphysics 9.8.1050a21-b2; therefore if it can produce a product, it can produce it in itself and not outside itself, otherwise it would not have the idea of being active as this is distinguished from the idea of being factive. This intellect, therefore, which cannot produce knowledge in itself, cannot produce any knowledge, as it seems.”
a. [In place of “I prove” Scotus wrote “I prove in two ways, first…” on which then follows this interpolation] …thus: memory in anything is either really productive of generated knowledge, as it is in us, or quasi-productive, as it is in God, because his intellection there is understood [to be] generated accidental quasi-knowledge. Then I argue…

231. By excluding these reasons I confirm the argument [n.221]. And to exclude the response to the minor [n.227] in itself, I say that our intellect has with respect to generated knowledge a receptive potency; and this potentiality is one of imperfection, because it is a passive potentiality; and it does nothing through itself for the idea of productive principle, because no imperfection is formally of the idea of a productive principle, and especially when the productive principle can in itself be perfect. Our intellect also has the idea of productive principle with respect to generated knowledge; and this is from its perfection, insofar as a first act virtually contains the second act.

232. The first of these, namely to receive intellection, clearly belongs to the possible intellect. About the second it is not as certain whether it belongs to the possible or to the agent intellect; there will be inquiry about this elsewhere [Scotus, Quodlibet q.15 nn.13-20, 24]. But now this indistinctly taken point about the intellect, that it is a productive principle of knowledge, I think to be sufficiently true, and it will be made clear in I d.3 [p.3 q.2]; and intellect in this sense exists in God, because he has intellect according to every idea of intellect that does not posit imperfection.

233. Then I argue thus: whenever two things per accidens come together in something, a namely the idea of acting and of undergoing, when that which is the idea of acting is per se, it is no less the idea of acting; the point is plain from Physics 2.1.192b23-27 about a doctor healing himself: if medicine be separated from illness it will no less be the idea of healing. Therefore if these two be separated in the intellect from each other, when that remains which was the per se idea of productive principle it will still be the idea of producing, however much the receptive passive potentiality not be there. An example of this might be manifest: if knowledge of itself were co-created or consubstantial with our intellect, according as some understand Augustine about hidden knowledge, On the Trinity XIV ch.7 n.9, then the intellect, although it could not receive the generated knowledge by which it knows itself formally, b yet in another intellect, to wit in an angel or a human blessed in the fatherland, it could generate knowledge of itself in idea of object, because thus to generate belongs to itself whereby it is in act, although it not be receptive of it.

a. [Interpolation] one per se and another

b. [Interpolation] because it knows itself by co-created knowledge according to them.

46 The Latin here is ambiguous and admits of a variety of construals.
47 Text cancelled by Scotus: “if however it could have another actually intelligible object present to itself, it can generate some knowledge in a passive thing next to it, if there be something such [or an interpolation: ‘if there be any such knowledge that is received in another’], or it can generate a self-standing knowledge if it were to have the virtue of generating something self-standing; therefore, when the idea of being receptive of knowledge is removed, if the idea of being productive of knowledge remains and this a self-standing knowledge, knowledge will be able to be generated although it not be received in the intellect that is the principle of generating.”
From this is plain that the gloss [n.231] on that first minor [n.221] is in itself null.

234. To confirm the gloss about the ‘in vain’ [n.228], I say that in every order of agents, especially where a principle active of itself is not imperfect, there is a stand at some active principle simply perfect – namely that the agent acts from the fullness of perfection and is called an agent from liberality [Ord. I d.8 p.2 q.un. n.13], according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6. ch.5 (95ra). But no agent acts liberally which expects to be perfected from its action. For, just as in human acts he is liberal who acts or gives not expecting return, so similarly an agent is called liberal which is in no way perfected by its production or product.

235. From this an argument is made as follows: in every genus of productive principle that does not include imperfection, a stand can be made at some principle simply perfect; but the intellect is such a principle, and the will similarly; therefore in this genus a stand can be made at something simply perfect. But nothing is a simply perfect agent which does not act liberally, in the way stated [n.234]. Therefore in the genus of this productive genus there is some such principle that is in no way perfected by its production; such an intellect, having thus an actually intelligible object present to itself, is none save that which does not receive nor is perfected through the intellection which it generates or which is by its virtue generated. Therefore it is not necessary that every intellect produces a knowledge so as to be perfected by it, but it is necessary that there is some prior producing intellect that is not perfectible through its product.

236. And when [the objection] says [n.228] ‘then it will be in vain’, this does not follow, for it will be the supreme good; but it is not produced by the producer so that the producer be perfected by it, but it is from the fullness of perfection of the producer.

a. [Interpolation] the product is the supreme good, standing per se, produced from the fullness of the perfection of the very producer; but it is not produced so that the producer be perfected by it.

237. But when afterwards the argument about impossibility is made [n.230], I take it to the opposite, because if some actually intelligible object present to the intelligence or memory of the Father have there actual quasi-produced knowledge of the Father, yet it does not have the actual knowledge produced in the Father. Now from no principle productive of itself is producing taken away as it exists in something, unless that principle be understood to have produced, or to produce, by some production adequate to the virtue of such productive principle; therefore however much the memory, as it is in the Father, have a quasi-product, it can still truly produce a product. But it is true that since it truly had really a product adequate to itself, it will not be able to produce another.

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48 Text cancelled by Scotus: “therefore this is something acting freely, in the aforesaid way.”
49 Text cancelled by Scotus: “When it is further argued about the active and the factive [footnote to n.230], I say that these are accidental differences of productive power, namely active and factive. For universally every power of itself productive of something receivable in something, produces or can produce that producible in any recepive thing proportionate and next to it; but if the producible thing is not of a nature to be received in something, the productive power will produce it, and not in something but as per se subsistent, provided however the productive power be sufficient for producing it without anything else presupposed. So it is in the matter at hand, that the Father has generated knowledge not by acting, that is, by producing something in himself, nor by making, that is, by producing something essentially distinct outside himself; but because the product is of a nature to be received in nothing, and the intellect is a
238. [Second principal reason] – Second principally [n.221] to the principal conclusion [n.220] I argue thus: the object as it is in the memory produces itself, or is a reason for producing itself, as it is in the intelligence; but that the object has ‘existence’ in both places in a certain respect, this is a mark of imperfection, because if the memory were perfect and the intelligence perfect, the object would be simply the same as both; therefore when all imperfection has been taken away, but preserving that which is simply a mark of perfection, the object simply the same as the memory will generate or will be the reason for generating something in the intelligence which it is simply the same as, which is the thing proposed.

239. [The third principal reason] – Further, third in this way: in any condition of being which is not of its idea imperfect, there is a necessity simply of perfection; therefore in the production too because that does not of itself signify imperfection. Proof of the antecedent, because just as the necessary is a condition of perfection in being insofar as it is being, so also it is a condition of perfection in anything dividing being that is not necessarily of itself imperfect and limited. For just as when being is divided through opposites, one of the dividing things is a matter of perfection in being, the other of imperfection, so in anything at all which is a matter of perfection one member of any division at all is possible which is a matter of imperfection, and the other is necessary which is a matter of perfection. But the producer insofar as it is such does not include imperfection, therefore it is not a perfect producer in idea of producer unless it be necessarily producer. But the first producer cannot be necessarily producer of something other than itself and externally, as is said in I d.8 [p.2 q. un nn.12-14]; therefore internally. A similar argument is made about natural production, because natural production is the first production; therefore it belongs to the first producer; but it does not belong to the first producer externally, as will be clear elsewhere [ibid.], therefore internally.

240. [Fourth principal reason] – In addition, opposite relations of the second mode of relatives can belong to the same limited nature, just as to the same will belongs the idea of mover and movable when the will moves itself; but the relations of produced and produced, although they are more repugnant than the relations of mover and moved, are relations of this sort according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.15.1020b26-32, 1021a14-25; for in that place he sets down, for example, the heater and heatable as sufficient productive principle, because it is infinite, therefore it produces a generated knowledge in itself subsistent, which is a person.* And thus the responses to the instances [nn.231-237] are clarifications of the first reason [n.221], and consequently of the principal proposition [n.220].”

*Note added here by Scotus: “Note, why is my agent intellect not able to cause in you an intelligible species, at least in the fatherland?
   Another response perhaps to the instance [footnote to n.230], that the Word is generated in the same intellect as to substance [n.232]. This suffices, without simple identity [n.238], for action distinct from making; an example: if intellection in us is consubstantial, it produces a generated knowledge, etc. [n.233].”

50 Text cancelled by Scotus: “I reply that it is not imperfect, nor does it signify a respect to something imperfect, because necessity in such a relative thing requires necessity in the imperfect thing to which it is [relative].”

51 Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is denied as the natural is distinguished from the artificial, or as nature from intention. It is conceded by philosophers as the natural is concomitant to the intellectual and the volitional; thus is it posited externally.”
relations of the first kind, and father and son, or generated and him whom he generates, as relations of the second.\footnote{Text cancelled by Scotus: “therefore the relations of producer and produced are compossible in the same nature”}

241. The reason is confirmed, and then I argue thus, because just as will is in a way unlimited insofar as it founds some opposed relations of the second mode, namely from the fact it virtually contains that which it is in potency for formally possessing, therefore much more can an essence simply unlimited simply found opposite relations of that sort that are more repugnant, such as are the relations of producer and produced. For the infinity of the divine essence more exceeds any sort of lack of limitation of anything created than the repugnance of any relations of the second mode exceeds the repugnance of any others of the same mode.\footnote{Text cancelled by Scotus: “The reason [n.240] is also confirmed because all relative opposites equally involve contradiction; therefore if some of the second mode do not include it then neither do others.”}

242. According to the Canterbury articles\footnote{Which these articles are is obscure. The articles must at any rate have said that the Trinity is not a matter of demonstration but of faith.} it is necessary that the reasons [nn.221, 238-241] for solving this question not be demonstrations.

243. So, the minor of the first reason [n.221] is not manifest according to natural reason. When it is proved [n.224] I reply: to be a principle of producing belongs really to the memory not whereby it is memory, insofar as memory has a unity of analogy to an infinite and finite memory, but to the finite memory only, not however that finitude is the formal reason of producing, but the nature is, which we specifically call by circumlocution ‘finite memory’. I concede therefore that imperfection is not the idea of producing but perfection is [n.224], yet not a perfection common to finite and infinite perfection, but such perfection as is necessarily accompanied by some imperfection; the reason is because to have the relation of naturally productive cause according to natural reason belongs only to such a perfect thing as is imperfect, because the imperfect is not naturally immediately producible save by the imperfect, and it is not clear but that every producible is imperfect.

244. Therefore the instance against the gloss of the minor [n.233] is to be conceded, that it is not therefore non-active because non-receptive.

245. But to the second instance about a liberal agent [n.235] I reply: here the productive principle is not plain without being necessarily imperfect and perfectible by the product, although that perfectibility not be the idea of acting.

246. To the third instance about the product and quasi-product [n.237] I reply: it is not plain that perfect memory is a principle of producing.

247. To the fourth about acting and making [footnote to n.237]: the response to the major by the gloss is not valid, that ‘it is understood of a principle of producing in which it is univocally, not equivocally’, because – against this – where it is a principle analogically, there it will be more a principle of producing; an example about heat in the sun with respect to heat in fire.

B. Proofs of Others
248. Now a certain doctor argues otherwise in this way: the first person is constituted by relation to the second, and only by relation of origin; therefore one should posit in divine reality diverse supposit of which one is from another, etc. Proof of the first proposition: for the first person is relative to the second; and if he were not constituted by that relation then that relation would either be accidental to him or would be adventitious to the person constituted, which is unacceptable.

a. [Interpolation] and it would be as it were adventitious to the person already constituted….

249. Secondly he argues thus: a virtue supremely active diffuses itself supremely; but it would not diffuse itself supremely if it did not produce something supreme, or unless it communicated a supreme nature to something; therefore etc.

a. [Interpolation] and this a second person

250. Others argue through the idea of good, because the good is of itself communicative; therefore the supremely good is supremely communicative; only internally, because nothing ‘other’ can be supreme.

251. There is a similar argument about the idea of the perfect, because the perfect is what can produce something like itself, from Metaphysics 1.1.981b7 and Meteorology 4.3.380a12-15; therefore the first agent, which is most perfect, can produce something like itself. But more perfect is what can produce something like itself univocally than equivocally, because equivocal production is imperfect; therefore etc.

252. These reasons do not make the intended proposition clear through what is more manifest, either to the faithful or to the infidel.

The first, when it accepts that the first person is constituted by relation, if it intends to persuade the infidel, is accepting something less known than the principal proposition; for it is less known to such a one that a per se subsistent thing is constituted by relation than that there is production in divine reality. If too the reason intends to persuade the faithful it still proceeds from that is less known, because that there is production in divine reality is an evident article of faith; but it is not in this way first evident that this is an article of faith, that the first person is constituted by relation.

a. [Interpolation] because if some per se subsistent person be known to be produced, yet not through relation but rather it would seem to him to be through an absolute.

b. [Interpolation] Nor is the consequence valid [sc. ‘the first person is relative, therefore he is constituted by relation’], because common inspiriting is a relation, and not constitutive.

253. And when it is argued further that the distinction there is only by relations of origin, this not immediately manifest from faith as is the conclusion which it is intending to show.

\[55\] A reference to Henry of Ghent.
\[56\] A reference to Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton.
\[57\] Text cancelled by Scotus: “Also it is not necessary for the intended proposition in general, because even if the distinction were there in another way, origin could still be preserved.”
a. [Interpolation] nor is this consequence valid that ‘the distinction is through relations, therefore through relations of origin’ because not all relations are relations of origin.

254. When he proves it, because otherwise the relation would be adventitious to the constituted person and so would be an accident [n.248], this proof does not seem to be valid, because it could be argued in a similar way about active insp its, about which all hold that it does not constitute a person, nor yet is it an accident, because what the essence is in a person is perfectly the same as the foundation.

255. And when it is argued secondly that something supremely active is supremely diffusive of itself, the response would be that it is true to the extent that it is possible for something to be diffused, but it would be necessary to prove that it would be possible for something to be diffused or communicated in unity of nature.

256. Through the same point to the third argument about the idea of good [n.250], because it would be necessary to prove that communication of the same thing or nature would be possible, because to an impossible that includes contradiction there is no power or communication of goodness.a

a. [Interpolation] and consequently neither supreme communication of goodness.

257. Likewise to the fourth ‘the perfect is of a nature to produce a supreme like itself’ [n.251], it is true as to a supreme as like to it as can be produced; a therefore one ought to prove that a like supreme univocally would be producible.b

a. [Interpolation] but it is not a supreme that is univocally similar, because then it could produce another God.

b. [Interpolation] but this is impossible, because there cannot be several Gods, as was shown in the question about the unity of God [nn.165-181].

II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

258. By holding onto the four reasons [nn.221, 238, 239, 240-241] and especially the first two [nn.221, 238] for the affirmative conclusion to the question, I respond to the arguments for the opposite [nn.201-208].

To the first [nn.201-206] by denying the major.

259. When it is proved first through the necessary from itself and from another [n.202], I say that if the same genus of cause is imported by these two, ‘from itself’ and ‘from another’, it is true that in this way nothing is necessary from itself and from another; but if another genus of cause is imported, to wit through the ‘from itself’ the formal cause and through the ‘from another’ the effective or productive cause, it is not unacceptable for the same thing to be necessary from itself in one way and from another in another way.

260. When the major of the prosyllogism [n.202] is proved, I say that what is necessary from itself formally cannot not exist when any other thing is removed whose removal does not include incompossibility in positing it is other; but ‘necessary of itself formally’ follows ‘being able not to be’ when any other thing is removed through incompossibility, just as from the positing of one incompossible another incompossible follows.
261. But then there is a doubt what the difference is between the necessary from itself of the Son, according to theologians, and of a necessarily produced creature, according to philosophers.

I respond: the philosophers, when positing that creatures are necessarily produced, would have to say that the creatures would have an entity whereby they would be formally necessary, although in that entity they would depend on a necessarily producing cause; but the Son has an entity formally necessary and the same entity as the producer. A creature, then, if it were necessary of itself, could not fail to be when everything else was removed whose removal does not involve a contradiction, although, when a cause other than itself was removed by incompossibility, it could fail to be; but the Son could not fail to be when everything else as to entity was removed, because he could not fail to be unless the person producing was removed, and the producer is not other as to entity than the produced. Hence if the Father were to produce a creature naturally and necessarily, he would produce it formally necessary, and yet it would not then be necessary with as much necessity as the Son now is necessary.58

262. To the second proof of the major [n.203] I say that the logical possible differs from the real possible, as is plain from the Philosopher Metaphysics 5.12.1019b28-30. The logical possible is a mode of composition formed by the intellect, whose terms do not involve contradiction, and so this proposition is possible: ‘God exists, God can be produced, and God is God’; but the real possible is what is received from some power in reality as from a power inhering in something or terminated at something as at a term. But the Son is not possible with real possibility or with a possibility inhering in something or determined to him, because possibility, whether active or passive, is to another thing in nature, as is plain from the definition of active and passive power at Metaphysics 5.12.1019a15-20, that it is a principle of changing another either from another insofar as it is other or from another or insofar as it is other. But the Son is the term of productive power, which abstracts from the idea of effective power, and if that power be called simply power, the term of that power can be said to be simply possible; but that possibility is not repugnant to being formally necessary, although perhaps the possibility of which the philosophers speak, of active and passive power, is properly repugnant to necessity of itself; but this doubt is about active power, if they were to posit that something necessary has a productive principle.

263. To the third proof, when it is said ‘there is order there, so the first person is understood when the second person is not understood’ [n.204], I reply that in the first understanding the second person is not necessarily understood along with the first person if that first person is absolute; but it does not follow from this that, if the first person is understood with the second not understood, therefore the second person is understood not to exist,a just as it does not follow ‘the animal which is in man is understood when rational is not understood, therefore man is understood not to be rational’. b

a. [Interpolation] for here the intellect, by abstracting in this way, does not merely abstract but also divides the things that exist in reality.

58 Text cancelled by Scotus: “A stand therefore is made about the Son, that he is formally necessary of himself, and yet from another producing him efficaciously [interpolation: or by origin], together with whom he has the same necessary entity [interpolation: for necessary formally and non-necessary in origin are not contradictory].”
b. [Interpolation] For it is not the same thing to understand animal without rational when understanding by way of a proposition that it is not rational, and not to understand it to be rational by way of abstraction. Hence this is the order in the intellect: first not to be understood to be, second to be understood to be; but in real existence there is no order.

But on the contrary: in the first stage one must understand that the thing is not, because in that first stage it does not have being, otherwise it would have a priority of being along with that first stage.

To this objection, which is set down in [Reportatio IA d.2 n.142], I reply as follows: it is not understood in that prior stage not to be absolutely but not to be in prior stage of origin, that is, not to be from itself, and it is in this way understood to exist in that prior stage, and absolutely, because that is prior; but in the later stage of origin it is understood to be produced, because it is from another.

264. When, however, you infer change from opposed terms [n.204], you take it as if the produced were understood not to exist when the producer exists, which is false; you are, therefore, changing abstraction without falsehood, which is by not considering the thing from which abstraction is made, into false abstraction, which is by considering that from which abstraction is made not to exist.

265. To the fourth proof [n.205] I say that the person would not be in essence without production; for it has essence through production. The consequence is not: ‘therefore the essence becomes from not having the person to having it’, but the consequence is: ‘therefore the essence, which of its idea does not include person’ (which is true if person is relative, first because then there is something when the relative is taken away, according to Augustine On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2, and second because a respect is not of the idea of an absolute) – the essence, I say – has ‘that production, or through production it has the person in which it subsists’, which person or production, however, is not of the idea of essence. But change does not follow from the fact that something is in something which is not of the idea of it, but change requires that something be in something in which the opposite of it first was, which does not hold in this case.

266. To the fifth proof [n.206] I say that also in generation in creatures two ideas come together, namely that it is a change and that it is a production; but as it is a change it is the form of the changed subject, and as it is a production it is of the produced term as the way [to it]. These ideas do not include themselves essentially even in creatures, because they have a regard first to diverse things. Therefore without contradiction can the idea of production be understood without the idea of change, and in this way is generation transferred to divine reality under the idea of production, although not under the idea of change.

267. To the second principal argument [n.207] I say that this does not follow ‘it is from another therefore it is dependent’. When the proof is given, I concede that nature is equally independently in producer and produced. When it is argued from independence that there will not be pre-requirement, I deny the consequence, because dependence follows the formal entity of the dependent thing on that on which it depends; when therefore they have the same entity, there is not dependence there, but there can be pre-requirement if one supposit have it from a second.

a. [Interpolation] and they have essence equally first by a primacy opposed to dependence.
268. To the final argument [n.208] I say that changes other than generation are of their formal idea more imperfect than generation, because the terms introduced are more imperfect than the terms of generation; yet the other changes do not require, as to what they presuppose, as much imperfection in the subject as generation requires, and this as it is a change, because generation requires in the subject an entity in potency, and this for existence simply, other changes do not.

269. Applying this to the issue at hand, I say that generation is not transferred to divine reality as to what generation presupposes, to wit a changeable subject, which is a matter of imperfection, because as it is a change it is not in divine reality, – but it is transferred to divine reality insofar as it is a production, under the idea in which production is of a term, which term is more perfect than the terms of other changes; and thus can essence be well received through generation as the most perfect term in divine reality, although there could not be received through some other change some other term of other changes, because this would prove composition and imperfection, because the term of any change at all would be an accident combinable with a subject.

III. To the Fourth Question

270. To the fourth question, about the number of productions [n.212], the truth is plain that there are only two productions.

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded.

271. But this is explained by some [Henry of Ghent] as follows: notional acts are founded on essential immanent acts; but there are only two essential acts that abide within, which are understanding and willing; so there are only two notional acts that are productive within, founded on the same essential acts.

272. A confirmation of the reason is because notional acts founded on essential acts are adecuated to them, and so there cannot be a multiplication of notional acts founded on the same essential act.

273. The mode of their founding is this, as is collected from the many statements of him who has this opinion that are scattered about in many places: “Both the intellect and the will, whatever they have being in, because of their separation from matter, after they have being in their own first act of simple intelligence or volition, can turn themselves back on themselves, and on their simple acts and on the objects of them, through acts of turning back or through convexive acts of understanding and willing.”

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A]: This mode is set down, and it is gathered from the many statements of that doctor, scattered about in several places. For, according to him, the word is formed in us in this way, that “when first known it impresses the simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to it as to something purely passive and under the idea by which it is intellect. But the intellect perfect with simple knowledge through a known object, which it contains in itself expressively, is made fecund and a principle active as nature (in itself being as intellect merely and passive principle) for forming in itself declarative knowledge about simple knowledge. And in this respect, when it is said that ‘the

59 Text cancelled by Scotus: “by reason of the imperfect forms introduced they have greater imperfections, or because...”
word is formed by the intellect’ and that ‘the intellect is active in the formation of the it’, this is understood of the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge; for by this as by a formal idea of acting the intellect is an active principle, and necessarily the idea of it in the way intellect is passive, but passive with respect to the simple knowledge it receives from the object, is prior to the idea of it according to which it is nature and active through the simple knowledge inhering in it; and therefore, in the order of reason, it has being first as intellect before it has it as nature, and before the notional act is founded that it performs as nature over and above the essential act which it undergoes as intellect” [Henry of Ghent, Summa a.54 q.10 ad 2], namely over and above the simple knowledge of the object which it receives as it is bare.

But as to how the intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to the intellect as purely for producing he makes clear in this way, because “both the intellect and the will, whatever they have being in, because of the separation of it from matter, after they have had being in their own first act of simple intelligence or volition, can turn back on themselves and on their simple acts and on their objects through the acts of turning back of understanding and willing.

For the intellect not only understands truth by simple intelligence but also by conversive intelligence, by understanding that it understands and by turning itself back on the intellecative object and on the simple act of understanding and on itself understanding through its own conversive act, because the second knowledge of the intellect which is in the word not only knows and understand the thing but knows and understands it in such a way that it knows that it knows and understands that thing. Likewise the will not only wills the good with simple volition, but also with conversive volition, by willing that it will, by turning itself back on the willed object and on the simple act of willing and on itself willing through its conversive act.

But this turning back belongs to the intellect and the will in one and the same way and partly in different ways. For the fact that both turn themselves back as they exist as bare, pure, and mere powers, this belongs in one and the same way to them as far as concerns their turning themselves back; for both turn only themselves back by their own active force, which force belongs equally to them but in different ways as concerns the objects to which they turn themselves.

For the intellect, after it has turned back to the things to which it has turned back is disposed as a certain potential and pure possible, and this because the bare and pure intellect is of a nature to receive from them – as a proper passive thing from its proper natural active thing (which active thing indeed is the same intellect informed with simple knowledge) – the informing of declarative knowledge. But the will, after it is turned back to what it is turned back to, is related as a certain active thing, and this as a bare and pure will of a nature to express about them – as a proper active thing about its proper passive thing (of which sort is the same will when informed by simple love) – a certain incentive love about those things [ibid. a.60 q.1 in corp.].” Applying this to the proposed case in divine reality [he says], “the intellect as existing in the Father in an act of understanding his essence, which act the essence itself operates in its own intellect as it is in potency, as it were, to essential knowledge according to the idea of understanding – this intellect is fertile with natural fertility for producing from itself something like itself, to which it is as it were in potency through the fact that it is in act under that essential knowledge. For the intellect, as it is a certain essential knowledge in act, is nature and the active principle by which the Father forms from the same intellect, as it is pure intellect and only intellect, as from a passive principle, the knowledge which is the Word, which in reality is the same knowledge as that from which [the Word] is formed, differing from it only insofar as it proceeds from it as making it manifest and declaring it” [ibid. a.54 q.10 ad 2].

‘Therefore on the part of the intellect an act of saying is caused by simple knowledge in the bare intellect when it is turned back on itself and on its simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed with simple knowledge is an active and eliciting principle of the notional act of the intellect. But the bare converted intellect itself is only a passive principle, from which, as if from some material, the Word is produced as though by impression. Now,
on the part of the will, a notional act is caused by the bare will itself when turned back on itself and on its simple love and on its will informed with simple love, such that the bare converted will is an active and elicitive principle of the notional act of the will. But the will itself, informed with simple love, is a quasi-passive principle, from which, as from some material, the Holy Spirit is produced” [ibid. a.60 q.4 ad 1]. "not by an informing of that from which he is as it were subjectively, nor through any impression made on the same according to the manner in which the Word or the Son proceeds from the Father by a certain quasi-informing or impressing made on the converted paternal intellect, as it is a sort of knowledge declarative of simple knowledge, but by a certain quasi-striking or expulsion or progress or – speaking more properly – by a certain expressing of what is produced from that from which it is subjectively produced” [ibid. q.1 in corp.].

In this way, then, the mode is plain in which, according to this opinion, the notional act is founded on the essential act, and how it is founded in diverse ways on the intellect and the will.

b. [Interpolation] For the word is formed in us, according to him, in this way, that “when first known it impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to it as to what is purely passive and under the idea under which it is intellect. But the intellect when thus perfected with simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressively in itself, is made fecund and an active principle as nature, impressing it on itself as intellect merely and as a passive principle for forming a declarative knowledge in itself about simple knowledge, as – according to this – when it is said that ‘the word is formed through the intellect’ and that ‘the intellect is active in the formation of the word’, this is understood of the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge, by which knowledge, as by the formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle; and necessarily the idea of it as it is intellect and passive with respect to the simple knowledge which it receives from the object is prior to the idea of it according to which it is nature and active through simple inherent knowledge; and therefore, in the order of reason, it has being first as intellect before it has it as nature.” But how intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to the intellect as pure for producing the word, it is made clear thus, because… [as in nn.276-277 below].

274. “For the intellect not only understands truth by simple intelligence but also by conversive intelligence, by understanding that it understands, by turning itself back on the understood object and on the simple act of understanding and on itself understanding through the conversive act, because the second knowledge which is in the word not only knows and understand the thing but knows and understands it in such a way that it knows that it knows and understands it. Likewise the will not only wills the good with simple volition, but also with conversive volition, by willing that it will, by turning itself back on the willed object and on the simple act of willing and on itself willing through its conversive act.

275. But this turning back agrees with the intellect and the will partly in one and the same way and partly in different ways. For the fact that both turn themselves back as they exist as bare, pure, and mere powers, this is in one and the same way as far as concerns their turning themselves back; for both turn only themselves back by their own active force, which force agrees equally with both, but in different ways as concerns the objects to which they turn themselves back.

276. For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it is turned back, is related as a certain potential and pure possible, and this as the bare and pure intellect is of a nature to receive something from them, as a proper passive thing receives from its proper natural active thing, which active thing indeed is the intellect informed with simple knowledge, and this in respect of the formation of declarative
knowledge. But the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, is related as a certain active thing, and this as the bare and pure will is of a nature to express something about those things, as a proper active thing about its proper passive thing, which is the same will, informed by simple love, about which – when thus informed – the same will as bare is of a nature to express incentive love, who is in the divine reality the Holy Spirit, who has being from the persons producing him, not by an informing of that about which he is subjectively, nor through any impression made on the same according to the manner in which the Word or the Son proceeds from the Father by a certain quasi-informing or impression made on the paternal converted intellect, but by a certain quasi-striking or pushing out or progress or – speaking more properly – by a certain expressing of what is produced from that from which it is subjectively produced.”

277. “On the part of the intellect an act of saying is caused by simple knowledge in the bare intellect when it is turned back on itself and on its simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed with simple knowledge is an active and eliciting principle of the notional act of the intellect. But the bare converted intellect itself is only a passive principle, of which, as if of some material, the Word is produced as though by impression. Now, on the part of the will, a notional act is caused by the bare will itself when turned back on itself and on its simple love and on the will informed with simple love, such that the bare converted will is an active and elicitive principle of the notional act of the will. But the will itself, informed with simple love, is a quasi-passive principle, from which, as from material, the Holy Spirit is produced according to a certain expressing.”

278. But how the intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to intellect as pure for producing the Word, this is made clear in this way, because [point f] “the intellect as essential not existing in the Father, or, which is the same thing, existing in an act of understanding its own essence, which act the essence itself as it were brings about in its own intellect as it is in potency, as it were, to essential knowledge according to the idea of understanding – this intellect is fertile with natural fertility for producing from itself something like itself.”

279. Now the intellect, as it is a certain essential knowledge in act, is the nature and as the active principle, by which the Father, as he is pure intellect and only intellect, forms from the same intellect, as from a passive principle, the knowledge which is the Word, which in reality is the same knowledge as that from which it is formed, differing from it only insofar as it proceeds from it as manifesting and declaring it.

280. And in the whole same way must we thus understand the word to be formed in us. For a thing when first known impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to the intellect as to something purely passive and as under the idea in which it is intellect. But the intellect thus perfected by simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressively in itself, is made to be fertile and an active principle by way of nature, making impress on itself as it is intellect only as on a passive principle, so as to form in itself declarative knowledge about simple knowledge, so that – according to this – when it is said ‘a word is formed by the intellect’

60 Text cancelled by Scotus: “as it is declarative knowledge about simple knowledge.”
61 Text cancelled by Scotus: “And hence is apparent the difference between intellect as intellect and intellect as nature.”
62 Text cancelled by Scotus: “to which it is as intellect, as it were, in potency through the fact that it is in act under that essential knowledge.”
and that ‘the intellect is active also in the formation of it’, this is understood about the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge, by which, as by the formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle; for by this it is a principle, and its idea as it is intellect and passive with respect to the simple knowledge, which it receives from the object, is necessarily prior to its idea according to which it is nature and active through inherent simple knowledge; and therefore, in order of idea, it has being as it is intellect before it has being as it is nature.”

281. Thus then is the mode made plain how, according to this opinion, the notional act is founded on the essential act, and how it is so in diverse ways in the intellect and the will [nn.273-280].

B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected.

282. This opinion posits four articles which I do not believe to be true. The first is that the divine Word is generated through impression [nn.273-280]; the second is that this is through impression on the intellect as it is turned back on itself; the third is that essential knowledge is the formal idea of generating declarative knowledge; the fourth is that it is generated through impression on the intellect as bare.

283. [Article one] – I set aside the rejection of the first article until distinction 5 [I d.5 q.2 nn.2-10], where it properly has place.

284. [Article two] – Against the second article I argue in a threefold way: first that on the intellect thus turned back the Word is not impressed, the second that such turning back is not necessary for generating the Word, the third that there is no such turning back.

285. I argue for the first as follows, namely\(^\text{63}\) that the intellect is not turned back save as it is in some supposit, because turning back is posited as an action, and actions are of suppositos. Then I ask, whose supposit or whose person is it as turned back on the formed intellect? If as so converted it belongs to the person of the Son, and according to you this conversion precedes the generation of the Word, then before the generation of the Word there are two persons, which is heretical. But if, as it is turned back on the formed intellect, it belongs to the Father himself, and if whose it is as converted is his as formed by generated knowledge, as I will prove, then the intellect as it is of the Father is formed by generated knowledge; therefore generated knowledge is formally of the very person of the Father, because what person the intellect is of as formed, of the same person is the knowledge by which it is formed. The assumption that needs to be proved I prove thus: whose it is as it is turned back on formed intellect, his it is as he has formed intellect for object actually present; therefore it is his as formed by the object. The proof of this consequence is that a passive thing proportioned, disposed, and approximated to a proportioned sufficient active thing is of a nature to be immediately perfected by that active thing, from the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.5.1048a5-7; for then is something in proximate potency, according to the Philosopher, when nothing needs to be added, subtracted, or lessened for the act to be present within. But the intellect bare, as converted and having formed intellect as present object, is a passive thing disposed, proportioned, and approximate to informed intellect as to a sufficiently active object; therefore the bare intellect as converted – with no variation made with respect to it of subsistence or any

\(^{63}\) Text cancelled by Scotus: “The first is that, in the intellect as turned back bare on the intellect formed by simple knowledge, generated knowledge is formed; this I refute as follows…”
entity at all as such – is formed generated knowledge. And thus is the first consequence proved.\textsuperscript{64}

286. Here a response could be made that the intellect bare, through the fact that from it the knowledge is actually formed, or by the fact it is a quasi-matter informed by generated knowledge, has ‘existence’ in the generated person [I d.5 q.2 n.8]. But against this response are the two first arguments set down in d.5 [\textit{ibid.} nn.5-8] against the opinion about quasi-matter, which is there specifically refuted.\textsuperscript{a}

\begin{itemize}
\item a. [\textit{Interpolation, replacing what follows after ‘intellect bare’}] of which generated knowledge is formed, it is communicated to the Son by an act of producing generated knowledge, – about which we will speak in distinction 5, and so I pass over it here.
\end{itemize}

287. I argue for the second [sc. of the second article, n.284] thus,\textsuperscript{65} because the intellect of the Father, having the object present to itself, is a natural principle, not only operative with respect to the intellection of the Father but also productive with respect to generated knowledge; therefore it would still, when the reflection is removed, be a productive principle.

288. Again\textsuperscript{66} I prove the third [= the second, n.284] thus: if by conversion nothing is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood to be there when no conversion is understood, then conversion is nothing there; if something is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood without the conversion, what, I ask, is it? – not the presence of the object, not the perfection of the power, not finally the determination of the power to act or to the exercise of act. As to how some posit that the will in us turns the intelligence back toward memory, it is plain that the will does not turn it back toward generation of the divine Word.

289. Again, this conversion is not the action which is operation, because it is not intellection nor volition, nor is it an action productive-of-which.

290. [Article three] – The third\textsuperscript{67} article [n.282] is that the intellect informed with actual essential knowledge is a principle active and elicitive of generated knowledge.

291. This I refute\textsuperscript{a} as follows: the Word is not generated by intelligence but by memory,\textsuperscript{b} according to Augustine \textit{On the Trinity} XV ch.14 n.24;\textsuperscript{c} therefore, although in

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{64}] Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, that the Word be formed of the intellect as bare, and yet that it be impressed on the intellect as the intellect has essential knowledge [\textit{the matter of the fourth article.} n.282], do not seem to stand together, because the idea under which it is the proximate of-which is also the proximate in-which; but at point f [n.278] he says that it is quasi-in potency to the Word through the fact that it is in act under essential knowledge” [see cancelled text at n.278].
\item[\textsuperscript{65}] Cancelled text: “The third article [sc. in the primitive text] is that the turning back of the bare intellect on the formed intellect is necessary for the bare intellect to be formed by the formed intellect [n.277]. This I do not see [canceled in effect].”
\item[\textsuperscript{66}] Note by Scotus: “b the second reason, c the third reason along with the fourth; d is another article, for which there are five reasons.” Note by editors: Scotus speaks thus uniquely for designating the place of the third article [n.290], for because d is the fourth letter of the alphabet, so in the fourth place is this third article to be placed. According to this note the text is in order. Let the note be understood in this way: the second place b is for the second reason [n.287] of the second article, the third place c is for the third reason [n.288] of the second article, with the fourth [n.289] of the same article; the fourth is not a place for a reason but for another article, namely that for which there are five reasons, that is, the third article [nn.290-296]. He says ‘five reasons’ because he is not counting n.294. He did not say a is the first reason, because the first reason is the primitive text and, as such, was internal, within the column.
\item[\textsuperscript{67}] Instead of ‘third’ Scotus put ‘second’, which is corrected in effect.
\end{itemize}
the Father memory, intelligence, and will go together, the Father does not generate the Son formally by intelligence as ‘by which’ but as he is memory. Now as he has actual knowledge quasi-elicited and as second act, he is in act of intelligence, to which belongs all actual understanding; therefore as such he will not generate the Word, but as it is in act of memory, that is, as he has the intelligible object present to his intellect; for here first act is understood as if preceding second act, and second act is to understand actually.

a. [Interpolation] But that intelligence or essential knowledge in the Father is not the formal idea of acting or generating the Word, I prove.

b. [Interpolation] [not] through an act of intelligence but through an act of memory.

c. [Interpolation] at the end: ‘the way,’ he says, ‘that the Word of the Father is knowledge from knowledge, etc.’; knowledge according to him is only ever in the memory.

d. [Interpolation] according to Augustine On the Trinity 15 ch.7 n.12 however.

292. Second thus: production more agrees with first act as active principle than with second act, because perfect operations are ends in their idea, and so they are not for the sake of other ends; therefore intellection as it is the operation of the Father is not the formal productive idea of any term, but only the first act (by virtue of which the operation is elicited) will be the productive principle.

293. Third thus: if the actual intellection of the Father is the formal idea of producing the Word, still the object as present to the Father’s intellect as having the idea of memory will be the prior productive principle of generated knowledge, because it is apparent in us that it is of a nature to generate more immediately than the act of understanding is; therefore some Word will be generated by the Father as he is memory itself before generated by him as he is knowing intelligence itself.68

294. Further, all intellection, since its being is in becoming, has a principle or quasi-principle whose being is not in becoming, because otherwise there will be a process to infinity; therefore of some understanding of the object $a$, to wit the first understanding, only the memory must be the principle or quasi-existing such that it is not the whole complex ‘intellect understanding’ [n.221], otherwise this would not be the first intellection. But all understandings of $a$, and in an intellect of the same idea, are of the same idea. But whatever is a perfect principle of the first thing in a species can be the principle of anything else and immediately; therefore perfect memory of $a$ can be the immediate principle or quasi-principle of every understanding of $a$. Therefore the memory of the Father can be the immediate principle of the Word; therefore he necessarily is.

On the contrary: therefore the memory of the Son to the intelligence of the Son is not as the memory of the Father to the intelligence of the Father.

68 Text cancelled by Scotus: “There is a confirmation, that for you essence quasi-operates the essential act of understanding in the paternal intellect [n.278]; the essence then as present to the intellect is a sufficient principle ‘by which’ with respect to actual intellection; but the fact that it is only a quasi-principle with respect to it as it is in the Father is because the intellection of the Father is not producible; therefore with respect to actual producible knowledge it will be simply the principle ‘by which’, and so the first Word will not be produced by the actual intellection of the Father as by formal productive idea.”
295. Further, the Word is most immediately declarative of that by which he is most immediately expressed; therefore if the elicitive idea of the Word be the actual knowledge in the formed intellect of the Father, it follows that the Word be more immediately Word or declarative of the intellection of the Father than of the essence of the Father, which seems unacceptable, because then there would be another prior Word that would be immediately declarative of the essence of the Father, or one should say that the essence could not immediately be declared by some Word, which seems unacceptable, since according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.10 n.19: “knowledge formed by the thing which we contain by memory” is the word; the first object of the divine memory is essence as essence.

296. Further, if the actual intellection of the Father were generated or produced, it would be produced by virtue of the essence not as already known but as prior to all knowledge; this is plain also according to truth, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in acts of understanding, namely act before act, and also according to them, because he said above [Henry of Ghent, n.278] that the essence itself in the Father’s intellect does in the Father the act of understanding the essence. From this I argue as follows: actual knowledge of the essence cannot formally be of a different idea in the persons by the fact that it is communicated by another or not communicated by another, because then deity would formally be of a different idea in the persons; therefore actual knowledge of the essence is of the same idea in the Father and in the Son. Therefore, that which, if it were principal, is of a nature to be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to one, the same will be principal with respect to another if it follow the principal.  

a. [Interpolation] because one person has it from himself and another not.

b. [Interpolation] But it has been made clear [in the note to n.293] that actual knowledge in the Father, if it were generated, would have the essence as formal principle; therefore when, in the Son, it is generated and of the same idea, it will have the essence for formal principle, not therefore the intellect or simple knowledge.

297. About the fourth article [n.282], I pass over it, except that in this he [Henry of Ghent] seems to be contradicting himself, as was argued before [footnote to n.285].

298. The second article [n.282] is also false in us, because the most perfect word will be in the fatherland, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 nn.20-21, and yet it will not be a word generated by a turning back on first act, so that the word, because of this, is a reflex act in the way he says that by the second knowledge which is in the word the intellect knows that it knows or understands [n.274]. But the proof that it is not reflex knowledge [n.287] is that the most perfect created word does not have for its first object something created but something uncreated.

299. The third article too [nn.282, 290] is false in us; both because confused knowledge cannot be the elicitive principle of distinct knowledge, just as neither can an imperfect thing be the elicitive principle of some perfect production; and because the confused actual knowledge would exist together with distinct actual knowledge, and so

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69 Instead of ‘second’ Scotus put ‘third’.
70 In place of ‘third’ Scotus put ‘second’. The editors note: the correction is made virtually. In the primitive text n.298 comes after n.299, but it is transposed virtually.
two elicited acts together, or a confused act would, when it did not exist, generate a distinct act; and because every second act of understanding is generated by memory as memory is in a first act proportional to it, namely perfect by perfect, imperfect by imperfect, as will be clear later [I d.3 p.3 q.2 nn.12-13].

C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

300. I say then to the question that there are only two productions distinct according to formal ideas of productions, and this because there are only two productive principles that have distinct formal ideas of production.

Of this causal statement I prove the antecedent and the consequence.

The antecedent I prove as follows: every plurality is reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to; therefore the plurality of active principles will be reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to. But it cannot be reduced to some single productive principle. The proof is because the principle would determinately have one mode of being principle, or the mode of being principle of one of them: for either it would be of itself determinately productive by way of nature, or not determinately of itself but freely productive, and so by way of will; therefore these cannot be reduced to some principle as it were third from these that would, namely in producing, have the idea of neither of them. Nor is one reduced to the other because then one would in its whole genus be imperfect, which is false, because since it belongs to both from the same perfection to be an operative and productive principle (which was proved in the preceding solution, in the proof of the minor of the first syllogism there given [nn.224, 226]), and since neither is in itself imperfect insofar as it is productive, for then it would not exist formally in God, therefore also is neither imperfect insofar as it is productive.

302. The productive principles, therefore, cannot be reduced to a lesser fewness than to duality of principle, namely a principle productive by way of nature and a principle productive by way of will. Now these two principles, according to their ideas of being principle, should be placed in the first being, because in it there is every idea of principle that is not reduced to another prior principle. Therefore there are only two productive principles of different idea in the first productive thing, namely one productive by way of nature and one productive freely. Now these are inward productive principles are, because any productive principle which is not reduced to another prior principle is of a nature to have a production and a product adequate to itself; therefore the productive principle which is will is of a nature to have a product adequate to it, and the productive principle which is nature is of a nature to have a product adequate to it. These productive principles are infinite, therefore the products adequate to them can only be infinite. Also omnipotence in the first thing cannot have a possible infinite object, because then the creature could be infinite; but nothing is formally infinite except God.

71 Text cancelled by Scotus: “the productive principles which are nature and will have opposite modes of being principle, because one is of itself inclined to acting naturally, the other has the producing freely in its own power, such that it is not of itself naturally inclined to this; but if they were reduced to some single productive principle...

72 Text cancelled by Scotus: “I prove that perfect memory is productive inwardly by way of nature, from the preceding solution [nn.225-226], because perfect intellect, insofar as it is an operative power, is of a nature to understand an object as much as the object is knowable, and thus, to the extent it is a productive power of generated knowledge, it is of a nature to be a principle of as much knowledge as there can be of
from the question ‘Whether there is a God’ [nn.39, 74-147]. Therefore these principles are productive of some things in the divine nature.

303. Further it follows: if there are only two productive principles of different idea, then there are only two productions numerically. The proof is that each productive principle has a production adequate to itself and co-eternal; therefore while that production stands it cannot have another.73

D. Instances against the Solution

304. An objection is raised against this deduction [nn.301-303] as follows: nature is of itself a determinate principle for acting; but in divine reality intellect whereby it is intellect not only seems to be a determinate principle for acting but also an essence by nature as it is in some way prior to intellect, being its root as it were and foundation, in the way that any essence seems to be the foundation of a power; therefore not only the intellect but also the essence itself as essence should be set down as having the idea of being principle of the principle which is nature as it is distinguished from will.

305. Second, there is a doubt about these productive acts, how they belong to those productive principles whose the essential acts are; for since acts distinguish powers, *On the Soul* 2.4.415a16-20, it seems that to the powers to which the essential acts [understanding, willing] belong, the notional acts [generating, inspiriting, n.271] do not belong.

306. Third, the proof does not seem to be valid which is adduced for showing that the duality in productive principles cannot be reduced to unity [n.301], for to be principle necessarily and to be principle contingently are opposite modes of being a principle and yet this duality is reduced to unity. And I concede that the ‘one thing’ has determinately

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73 Note cancelled by Scotus: “One must keep in mind that the whole matter of distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un.] turns on the antecedent of this causal argument [n.300], therefore either let the dispute about the antecedent be deferred thither, or let the whole of it be touched on here.

Second, it will be done better if this question is moved, ‘Whether productions are precisely distinguished according to the distinction of formal principles of producing’. The solution of this question depends on these questions: ‘Whether essence as essence is formal principle of communicating essence’ (and as to the former ‘That thus’ in the Collations [16], and as to the latter ‘It is objected to the contrary’ etc. [n.304]); again, ‘Whether there can be the same formal principle of producing with respect to distinct products’ (as here at ‘Fourth, whence’ etc. [n.307]); again third, ‘Of what sort is the distinction of principles of producing’, but this pertains to the question about the distinction of attributes [I d.8 p.1 q.4].

Note, for the solution of the question [‘Whether productions are precisely distinguished…’] let the proposition be: ‘Whatever of the same idea extends itself to many things of the same idea is not determined of itself to as many such things as it extends itself’. The proof is in the relation of what is common to supposit and in the relation of cause to effect. From this proposition follows that neither does the divine nature, insofar as it is common, determine for itself a number of supposit, nor insofar as it is a principle of producing – if it is such a principle – will it determine for itself a number of things from the principle; therefore if there is a definite number of persons, it will be because the productive principle is distinguished. Thus are [the first] two ‘Whether…’ questions solved; the third requires a proof through the adequation of one or a single principle to a principle of one idea.’
one of these two modes, the mode namely that is more perfect and prior. So it should be
said, in the matter at hand, that to the principle which is nature – because it is prior in
idea of being principle – is the will reduced, although it have the opposite mode of being
a principle.

307. Fourth, whence is proved the proposition ‘when one act adequate to the
power stands, the power cannot have another act’ [n.303]? If it understand adequation
according to extension, the question is begged; if according to intension, it seems to be
false. For although the vision of the Word is adequate to the intellective power of the soul
of Christ, yet it can also know by an elicited act some other intelligible; it is plain too that
God knows himself by a knowledge adequate to his intellect according to intension, and
yet he knows things other than himself. If this is how it is about an act adequate to the
operative power, which allows of another, much more does it seem to be so of the
productive power, because its product is not in the productive power as operation is in the
operative power.

308. Again, a principle is not a principle insofar as the thing that has the principle
is already understood to be posited in existence, but insofar as it is prior to that thing;
now as it is prior it is not differently disposed by the fact that what has it as a principle is
posited to be in existence. Therefore if, when this thing is not posited, it could be the
principle of another thing, it seems by parity of reason that, when this thing is posited, it
could at the same time be the principle of another thing, because when the first thing is
posited the principle, insofar as it is principle, that is, insofar as it is prior to what has it as
a principle, is in no way differently disposed.

309. The solution of these two ultimate questions [nn.307-308], and the
clarification of the reason against which they are made, and the proof of the conclusion
for which the reason is adduced, namely that there are only two productions – let them be
dismissed to distinction 7 [n.358], in the question ‘Whether there could be several Sons in
divine reality’ [I d.7 q.2].

310. [Response to the instances] – To the first [n.304] I reply that this whole ‘the
intellect having an object actually intelligible present to itself’ [n.211] has the idea of
perfect memory in first act, namely the idea that is the immediate principle of second act
and of generated knowledge; now in this principle that is memory two things come
together which constitute one total principle, namely essence in the idea of object and
intellect, each of which is per se a quasi-partial principle with respect to a production
adequate to this total principle. When therefore it is argued that the idea of nature belongs
not only to intellect but to essence [n.304], I reply that the total principle, including the

74 Note cancelled by Scotus: “Note: the instances against the antecedent are about the matter of distinction
13 [I d.13 q. un], however let some be touched on here, at least the first one [n.304]; the second [n.305] can
be against the preceding solution [nn.221-241, 258] rather than here, and the argument about the distinction
of intellect from nature in idea of principle [nn.216-217] is proper here.
The instances against the consequence [nn.307-308] pertain to the question ‘Whether two Sons’,
in distinction 7 [n.309].
Look in the other part of the folio for the four instances [nn.316-319] against the rejection of the
second article of the opinion [nn.290-296]; of which two are put first for confirming the opinion [nn.316-
317], the other two are against the reasons against the second article of the opinion [nn.318-319].”
essence as object and the intellect as a power having the object present to itself, is the productive principle which is nature and is the complete principle of producing by way of nature. For if essence as object did not have the idea of principle in the production of the Word, why would the Word be said more of the essence than of a stone, if from the sole infinity of intellect as productive principle an infinite Word, when any other object whatever was present, could be produced?

311. To the second doubt [n.305] I say that memory in the Father is the operative principle of the Father, by which, namely, as by first act, the Father formally understands as in second act; the same memory of the Father is also the productive principle by which the Father, existing in first act, produces, as in second act, generated knowledge. The productive act, therefore, is not founded on the essential act, which consists in second act, namely which is a quasi-operation on the formal idea of eliciting the second productive act, but in a certain way pre-requires that second act, because the first act, which is operative and productive, is the idea of perfecting a supposit in second act, in which it exists first by a certain order before that which is produced is understood to be produced or perfected. For what operates and produces through that principle is operating before it is producing.

312. An example. If ‘to shine’ were set down as some operation in a luminous thing, and ‘to illuminate’ were set down as production of light by the luminous thing, light in the luminous thing would be the principle ‘by which’ both with respect to the operation which is ‘to shine’ and with respect to the production which is ‘to illuminate’; yet ‘to shine’, which is an operation, would not be the formal idea of the illumination that is production, but would be there the order, as it were, of the effects ordered to the same common cause of both, from which one effect proceeds more immediately than the other. So it is in the matter at hand. A certain order to the same first act, which is the memory of the Father, is understood to be possessed by the ‘to understand’, which is an operation of the Father, and by the ‘to say’, which is the ‘to produce’ of the Father with respect to generated knowledge; not such an order that the ‘to understand’ of the Father is the cause or elicitive principle of the ‘to say’ of the Word, but that the ‘to understand’ is more immediately quasi-produced by the memory of the Father than the ‘to say’ or the Word is produced by the same memory. So there is not such an order there as is posited by the first opinion [of Henry of Ghent, 280] in the idea of a presupposed object or in the idea of the formal principle of acting, but only the prior order of quasi-product to product, with respect to the same principle, a principle common to quasi-product and product.

313. And then to the passage of On the Soul, about the distinction of powers by acts [n.305], one could say that ‘to quasi-produce’ and ‘to produce’ are acts of the same idea; for if that which is not produced but quasi-produced were really distinct from the producer, it would truly be a product; therefore what is now present without production, though by virtue of a principle which would be productive of it if it could be made
distinct – and to this extent let it be called a quasi-product – does not vary the act formally from the act by which it would be produced were it producible.

314. Another response would be about the agent and possible intellect, but I pass it over now; I have not yet said to which intellect, as to partial principle, it belongs to produce knowledge (this will be spoken of below), but I have now spoken about the intellect indistinctly [n.232].

315. To the third [n.306] I say that when two principles have opposite modes of being principle, neither of which requires any imperfection, neither is reduced to the other as to a prior in nature, although there could there be some priority of origin, as it were, or something of the sort. But now neither of these principles includes any imperfection, no more insofar as it is productive than insofar as it is operative; therefore one of them will not be reduced to the other as to a prior in nature, nor both to a third, for the same reason, because neither is imperfect, and also because the third thing would be a principle according to the idea of one or other of them, because there is between them no middle in being principle, and so, if both were reduced to a third, one would be reduced to the other and the same to itself.

316. Against these [nn.310–315] an instance is made, and first in this way: intelligence is in the Father under the proper idea of intelligence, and the Word is the proper perfection of intelligence as intelligence; therefore the Word belongs to the intelligence of the Father [n.290], which was before denied [nn.291–296].

317. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.12 n.22: “The Word is vision of vision;” therefore actual knowledge is the idea of generating the Word [n.290].

318. Further, there does not seem to be a difference between memory and intelligence in the Father, therefore to reject the Father as he is intelligence from being the principle of the Word and to reject the Father as memory does not seem to be different; therefore you are approving and rejecting the same thing [nn.310, 291].

319. The fourth instance is: there seems to be no reason why the Father produces generated knowledge in this act and not in that, since each is second act and is a principle by virtue of the same first act [nn.311, 292].

320. To the first [n.316] I say that the Father is formally memory, intelligence, and will, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12: “In the Trinity who would dare to say that the Father only through the Son understands himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but only per se remembers either the Son or the Holy Spirit?” – there follows – “who would presume to opine or affirm this in the Trinity? But if there only the Son understands and neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit are understanding, one is reduced to the absurdity that the Father is not wise about himself but about the Son.” So St. Augustine. He understands, therefore, that the Father is formally memory for himself, intelligence for himself, and will for himself; and in this respect there is a dissimilarity between the persons and the parts of the image in us, according to him.

When therefore it is said that ‘the proper act of intelligence is the Word’ [n.316], I deny it; rather it belongs to the idea of the Word that he is generated knowledge.

312. You say that it suffices that he be declarative knowledge.

I deny it, understanding by ‘declarative’ a relation of reason, as of the intelligible to the intellect; for such is the relation of the actual declarative knowledge of the Father, by which the Father formally understands, to the habitual knowledge of the Father as he is memory, such that the object present to the Father’s intellect is made clear as equally
by the actual knowledge of the Father as by the actual knowledge that is the Son, – and yet the actual knowledge of the Father is not the Word, because nothing can exist formally in the Father save what is non-generated.

322. When it is said, second, that there is ‘knowledge of knowledge’ [n.317] I reply that the selfsame Augustine expounds himself On the Trinity XV ch.11 n.20: “the vision of thinking is most similar to the vision of science;” and ibid. ch.12 n.22: “Then is the Word most similar to the thing to be known from which he is generated, and the image of it: vision of thinking from vision of science.” – These phrases are intransitive. For as ‘vision of thinking’ is nothing other than thinking, so ‘vision of science’ is nothing other than science. It is the same thing then to say that from the vision of science the vision of thinking is born as to say that from science thinking is born. But ‘science’ is habitual science, which perfects memory, according to the same Augustine ibid. ch.15 n.25, where he says: “If there can be in the soul some eternal science, there cannot be eternal thinking of the same science.” The ‘eternal’ according to him pertains to memory, ‘non-eternal’ to intelligence. He does not then intend the phrases ‘vision of vision’, ‘knowledge of knowledge’ to mean anything other than that second act, which is vision or thinking in intelligence, is born from the first act that is habitual vision or science, according to him.

323. To the third instance, when an argument is made about the difference between memory and intelligence [n.318], I say that those adversaries do not posit a real difference between the intellect and the will of the Father, and yet these have so much difference that one can be the elicitive principle of some production of which the other is not the formal elicitive principle; for the Son is not produced formally by way of will. Therefore although the memory and intelligence of the Father do not differ really, there is yet as much difference between them that one of them could be posited as the elicitive principle of some production of which the remaining one is not posited as the formal elicitive principle. Such difference is plain according to Augustine ibid. ch.7 n.12 and as before [n.291]. For the difference is such that if the Father by way of memory were knowing but not understanding, he would not be perfect, according to the Philosopher Metaphysics 12.9.1074b17-18, notwithstanding the identity of memory with intelligence or of recollection with understanding.

324. To the fourth instance [n.319] I say that this is an immediate contingent proposition, ‘heat is heating’ and this an immediate necessary one, ‘heat is able to heat’, because there is no middle found between the extremes of either of these. So I say that this proposition is per se, ‘operation insofar as it is operation is not productive’, because operations as operations are the ends and perfections of the one operating [n.292]; but production as production is not the perfection of the producer but contains the term produced outside the essence of the producer, or at any rate not formally in the person of the producer.

325. Why then does the first act by which the Father understands or formally operates not produce?

I reply that the ‘to understand’ is the ‘to operate’ of the Father by his own idea, and is not the ‘to produce’; but by production or by speaking he produces in the way that something heats by heating, of which there is not formally another prior cause.

326. But as to your statement that the principle of these two acts is the same [n.319], without interchange of mode of agent intellect and possible intellect [nn.314, 232], it can be conceded that, from the fullness of perfection, there can belong to
something that it operate and that it produce something other than itself. This, however,
will be plain when it will be asserted that ‘to say’ is not some act of understanding
formally [I d.6 q. un. nn.2-4]; it is however some act of intellect. But no act of
understanding is formally productive, but some other natural act, preceding or following,
can be productive – of which sort is the act of saying.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

327. To the principal reasons [nn.212-218]. – To the first [n.212] I say that
Averroes in comment 49 on Physics 8, whose text begins “Whether each of the moving
things,” is only speaking expressly of man, and on this point he is contradicting Avicenna
(On the Nature of Animals, XV ch.1 59rb-va), as he himself says in the same place. He
imputes to Avicenna, then, that he posited that man could be generated equivocally, – and
in that case the conclusion of Averroes [n.212] is true, because nothing univocally
generable can be generated equivocally unless it is so imperfect that an equivocal or a
univocal cause is sufficient for its generation; and therefore imperfect beings can be
generated univocally and equivocally but not perfect ones. However, the reasons of
Averroes [nn.213-214] seem to prove the conclusion not only about man but about any
species of natural generable things; and if he intends this, his conclusion is false and his
reasons not conclusive.

328. That his conclusion [n.212] is false is plain from Augustine On the Trinity III
ch.8 n.13. And the reason of Augustine in the same place is that a generated thing
propagates other things through putrefaction; but the propagators are univocal with the
things generated by them; therefore things propagated and generated by putrefaction are
univocal.

329. But if Averroes deny the assumption of bees and animals, he cannot deny it
of plants, because plants equivocally generated, that is, not generated from seed, do
afterwards produce seed univocally, from which are generated other plants of the same
species.

330. Augustine also contradicts him in Letter to Deogratias q.1 n.4,\(^{a}\) and so does
Ambrose On the Incarnation at the end, ch.9 nn.101-102.

\(^{a}\) [Interpolation] where he says: ‘Many kinds of animals are procreated from earth without
parents, and yet they produce their like among themselves; nor is there because of the diversity of
their birth any difference as to the nature of those which are procreated from earth and those which
come from their coitons; for they live and die in similar way although they have a dissimilar
birth’.

331. But Averroes also contradicts himself in other places about this conclusion.
For about the equivocal generation of accidents he himself makes it plain in On the
Heavens 2 com.42, where he concedes that in accidents there is not always generation
from something univocal; and he sets down an example about heat and fire: for he posits
that heat is generated equivocally from the motion and the concourse of rays, and also
univocally from heat. – In substances too it is plain that fire is generated univocally and
equivocally. That it is generated equivocally is plain from On the Heavens com.56: “The
proceeding of fire from a stone is not in the chapter on transfer but in the chapter on
alteration,” that is, it is not generated by transference but by alteration; it is also generated
by local motion, *Metaphysics* 12 com.19, and *Meteorology* 1 summa II ch.1, about the generation of ignition by striking. – Again the same is plain about animals, that many are generated equivocally, *Metaphysics* 12 com.19: “For wasps seem to come to be from the bodies of dead horses, and bees from the bodies of dead cows, etc.”

a. [Interpolation] Fire, then, that is generated by the motion of striking a stone and from the reflection of the rays of the sun is generated equivocally, and yet the fire thus generated univocally generates fire.

332. But that all the aforesaid things generated equivocally are of the same species with things generated univocally is proved because they have the same operations, and about the same objects; by the same things they are preserved and by the same things corrupted. They have the same motions, either as to going upwards or going downwards, or as to progressive motion, and the same organs of progressive motion; but from the unity of motion Aristotle concludes, in *On the Heavens* 1.2.269a2-7, to the unity of nature, and the Commentator in com.8 at the same place says: “one motion comes only from a unity of nature.” These – the latter and the former – also have limbs of the same species, and “the limbs of a lion do not differ from those of a deer save because soul differs from soul,” Averroes *On the Soul* 1 com.53. And generally all the middle terms that can prove unity of species, whether these terms are taken from acts or from operations, prove the intended proposition about the univocity of things generated in this way and in that.

333. Averroes’ conclusion is also contradicted by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a9-14, 30-b7, where he means that, just as some same things come to be by nature and by chance, namely when the principle is in a matter similar to what would be the principle of the motion of making if the same thing were to come to be by art, so he means that some natural things come to be by nature and chance, and some do not; and in the same place Averroes’ meaning – and the text beings “Therefore just as in syllogisms” [*Metaphysics* 7 com.31] – is that those things can be generated without seed (and consequently, according to him, equivocally) in whose matter can be introduced by the virtue of the heavens some virtue similar to the virtue of seed in propagated things.

334. Therefore the opposite of the conclusion of Averroes is plain, if he be understood generally and universally.

335. His arguments too are not conclusive. – To the first [n.213] I reply: matter according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a24-25 is that “from which, although present within, a thing comes to be;” ‘although present within’ is added to differentiate the opposite case, when a thing comes to be from what is transmuted and corrupted but is not within the thing come to be. – But if he take the phrase ‘a form of the same nature belongs to matter of the same nature’, speaking properly of matter as it is a part of the thing existing within it, I concede the point; but if he take matter for the opposite, for that from which when corrupted the composite is generated, I deny it: for fire of the same species is generated either from corrupted wood or from corrupted air. And in things propagated and putrefied the matter is of the same nature in the first way but not in the second way.

336. To the second [n.214] I say that something is not said to happen rarely or for the most part because it is in itself a frequent or rare event; for a falling stone breaks someone’s head more frequently than the moon is eclipsed. But this difference should be
understood by comparison of something to its cause: and the effect is said to be something happening for the most part which has a cause ordered to its effect which produces the effect for the most part; that is said to come about rarely which does not have a cause ordered to its coming about, but arises only from some cause which is ordered to another effect but which has been prevented from the effect it is ordered to, and it comes about rarely from such preventing. – The rare or for the most part are also taken as they distinguish between contradictory opposites, not as they distinguish between disparate things.\textsuperscript{a}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Interpolation} Between contradictories, because for the most part and more often than not, if the sun approaches such matter, a mouse will be generated, the distinct within the diverse; as to diverse matters it is opposite, because a mouse more rarely comes to be from putrefaction than from generation.
\end{itemize}

337. So when he [Averroes, \textit{Physics} 8 com.46] argues that if this generable thing is generated equivocally, or not from seed, ‘then either from necessity’, and I concede that it is not, ‘or for the most part or rare’, and I concede that it is for the most part, in comparison with a cause that is determinate, and also as it is a disjunction between contradictories,\textsuperscript{a} although it more rarely happen that this generable thing be generated not from seed than that it be generated from seed, namely as two disparate things are compared with each other.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Interpolation} namely by comparing an equivocal effect with an equivocal cause under disjunction to contradictories.
\end{itemize}

338. But that in the first way it happen for the most part there is proof: for in this way \textit{per se} the sun is a cause ordered to generating not from seed, just as a propagating cause is ordered to generating it from seed. If he infer that if in the second way something happens rarely then it happens ‘by chance’, the consequence does not follow, – and so he argues further about causality insofar as those things are said to be by chance that happen only from an impeded cause of another thing; and therefore, as he says, chance things are monstrous and not perfect in any species [n.214].\textsuperscript{75}

339. When the argument is made, third, about motion and its term [n.215], I reply that this proposition ‘of motions different in species the terms are different in species’ is not an immediate one, but it depends on these other two: the first is ‘in motions differing in species, the transient forms, or forms according to which there is transience, are different in species’; the second is, ‘a transient form, or a form according to which there is transience, is of the same nature as the terminating form’. When one of these two is false, the assumed proposition is false. So it is in the matter at hand, because the form induced by production is not of the same idea as the form which is quasi-transient or according to which there is quasi-transience.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{75} Text cancelled by Scotus: “which chance things – properly speaking – do not come about from a cause ordered to producing them, but an impeded cause ordered to producing something else produces a chance thing.”

\textsuperscript{76} Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it is false when one of those two is false is plain, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by circular and by direct motion, which are also motions of a different species and incomparable, according to the Philosopher \textit{Physics} 7.4.248a10-b6; but this is because the form which is
340. But the difficulty of Averroes’ arguments still seems to remain. For although
the same nature could be communicated equivocally and univocally, yet not by
something of the same species, but it is only univocally communicated by an individual
of one species and equivocally by a superior cause; but divine nature is not
communicated by any superior cause, but only by something in the same nature; therefore
it seems that the nature would not have a communication save of one idea.

341. I reply that created nature cannot be communicated save by a communication
of one idea from a supposit of that nature; the reason is that the effect does not exceed the
cause. But the effect communicated by such a supposit is nature; therefore the principle
of communicating must be nature, because nothing more perfect than nature exists in
such a communicating supposit, nor anything equally perfect as nature. But nature is a
principle communicative of one idea; therefore to a supposit acting by virtue of nature
there belongs a communication only of one idea.

342. The opposite exists in matter at hand [sc. the divine nature], because a
supposit of this nature can have principles of a different idea in producing, each of which
is equally perfect as the nature, and therefore each can be a principle of communicating
nature; and so here there can be a twofold communication by the supposits that are of this

divine nature. 77

343. If objection be made that the twofold principle of operating in us, namely
intellect and will, is equally perfect as the nature, because it is the same as the form,
according to one opinion about the powers of the soul, – I reply: 78 although in us there is
a twofold operative principle, will and intellect, and both are perfect principles of
operating and can have perfect operations adequate to themselves in idea of perfection of
operation, yet they do not have operations adequate to themselves in being, that is,
although by our intellect we can have an intellection as perfect as any can belong to our
nature, yet this intellection will not be as perfect a being as nature, because an intellection
adequate to the intellect, as to a power or object in idea of operation, is not adequate to
the object or intellect in being. The intellect, therefore, and the will, namely in the
creature, although they are principles of producing operations adequate to themselves in
idea of operation, yet not so in being, and consequently much more not really adequate to
the nature of which they are intellect and will.

the term of the transience does not have a specific distinction, just like the form which is transient or
according to which there is transience.

However it may be with the example, one must perhaps expound the Philosopher there and hold
that the ‘where’, which is transient in a circular or straight line, is of the same idea insofar as the ‘transient
where’, whether straight or circular, which are accidents of the line or magnitude over which the motion is,
are not of the same idea; and therefore in this respect they are incomparable, but not in respect of the
‘where’ or the ‘transient where’ per se; and therefore not in respect of motion per se. At least this is true as
to the example here adduced, that when the transient form is of a different idea from the terminating form,
one should not conclude from a distinction of motions to a distinction of terms.

But in the matter at hand production is of a different idea from the terminating essence as from
the formal term taken from it, because production is relation but essence is for itself; and therefore a plurality
of productions does not prove a formal distinction of the terms of them.”

Note by Scotus: “This response [nn.241-242] is valid in responding to the first instance made against the
solution of this question [n.304].”

Text cancelled by Scotus: “A further reason for what is here [nn.241-242] supposed, namely about the
twofold principle of communicating nature in divine reality, but not in creatures, can be set down of this
sort:…”
Thus can one argue about any productive principles in creatures, the distinction between which principles stands in the same supposit of any nature.

344. But in divine reality the operative principle is not only equal to the nature in idea of operative principle but also in being; the operation too is equal to the operative principle, and that in being, and consequently it is equal to the nature. Likewise the productive principle is equal to the nature in being. 79

345. To the arguments which prove that there are not just two productive principles in God [nn.216-218], – When first it is argued about nature and intellect that they are two distinct productive principles, from the Philosopher Physics 2.5.196b17-22, I reply that the Philosopher spoke little about the will as it is distinguished from the intellect, but he commonly conjoined intellect with will in idea of active principle; and therefore in the Physics 2 passage, where he distinguishes these active principles, namely nature and intellect, the intellect should not be understood there as it is distinguished from the will but as it goes along with the will, by constituting the same principle in respect of things artificial.

346. This will be plain from the response to the instance of the Philosopher from Metaphysics 9 [n.217], to which instance I say that the intellect is compared to its own nature and its own proper operation, of which it is in some way the elicitive and productive principle; and it is compared also to the operations of the other powers, with respect to which it is the directive and regulative power. If it is taken in the first way, I say that it is merely nature, both in eliciting and in producing; for whatever act of understanding it produces with the object present in memory, it produces merely naturally, and whatever operation it operates, it operates merely naturally.

347. Now the will as productive with respect to its proper operation has an opposite mode of producing, and this is sufficiently clear from the Philosopher Metaphysics 9.5.1048a8-11, where he treats of how a rational or irrational power is reduced to act; and he argues that a rational power, which of itself is for opposites, cannot of itself proceed to act; for then it would proceed to opposites at the same time, because it is of opposites at the same time; and from this he concludes that one must posit, in addition to that rational power, another rational power, a determinative one, by which the former is determined and can, when determined, proceed to act.

348. And from this it follows that the intellect, if it is of opposites, that it is so of opposites, namely by way of nature, that as far as concerns itself it is necessarily of opposites; nor can it determine itself to one of them, but requires something else as determinant which can freely proceed to act on one or other of the opposites; but this is appetite, according to him, or choice.

349. An example. The sun has the virtue of producing opposites, namely liquefaction and constriction. If there were two things nearby, one of which was liquefiable and the other coagulable, the sun would, by necessity of nature, have to elicit those two acts in them, and if some same thing were nearby that was of a nature to receive opposites at the same time, the sun would, by the necessity of nature, at the same time produce the opposites, or neither of them.

350. The power of the sun, therefore, is merely natural, although it is of opposites, because it is of them merely by itself such that it cannot determine itself to one of them

79 Text cancelled by Scotus: “and so by it can be communicated a formal term of production adequate in being to itself and to nature.”
alone. Such a power is intellect, as it is precisely intellect, with respect to understood opposites; and there is not there any determination to one of them and not to the other, save to the extent the will concurs.

351. Now the Philosopher commonly speaks of intellect according as it constitutes with the will one principle with respect to artifacts, and not as it is naturally elicitive of its own operation; and therefore as to the fact he sometimes distinguishes intellect against nature and sometimes art and sometimes intention, it is the same intellect in all cases.

352. When, finally, the statement is made about the will, that it is the principle in respect of creatures [n.218], I say that the will of God is first naturally the productive principle of some product adequate to it before it is the productive principle of something non-adequate; what is adequate to the infinite is infinite, and so the creature is a secondary willed, and produced by the will of God secondarily.

IV. To the Second Question

353. To the second question, when the question is asked about the trinity of persons in divine reality [n.197], I reply that there are only three persons in the divine essence.

The proof is as follows: there are only two produced persons and there is only one un-produced person; therefore they are only three.

A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

354. About the first proposition I first prove that there are two produced persons [nn.355-357], second that there are not more [358].

355. To prove that there are two produced persons I prove first that there is one produced person, and this as follows: the intellect as it is perfect memory, that is ‘having an object actually intelligible present to itself’ [n.221], is through some act of itself productive of an adequate term, namely an infinite one, from the preceding question [nn.302, 222]; but nothing produces itself, On the Trinity I ch.1 n.1; therefore what is produced by the act of the intellect is in some way distinguished from the producer. It is not distinguished essentially, because the divine essence, and any essential perfection intrinsic to it, is indistinguishable, from the question about the unity of God [nn.89-104], therefore the thing produced is distinguished personally from the thing producing; therefore there is some person produced by the act of intellect.

356. There is a similar argument about the produced act of will [footnote to n.302, nn.222, 226].a

a. [Interpolation] But you will say that one and the same person can be produced by each production. On the contrary.

357. Now, that the person produced by this act and by that are different persons, the proof is because the same person cannot be produced by two sufficient and total productions; but this production is different from that one, from the preceding question [n.303]; therefore by this and that production the same person is not produced but two are. Proof of the major: if the same thing were produced by two total productions, it would
receive being sufficiently by each; but if it receives being sufficiently from the producer by this production, it would perfectly have its being by no other posited production; therefore it cannot receive being through another production, because then it would not exist without it.

a. [Interpolation] nay, when everything else is removed.

358. Further, that there cannot be more produced persons than these two I thus prove: there can only be two productions inwardly. This was in some way proved in the preceding question [n.303], but it was deferred to distinction 7 [n.309] to be finally made clear; so let this now be certain, that there are only two productions inwardly. But neither of these can be terminated save in one person, because a produced person is the term adequate to the production; therefore etc.

B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

359. It now remains to prove that there is one person not produced. a

a. [Interpolation] the non-produced person is one only.

Here one doctor says [Henry of Ghent] that this is shown the way the unity of God is shown. The thing is also clear from Hilary On Synods n.26, where his meaning is that someone who says there are two unborns is confessing two gods. a

a. [Interpolation] See the authority in the text [Reportatio IA d.2 n.205].

360. Again Henry [of Ghent] Summa a.54 q.2, where he argues to the opposite: “cases of being unborn would be of the same idea, and so there would be several properties of the same idea in the same singular nature, namely deity, which is impossible, whether these properties be absolute or relative; the thing is clear in the case of creatures.”

361. Again he there argues: “an unproduced person is a first principle; therefore several first principles.”

362. Again, in the solution: “Richard [of St. Victor] On the Trinity V ch.4: ‘the person not from another has power through the essence; wherefore he has in himself all power’.”

363. To the first [n.360]: there are in this as many negations of the same idea as there are other possibilities of the same idea; being unborn is a negation. – In another way: several relations are in the same thing, III d.8 q. un.

364. To the second [n.361]: now are three persons one principle of everything else.

365. To the third [n.362]: all power is in respect of any possible whatever. Nor can the reason be colored as the reason is colored about omnipotence in the question of the unity of God [n.180]; it is plain why not.

363. Further he argues in this way: several absolute suppositps cannot exist in this nature, because nature does not exist in several absolute suppositps without division of nature; there will then be several relative suppositps. Either therefore by mutual relation among themselves, or in relation to some other things. But if there were several
unproduced supposita, they would not be distinguished by relation to other supposita, because not by relation to producing supposita, because ex hypothesi there are none; nor by relation to produced supposita, because they would have to them the same relation, as now the Father and the Son have the same relation of active inspiriting to the Holy Spirit. Therefore they would be distinguished by relations among themselves, and this by relations of origin, which is the intended proposition.

367. These proofs do not seem sufficient. The first [n.359] is not, because the unity of God is proved from the fact that divine infinity is not divided into several essences; but it is not as manifest that the idea of ‘ungenerated’, or of ‘unborn’, is not in several supposita, – both because the idea of ‘unborn’ does not state any perfection simply, from which perfection simply the unity of being unborn could be concluded in the way that from infinite perfection the unity of the divine essence is concluded; and because indivisibility does not prove incommunicability. – Likewise, the authority of Hilary which he adduces [n.359] says that it is so but does not prove that it is so.

368. And when he assumes in his argument that several absolute persons cannot exist in the same nature [n.366], how is this more known than the conclusion? For he who would posit several ungenerated persons would not say that they are formally constituted by any relations; therefore, contrary to him, to assume that there cannot be several absolute persons seems to be to assume what is more immanifest than concluding to it.

369. When he says further that they are not distinguished by relations among themselves, because this would only be by relations of origin [nn.366, 253, 248], he would have to prove this consequence. 80

370. So I prove the intended conclusion in another way thus: whatever can be in several supposita, and is not determined to a definite number by something other than itself, can, as far as concerns itself, exist in infinite supposita; and if it is a necessary being, it does exist in infinite supposita, because whatever can exist there does exist there. But if what is ungenerated can exist in several supposita, it is not determined by another as to how many supposita it is in, because to be determined by another to existence in a supposit or supposita is contrary to the idea of the ungenerated; therefore of its own idea it can exist in infinite supposita; and if it can exist in them, it does, because everything ungenerated is of itself a necessary being. The consequent is impossible, therefore also that from which it follows. 81

VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

371. To the arguments. – When it is argued ‘they are equally noble, therefore they are so many [n.197]’, there is figure of speech, by change of ‘what’ or ‘what sort’ to ‘how many’. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is: for it is not because of the

80 Text cancelled by Scotus: “For when it has been conceded that the distinction is only by relations of origin, the intended proposition would be quickly obtained.”
81 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Second thus: plurality should never be posited without necessity; by no necessity, whether to itself or outwardly, does it happen that there are several unguns; therefore there is only one. – Third, because one essence actually existing does not seem of itself to have very immediately several modes of existing. The opposite would follow if there were several ungenerated supposita. But it does not follow now, because the divine essence does not have very immediately several modes of existing without production, but only one mode of existing without production and another two with mediating productions also.”
nobility or ignobility of the relation of principle or principled that it is multiplied or not multiplied, but unity is of the idea of principle, although in principled things there can be plurality, because there is always reduction of plurality to unity. And so, with equal nobility standing, there can be multiplication in the relations of the produced though not in the relations of the producers.

372. Another response is that there any relation of one idea is of itself a this, yet from the several relations of the producers there can perhaps be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘productive’, and so from the several relations of the produced there can be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘produced’. Although therefore there is one relation in common – if there is a common abstractable – which is called in common ‘relation of producer’, yet there are two relations of the producer, in this way and in that, just as there are two relations corresponding to them.

373. To the second reason [n.198] I concede that to relations on the part of the produced there correspond relations on the part of the productive, and as many relations, but it does not follow ‘if the relations of the produced are distinguished personally, therefore so are the relations of the producer’; the reason assigned for which is because on the part of the producer another idea of producing is sufficient, just as artificial and natural production are thus distinguished through productive principles, namely art and nature, although they come together in the same supposit. But the relations of the produced cannot so come together in the same supposit and in one person, but they are personally distinct, because the produced is per se subsistent and a suposit.

374. Another response is plain from the solution of the question [nn.357, 172-173], because the same thing cannot be produced by two total productions, although the same thing can produce by two total productions; and therefore the relations of the produced are not multiplied in the same thing, although the relations of the producer can be multiplied.

375. To the third [n.199]: a finite power cannot have at the same time two adequate terms in the being produced, although it can have one in the being produced and another in the having been produced; but an infinite power has its term within always in the being produced, and this term is adequate, and therefore it cannot have several terms.

VII. To the First Question

376. To the first question [n.191] I say that unity of essence and plurality of persons stand together, as appears from the solution of the preceding question [nn.353-370], because this plurality of persons exists there together with this unity.

A. Declaration of Scotus’ Own Solution

377. Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant of their own proper ideas, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper ideas of compossible things.

378. But to see this compossibility one must look at the idea of the extremes, namely of nature and suposit.

82 Text cancelled by Scotus: “because the relations of the produced can be distinguished because of the distinct ideas of producing that are in the producer, although it is the same supposit producing.”
Here one should note that nature is not related to supposit as universal to singular, because in accidents too singularity without the idea of supposit is found, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene On the Orthodox Faith III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is nature related to supposit as ‘in what’ to ‘what’, for to each ‘in what’ there corresponds a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’, and so, as nature is the ‘in what’, so it has a proper ‘what’ or ‘who’ which it does not contract to the supposit; and as the supposit is the ‘what’ or the ‘who’, so it has a proper ‘in what’ in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is by necessity a singular, – and also, it cannot be an ‘in what’ with respect to something else, because it is substistent, incapable of being the act of some subsistent thing; these two state a twofold incommunicability.\footnote{Text cancelled by Scotus: “The idea of the supposit then exists in a double incommunicability.”}

379. Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is ‘it’, or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is ‘by it’, not ‘it’.

380. In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.\footnote{Text cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued as follows: divine nature, and whatever belongs to this nature as it is nature, is ‘perfection simply’; every ‘perfection simply’ is communicable to many things; } Any nature at all, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposit, each of which is ‘it’, – and also as ‘in which’, as form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or is in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by an opposed double incommunicability.

\[\text{a. [Interpolation]}\] such that matter is actually a being through form.

381. On this basis the intended proposition is made clear.

And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things through identity, therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before \[\text{nn.353-370}\]); but it is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God \[\text{nn.157-190}\]; therefore it is communicable without division.

382. Again I argue thus: ‘perfection simply’ as far as concerns itself, whatever be incompossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, \textit{ex hypothesi}; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a unique subsistence, therefore it is of itself incompossible with any other subsistence also precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as it is another subsistence.

383. The proof of the first consequence is because, just as something of itself determines for itself a unique [supposit], so anything else incompossible with that is repugnant to it; \textit{ex hypothesi} divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a unique subsistence – this subsistence and as this – in idea of subsistence, not considering it only because it is in this nature.

384. The proof of the second consequence is because, just as it is incompossible with this, so it is not better than this than is anything else incompossible with it.\footnote{Text cancelled by Scotus: “This also is argued as follows: divine nature, and whatever belongs to this nature as it is nature, is ‘perfection simply’; every ‘perfection simply’ is communicable to many things;
385. There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and this as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction of itself, perfect several parts of matter.

386. An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any kind of distinction or extension of itself, whether per se or per accidens, perfect another part of organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without extension per accidens.

387. From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter, this belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole, this belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, is taken from the soul this which is ‘to perfect matter’, and from the many distinct things this which is ‘to be parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not inform matter, but does give total being, and this to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but per se subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, from which everything of imperfection is taken away, can give total being to several distinct supposits.

B. On Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

388. But there still remains a further difficulty. For it does not seem intelligible that the essence not be multiplied and that the supposits be several unless some distinction be posited between the idea of essence and the idea of supposit. And therefore, to preserve this aforesaid compossibility [nn.376-387], one must see about this distinction.

389. And I say, without assertion and without prejudice of a better opinion, that the idea by which the supposit is formally incommunicable (let it be a) and the idea of essence as essence (let it be b) have some distinction that precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect.

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Therefore etc. Proof of the minor: ‘perfection simply’ is that which in anything whatever ‘is better it exist than not exist’, Monologion ch.15; which fact is understood in this way, that ‘perfection simply’ is better than whatever may be incompossible with it, in any supposit at all absolutely considered, that is, not determining what nature it is subsistent in. But if the divine nature determined itself to incomcommunicable subsistence, it would in no other subsistence be better than anything incompossible with it save in that subsistence to which it determined itself, because it would be incompossible with any other subsistence; therefore it would not be ‘perfection simply’.

Text following on from this, also cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued on the part of the idea of supposit; for because a supposit is of its idea incomcommunicable simply, it is not necessary that that idea include any idea of entity through identity, and thus can another distinct idea of supposit stand, and therefore the idea of supposit is not ‘perfection simply’ in the aforesaid way [in the previous paragraph of this footnote]; but if two distinct ideas of supposit can stand, then so can two distinct supposits, and without division of nature; therefore etc. – This fourth.”
390. I prove this as follows: the first supposit formally or really has a communicable entity, otherwise it could not communicate it; also it really has an incommunicable entity, otherwise it could not be positively a supposit in real entity. And I understand ‘really’ thus, what in no way by an act of an intellect considering it, nay what would be such an entity there if no intellect were considering it; and to be in this way there if no intellect were considering it I call ‘to be before every act of intellect’. – But there is not any entity before every act of intellect, such that it is not communicable by an act of intellect and another entity is of itself incommunicable such, namely, that to be communicated contradicts it, unless there is before every act of intellect, that is, not precisely through an act of understanding, some distinction between this entity and that; therefore etc.

391. If you say that before every act of intellect of the Father there is not there any distinction but an entity altogether of one idea, and thus the Father has no positive entity in himself which he does not communicate to the Son; therefore he communicates to him paternity just as he does essence!

392. There is an argument, second, as follows: one distinction in the intellect is in the presence of a diverse mode of taking the same formal object, and this either by conceiving it grammatically, as ‘man’, ‘of man’, or logically, as ‘man’ and ‘this man’; another distinction, a greater one, is in the intellect by conceiving two formal objects for two acts, and this whether diverse things correspond to them, as when understanding man and ass, or whether one thing outside does, as when understanding color and what diffuses [sc. sight].

393. From this I argue: the Father, when understanding himself in the first moment of origin, either understands the essence and property as diverse formal objects, or precisely as the same object under different modes of conceiving. But not in the second way, because then there would be no greater difference than when conceiving God and deity, and so one would not conceive the property as more incommunicable than incommunicable deity, for man is not incommunicable if humanity is communicable, nor conversely; so it is in the matter at hand. And then too the intellect of the Father would not be more blessed in the divine essence than in a, which is said to be a property of the Father, nor more in a than in a property of the Son, and thus in two objects, as in the property of the Father and of the Son, he would first be blessed.

394. And if the first mode be given, that the paternal intellect has the essence and a as two formal objects, then I argue: that intellect understands nothing save intuitively, because – as will be plain from I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24, 28 [above n.139] – every abstractive and non-intuitive understanding is in some way imperfect. But intuitive knowledge is of an object as the object is present in actual existence, and this in itself or in another containing eminently its whole entity; therefore, as to things that are known intuitively as formal distinct objects, either one is contained eminently in another, or each according to its own existence terminates the act as the act is of it. But nothing intrinsic to a divine person is properly contained in something eminently, because then it would not be a being save by participation in the thing containing it; therefore all intrinsic things that are diverse intuitive formal objects, according to their proper actual existence,

85 Text cancelled by Scotus: “on the contrary: therefore the Father communicates that whole entity of one idea.”
terminate intuition as objects, and so they have some distinction before the act of understanding.

395. If you say that the essence makes of itself one concept in the intellect of the Father but the paternal intellect can make diverse ideas about it and precisely in the second mode are essence and a in the paternal intellect distinguished but not in the first mode [n.393], – on the contrary: whatever the intellect, without the action of the object, causes about the object precisely by the proper virtue of the intellect (and this when speaking of the object as it has known being in the intellect precisely and of the intellect as considering it), that thing is precisely a relation of reason. But now the idea which the essence makes of itself is plainly absolute, otherwise it would not beatify the intellect of the Father; besides this absolute idea there is no other in reality before the act of the intellect, or the intended proposition is attained [n.389]; also there is for you no other idea in the intellect of the Father save through an act of intellect busy about it and not through an impression made by the object, which, for you, only imprints one concept; therefore any idea at all other than the absolute idea of the essence would be precisely a relation of reason, and thus the property of the Father by which he is incommunicable will be a relation of reason, which seems unacceptable.

396. Second, it is necessary to see [n.388] of what sort the difference is that is posited to precede every act of intellect.

I say that both in things and in the intellect a major difference is manifest, and that from it a minor difference is frequently inferred that is not manifest, just as from the difference of creatures a difference of ideas is inferred in the divine intellect, as is plain from Augustine On 83 Diverse Questions q.46 n.2. In reality, however, a distinction of things is manifest, and this a twofold one, namely of supposits and of natures; in the intellect there is manifest a twofold difference, namely of modes of conceiving and of formal objects [n.392].

397. From what has been said is inferred the difference here intended, which is not manifest, namely because it is least in its order, that is, among all those that precede intellection.

398. Now the inference is made from real difference in this way: the distinction of divine supposits is real; therefore since it cannot be that the same formally agree in reality with the same (which is something of itself) to such an extent that it not be distinguished from it, and differ from it in reality to such an extent that it not agree with it (because if it is altogether the same in reality, why is this so great a principle of identity and non-distinction and the same so great a principle of distinction and non-identity?), there is inferred some difference or distinction of the essence in which the supposits agree from the ideas by which the supposits are distinguished.

399. Likewise in the second way [n.396]: from the difference of formal objects, neither of which is contained eminently in something (and this in an intellect considering intuitively), there is inferred some difference, prior to an act of intellect, in the things that are known intuitively [n.394].

400. But will this distinction then be called real?

I reply: it is not an actual real, understanding (as is commonly said) ‘actual real difference’ to be that which is a difference of things and a difference in act, because in one person there is not any difference of things, on account of the divine simplicity; and
just as the difference is not a real actual so it is not a real potential, because nothing is in potency there that is not actual.

401. But it can be called ‘a difference of reason’, as a certain doctor said [Bonaventure]; – not that ‘reason’ be taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as ‘reason’ is taken for the quiddity of a thing according as quiddity is an object of the intellect.

402. Or, in another way, it can be called ‘virtual difference’, because what has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but it is one thing, having virtually and pre-eminently two realities as it were, because to each reality, as it is in that one thing, there belongs, as if it were a distinct thing, that which is a proper principle for such reality; for in this way does this reality distinguish and that one not distinguish, as if the former were one thing and the latter another.

403. Or, as most properly, let it be said: just as we can find in unity many grades – first, there is the least unity of aggregation; in the second grade there is unity of order, which adds something above aggregation; in the third there is unity per accidens, where beyond order there is an informing, although accidental, of one by another of those things that are in this way one; in the fourth there is a per se unity of a thing composed of essential principles per se in act and per se in potency; in the fifth there is unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for whatever is there is really the same as any at all, and is not just one with the unity of union, as in other modes) – so, still further, not every identity is formal. But I call identity formal where that which is called thus the same includes that with which it is thus the same in its own formal quidditative idea and per se in the first mode. Now in the matter at hand essence does not include in its formal quidditative idea the property of a supposit, nor conversely. And therefore it can be conceded that, before every act of intellect, there is a reality of essence by which essence is communicable, and a reality of supposit by which supposit is incommunicable; and before an act of intellect this reality is formally not that one, or it is not formally the same as that one, in the way that what ‘formally’ is was expounded before [n.390].

404. But should not, then, some ‘distinction’ be conceded?

It is better to use this negative ‘this is not formally the same’ than ‘this is distinct thus and so’.

405. But surely this follows, a and b [n.389] are not the same formally, therefore they are formally distinct?

I reply that it need not follow, because formality is denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent.

406. Briefly then I say86 that there is in the divine essence before an act of intellect entity a and entity b, and this one is not formally that one, such that the paternal intellect when considering a and considering b has, from the nature of the thing, that which makes this composite true ‘a is not formally b’, but not precisely from any act of intellect about a and b [n.389].

407. This difference is made clear by an example:87 if whiteness be set down as a simple species not having in itself two natures, yet there is in whiteness something really whereby it has the idea of color, and something whereby it has the idea of difference; and

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86 Text cancelled by Scotus: "omitting the words about distinction of reason and virtual distinction [nn.401- 402]; not because they are badly said but because it is not necessary to use them; I say…"

87 In place of ‘an example’ Scotus put ‘examples: first’
this reality is not formally that reality, nor formally the reverse, nay one is outside the reality of the other – speaking formally – just as if they were two things, although now by identity those two realities are one thing.

408. But this example, although it is in a way similar to the matter at hand (namely as to the fact that real identity does not necessarily entail the formal identity of anything that is in something thus the same with anything that is in it), is yet not altogether alike, because there is some composition in whiteness, although not of thing and thing, yet of a sort that would not be conceded in God, because of formal non-identity. But where formal non-identity of some things in the same thing requires some composition, and where it does not, will be stated in distinction 8 in the question about attributes and in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [I d.8 p.1 q.4.3].

409. This formal distinction or non-identity, which was proved before by two or three reasons [nn.390, 394, 398], can also be proved by two or three authorities of Augustine:

*On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 ‘about big things’ or ‘about little things’: “Every essence which is said relatively is something other when the relative is excepted;” and: “If the Father is not something to himself he is altogether not one who may be said relatively.” In reality therefore he is essence to himself and not to another, and in reality the Father, insofar as he is Father, is said relatively, or he is in relation to something or someone other; but he is not formally the same entity to himself and not to himself; therefore etc.

410. Again in the same place ch.2 n.3: “He is not Word by that by which he is wisdom, because the Word is not said to himself but only relatively to him of whom he is the Word, as Son to Father; but he is wisdom by that by which he is essence.” And from this he concludes: “Wherefore not because the Father is not the Son…is there for that reason not one essence, because by these names of theirs relatives are indicated; but both are together one wisdom, one essence.” There is, therefore, according to him such a non-identity of relation with absolute in divine reality that if one is the ‘by which’ with respect to another, the other will not be the ‘by which’ with respect to the same; but to be the ‘by which’ belongs to someone according to his formal idea; therefore one of them is not of the formal idea of the other but is outside it, and consequently he is not formally the same as the other, just as the idea of that which is ‘not to be the same’ was expounded above [n.403]. And yet from this does not simply follow a real diversity or non-identity of substance and relation. For that by which the Father is Father is not other than the

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88 Text cancelled by Scotus: “An example could be posited about a quantitative whole, by subtracting the things that are of imperfection and positing those that are of perfection [nn.386-387]; but it would be unlike in more things than like [n.408], so let it be omitted.” [It is stated in *Lectura* I d.2 n.273: “a quantitative whole is taken possessing parts, and we imagine that the extension of the parts is taken away and that the parts remain, and that one part is another by identity, still the formal idea of one part will be outside the formal idea of another part.”]

89 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Augustine therefore understands that in the way the Father is Father, in the same way he is wisdom and in the same way essence, not in the same way is he Father and God” [cf, *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9]

90 Text cancelled by Scotus: “Augustine in the same place: ‘Now substance will not be substance, because it will be relative’; and there follows: ‘It is absurd for substance to be said relatively’ (deduce: therefore the converse is absurd’).”
essence but the same, according to Augustine himself91 City of God XI ch.10 n.1: “God is called simple because he is what he has, except that each person is said relatively to another;” nor is essence “as the Father has a Son but is not the Son,” but “whatever the Father has in himself, to which he is” as a consequence “not said relatively, that he himself is” by true identity, although not by formal identity.

VIII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

411. [To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.191] I say that the major is to be understood in this way: ‘all things that are by some identity the same as another are by such identity the same thus among themselves’, because an identity of extremes with each other cannot be concluded unless they are according to that identity the same as the middle and the middle is in itself in this way the same; and by this proposition so understood ‘every syllogistic form holds’. For when one or other condition is omitted, whether of the unity of the middle in itself or of the extremes to the middle, there is no syllogism, but a paralogism of the accident.

412. Another response, where the unity of the middle is unlimited with respect to the unity of the extremes. An example of limited where-ness and limited when-ness: things that are together according to ‘where’ or ‘when’ without limitation, in this way or that, are nevertheless not thus the same among themselves. Another example, more familiar, about the intellective soul and about this and that part of flesh [nn.386-387]. – This response succeeds when the same unlimited thing is ‘with which’ or ‘in which’, not when it is ‘this’, unless the requisite unity is lacking to the middle in itself, as the logical response contained here just above has it.

413. When is taken in the minor that ‘whatever is in the divine essence is the same as it’ [n.191], it is not true of formal identity, and therefore formal identity of the extremes among themselves cannot be inferred; but as long as the formal distinction of the relations of the supposit stands, the distinction of the supposit stands.

414. And if you say that at least from the real identity of them with the essence the identity of them among themselves is inferred, I say that the essence does not have such unique identity of subsistence to the extent the persons or the personal features as extremes are united in the essence, and therefore one cannot infer identity of subsistences or of subsistence through the idea of their identity in the essence as in a middle term.

415. From this the response is plain to such sophisms as ‘this God is the Father, the Son is this God, therefore the Son is the Father’, which has a confirmation because when ‘this something’ exists as middle term, the extremes are necessarily conjoined.

My reply. Just as in creatures what is common is disposed as ‘some sort of what’, the singular as ‘this something’, so here the essence common to the persons has the idea of ‘some sort of what’, and the person has the idea of ‘this something’. The middle term here, then, is ‘some sort of what’ and not ‘this someone’. But the identity of the extremes in the conclusion is inferred as if the middle term were ‘this something’; likewise there [in the above sophism] it seems there is a fallacy of the accident and of the consequent, because ‘this God’ is taken in the premises for different supposit, and likewise a fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘some sort of what’ to ‘this something’.

91 Note cancelled by Scotus: “Let here be introduced the saying of the doctor [Augustine] about double predication in divine reality, namely by identity and formally, which he well explains in this one way…”
416. But if you argue ‘the deity is the Father, the Son is deity, therefore etc.’, although deity does not supposit for any supposit in the major and minor, yet there is [fallacy of] figure of speech there, by change of ‘some sort of what’ to ‘this someone’. For to make a change like this is nothing other than from the force of the inference to interpret that that has the idea of ‘this someone’ which has the idea of ‘some sort of what’; so thus to infer supposit of supposit is to interpret the middle to be the same according to idea of existence or of subsistence, which is false.

417. But if you at least argue that ‘the extremes are really the same among themselves because the same also in the middle’, I concede that essential identity can be inferred, not formal identity or identity of supposit. And therefore it should not be inferred ‘the Son is the Father’, because there by the force of the words formal or hypostatic identity is denoted, but it should be inferred in this way ‘the Son is the same with that which the Father is’ or ‘the Son is that which the Father is’.

418. But if there be still a confirmation of the major of the principal argument [n.191] through the fact that, by denying it, one seems to destroy a first principle, namely by positing affirmation and negation to be true of the same thing, I reply: about something that has true identity, but not only unique, formal identity, the same thing by reason of one ‘reality’ must be formally predicated of it, and of the other ‘reality formally’ not be predicated formally. Just as whiteness by reason of some reality which it has in itself agrees with blackness, and by reason of another reality does not really agree with it but differs, nor are affirmation and negation said of the same thing by reason of the same thing – namely ‘of reality formally’ –; so here, the Father by reason of essence is the same quidditatively, and by reason of property is not the same formally or hypostatically, nor is the affirmation and negation of the same identity about the same thing nor by reason of the same thing; and although affirmation and negation be said of the same identity about the same thing, not however by reason of the same thing, namely if it were said that by reason of paternity the Father is not the same quidditatively with the Son but by reason of essence.

419. If on the contrary you argue that affirmation differs from affirmation where the negation of one is said about the other or stands with the other, because neither is true of the affirmation contradicting the negation, therefore if deity stands with non-paternity (to wit in some other person), deity itself would differ from paternity, which never stands along with non-paternity in the same thing, I reply: the major could be conceded of formal, or not adequate, non-identity, because one of them is not determined to the other, wherefore it stands with the opposite of it, – or in other words it could be conceded of convertible and precise non-identity. But if the major take real distinction simply, it is to be denied; the thing is plain in whiteness: by taking the proper reality from which the genus is taken, to that is the opposite of the difference of blackness not of itself repugnant; yet to the reality from which is taken the specific difference of whiteness is the difference of blackness repugnant.

420. And this response should be understood as to the second part of the major, which says that one or other of the affirmations ‘stands’ with the negation. But the first part of the major, which takes the negation ‘to be said’ of the affirmation – the major could, as to that part, be conceded if ‘to be said’ is understood ‘necessarily and universally and through the proper idea of that of which it is said’, and this when the contradiction which the words concern is real or is of thing to non-thing, but not of
reason to non-reason, for then there only follows a distinction of reason of affirmation from affirmation.

421. By applying the first part of the major – in the way it is true – to the matter at hand, it follows that the Son is really distinguished from the Father, but not that God or deity is, because not-Father is not said of God necessarily and universally, nor by reason of the subject, although according to some [Henry of Ghent] it be said particularly by reason of the supposit of the subject.

422. But if you argue, let that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son be \( a \), then \( a \) insofar as it is \( a \) is either the same as the essence or different – if it is different, this is unacceptable; if insofar as \( a \) is the same, then insofar as it distinguishes it is the same, and consequently the essence distinguishes – I reply: I say that it is neither true that \( a \) insofar as it is \( a \) is the same as the essence nor that \( a \) insofar as it is \( a \) is different from the essence, and this by understanding that which follows the reduplication to be taken according to its formal idea, and it has along with this to be the formal idea for the inherence of the predicate, as I distinguished above in the case of unity of enjoyable object in response to the third argument [I d.1 n.58]. There is an example for this: for man and non-man are immediate opposites, and yet neither is said formally about anything along with reduplication; as a white thing is not man insofar as it is white nor is it non-man insofar as it is white.

423. And if you say ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are immediate opposites in the case of being, I say that it does not follow “they are immediate opposites, therefore one or other is said of anything along with ‘insofar as’” such that the idea of the subject is the formal reason for the inherence of the other contradictory, but it suffices that one or other of the contradictories truly exist in any subject, although not \( \text{per se} \) by reason of the subject. But if the ‘insofar as’ is taken in the first way, so that it only indicates that the \( a \) is taken according to its formal idea [n.422], I say that \( a \), whatever way it is formally taken, is the same as the essence, although it is not formally the same as the essence; but in that case this inference does not follow “‘\( a \) formally’ is the same as the essence, ‘\( a \) formally’ distinguishes, therefore the essence distinguishes,” but there is [fallacy of] figure of speech, by change of ‘this someone’ to ‘what sort of what’.

424. If still you insist that \( a \) insofar as it is \( a \) is a being or a thing, so which thing or which being? – if the essence then the proposition [n.191] is obtained, if a thing and not the essence, then it is another thing – I reply: I concede that it is a being and a thing, and this by taking ‘insofar as’ in both ways, because if some predicate \( \text{per se} \) in the first mode is present in something, then it will be present in the same mode \( \text{per se} \) whether the subject is a thing distinct from whatever is outside the idea of it or is contained by identity in something which is outside the idea of it; for such containing does not take away the formal idea nor what is present \( \text{per se} \) in the first mode.

425. But when you ask, what being [n.424], – I say the being which is \( a \); just as if a substance is a \( \text{per se} \) being, which being, by descending under being, is \( \text{per se} \) substance, and not something else. If you ask further whether it is \( \text{per se} \) essence, it has been said [n.423] that it is not. If you infer ‘therefore it is another \( \text{per se} \) thing’, there is a fallacy of the consequent: ‘it is not \( \text{per se} \) this thing, and it is a thing, therefore it is another thing’
[n.424], because in the antecedent ‘per se identity’ is denied, in the consequent ‘identity’, and so the antecedent is destroyed.\footnote{Tr. The point seems to be that the argument is of this form: ‘if it is not per se this thing, then it is some other thing; but it is a thing; therefore it is some other thing’, which amounts to denying (‘destroying’) the antecedent, and asserting the consequent, which move is fallacious.}

426. Suppose you object: ‘it is per se a thing, and it is not per se essence’, ‘therefore it is per se another thing’, and further, ‘therefore it is another thing’.

427. The proof of the first consequence, for ‘the same’ and ‘different’ about a being are immediate opposites; therefore if it is per se a thing, it is per se the same thing as the essence (and so it is per se essence), or it is per se some other thing. The proof of the second consequence is because ‘per se’ is not a distracting determination, it is plain.

428. Further, the first consequence is proved, and it is to the principal point: if it is per se a thing, it is either a thing which is essence or a thing which is not essence. If it is per se a thing which is essence, therefore it is per se essence; if it is per se a thing which is not essence, then it is a thing other than essence.

429. Further, third: essence is per se a thing, and a property is per se a thing, and they are not per se the same thing; therefore they are per se two things, and so each is per se a thing different from the other.

430. To the first [n.426]. Although the conclusion of the first argument could be distinguished, that there would be there an otherness of per se-ity or a per se-ity of otherness, and in the first way the ‘per se’ would be denied by the negation included in otherness, in the second way it would be affirmed, because it would precede the force of the negation, and consequently in the first way the consequent of the first consequence [‘it is per se a thing and not per se essence, therefore per se another thing’, n.426] would be conceded – but then the second consequence [‘it is per se a thing, and not per se essence, therefore it is another thing’ n.426] would be a fallacy according to the consequent by destruction of the antecedent [n.425], in the second way the first consequence would be a fallacy according to the consequent – however, because it does not seem logically well said that negation, if it is in any way included in otherness, could attain anything besides a term of respect and a form in which, or according to which, otherness is noted to exist, nor does it seem logically well said that the ‘per se’, which states the mode of inherence and consequently determines the composition, could be denied by any denial in the predicate, therefore one should say in another way that, in the consequent of the first consequence, there can be obtained, by force of the words, only one sense, namely that this predicate, to be a thing other than the essence, is ‘per se’ present in the property; and this sense is false, because thus the false thing that is inferred in the second consequence very well follows. Therefore I simply deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent [‘it is per se a thing, and not per se essence’] are true and the consequent [‘therefore per se another thing’] false.

431. To the proof of the consequence [n.427] I say that ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are not immediate about any predicate as per se said of a subject, rather neither are contradictories thus immediate: for man is not per se white nor per se not-white. Yet between contradictories absolutely taken or absolutely said of anything, there is no middle; so if a property is a thing, it is true it is the ‘same’ or ‘other’, but with a ‘per se’ it is not valid that it be ‘per se the same’ or ‘per se other’.
432. To the second [n.428]. The antecedent [‘if it is per se a thing, either a thing which is essence, or a thing which is not essence’] can be distinguished according to composition and division. In sense of composition neither [part of the antecedent] is to be granted; for just as one must not grant that it is per se essence or per se non-essence [n.431], so neither must one grant the other member of the disjunctive, with ‘which is’, in sense of composition. Nor are by this both contradictories denied, because if you are speaking of the terms, it is got that neither of them is said per se of the subject; this I concede. If you wish to get contradictory propositions. I say that they will be these: ‘either the property is per se a thing which is essence, or it is not per se a thing which is essence’; and the negative here is true, but it does not entail ‘therefore it is per se a thing which is not essence’, just as it does not follow ‘man is not per se white’, ‘therefore he is per se non-white’. – In sense of division the affirmative part of the disjunctive must be granted; but it does not further follow ‘therefore it is per se essence’, because formal identity is being inferred from real identity, for the antecedent in sense of division only indicates real identity by the ‘which is’.

433. In another way could the aforesaid antecedent [n.432] be distinguished, so that by the implication ‘which is’ be understood formal inherence or only identical inherence. In the first way neither part is to be granted, because neither of the opposites is per se in the thing which is said per se of the property. In the second way the affirmative part is to be granted, but the further proposition [n.191] does not follow, because of assertion of the consequent [n.428].

434. This second distinction [n.433] does not hold by force of the words, because the implied composition [‘which is’] is not determined by something which indicates that it [‘which is’] states formal inherence, but only identical inherence; the first distinction [n.432] is got by force of the words, and although ‘which is’ there does not indicate formal inherence in sense of composition, yet from the unity of the extreme, as it is a quasi specific or determinative construction, the essence has to be denominated ‘per se present in’ the subject.a

a. [Interpolation, giving a response to the third objection, n.429] The answer to the third is plain. It is said that neither are they per se the same things nor are they per se two things; but it is well said that when the syncategorematic term is removed, namely the ‘per se’, the affirmative is true, namely ‘they are the same thing’.

435. [To the second] – To the second [n.192] I say that accidental is either taken for something extraneous or is taken properly for that which as it were perfects something accidentally which pre-exists perfect in itself. If in the second way, I say that not every being is essential or accidental to every being that it is in; for there is a middle between accidental and essential, as what contracts, as difference contracts a genus, because such a thing is not substantial nor accidental, taking it in this way. And thus in divine reality nothing is accidental, but there is beside the essence something non-essential. – But if accidental be taken in the first way, whatever is not of the formal idea of it but extraneous, although it not properly be thus called accidental, would thus be an accidental difference with respect to the genus; and in this way the Philosopher takes the accidental for the extraneous in the fallacy of the accident [Sophistical Refutations 1.5.166b28-30]. Thus can be called accidental to something whatever is extraneous to it as that is compared to some third predicate.
436. [To the third] – To the third [n.193] I say that if in the major by the ‘if’ be understood a possible condition, the major is true and the minor false; for by no possible position when posited can the second person in divine reality be lacking without supreme good and supreme perfection being lacking. And if you prove that, if the second person were lacking, supreme perfection would exist in the Father, I say that if that person were lacking, supreme perfection would be lacking; and if the second person were lacking and the Father were not lacking, supreme perfection would be present; and so for supreme perfection to be lacking and for the Father to be present includes a contradiction. – But if in the major by the ‘if’ be posited an incompossible position, I say that the major is false; for that must be posited in the supreme good which cannot be posited not to be without the positing of incompossibles.

437. [To the fourth] – To the final one [n.195] I say that the reason about ‘necessary being’ must be thus understood: whatever is of itself a necessary being has of itself the most actual existence, such that it does not expect through anything – in any way other than itself – any actuality of existing. And therefore it is of itself indivisible, because if it could be divided, then from the things by which it would be divided it would expect some actuality of existing that it would have in the divided parts; and it would then be necessary that the things distinguishing those necessary beings would be formally necessities of existing; because they would be ultimate actualities of necessity in those diverse necessary beings, without which they would not have the most actual entity; because the divisible does not have the most actual entity or the most actual existence. On this basis, then, holds the reason posited above [n.177] in the question about the unity of God, from the idea ‘necessary being’, which was also touched on in the first question of the second distinction [n.71], that necessary being is not divided among several things. Because if $a$ and $b$ were not formally necessities of existing, before even they were understood in any of the things among which necessary being is divided, then, since they are ultimate actualities without which that common actuality would not exist, that common actuality would not be necessary being, because it would in some way require something other than itself by which it would be. But this conclusion does not hold of diverse persons in the same necessary entity; for that entity, of itself necessary, does not expect any actuality from the things that distinguish the persons, because it is not divided by the things that distinguish the persons, and the things that distinguish the persons are not as it were ultimate actualities by which such beings exist.

438. When therefore it is argued ‘$a$ and $b$ (understanding by these here two personal properties) are either formally necessities of existing or they are not’ [n.195], one can concede that they are not formally necessities of existing; nor does it follow ‘therefore they are possibilities’, because they are by identity that one necessity of existence. But if $a$ and $b$ were in diverse things, one would have to say that they were formally necessities or possible entities, because they could not be the same as some entity that was of itself necessary; for that common entity, with which they would be the same, would be as it were a potential for existing as it is pre-understood before the idea that contracts or divides it.

439. Against this [nn.438, 437]: being able to fail is either repugnant to $a$, insofar as it is $a$, or is not repugnant. If it is, $a$ insofar as it is $a$ is necessary, and so it is the reason for necessarily existing for that for which it is the form. If not, therefore through nothing else can it be repugnant to $a$ precisely insofar as it is $a$, therefore by nothing is it taken
away without ‘failing to be’ being compossible to a precisely insofar as it is a; therefore always, as precisely taken, it is ‘able to fail’; therefore, it is repugnant to ‘necessarily of itself’. – To this…

a. [A space was left here by Scotus which is supplied by this Interpolation] The response is that, with the ‘insofar as’, it is neither repugnant nor not repugnant. But, without the ‘insofar as’, I say that the relations are not possibles but they are necessary beings, and that by identity; but they are not formally nor non-formally possibles.