This translation of Distinctions 1 to 3 of Book Two of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. The Latin text used is that printed in volume seven of the critical edition of the *Ordinatio* by the Scotus Commission in Rome, and published by Frati Quaracchi.

Scotus' Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson psimpson@gc.cuny.edu December, 2012

The translation has now been revised and reformatted, to tidy up some looseness of translation, supply some omissions, and help reduce file size.

NB: The interpolated texts, added at various points in some of the questions, are of texts inserted in the *Ordinatio* by earlier editors from equivalent passages in other surviving commentaries on the *Sentences* by Scotus. The Vatican editors placed these in footnotes or the appendix and they are translated here for the convenience of the reader.

June, 2023

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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Book Two

First Distinction

Question One

Whether Primary Causality with Respect to all Causables is of Necessity in the Three Persons

1. About the second book, wherein the Master [Lombard] treats of God as to his primary causality, and this specifically of the causality of the triple cause that he has in respect of creatures, I ask questions, – and first about the first distinction: whether primary causality with respect to all causables is of necessity in the three persons; and I mean 'with respect to all causables' in any being whatever [sc. real and in a certain respect, n.15], and this of necessity, such that it cannot be but in the three persons.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] After the Master has in the first book determined about God as to the idea of his natural perfection, in this second book he determines about him insofar as his perfection shines forth in the works of creation. And about the first distinction, in which determination is made about the emanation of creatures in general, five questions are asked: first is whether the first causality with respect to all creatables, according to any existence of them whatever, is of necessity in the three persons such that it cannot be unless in the three persons; second is whether God can create anything; third is whether it is possible for God to produce something other than himself without a beginning; fourth is whether the creation of an angel is the same as the angel; fifth is whether the relation of creature to God is the same as its foundation [nn.1, 50, 95, 179, 188].

2. It is argued no:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* bk.3 ch.16: "If there were," he says, "only one person, still there would be in him the fullness of wisdom and power;" therefore he could produce everything producible.

3. Second as follows: action is of a supposit, therefore of several supposits there are several actions; therefore of three persons there cannot be one action, – therefore neither one active power nor one causality either, because "whose is the power, his also is the act," according to the Philosopher *De Somno et Vigilia* 1.454a8.

4. The third as follows: 'as principle of operation to principle [of operation], so operation to operation' (this proposition is plain in sensitive, intellective, and volitive [powers] and their acts); but the principle of causation of causables is something essential (because common to the three [persons]), and such is prior in some way to the notional and personal; therefore also action to action.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] On the contrary: the act of creating is related to the three persons as the act of spirating to Father and Son, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15; but the act of spirating so belongs to the Father and Son that it belongs to them precisely, and to neither without the other; therefore the act of creating, which is the first act of causing, belongs to the three persons precisely. – Again, to be able to create does not belong to another nature than the divine, nor can it belong to any supposit in divine reality besides the three persons, as is

plain through Augustine from *On the Trinity* bk.2 ch.10 n.18, "the works of the Trinity are undivided;" therefore etc.

[Note from the Vatican editors: the arguments answered later in nn. 48-49 are actually other than those interpolated here; they come from the Lectura II d.1 nn.6-7, as follows: On the contrary: as the goodness of God is to the goodness of the creature, so production to production; but the goodness of the creature is not unless the goodness of God precedes; therefore neither will the production of the creature be unless production is presupposed in God inwardly. – Further, person more agrees with person in operating in divine reality than substance and virtue in the creature in operating; but in the creature substance cannot operate without its proper virtue; therefore neither in divine reality one person without another.]

I. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

5. [Statement of the opinion] – Here there is an opinion of Henry, *Quodlibet* VI q.2 – look for it there.^{a b}

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A, re Henry of Ghent, Quodl. VI q.2] that "the philosophers [sc. Avicenna] only posited in God an intellect of simple intelligence whereby he understands himself and all other things, and likewise a simple will whereby all things are pleasing to him according as they are good in their essence. But such intelligence, with the fact it is natural, is disposed naturally to producing things understood, and according to a single determinate way – and likewise is it of the will concomitant with such simple apprehension; and therefore the philosophers held it necessary to posit that by necessity of nature did it [the intelligence] produce creatures outside itself, and according to the best way of producing (namely by intellect and will as nature, not by will as dispositive and elective)," and in this they erred, because according to them no intrinsic personal emanation precedes the production of things externally.

But this, as the opinion of the philosophers says, is not valid, because for this, that God produce something outside himself, simple knowledge and simple love of being well pleased (which alone belong to speculative knowledge) do not suffice, but there is required declarative and dispositive knowledge of things to be made and a love inciting and affecting the production of the same; now this declarative or dispositive knowledge is the Word, and the affecting love is the Holy Spirit; therefore the Word and Holy Spirit precede the production of things.

Now the manner of positing [sc. by Henry] is this, because "however much God by simple knowledge would know the things to be done and the will would love them, unless the intellect would make disposition about them and the will affect their production, never would God by his wisdom and his will produce them outside himself, because" – as I said [sc. just above] – "simple wisdom and consequent love pertain to pure speculation, but then first is a work produced when it is disposed by wisdom and affected by will, because wisdom and love of this pertain to praxis. Hence, just as a natural form is not a principle of action according as it is the perfection of that in which it is, but only according as it has a respect to the effect, so wisdom and love in divine reality, according as they are the forms of intellect and will (as such, absolutely), are not a principle of action, but only according as they have a respect to the effect; but wisdom disposing and love affecting, which respect the act, are only wisdom and proceeding love."

For this opinion, thus faithfully recited, it can be argued as follows: Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.11 n.20 says that "just as our word can be what a work does not follow, and a work cannot be unless a word precede, so the word of God can be with no creature existing; but no creature can be save through him 'through whom all things were made' [*John* 1.3];" therefore etc. – Again, it is argued thus: because if only through simple knowledge and complaisance

were creatures produced, then they would of necessity be produced, as the philosophers said; therefore they are produced by knowledge dispositive and deliberative and volitive elective and freely inclinative. Again, a natural form does not produce its effect immediately but introduces a certain respect; therefore likewise wisdom of artifice. Third, speculative wisdom and the love corresponding to it are not the immediate principle of producing; but "wisdom as essential in divine reality is speculative, having speculative ideas and reasons for knowing only, but personal wisdom is not only speculative but practical, having the idea of operating."

With this seen [sc. all the above], it is sufficiently plain what is argued in that question [*Ord*.2 d.1 nn.6-14].

b. [Interpolation from Appendix A: re Henry *ibid.*] that although the whole knowledge that is in the Son is really in the Father (because the Son knows nothing that the Father does not know), and the love too that is in the Holy Spirit is in the Father and the Son (because the Holy Spirit loves nothing that the Father and the Son do not love), yet the knowledge that is in the Son as in the Son has a certain special idea that it does not have as it is in the Father, which idea indeed is the idea of dispositive knowledge; likewise, the love in the Holy Spirit has a certain special idea that it does not have as it is in the Father, which idea of love affective for a work and affecting production of a work. For knowledge in the Father has only the idea of knowledge simple, but in the Son the idea of knowledge manifestive or declarative of the things that the Father knows in a simple intelligence, dispositive and ordinative of that which needs to be produced and of the modes of operating; love too in the Father and the Son has the idea of love of simple complaisance, but in the Holy Spirit it has the idea of love affective and as it were impulsive to a work.

Now this distinction of knowledge and love in divine reality can be taken according to the proportion of a double knowledge and love that are perceived in us. For an artisan first simply, and with simple intuition, intuits the form of the work, second he ordains and makes disposition about making and mode of making – and this is called dispositive knowledge, which is conceived from the prior [knowledge]. Likewise on the part of the will: when to the artisan the form of the work is offered, first he is pleased by it, second he is, by his being pleased, affected for the production of it – and this affection is called affective love, which arises from the first.

So must it be imagined in divine reality, according to them [sc. Henry and his followers]: namely that in the Father there is as it were simple knowledge, not dispositive about production of the thing and the mode of producing, but in the Son there is knowledge having the idea of this dispositive knowledge; similarly in the Father and the Son there is the love of simple complaisance in things understood, but in the Holy Spirit there is the idea of love affective for and inclining to a work.

The second thing – which this opinion says – is that for this, that the effect be produced, simple knowledge on the part of the intellect does not suffice, but dispositive knowledge is required; nor too does volition of simple complaisance on the part of the will suffice, but there is required love or affective volition; from which follows a third, namely that the extrinsic production of creatures presupposes these persons in the divine essence as certain formal ideas of the essence, whereby are creatures immediately produced – and this extrinsic [production] presupposes intrinsic productions as by which these formal ideas are acquired. Hence this is the conclusion of this opinion, that extrinsic production presupposes intrinsic as cause by which is got the immediate productive formal principle: as the author of this opinion expressly maintains (in the afore noted question, n.5), without also the produced persons (namely without love and word produced), the essential acts of knowledge and love in divine reality were not complete nor perfect for producing, but they are perfecting the essential acts of understanding and willing in the three persons, are the immediate formal ideas and immediate principles of producing creatures.

For this opinion the same doctor, *ibid*. [n.5], seems to intimate three reasons.

The first as follows: that which is produced by the knowledge of simple knowledge and the love of simple complaisance as by immediate principles of producing, is produced necessarily by the necessity of natural determination for producing and for mode of producing. This is plain, because such knowledge and such love are disposed in natural manner to producing their effect, and only to one determinate mode, no less so than heat to heating; hence too the philosophers (who did not in God posit such knowledge and such love) posited that the world proceeds from God by a necessity of natural determination for producing and for one mode of producing only, such that he was not able not to produce, nor to produce in another way than he did produce, as is plain from Avicenna Metaphysics 9 [apud Henry loc. cit.] So for this, that God will not have produced the world by necessity, it is necessary that he will have produced, as by immediate principles, not through cognition of simple knowledge and love of simple complaisance, but through knowledge dispositive (about producing and manner of producing) and through volition elective and freely affective for work, as if through acts supervenient to prior produced acts; but such dispositive knowledge and such affective love are the Word and Holy Spirit in divine reality; therefore the world is produced by word and love produced as through immediate principles of producing it.

The second reason is of this sort: as a natural form is disposed to producing its effect naturally, so intellectual wisdom and the volition concomitant to it are to producing their effect intellectually and artificially; but "a natural form is not the immediate principle of operation as it is the perfection of that in which it is, but only insofar as it induces a respect to the effect;" therefore in this way the wisdom of the artisan and his volition are not the immediate principle of a work save as they induce a respect to the work. But this respect they do not induce save according as they are in the word and love produced; therefore word and love produced, in any artisan whatever, are the immediate principle of operating artificially. – Were it must be noted, according to this doctor, that intellectual wisdom as essential is as it were the form of a natural agent according as it is the perfection of that in which it is, but wisdom itself, as it assumes the idea of word, is as it were the natural form itself as having a respect and order to the effect; hence, according to him, the word from the proper idea of word has a respect and order to making things, which essential wisdom does not have insofar as it is such.

The third reason is of this sort: speculative wisdom, and the volition or love corresponding to it, are not the immediate principle of operating, but only practical wisdom or knowledge and the love corresponding to it are – as is plain in the rational artisan, because the universal knowledge whereby he considers the operable thing in general and according to its common principles, is not for him the idea of operating, but a certain particular knowledge is, conceived from a universal or under a universal [knowledge]; but "wisdom in divine reality, as it is an essential perfection, is only speculative, having as such speculative ideas as ideas of knowing only, but personal wisdom – which is the word – is not only speculative for knowing but practical, containing in himself ideas as they are principles of operating;" therefore the word produced corresponding to him and the love are immediate principle of operating and producing in divine reality. – The idea is confirmed by the verse of the Apostle *I Corinthians* 1.23-24, "We preach Christ,' he says, 'the virtue of God and the wisdom of God;' 'virtue' insofar as he [Christ] has the idea of practical science (and this is proper to him), according to which too the word is called operative power – 'wisdom' insofar as he has the idea of speculative science etc." (look there in Henry [n.5]).

6. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against it argument is made in many ways:

For first it seems to follow that the Father formally does not create. For nothing formally acts that is not in act according to that which is the proximate idea of acting; the Father is not formally in act by the Word nor by the Holy Spirit. But according to this

position the Word and Holy Spirit are the proximate idea of acting and causing, just as understanding and volition are the remote ideas of causing; therefore the Father does not create formally and proximately.

7. And if you say that they all create 'because they all have one word in their intellect by which essential intellection is perfected (although the word be from the Father alone speaking for them all), and all have one love in the common will (although the love be spirated by the Father and Son together for all three)', – against this I argue as follows: I ask how the Father has this generated knowledge. Not formally (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.7 ch.2),^a but he has it as a correlative, as the producer has the produced; a haver in this way is not in act formally by that which is had; therefore neither does he formally act by the action with respect to which the had – or that which is had – is the formal idea of acting.

a. [*Interpolation*] because, according to him there, the Father is not wise with generated knowledge or wisdom.

8. It seems also further to follow that the Son and Holy Spirit do not create, because commonly the formal idea of acting does not act in the¹ action with respect to which it is the formal idea of acting.^a

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] but the Son and Holy Spirit, according to this position, are the formal idea of creating; therefore etc.

9. And if it be said that the Son creates and the Holy Spirit creates: – neither however of the persons seems proximately to create, because neither is in act formally by the other, and 'everything acting proximately through intellect and will' is in act by both the knowledge and the volition necessary for such act.

10. Further, second: I ask what you understand by dispositive or disposing wisdom and by affecting love. For either these are appropriated to the Word and Holy Spirit or they are proper. If appropriated then in truth they are common to the three, and thus the two persons are not the proximate formal ideas of creating. If they are proper, and they state a respect of reason to creatures (because according to him [Henry] a disposition states a respect of reason to disposed things), then some respect of reason is proper to some divine person, which was rejected earlier (*Ord*.1 d.27 n.95, and *Lectura* 1 d.18 nn.6-16 [d.18 lacking in *Ordinatio*]).

11. Further, what he says about practical ideas, namely that they are not in the Father but in the Word (as if one Person were not sufficient for production), seems to be against Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.14 n.23, "Therefore this Word is truly truth, because whatever is in the science from which he is generated is also in him – but what is not in it is not in him either;" and a little later, "God the Father knows all things in himself, knows them too in the Son;" and later, "All that is in their science, each of them fully sees." From which – and from others there set down – he [Augustine] seems manifestly to mean that nothing is more actually in the Word than in the intelligence of the Father, and consequently is not there more distinctly than in the intelligence of the Father.

¹ Most mss. have 'in illa actione – in the action', but the Vatican editors prefer the reading 'illa actione – by the action'. Not much seems to hang on the point, but 'in illa actione' seems to fit better in context.

12. Further, what is said there [by Henry, n.7], that 'the word is for perfecting essential intellection' seems to be false, because that which is the idea of acting with some non-immanent action is not perfected by that action (just as the hot, insofar as hot, is not perfected by the heating, which is received in the passive object); but according to him [see Ord.1 d.2 nn.277-79, 290-96], actual intellection is the idea of generating the Word, and the generating is not an action formally immanent in the Father himself, because the term of generating is not the form of the Father; therefore essential intellection – which is the idea of generating the Word according to him – is not perfected by the produced Word.

13. What he says about universal knowledge, that it is speculative, was rejected above in the proemium (*Prol.* nn.360-61, 'On divine theological science, whether it be speculative or practical'), because practical conclusions are resolved into practical principles and not into speculative principles, just as speculative conclusions are resolved into speculative principles and not into practical principles.

14. What he also says, that 'for this reason did the philosophers concede that God necessarily produces what is other than himself, because they denied that in him are proceeding dispositive or disposing wisdom and affecting love products', does not seem true, because essential volition – whether as in the three or as in the Son or as in the Father – is not necessarily of another than itself (as of a creature): for nothing other than itself does the divine will necessarily will, even if *per impossibile* it were not a principle productive inwardly – because then it would necessarily depend on the creature, which is unacceptable in the extreme.

II. Scotus' own Solution

15. For the solution, then, of the question, three things need looking at: first, that the first causality with respect to things caused is necessarily in the three persons, and this in respect of the things as caused in true being or in being simply; second, because of what was added in the question, 'about causables according to any causable being whatever' [n.1], causality needs to be looked at with respect to all causables as to their being in a certain respect, as known being or willed being; third, because of that which was also added in the question, 'such that it could not be otherwise than in the three' [n.1], it must be seen whether – if a single absolute person were *per impossibile* posited – there could be in him a perfect causality with respect to all causables.

A. First and Perfect Causality is Necessarily in the Three Persons

16. As to the first, I say that perfect causality is necessarily in the three persons. 17. Which is proved in three ways:

First, because [as to] a principle of two productions, namely necessary and contingent, necessarily prior is the principle of the necessary than of the contingent (for a necessary effect cannot presuppose a contingent one); but something in divine reality is principle of intrinsic production, which production is necessary – and something in divine reality is principle of extrinsic production, which production is contingent; therefore first necessarily is something in God a principle of necessary and inward production before something in him is a principle of contingent and outward production. In the prior then,

with intrinsic production complete, there is communicated to the three persons all the fecundity that is not repugnant to them, and consequently is communicated to them that which is the productive principle of communication outwardly; therefore, in the instant in which there is in God a proximate principle for producing something contingent outwardly, it will be communicated to the three [persons].

18. Again, prior naturally is the first object present to the power respecting such object as first before a secondary object is present to it, and this is especially true when only the first object is from the nature of the thing and of itself object of the power, and the secondary object is not of itself object of the power but comes to be through the act of the power in such being; now in this way is the first object of the divine intellect and of its will the divine essence alone, and all others are only secondary objects and produced in some way in such being by the divine intellect; therefore naturally first is the divine essence present to its intellect as first object before anything else. But the divine intellect, having the object present to itself, is not only a power operative about it, but also a power productive of knowledge adequate to the intellect as to productive principle; therefore then is it productive of the infinite Word and consequently of the Word generated in divine nature. Likewise the divine will, having the essence actually understood as object present to itself, is not only an operative power (by which, namely, what formally has it loves the object), but is also a productive power of adequate infinite love and consequently of a person spirated in divine nature. Therefore first naturally before the divine intellect and divine will have or regard some secondary object, the complete idea is had of the production of the divine intrinsic persons and consequently those persons are produced before any other object is presented, and consequently much more before any other object is caused.

19. Further, third thus: the relation of nature to supposit is prior to the relation of it to second act, because to act presupposes being, and the relation of nature to supposit pertains to being;^a likewise the relation of nature to supposit is essential and is in the 'what', but the relation which is of nature to acting does not seem so essential. Therefore divine nature has being first in the persons before it is a principle of extrinsic production.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] because it must be that nature first have 'to be' before 'to act'; but it does not have being save in a supposit, just as a species does not have being save in an individual; therefore etc.

b. [*Note of Scotus*] The first reason [n.17], if it proves any priority, does however not prove that contingent production necessarily pre-requires necessary [production], because this priority is not because of dependence of the contingent on the necessary but because of the principle 'by which', which is common to both. Likewise, the second reason [n.18] takes it that the intellect, having the divine essence present before the secondary object, is the idea of generating, and this is true in such way that 'as it is the idea of generating' it does not require a secondary object; so it would be said, conversely, that although the secondary object pre-require the first object to be present to the power, yet it does not pre-require that, with it being present, the second person be generated,² because it [the first object] present in one person is sufficient for the presentation of the secondary one. Likewise to the third [n.19]; action presupposes nature in some supposit, but not necessarily in many – or not even in any when nature is agent. Thus, therefore, do these reasons [nn.17-19] conclude as is expounded in the third article [nn.41-43]; not that from the idea of these productions there is an order (and

² The mss actually say 'generate', but the Vatican editors think 'be generated' is needed in its place.

therefore the extrinsic one is not properly said to presuppose or pre-require the intrinsic one), but the order is from the common foundation, in which the intrinsic [production] is more immediate and therefore prior.

20. Secondly, as to this article [n.16], it is necessary to see what is the reason for this [sc. the priority of intrinsic production to extrinsic].

And I say that the reason is not as the first position was intimating [Henry of Ghent, n.5], namely that the Word and Holy Spirit are formal reasons of proximately causing, or that in some way they complete the causality of the Father [nn.6, 12] (indeed the same and equally perfect causality is in the Father and in the three). Therefore this priority [sc. of intrinsic to extrinsic production] is of the same sort in the Father and Son with respect to the Holy Spirit as was said in the twelfth distinction of the first book (*Ord.*I d.12 nn.7, 38-40), and the reason for this is not [what is] posited there (that a more imperfect fecundity is in one person than in two), but because fecundity is first communicated to the Son before the Holy Spirit is spirated; and then in the instant of origin in which the Father produces the Son, the fecundity by which the Holy Spirit is produced will be in the Father and the Son, and from this follows that then he is produced by two in whom is one fecundity.

21. And so here: first in nature is the divine nature communicated to the three divine supposits (according to the reasons posited above [nn.17-19]), before the creature can be immediately created; and therefore in the instant in which the creature is immediately producible, there is one causality in the three persons with respect to the creatures to be produced.

22. And this is Augustine's reason, *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15, that "just as Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, so all three persons are the creature's one principle" for producing it.

B. On Causality in Respect of all Causables as to their Being in a certain Respect

23. As to the second principal article [n.15], it seems that if in the intellect of the Father there are also practical ideas (as was argued against the first opinion [nn.17-19]), then the Word is generated from a creature as it is an idea in the intellect of the Father; which is also confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.14 n.15, "[The Word is] born of all things that are in the knowledge of God."

24. But against this it is argued thus:

Then [sc. if the Word is generated from all things as they are ideas in the Father's intellect] the Holy Spirit is spirated, not only as love of the divine essence, but as love of every understood lovable thing, and thus by force of his production he would be love of creatures just as of the divine essence; either then God would necessarily love creatures or the Holy Spirit would not necessarily be produced – each of which is false.

25. Again, not only does the Father know creatures formally but he also knows the Son formally; therefore if from all things as known to the Father the Word is generated, from the Word as known to the Father would the Word be generated, and thus the Word would be generated from himself.

26. Again, no real relation of any divine person seems to be to anything else outside him (as to a creature), from 1 d.30 nn.49-51; but of the generated to that from

which it is generated, if it is really distinct, there is a real relation; therefore the Word is not generated from a stone as known to the Father.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, the Word is generated by act of paternal memory not intelligence – from 1 d.2 n.291. But in the paternal memory, as it precedes as it were intelligence, a stone does not have intelligible being: for it is not intelligible before it is actually being understood or has actually been understood, but only the divine essence is first actually intelligible, and it as it were makes all other things understood; nor are they intelligible before understood, because then they would according to some distinction precede the act of understanding, which is false. Therefore they are only virtually in the memory, because the essence is there formally. – If it be said that they first shine forth as intelligibles before they be actually understood, this must be denied of 'actual shining forth': it is only true of 'virtual shining forth', because the divine essence actually shines forth.

Again, a stone in intelligible or understood being is not formally of itself necessary being, because then it would not be in that being a secondary object but first; therefore, having been produced as such [sc. secondary] by it, it would not be formally necessary being.

Again, the divine intellect would be cheapened if it were moved by a stone; therefore similarly if knowledge were generated in it by it [sc. by a stone].

27. As to this [n.23], then, I say as follows that two orders can be understood in divine reality, namely the order of nature and the order of origin (which are of different idea), and to each degree of one order can the whole of another order be attributed.

28. An example first: in a creature, where there is order of origin, of nature, and of duration (which are of different order and different idea), the whole of one order can be allotted in one degree of another order; for let one instant of duration be taken, and in that one instant can be allotted all things ordered according to origin and nature– also let one instant of nature be taken, and in it can everything ordered according to origin be allotted.

29. Simply, however, in divine reality the order of nature is first, so that, proceeding simply, in the first instant of nature the whole first order of origin must be allotted, and if in the second instant of nature the first order of origin be allotted, it is not the first order of origin but the second. I understand it thus: the order of nature is taken by comparing objects to the divine intellect and will, because by comparing his essence to his intellect and will – which is the first object in itself of his intellect and will – there is the first instant of nature, and by comparing other objects, which are secondary, to the divine intellect and will, which [secondary objects] are not of themselves objects but things produced through intellect and will, there is the second instant of nature.

30. In the first instant of nature, abiding in it, is had a perfect person, having perfect memory of the divine essence (namely having an intellect to which the divine essence is present in idea of an object actually intelligible), and this person, by this memory of the divine essence, is able both to operate and to produce formally, as was said in the first book (1 d.2 n.311); but in some way first is this person understood first to operate by this memory before to produce by it, and in that prior stage is this person understood perfect in himself, and is blessed in his act of intellect in understanding the divine essence as his object. Also, the same person, producing by this memory, produces knowledge adequate to this object, and this object, since it is infinite, produces a formally infinite person per se subsistent; and to that person is communicated will as first act, not having yet an adequate produced term. And by this single will, the first and second person operate about the divine essence as about the object, loving it infinitely, and then

are they in themselves perfect and blessed in the divine essence; but in addition to this, by this same will – single in them – these two persons produce a love adequate to this object, known under the idea of being lovable, and so produce infinite love and so spirate a divine person, because nothing is formally infinite save what by identity is God.

31. Abiding therefore precisely in the first instant of nature, comparing the divine essence to intellect and will, the whole first order of origin is had (namely that two perfect persons are originated), and the whole perfection of the divine persons inwardly, in divine intellect and will, is had in the first instant of nature, because the whole perfection simply of any person at all in understanding and willing the divine essence is complete in that instant.^a This therefore as to the first instant of nature.

a. [Interpolation] because in understanding and willing it they are formally blessed.

32. The second instant of nature follows, wherein the divine intellect and will are compared to another object, a secondary one. And because in this instant that object is not of itself actually intelligible but becomes actually intelligible through the intellect and will [n.29] – therefore it does not have being in the divine memory as it is memory, but is produced by act of intelligence in such being of object (just as in us second intentions are produced by intelligence and are not in memory as it is memory); and whether too it were posited that they had being through memory or that they were produced by intelligence in known being, at any rate before in nature they have being in memory or intelligence, both memory and intelligence are in the three persons– and so, insofar as memory or intelligence. Not therefore is the Word by first production produced from a stone as it is in the memory of the Father, because either a stone does not have being in the memory of the Father as memory is the principle of producing the Word, or if it do have being in the memory, not naturally before [memory] is understood to be in the three persons.

And thus can it be proved that causality with respect to causable creatures in known being is necessarily in the three persons, as was proved in the second reason for the first article [n.18], which [reason] is equally valid for this [second] article.^a

a. [Interpolated note] About this [remark], which says 'it is produced by act of intelligence' [n.32], there is a doubt; at least it does not exist as formally intelligible in act of intelligence, although it is there produced as if by action of memory, not of intelligence. - The example about second intentions [n.32] is perhaps not alike, because the comparison, made by the intellect, with the object seems only to be of the considering intellect as cause, not so the absolute object that is shown to the intellect by virtue of another object existing excellently in memory; a second intention does not become actually understood by virtue of the thing shining forth in memory, in the way this stone becomes understood by virtue of the divine essence shining forth in its memory: for take away the comparative act, positing only absolute ones in some way or other, the stone will be known, -a second intention without a comparing act will never be. Likewise, a second intention comes to be in its true being and not in known being, therefore it is before it be known, because it is known by reflex act; a stone does not come to be in its being save only in diminished way, and so it is known – and in a direct act – before it is. About this in distinction 10 of the first book [Ord.I d.10 n.41], that memory is not only a principle productive of knowledge of an object shining forth in it formally but also virtually, and so it [the object] is first formally in produced knowledge, or as if so.

33. However, in the second instant of nature a certain order of origin can be assigned, because prior in origin does the Father understand stone before the Son, because the Father understands stone from himself and the Son not from himself but has this from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son; but this second order of origin is not origination simply, whereby namely the divine persons are produced in being of nature simply, but as it were origination in a certain respect, consequent to the persons already produced.

34. An example of this in creatures: if the origin of Socrates from Plato be per se according to humanity, the order of origin in them in having humanity is the first order of origin simply, but the order of them in having the capacity to laugh is a different order of origin, as if in a certain respect – because just as in the first instant of nature Socrates has humanity from Plato, so in the second he has from him the capacity to laugh; and if both naturally had humanity before the capacity to laugh was produced, both would cause together the capacity to laugh, and yet one would have from the other that they would cause this.

35. So I say in the matter at hand, that the Word is infinite generated knowledge is that he is infinite knowledge of infinite essence, and this is through the origin of him from the Father in the first instant of nature; but that the Word is knowledge of a stone [n.23] or has knowledge of a stone from the Father generating him [n.33], this is as it were to originate the Son in a certain respect or in a respect additional to 'the Word simply': for this is not that he is generated simply under the idea of divine person, because neither [under the idea] of knowledge simply infinite and of formally infinite essence as of object per se; for although concomitantly that infinite knowledge, which is of the infinite essence as object per se, is knowledge of a stone, yet insofar as it is of a stone it does not have infinity formally.

36. And as was said of what is produced in understood being [nn.32-35], similarly can it be said of willed being [n.15].

37. And if it be argued against this [sc. against the causality of the three persons with respect to the creature in known being] that prior in origin does the Father produce a stone in known being before the Son produces it, therefore the Son does not produce, or the same thing will be produced twice, or at any rate will be produced after it is understood to have been produced before (for it is pre-understood to have been produced by the Father in a prior stage of origin) – I reply: the Father produces a stone prior in origin to the Son (that is, the Father by himself and the Son not by himself), and yet the Son produces the stone with the same production and in the same instant of nature, and yet to the same instant of nature can all the degrees of origin be assigned [n.33]. So it does not follow that it is twice produced, nor naturally before, because then it would be produced in a prior instant of nature by the Father than by the Son, which is not true; for in the same instant of nature in which the Father produces a stone in such being, the Son has the same nature and consequently all productive fecundity (which is not repugnant to him), and so the virtue of producing a stone – and before that instant in the order of nature is the stone not understood to have been produced in known being.

38. And if you say 'at any rate it is in some order pre-understood produced by the Father before by the Son, therefore it cannot be produced by a posterior in origin, therefore not by the Son either, because the Son cannot produce the Son, because prior in origin does the generative force as it is in the Father have a term adequate to it' – I reply

and say that it is not so in origination in a certain respect as it is in origination simply: for origination simply posits the originated in being simply, and therefore what in real being precedes origination simply precedes also the originated simply, and so cannot be from the originated – and hence it is that the Word cannot produce another Word; but in origination in a certain respect the originating does not produce the originated in some being simply, and so there can stand with this that its production precede something originated, such that yet it simply not precede the originated.

39. But this does not seem to suffice, because there seems always a doubt how the Word can produce a stone in known being and how a stone can be produced by the Word when it is produced prior in origin by the Father in such being, – and the Word cannot produce the Word, therefore likewise neither a stone in known being.

If this be the reason why the Word cannot produce the Word, which commonly is posited, because namely 'the term is pre-understood already adequate to the generative virtue or force as it is in the Father' [the objection at n.38] – I reply: this proposition 'every power having prior in origin an adequate term before it is in something is not for it a principle of producing' is not true unless it be added that 'when it has that communicated (or adequate) principle it cannot be another term', or unless it be added that 'by that which has it, the term is not producible a second time'. So is it in production simply, that 'the Word having the same memory as the Father' cannot really be before the Word simply is produced, neither too can another Word be produced by the Word having that memory; but not thus is it in the production of creatures in intelligible being.

40. But this response destroys a certain position that is posited by many, in *Ord*.1 d.7,³ which posits that the Son cannot generate; for the whole reason is not 'because the memory as in the Father has an adequate term', but it is necessary to add that 'it has a term adequate to the principle, not producible by that to which such principle is communicated'; because if it were producible by that to which such principle is communicated, there would also be communicated to it a principle in idea of principle for producing, and so it could produce by that principle. Now by asking further why 'to the Word having the same memory as the Father' the memory is not communicated in idea of productive principle, it seems the proof must be through something else than through a term adequate to the idea of this principle as it is in the Father.

a. [*Interpolated note*] Understand that 'prior in origin' [n.33] does not only mean 'from itself' (or 'not from another') but also 'from which another'. Although therefore the Father understand stone from himself, if however insofar as understanding stone he is not 'from whom is the Word' (neither simply nor as understanding stone), the Father will not be perfectly prior in origin to the Son, insofar as understanding stone: and this supposition seems true, because the essence 'as in the Son' is not less the perfect idea of understanding all things than as in the Father; therefore since the Father by it [the essence] alone knows all things, similarly will it be of the Son.

Again, if the essence can be for the Son the reason for knowing all things, then it is, – because although the knowledge of stone in the Father could be the idea of the knowledge of

³ Vatican Editors: Scotus did not deal with this question in *Ord*.1 d.7 and he here corrects a position he had embraced in the *Reportatio*, IA d.7 n.58, "Although the Son have the essence that is the productive principle of the Son, yet he cannot produce by it, because it is pre-understood in the Father to have a term adequate to the production; and so [the essence] in the Son cannot be a principle of production of the same idea, because then [the production] would not have been adequate to the principle in the Father."

stone in the Son, yet the essence quasi-precedes stone understood by the Father, because it moves more efficaciously.

Again, stone formally known is only in the intelligence of the Father: that is not the reason for generating [sc. rather the memory is].

Again, that remark of Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.14 [n.23, "[The Word is] born from all things that are in the knowledge of God"] is expounded: "from all things..." supply 'virtually' because from the essence, which is virtually all things.

But does the Son have actual knowledge of stone by virtue of the essence as it is in the memory of the Father, or as it is in the memory of the Son? It seems that, as it is in the memory of the Father, it precedes, giving to the Son everything that it can give.

I reply: the essence absolutely is the first object (not 'as in someone'), but with the essence concurs the intellect, by which any [person] operates as it is his, not as another's. Therefore it is only necessary for one order of origin to be posited, because in the second instant of nature there is no origin: not simply, as is plain – nor in a certain respect, because through nothing in the person originating is that which in the second instant is in the Son as through a principle productive in the second instant, but what is in the Son in the second instant is only in him through what he received in the first instant.

And then the example about 'capacity to laugh' [n.34] seems apt, understanding it thus, that according to humanity simply there is origination, but in the second instant – according to the property [sc. capacity to laugh] – not, because having been generated by this which he received in the first instant he is now capable of laughter in the second, and not through something else being principle in the generator; thus did the Word receive intellect in the first instant (to which is essence present in itself), through this in the second instant he is knowing it.

But is not knowledge of a stone in some order in the Father and the Son [n.38]? – I reply: not first but as it were concomitantly, because of that in each person with which this knowledge is concomitant in this person and in that, and in it they have per se an order of origin.

A doubt does at any rate seem to remain (touched on here [n.39]), how does the Son produce if the Father first in origin produces it? – I reply: the productive principle is first in origin in the Father before in the Son, but the Father does not produce in that priority of origin but only when the essence has been communicated to the three. It is not necessary then to say that the principle is as it were communicated under act and therefore act is, but that the principle is first communicated and as 'already communicated' it is under act.

On the contrary: therefore, the Father in the first 'now' of origin does not have the principle under act. – It can be conceded as he is the principle of origin simply; but in the second instant of nature there is a certain order of origin, not simply nor in a certain respect, but as it were concomitantly (as was said above [in this note]), namely in having the principle under act because in having the principle – and thus the Father in the first [moment] of origin concomitantly has the knowing of stone, but it is not the reason for originating anything in the Son.

C. Whether in an Absolute Person, if he were posited, there could be Perfect Causality with Respect to all Causables

41. As to seeing and understanding the third article [n.15], it is necessary to know that in creatures, if a cause be compared to two ordered effects, the comparison of it to each effect is more essential than the comparison of one effect to the other: for because of the dependence of them on the same cause do they depend in ordered way on each other, and not conversely, because of the dependence of one on the other do they depend in ordered way on the same cause; therefore if *per impossibile* the order of effects ordered among themselves is there destroyed, not for this reason must the order and dependence

of each on the cause be denied, because a more impossible thing is not to be conceded because of a lesser impossible thing, nor is a more necessary thing to be denied because of a lesser necessary thing.

42. An example. If it be posited that fire has two ordered effects, namely to heat and to ignite, if fire is more essentially disposed to each effect than that to ignite presupposes to heat – if it be posited *per impossible* that fire cannot heat, not for this reason must it be denied that fire cannot ignite, nor is he who obligates himself to holding the antecedent obligated to holding the consequent. For this consequence would not hold, 'if fire could not heat then not ignite either', save through this understood affirmative proposition 'what can ignite can heat' – which is stripped off from the matter at hand, when the perfect idea of fire is posited able to stand with the opposite of that which is to heat: and so, that which is more immediate to fire (namely to ignite) than to heat is, can stand with the opposite of that which is to heat (because it is posited to stand with 'not to heat'), and thus this position destroys the proposition by which such consequence would hold.

43. So applying this in the matter at hand,^a it can be said that something is in God principle of intrinsic production and something in him is principle of extrinsic production, so that these productions are ordered to the same principle, and in some way the order is more necessary of each production to the cause than of either to the other. If therefore – *per impossibile* – it be posited that some principle is not a principle of the prior production (which is posited by positing that one person is absolute and denying intrinsic production), not for this reason does it seem it must be denied that that principle is a principle of extrinsic production, because still on this posit is the whole idea had of a principle of extrinsic production and only denied is the order of production to production, which order does not stand but is destroyed by the position. And so, if the argument is made 'this person cannot produce inwardly, therefore he cannot produce outwardly', the consequence must be denied by him who is obligated to the antecedent; for the consequence does not hold save through this proposition 'a power for producing something outwardly presupposes production inwardly', which is destroyed by the hypothesis. And therefore it seems that a causality perfect of its idea - insofar namely as it states a comparison to a product outwardly or to extrinsic production – does not require a relation to intrinsic production, although the same foundation necessarily is the idea and cause of each production, intrinsic and extrinsic, and first of intrinsic than of extrinsic. And from this does it seem that the philosophers did not posit a relation in them; for although they saw a necessary relation to efficient principle, yet they did not see a necessary relation of extrinsic causation or production to intrinsic production – and therefore although they denied the intrinsic production, they yet conceded the other extrinsic causation or production [n.14].

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A] This reason seems to stand on this: every cause productive of two ordered effects, of which one is necessary, the other contingent, if *per impossibile* it not produce the first of those effects still it can produce the second; but the eternal Father is productive principle of the Word necessarily and of the creature contingently; therefore if he not produce the Word, he was still able to produce the creature. An objection is made, because the soul first produces to understand before to will,

and yet it cannot produce and create to will without to understand.

D. Conclusion

44. To the principal question therefore [n.1] it is plain that of necessity perfect causality with respect to causables outwardly is in the three [persons], and this with respect to all causables in any causable being (whether in a certain respect or simply), so that it could not fail to be in the three [nn.21, 32]; yet if *per impossibile* there were one absolute person, it would have in consequence to be said that in such absolute person would such 'perfect causality' simply be [n.43]. And thus 'perfect causality', from the idea of this term, does not seem to include necessarily that it is in the three persons, just as neither from the idea of this term does it include the idea of production inwardly, though that is in fact necessarily presupposed to it – just as neither does being able to ignite necessarily of its idea include being able to heat, although in fact it is presupposed to it [n.42].

III. To the Principal Arguments

45. To the principal arguments.

First to Richard [n.2]: it is plain that he concludes for the third article of the position [nn.41-43].

46. To the second [n.3], it was stated in a like case, in *Ord*.I d.12 n.49-52, how Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit – and better, as to the matter at hand, in *Ord*.I d.4 nn.11-13, where there was statement about the truth of this, 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'; and it was touched also in *Ord*.I d.20 nn.24-27, about power, how it is the same in the three persons.

47. To the third [n.4] I say that although something essential is the principle of producing something externally, yet it is not a principle at once applicable to work or to act save as it is understood in the three [persons], because – as was said in *Ord*.I d.12 nn.38-40 – that which is a principle of ordered acts is not understood to be in proximate power to a remote act save as it is under a prior act (just as the soul is never understood in proximate power to an act of willing save as it is actually understanding, because when it is in proximate power of willing something it does actually will it, and nothing is willed unless understood); and thus although any essential [sc. in God] – in respect of itself – precede in some way the notional [sc. in God], yet it is not necessary that every essential, in every respect outwardly, be able to precede anything notional whatever.

48. To the first argument for the opposite [sc. the second argument from the *Lectura*, note to n.4 above] I say that the divine persons necessarily agree in every operation outwardly, more than substance and virtue – because the divine persons have one operation, by which they are simply one operator; and yet if *per impossibile* the virtue were in one person, nothing of perfection would be lacking to him but that he could perfectly produce everything producible.

49. To the second argument [note to n.4] I say that it proceeds about the fact, because production presupposes production – not however as 'formally cause' or under the idea by which it is production, but as if immediate principle.

Whether God can create Something

50. Secondly I ask whether God can create something.

51. It seems not:

Because if anything is produced that before was not being produced, this is because something is disposed differently now than before; this cannot be posited done in the matter at hand if the cause of its variation not be an agent, because the passive thing was not pre-existent; therefore it is necessary that the agent is disposed differently now than it was before and consequently changes. But the first agent cannot change; therefore etc.

52. If it be said that an agent can without change of itself produce a new effect– on the contrary: 'because the agent gives being, therefore does the passive or produced thing receive being', and not conversely, 'because the produced thing receives being, therefore does the producing thing give being'; therefore in the agent must there naturally precede some new relation to the produced thing and not conversely; therefore also change, which is not to be posited in God – therefore not creation either.^a

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] Creation is change, and all change precedes its term; I ask therefore in what was the change? And there is need necessarily to grant a subject. Therefore no change can be from nothing.

53. Secondly thus: a cause always equally determined to acting seems equally to act always and to produce the effect, because there does not seem any reason why now it should produce and not at other times, if it was at other times as determined to acting as it is now; but if something is created now, it [the cause] is in some way differently disposed now than before, and through a greater determination of the cause to it [the effect] now than before; therefore the cause is sometimes more determined to producing an effect than at another time, and so not equally – and consequently it will be changed.

54. Third thus: according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 2.10.336a27-28, "the same thing remaining the same is always of a nature to do the same;" therefore there will never be any variation in the effect unless it first be naturally posited in the cause.

55. Fourth thus: if no change is posited on the part of the cause (so that it be now called 'more approximate' or 'less approximate' than at another time), and there cannot be either any impediment on its part – a reason does not appear why it acts now and did not act before.

56. And if you say, 'because it acts voluntarily, therefore it can act when it wants to act' – against this: there does not seem a reason why a voluntary agent acts sometime and not at another time, save because it is expecting a greater opportunity for acting then than at another time; but this cannot be ascribed to the first agent and first mover with respect to its effect; therefore neither 'because it voluntarily acts, can it act when it wants'.

57. To the opposite:

Genesis 1.1, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth."

I. To the Question

58. I reply:

To create is to produce in effect something from nothing. Now although the 'from' can be taken in many ways (as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* 8), namely as far as it denotes order etc. [*Ord*.I d.5 n.53],⁴ yet it is still – in addition to this – multiple by taking 'from' in this way as it indicates order, because it can indicate order of nature or of duration.

A. About Creation from Nothing as 'from' indicates Order of Nature

59. In the first way [sc. as 'from/of' denotes order of nature] the philosophers concede that God can create and produce something from nothing, as is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2 (f. 92ra) (searcg there).⁵

60. I understand this 'from' in priority of nature as follows:

Something can be called 'prior in nature' positively, because it is in something first and is a prior entity than that which is said to be in it later in nature – as is of animal and rational in man, and of substance and accident in a *per accidens* composite.

61. In another way one thing is said to be prior by nature to another quasi privatively or potentially, from the removal of another or exclusion of another, because it would belong to it with the other cause excluded – that namely it is not that to which it is said first to belong, but would be in it if it were not impeded by another; as if it be said that in matter privation is naturally prior to form: not indeed that these two are in matter together (so that privation be present before form), but privation can *pro tanto* be said to be prior by nature, and prior by nature in matter than in form, because privation would always be present in matter unless from some agent it received form– such that for having privation matter alone suffices with negation or with privation of extrinsic cause, but for having form an extrinsic cause is required; and yet is privation not of the idea of matter, as neither form, nor are both present together in matter.

62. So do I understand in the matter at hand that a creature does not of itself have not-being, nor that together in it are being and not-being (as if being and not-being be simultaneous), nor does it in some way have not-being when it is; but, as far is of itself, it would have non-being unless an extrinsic cause were to prevent its non-being by giving it being – because from its own idea alone it would not have being when every extrinsic cause giving it being is excluded, because in no way would it have being unless it were produced by an extrinsic cause in being: so that more properly must it be said that a creature is not of itself formally than that it has non-being of itself formally (because 'formally has of itself' is an affirmation [sc. not a negation]); nor does it have of itself being nor non-being.

⁴ The three ways are: negatively, when someone says he is speaking 'of nothing' because he is not speaking; or affirmatively when the 'from' marks the matter out of which something is made; or affirmatively when the 'from' marks origin or order, in the sense of 'after nothing'.

⁵ Avicenna: "Since something from among 'things by essence' was cause of the being of something else always, assuredly it will always be the cause of it as long as it has this being; and if the being of the cause always was, the being of the something else always will be; the reality of this cause then is more worthy in causality than all causes, by the fact it absolutely prevents a thing not to be. This then is the cause that gives a thing being in fact, and this is what for the wise is meant by 'creation', which is the giving of being to something after absolute not-being. For the caused thing, as far as concerns it in itself, is that it not be – but as far as concerns its cause, it is that it be; but what belongs to a thing from itself is, as to understanding, prior in essence, not in time, to what belongs to it from something other than itself; therefore everything created is being after not-being, by posteriority of essence."

63. For this position [n.59], so understood [n.62], it is argued thus: a more perfect agent presupposes less in acting than does a more imperfect agent – just as nature presupposes less than art, because nature presupposes only being in potency and art being in act; but God is an agent more perfectly than nature or art; therefore he presupposes less in his action than being in potency (which is presupposed by nature), and so [he presupposes] nothing, and consequently he can create.

64. This reason do some adduce for the second member, namely insofar as 'from' denotes order of duration. But there [n.62] it is altogether not valid, because although God presuppose nothing in producing from which he produce, yet it does not follow that he can produce the new, just as neither about nature and art does it follow (by force of the argument), because it does not follow: 'because nature does not presuppose in its action an entity in act, therefore it can produce something altogether new according to existence in act'.

65. But neither for this first [member] [n.63] is it valid, because according to the philosophers any intelligence at all is a superior agent to a natural agent, and yet it is not commonly conceded (although Avicenna would concede it) that intelligence could create or produce something from nothing.

66. Therefore I argue differently for the same member thus: God can immediately cause and effect something, therefore he can create and make something from nothing.

67. The antecedent is manifest, because God is the first efficient, from 1 d.2 nn.43-59; and if he can make nothing immediately then neither can he mediately make anything (because he is the first efficient), and so he will produce no effect.

68. The consequence [n.66] I prove thus, because if he can effect anything, it does not have of itself necessary being formally, and thus it has being from a cause; therefore it has being after non-being according to the understanding of this member [sc. where 'from' states order of nature]. And he produces also immediately, with nothing else presupposed – because if something is presupposed, it would be effected by him (as is plain from *Ord*.I d.8 nn.7-8), and so this would not be an immediate effect from him. We have, therefore, from the first antecedent [n.66] to this consequent, that he produces something in order of nature, from non-being to being, and this with nothing presupposed; according to this understanding then does he create. This reason seems to be intimated by Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2, in the place before, (look for him there [n.59 and note; cf. also *Ord*.I d.5 n.53]).

B. About Creation from Nothing as 'from' Indicates Order of Duration

69. About the second member, according as 'from' indicates order of duration [n.58; cf. *Prol.* n.18, 1 d.2 nn.83, 120, 149, d.8 nn.251, 255, d.42 nn.10, 13], creation is commonly denied by philosophers, because they say that God necessarily produces whatever he immediately produces and with nothing presupposed – and what he mediately produces, he produces with something presupposed from which he produces, because then he produces through second causes; and so he produces neither a mediate nor an immediate effect from nothing – taking 'from' in this way.

70. But against this was proof given in *Ord*.1 d.8 nn.275-277, 281-291 (and it was also touched on in *Ord*.1 d.39 nn.35-37, 41, 91 [in the *Lectura*; not d.39 in the surviving *Ordinatio* proper]), that God causes 'everything that outwardly is' contingently and from

himself; and from this it follows that not necessarily, and consequently not necessarily sempiternal (because [Aristotle] seems in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8 to concede that everything sempiternal is necessary; the same too he seems to insinuate in *On the Heavens* 1.12.283b1-6 against Plato, who conceded that something is eternal and yet is able not to be, *Timaeus* 30-33).

71. But you will object to this reason [n.70] that it is not necessary, where there is contingency in the effect, that there possibility for newness be inferred; for God wills *a* contingently (from *Ord*.I d.8 nn.275-277, 281, 291), and yet he cannot *de novo* not will *a*, because then he would be changeable.

72. I reply. In divine production there can be newness of product although there not be newness in the producer, because in 'first production' change and newness is on the part of the product, as will be plain in responding to the first principal argument [nn.85-86]. But in 'to will' there cannot be newness or change on the part of the thing willed unless there were some newness on the part of the act of willing, because the act of willing – disposed the same and in the same way – cannot be of anything newly willed; for a willed thing does not have willed being save through act of willing, and so it is not new in being of being willed save through a new act of willing.

73. So therefore it seems in some way to follow that if God can contingently cause something, he can also contingently cause something new (because there is no reason why he cannot cause a non-sempiternal thing contingently) just as he can cause the sempiternal contingently, whence he does not cause necessarily; for that it would be necessary for a 'caused thing' to be sempiternal would seem to follow from the necessity of the causation or from the immutability of the causer, neither of which entails the sempiternity of it [the thing caused]; therefore newness is capable of being inferred.

74. It is also argued for this member [the second, n.69]: because if something is new, I ask by what cause is it new? Let the cause be a. – Then I argue: either a being disposed in the same way produced this new thing, or in another way. If in the same way, the matter at issue is got, that from the same cause not changed there can be some new effect. If by a otherwise disposed, I ask by what mover was it otherwise disposed for producing this new effect; there is not a process to infinity, therefore a stop will be made at length that something will be new from a cause uniformly disposed.

And the reason is confirmed, because if from the first mover can this part of new motion be that never was before, why cannot thus some whole thing be new, nothing of which ever was before?

75. But this reason (with its confirmation) against the philosophers [n.69] is of little avail and would easily be solved by them; the conclusion however is true, that from some agent not changed there can be a product in some way thus new.

76. In this second member however (namely understanding 'from' insofar as it states order of duration), a distinction can be made about this that is the 'from nothing' [n.58], that namely it can be taken for nothing in every way [nn.83-84], or for nothing according to being of existence, although in some way according to being of essence [n.82].

77. And an example is posited by some, that although God can create from nothing in the second way [sc. according to being of essence, n.76], yet not from nothing in the first way [sc. in every way, n.76], because nothing can be produced that is not on its own part possible, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 4; and nothing is not possible

on its own part, because there is not any reason why one nothing were possible on its own part and not another nothing.

78. The reason is also confirmed, because in every creature there is composition of act and potency – and wherever these are, possibility or potentiality precedes in order of nature; therefore potentiality, in whatever created thing it be, naturally precedes and is prior in nature to actuality. And then this potentiality is not nothing but belongs to some entity according to some being; not according to being of existence, therefore according to quidditative being.

79. And this is posited according to the way that was recited in 1 d.43 n.5 [of the *Lectura*, not the *Ordinatio*]. For it is there posited that by the power of God active for itself are things first produced in possible being passively for themselves; and then further can they be produced in being of existence, not however unless they have been first in nature produced in quidditative being and in possible being passively.

80. Against this is the argument in the same place in distinction 43 [*Ord*.I d.43 nn.6-9], because 'a thing is not produced in possible being by omnipotence but by intellect, whereby it is produced in intelligible being'; and when it is in intelligible being, to be is not repugnant to it, nor is it of itself formally necessary; therefore it is possible.

81. Likewise there is another argument in *Ord*.I d.36 n.17 against that being of essence, because 'if that being were true being, production in that being would truly be creation and to some being simply from nothing'. Therefore this production is simply other; not in possible being (or not of a thing in possible being), because if a thing is not possible before it is in being of essence, and if it is produced in this being – therefore something is produced in some being, by some production, that is not possible on its own part.^a

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] It was impossible or necessary; therefore from the impossible or the necessary it becomes possible – which is false; for what is impossible on its own part cannot be produced in being of essence nor in being of existence.

82. As to this third article then [n.76], I say that from nothing (that is, not from anything) according to being of existence can God create, and consequently from nothing (that is, not from anything) according to being of essence, because, as was proved in *Ord*.I d.36 nn.26-29, 48-49, 53, never is being of essence really separated from being of existence.

83. And yet not can anything be created, that is, produced in being simply from nothing, that is from in no way a being (neither simply nor in a certain respect). For nothing is created that did not first have understood and willed being, and that was in understood being possible formally, as was said in the first reason against the position [nn.80, 79]; and then it was quasi in proximate potency so that it could be an object of omnipotence and be posited in being simply.

84. Something can be produced (although not created) from nothing simply, that is, not from anything according to being of essence or being of existence, nor according to any being in a certain respect – because a creature is not produced in intelligible being from any being, either simply or in a certain respect, nor from [something] possible on its own part in this being; however, this 'to be produced' is not to be created, because nothing is created in being simply but is produced for being in a certain respect.

II. To the Principal Arguments

85. To the first principal rgument [51] I say that the first cause can immediately produce some new effect without any newness in the cause itself. Which is plain from an example: for if the sun be posited always to be in itself equally bright and if there be created some transparent medium next to it, the sun will *de novo* illuminate it, so that nothing new will be in the sun for this, that there be a new illumination from it; and if it could of itself put in place a medium transparent and under the light, just as it causes light in it so could it produce into being this whole – namely the illumined medium – without any newness in itself.

86. And if you say 'it could not do this if it were a natural agent and uniformly disposed (because then it would always produce uniformly), therefore the example is not valid for displaying the matter at hand' – I reply: it is true that this example has availed to this extent, that it is not necessary, because of newness of effect, to posit newness in the cause; yet it has not availed as to this, that an effect could be new from a naturally acting and total cause, because such an agent would always uniformly act (if it were such) with respect to the effect. But a free agent can by the same former will produce a new effect for the time when it wills that new effect to be; for it is not necessary that 'if it sempiternally wills and cannot will *de novo*, therefore it wills for sempiternity', just as it is not necessary in me that if I now will something, that I will it for now: but I can will it for tomorrow, and with the same will in place (without any change on the part of my will) I can cause that new thing tomorrow, for which I will it.

87. And when it is argued against this by this reason, 'because it is naturally necessary for some new relation to precede in the producer to the product, and not conversely' [n.52] - I say (as was said in *Ord.I* d.35 nn.31-32, 47-50, and frequently elsewhere [d.3 n.326, d.30 nn.22-23, 30-45, 65-68, d.43 nn.11-12]) that on an absolute in the cause follows immediately an absolute in the effect – and in the effect there first follows a respect to the cause; and then, if there is some respect of the cause to the effect, the respect to the effect is last and sometimes null.⁶ As to what therefore he says, that 'because the cause gives being, therefore the effect receives being and not conversely' [n.52], I say that if he intends by the 'because' a reduplication of relation in the cause or some new reality in the cause (whether relative or absolute), the proposition is false; but if it intend to reduplicate the first act of the cause, which cause naturally precedes the thing caused, in this way is the proposition true: for the absolute in the cause naturally precedes the caused.

88. And if you say 'not only because it is absolute does it cause, because it is such – namely absolute – when it is also not causing', I say that in the instant in which it causes, it still causes as prior naturally to the action itself – and as such nothing is understood but the absolute itself, by which the thing caused is posited in being; and so nothing can be taken with this, which is 'it causes', save that it is prior, and not in respect of this instant nor in respect of another. But imagination deceives 'because it always seems that the cause is indeterminate up to the instant when it causes, and then that some relation – determining it [the cause] to the effect – is required first on the part of the cause', which is false; for that same absolute, which in it [the cause], both in nature and

⁶ Vatican editors: About these four in order (absolute in the cause, absolute in the effect, respect or relation of effect to cause, respect or relation of cause to effect) see the references [noted earlier in the paragraph].

in duration, preceded the effect produced or caused, is in it in that instant naturally before it cause – and according to the same absolute 'according to which it first was causative' it is now causing, and not according to anything added, either absolute or relative.

89. To the second [n.53], when it is argued for determination – I say by the same point [n.88] that a cause equally determined for producing some product (as far as is on its part) can sometimes produce and sometimes not produce, because as in natural things 'that a cause is determined on its own part' is that it has the form whereby it causes, so in free things 'that a cause is determined' is that there it has a volition with respect to the willable; and just as there the form can be had before the effect is caused (but then there is an impediment outwardly, or absence of the passive thing), so also can a volition here be had before the willable thing be had, and before in nature and in duration.

90. To the third, about the Philosopher in *On Generation* [n.54] - I say that the Philosopher's understanding is of a natural agent, as is plain from him there.

91. To the fourth [n.55] I say – as was said in *Ord*.I d.8 n.299 – that 'it is a mark of lack of education to seek demonstrations for everything' (according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8), 'for there is no demonstration of principles'. And in the same way in contingent things; otherwise there would be a process to infinity in contingent things, because contingent things do not follow from necessary ones. And therefore this will of God – which wills this and for now – is immediate and first cause, for which some other cause must not be sought: for just as there is no reason why he wanted human nature to be in this individual and to be possible and contingent, so there is no reason why he wanted this now and not then, but only 'because he wished this to be, therefore it was good that it is'; and to seek for this proposition – although a contingent immediate one– another reason is to seek a reason for which no reason should be sought.

92. And when [the argument] speaks about 'expecting' [n.56], I say that the will, which has goodness from the willable itself, this will – if it is right – wills at once the willed thing, unless there be some reason why it will it rather to be at another time, and then it waits for that more opportune time; but a will that has no reason why it is now willing something (just as neither does it absolutely have a reason why it will this) does not have to wait for some opportunity in the willed thing – nor does it have goodness from the willed thing, but conversely.

III. To the Other Arguments

93. To the first which is argued for the third opinion 'about being of essence' [n.77; the first opinion, n.59; the second, n.69], the response is plain from what was said before [nn.80-81, 82-84]. For I concede that everything creatable was first possible on its own part, but this possibility or potentiality is not founded in any being simply but in known being (such that concomitant with known being is potentiality for being simply is), although formally known being is not possible being, because 'known being' is being in act in a certain respect – but possible being is being in potency for being simply, and not in act. Nor yet is 'being in potency' being simply, but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect: just as neither is 'future being' being simply, nor is 'past being' being simply; for just as 'to have passed in being simply' does not imply being simply, so neither does 'future being' imply being simply; therefore much more does 'able to be simply' not imply being simply, because 'able to be' seems to be more remote from being simply than 'to be future'.

94. To the other reason, about composition from act and potency [n.78], it is plain through the same point [n.93]. For although it be conceded that objective potency precedes act, not however is it in any act – and although this, which is conceded to be known, be in some 'known being', not however is it formally known being. However, the reasoning [n.78] is not valid, because composition is not from objective potency and terminating act, but in another way this composition is, as was said in *Ord*.I d.8 nn.32-33.

Question Three

Whether it is possible for God to produce Something without a Beginning other than Himself

95. Thirdly I ask whether it is possible for God to produce something other than himself without a beginning.

96. That it is:

The Philosopher in *Physics* 1.9.192a27-31 proves that matter is ungenerated and incorruptible – otherwise there would be a process to infinity in matters. Therefore matter either was not produced, or was produced without a beginning, which is the thing proposed; or if not, at any rate some form was produced in it [matter] and without a beginning, because matter never was without form.

97. Second thus: time, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 8.1.251b10-28 and *Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b6-9, is without beginning. Which seems to be proved from this: because if not, then time could have been before it was, or be before it was; but 'before' is a difference of time; therefore before time there was time.

98. Third thus: according to the Philosopher *On Generation* 1.3.318a23-25, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Therefore never was there any first generation, and consequently without a beginning some generable things were.

99. Fourth thus: a cause not acting by motion and not able to be prevented can have an effect coeval with it, as is plain in creatures; therefore etc.

100. On the contrary:

Augustine *To Felicianus* [Ps.-Augustine ch.7] assigns a definition for creature and says that "a creature is from this, that – by the will of the omnipotent God – from notbeing to being its substance is produced." If therefore it is of the idea of a creature to be produced from not-being, then it is impossible for it to be produced without a beginning.

101. Secondly thus: the reason whereby God could have produced one thing without a beginning, also another – and so there would be produced in act things infinite in multitude; he could also have piled together all the magnitudes that afterwards there would have been, and so have made an infinite mass. But an infinity both in mass and in number is rejected in *Physics* 3.5.204a17-b10.

I. First Opinion

102. Here it is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*. I q.7-8] that God could have produced something 'other than himself' without a beginning, because that he could not

have done this (namely to have produced something 'other than himself' without a beginning) cannot be demonstrated, either by an intrinsic middle term or by an extrinsic one. Not by an extrinsic middle term because that is the will of God, of which there cannot be known nor had a reason why it wills this more to be with a beginning than without a beginning. Nor by an intrinsic middle term, namely by the 'what it is' of the makeable, because the 'what it is' abstracts from the here and now; so it is not a reason for demonstrating the here and now.

103. Again, that 'anything else whatever' is from God is an article of faith. Therefore it is not expedient for demonstrations to be made for it, neither because of the faithful nor because of infidels; indeed, it seems dangerous: as to the faithful indeed, because thus the merit of faith would be evacuated, as it seems; and as to infidels, because then they could argue that we were believing such things because of reasons and thus are without faith – and also if such reasons seemed to them to be sophisms (just as they seem to certain of the faithful [Aquinas *Sentences* 2 d.1 q.1 a.5]), infidels could doubt that we believed because of such sophisms.

104. Besides third, Augustine *On the Trinity* 6.1 n.1, "If fire were eternal the splendor caused by it would be eternal, and would be coeternal with it."

105. And from this is an efficacious argument is made for this position [n.102], as it seems: for Augustine's consequence is natural – otherwise it would not be valid against Arius for proving the coeternity of the Son with the Father; but it cannot hold save from the perfect idea of cause and caused; therefore just as there [sc. Augustine's case of fire] is 'necessary coaevity' inferred from a perfect cause naturally acting, so from a perfect cause acting voluntarily can possible coaevity be inferred of a limited effect with an unlimited cause, because there does not seem to be a difference between a natural agent and a free agent save in contingently and naturally acting (and there is not a difference in able to act and to non-act, because whatever a natural agent can do, a free agent can also, and they do not differ save in mode of causing).

106. And this argument can be replicated in many ways:

Because no perfect condition is found in a second cause, whatever position has been made (which is a condition of perfection), without its being in the first cause as cause; but it is a mark of perfection in any second cause to have an effect coeval with it – and from this, if there were an eternal or coeternal effect of its cause, perfection would be in the cause; therefore etc.

107. It is also deduced in another way (and it is quasi the same): because the mode of causing does not formally vary the caused thing, according to Ambrose *Incarnation of the Word* 9 n.103;⁷ but if God caused naturally and necessarily, he could cause an effect coeval and coeternal with himself; therefore if now he cause voluntarily – although he not cause necessarily, he will yet have been able to cause an effect coeval with himself.

108. And if it be said that Augustine understands it [n.104] of the splendor immanent in fire, which is not formally caused by it – against this is his text, which says 'the splendor generated and diffused by it'.

⁷ Ambrose: "But what is as of one nature as our flesh is with the truth of the Lord's body? But each has been drawn from diverse causes, each has arisen from diverse principles...; and still, although there was a diverse cause of generation, there is yet of the flesh in Christ one nature with all men."

109. And he states the same opinion in homily 36 *On John*, about a stick and its image in water. But it is certain that such an image, if it were, would be caused and generated by the stick.

110. Besides, fourth: whatever is not repugnant to limitation is not repugnant to the creature, if it is some entity; but however long the duration, it is not repugnant to the limitation of the creature, because no more imperfect is what lasts for one day than what lasts for ten years [cf. Aristotle, *Ethics* 1.4.1096b3-5]; therefore it seems that an infinite duration would not posit a greater perfection in a creature than [would] a lesser one, and consequently it does not posit repugnance that it [the creature] always was without beginning.

111. Again, the creature does thus tend to not-being to the extent it is from itself, just as [does] not-being to the extent it is from itself and from nothing; therefore just as without contradiction the creature can always tend to not-being and yet always exist (as is plain of angel and soul), so without contradiction can it have always existed and yet – to the extent it is from itself – have always had non-being.

112. Again, Augustine *City of God* 10.31 says that "if a foot had from eternity been in the sand, a footprint would always be under it, which footprint however no one would doubt was made by the one treading; nor would one be prior to the other, although one was made by the other."

113. The same in the same place [*City of God* 11.4], "in a certain scarcely intelligible way" the philosophers said that the world was made and yet does not have a beginning of duration. Therefore that way, if it is scarcely intelligible, is intelligible, and so it does not include a contradiction that something always has been and without beginning.

114. It is confirmed too, because it does not seem probable that such brilliant philosophers, and so diligently inquiring the truth and so perspicuously conceiving the meanings of the terms, did not see the included contradiction if it had been included in the terms.

115. And it is confirmed also according to the philosophers (that there is not there a contradiction), because not only does the natural philosopher consider the four causes but the metaphysician too, however under a prior and more common idea [sc. by abstracting from motion or change]; the efficient cause therefore is in more things than the moving or also changing cause, and consequently it can give being without motion. The first efficient, then, can give being without this that it give new being [sc. new in time], because without this, that it give being through motion or change.

116. Again, motion is an effect coeval and coeternal with the first mover; therefore there can be some product or effect from the first efficient cause that is coeternal and coeval with it.

II. Second Opinion

117. Against this position [n.102] it is argued [from Henry of Ghent] that something 'other than God' having existed without a beginning involves a contradiction, because about everything produced it is at some time true, or will at some time be true, to say that it is produced, because even of the Son of God produced in eternity it can truly be said that he is produced in eternity. The creature then is either always produced when it is, or is at some time produced and not always; if in the second way, in the instant in which it is thus produced it first gets being, and the proposed conclusion is plain [sc. that the creature at some time began to be]; if in the first way, then the creature is in continual coming to be – which seems unacceptable, because then it would not be permanent.

118. It also seems that then [sc. the first way in n.117] being created would not differ from being conserved, and this is disproved in two ways:

First because 'to be created' is to be produced from not-being to being, but 'to be conserved' is of the being had before, and so to be created is not to be conserved.

119. Second, because a particular agent generates and does not conserve; therefore when both come together in the same thing, one and the other are different.

120. And added to this reason [n.117] is that a creature has an acquired being, and consequently being after non-being; because if not, it would have being without acquisition, just like the Son of God – although it would not have the same being with that from which it acquires being.^a

a. [Interpolation from Appendix A]. Third, "by the authority of Augustine On the Immortality of the Soul 8 n.14, 'What is made by him, he guards; for what per se is not, if it is deprived of that through which it is, will be nothing.' And Genesis 2.1, "God rested on the seventh day from the work of creation," not from the work of conservation [Henry of Ghent, Quodl. I q.7-8].

121. A second argument is as follows: "Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is," from *De Interpretatione* 9.19a23-24; therefore it cannot not be save because potency precedes its being, whereby it can be prevented from being. But if something was from eternity from God, no potency preceded its 'being from God'; therefore it couldn't not be from God.

122. He objects to himself that the predestined can be saved and not saved; therefore likewise, about what was made from eternity, it is possible for it to have been and not to have been.

He responds that predestination regards 'a thing outwardly' for some definite now of time, for which namely the thing is able not to be and so not to be predestined, because predestination corresponds to the nature of the thing; but to give something being from eternity regards power for an infinite eternity wherein there is no power for the opposite, and so not in the act of giving either.

123. And this is confirmed, because "in perpetual things to be and to be possible do not differ," *Physics* 3.4.203b30; and in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b7-8, "Nothing eternal is in potency."

124. Further, third he argues the same thus, elsewhere: any species at all is equally in potency to be, in comparison to God as giver of being; therefore just as the sun could have been from eternity, so also an ass,⁸ and this a perfect one, able to generate; and from it could all the other asses have been generated which there have been, up to this one generated now. And then I ask whether all would have been then finite or infinite: if finite, then the whole time from that time to this would have been finite; if infinite, then, with the extremes posited, the middle would have been able to have been infinite in act, which is unacceptable.

⁸ The Vatican editors note that the example Henry used was 'man' and not 'ass'.

125. Further fourth he argues as follows: a creature from eternity is possible to be and not to be,^a etc.; look for this reason in *Quodl*. I q.9.⁹

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] if then it is posited in being, it has that acquired being; therefore its not being preceded in duration its new and acquired being. Or.

126. Again, argued for this opinion [n.117] is that it follows that there have been infinite intellective souls, if the world could have been from eternity without a beginning.

127. Further, it is against the idea of the infinite in quantity that it can be exceeded or can be taken in its totality (as is plain from its definition in *Physics* 3.6.206b33-7a2, 7-9, "the infinite is what it is possible to take nothing extra of;" and elsewhere "that of which, for those taking the parts, it is always possible to take something extra"¹⁰); but if the world could have been from eternity and without a beginning, an infinite duration would have been taken.^a Nor is the response valid [Thomas of Sutton, *Quaest. Ordinariae* q.29 arg.17 *in opp.*] which says that 'it would have been infinite in potency and in always receiving being and not in having received being', because the marking off by the intellect does nothing for this the infinite to be actually taken; for it is incompossible that a future infinite has at some time been taken although no intellect would have been that would mark off the parts of that infinite time'.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] ...an infinite could have been exceeded and taken in its totality, because infinite things have preceded to which addition is continually being made, which have also now been taken; therefore it is impossible for the world to have been from eternity.

128. Again, it is argued that the part would be greater than the whole – because let the midday of this day be *a*, and the midday of tomorrow be *b*: if, on either side of *a*, time could have been infinite, by parity of reason about the past in respect of *b* to the future in respect of *b*;¹¹ therefore by whatever the past up to *b* is greater, by that is the future from *b* greater. But greater than the past up to *a* is the past up to *b*, as whole than part, therefore the past up to *b* is greater than the future from *a*; therefore the future from *b* – which is equal to the past up to *b* – would be greater than the future from *a*, and so the part would be greater than the whole.^{12 a}

⁹ Henry: "but ability not to be precedes in nature and duration ability to be, just as not being precedes being in nature; therefore if the creature could have being from God from eternity, it would either have being after not being in duration (and so it would at some point begin to be), or being and not being together, which is impossible." Cf. n.162

¹⁰ Scotus here seems to be misreading Aristotle, or to be being misled perhaps by the Latin translation, since Aristotle gives the first definition of the infinite only to reject it for the second. On the other hand, Scotus does have the notion of a positive and perfect infinite (very different from a numerical or quantitative infinite), which is not the imperfect and always incomplete infinite of Aristotle's second definition.

¹¹ That is, if time on either side of a is allowed to be infinite (future and past), then the time on either side of b must be allowed to be infinite. But the time on the past side of b is greater than the time on the past side of a, for b by supposition is later in time than a. Therefore the time on the future side of b must be greater than the time on the future side of a.

¹² The future of *b* is a part of the future of *a* (*b* follows *a* in time) and so, to that extent, is shorter than the future of *a*. But it must also be longer than the future of *a*, because the future of *a* and *b* equals their past and the past of *b* is longer than the past of *a*. Consequently, the part (the future of *b*) is larger than the whole (the future of *a*).

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, every permanent sempiternal is formally necessary; nothing other than God is formally necessary [*Ord.*I d.30 n.56, d.36 n.19]; therefore. – Proof [of the major]: the permanent has the whole of its being at once, such that if it remain perpetually it receives no new being [*Ord.*I d.8 nn.257-58]; therefore now it has the being whereby it formally always is; therefore now it has the being whereby it would be repugnant to it sometimes not to be; therefore [it is] now a necessary being. Proof of the minor: what includes being in act is of itself a 'this'.

Again, when a determinate act necessarily follows a determinate act, if the necessity of the prior can be shown, of the posterior too; the act of the divine will with respect to 'anything other than itself' necessarily follows the determinate act of the divine intellect about the same, and by a necessary reason can the determinate act of God's intellect about it be shown; therefore also of the will: therefore creation too, which follows the determination of the will. – Proof of the first part of the minor: by a likeness about sense and sensitive appetite. Proof in another way: the divine will presupposes the act of the divine intellect (about the same object) and a right act; the will cannot not be in concord with it, because then it would not be right. – Proof of the second part of the minor: what follows on causes necessarily naturally causing can necessarily be proved from them; a determinate act of the act (in no way the will, because then it would have an act about what is not understood). Another proof of the second part: as the principle in speculative things, so the end in desirable, doable things; from the principle there is necessary speculative knowledge of all else, therefore from the end there is necessary practical knowledge about things that are for the end.

Again, every essence other than God is finite and not pure act – therefore (according to Thomas [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.50 a.2 ad 3-4]) it is in matter or in potency to being and, by parity of reasoning, material; it is therefore first in potency before in act (*Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a7-11), and the order of nature between incompossibles has a like order of duration.

Again, the more necessarily and immediately a determinate relation to something follows the essence, so much the more through the essence as through the middle term can such a determinate relation be demonstrated; but a relation to the first efficient cause more necessarily and immediately follows any essence than does any relation to something posterior, because according to this does it depend essentially, not according to that (some relation to a posterior is determinate relation demonstrated more. Creation states such a determinate relation, because it states a determinate accepting of being from such a cause [nn.102-116]; therefore.

Again, through the essence is that necessarily proved without which the essence cannot be: such is dependence on the first efficient cause; creation as it is common to everything other than God states that [dependence, nn.260-263] and no other respect, because then it would not signify a concept per se one.

Again, it no less depends in real being than in known [*Ord.*I d.8 n.270, d.36 n.19]; but by a necessary reason is the passive exemplification proved of anything exemplified, because God is an agent through knowledge, because he is the first who ordains.

Again, it is necessarily shown how the divine will is disposed to quiddities, therefore also how disposed to existence. – The antecedent is proved: he is well pleased in participation of his goodness. Proof of the consequence: existence has an equally perfect relation to the first object of the divine will, as does essence.

129. Many other reasons could be adduced, but some are sophistical and many others happen often.

III. To the Reasons for the First Opinion by holding the Second Opinion

130. Those who hold this conclusion [sc. that there is a contradiction involved in God having made something other than himself without a beginning; nn.117-128], especially because they posit that there is the same impossibility on the part of any species at all (and in some species – as in successive ones – it seems that everything taken is finite, although the whole be infinite by taking part after part [nn.124-28]) – they respond to the reasons for the first opinion [nn.102-116]:

To the first [n.102], that although God's will (as to whether it exists in respect of this [particular]) cannot naturally be known, yet it can naturally be known that his will is not of anything that is of itself not willable; and this because it includes a contradiction (and consequently an incompossibility) that the divine will be of that of which there is no idea;¹³ but then it is necessary to put 'non-willability' on the part of the object, as also incompossibility, from *Ord*.I d.43 nn.3, 6.

131. And then, when it is argued that 'the what it is' is not the middle term for demonstrating being [n.102], it is said that, although that be true, yet the creature can be the middle term for demonstrating the beginning of its existence.

132. Against this: because the middle by which the beginning of existence will be demonstrated cannot be the 'what it is', according to them, therefore existence [is].

133. And then the reasoning seems to be doubly at fault: first, according to the fallacy of the consequent, because 'existence' in the minor does not entail actual existence;¹⁴ second, because the premise in which existence is applied to the stone will be contingent, and so the demonstration will not be a very probable reason, but sophistical.¹⁵

134. To the argument [n.102] however it can be replied that, although the 'what it is' is contingently disposed to existence actual or non-actual (and so it is not a middle for demonstrating absolute existence, or any absolute condition of existence [131]), yet to some 'what it is' can some condition of existence be repugnant, and so it can be a middle for demonstrating that existence under such a condition does not belong to that of which is the 'what it is': just as, although the quiddity of a stone not include in itself 'to exist', yet 'to be uncreated' is repugnant to it of itself, – and so, from the idea of this quiddity, it can be concluded that it does not have uncreated nor sempiternal being.

135. So it would have to be said in the matter at hand (according to this position [sc. when holding the second opinion, n.130]), that sempiternal existence is repugnant to a stone, and so from the quiddity of a stone it can be demonstrated that it does not have eternal being; and from this further, not absolutely that it has new being, but if it is that it has new being – which is the thing proposed.

136. In another way too does the reason fail [nn.102, 131] – as it seems – according to the fallacy of the consequent: for it does not follow, 'the opposite of this cannot be demonstrated, therefore this is possible', but it is a fallacy of the consequent, for 'first impossibles' are impossible from the terms, just as their opposite 'first necessaries' are necessary from the terms; and although the opposites of those [sc. the

¹³ Contradictions or incompossibilities are strictly unthinkable, or lacking in idea, because to think them is at the same time not to think them.

¹⁴ The 'what it is' of a thing does not entail 'that it is' So if the 'what' of a stone is in the minor but not the 'that', the conclusion about the 'that' is not the consequent of the argument but gratuitously assumed.

¹⁵ Demonstrations proper proceed from necessary premises. But the existence of a stone is contingent and not necessary. So if such existence is posited in one of the premises, the argument will not be the demonstration it is purporting to be.
opposites of the first impossibles, which are the first necessaries] cannot be demonstrated (because they are first truths), yet it does not follow that therefore they are possibles, but it would be necessary to add to this antecedent, 'the opposite cannot be demonstrated', that the opposite is not a first necessary or known from the terms – and perhaps that would be denied by some in the matter at hand, although the necessity, from the terms, of the opposite be latent, and not evident to whatever intellect is confusedly conceiving the terms.

137. To the second [n.103] it can be said that, if there are necessary reasons for things believed, it is however not dangerous to adduce them, either because of the faithful or because of infidels.

138. Not as to the faithful, for Catholic doctors, when examining by reasons the truth of things believed and striving to understand what they believed, did not thereby intend to destroy the merit of faith – rather, Augustine and Anselm believed they were laboring meritoriously to understand what they believed, according to *Isaiah* 7.9 (according to another translation [the LXX]), "unless you believe you will not understand;" for while believing they were examining, so that they might understand by reasons what they believed. But whether demonstrations – if any can be had – make faith void or not, about this in book three, on the incarnation [3 Suppl. d.24].

139. Nor is it dangerous as to infidels if necessary reasons could be had;^a even if necessary reasons could not be had for proving the being of a fact – namely an article of faith – if yet they were had for proving the possibility of the fact, it would also be useful to adduce them against an infidel, because thereby would he in some way be persuaded not to resist such articles of belief as impossibilities. However, to adduce sophisms for demonstrations, this would be dangerous against infidels – because hereby would the faith be exposed to derision (and so it is too in every other matter, even indifferent matter, as in geometrical ones, to propose sophisms as demonstrations). For it is better for the ignorant to know he is ignorant than because of sophisms to think that he knows. Now those who state the opposite view say that they are not adducing sophisms but necessary reasons and true demonstrations – and therefore it is to do nothing prejudicial to the faith (either in respect of the faithful or of infidels), but rather with reasons of this sort to confirm it.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] because "demonstrative speech is not born for solving all questions that happen in a thing," Averroes *Physics* 1 com.71.

138. Not as to the faithful, for Catholic doctors, inquiring into the truth of things believed through arguments, and striving to understand what they believed, did not thereby intend to destroy the merit of faith – rather, Augustine and Anselm believed they were laboring meritoriously to understand what they believed, according to *Isaiah* 7.9 (according to another translation [the LXX]), "unless you believe you will not understand;" for while believing they were examining, so that they might understand by reasons what they believed. But whether demonstrations – if any can be had – make faith void or not, about this in book three, on the incarnation [3 Suppl. d.24].

139. Nor is it dangerous as to infidels: if necessary reasons were able to be had,^a even if not able to be had for proving the being of the fact (namely an article of faith), yet if they were had for proving the possibility of the fact, it would even be useful to adduce them against the infidel, because thereby would he in some way be persuaded not to resist

such articles of belief as impossibilities. However, to adduce sophisms for demonstrations, this would be dangerous against infidels – because hereby would the faith be exposed to derision (and so it also is in every other matter, even indifferent matter, as in geometrical ones, to propose sophisms as demonstrations). For it is better for the ignorant to know he is ignorant than because of sophisms to think that he knows. Now those who state the opposite view [cf. Henry, n.117[say that they are not adducing sophisms but necessary reasons and true demonstrations – and therefore it is to do nothing prejudicial to the faith (either in respect of the faithful or of infidels), but rather to confirm it, with reasons of this sort.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] because "demonstrative speech is not of a nature to solve all questions that arise in reality," Averroes *Physics* 1 com.71.

140. As to the third [nn.104-105], although it there be said in many ways by diverse persons, yet I say that in the same consequence there can be many reasons because of which the inference is necessary, and therefore many places¹⁶ (namely taken from the many reasons for such consequence) in the antecedent itself; and wherever any of these reasons or any of those places can be found, a like inference can be found and inferred. An example: 'a man runs, therefore an animal runs' rightly follows through the place 'from species', and not only this but through a more common place, namely through the place 'from subjective part' [sc. because 'animal' is a subjective part of 'man', for man is a rational animal] – because not only whenever there is an inference from subjective part to whole is the consequence good. And another example could be posited where several reasons for inferring come together; but this suffices for the purpose.

141. So I say that it follows, 'there is fire in this now and it is not impeded, therefore there is light': the place is from a cause naturally causing, not impeded; and not only this, but also the consequence can hold from a certain more common reason in the antecedent, namely from the idea of a thing producing naturally and not impeded. For not only does 'a thing causing naturally, not impeded' have a thing caused or an effect coeval with it (*Physics* 2.8.199a10-11), but also does 'a thing producing naturally' have a product coeval with it, as is manifest from the second reason [n.141 here above]. So wherever there is a like reason for inferring, there will be, not only according to the special reason [sc. a thing causing naturally], but also according to the general one [sc. a thing producing naturally], a necessary and natural consequence.

142. And so I say that the example [n.104] is well to the purpose: that if 'there is fire' entail 'splendor is diffused' by reason of the thing naturally producing, although this antecedent was impossible and incompossible and the consequent likewise, yet the consequence is necessary and good. Therefore, wherever that reason for entailment is [sc. a thing producing naturally], the consequence will be good and necessary, however it may be with the antecedent and consequent; but so it is here about the Father and Son, because the Father is producer naturally in respect of the Son; therefore a like entailment, good and necessary, will be there.

¹⁶ Sc. places or topics [*topos* is the Greek for 'place'] of argument, following Aristotle's *Topics*, which is precisely about finding places of argument for any subject whatever.

143. And hereby is it plain to the confirmation of the reason, 'that no perfection is taken away from the first cause that can be in the second' [n.106]. But to be able to have a simply necessary caused thing is not a mark of perfection in a second cause; rather this even belongs to no second cause (as was said in *Ord*.I d.8 n.306), although some second cause may have this in a certain respect; for simply necessarily to cause involves a contradiction, and therefore this belongs to no second cause.¹⁷ Nor from this as from the impossible (by inferring anything at all on the part of fire) does Augustine argue, but he argues it [sc. the splendor is eternal and coeternal with fire; n.104] from a more common idea (namely from the idea of the thing producing), which does not involve a contradiction; and this suffices for his reason [n.104, cf. *Ord*.I d.9 n.10].

144. By the same is it plain to the other reason, 'that a diverse mode of causing does not vary the caused formally' [n.107]. It is true of 'diverse modes of causing' that can be of a cause in some causation, but if one mode in causing is possible and another impossible, according to the possible mode the caused will be such and according to the impossible mode the caused will be other: just as from the impossible follows the impossible, by natural consequence however – so I say that by natural consequence it follows that if it caused naturally, that it would cause necessarily (and even coeternally), but this mode of causing includes a contradiction with the 'to cause freely'; and the other mode of causing – namely freely – is of a compossible cause, and therefore it does not take away compossibility in antecedent and consequent [Vatican editors: sc. 'if it causes freely, then it causes contingently'].

145. To the fourth [n.110] someone might say (for this way [n.117]) that 'to be sempiternal' includes some illimitation, because it includes being made in some respect equal to God (namely according to illimitation of duration), which could not be without illimitation [sc. in every other perfection], because it could not be made equal to him in some one thing without another.

146. But this is nothing, because even what coexists with God today is not for this reason made equal with eternity, with which it coexists today; which eternity too, as coexisting with this day, is infinite and independent – and the creature as today coexisting with eternity is finite and dependent and so is not made coequal with it. Therefore it is necessary to say that 'to be sempiternal' states some illimitation in a creature whence it is repugnant; but whence be that repugnance and that illimitation, anyone at all would manifest through the fundamental reason he would posit for himself.

147. To the fifth [n.111] response is made by reducing it to the opposite, that 'just as a creature could not actually tend to not-being and yet be always going to be, so it cannot actually have been after non-being and yet always have been' (and it is of the idea of a creature, according to this position [n.117], that not only is it a having had not-being before being aptitudinally, but even actually, before being, having had not-being).

¹⁷ Ord.I d.8 n.306: "I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect – namely as far as concerns themselves – and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [Daniel 3.49-50]."

148. To the authority [n.112], I say that the authority of Augustine, *City of God* 10, is not put there according to his understanding, but he put it there according to the understanding of the philosophers; hence he prefaces there about the philosophers, "For thus do they speak, 'if a foot were in sand from eternity, etc.'" Hence, according to the truth, that a foot has always thus been and has caused a footprint in the sand includes a contradiction, because the footprint is caused by a pressing down of the foot in the sand by local motion; and therefore that some such motion has been without a beginning, which motion of its idea is between opposites [sc. between a beginning and an end], is a contradiction.

149. To that about 'scarcely intelligible' [n.113] I say that contradictories can be apprehended by the intellect, and are also apprehended together (otherwise no intellect would say they were contradictories), as is generally plain from the argument of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.2.426b8-23, where he proves about the common sense and the other particular senses that no sense compares extremes unless it apprehend both. But thus to be understood is to be 'scarcely understood' because it is not to be understood with assent, in the way we say that we 'understand' what we believe to be true and 'do not understand' what we do not believe to be true, although yet we apprehend it.

150. Or in another way it can be said that, if the 'intelligible' be taken for that to which the intellect can assent, and it be said that the mode of the philosophers thus was scarcely intelligible, the exposition can be made that in its universal form that mode was intelligible, but not in itself and in particular; for it was intelligible with assent in idea of producer and not in idea of causer – and to understand 'causer' in idea of producer is to understand 'causer' imperfectly, just as to understand man in idea of animal is to understand man imperfectly.

151. Or in a third way it can be said (and perhaps to his [Augustine's] mind) that latent contradictories – as long as an evident contradiction is not perceived in them – can in some way be apprehended by the intellect, not however with certitude; and so this 'contradiction', if it exists, did yet escape the philosophers and could by them be 'scarcely understood'.

152. To that which is added about the philosophers [n.114], it can be said that they conceded many latent contradictions – just as they denied commonly that there is some first cause causing contingently, and yet they did say that there is contingency in beings and that some things happen contingently; but that 'some things happen contingently and the first cause causes necessarily' includes a contradiction, as was deduced in d.8 of the first book and in d.39¹⁸ of the same [*Ord*.I d.8 nn.275-277, 281-291, and d.39 nn.35-37, 41, 91], and to some extent in the preceding question [nn.69-70 above].

153. To what is added about the four causes [n.115] (that are considered by the metaphysician), which proves that the abstraction, according to the intellect, of the efficient cause is from the mover and changer – I say that not everything abstracted according to the intellect (or according to the consideration of the intellect) must be capable of being separated 'according to being' from that from which abstraction according to the intellect can be done; and so from this it does not follow that there is in reality some efficient [cause] that is not a moving or changing [cause].

¹⁸ Ord.I d.39 is lacking in the Ordinatio proper, and is supplied from his other Sentence commentaries, as is noted there in the translation.

IV. To the Reasons for the Second Opinion when Holding the First Opinion

154. But those who hold the first opinion [sc. that God can make something other than himself without a beginning, n.102], especially because of this, that a contradiction is not found in these terms 'other than God' and 'to be sempiternally' [n.114], and secondly because of this, that the reasons that seem to prove a contradiction are special (and so, although they may prove contradiction of something special, yet they do not prove this of everything 'other than God' [n.155ff.]), and thirdly because certain reasons seem similarly to reject the being able to come to be of the future as of the past [n.127] (although however no one denies 'the possibility of a future without end' or the coming to be of the non-successive or the being able to come to be of the successive) – these [sc. who hold the first opinion], I say, reply to the reasons against this opinion that prove contradiction [nn.117-28].

To the first [n.117]: that some creature could have always been produced, as an angel, whose being is to be in the aevum [= the measure of angelic eternity, cf. n.170].

155. And if you say that that creature [sc. the angel] at some time comes to be [n.117] – they would concede that it comes to be in the instant of the aevum, and that it always comes to be and is produced when it is. And when is inferred 'therefore it would be successive' [*ibid*.], it does not follow, because the Son of God too is always being generated, and yet is not something successive but supremely permanent, because the instant in which he is generated remains always. And so they would say that the same 'now' remains, wherein the angel remains and received being, and so there is not succession; for successive things are always receiving one part in being and another.

156. To the other proof, about being conserved and created [n.118], the answer will be plain in the first question about the aevum [2 d. 2 nn. 49-51, 63].

157. To that added about acquired [being] [n.120] – they concede that it has acquired being, because it does not have a being that is of itself formally necessary; it does not however seem that it be acquired after not-being, because acquisition (as also reception) seems sufficiently to stand if of itself it not have that which is called 'to acquire', whether it be new or old.

158. To the second reason, from the Philosopher in *De Interpretatione* ("Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is" [n.121]), – the response is plain in distinction 41 of the first book where this objection is adduced to prove that it is not contingently in the instant for which it is, since then the opposite could be present in it [see rather *Lectura* I d.39 nn.55, 58, and *Rep*. IA d.39-40 nn.45, 49]; and from this it is plain that the assumption is false – rather in that instant and for that instant, in which it is and for which it is, it is contingently, as was there deduced and determined [see rather *Lectura* I d.39 n.55, and *Rep*. IA dd.39-40 n.49]. And the same I say of the cause, because the cause does not cause insofar as it precedes the effect in duration, but it is cause insofar as it precedes the effect in nature: if therefore every cause – for the instant for which it causes and none contingently.

159. To the third reason [n.124], an equal possibility for eternity and sempiternity could be denied to be in any species at all, because a contradiction does not appear on the part equally of any species at all [e.g. n.154: it does not appear on the part of angels but

does on the part of souls]; and therefore not a like possibility. Or if it be conceded of an ass that it could have been produced from eternity and could have generated, and consequently that from it could all the asses have been generated up to now [n.124] – when you ask whether they would have been finite or infinite, let it be denied that they be infinite; rather they would have been finite.

160. And when he infers [n.124] that 'therefore the whole duration from the production of that ass up to this one would have been finite', let the consequence be denied;¹⁹ for it [the first ass], although *produced* from eternity, could yet not have been *generated* from eternity, because generation necessarily includes – in creatures – that there be change between opposite terms (namely privation and form), and whatever is between opposites that succeed themselves cannot be sempiternal.

161. And if you say that then it was necessary for it to have been for an infinite time at rest from generating (although however it would have been made perfect and able to generate), which seems unacceptable – I reply: the ass would not have been made more perfect from eternity for generating than God for causing, and yet for you [sc. you who posit that creatures are at some time produced and not always, n.117] God must have been at rest from causing *a* for a quasi-imagined infinite, so that it would be a contradiction for him to have caused something without an infinite quasi imagined past having preceded; and yet in the causation of it, namely in giving total being to that which has being in itself, newness does not seem to be as necessarily included as in generation, which is from privation to form. It is not therefore unacceptable, if the ass had to have generated, that it would have been at rest for an imagined infinite^a from the action which necessarily includes that it be new, since you posit that God was necessarily at rest from an action that you do not show formally includes newness.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] and so, of anything else whatever that would have been created from eternity, it must be said that it had rested for an imagined infinite.

162. To the fourth [n.125] I say that the whole deduction about those powers²⁰ seems to be superfluous and at fault in many ways. And yet speaking of power as he

¹⁹ Vatican editors: as by Thomas of Sutton, *Quaest. Ordinariae* q.29 ad 23 in opp., where an infinite past time is posited before the first generation by the first ass, but a finite time from the first generation to the present.

²⁰ The Vatican editors quote from Henry *Quodlibet* 8 a.9 what they judge to be necessary to understand what Scotus says here nn.162-167, and earlier n.125: "...if the creature has from God being in act, the creature of itself is possible to be...; wherefore when, as being simply is related to possible being simply, so too being from eternity to possible being from eternity, - therefore, if from God the creature has being from eternity, the creature of itself is possible to be from eternity...and not having being from eternity. I ask therefore whether the creature at the same time has altogether from God being from eternity and from itself possible being and not-being from eternity, or being first from God before the reverse, or the other way around? Not in the first way because then contrary acts would be together in the same thing, namely being and not-being; nor in the second way, because...what belongs to a thing from itself is prior to that which belongs to it from another. A third way then is necessary, namely that the creature have from itself possible being and not-being before it has being from God... - Being able to be in existence and being able not to be in existence, do they have being in the essence of the creature at the same time, or according to prior and posterior? Not together because contrary powers (according to the Philosopher and the Commentator On the Heavens I) cannot be wholly together at the same time in the same thing, just as neither the contrary acts; for if (as they say) the powers were present together...then it would be possible for two contrary powers at the same time to issue in contrary acts, and from a possible posited in being there would follow a false impossible. - In the essence then of the creature does possible being in existence precede possible not being in existence, or the reverse, and this either in nature or in duration? Now possible being cannot precede in nature, because not being precedes being in nature... Possible not being then precedes in nature possible being. There remains therefore a doubt, which of them precedes in duration? For if one precedes in duration, either then of necessity 'possible' this precedes that, or conversely, or indifferently can either of them precede

himself [sc. Henry] does in arguing at the end, it would have to be concluded according to him that 'potency for not being' necessarily precedes potency for being, and thus his argument, namely about contrary potencies (which he takes from the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 1.12.281b9-18) must be understood of potencies incompossible with their acts; and then if potency for not being necessarily precede potency for being, then to be necessarily precedes not to be, because potency for not being never is, according to this understanding [sc. about potencies incompossible with their acts], unless in the same thing being will have preceded.

163. Where it is necessary to know that, speaking properly of potency, namely before act, the subject of immediate opposites never is in opposite potencies at the same time, because then it would lack each act, and so the opposites would not be immediate about the same subject: and of these it is true that never is the potency for one without the act of the other; not that the act is receptive of the potency, rather the subject alone receives the potency, as also the act of it (for if act a be prior to potency for b, because [it is] the idea of the receptive – then also to b itself, because in the same thing potency is prior by nature to act; but b by equal reason is prior to potency for a, and so the same thing is prior and posterior to the same thing) – but with the potency for one is the act of the other necessarily concomitant, because of the immediacy of the acts.

164. To the matter at hand [sc. the fourth argument, n.125] I say that it [the creature] was not from eternity under potency to being and under potency to not being, but first it was under potency to being (according to truth), because under not being and so not under potency to it [sc. not being]; and if it had been from eternity, it would have always been under potency to not being, and never under potency to being but under act [sc. of being]. But if you not speak of potency before act but of quasi subjective potency, and if you assume essence not to be in this way for being save under not being, it is false and was rejected above [n.162].

165. Passing over potencies then, briefly the argument seems to stand on this, that opposites that are in the same thing in order of nature cannot be in the same thing at the same time in order of duration, because first by duration is in it what first by nature is in it; being therefore and not being, although they are in order of nature in a stone, cannot be in it at the same time in duration nor precede each other in turn indifferently, but not being necessarily precedes being itself in duration, and so it [the stone] could not have always been. And that not being is present by nature first before being, the proof is: because not being belongs to a stone from itself, but being does not belong to it from itself but from another.

the other. And this last is impossible because then the essence of the creature under indifference would be disposed to each of them, and thus to the possible and to the act of the same things; but now is the essence of the creature not equally disposed to act of existing and of not-existing, because it is not of a nature to have the act of existing save from another, while the act of not-existing from itself... But if [possible to be] precedes in duration, and this of necessity... then of necessity the existence of the creature would precede its not-being (so the creature would not be first of itself a non-being by nature before it would be a being from another by some duration; for nothing belongs to something first in nature that is not of a nature to belong to the same first in duration): but this is impossible, because (as has been said) what belongs to something of itself by nature is prior to that which belongs to it from another. Necessary therefore is the second member (namely what I called above 'the reverse'), which of necessity in the being of a creature precedes in duration possible not being, wherefore also its not being not only in nature but also in duration... It remains therefore that the creature cannot have being from another than itself, unless it first in duration have not-being (which belongs to it of itself) – and thus in no way will it be able to be posited that it can come to be from eternity, but from time."

166. Here I say that two opposites are not present at the same time in order of nature in the same thing, quasi positively speaking of order of nature (just as is necessary to speak of animal and rational, substance and accident), but quasi privatively namely that the other would be present if it were not impeded – which way was expounded in the preceding question [n.61], in expounding the opinion of Avicenna; and in this way I say that it is not necessary that what first in nature belongs to something belong to it first in duration; for it is possible for that which does not have any being of itself to be prevented by a positive cause giving it something which it does not have of itself, and thus it would first in duration have the opposite before the 'of itself'.

167. This response [n.166] is plain in other things. For the argument [sc. of Henry, footnote to n.162] would prove that God could not create matter under form, because matter is first by nature deprived before in-formed, because from itself it has that it is deprived and from another that it is in-formed; therefore form could not be in matter unless unformed matter had preceded in duration. But this is not conclusive, because matter is not of itself positively deprived but privatively only, because it does not of itself even have form but from another (as from the generator or creator), and it alone, without any other positive cause, suffices for this, that it be deprived: it would therefore always be deprived unless there were some positive cause impeding its continuous privation; and yet, because a positive cause can impede matter's privation from the beginning of its essence, by giving it being so that it not always be deprived, therefore there is no need, from such priority of nature, to conclude necessarily a priority of duration.

168. To the other, about infinite souls [n.126] I reply: whatever cannot be made by God in one day 'because it includes a contradiction', this could not be made in an infinite time past (if there had been), for the same reason. For in this day there are infinite instants (nay, in one hour of this day), in any at all of which he could create a soul just as in one day of the whole of infinite time, if it existed (for it would not be necessary for him to rest from day to day order to create one soul after another), and so if in the infinite instants of this day he cannot create infinite souls (because this is not doable), neither in the infinite days of the whole of past time could he have created infinite souls.

169. And if you say 'the instants of this day have not been actual as are the infinite days of the past', this is not enough, because just as the infinite instants of the infinite days – wherein he would have created – would have been in potency for you [sc. who say that the instants of this day have not been actual] (just as 'the indivisible' is in the continuum and not in act), because none of them would have in act been the end of the whole time, so too is it about the infinite instants of this day; therefore the instants of this day – or of this hour – seem to have an equal infinity with the infinite instants of infinite days, and so the proposed conclusion seems to follow [n.168]. However some philosophers would concede that it is not impossible that there is an infinity in accidentally ordered things, as is plain from Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6.2 [f. 92ra], chapter 'On Causes'.

170. To the one about transit of the infinite [n.127]: it seems to reject a sempiternity of successives. But according to those who hold this opinion [sc. the first, n.102], there is not a like idea of impossibility in things successive and things permanent, because permanent things (of whatever sort), although according to their motions they could be measured by time, yet according to their substantial being measured they are

posited to be measured by the aevum;²¹ and therefore to posit that the permanent is without beginning does not seem to posit that anything infinite has been accepted.

171. This idea of 'the successive infinite' [n.170] does that imagination confirm about a converted line: because if some line were extended as it were to infinity, beginning from this point *a*, it would not be possible for it to be transited; therefore it seems that also conversely, imagining a line as if it were taken into the past, it does not seem possible that it be taken up to point *a*.

172. To the final argument [n.128] it can be said that equal and greater and less only belong to a finite quantity of mass, because 'quantity' is divided into finite and infinite first before equal or unequal belong to it; for it is of the idea of a greater quantity to exceed, and of a lesser to be exceeded, and of an equal to be commensurate – which all seem to involve finitude: and therefore it would be denied that the infinite is equal to the infinite, because equal and unequal and greater and less are differences of finite quantity and not of infinite quantity.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of Each Part

173. To the first principal argument [n.96] I concede that matter is ungenerated and incorruptible; it does not however follow from this that it is sempiternal, because although it not have matter whence it come to be, it is yet itself a produced whole – which production is not generation, because generation and corruption are of composites and not of simples.

174. To the second [n.97], about the sempiternity of time, I say that it is not valid, because otherwise it concludes that 'the mover cannot not be moved'²² (this response is to that in the preceding question [n.70]). And as to what is argued and added about 'before' [n.97], I say that it only concludes about an imagined 'before', or in the way eternity is 'before' – which is nothing; just as 'outside the universe is nothing' – there the 'outside' is denied, or only an imagined 'outside' is asserted.

175. To the third from *On Generation* [n.98]. Although this be in some way probable, 'corruption of one thing is generation of another' (I say that it is to this extent true, that no natural agent per se intends to corrupt anything, but per accidens it corrupts that which is incompossible with the generated thing that it does per se intend), however from that does not follow perpetuity of generation, because ultimate corruption can be concomitant with ultimate generation, as when all mixed things are resolved into the elements – and then there will be a stand both of generation and of corruption, although the ultimate corruption not be annihilation;^a the Philosopher however supposes one other proposition along with this one [sc. 'corruption of one thing is generation of another'], namely that such a generable thing is again corruptible, and its corruption is the generation of something else – which is not true. But when arguing about past things it would be necessary to take this, that 'the generation of one thing is the corruption of

²¹ The Vatican editors helpfully note a definition of the aevum from Aquinas, *Sent.* II d.2 q.1 a.1: "The being of an angel, which is measured by the aevum, is indivisible, lacking variation, and therefore the aevum does not have a before and after... For as time is the number of before and after in change, so also the aevum is the unity of permanence of act which is the being or operation of the thing created."

 $^{^{22}}$ The Vatican editors note that the second 'not' is omitted in the mss. and has to be added. For Scotus' criticism seems to be that if time has to be eternal, then God has to be always moving things, which he rejected in n.70 against the philosophers.

another' – and this is not as true from the per se intention of a natural agent as is the preceding one; for it is accidental that the generator corrupts, because of the incompossibility of the term to be corrupted with the term the generator intends, because [the generator] cannot produce the form it intends save in preexisting matter – and that preexisting matter is commonly under a form incompossible with the form it intends, and so it has to corrupt the preexisting composite in order to generate what it intends. And given that from this would follow that there would be no generation by which the whole is produced, not because of this would the eternity of the thing follow – because when the whole is produced, it is not necessary that part of it preexist under the incompossible form, and it is not necessary that such production of some being is the destruction of some second being, but only the destruction of nothing or of not being precisely; and then it is not necessary for the first production to have preceded another, because the term 'from which' [sc. nothing] of this production was not the term 'to which' of any production, because 'nothing' was by no production being produced.

a. [Interpolation] because it is to matter, which is not nothing.

176. To the fourth [n.99] about succession because of motion (when it is said that 'an agent not causing by motion and not preventable can have an effect coeval with it'), it would be said that, where cause and effect can have an essence of one kind, the major is true; but where they cannot be of one kind, but the priority of nature in the cause requires of necessity the priority of duration of it in respect of the effect, there the major is false; and so it is in the matter at hand.

177. To the first argument for the opposite [n.100] I say that either that is not the definition of a creature but a certain description, conceded by Arius (against whom Augustine is arguing) because he [Arius] said that 'the Son of God at some time was not' – and then it suffices for Augustine to take this definition or description against him as conceded, and from the negation of this description of the Son of God (conceded by him), conclude against him that [the Son] is not a creature. Or if it is the definition of a creature (speaking properly of creature insofar as creature), not however because of this is it a definition of whatever is other than God (as of an angel or a man) – because it would be said that to this, which it is 'to be a creature', this definition is accidental. But if some [definition] were posited to be the definition of 'something that begins', and in fact everything other than God is something that begins, then 'everything other than God is a creature' does not follow but is a fallacy of the accident, because of the extraneousness of the middle term with respect to the third insofar as it is compared to the first. For not everything that is repugnant to the accident is repugnant to the subject to which such accident is accident.²³

²³ Translator: Strictly speaking a creature is being from not-being, and that a creature has a beginning of time is accidental to being from not-being. For God could give being to not-being in eternity and not in time. Arius seems to have thought that having a beginning of time was the idea of a creature, and Augustine uses this against him to prove that the Son of God, who does not have a beginning of time, is not a creature. Augustine's argument is thus *ad hominem*, because it uses Arius' own definition against him. However, if Arius' definition is held, that a creature is 'something that begins', and even if every creature is in fact something that begins, the inference 'therefore everything other than God begins in time' fails to hold. For it is accidental to 'everything other than God, and so would be a creature, but not a creature in Arius' sense. So, as to Arius' statement 'a creature has a beginning in time', something could be repugnant to 'has a beginning in time' but not repugnant to 'creature'. For it is an accident to a creature to have a

178. To the second, about the infinite in multitude and magnitude [n.101] – it was replied before, in the response about the actual infinity of souls [n.168].

Question Four

Whether the Creation of an Angel is the same as the Angel

179. Fourth I ask whether the creation of an angel is the same as the angel. 180. That it is not:

Because according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.1 (f. 86va), "horse-ness is only horse-ness, neither one nor many;"²⁴ therefore, by parity of reasoning, an angel is only an angel, and any relation is not the same as it.

181. Second thus: the creation of an angel is only in the first instant of nature, when the angel receives being; but an angel remains after the first instant, and nothing remains without that which is the same as it really; therefore etc.

182. Third thus: because if it were so, God could not *de novo* repair one and the same – annihilated – angel in number; the consequent is false, therefore also the antecedent. Proof of the consequence: he cannot repair the same creation (as it seems) because not the same motion in number either (according to some), because the interruption would prevent it from being the same in number.

183. Fourth thus: 'fire generated' is from another fire generating it causally (and consequently it has nature from it); and yet creation – in a fire causally generated – is not from a generating fire; therefore etc. The minor is proved, because then the generated fire would have from the generating fire that it was a creature, because by whatever agent there is creation in fire, by it is fire created – which consequent seems false, because 'that it is a creature' states only a respect to the Creator.

184. Fifth thus: change differs from the term to which; creation is change; therefore etc.

185. Proof of the major [n.184]: first because change precedes the term, then because change is in the genus of passion (because motion too), according to the Commentator, *Physics* 5 com.9; but the intrinsic term is of the same genus as the thing termed (as point with line), but the form to which there is motion or change is not of the genus of passion (from *Physics* 5.2.226a23-25).

186. Proof of the minor: first, because a new relation does not come to anything without change of some extreme; through creation there is a new relation of the creature to God, because something new is said of the Creator and only because of a new relation in that to which he is said. There is confirmation from Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.16 n.17: "They are relative to God that exist with change of that of which they are said." Second, because "in every genus there is something one that is the measure of all other things that there are in that genus" (Averroes, *Metaphysics* 10 com.2): now the first in the genus of changes does not seem it can be posited as generation, because it is not the idea

beginning in time, and to be repugnant to this accident 'beginning in time' is not, *eo ipso*, to be repugnant to the subject 'creature'.

²⁴ Avicenna: "Hence horse-ness itself is not anything but horse-ness alone; for it is of itself neither many nor one, neither existent in these sensibles nor in the soul; neither is it anything of these in potency or in fact, so that this be contained within the essence of horse-ness."

of changeability in all changeables, because not all changeables are generated – likewise the opposition between the terms of generation, which are privation and form, is not the greatest; but there is a greater opposition between the terms of creation, which are contradictories, as being and nothing; therefore creation is the first change.

187. To the opposite:

If it [the creation of an angel is other [than the angel], then either it is the Creator – which is not the case because creation is new; or is a mean between Creator and creature – which is not the case, because nothing is the mean; or posterior to the created thing – which is not the case, because [creation] is as it were the way to the being of a creature. Therefore it [creation] is the same [as the angel].

Question Five

Whether the Relation of the Creature to God is the Same as its Foundation

188. And because this question [fourth question, n.179] depends on a certain other, namely about 'the identity of the relation with its foundation', and this in speaking specially of the relation which is of the creature to God – therefore I ask fifth whether the creature's relation to God is the same as its foundation.

189. It seems not:

First thus: if everything 'other than God' has a relation to him, therefore everything other would be '[relative] to something' not only accidentally but by identity; the consequent seems impossible, because the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 4.6.1011a19-20, infers it from the statement of those who say that 'all appearances are true'.

190. Second thus: the categories [predicaments²⁵], are first diverse – from *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a12-13, 10.3.1054b28-30 – and as simply diverse beings, because being of itself is divided into them (*Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a22-27); therefore nothing of one category is the same as something in another category. Therefore no relation is the same as something absolute.

191. The opposite:

No less does any created thing depend on God than does any created thing depend on another created thing, because dependence on the First seems most essential; but a whole has a relation to the parts the same as to itself, because it cannot be a whole and not be of parts; therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will have to the first cause, although extrinsic, the same relation as to itself. For although an extrinsic cause not constitute a thing the way an intrinsic cause does, yet it more perfectly causes the thing than an intrinsic cause; for to constitute a thing includes imperfection, namely potentiality.

> I. To the Fifth Question A. On the Identity of Relation in General to its Foundation 1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

²⁵ In English the word 'categories' (a transliteration from Aristotle's Greek) has become standard for his division of terms into logically distinct classes. Scotus uses the equivalent Latin word 'predicament', which now as carried over into English typically carries the different sense of 'difficult, perplexing, or trying situation'. The association seems to be that, logically, a term in one category cannot be also in another category – they are 'first diverse'. Or as Scotus immediately says "nothing of one category is the same as something in another category." So being in a category is to be in something that, so to say, one cannot get out of; hence 'to be in a predicament'.

192. [Exposition of the opinion] – Here it is said [sc. by Henry] that every relation is the same as its foundation – look for *Quodlibet* 9 q.3 and 5 q.2 (which seem quasi contrary²⁶).

193. For this opinion it is argued in many ways:

First, because relation is transferred to God according to the proper idea of relation, and therefore in divine reality two categories are said to remain properly, namely relation and substance [1 d.8 n.130]; but if it were to be of the idea of relation that it would be a thing other than the foundation, then in God there would be thing and thing, and so composition, which is against divine simplicity.

194. And from this middle it is argued generally, namely from simplicity: for a 'similar white' is not more composite than a white alone, and consequently the relation of likeness does not add another thing than the foundation; therefore neither is it another thing.

195. Secondly this is argued by way of change, because if it were another thing than the foundation, then at whatever foundation it would arrive *de novo*, it would be changed – which many authorities seem to deny: first of the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a34, because he denies that in '[relation] to another' there is motion or change; second of Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.5 (look for him there [not *expressis verbis* but implicity]); third of Anselm *Monologion* ch.25.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] from Boethius *On the Trinity* 13: negative and relative predicates make no composition (look for him there); third of Anselm, *Monologion*, "For it is clear that for a man after a year" etc.

196. Third it is argued from this that, if relation were a different thing than its foundation, then likeness would have its own presence in it other than the presence in it of whiteness; which *prima facie* seems unacceptable, because then relation founded on substance (if there be any) would be accidental, because of its own proper accidentality – which seems against Simplicius *On the Categories* (f. 95r, 40v-41r) where he says that the Philosopher treats of quantity and quality before relation, because relation is founded on them immediately; and it is not founded on substance immediately (and this speaking of accidental relation), because relation founded on substance does not have of itself a proper accidentality.

197. The same thing inferred before [n.196] is proved also to be unacceptable because then the genus of relation would not be simple but as it were composed of 'in' and 'to' – which seems to be unacceptable because the first concept of any first genus should be altogether simple, as it seems; therefore etc.

198. Fourth it is argued that if it were a thing other than the foundation, then there would be an infinite regress in relations; for if this relation is a thing other than the foundation, by parity of reasoning also will that otherness (which is a certain relation) be a thing other than the foundation, and that otherness than its foundation, and so ad infinitum; which is unacceptable, therefore etc.

199. Fifth thus: a relation does not have a distinction in its species save in presence of the foundation (for lordship is not distinguished from paternity in presence of

²⁶ The Vatican editors note that Henry seems to give contrary definitions of the category of relation as 'something one simply' and 'something to which it belongs to be in another, not absolutely but in respect to another' and so 'not simple but as if composed of 'in' and 'to'.'

this, which is 'in relation to', but of the foundation – nor are those disparate relations distinguished, or are the same as relations of equivalence, save by unity and difference of form in foundations [n.205]); but if relation were a thing other than the foundation, it would have of itself formally a distinction in its species; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*]: Again, if likeness in this thing is other than this whiteness, by parity of reasoning is also that in the term other than that whiteness; therefore both foundations can be together without this or that [whiteness], just as things prior in nature without things posterior, and so two whites [can be together] and not two similars – which seems incompossible, because [similarity is] unity in quality.

199. Fifth thus: relation does not have a distinction in its species save by reason of the foundation (for lordship is not distinguished from paternity by the fact it is 'in relation to' but by reason of the foundation – nor are these disparate relations distinguished, nor are they the same as relations of equivalence, save by reason of unity and difference of form in the foundations [n.205]); but if relation were a thing other than the foundation, it would have of itself formally a distinction in its species; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*]: Again, if likeness in this thing is other than this whiteness, by parity of reasoning is also that [likeness] in the term other than that whiteness; therefore both foundations can be together without this or that [likeness], just as things prior in nature without things posterior, and so two whites and not two similars – which seems incompossible, because [similarity is] unity in quality.

200. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion I argue first as follows: nothing is the same really as anything without which it can really be without contradiction; but there are many relations without which foundations can be without contradiction; therefore there are many relations that are not the same really as their foundation.

201. Proof of the major: because that the same being really is and really is not seems to be the opposite of a first principle [sc. the principle of non-contradiction], from which first principle the diversity of things seems at once to be inferred; because if contradictories are said of some things, they seem, in the way that they are said of them, not the same, and so if the contradictories 'to be' and 'not to be' are said of them, they seem to be not the same in being or in reality, or not the same being.

202. This is confirmed, because if the major [n.200] be denied, there does not seem to be left that from which a distinction of beings could be proved: for it will be said by the impudent – not only because in one supposit several natures, as substance and accidents, are the same – but also that Socrates and Plato are the same, or that Socrates and stone or white do not really differ; and if it be argued against him that 'Socrates can be when a stone is not' and through this is inferred a distinction of one from the other, or that 'Socrates can be Socrates and not white' and through this is inferred a distinction of subject and accident– the consequence will be denied, because the impudent will deny the proposition on which these consequences rely, which proposition you also deny [sc. *ex hypothesi* from the beginning of this paragraph].

203. This proposition too, 'those things are really distinct of which one can remain without the other', the impudent would deny. But, with this denied, the whole doctrine perishes of the Philosopher, *Topics* 7.8-9.154a23-55a38, whereby he teaches that

a proposition or problem is easily destroyed by discovery of a contradiction but is with difficulty constructed, and – if the above proposition [at the beginning of the paragraph] be denied – it does not seem it can be destroyed; because if it is not destroyed by a contradiction then not by any other opposition either, or at least not easily, and very easily does it seem it can be sustained – because no place²⁷ according to him or assigned by him seems efficacious for destroying anything if this place [sc. destruction by contradiction] is destroyed.

204. Also on this way of the Philosopher is founded the way of motion or change for proving a distinction – which the Philosopher uses in proving that matter is a thing other than form, because it remains the same under opposed forms; which also the Philosopher uses in *Physics* 5.2.220a1-11^a for proving that place is other than the placed things, because the same place remains with different placed things.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] Averroes com.3 and more manifestly in com.7: "If place," he says, "is prior to every natural body (as Homer posits), then there could be place without body, and it would not be corrupted on the corruption of it [body]." See there.

205. The minor [n.200] is also plain in all relations whose foundations can be without terms, as in all relations of equivalence (as are similar, equal, and the like): for if this white is and that white is not, this white is without likeness – and if that white come to be, in this white there is likeness; it can therefore be without this and with this. It is alike in many relations of non-equivalence: for if this be a man, and such that no other be subject to his power, he will be without lordship – and also he can be lord with the accession of slaves, as Boethius says [*On the Trinity* ch.5]; and so it is of many other things, about all of which there is no need to adduce examples.

206. This reason [n.200] is also confirmed as to the whole of itself (because these confirmations are valid for both the major and the minor): because if a relation is not other than the foundation, which however remains without it, the incarnation seems to be denied, and the separation of accidents from the subject in the Eucharist; also all composition seems to be denied in beings and all causality of second causes.

207. Proof of the first unacceptable result: if the same really as the human nature is its union with the Word, then if the Word had never assumed that nature and had made the same absolute, it would have been as equally united with the Word as it is now, because the whole reality of the assumption had been assumed; if also he [the Word] were to put aside that nature (with it however remaining the same in itself), the nature would remain really united with the Word, and as really as it is now united, because the whole reality of the nature would be preserved then as now.

208. Also a second unacceptable result about the Eucharist is proved [n.206]: because if the same quantity of bread that was before remains, and if the inherence of it [the Eucharist] in the bread is nothing other than really the quantity itself, then it is as really united to the bread (or informs it) now as before.

209. Proof of the third unacceptable result [n.206, composition in things]: because if a and b compose ab, and if the union of these parts with each other is nothing other than this absolute a and b, then with a and b really separated, the whole reality remains

²⁷ Place of argument, or for finding an argument, from Aristotle's use of place, or topos, for his work, *Topics*, about where to go to find arguments on any matter at all (or *topic* as we now say).

that is of *a* and *b* united. And then *a* and *b* separate remain really united, and so the composite remains with the components separate, and so the composite will not be composite – because when the composite remains with the component parts separate, it is not a composite of them; for then nothing would remain but a one by aggregation, as the Philosopher seems to deduce in *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b11-19.

210. A fourth unacceptable result too [n.206, about the causality of second causes] is proved: because whatever is caused by diverse second causes pre-requires in them a due proportion and coming together for this, that it may be caused by them; but if this coming together and proportion be nothing but something absolute, then they are as really causative of this sort of effect when they do not come together as when they do, and so when they are together they can cause nothing really that they cannot cause even when not together; for, with no other reality posited, not a thing can be caused that could not have been caused before. And so it could have been argued in the third member, about the component extremes [n.209], because if *a* and *b* separated do not compose *ab*, then neither do they united, because just as the same thing – without any other reality – cannot cause something now that before it could not, so neither can the same things, without any other reality, compose anything now that before they could not compose; therefore etc.

211. Second^a principally I argue against the aforesaid opinion [n.192]: nothing finite contains, according to perfect or virtual containing, opposites formally (because however much there be conceded in God a most perfect containing of all perfections by identity that are in him, yet he cannot contain absolute opposites formally in himself, although he could have in himself such opposites virtually and relatives formally – but therefrom is conceded infinity of the foundation). But equality and inequality are opposites formally, and similarly likeness and unlikeness – at any rate to the same correlative; but these can be perfectly founded on the same foundation successively. Therefore neither of them contains 'that foundation' formally (or, more to the point, really and according to perfect identity), because the reason for not either is the same as the reason for not both.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] This reason is doubly deficient: first because the major is false of divine relations, second because the first part of the minor is false, save when making comparison to the same thing; so two things false. However, the major has a difficulty adding thus to the subject: 'nothing finite' etc. – The minor is true when comparing equality and inequality to the same thing, and so these are in the same foundation, though successively.

212. Third thus: the same thing does not contain several things of the same idea the same as itself in perfect identity; but several relations of the same idea are in the same foundation, just as several likenesses are founded on the same whiteness; therefore etc. The major is plain inductively in everything that contains several things by identity, because one thing containing contains one thing of the same idea.

213. Fourth thus: what contains something by identity, if it is more perfect, entails too that what is contained in it is more perfect by identity (just as a more perfect soul has a more perfect intellect – and according to those who posit that the same form is intellective and sensitive, of corporeity and substance, the intellective includes a more perfect sensitive form than is the sensitive form in brutes); not however does a more

perfect foundation contain in itself a more perfect relation, because not everything whiter is more alike, as is manifest to sense; therefore etc.

214. Fifth thus: things contained in certain things by identity are not less different in containers more distinct; but relations founded on two genera are less different than two relations founded on a thing of the same genus (indeed in the same most specific species), because the equality that is founded on quantity and the likeness founded on quality differ less than the likeness and relation of active power that can be founded on the same heat; therefore etc.

215. Sixth and last thus: a relation of reason is a different thing of reason than its foundation, therefore a real relation too will be a different real thing than its foundation. The consequence is proved because just as a relation of reason is a mode of the object in the first act of the intellect, and yet is not in itself nothing in the genus of intelligibles, but is in itself something truly intelligible (although not as or equally first as that of which it is the mode, since it is not understood save by a reflex act – and so not as perfectly as that of which it is the mode), so too a real relation, although it be a mode of its foundation (and not equally first as it, nor equally perfect as it), is yet in itself a thing, because what in itself is nothing, is of nothing the real mode; for there is not any name more general than being or thing (according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6, f. 72rb), and that which being a being or a thing does not belong to, being anything real does not belong to.

216. Further, the conclusion – for which the reasons have been adduced [nn.200-215] – is proved by authorities:

And first by Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.5. n.6, "In created things," he says, "what is not said according to substance remains to be said according to accident;" where he expressly maintains that relation is an accident in creatures. Although this does not have to be understood of the relation that is of a creature to God [cf. nn.253-54, 260-63, below], yet it is certain that [it must] of a relation that can be lost while the foundation remains, both according to truth and according to his intention,

217. Again, Ambrose *On the Trinity* 1.9 nn.59-60, "If he was God first and afterwards Father, he has been changed by the accession of generation; may God ward off this madness." Therefore by sole accession of real relation would change happen in a divine person, according to him – which would not be unless that relation were something other than the foundation, because the foundation pre-existed.

218. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* 12 n.30, "That what was is born is already not only to be born but itself to change by being born," and he is speaking of the nativity of the Son of God. Therefore 'to be born' states a new relation.

219. Again, the Philosopher in the *Categories* 7.6136-37 says, "'Relative to something' is all things that, as to what they are, is said of others or is to others," – and for this reason are substances excluded, which, although they are of others, are yet not to another; therefore 'this thing that they are' is taken there, not for being in the intellect, but for being in reality. But if relations in reality are of others 'as to this that they are', and a foundation is not of another 'as to this that it is' – then the being of the latter is one thing and the being of the former another; therefore etc.

220. Again, Simplicius *On the Categories* 'Relation' (f. 43r) declares intentionally that relation is to another.

221. Again, the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.4.1070a31-b4 maintains that as the categories are different so also are the principles – and he exemplifies it specifically of

the distinction of relation from the other [categories] and of the principles of relation from the principles of the other [categories].

222. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.10 (f. 83va) seems to maintain expressly that relation has its proper certitude; and at the beginning of the chapter he maintains that it has, according to its certitude, its own presence in things and its own accidentality.

2. Objections

223. And because it would be possible to be stubborn about relations, conceding that they are not the same really as the foundation yet are not other realities, denying that they are certain things by saying that a relation only is in the act of the comparing intellect [Henry of Ghent] – against this it is argued: first because this destroys the unity of the universe, second because it destroys every substantial and accidental composition in the universe, third because it destroys all causality of second causes, and fourth because it destroys the reality of all mathematical sciences.

224. The first is easily proved because, according to Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11-15, the unity of the universe is in the order of the parts to each other and to the first, just as the unity of an army is in the order of the parts of the army to each other and to the leader; and from this, against those who deny that a relation is a thing outside the act of the intellect, it can be said that the word of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075b37-6a3, that the sort who so speak "make the substance of the universe unconnected."

225. The second is proved because nothing is composite without the union of the composable parts, so that when the parts are separated the composite does not remain; and nothing real depends on what is merely an idea (and precisely an idea caused by act of our intellect), and²⁸ is at least the sort of real that is not artificial; therefore no 'whole' will be a natural real if it necessarily requires for its being a relation, which relation is nothing but a being of reason!

226. The third is proved because the causation of a real being does not require a being of reason in the cause, and because second causes cannot cause if not proportionate and close by; therefore, if this closeness is only a being of reason, causes under this being close will not be able to cause anything real. Because without this being close they cannot cause, and this being close (which is a relation) is not a thing, for you [n.223, Henry] – therefore a second cause brings nothing for being able to cause.

227. The fourth is proved, because all mathematical conclusions demonstrate relations of subjects. Which is evident first from the authority of the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 13.3.1078a31-b2, at the end: "Of the good," he says, "the species most of all are order etc." [sc. common measure and the definite] "which the mathematician most of all displays," because his art is in proportion and things' measures with each other. Secondly does this same thing appear through experience, by running through mathematical conclusions, in all which is some relative property commonly predicated: just as is plain in beginning from the first conclusion of geometry, where the equality of sides is shown of a triangle, or of a straight line this predicate 'able to be the base or side of an equilateral triangle'; and so in all the rest, as that a triangle has three angles equal to

²⁸ The Vatican editors change the 'and' of the mss. to 'or'; but 'and' seems acceptable enough.

two right angles (the property demonstrated of the three angles of a triangle is this, namely 'equal to two right angles'), and so it is in other things.

228. But if the impudence still continue, that although relations are not formally beings of reason but something outside the intellect and not the same as the foundation, yet they are not a thing other than the foundation but are only modes proper to the thing – this objection only seems to argue about the name of a thing's mode: for although the mode of a thing not be another thing than the thing of which it is the mode, it is yet not a null-thing (just as not a null-being either), because then it would be nothing; and therefore relation falls under a division of being in itself, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.7.1017a24-27. Nor are all the things into which 'being in itself' is divided equally perfect beings; rather, quality in respect of substance can be called a 'mode' and yet in itself it is a true thing. Thus relation, although it is a mode (but still a more imperfect one than quality), if it be outside the intellect (and not a mode intrinsic to the foundation, as infinity is in God and of all the essentials that are in him, as was said in *Ord.*I d.8 nn.192, 220-221 [d.3 n.58, d.10 n.30, d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19]), it follows that such mode, other than the thing from the nature of the thing, is another thing than the foundation, taking 'thing' most generally as it is divided into the ten categories.

229. And if it be said that the genus of relation is a thing not because of the mode that is a disposition to something else, but because of the thing to which is the being to another – this is not true: because just as every 'being for itself', conceived under an absolute idea, can pertain essentially to some absolute genus, if it is per se one (for no mode of conceiving with which the per se unity of the concept can stand, and which concept is absolute, takes it away without what is thus conceived pertaining to an absolute genus, because what is thus conceived includes something absolute said of itself in the 'what' and something said in the 'what-sort', whereby it is distinguished from other absolute concepts – as genus and difference outside the intellect), so every such respect, or disposition or relation (or however it be named, because these are synonyms), can be per se conceived as per se one, having some quidditative predicate said of it in the 'what' (and is outside the soul, as was proved [nn.224-227]), and distinct from that in which it is founded, as was proved in the first article [nn.200-222]; therefore a proper genus can be had of these respects as they are respects, not essentially including the foundations, – and so the reality of them, which are in this genus, is not precisely such because of the foundations, formally speaking, because the foundation is outside the per se idea of them as they have the complete idea of a being in a real genus.

3. Scotus' own Conclusion

230. With the reality of relation thus made clear in the second article [nn.224-229], and its real distinction from the foundation in the first article (and this as to the relations about which the reasons there adduced are conclusive [nn.200, 211-215]); the first opinion [sc. of Henry, n.192] seems sufficiently refuted, whatever understanding it is posited to be understood in accord with.

4. To the Arguments for Henry's Opinion

231. To the first argument of the other opinion [n193] I say that nothing of any genus is said of God, as was said in *Ord*.I d.8 nn.95-115; and just as absolutes, so also relations that are formally said of God, are not of any genus [category] but are transcendentals and properties of 'being in general', because whatever belongs to being insofar as it is not distinct as to finite and infinite belongs to it before it is divided into genera, and so is transcendent.

232. To the point [n.194] that a like white is not more composite than a white only: although it could easily be expounded by putting force on the word, saying that 'com-position' is 'together-position', however – not caring about the word – it should be said as a result that a like white is more composite than a white merely, because it has in itself act and potency really distinct.

233. This should he also concede [sc. Henry], for whose opinion this argument was. For he himself concedes that there is never a difference of intention without composition, and that a relation differs from its foundation in creatures by a difference of intention. He also concedes that in divine reality person is a quasi-composite and essence is a quasi-potency and relation a quasi-act [cf. *Ord*.I d.5 n.52]; but where these are quasi-act and quasi-potency, there is quasi-composition – therefore where there is act and potency, there is truly composition (not however a composition of two absolute entities, because one entity [sc. 'like'] is not an absolute entity).

234. To the second, about change [n.195], Simplicius replies, *On the Categories* 'Relation' (f. 43r): since just as relation is not to itself but to another, so does that to which it comes not change as to itself but as to another; and if that only be said then 'to be changed' which is differently disposed to itself now than before, there is no change in 'to something'²⁹ – but if 'to be changed' is common to being differently disposed to itself and to another, then change is in 'to something' (as Simplicius maintains), because someone is differently disposed to someone else according to relation.

235. The Philosopher, however, because he posits that it is not possible for something to be differently disposed to another unless it be differently disposed to itself, therefore says that in 'to something' there is no motion; hence he only shows in which categories there is first motion and in which not.

236. Again, the Philosopher shows there [*Physics* 5.2.225b10-11] that in substance there is no motion, and yet there is change there; so from the Philosopher's intention can only be had that in 'to something' there is not motion, with which however stands that there is change there. And this response is confirmed by the authority of Ambrose above adduced [n.217], who concedes that a relation is a different thing from the foundation.

237. To the third, about presence-in [n.196], I concede that relation has a proper being-in (as Avicenna says in his *Metaphysics* [n.222]), and yet the composition of that genus from things essentially included does not follow, because even quality has its own being-in (which is not of the idea of its genus formally), and yet it is not composite with a composition respecting the nature of a genus; but this therefore is because a property is in the thing of which it is and is not of the per se understanding of it, which however seems more to be true of property than of relation.

238. When it is therefore argued that then a relation founded on substance would have its proper accidentality, because its proper being-in [n.196] - I reply: if there be any

²⁹ Sc. in the genus or category of relation.

such relation (about which the reasons conclude adduced above, in the first article [nn.200, 211-215]) I concede the conclusion; each part of the antecedent [sc. relation founded on substance, and having its own accidentality] seems to be true of the specific identity of one individual with another individual, in species, or of essential likeness according to specific form.

239. To the fourth, about process to infinity [n.198], I say that it does not follow, because the relation itself is referred to the foundation; for it cannot be devoid of foundation, or devoid of itself, without contradiction. For with it existing, and the foundation at the same time, both are extremes of the relation which is of it to the foundation; therefore it cannot be – without contradiction – devoid of the relation of it to the foundation, and so without contradiction it cannot be devoid of its foundation – and so the relation by which it is referred to the foundation will be the same as itself (and this will be plainer in the next solution of the following question, nn.268-71).

240. To the fifth, about distinction [n.199], I say that relation has a distinction into its species as any other genus has a distinction into its species; and yet it only becomes known through the foundations, because of the little entity of it that it has in the foundations. So is it also in other accidents that have a greater identity and reality, that sometimes the distinction is made through things extrinsic, and is known from a distinction extrinsic; in them however it is formal, intrinsic, but becomes known through extrinsic things.

B. On the Identity of the Special Relation of 'Creature to God' with its Foundation 1. First Opinion

241. [Exposition of the opinion] – With that then about relations in general having been seen, about the special relation of 'creature to God' there is an opinion [from William of Ware] that says the relation is the same as the foundation, and this such that the foundation is nothing other than a certain relation to God; because just as a creature, although in itself it is a being, yet in respect to God is called a non-being, according to Anselm [*Monologion* ch.31],^a – so too, although in itself it is an absolute being, yet in respect to God it is nothing other save a certain respect.

a. [*Interpolation*] which must be understood insofar as the comparison falls under negation (in this way: 'a creature, not in comparison to God, is something'), because according to no comparison is its [the creature's] entity proportional to that [God's]. But it is false if the comparison be affirmed in this way: 'in comparison to God it is nothing'; for such speech is metaphorical, according to Anselm.³⁰

242. With this seems to agree that which is said, that a relation is the ratification of the foundation, which was rejected in *Ord*.I d.3 nn.302-329, in the question 'About the Vestige'.

243. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion is Augustine *On the Trinity* 7.1 n.2, "Everything said relatively is still something with the relative excepted;" and again, "What is nothing to itself is nothing that is said to another."

³⁰ The Vatican editors opine that this interpolation (conflated from statements in the *Reportatio*), was here badly introduced, since it regards rather the rejection of the opinion.

244. The foundation therefore of a relation is some entity formally that does not include the relation itself formally – because if it included it formally, it would not be formally a relation to another but to itself, because its foundation is formally to itself, with which formally the same thing is posited. Nor could [a relation] be the first foundation of a relation: for it would remain to ask about that first relation, in what would it be posited? Not then is precisely any relation the foundation of any relation.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Let the reason [n.244] be thus formed: if a relation not be founded in something else, it is not a relation; therefore either there will be an infinite regress, or a relation will at length be founded on an absolute. But the idea of an absolute is that it be to itself, while the formal idea of a relation is disposition to another; but the same formal entity is not to itself and to another; therefore etc. – Again, that in whose quidditative idea there is a disposition to another is not to itself, nor absolute; therefore nothing created is an absolute entity.

245. Which also appears [sc. that the foundation does not formally include the relation] in divine relations, where there is the greatest identity with the foundation; and yet the foundation is not formally the relation, because then it would not be a perfection formally infinite [*Ord*.I d.5 nn.114, 117].

246. Secondly it is argued against the aforesaid opinion [n.241] thus: a definition indicates the total quiddity of a thing, if it is perfect; but the definition of a stone does not include, essentially or formally, a respect to another, because then it would not be the definition of a stone as it is in an absolute genus, and so it would not be of a stone as it is in the genus of substance or as it is a species of substance; therefore in the essence of stone, formally, is not included any respect.

247. Third thus: according to this opinion [n.241] creatures are not more distinguished from God than relations in divine reality among themselves, because all opposite relations are equally distinct and especially when they pertain to the same mode of relatives; now divine relations, which are relations of origin, pertain to the second mode of relatives, to which also seem to pertain the relations that are in God in idea of efficient causality to creatures [*Ord.*I d.3 n.287]; therefore if the creature is only a relation, and if an opposite relation in God – as filiation – is a subsistent relation, opposite to the relation of Father, there will be an equal distinction on this side [sc. God] as on that [sc. creation].

248. And it is confirmed, because then a 'created supposit' would only be a subsistent relation, and so it would be more difficult to conceive the mode of existing of a created person than of an uncreated one.

249. And if you say that creatures differ in absolute nature, among themselves, and not so the [divine] persons – this seems to destroy what is posited [n.241], because then the creature will have an absolute essence that will not only be a relation.

250. It seems to follow further that a creature differs less from God than one divine person differs from another divine person, because in divine persons there is a real and mutual relation, but between creature and God there is not a mutual relation [*Ord*.I d.30 nn.30-31, 40, 43]; therefore etc.

251. Fourth, to the principal [the opinion itself, n.241], thus: things that are distinct formally are not the same formally and precisely (because then they would be distinct formally and not distinct formally, because they would be nothing but the same

thing, indistinct formally); but the relation of creature to God is not distinct formally, nor specifically, in diverse creatures; therefore creatures either do not differ in species or a creature will be precisely that relation. Proof of the minor: to all those relations – in creatures – there corresponds the same extreme on the part of God, and to relations of different idea there does not correspond a term of the same idea.

252. Fifth thus: in creatures there is a triple relation to God [*Ord*.I d.3 n.287]; therefore the reason by which it [the creature] will be nothing but one relation is an equal reason by which it will be nothing but another relation; therefore it cannot precisely be any one of them. Nor can it be all of them, because they differ formally among themselves – and then any one created essence would have a formal distinction from itself. Therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: one nature formally and specifically is not many specifically; but any nature has three relations in respect of God different in species, which is plain – conversely in God to creatures there are three relations according to reason; therefore etc.

2. Second Opinion

253. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way it is posited [by Peter of Tarentaise (Innocent V) and Romanus of Rome, based on statements of Thomas Aquinas] that this relation of an angel [supply: and of any creature] to God differs really from the essence of the angel [supply: and of any creature].

254. Which is confirmed through the authority from blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* 5.5 n.6, where he says that in creatures "whatever is not said according to substance is left to be said according to accident;" and he argues that in these creatures [sc. relations] it is an accident.

255. Which he also expressly means in the same chapter [*id*. 5.16 n.17], "Those things," he says, "are relative accidents which happen with some change of the things about which they are said," and he means from this that the relation of creature to God is an accident, but not to God what is said relatively of God to creature.

256. And from this more expressly *ibid*. at the end, "That," he says, "God begins in time to be called what before he was not being called is manifestly said relatively; it is not however said according to an accident of God (that something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins to be called something relatively."

257. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this:

Substance is triply prior to accident (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a31-33), namely in knowledge, in definition, and in time; and this which it is to be prior in time is so understood that there is no contradiction on the part of substance but that it can be prior in duration to every accident; so it would not be a contradiction that a stone was prior in duration to all dependence on God, and consequently it would not be a contradiction for a stone not to depend on God, which seems absurd.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: if the relation of a creature to God is other than the creature, it is posterior to it naturally; but the prior in nature can be without the posterior naturally – as far as is of itself – without contradiction; therefore a stone can be without a respect to God – therefore it can be without a term of respect, which includes a contradiction. The first is plain,

because a relation cannot be prior; for a relation founded on the absolute cannot be prior to it - nor at the same time in nature, for the same reason; therefore posterior, because an accident to it. The second is plain, because this is the idea of 'prior naturally', which - as far as is of itself - it can be without the other, and thus according to the Philosopher does substance precede accident.

258. Further, either Augustine is there taking 'accident' commonly [nn.254-56] for any changeable whatever – and then any created substance at all is an accident, because it is changeable; or he is there taking accident for the changeable, that is losable (namely what can, with something remaining, be lost, and this something remaining is posterior either in duration or nature): if in this [second] way, then the relation of creature to God is not an accident, because a creature cannot remain either in duration or in nature without this.

259. And in this way he himself seems to be speaking in 5.4 n.5, how some accidents are inseparable: "Just as," he says, "the color of a raven's feather is black – yet it loses it, not indeed as long as the feather is, but because it is not always a feather. For which reason the material itself is changeable, and from this, that it ceases to be the feather, it loses to be sure also that color."^a It is not however a change, because thus indeed the loss of the feather would be a change; but it is a loss, because just as the feather is prior in nature to blackness, so could it also be posterior in nature to blackness, that is, not first corrupted with the corruption of blackness.

a. [*Interpolation*] because although while remaining a raven it cannot lose blackness, it can yet lose feathers and certain other things.

3. Scotus' own Solution

260. To this question then [question five, nn.188, 241], I say that the relation to God common to all creatures is the same really as the foundation; not however the same formally, nor precisely the same (or not by adequate sameness), so that the foundation is only a relation formally [cf. on real identity and formal non-identity in divine reality *Ord.*I dd.33-34, nn.1-3].

a. The Relation of Creature to God is the same really as the Foundation

261. The first is proved by two reasons:

Because that which is properly said to be in something, without which it cannot be without contradiction, is the same as it really; but relation to God is properly in a stone, and without it the stone cannot be without contradiction; therefore the relation is really the same as the stone.

262. Proof of the major: because just as a contradiction stated of some things is a way of proving distinction, so an impossibility of receiving the predication of contradictories pertaining to being is a way of proving identity in being – and this when there is no essential dependence that requires a manifest distinction (which I make clear thus: because the impossibility that a [e.g. a creature] is without b [e.g. relation to the Creator] is either because of the identity of b with a or because of priority or simultaneity in nature; therefore if b is not prior naturally to a nor necessarily simultaneous in nature,

and if *a* cannot be without b – it follows that *a* is the same as *b*; for if it be other or posterior to it, it is not likely that it naturally could not be without it without contradiction); but what is in something properly as a relation is in the foundation (that is, so in it that if it were other it would be by nature posterior to such), is not prior by nature nor simultaneous by nature with that in which it is; therefore if it is necessarily required for the being of it, so that that cannot be without it, necessarily it is the same as it really. So is it in the matter at hand.

263. The minor [n.261] is manifest, because just as it is impossible for a stone to be without God, so it is impossible for it to be without its dependence on God – for as it could be without dependence, so could it be without the term of the dependence: for there is no incompossibility of being without a term save because of the dependence – and something 'not necessary simply' is not the idea of the simply necessary; therefore etc.

264. Against this reason [n.261] I make an objection, because then [sc. if relation to God were the same really as the creature] any relation that is in the divine essence by act of the divine intellect would be the same as the essence (proof: it is incompossible for the essence to be without it – for if such relation could be new, then the divine intellect could change, which is impossible); but to posit such [relation] the same as the essence is unacceptable, because then it would be real (for whatever is the same as a thing is real); and that relation is not real (from*Ord*.I d.31 nn.6, 8-9, 16, 18); wherefore etc.^a

a. [Interpolated note³¹] Again, the relation of likeness is not the same as whiteness, and yet it is necessarily in the term posited; therefore if the term were necessary, it would simply necessarily be in it – and yet not then more the same, because not more intrinsic to the foundation because of the incorruptibility of the term. Likewise it is argued here: if the term were corruptible, the relation would not be the same as the foundation; therefore not now either [sc. when the term is incorruptible]. – This reason well shows that incorruptibility of the term does not make per se for this identity; but incorruptibility of the term in comparison with the foundation does well make for it, that is, if it be simply impossible for the term not to be unless the foundation not be – and further, if this is the first relation of dependence of the foundation on the term, because then by reason of the foundation there is this necessity simply of coexistence: because of the first ['if it be simply impossible for the term not to be etc.'], according to some opinion, the relation of vision to the object would be identical – because of the second ['and further, if this is the first relation etc.'] the dependence of our nature on the person of the Word in Christ is not identical with our nature.

Again, a relation to the simultaneous in nature as term is posterior to the foundation (as likeness to whiteness); therefore also of that to the prior in nature as term can similarly be posterior. It does not follow therefore that it is a contradiction for the foundation to be without that relation from the fact that it is a contradiction for it to be without a term [nn.262-263].

These two reasons [sc. in the preceding two paragraphs] are probable reasons against the first reason about the contradiction 'to be without each other' [n.261]. Likewise, it is not possible for a foundation to be generally without the respect, which is other than it (body and figure); therefore it does not follow 'not without that, therefore the same', when that is a respect.

Against the other reason, namely that a respect common to everything other than the term is an accident to nothing else [n.266]: it has a logical objection, because creation is not created (a concrete is not said of an abstract). Again, more really: 'inherence accidentally' is

 $^{^{31}}$ Vatican editors: This note, which in the mss. is wrongly put after the text at n.190, consists of four objections: the two first are against the first principal reason (n.261), the remaining two against the second (n.266). But while the objections posited by Scotus (nn.264, 268) are adduced so as to be solved, the said four are only attacks without solution.

in itself in [a subject], not so whiteness; therefore a relation is in itself related, the foundation not. There is not therefore the same idea of standing [sc. being the case] in the first and in the second [nn. 268-271]. [Vatican editors: these interpolated objections are left without answer.]

Note, in the year 1304 (almost at the end): 'the two extremes are one total cause of relation'; later differently: 'because the foundation is the total cause of relation, but the term is a sine qua³² non (just as fire is the total active cause of heat, but wood a sine qua non), such that the foundation is prevented from causing as long as it does not have the term. *[Vatican editors remark that in this last paragraph the first note is the regular teaching of Scotus; the second note is not found in him.]*

265. I reply. The incompossibility of separation can be from the idea of itself by which something is inseparable, and it can be by something extrinsic. An example of this second: because, according to the Philosopher, it would be a contradiction for the heaven to be without motion, not indeed from an intrinsic cause in the heaven (because it is receptive of motion, indifferent to rest just as to motion), but from an extrinsic moving cause; yet it does not follow that the heaven is its motion, although it cannot be without it. Now I say that the incompossibility of being a stone without dependence of it on God is from the idea of stone precisely, from which also is the idea of the incompossibility of being a stone without a term of the dependence of it - and whatever is the reason for requiring a term of dependence is the reason for having that dependence. But in this adduced objection [n.264], there is no necessity simply for the inherence of such relation, nor an incompossibility of the non-being of the object on the part of the divine essence (as if it were impossible for the essence to be unless it require a term 'to which' and it is impossible for that term not to be), but there is only the incompossibility from an extrinsic cause, namely from the divine intellect (a cause, I say, simply necessarily acting), and there is an incompossibility on its part to act newly.

266. The second principal reason for the first member of the solution [nn.260-61] is this: what is uniformly said of everything other than the term [of a relation] is accidental to nothing said [relative] to such term; this relation of creature to God is of this sort; therefore etc.^a – and so it is the same as the foundation.

a. [*Interpolation*] but such relation, common to every creature, is uniformly said 'of everything other than God' [in relation] to God himself; therefore it is accident to none.

267. Proof of the major: because if it were accidental to any, by parity of reason also to another; as, suppose, if the relation of effect to cause were accidental to a stone (and consequently would be a thing other than the stone), by equal reason it [sc. the relation] would have a relation of effect to God – and then accidental to it would be another relation of effect, and so on ad infinitum.

268. Against this reason [n.267] I make objection, because it does not seem unacceptable to proceed to infinity in relations; for it was said in *Ord*.I d.19 n.6 that relation is founded on relation, as proportionality on proportion. From this it is argued thus: if Socrates is the same as Plato then also the sameness of Socrates is the same as the

³² Scotus' Latin follows Latin grammar in writing here 'sine quo non' because the thing 'without which' is in context masculine and hence 'quo' in Latin rather than the feminine 'qua'. The 'qua' has become standard now in English (and other modern languages) because, apparently, of transfer from its common use in legal contexts for 'condition without which' and 'condition' is feminine in Latin.

sameness of Plato, and by parity of reason that sameness is the same as sameness; and the first sameness [sc. of Socrates with Plato] is a thing other than the foundation, because the foundation was able to be without it; therefore by parity of reason any sameness at all will be a thing other than that of which it is, and so there will be infinite real relations. And so can it be argued about proportions and likenesses.

269. To this I reply that there is a stand at the second [stage]. Which, so it may be understood, let the first foundations be taken, namely Socrates and Plato, between which there is mutual sameness, and let that in Socrates be called a and that in Plato b; let the sameness of a with b be called c, and that sameness conversely [sc. of b with a] be called d. I say that a differs from Socrates because Socrates can be without a (because he can be without the term of it), and it cannot be without a term; a however does not differ from c but c is the same as it, because a cannot be without b (since they are together by nature); and consequently it is a contradiction that a is unless both the foundation of that which is c and also the term of it are. But with the foundation and the term of the c existing, necessarily c will be – therefore it is a contradiction that a is without c; and c is formally in a, because a is said to be the same as the sameness that is c; therefore c is the same as the same

270. And if you ask by what sameness c is the same as the a, I say that by a itself, because that sameness is only one of reason, because it is simply of the same thing to itself.

271. In the same way there is a stand about likenesses of proportionalities, because one proportionality is like another in essential likeness (and two individuals of the same species are said to be alike in specific form), and so just as there is a stand in specific sameness in the second stage (and not in the first), so too in the likeness of proportionalities.

b. The Relation of Creature to God is not the Same formally as the Foundation nor is it precisely the Same

272. The second article, namely that a relation is not formally the same as the foundation [n.260], I suppose to be manifest from the understanding of what is called 'formally the same', because the per se idea of a respect does not include formally the idea of an absolute, nor conversely does the idea of an absolute per se include the formal idea of a respect; similarly, what is there added [n.260], that the foundation is not precisely the relation, this is proved against the first opinion [nn.243-52].

273. And then I understand how there can be a true and not precise identity in this way:

When, in creatures, something contains another thing by identity, or several things unitively, this is not from the perfection of the contained but from the perfection of the container – just as if the intellective soul (according to some) contain the vegetative soul and form of substance, this is not from the perfection of the form of substance (because it does not contain all others), but from the perfection of the intellective soul. Likewise, let it be that being contains any property at all of being (as truth, goodness, and unity), yet this containing is not from the perfection of the contained but from the perfection of the container – just as also in divine reality, that relation is the same as the foundation is not

from the perfection of the relation (as if it contain the essence by identity), but from the formal infinity of the essence, because of which it has in itself relation by identity.

274. In all these (and maximally in creatures) the container is not precisely the contained, but is as perfect an entity in itself as it would be if the contained were outside the container added to it – indeed it is a more perfect entity, because from its perfection it contains every other entity; hence the intellective soul is not only a substantial form (because then it would not be perfect), but is as perfectly the ultimate entity that is there as [it would be] if it were to presuppose another entity than itself.

275. So I say in the matter at hand, that the foundation is not only the relation (which it contains by identity), but is as absolute as [it would] if the relation were added to it, or it had altogether no relation; but this is not from its imperfection but from perfection (either simply or in some way or other), because it contains the relation by identity, so that the container prevents the accidentality of the relation from being able to be an accident, because it is perfectly contained in the substance – which relation however, if it were not thus contained, would of itself not have perhaps that it were by identity substance.

C. To the Principal Arguments

276. To the principal arguments of this fifth question.

To the first, from *Metaphysics* 4 [n.189]. It is said that he [Aristotle] infers that 'everything is [in relation] to something', that is, 'to opinion and sense'. – But on the contrary: the consequent should differ from the antecedent in the thing proposed [*Ord*.I d.3 n.316].

Therefore I say that it is unacceptable that 'all things are [in relation] to something' such that the 'to be' of them is formally to be to another, as that opinion said which posits that all appearances are true [n.189] – which also said that the being of a thing is formally in 'to appear' [Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.5.1009a38-1010a25]. Nor do I thus concede that 'all things are [in relation] to something' such that the being of them is formally to another – rather the being of them is formally 'to themselves', although by identity it contain the being of 'those that are to another'.

277. To the second [n.190]. Although it could be denied of relatives or of these that are in diverse genera (and then they would be said to be first diverse, as far, namely, as concerns their formal ideas, so that none of them formally includes the other or anything of the other, although by identity in existing one contain the other), yet it can be said – in consequence of things said elsewhere [n.231] – that this sort of relation is transcendent, because what belongs to being before it descend to genera; therefore what is such is transcendent and not of any genus. And therefore these relations that follow being before it descend to beings of whatever genus, since they are transcendent, will not be of any determinate genus.^a

a. [Interpolated note by Richard Sloley, fl. 1300+] against the first response [n.277]:

Then, for the same reason, the powers of the soul could be posited as qualities and yet that they are really the same as the substance of the soul, because the reason by which something in one accidental category – for instance relation – is the same in reality as substance is the same reason by which it is also in another. Again, nothing finite includes by

identity anything first diverse from it; therefore substance does not include relation of the genus of relation.

Against the second response [n.277]:

That which is of a determinate genus cannot be the same as that which is not of any genus but is transcendent. Again, what is a substance to one thing is an accident to nothing (from the Philosopher and Commentator, *Physics* 1.3.186a32-b12). Again, then an absolute and a comparative would not be contraries nor first differences dividing being: the first is plain, because – according to Aristotle – great and small are not contraries, because they are in the same thing [*Categories* 6.5b11-6a11]; the second is plain, because first differences differences differences another quality, etc.' are first diverse; therefore). Again Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.10, f 83rb, "There is no relation that is not an accident;" again *On the Soul* 5.2, f 23va, "Substance of itself is not referred to anything in any way."

D. To the Authority for the Second Opinion

278. To the authority of Augustine for the last opinion [nn.254-56]: I concede that 'relations in creatures are accidents' about the relations of creatures to that on which they do not depend essentially; but whatever something essentially depends on, the essential dependence of it on that is not an accident for it, that is, it is not another really.

279. And then to the first [n.254], which is adduced from ch.5, that "in created things that which is said according to substance is left to be said according to accident," the 'said according to accident' must be expounded, that it is not predicated per se 'in the what', and with this also it is changeable, not however when the foundation remains, but through change of foundation; and the first condition fails in essential predicates (or rather substantial ones) said of creatures, the second condition fails in divine relations – but both concurrent are sufficient.

280. And so can the last authority from ch.19 be expounded, that "they are accidents" [n.255], 'in things to which God is said' [n.256]; that is, they are simply changeable, not however losable – and they are said 'accidentally' [n.256], that is, not essentially of subjects; and one condition fails in divine relations.

II. To the Fourth Question A. Solution

281. To the fourth question, about creation [n.179], I say that creation not only seems to import a relation to God in idea of efficient cause, but also a respect to preceding not-being, and this in order of duration, as creation is properly taken. But this order can be understood either to immediately preceding not-being or indistinctly; and in the first way a thing is only said to be created in the first instant – in the second way a thing can be said to be always created, while it remains.

282. If we speak of the first relation (namely to efficient cause), the solution is plain from the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260].

283. If of the second relation [sc. order to preceding not-being], it seems that it is not the same as the foundation – which follows from the first way [n.281] to the extent it only belongs to the thing in the first instant, if the respect to not-being remains only in that instant; but the absolute remains after that instant, and with and the non-remaining is not the same really as the remaining.

284. But³³ about the order to not-being when not-being is taken indistinctly the same appears [sc. that the relation is not the same as the foundation], unless it could be proved to be a contradiction that the essence could be without a respect to a not-being preceding in duration. But if it be proved (in the third question asked [n.95]) that it is a contradiction for a stone to be without a respect to a not-being preceding in duration, then it could be said in consequence that the respect does not differ from the foundation, save that this respect is not a dependence on anything that what has it essentially depends on; and it was not in general way said in the preceding question [the fifth question, n.260] that 'every respect is the same really as its foundation', but that 'every respect of dependence on something, without which the dependent cannot be, is the same as the dependent' [nn.261, 263, 265, 278]. But if it not be a contradiction for a stone to be without such respect and order to not-being, then it is plain the order is not the same as the foundation.

285. So therefore either, according to one opinion, creation as to both respects that it states is the same as the foundation [nn.282, 284] – or at least as to the first respect (though not as to the second [n.282]), according to the first opinion.

B. To the Principal Arguments

286. It can be replied to the first argument [n.180] that the authority is speaking of these precisely that are included per se in the quiddity of the thing, whence it is quiddity (whence it excludes one and many, act and potency, because nothing such is of the per se understanding of quiddity); and thus do I concede that no relation is formally the same as the foundation, even if really and by identity it be sometimes contained in it, as in the matter at hand.

287. To the second [n.181] it is plain that that respect to God not only remains in the first instant but always, while the thing remains – as will be said in the first question of the second distinction of this [book] II [*Ord.* II d.2 n.62].

288. To the third [n.182]. Although it not be true that 'God cannot renew the same motion' (which will be spoken of in [book] IV d.43 q.1 n.8, q.3 n.7), yet if this be conceded, it is conceded because of interruption, which according to them prevents the identity of renewed and destroyed motion. But this does not happen in the matter at hand, save that creation cannot be renewed the same insofar as it states an order immediate to not-being, but not insofar as it states a respect to the cause; hence, the same respect can be renewed, because the same maternity was in the mother of Christ to him after the resurrection as it was before [4 d.43 q.1 n.13].

289. To the fourth [n.183] it can be conceded that creation-passion is in the fire from the generating fire (namely the creation by which everything other than God is said to be created, whether it be created or generated); and it does not follow 'if it is in it from the generating fire, therefore it is to the generating fire as to a term', - for likeness is in this white and in that from what generates it, and yet it is not necessary that the likeness is to the generating as to the term.

290. To the fifth, when it is argued about change [n.184] – there seems to be there a difficulty, both about the major and about the minor. I say that in natural change there is matter and form there, and agent and composite of matter and form and many respects (to

³³ The Vatican editors think that in the place of 'but' (which is the reading of almost all mss.), 'if' should be read.

wit: the respect of the agent to the produced composite, and conversely the respect of the produced composite to the agent, the respect of the matter to the form and conversely, and the respect of each to the whole and conversely, and the respect of the composite and of the present form to the preceding opposite; and not only were these absolutes, namely composite and form, preceded by their opposites, but also were those respects of matter to form and conversely, and of form to composite and conversely, preceded by their opposites, and so there can be respects of all these respects to their opposites; and not this only, but also all these respects are from the agent, and so there can be respects of all these respects to the agent) - such that about these many respects, taking those that are to the purpose, matter has respect to form as perfectible and what is perfected to its perfection, and these are coeval with the existence of the composite; this respect too is from the agent effectively inducing the form and perfecting the matter with this formal perfection, such that on this respect, which is 'of matter to form as of receptive to perfection or of perfectible to perfection', a respect is founded of the passive to the agent; this respect too succeeds to its opposite, because matter was first not formed. These three respects does passive change seem to state, namely: (1) the respect of matter to form as of receptive to perfect on or of perfectible to perfect on, and (2) the respect of passive or produced to the agent or to the producer, and $(3)^{34}$ the respect of the later to the opposite that precedes. But two of these respects, namely the first and second,³⁵ seem to come together for change absolutely (not comparing it to the agent), and these are expressed by that idea of change whereby something is said to be changed 'because it is otherwise disposed now than before': if 'disposed' express the respect of matter to form or of the perfectible to the perfection according to which it is thus disposed, this is what is actuated by that perfection; but³⁶ 'otherwise...than before', behold another respect, founded on some respect of matter to form or of perfectible to perfection. And if it be added that change is something being otherwise disposed now than before by some changer, behold a third respect.

291. To the matter at hand, therefore, it can be said that change, properly taken, is not the same as form (because then change would remain when the form remains), nor is it the same as the respect of matter to form or conversely (because then it would always remain when this sort of respect remains), nor is it the same as the respect of the whole to the opposite or conversely of the opposite to the whole (because then likewise it would remain when the composite remains) – but it is the order of 'matter to form' as new and immediate to such form; and neither of these orders is an essential dependence on anything on which what has that order depends, and so neither is the same as an absolute. In this way then is the major of the reason [nn.184-85] conceded.

292. And to the minor [nn.184, 186] I say that creation is the production of the whole created thing into being, not any part of it presupposed – such that, although the created thing have two parts (one of which could naturally precede the other and receive it as its perfection), yet it is as a whole created. The first term does not seem to be some

³⁴ These numbers are added to help comprehension.

³⁵ The Vatican editors think 'third' should here replace the 'second' of the mss. because of the following parenthesis "(not comparing it to the agent"). But the words at the end of this paragraph 'behold a third respect' seem against this change. Let him decide who will.

³⁶ The Vatican editors again think that 'if' (si) should replace 'but' (sed).

part of creation but the total being; or at least if we speak of an angel created – there nothing is potential receiving something actual, under whose opposite it was before.

293. And then if change be called 'a new relation of potential to actual', such that the potential pre-existed in itself and yet without that actuality, it is plain that no creation is change, because nothing potential was pre-existent.

294. But if change be called 'a new actualization of the potential', such that the potential were not pre-existent under that act, nor yet necessary that it were in itself pre-existent– neither thus is the creation of an angel change, because nothing potential is in it. Yet it could thus be said that the creation of fire was change (if fire were created), because in it there would be potential and it would be actuated by form and would be otherwise disposed now than before; not 'otherwise than it had been before', but that it was not thus disposed before, as it is now. And it seems that in the definition of change, the 'being otherwise disposed now than before' not need to be taken positively, because it is plain that it is not referred to a subject but to the term 'from which'; and the term 'from which' of change properly is not anything positive, but a privation, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b35-5a16.

295. I say then that either no creation is change, if it be always necessary for a potential in itself to have pre-existed and to be newly actualized by a received form (because the potential of no created thing pre-existed), or at any rate the creation of a simple is not change, if it suffice that a potential was not under the act in which it now is and so was newly under act through change. But, in whichever way, by reason of that immediate order to not-being [n.281], because of which it was conceded that change differs from form [n.291], it is conceded too that creation is not the same really as the foundation [n.283], because the order immediate to not-being is not the same if it do not remain save in the first instant, just as, because of that same order, creation does not remain save in the first instant along with form.

Question Six Whether Angel and Soul differ in Species

296. Sixth – and lastly – about this distinction, where the Master [Lombard] treats of the creature purely spiritual and the creature composed of the spiritual and corporeal, I ask whether angel and soul differ in species.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, in place of the above paragraph] About this second distinction, where the Master deals with the issuance of creatures into being specifically, and first of the creature purely spiritual – thirteen questions are asked (which all pertain to the present distinction): first is whether angel and rational soul (which is a creature purely spiritual) differ in species; second is whether in the actual existence of an angel there is some succession formally: third is whether in an angel actually existing it is necessary to posit something measuring his existence, or the duration of his existence, which is really other than his existence; fourth is whether of all aeviternals there is one aevum; fifth is whether the operation of an angel is measured by the aevum; sixth is whether an angel is in place; seventh is whether an angel requires a determinate place, so that he can be neither in a greater nor a lesser but precisely in a place so much (and included in this seventh is whether he could be in a point of place and whether in however small a place); eighth is whether one angel can at the same time; tenth is

whether an angel could be moved from place to place by continuous motion; eleventh is whether an angel could move himself; twelfth is whether an angel could move in an instant; thirteenth is whether an angel could move from extreme to extreme not passing through the middle. About the first it is argued [d.1 n.296; followed in order at: d.2 nn.1, 84, 126, 143, 189, 197, 254, 273, 439, 486, 507].

297. That not, proof:

Because if essences differ in species then also the powers that are founded on them; and if powers then also operations – and further, then also objects, from *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-22. The consequent is false, because there is the same object of an angel's intellect and of mine.

298. Second thus: Augustine *On Free Choice* 3.11 n.32: "Angel and soul are in nature equal, but in office unequal;" but equality of nature is not in things differing in species; therefore etc.

299. Third thus, because if they are of different species, one will according to its totality be nobler than the other and consequently any individual of the nobler [species] will be nobler than any individual of the ignobler: and so either any angel will be more perfect than any soul, or conversely; and then further, since capacity follows nature, either the capacity of any angel will be greater than the capacity of any soul, or conversely; and since blessedness requires the whole capacity of the soul to be satisfied, it follows that a greater perfection is necessarily in any angel (so that it may be blessed) than in any soul, or conversely – each of which is false, because angel and soul are disposed as exceeding and exceeded in blessedness.

300. On the contrary:

The nobler a created form, the more it is distinguished into several degrees of nobility (just as the forms of what is mixed are more than the elementary, and forms of the animate more than of the inanimate, and perhaps more animals than plants); so there will be more differences in species in intellective nature than in non-intellective, which cannot be unless angel and soul differ in species; therefore etc.

I. To the Question A. About the Conclusion in Itself

301. The conclusion of this question [n.296] is certain, namely that angel and soul differ in species – because forms of the same idea have the same idea of perfecting and not perfecting; but the soul is naturally perfective of an organic body as form, and an angel is not naturally perfective of any matter; therefore etc.

B. On the first Reason for this Distinction

302. But what is the first reason for this specific distinction?

1. First Opinion

303. It is said by some [Alexander of Hales, Thomas Aquinas] that [it is] unitability with matter and non-unitability with matter.

304. On the contrary: form is the end of matter, from *Physics* 2.8.199a30-32 – and therefore distinction of matter is because of distinction of form and not conversely (hence the limbs of a deer differ from the limbs of a lion, because soul differs from soul [*Ord*.I d.2 n.332]); therefore the first distinction of this and of that will not be through matter and non-matter, but there will be a prior one of the very acts in themselves.

305. This is confirmed; for because this nature is such and that not, therefore this is not that; therefore this reason for perfecting and of not perfecting will not be the first distinctive reason.

2. Second Opinion

306. In another way it is said [Thomas Aquinas] that a greater or lesser degree [sc. of being intellectual], in angel and in soul, is what first distinguishes one from the other.

307. Which is confirmed through a likeness, because the sensitive soul does not seem to be distinguished in brutes save because of diverse degrees of sensing, and yet a specific difference is there; therefore so can it can be here with diverse modes of understanding, namely more perfect and more imperfect.

308. But what is this distinct mode of understanding? – It is posited that an angel understands non-discursively and a soul discursively (speaking of natural intellect); and these modes are distinct in species, and are intellectualities of different species.

309. On the contrary:

The soul is not discursive about principles and is discursive about conclusions; therefore if to know this way and that is of a different species and therefore requires an intellectuality of a different species, there will be two intellectualities of a different species in the soul: one insofar as it understands principles and the other insofar as it understands conclusions.

310. Besides, the soul of a someone blessed in the beatific object is not discursive about it, but it is discursive about an object known naturally; so there would be a different intellectuality in species insofar as it understands God beatifically and insofar as it understands something naturally.

311. Again, third thus: if the intellectuality of angel and soul differ in species, then things that essentially depend on that and on this differ in species; but on these do the beatific vision of an angel and of a soul depend essentially (for although an angel not be the total cause of his vision nor the soul of its, yet each vision essentially depends on the intellectuality of the nature of which it is); therefore this beatific vision and that differ in species – which is false, because all diverse species have a determinate order according to more perfect and more imperfect, so that any individual of the more perfect exceeds any individual of the more imperfect: and then it follows either that any beatitude of any angel would exceed any blessedness of any soul, or conversely, each of which is false.

312. Again, fourth: what is understood by this, that it is said 'an angel does not understand discursively'?

Either that an angel does not have power whereby, with the principles known, he could know the conclusions (if they were not known to him before in act or habit): and this does not then seem to be a mark of perfection in an intellect; rather this seems to be a mark of imperfection in a created intellect, because it is a perfection in our intellect –

supplying an imperfection – that from certain known things, virtually including others, it can acquire knowledge of those others.

313. Or it is understood that for this reason he [the angel] cannot discourse, because all conclusions are known actually to him from the beginning³⁷ (and so he could not know them through principles): but this is false, because not everything does he know and understand actually and distinctly from the beginning.

314. Or for this reason, because everything is known to him habitually from the beginning (and therefore he cannot acquire habitual knowledge of them from principles); and this does not posit an essential difference of intellectuality in soul and angel, because thus would it be in my soul that, if all conclusions were known to it from the beginning (by God impressing knowledge of them at the same time as knowledge of the principles), it could not know discursively – not because of impotence of nature but because it would pre-have knowledge of the conclusions and cannot acquire *de novo* what it would pre-have (in this way the soul of Christ was not discursive but it knew habitually all the principles and the conclusions in the principles, and yet it was not angelic in nature).

3. Scotus' own Solution

315. I say then to the question [n.302] that whatever is able to act is a being that has first act; and prior there according to nature is the idea of first act in itself before in comparison with second act, of which it can be principle, so that, although that by which such being is principle of second act is not other than its nature, yet its first entity is not its nature as it is principle of such second act, but its nature as it is in itself a 'this'; and so the first distinction of being is not through its nature insofar as it is principle of such operation, but through its nature as it is 'this nature', although by identity it be principle of second act.

316. So I say in the matter at hand that, although the angelic nature be the principle of understanding and willing, and the soul likewise (such that these powers state nothing added to the essence of the soul), yet what is first – here and there – is this nature and that nature as to themselves. And this distinction is first, on which follows the distinction of principles of operating, whether of the same act or of other operations: for because it is this nature, therefore it is the principle of such operation, and not conversely.

317. An example of this: the sun has the virtue of generating many mixed bodies below. And if you seek the first reason for the distinction of sun from plant, the first reason for the distinction of one from another is not through the power of generating a plant on the part of the sun, because, if that power were communicated to another, not because of this would it be the sun, nor would it be distinguished from a plant as the sun is distinguished. The first distinctive reason therefore is because the form of the sun is that sort of form and the form of a plant is that sort of form, and thereon it follows that this form can be a principle of such operations and that not.

318. So I say in the matter at hand that, because an angel is such a nature for itself and because the soul is such a nature for itself, therefore are they first distinct in species; not indeed as two species, but as species and part of a species, because the soul is not

³⁷ The Latin 'principium', translated as 'beginning' here and in the following lines, also means 'principle', and 'principles' is the translation regularly used when the word is plural. However 'beginning' and 'principle' have somewhat different connotations in English, so how best to translate the Latin word in specific cases can vary.

properly a species but a part of a species: and yet it is the first reason for distinguishing its species – of which it is part – from an angel, and so the first reason for specific distinction on the part of its species is itself.

319. It can also be added (although it is not absolutely necessary for the solution of the question) that the intellectuality of an angel, insofar as intellectuality, does not differ in species from the intellectuality of the soul insofar as intellectuality^a – this is that although this first act and that differ in species as these acts are considered absolutely in themselves, not however according to the perfection that they virtually contain, according to which they are principles of second acts; which is seen through this, because they are about objects of the same idea and to objects of the same idea (and a likeness of this is: if the soul of ox and eagle differ in species, yet not because of this does the visive power here and there, insofar as it is such and such a perfection, differ in species).

a. [*Interpolated note* from Appendix A] Opinion of venerable Alexander of Hales [*S. Theol.* II n.112 corp.] – Angel and soul can be considered:

Philosophically, and thus they differ essentially in being "separate according to substance" and in being "unitable according to substance."

Logically, and thus 'they differ by the essential powers that they add to the genus', as is 'intellectual being with reason' and 'intellectual being without reason'. "And I mean 'intellect with reason' combining and dividing and running discursively from extreme through middle, of which sort is not the angelic intellect."

Metaphysically, and thus "they differ essentially by possible intellect as to species existing in a phantasm and by intellect abstracted from this possibility," of which latter sort is the angelic intellect, because "a sensible power is lacking to it."

Theologically, and thus they differ because an angel "is changeable immutably and soul is changeable mutably."

320. Now this is very possible, that some containers differ in species and yet the contained do not differ in species, as the properties of being are contained by identity in beings however much distinct and yet the properties in them are not distinct in species; for the unity of stone (which is not other really than the stone) and the unity of man (which is really the same as the man) are not as distinct formally in species as man and stone; rather, this unity and that only seem to differ in number.

321. This is also made clear through something else, because just as in the same thing can those things be contained by identity of which there is a quasi-specific formal distinction (just as in the same soul are intellective and sensitive perfections included, such that they are as formally distinct as if they were two things), so conversely can something 'indistinct formally' be contained in distinct things.

322. And if this be true [sc. that in angel and soul, distinct in species, can an intellective power be contained not distinct in species, nn.319-321], then it is plain that angel and soul are not as distinguished in species first by such and such intellectuality – rather, neither first nor not-first are they distinguished in species 'because such and such is the intellectuality in them'. Or, if this not be true but it be left now as a doubt, at any rate the first statement [sc. that the first idea of specific distinction of angel from soul is on the part of the absolute nature of each, nn.315-318] seems sufficiently clear, that their first distinction is not through this [sc. the said intellectualities].

II. To the Principal Arguments
323. To the first principal argument [n.297] it can be conceded that the essences of angel and soul can differ in species and yet not the powers, if the last statement in the solution of the question [nn.319-21] be true – and then the argument [n.297] does not proceed.

324. Yet it can be said that the powers, different in species on the part of the foundation (but not on the part of the object), can have acts different in species insofar as those acts depend on the foundation of the power, though the acts be of the same species insofar as they depend on the objects; and then it would be conceded that the intellection of angel and of man, about the same intelligible, is on the part of the object the same in species, and on the part of the foundation – insofar as the foundation is the power's idea of acting – they are different in species.

325. It would also then be necessary to say that the operations simply differ in species – because the identity on the part of the object is not simply identity in species, but diversity simply and identity in a certain respect (for any difference whatever suffices for distinguishing, but not any identity whatever suffices for the perfect identity of any things); and then seems to follow the same unacceptable result as was inferred against the second opinion, about beatific acts [n.311], unless perhaps it were said that the total cause of the beatific act is the object and that the powers are disposed there in respect of the act as merely receptive and passive – and receptives do not distinguish received forms in species, as is plain about whiteness received in stone and in wood.

326. To the second [n.298] (and to all like authorities) it is plain through that authority of Augustine [*On 83 Diverse Questions* q.51 n.4] 'the soul is formed by truth alone'; because of this indeed, nothing is superior to the soul – for it is true in idea of the object in which it rests; and as concerns this, the soul is equal to the angel, because no intellectual nature can rest save in an infinite object. And thus must that authority be understood, and all like ones.

327. To the third [n.299] it can be conceded that any individual at all of one [species] exceeds any individual at all of another – but what that be does not have to be explained before book 3, in comparing the soul of Christ to angelic nature.³⁸ And the whole argument must be conceded, up to the remark 'that the whole capacity of nature is satisfied in blessedness' [n.299]; for that proposition is not true, speaking of purely natural capacity; for it is precisely satisfied in proportion to merits (commonly speaking), and in this is deliberative appetite sufficiently satisfied. But how perfect blessedness from such satisfaction alone can stand, although natural appetite be for a further perfection added – it can be treated elsewhere, in the matter about blessedness in book 4 (*Ord.* IV Suppl. d.50 p.2 qq.1-3 n.3).

Second Distinction First Part

On the Measure of the Duration of Existence of Angels

 $^{^{38}}$ No precision of the reference to *Ord*.III is given here by the Vatican editors, but they do make incidental reference to *Ord*. II d.13 qq.1-4 (nn.2, 5-6, 9, 19).

Question One

Whether in the Actual Existence of an Angel there is any Succession Formally

1. About the second distinction, where the Master deals with the place of creation of the angel and the time when it was created, I ask about two things: and first about the measure of duration of existence of angels, and second about the place of angels.

2. As to the first question, I ask first whether in the actual existence of an angel there be any succession formally.

3. That not:

First, because a quantity cannot be received in a non-quantity; therefore succession – which is a quantity – cannot be received in the actual existence of an angel, which is indivisible.

4. The reason is confirmed, because a permanent quantity cannot be received in an indivisible; therefore neither a successive quantity.

5. Second thus: prior and posterior, in idea of number, can integrate the idea of time;³⁹ wherever there is succession, there is before and after, and there can the idea of number and measure be found; therefore, if in the actual existence of an angel there were succession formally, it would be measured by time.

6. Third, for this is Augustine 83 *Questions* q.72, "Aeviternity⁴⁰ is stable but time is changeable."

7. Fourth, the same is argued by Dionysius *Divine Names* ch.10 (these, when there seen, are there said to be) [Dionysius: "...the property of aeviternity is ancient and invariable, and the whole is measured according to the whole..."]

8. On the contrary:

It is not necessary for God to create one angel when he creates another; therefore some angel can be with another not existing, and another can be created so that it be with the other now existing. Therefore he who was with this one not existing and is with this one now existing seems to be prior to him, and his being as 'not with him' seems to precede his being as 'with him'.

9. Second thus: an angel can be annihilated, time excluded. I ask therefore in what moment? Not in the 'now' of time because that is not; nor in the 'now' of eternity, formally; nor in the 'now' of the aevum, because that 'now' remains one and the same. Therefore in the same [moment] it will and will not be, which is contradictory.

10. Third thus: an angel can now be and later be annihilated and again be repaired; but to be repaired is not as one with the created 'to be' as if there had been no interruption (otherwise something interrupted would be as one as something not-interrupted, which is false); therefore in one 'now' will this having been repaired be, and in another now the created-before – and if so, then if he had remained without interruption, he would have been then in another 'now' than this one. Proof of this consequence: for there is as much interval of him resting as there would be of him

³⁹ Time is 'the number of motion with respect to before and after' according to Aristotle.

⁴⁰ Scotus and Medieval theologians in general used the word 'aevum' for the eternal existence of angels and 'aeternitas' for the existence of God. Angels depend for existence on another (unlike God) but are immaterial and immortal (unlike men), and so exist, once they exist, without end (unless God un-create or annihilate them). They are thus measured neither by God's eternity nor by human or material time but by something in between, for which the Latin word 'aevum' or 'aeviternitas' was used, and these have been taken over into English. See the quotations from Henry of Ghent in the footnote to n.42 below.

moved; therefore, by similarity, there would have been as much interval of him nottending to not-being (of the able to tend, however) as if he be actually tending.

I. First Opinion, which Bonaventure Reports and Holds

11. Here it is said that in the actual existence of an angel there is succession formally. See the opinion in Bonaventure and his writings [Bonaventure, *Sent*.II d.2 p.1 a.1 q.3].

A. Arguments for the Opinion

12. And for this opinion it is argued in four ways:

First on the part of conservation. And the reason is founded on the authority of Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.12 n.26, where he maintains that "as air in respect of the sun is not a having been made lucid but a being made lucid (otherwise, with the sun absent, the air would remain lucid), so is a creature disposed in respect of God;" again (*ibid.* 4.12 n.22), he maintains that God is not disposed in respect of a creature as a builder in respect of the house.

13. And from this it is argued as follows: if a creature in respect of God is not having been made to be by him but is as it were in being made formally, then formally it is always being posited in being by God - and so just as it continuously remains in being, so its creation is continuously in being, from God.

14. This is confirmed, because 'to conserve' is not merely not to destroy, but is some positive action of God (otherwise it would be said that he who does not close a window is conserving light; similarly then 'to annihilate' would be a positive act, which is false, because 'to annihilate' is to non-act); therefore to conserve is to act.

15. Which is also plain from this, that no creature is independent in its being, because not pure act either; therefore continuously it depends on its cause in being: and not only on a cause that has given being and now does not, because then 'to conserve' would be nothing but to have acted before and now not to be destroying.

16. If all these things be conceded, that God in conserving does something positively about the creature, not however by any continuous action (because there is no form there according to which continuation of action could be assigned), nor even by one and another action but always by the same one – on the contrary: by this causation there is not had formally and ultimately that which cannot be had when this causation is posited (this I prove, because a cause causing by this causation is an ultimate cause, applied to producing the effect in being; therefore if with this can stand that the effect is not, it does not seem that by this causation it is had ultimately); but with this causation posited, whereby the angel was produced in being, the angel is able not to have being tomorrow; therefore he will not have that being tomorrow formally by this causation: and he does have being, therefore by another causation.

17. If you say that he does not have being with coexistence in time tomorrow from the first causation, but for this is that 'future existence' required (and therefore, with the future existing then, the idea of the future is the idea of the coexisting of the angel) – on the contrary: thus it is in eternity, that it does not have coexistence with time insofar as it is coexistence.^a Likewise, not only 'with causation of the future not posited' is an angel

able not to have existence with the future, but also is he able not to have the foundation of that coexistence, namely 'to be absolutely'; therefore that 'to be absolutely' he does not have from such coexistence.

a. [*Interpolation*] but only when time coexists with it; and so, if this were the cause, the aevum and eternity would not differ.

18. Again, second: if his being is simple, then just as God cannot make an angel not to have been, so neither can he make an angel not to be going to be.

19. The reason is confirmed, because in eternity there are no true contradictories about the divine will, nor even is the divine volition in respect of contradictories as they are contradictories; but God in eternity was able to will to create some angel and to annihilate the same; therefore he willed him to be and willed him not to be. Therefore, it is necessary here to find some conditions on the part of being and not being so that they not be contradictories. But as to these [conditions] that take away contradiction, only diverse 'nows' seem able to be assigned for them (namely, that he willed him to be for *a* and not to be for *b*), therefore it was incompossible for God to will to create one angel and to annihilate the same, unless he willed this and that to be at diverse 'nows'; but he could have willed this and that without any respect to time; therefore it must be possible on the part of the angel to be understood one at different nows without respect to time; this otherness can only be of the 'nows' of the aevum; therefore etc.

20. The third way is argued from infinity – because from the fact an angel will endure to infinity with the whole of future time, if he has now the whole of his duration that he will always have, therefore he now has infinite duration formally.

21. This is confirmed, because the 'now' that is of itself such that it can coexist with the infinite is formally infinite - just as if an angel had in himself whence he could coexist with every place, he would be infinite according to place.

22. And if you say that this is not true unless he has this of himself wherefrom he can so coexist – on the contrary: although he does not have of himself wherefrom he may, coexisting thus, have infinity, yet just as he formally has wherefrom he does thus coexist, so he seems formally infinite – just as if he had wherefrom he would be present to every place (actual and potential), though effectively from God, yet he would be immense formally; and although his immensity would not be equated with divine immensity in intensity, it would yet be equated with it in extension, so that nowhere could God be by his immensity save where an angel could be.

23. And this reason is confirmed, because the negation of a negation is the affirmation of the positive – therefore negations of infinite negations posit infinite positives, or one infinite formally; but an angel, having this simple coexistence, has from it negations of infinite negations ('not being with infinite instants of time'); so he has from it infinite positives, or one positive virtually infinite.

24. The fourth way is from the order of things that come to be in the aevum: for an angel could have been created not sinner but innocent, and could afterwards sin or not sin, with all time removed; this angel therefore would have first been innocent before sinner, therefore 'before' and 'after' [are] in his being.

25. Likewise, one angel could first be created and afterwards at once annihilated, and later another created; the first never was with the existing second, therefore not in the same 'now' with him either; therefore one is prior and the other posterior (because if they

were, and not together, then one after the other). Therefore if one other had existed with both of them, he would have been 'prior' and 'posterior' in his being, just as the being of one of these is prior to the being of the other.

26. For this position [n.11] there are authorities:

Augustine *Confessions* 11.14 n.17, "The now of time, if it always stood and did not flow, would not be time but eternity;" and he seems to be speaking there of the true eternity of God, in expounding the verse of *Psalm* 101.28, "But you are yourself the same and your years, etc."

27. Further, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.12.n.23, "But that he says (*John* 5.17) 'My Father works until now', it signifies continuation of work;" this he proves, supplying, "For it could be understood otherwise if he were to say 'works now' (where it would not be necessary that we treat it a continuation of work), but he compels it to be understood otherwise when he says 'until now', namely from that [now] in which – since he was making all things – he has worked."

28. Further, Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.4: Although according to the philosophers it can be said of the heavenly bodies and spirits that they always are, yet there is a great difference; 'always being' in God is only the present, not running finally through eternity.

29. Further, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.15, "The 'saeculum' is said [to be] what is always prolonged with things eternal, just as space etc."

30. Further, Gregory *Morals* 27.7 n.11 (on that in *Job* 36.26, 'the number of his years [is without reckoning]') says of the angels, "In them we discern a beginning when we turn our mind backwards etc."

31. Further, Anselm *Proslogion* ch.20, speaking to God says, "You pass through all things, even the eternal, because your and their eternity is present whole to you, since they of their eternity do not have what is future as neither what is past."

32. Further, Jerome *To Marcella* [rather Isidore *Etymologies* 7.1 n.12], "Only God does not know 'has been' or 'will be'."

B. Arguments against the Opinion

33. Against this position [n.11] it is argued that it includes a contradiction, because where succession is, there is before and later – which are not together, but when the later arrives the prior falls away, and consequently the before grows old and the later is new.

34. And if it be understood that succession is in the measure without this that newness be in the measured – against this it can be argued, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 4.11.219a10-29, 'before' and 'after' in time are because of 'before' and 'after' in motion, such that if there were not other and other in motion there would not be 'before' and 'later' in time; therefore, by similarity, if there not be any new existence in the aeviternal (nor any newness in it), there will not be any distinction between 'before' and 'after' in measure.

35. This is also confirmed by the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10.1.1053a18-27, because a measure should be of one genus with the measured, so that if the measure be divisible, also the measured; which is also proved by this, that the indivisible (insofar as indivisible) cannot be measured by the divisible.

36. Further, if the 'now' of the aevum fails and does not always remain the same, this cannot be because of cessation of the subject, because for you the subject remains the same [cf. Bonaventure, n.11]; nor can it be posited because of some corrupting cause, because it does not seem a corrupting cause can be assigned. Therefore it does not cease. It is otherwise about the 'now' of time, because the proximate subject of that (or the proximate measured) ceases, namely change.

37. Further, if there is here some newness and remaining about something the same, then that properly changes, because it is disposed differently now than before; and the measure of change is the 'now' of time; therefore the aeviternal, insofar as it is posited to be measured by the 'now' of the aevum, will be measured by the 'now' of time.

38. For this there are the authorities of Blessed Augustine *City of God* – look for it.⁴¹

II. Second Opinion

39. By holding this negative conclusion [sc. that there is no succession in the existence of an angel], in two ways is a difference of the aevum to time and eternity posited.

A. Thomas Aquinas' Way of Positing it

40. In one way thus – look for the opinion elsewhere.⁴² 41. On the contrary – look for it.⁴³

B. Henry of Ghent's Way of Positing it

42. In another way, [Henry] *Quodlibet* 5 q.13⁴⁴ – look for it.

⁴¹ Bk. 11 ch.31, "The holy angels...have an eternity of persistence...", bk. 12 ch.15 n.2, "...the immortality of the angels does not pass in time, nor is it past (as if now it is not) nor is it future (as if it not yet be)..."

 $^{^{42}}$ Scotus *Lectura* 2 d.2 n.34, "So others say [namely Thomas] that eternity is the measure of stable being. To the extent, therefore, that something departs from stable being, to that extent it departs from eternity: and there is something that is in flux as to its whole being (as the temporal); and there is something that, though in itself it not be in flux, has yet being with that in which there is flux (and thus are 'aeviternals' with flux) – and, so understanding, heaven and angels are with flux, but yet their being is stable in itself and the whole duration together in itself."

 $^{^{43}}$ Scotus' *Lectura* 2 d.2 nn.35-36, "On the contrary: an angel is some being in itself, and so he has in himself his proper duration; therefore some duration must be assigned in itself to him. So he is not measured because of the fact that something else, possessed of duration, runs along with him; the point is plain in the heaven, which exists along with its own motion that is measured by time, and yet the heaven in itself has its proper measure... Besides he [Thomas] says elsewhere [*ST* Ia q.14 a.13] that 'God knows future contingents because all things are present to the 'now' of eternity, which contains in itself the whole of time'; therefore, if the 'now' of aeviternity contain the whole of time, the consequence is that an angel knows all future things."

⁴⁴ Henry *ibid.*, "Now mode of being is only triple in the universe of beings: for there is some being, altogether immutably existent in act, without any potency for change; there is also another being, altogether existent in act immutably, it is however (as far as concerns itself) in potency for change if it were left to itself; there is a third being, existent altogether mutably in act and in potency. The measure of the quantity of being (or of duration in being) in the first way is called 'eternity' – which, because of its 'in every way immutable existence', is necessarily whole at once, because as nothing is left to be acquired, as in its existence, so neither in its duration or eternity; but because of its lack of potency for change, it is of itself standing fixed in the same – for which reason the whole of eternity is nothing but a 'now' standing of itself immutably and indivisibly, not having parts..., and it has, as far as concerns itself and the idea

43. Against this way of positing I argue:

For he seems to contradict himself,⁴⁵ because if in the aeviternal "it is not that in the following 'now' it has the being that it has in the present now'... rather the being of an angel, to the extent it is of itself, has to have a term" (as he says expressly), and later that "the aevum can in any instant, to the extent it is of itself, cease" – therefore, if this aeviternal have being formally along with the first 'now', from which that being had to have a limit with the first 'now' (according to them), therefore it is necessary either that it is in another 'to be' with the second 'now', or with the same ['to be'] posited again.

44. Further, that he says⁴⁶ 'the impossibles to be that are inferred, and that they do not follow from this, that the aevum is posited to be indivisible, but from negation of time, which negation is incompossible with the positing of the aevum, and that because of that incompossibility the impossible follows about the aeviternal': this does not seem reasonable, because, according to him,⁴⁷ whatever is prior in nature as far as concerns itself can be prior in duration as far as is from its own part. Therefore it is not repugnant to it but that it could, without contradiction as far as is from its own part, be 'prior in duration' to the posterior (with respect to which it is said to be 'prior in nature') – and, with it posited and the posterior not posited, there is no contradiction on the part of the 'prior naturally', nor of anything that pertains to it insofar as it is prior.^a Therefore, from

of the measured, no idea of the continuous, but only as to the consideration of our intellect in respect of, and comparison to, the succession of time... The measure of the quantity of being (or of duration in being) in the second way is called 'aevum' – which, because of its actual immutability, is necessarily whole at once, because nothing remains in the being of the aeviternal to be received; but because of the potency for change in the aeviternal...it is not of itself a standing fixed, but from another only; not because it could be in flux in the continuum, having of itself parts (as the 'now' of time can), but because it can fall, and has a necessity of falling, into non-being, unless it be conserved in being by another...; because of which, the whole aevum of the aeviternal is only a 'now', standing from another immutably and indivisibly, not having parts...save by the protension of the intellect in respect of, and in comparison with, the parts of time... Now the measure of quantity (or duration in being) in the third way is called 'time' – which, because of the actual change of the temporal thing (of which 'time' is the per se measure), is not a whole at once but in succession, because in the being of a temporal thing properly (of which sort motion is) there remains always something to be received; and, because of the potency always mixed in its act, it is always in flux (never a fixed standing), having parts that succeed to each other and never remain, in which common difference eternity and aevum differ from time."

⁴⁵ Henry *ibid.*, "He [Anselm, n.31] only says this with respect to the protension of time, namely by the fact that in them it is not that, namely, the being they have in the present now they have in the following 'now', nor do they have now of themselves the being that they had before; rather, the being of a creature (as of an angel), as far as concerns itself, has to have a term, but the being of God in no way. Hence the being of a creature is not had through continuous influx save by having an aspect for protension of time, as was said; as to which also as concerns protension or process, eternity and aevum are differently disposed, because eternity is related to the whole of time 'not being at all able to fail', but the aevum can in any instant fail (as far as concerns itself) and be concluded under time – and thus, by reason of its potency for corruption, has in some way the idea of the temporal, which in no way does eternity have."

⁴⁶ Henry *ibid.*, "For eternity, as exceeding measure, contains in itself in virtue the whole course of time, just as a superior creature contains in virtue and in a certain supereminent way whatever is in an inferior; so that, by positing eternity or the aevum to exist in the nature of things, not only is it impossible to posit that in itself time cannot exist..., rather it is incompossible to posit it, having posited that eternity or aevum are in reality... That therefore from positing this impossibility, namely that time cannot be...(which is not only impossible in itself but incompossible with that posit, namely that eternity is in God and the aevum in an angel), that those impossibles, concluded in the four ultimate modes of unacceptability, follow is no wonder. Which however can in no way follow from this, that the 'now' of the aevum is posited simple and indivisible, since it has by virtue in itself that it thus, by intellect or imagination, be protended to time...; but they all follow from the not only impossible but incompossible thing aforesaid – by the opposite of which, posited as necessary, namely 'time is'... the contraries of all those conclusions are very easily understood."

⁴⁷ Henry *ibid.* 8 q.9, "For nothing belongs to anything prior in nature which is not of a nature to belong to the same – as far as is from itself – prior in duration."

such hypothesis there does not follow any incompossibility on the part of the aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal.

a. [*Interpolation*] but the aeviternal and its proper measure are prior in nature in every respect to time, as a foundation is prior to a relation.

45. An example of this: because although there follow on a subject its proper property yet, because the subject is prior in nature, there is no contradiction on the part of the subject that the subject be prior even in duration to its proper property; and if this be posited, no incompossibility follows on the part of the subject in itself in the way in which it is prior to the property. Therefore if any contradiction follows, this is through some extrinsic place, namely from the relation of cause to effect.

46. So therefore, if there were some necessary comparison of the aevum to time, as of the prior in nature to the posterior in nature, because of the negation of the posterior in positing the prior, there would not follow any contradiction on the part of the prior in itself, nor on the part of anything that belongs to the prior in itself; but these inferences [sc. of Henry, first footnote to n.44], namely that an angel 'cannot be prior to another angel' or that 'it cannot be after its non-being', are impossible per se on the part of the aeviternal insofar as it is aeviternal; therefore etc.

47. That he also proves the necessity of the concomitance of time with the aevum, because of the order of the more perfect to the more imperfect, does not seem to suffice. For this would not conclude about quasi-quantitative but quidditative containing, just as the superior quiddity contains the inferior; but with such containing stands that the superior can be without the inferior, and that to it belongs 'the being that is proper to it' without the inferior, or at least does not belong to it in respect to the inferior. So therefore in the matter at hand it must be said that nothing proper to the aevum belongs to it precisely in respect to time.

III. In what Ways the First Opinion can be Sustained A. First Way, which is according to the Intention of Bonaventure 1. As to the Opinion itself

48. He who wishes to hold the first opinion [n.11] (which seems probable and to have for itself probable reasons) can say – according to the intention of him who poses it [sc. Bonaventure] – that the aevum properly is a quantity and consequently has a proper divisibility; and not a permanent divisibility, therefore a successive one: of such sort is indivisible succeeding to indivisible, and another to another.

49. And so the 'now' of the aevum, insofar as is of itself, goes by suddenly – and aeviternal being as posited in being in the 'now' has, by force of this positing, precisely being in the 'now' and at once non-being (the 'now' having been transacted), unless the same cause, by another causation, posit the same being in another 'now'. And so does it conserve it, by positively causing, not another being (as is in the successive), but the same being infinite times – such that the first causation is called 'creation', because it follows immediately on not-being in order of duration; and any following causation whatever follows not-being mediately in order of duration, and not-being immediately in order of nature, namely that it would then be in it if the conserving cause were not giving

being. But the being posited second follows in order of duration the being posited before - and so, by this, there is conservation and continuation of the same being.

50. An example of this is: if an angel has some virtual quantity by which he can be present to some place, by it he is so present to this place that he cannot at the same time be present to another place; nor absolutely can he be present to another place save by some change made concerning this place; either that it [the virtual quantity] become greater formally, or that it be transferred from place to place, or that by divine power it be in another place without abandoning this place.

51. So it is in the matter at hand, that the being that the angel has by a single causation is limited to this 'now' – and, with nothing new about him happening, he cannot by force of this single causation be beyond this 'now'; but God, by giving him a perpetual durative quantity (and this by one continuous causation or by infinite causations of the same being), gives to him always uniformly that whereby he may be extended for the whole time.

2. To the Arguments brought against the First Opinion

52. To the arguments against the opinion.

To the first [n.33], which proves that a contradiction follows from it, I reply: in that duration or delay of being, which is precisely successive, there is renewing (and one part of it goes away and another part succeeds, and generally one part succeeds to the other), but there is not any renewing in that existence of which is that delay; just as, if the same flesh were posited, not having part and part in the same permanent quantity, then there would be there an otherness of parts in the extension formally (which is quantity), without extension or diversity of parts of that to which such extension is accident.

53. And when it is proved [n.34] that 'there is no distinction in the measure (from the Philosopher *Physics* 4. 11.219a10-29) unless there will have been distinction in the measured' – I say that it does well follow that 'if the parts of time are other, that the parts of motion are other', as from effect to cause; but it is not necessary that in whatever the parts of duration are other, that there be some distinction of the parts prior; of which the cause is because the distinction that to something is second can in another thing be first.

54. An example of this is: fire makes hot and makes dry, because of distinct ordered accidents in fire, so that the distinction of actions there [sc. heating and drying] is second, presupposing the other prior one, namely the distinction of the active accidents [sc. of hot and dry in fire; Aristotle, *Generation and Corruption*, 2.3.330b3-4]; but from this it does not follow that wherever there is a distinction of actions, that it be second – because if in the sun these distinct accidents of fire were virtually contained, then the first distinction there would be of actions, which however was second in respect of fire.⁴⁸ So must it be said in the matter at hand.

⁴⁸ If one distinguishes things in terms of perceptible qualities, as was universal before the rise of modern physical science, Aristotle's distinction of the elements of things into the hot, the cold, the wet, and the dry has an intuitive attraction. These elements, however, and the changes they cause, only exist down here in the sublunary world. The superlunary world (because of its always seeming to be the same way with the same regular and predictable motions) was conceived as beyond decay. The celestial bodies therefore were not conceived as being hot or wet in themselves, for then they would be made of the same elements as things down here and would not be beyond decay (what they were made of was sometimes referred to as a 'fifth' element beyond the four; hence the word 'quintessence' or 'fifth essence'). Scotus nevertheless supposes, for the sake of argument (not by incipient anticipation of later theories), that if

55. To the other argument [n.36] I say that the 'now' can fail, because of itself it has being only suddenly – although its subject remain the same, and no agent corrupt it. And that 'the now of time fail, with its own proper subject failing' [n.36], it is accidental to it that its proximate subject fail – because if that were to remain the same (as in something at rest), then it could be said that that same thing acting through what is another 'now' succeeding this one, by producing another 'now' incompossible with this one, destroys this one, not of itself first but by consequence.

56. And if you then ask in what this now fails, whether in itself or in another (as Aristotle argues in *Physics* 4.10.218a8-21) – I say that 'to fail' (as also 'to cease') can be expounded in two ways: in one way by positing of the present and negation of the future, in another way by positing of the past and negation of the present. In the first way must it be expounded in indivisibles and in these things that have an ultimate of their being: for they do not have a first of their not-being, and then they cease when they are – and in this way the 'now' ceases in itself, because then it is and after this it will not be; and if you seek the first of its not-being, there is none, as neither of anything having the ultimate of its being.⁴⁹

B. Second Way, which is at a Tangent to the Intention of Bonaventure

57. In another way could the conclusion be sustained [sc. that in the existence of an angel there is succession formally, n.11] (although not to the intention of the one who posits that principal position), that the total existence of an angel remains according as it is absolute, having however repeatedly new respects to the cause – such that the whole of it as it is under one respect to its causing cause succeeds to itself as it is under another respect to its conserving one.⁵⁰

And this way would perhaps be easier for maintaining succession than the prior one (which posits quantity [n.48]), although it would on the other side be very difficult to sustain how there would be there precisely a succession of respects without any distinction in the absolute, in any way, whether in the foundation or in the term.

IV. Against the Conclusion of the First Opinion in Itself

58. But against the conclusion of the said opinion in itself [n.11], whether in the first way or in the second way it be sustained, I argue thus:

the accidents of fire were virtually contained in the sun, the actions of heating and drying would nevertheless still be first and the qualities second – the opposite of fire among us.

⁴⁹ The point here seems to be something as follows. The 'now' of time in temporal things comes and goes with the process of change, as these things themselves come to be and cease to be. Angels do not come or go by way of change; they simply are or are not (they have, or do not have, the fullness of their being all at once). The 'now' of angels, then, comes and goes simply because of itself, that it is an indivisible which immediately is if it is, and immediately is not if it is not.

⁵⁰ William of Ware *Sentences* 2 d.2 q.2, "The whole aevum, taken under one real respect to the angel, succeeds to itself under another real respect to the angel, succeeding to itself; likewise the creature, as it now coexists with God, has a different respect from when, in another 'now', it coexists with him without any new absolute. Hence whole succeeds to whole as concerns measured and measure, as thus the measure succeeds to itself whole just as the measured whole to itself, according to every mode of proportion; nor from this can any succession be concluded in parts succeeding themselves. Hence the first succession of whole to whole is in the aevum without absolute innovation, but not without relative innovation, because it acquires different real respects."

Either the 'now' of the aevum – which is posited as one and another absolute according to the first way of sustaining the opinion [nn.48-51] – is the same as actual existence or other. If the same, it is plain that actual existence, just as it remains the same, so also the 'now' of the aevum. If other – to the contrary: then just as existence can be posited an infinite times in being, so it seems that that absolute 'now' (different from it) can be posited the same frequently in being, and so can the same 'now' of the aevum be conserved, just as the same existence.

59. If it be said that 'if it be posited in being frequently, it is posited in diverse nows' – on the contrary: that absolute 'now', different from the being of existence, if it can frequently be posited in being and in other and other nows, still there will be the same reason that in any of those nows it will be able to be conserved; and then there will be a process to infinity, or there will be a stand in this, that just as existence is conserved the same, so any absolute in an angel will be able to be conserved the same.

60. Likewise, in the following question [nn.122-123] it will be proved that there is not in an angel any other absolute than his existence, and so it will not be possible for there to be identity in existence and succession in some other absolute; and, whether this way or that, it does not seem possible that there is a new respect without newness of the foundation or the term, for a respect consequent to the extremes – so that, with each posited, the respect follows from the nature of the extremes – cannot be new (as it seems) without newness in one or other of the extremes: and nothing for you is new in the foundation of this respect – nor in the term, as is plain.

61. Likewise, this respect is the same as the foundation, as is plain from the preceding distinction [Ord.II d.1 n.260]; therefore this respect cannot be other, the foundation existing the same.

V. Scotus' own Response to the Question

62. It can therefore be said that there is no necessity for positing anything new or any succession in any angel (namely that would be 'new' in it formally), without 'whatever is there' being able to remain the same (as existence remains the same) and consequently any respect consequent to the absolute.

VI. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

63. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.12-25].

To the first [n.12] I say that each way [nn.11, 33] saves the statement of Augustine. For as the first way says that 'always essentially does the creature depend equally on God', so that the conservation of a thing is as it were one continuous causation (or there are infinite causations), and thereby it is always actually causing the thing as it caused it in the first instant (although that causation as in the first instant be called creation, and in the others conservation) – so the second position [n.33], not seeing reason for continuation in this causation (because not any continued form), nor seeing so much reason for a distinction (because not seeing that distinction either in the causer or in the caused, as far as concerns the formal term) [n.16], says that one action 'always remaining in respect of the creature' is creation insofar as it is understood to coexist with the first 'now' of time, which 'now' of time immediately preceded the not-being of the caused; and that the same action remaining is called 'conservation' insofar as it coexists with the other parts of time not immediately following not-being but the being pre-had with those parts of time – and so the action is a sort of continuation of what was pre-had, not comparing to not-being (where there is not before and after), but comparing to the parts of time with which it coexists [cf.Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5 q.11.

64. But besides the intention of Blessed Augustine, the reason there adduced [n.16] seems to have a difficulty namely that by another causation does the thing have being with one 'now' and with another, because 'it is not had completively by any causation whose opposite seems to stand when such causation is posited' [n.16].

I reply. This proposition [sc. 'it is not had...such causation is posited'] is to be distinguished according to composition and division; and in the sense of composition it is true, that 'that is not had completively by any causation whose opposite stands when such causation stands, so that these are simultaneous'; but in the sense of division it is false, because even the conservation will be able not to be though the causation will have been posited by which the thing ultimately has its being – and so although causation of the angel be posited, it can yet stand divisively with this posit, not conjointly, that the angel not be.

65. And hereby is it plain to a similar argument, that 'an angel is being created and being annihilated cannot stand at the same time, therefore it is not the same thing to be created and to be conserved – because when it is being conserved it cannot be annihilated, but not when it is being created.'

I reply. Just as it does not stand at the same time in the sense of composition that an angel is being created and being annihilated, so neither does it stand that he is being conserved and annihilated at the same time in the sense of composition; but in the sense of division it does stand that, about an angel, at some time there is creation or conservation and yet that at some time it is possible there is not (and so there can be annihilation) – just as was said in the matter of God's predestination and his foreknowledge, that in the sense of division there is potency for one opposite when the other remains, not however that there is potency for that opposite when at the same time the other opposite remains [*Ord*. I d.40 nn.4-7; *Lectura* 1 d.40 nn.4-8 and d.39 nn.53-54].

66. To the second [n.18] I say that it is not another thing, on the part of an angel, that he is, has been, and will be, yet these do note that there is a different relation of him to time – because just as was said in *Ord*.I d.9 n.17, d.40 n.9, about to be generated and to have been generated, that they co-signify the 'now' of eternity insofar as coexisting with the diverse parts of time, so also would they say of the 'now' of the aevum that the same ['now'] can be and coexist with all the parts of time [cf Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.13].

67. And when it is said in the argument that 'he [God] cannot make an angel not to have been' [n.18], it is denied as it is of the thing signified by the 'have been' – because the thing signified by the 'have been' is that same being which the angel has.

68. And if it be said that 'the past cannot not have been', the minor is denied that would be co-assumed [sc. 'an angel has been'], because here it is not the past in itself.

An example of this would be: if the Son of God were to take with this, that he is generated in eternity, another nature according to which he would depend on the Father *per impossibile* – then it would be said to be the same thing in him 'to be generated' and 'to have been generated', and the 'to be' of the Son could absolutely not be; and insofar

as this being would as it were follow his not-being, he would be said 'to be generated' – and insofar as quasi mediately would follow his not-being as coexisting with other parts of time, he would be said 'to have been generated'. And so conservation and production (or creation) differ by sole action of the intellect; and it is possible for his 'conserved' not to be when he is conserved and when he is being produced, in the sense of division.

69. And if it be argued thus, 'the past cannot not have coexisted with this, therefore this cannot not have been' – it seems to be a fallacy of figure of speech, changing 'when' into 'what'.⁵¹

70. To the confirmation of this second reason, about contradictory things willed in eternity [n.19] – it can be said that although God willed me to sit at moment *a* and not to sit at moment *b*, yet first naturally are the objects willed by him before the 'nows' measuring [them], and in that prior stage is it necessary to seek the non-contradiction of the things willed; otherwise, through the later 'nows' added on, it would not seem possible that a contradiction of this sort can be removed. Although therefore he will an angel to be for this 'now' and not to be for that 'now', first would the possibility have to be sought out how he might will an angel to be and not to be.

71. I say then that if the 'now' be posited in any even aeviternal thing as proper to it, God wills it to be in that 'now' positively – and he wills it not to be negatively by willing that 'now' not to be; and then if there be another aeviternal in whose 'now' both of these come to be, this is accidental to the 'nows', for the 'now' of the aeviternal is not the proper measure of them – just as neither eternity, in which there can be contradictories that succeed to each other in every measure.

72. Or if there not be posited in any aeviternal some 'now' other than actual existence of it (as will be said in the following question [nn.122-123]), then [God] wills it to be with eternity and wills it not to be with eternity. He does not however will it to be with the whole of eternity 'according to all the presentiality of eternity', nor not to be with the whole of eternity in this way, because then there would be a contradiction; but there is no contradiction in comparing these to eternity 'not according to the whole idea of its infinite presence'.

73. To the third [n.20] I say that for this, that from the coexistence of some virtual quantity with some quantity properly – namely of bulk – the infinity of the virtual quantity [n.21] must be concluded, it must be that it necessarily coexists with all the parts of the quantity of the other. Proof, because 'that other quantity' [sc. of bulk] would not be infinite unless it had all the parts possible for it (just as time, if it were together, would not be actually infinite unless it had necessarily all the parts possible for it); therefore nothing is proved to be infinite virtually from the coexistence of it with the whole of time unless it necessarily coexist with all the parts of time. But such is not the aevum. I say then that although formally it have wherewith it can coexist with the infinite parts of time, it is not necessary – because of this – that it be in itself infinite, because it does not have formally whence it necessarily thus coexist.

74. And as to the likeness about immensity [n.22], I say that it is not similar – because that there which could be present to every place would be in it at once, and not

⁵¹ The first clause, 'the past cannot not have existed with this', is about 'when', namely that when 'this' existed, the past in question existed; the second, 'this cannot not have been', is about 'what', namely that this (the incarnation) cannot not have been (at least by divine decree). The two 'cannots', although in fact they go together, are logically different, and the inference of one from the other does not hold by logic, but by divine fiat.

through any conservation of an extrinsic cause. In the matter at hand, however, it does not have 'whence it may coexist with all the parts of time' save through the conservation of an extrinsic cause, and it would have nothing by which it might coexist unless the same thing were quasi-continuously caused by an extrinsic cause, although not by a different causation; so that what is like this [sc. the aevum] would more be about that [sc. immensity] if the coexistence of it with different places were continually caused – if this were possible – by the same causation. Never however, as coexisting together, would it have infinite presence to place, and thus it would never be immense. So in the matter at hand.

75. On the contrary: the finite thing cannot coexist together with the whole infinite, so that it have in itself a whole whence it can coexist with it; therefore what does thus coexist is infinite. -I reply: the antecedent is denied of the infinite that is in succession; and of the finite formally having what it has always by the same action, such that not without such action.

76. To the fourth [nn.24-25] it is conceded that one aevum succeeds to another aevum, and the existence of the aeviternal thing succeeds to its opposite (that is, one is after another) is conceded, but from this is not proved any succession in any sole existence of an aeviternal.

77. And from this it is plain to all the arguments:

That the two angels [n.25], about which is conceded a 'before' and 'after' (that one remains after the other); if however a third were to coexist with both, in the being of that third there would be no 'before' and 'after' – just as although the day today and tomorrow coexist with eternity, not because of this is there 'before' and 'after' in eternity.

78. Likewise [n.24], it is conceded that first would be the nature of an angel before his guilt, so that this existence (namely under innocence) would be with the opposite of that existence, and from the second existence would follow the opposite of the first; however the existence of the angel in its own nature would not have any succession, neither as it is existent under innocence, nor as existent under guilt – but there would only be a succession in accidents (that is, that the existence of one act would be after the existence of the other), without however diversity of the other in itself.

79. The authorities adduced for this opinion [nn.26-32] I concede, because no creature is independent of the first cause, but is always dependent on the cause – not however with continuous dependence, nor with different ones, but the same; and, because of that same any creature can have being with one part of time and not with another, and to this extent it can as it were fall under time: this is, that it coexist with one part and not coexist with another, and so it may be said 'to have been' and 'not to be going to be', and so not eternal.

VII. To the Principal Arguments

80. To the principal arguments [nn.8-10].

To the first [n.8] it is conceded that one angel is created before another, but because of this it does not follow that in the being of the angel first created there is a 'before' and 'after'.

81. To the second [n.9], it can likewise be said that an angel can be annihilated, and in the same 'now' negatively (if it has a 'now'), that is that its 'now' cease with it;

but if its 'now' not differ from its existence, then it can be annihilated with eternity and be with eternity, but not with the whole idea of the presentiality of eternity [nn.71-72].

82. To the last [n.10] I say that the being of the one repaired follows the not-being of the one annihilated, and that the not-being preceded the being of the created, and that that being preceded the not-being of the creatable – and so beings follows the same 'being', with the interrupting not-being in between. Nor from this does any continuation follow in the being 'if it had not been annihilated' [n.10], because now there is not succession in any one thing, but of one opposite to another [sc. from not-being to being, to not-being].

83. On the contrary: therefore thus is interrupted existence together with itself repaired, as if non-interrupted.

I reply: if there were not there succession of opposite to opposite (which opposite mediates between this to be and itself), it would follow that there would be as much simultaneity as if the opposite did not intervene; but now the opposite as it were mediates between being created and itself being repaired (and this 'opposite' is some middle, or has a certain relation to each extreme), and so these are not as at one as if not-being did not intervene. Just as however now the same 'now' repaired (or the same existence, if it requires no 'now' [n.72]) is the same, and in the same there is 'existence created and repaired' without any succession in it in itself (although it as posited in being succeed to itself as before posited in being) – so it would have been in the same 'now' if it had not been interrupted, and without any succession, in either way.

Question Two

Whether in an Angel actually Existing there is Need to posit Something Measuring its Existence that is Other than that very Existence

84. Second I ask whether in an angel actually existing it be necessary to posit something measuring its existence (or the duration of its existence [n.1]), other than the existence.

85. That yes:

Time differs from motion by this, that it measures it (as the Philosopher proves *Physics* 4.10.218b13-18 by this, that 'time is neither quick nor slow but motion is said to be quick or slow', and for other reasons); therefore, by likeness, there is something other than the existence of the aeviternal measuring it.

86. Second thus: permanent quantity and successive quantity are of the same genus – therefore each is something other than its subject, especially if it pertains to the genus of substance; therefore just as permanent quantity is other than that of which it is the measure, so also successive quantity [cf. nn.3-4].

87. On the contrary:

About that 'other' I ask by what it endures in being? If by itself then, by parity of reasoning, existence itself will be able to endure by itself formally, because that 'other' is not more perfect than the actual existence of it, since it is as it were the property of it. But if it endures in being by an absolute other than itself, there will be a process to in measures and measureds.

I. To the Affirmative Side of the Question A. The Opinion of Others

88. I respond.

The first opinion in the preceding question [n.11] must concede the affirmative part, because the aevum truly posits [sc. according to this opinion] the idea of measure and quantity properly [n.48] – and so it differs from the existence of an angel, which is not in itself formally a 'how much', but indivisible.

89. Similarly, in that existence different 'nows' of the aevum succeed each other; therefore each differs as a certain absolute from the existence of an angel (according to that position [nn.19, 49-51, 58]), because just like indivisibles of the genus of quantity.

90. Likewise some – holding the second opinion in the preceding question (about the indivisibility of the aevum [nn.39, 42, 33]) – say that the aevum belongs to the genus of quantity, not as a divisible but as an indivisible in that genus; such that from many indivisibles of the same species, measuring namely the existences of several aeviternals of the same species, a discrete quantity can be composed, which is the number and measure in aeviternals just as number in bodily things is discrete unities in them (for this they adduce reasons – look for them [Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 12 a.8]).

B. Rejection of the Opinion

91. Against this [nn.88-90] it is argued, as was argued before in *Ord*.II d.1 n.262, as follows:

That which, if it were distinct from something, would be naturally posterior to it, is necessarily the same as it if it is incompossible for it to be without it. Therefore, if it is incompossible for an angel to be without something extrinsic (which is the measure of his actual existence), since that, if it were other, would be naturally posterior to the actual existence of the angel, it follows that it is not other than his existence; or if it is other, and consequently posterior, the angel's actual existence will be able without contradiction to be without it – and so it is not necessary to posit it.

92. This reason is confirmed (and that similarly of which mention is made in Ord.II d.1 n.262), because a distinction between things of which one is properly present in the other is not proved except from a distinction actual or potential, or because they are as disposed to each other as things of which one is separable from the other.

93. This third thing I add, because according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.11.1036b22-28 'On the parts of Definition', the parable of Socrates the Younger has seduced many from the truth, saying that 'if there were no circle save in bronze, not because of this would bronze be in the definition of circle', and by likeness inferring that 'it is not necessary that flesh is of the definition of man, though man not be without flesh' – given, I say, that a separation of these from each other would be impossible. If however these are as disposed to each other as are things of which the separation is possible, these are proved to be distinct; for example, if from the proper idea of circle and triangle, flesh and wood, it be concluded that a circle is as disposed to wood as a triangle to flesh, and if separability be proved on one part, a distinction will be proved on the other part, and that the inseparability on that part is not from its proper idea but from something extrinsic. 94. I take, therefore, that nothing can be proved 'distinct from another' save either because of actual separation, or potential, or because of the proportion of these to some other things of which one is separable from the other. But in the matter at hand [sc. the measure of the existence of angels] none of these occurs. For there is not here (for you [sc. those who hold the first or second opinions in the previous question]) any separation, actual or potential. Nor are these [sc. an angel's existence and the measure of it] disposed to each other as things distinct and separable, because nothing distinct from another thing really, without which it cannot be without contradiction, is prior to it, but either posterior to it naturally or simultaneous in nature with it; and this, which is posited as 'other' [sc. the measure of an angel's existence], would, if it existed, be posterior naturally [n.91]; therefore etc.

C. Objection against the Rejection of the Opinion

95. It is objected against this [sc. that there is no distinction between the existence of an angel and the measure of it], because 'the now according to substance' is disposed to the substance of the movable just as is this, which is posited the measure of the duration of existence of angels, disposed to that existence – because just as this existence remains the same, measured by this indivisible, so it is posited from the other side about the 'now' and the substance of the movable; and yet from that side there is found a distinction between the substance of the movable and the substance of the 'now'; therefore also here.

96. But that there must be posited some such 'now' measuring the movable, the same in substance, seems to be froom the intention of the Philosopher in *Physics* 4.10.281a8-11: there he seems to solve as it were the question he is moving about the 'now', saying that it is 'one and the same according to substance, but different according to being'.

D. Response to the Objection

97. This objection [n.95] I exclude thus:

First I show that that which it supposes about 'the now according to substance' is false and is against the Philosopher's intention – because the Philosopher proves [*Physics* 4.11.219b22-25] that "the now' follows that which is being moved" by the fact that "from that which is being moved we know the 'before' and 'after' in motion," and by the 'now' we know the 'before' and 'after' in time. But this is not true of the movable according to substance but according to what is under different changes, because, if the movable be taken according to substance absolutely, we do not know from the 'before' and 'after' in motion.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] therefore neither through the same 'now', which is according to substance, do we know the 'before' and 'after' in time, but through different 'nows'.

98. Likewise, the Philosopher says [*Physics* 4.11.219b33-20a4] – in the second property of the 'now' – that it is not without time nor conversely, because motion is not without the movable nor vice versa; and as motion to the movable, so the number of motion to the number or unity of the movable. But it is false that the movable according

to its substance cannot be without motion, but it is precisely true of the movable as it is under change; if therefore the second is movable in the whole motion, therefore also the 'now' corresponding to it.

99. Further, how could the 'indivisible now' flow according to diverse 'to be's (which would necessarily be indivisible), without its whole flux being composed of indivisibles? For the Philosopher proves from his intention in *Physics* 6.10.241a6-14, that the indivisible cannot be moved, because then its motion would be composed of indivisibles, because first it would go through what is less than or equal to itself before what is greater; therefore time would be a composed of indivisibles, which is against the Philosopher [*Physics* 6.9.239b8-9].

100. For this [sc. that an indivisible 'now' cannot flow according to different 'to be's] there are two reasons of the Philosopher [*Physics* 4.10.218a21-30],^a of which one is of this sort: 'those things are said to be simultaneous which are in the same indivisible etc.'^b

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio*, "which are unsolved, though they be apparently solved."

b. [*Interpolation* in place of the 'etc.'] therefore if an instant is the same according to substance, all are equally present and at once, both those now and those in the thousandth year from now (Averroes *Physics* 4 comm.92).

101. The other is because 'there are of any continuous at all two distinct terms etc.' – which reason I clarify as follows:

Because whether 'the now according to substance' is a mobile substance is only to contend about words. But whether it is other than it (namely something indivisible of the genus of quantity), I ask of which continuous thing it be the term or of which discrete thing the term – because every indivisible that is per se of the genus of quantity is either term of the continuous or part of the discrete. If it be posited part of the discrete, then time is posited discrete, which the Philosopher did not concede [n.99]; if it be posited term of the continuous, then it must be that it is one thing and another (according as it is term of different parts of the continuous), because it is impossible for 'the same thing according to substance' to be the per se term of some quantity and the beginning of the same.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, the Commentator makes this argument, *Physics* 4 comm.91: an instant is end and term of something finite; but every finite has two terms and two ends; therefore also two instants.

102. And if you say that it is term according to diverse 'to be' – since these are accident to the same 'now' according to substance (because for you it remains the same under diverse 'to be' [n.95], and consequently these are accident to it), and every indivisible of the genus of quantity is per se term of quantity (or is part of the discrete), it follows that it is not an indivisible per se in the genus of quantity, since it is not per se term.

103. Further, these 'to be', of what genus, I ask, are they? If they are indivisibles of the genus of quantity, then they are enough to be term of the continuous proper without the 'now according to substance', which is unacceptable (proof of the

consequence, because nothing indivisible is per se term because it is term of another indivisible). But if they are of another genus, namely of quality – therefore quality will be the per se idea of terminating the continuous in the genus of quantity.

104. And besides, how would the 'now according to substance' not change according to diverse 'to be'? And then it would be necessary to seek for the measure of it and of its, and so on ad infinitum.

105. Further, is the 'now according to substance' the same either in any motion at all, or precisely in one?

106. To the Philosopher [n.96] I say that he does not intend the 'now' to remain the same according to substance, but the opposite follows from his statements; but any 'single now', considered in itself, is the same, and this is said to be 'the same according to substance' – and considered in order to time past and future, since it is end of the past and beginning of the future, it is said 'to be distinguished according to being' [*Physics* 4.13.222a10-15].

107. And to make this clear there is that likeness about the movable, that it remains the same [n.95]: not indeed the movable as it absolutely precedes change (because the now is not thereby the measure of it nor pertaining to time [nn.97-98]), but the movable as it is under one change is the same according to substance – that is, according to the being of the change considered according to itself; and it is other according to 'to be', – that is, as under that change it is term of the past and beginning of the future, and according to this it is said to be in one place and another. Not indeed in act, but in one 'where' in the middle between extremes (insofar as it is term of motion according to the prior 'where' and beginning of motion according to the later 'where') – so is it said to be in different places, because 'to change' is to have something of both extremes; hence the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.4.234b17-19 maintains that, although something may be in one middle, yet it is 'other' according to each extreme.

108. But how from this will that question be solved of the Philosopher, which he moves in the *Physics* [n.96], 'whether the same 'now' according to substance remain in the whole time or not'?

I say that just as he never expressly solves the question 'whether time is', but does say some things from which his solution can be gathered [*Physics* 4.10.217b31-18a8] – so also in this one: for if any single movable thing precisely have identity according to substance (that is, to itself) and distinction according to being (that is, according to order to different parts of motion), in the same way about an instant in respect of parts of time; and there is not as much identity of an instant in the whole of time as there is of one instant; therefore an instant in the whole of time is 'one thing and another' according to substance.

109. I say then to the objection [n.95], that if any 'now' is similarly disposed to the substance of the movable as aevum to the substance of an angel, that 'now' is not other than that substance, nor is it anything indivisible of the genus of quantity; and if some 'now' of the genus of quantity be imagined to measure the movable according to substance, thus is there nothing such in an angel actually existing, as was proved before [n.91].

110. But against this [sc. the imagining of a now in the genus of quantity etc., n.109] I argue as follows:

The movable can be considered in three ways: either as it is under the terms of changes, or as it is under the middle of changes, or as it is prior to motion and change (though able to receive them). In the first way there correspond to it diverse 'nows' according to being, in the second way there corresponds to it the time in the middle between those 'nows' – therefore in the third way there will correspond to it some proper measure; but this is only the 'now according to substance'; therefore etc.

111. I reply.

If it is necessary that time differs from motion, and consequently instant from change – there is not a like reason that something be posited different from the uniform existence of the angel that would be the measure of it.^a For if time differ from motion, this is for this reason, because the parts of the same proportion of some motion are not necessarily equal in number and quantity to the parts of the same proportion of time; but no quantity is the same as another quantity unless the parts of the same proportion in it are equal to the parts of the same proportion in the other, and this equal both in number and in magnitude (and speaking of the quantity that is in motion, this it has this from the part of the magnitude or form according to which there is motion). It is possible, however, that some parts of motion, suppose ten parts integrating the whole motion, are with ten parts of time – but they are not the same as them, because with the same parts of time there could be more parts of motion equal to the prior parts of motion, or again as many: because if a double force were to move the same movable and consequently twice as quickly, no part will be in the slower motion that is not in the quicker motion (speaking of the parts that it has in the magnitude, according to the form according to which it is), because moving a movable with a quicker motion does not make it pass through some parts of the magnitude at the same time but precisely one after the other; therefore as many parts are in the quicker motion and as great (speaking of this quantity), as there are in the slower motion. But the same time (having the same parts) cannot be with this motion and with that motion; therefore those parts of time will not be the same with the parts either of this motion or of that, because not disposed in the same proportion to the whole and as equal with these parts of the whole.

a. [*Interpolation*] from the other side about time and the instant in respect of motion and change just as of their measures.

112. If this were true, from this it would be concluded that an indivisible of one quantity is not an indivisible of another quantity, but from this does not follow that in anything 'permanent according to uniform being' it would be necessary to posit something other than it, because the argument there about those magnitudes and their parts does not hold. There is therefore a fallacy of the consequent in arguing affirmatively from the minor: 'if change and motion have measures other than themselves, therefore also the substance – which is prior to motion and change – has a measure other than itself' [n.110]; for there seems to be less distinction (or non-identity) in the permanent than in flux (or in motion) and its measure.⁵²

 $^{^{52}}$ To argue from a distinction between change and its measure to an equal distinction between the permanent and its measure is to argue from a less permanent thing to a more permanent one, which is fallacious here because there is no reason to suppose that a more permanent thing should have the *same* distinctions as a less permanent one; rather it would perhaps seem to have *fewer* distinctions.

113. If however it pleases to grant some measure to the movable according to which it is in itself prior to motion and change – that measure will be the aevum, as will be plain in the question about the measure of the operations of an angel [nn.167, 171-76].

114. And if you ask for another measure of it insofar as it is in itself and insofar as it is susceptive of motion and change, I say that it is not other, because the subject according to what is in it is susceptive of its own property – and likewise, if in any way it be a measure, it is the same; hence there is not another measure of a surface insofar as it is a surface and insofar as it is susceptive of whiteness and blackness. So I say that if the substance of the first movable (or of any other) be measured by the aevum, there is not other measure of it insofar as it is prior naturally to motion and change, and insofar as it is receptive of motion and change.

115. But if you say that insofar as it is at rest it will have a measure other than the aevum, this is false, as will be clear there [nn.167, 171-76].

II. To the Negative Part of the Question

116. To the second part of the question whereby it is asked 'whether should be posited in an angel existing anything measuring his existence' [nn.84, 87], I say that 'to measure' is to certify an unknown quantity through a quantity more known; and certification can be done through a quantity existing in reality or in imagination.

117. In imagination: as if some skilled artisan, through some quantity that he has in his imagination, measures whatever quantity occurs to him.

118. But sometimes it can be done through some quantity in the real, and this in three ways:

Either by an exceeding one – and then the intellect is made certain about a lesser quantity through the approach of it to a greater quantity or departure from it. And in this way is a measure posited in the quiddities of things, and the measure is more perfect than the measured and ought to be naturally more known than it – just as whiteness is posited the measure in the genus of colors and is called the first measure of everything that is in that genus [*Metaphysics* 10.2.1053b28-34, 54a9-13].

119. In another way the known quantity is smaller and part of the greater quantity (which is more unknown) – and then the smaller quantity by its replication measures the greater whole. And in this way a lesser motion can be the measure of a greater motion, from the nature of the thing.

120. In a third way an unknown quantity is measured by some known quantity equal to it – and this by applying or superimposing it; and because that which is first measure from the nature of the thing must be more known naturally than the measured, therefore in this way is one of the equals not the measure of the other unless it will have been more known from the nature of the thing. And in this way time, if it is a quantity other than motion and more known than it, can be the measure of motion from the nature of the thing.

121. For some intellect, however, it is possible for that to be the measure which from the nature of the thing is not a measure; for example, if the length of an arm is known to someone and the length of a piece of cloth unknown, the length of the arm (because it is known) can then for him be the measure of the length of cloth,^a although from the nature of the thing neither length has greater certitude than the other.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the measuring of one thing by another by a measure more known simply or more known to us, note Averroes *Physics* 4 comm.112-114 'On Time', where he shows how time measures motion by the more known number of it, and by that part the whole.

122. Applying this then to the matter at hand, I say that in the actual existence of an angel it is not necessary to look for some intrinsic measure different from the nature of the thing measured, because – as was already proved [n.91] – nothing is different there really from the nature of the measured thing; but a measure, from the nature of the thing, is other than the measured, and it is plain that if some measure were posited in an angel, it would only be posited in him in this third way (for it is neither exceeding nor exceeded but equal [nn.118-120]). Nor too does that existence seem able to be the measure of itself, the way that in other things a quantity as distinctly known can be the measure of itself according to its own confusedly known parts; not so is it here, since this existence is indivisible, not able to contain parts confusedly in itself, since it does not have them.

123. Likewise therefore it is not necessary to posit in an existing angel anything other than his actual existence so as to be the measure of that actual existence. And if plurality is not to be posited without necessity, and here there is no necessity, plurality does not seem it must here be posited; and not only is it not necessary to posit anything absolute for measure, but also not any relation either, because it is not necessary here to posit a relation other than that which is to the efficient or conserving cause – and that is not other than the foundation (from 2 d.1 q.5 nn.260-71).

III. To the Principal Arguments

124. To the first principal argument [n.85], it is plain that the consequence is not valid about time and motion when comparing to the existence of an angel (and the reason was said before, in replying to an argument [nn.110-112]), because that which would prove a difference between motion and time [n.111] does not prove here that there is anything distinct and different from the actual existence of an angel; therefore not a measure either.

125. To the second [n.86], it is plain it is not conceded that there is anything in the actual existence of an angel that may properly be a quantity, not even an indivisible of the genus of quantity – because his sole existence seems able to be known without anything else added.

Question Three Whether there is one Aevum of all Aeviternals

126. Third I ask whether there is one aevum of all aeviternals.

127. That not:

First, because then it would be in one subject, which when destroyed or changed, all other aeviternals would change, which seems unacceptable; and likewise, with others destroyed, it would seem to be changed, because there would not be an aevum in it in respect of other things.

128. On the contrary:

There is one time of all temporal things (*Physics* 4.10.218b4-5), therefore one aevum of all aeviternals.

I. To the Question A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

129. Here it is said [by Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*. XI q.11, XII q.8] that there are as many aeva as aeviternals, such that in any aeviternal there is some proper indivisible thing, pertaining to the genus of quantity, and from many such can one number be constituted, as was recited before [n.90].

B. Rejection of the Opinion

130. But this position seems to posit plurality without necessity; therefore it seems it must be spoken against in the way it was said in the preceding question [n.123]:

Because either the aevum is called the actual existence of an aeviternal angel, and in this way there are as many aeva as there are angels.

131. Or it is called something intrinsic to something actually existent, measuring the very existence – and in this way it is nothing, as was proved in the preceding question [n.122].

132. Or the aevum is called something extrinsic, different from the actual existence of the aeviternal, which extrinsic thing, however, from the nature of it, is of a nature to measure the actual existence of the aeviternal – and then it can be posited in three ways:

Because either it can be denied that every such thing, extrinsic of the nature of itself, is of a nature to measure the existence of the aeviternal, positing all aeviternals to have an existence equally invariable, because although one existence is more perfect than another and thereby can measure it by such quidditative measuring (the way the Philosopher speaks, in *Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a9-11, that 'the first in every genus [is the measure of everything that is in that genus]'), yet for every durative mensuration – which in some way is reduced to the genus of quantity – one invariable existence does not seem to be more invariable than another, because to any at all is a succession of parts in it altogether repugnant; and then it would be said that since the aevum is posited [to be] the measure of something insofar as, enduring, it is unvaried, and since it, extrinsic, would need to be more known, from the nature of the thing, according to idea of invariability, and since there is not such a difference between the existences of aeviternals, nothing thus will be an aevum.

133. Or in another way it can be said that any superior existence is simpler than any inferior existence, and is of a nature to give certainty about the inferior existence from the nature of the thing, and to this extent any existence of a superior could be called an aevum in respect of an inferior; and then there will be as many aeva as there are aeviternals, this excepted that in the ultimate aeviternal there is no aevum, because its existence measures no other invariable existence; and similarly, the existence of the highest angel is only an aevum in respect of inferior others, because his invariable existence measures all the others, and he does not have any aevum in this way because he has no other existence above himself. 134. Or it can be said in a third way that if the aevum not be called any existence simpler than another, and of a nature to give certainty about it, but the simplest one, which of its own formal idea and in itself is the most certain and first known and of a nature to give certainty about the others – also in this way can only one be called an aevum, namely the existence of the first angel with respect to all the other aeviternal ones.

135. Now whichever of these ways [nn.130-34] be posited, at any rate there is not in any aeviternal its own aevum [n.129]; nor in the last aeviternal is there any aevum [n.133] – nor is what the first aevum is in measured by any aevum [n.133], because it has in itself nothing such (from the preceding question [nn.122-23]) – nor in another from the nature of the thing, because any other at all is less certain.

C. Instance

136. Against this [n.135]:

Because⁵³ then it would follow – if so it is [sc. if the first angel is not measured by any aevum] – that the first motion will not be measured by time, just as neither is the first aeviternal measured by the aevum; for the comparison seems similar on this side and that.

137. The consequent [sc. the first motion is not measured by time] is conceded because of this reason: because – according to the rule in *Physics* 4.12.221a26-b5 – everything that is in time 'is exceeded by time and is corrupted and wastes away in time'; and therefore the necessary and impossible are not in time. The first motion therefore (which is not corrupted in time nor exceeded by it) is not in time nor measured by time.

D. Response to the Instance

138. But this reason is not valid, because 'something's being in time is like something's being in number' [*Physics* 4.4.12.221a17-18], and it is not of the idea of a being existing in number that it be exceeded by number – rather, if the first numbered be taken (that is, an adequated one), it is equal to the number; but it is of the idea of the first numbered that part of it be exceeded by number, because the whole is greater than its part and the whole is adequated to number; therefore a part of it is exceeded by number.

139. Therefore I say about a being in time that, from the fact every such being is of necessity variable according to different being, it must be that according to something of itself – namely according to some discreteness which it has on the part of time – it be exceeded by time, because it will be disposed differently in another part of time; and therefore impossible and necessary things 'are not in time' [n.137], because there is not any difference of disposition in them so that they could be exceeded by time or be differently disposed. But the first motion, although according to the whole of itself it not be exceeded by time, yet it is exceeded by time according to any part of itself, and this suffices for it to be truly said to be measured by time; and it seems unacceptable that time, since it is a uniform measure, not have some first measured uniform thing.

140. And then to the argument [n.136]:

⁵³ Vatican editors: In place of 'Because...' Scotus put 'First, because...

I deny the consequence [sc. if the first angel is not measured by the aevum, then the first motion is not measured by time], because there is not a like reason here as there. For if the first motion is measured by time, this is because motion is either posited to be different from time (because of the reason that was set down above, from the *Physics*, n.85) or, by positing time to be the same as motion, the motion can measure itself (not indeed first, but according to the part that is known it measures the whole, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 4.12.220b32-1a4, "Time measures motion by determining a certain motion that will afterwards measure the whole motion, as a cubit [measures] length by determining some magnitude that will measure the whole"); neither reason, however, is in the matter at hand, because there is not anything in the first aeviternal other than its existence, nor is its existence a quantum so that it can measure itself according some known part of itself [n.122].

II. To the Principal Arguments

141. To the first principal argument [n.127] I say that, with the first aeviternal destroyed, it does not follow that the others change save according to a certain relation in them (to wit that then they will not be measured by the first the way they were first measured), nor is it unacceptable to posit such change in something that before had relation. Likewise, that it is inferred that 'it will be changed when the others are destroyed' [n.127], I say that it does not follow, because it did not before have a real relation to the others but only one of reason, because it is not a measure dependent on the measured thing but exceeding it; and therefore, with the others destroyed, it will not be changed absolutely, nor according to any real relation, because there was before no real relation in it to them.

142. To the argument for the opposite [n.128] it can be said that, speaking of the aevum so far as it states something extrinsic different from the measured existence of the angel [n.132], the first opinion alone denies that there is an aevum in that way [sc. one aevum for all aeviternals], but the second and third concede one aevum, although the second does not concede only one [nn.132-34]. And then if you argue that 'there is only one time for all temporals, therefore there should be only one aevum for all aeviternals' [n.128], the consequence is not valid, because not every superior motion has the idea of measure from the nature of the thing in respect of an inferior, nor does it have the conditions of a measure from the nature of the thing as any superior existence has in respect of an inferior, speaking of the invariable existences of angels; and so there is not a like reason here and there, that just as there is only one time there for all temporals, that so there be only one aevum here for all aeviternals.

Question Four Whether the Operation of an Angel is Measured by the Aevum

143. Fourth and last I ask as to this matter [n.1] whether the operation of an angel is measured by the aevum.

144. That it is not:

From the author of *On Causes* penultimate proposition [#31], "Between a thing whose substance and action is measured by time and a thing whose substance and action is measured by eternity there is an intermediate thing, whose substance is measured by eternity (or the aevum) and whose action is measured by time;" now an angel is of this sort; therefore etc.

145. Second thus: the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.7.261b22-24 says that "nothing is generated so as immediately not to be;" therefore every operation of an angel endures for a time and consequently is not precisely in an instant. But if it be in the aevum (since it is not eternal) it will be precisely in some instant; wherefore etc.

146. The opposite:

The operation of an angel is not measured by time nor by eternity, therefore by the aevum. The consequence is proved, because several measures are not posited in a space of being. The antecedent is plain about eternity; – about time it is proved, because an angel could have an operation with the motion of the heaven not existing; but with the motion of the heaven not existing there would not be time; therefore etc.

I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent 1. Exposition of the Opinion

147. Here it is said [Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*. XII q.8] that the intrinsic operation of an angel is measured by discrete time. And it is posited thus:

A measure that is of the duration of a thing is the way in which the thing is measured, and it is proportioned to the measured (as the measure of the permanent is permanent and of the flowing flowing); therefore it is necessary to find such proportion between the thoughts or operations of an angel and the measures of them. Now these thoughts are transient, because an angel does not have always altogether one intellection possible for him but many, and they flow and pass by in a certain order, so that one after another; and yet without connection, so that an angel does not have one thought after another or from another because he is not discursive; also without succession, because none of these operations is in continuous acquisition and loss, but while it is it is whole at once and indivisible. So there will correspond to them a measure having transient parts, ordered, indivisible; and such is discrete time; therefore etc.

148. This reason is confirmed by Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.22 n.43, where he maintains that 'God moves the spiritual creature through time'.

149. And if it be asked what this 'discrete time' is - it is said that it is a true 'discrete quantity', distinct in species from number and speech: for the parts indeed of number are permanent (so that if they are not permanent this is accidental), and a part of speech is necessarily not permanent and yet is not continued with another part. Therefore 'discrete time' agrees with speech in this, that its parts are not permanent, but it differs from speech, because any part of vocal speech is continuous with vocal and of consonant with consonant (and it can be in our time truly, and be measured by some part of time), although it not be continuous with another part; but no thinking of an angel can be in itself measured by time (because it is indivisible), nor can it be continuous with another.

150. But if it be asked why Aristotle did not put this 'discrete quantity' among the species of quantity, the response is that he posited the intelligences to be certain gods

[*Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a14-b1, 1074a38-b13], and therefore he did not posit any measure corresponding to such operation of them – not all at once.

151. And if it be asked how this 'discrete time' relates to our time, – it is said that the 'now' of discrete time necessarily coexists with some part of our time and consequently with all the parts that are with that instant: for if with this instant of ours an angel first have some thought, not at once in the next instant does he have another thought but in the time following does he have it, and in the last instant of the time following he can have another thought continuously with our time.

152. Added also is that this instant does not have any proportion to our instant, because the same 'now' of that discrete time can coexist with any amount of our time, greater or lesser, –according to which an angel can continue the same indivisible intellection with a greater or lesser part of our time, without any other new intellection.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

153. Against the conclusion of this position [n.147] I argue as follows:

What have a uniform mode of lasting, while they last, have a measure of the same idea in lasting, though one may remain longer than another; but the thinking of an angel, while it lasts, has the same mode of lasting as the existence of an angel, although it not have as long duration as his existence has; therefore it has a measure of the same idea as the existence does, and so his thinking is measured by the aevum and not by time.^a

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio*, "The major is plain, both because the subject includes the predicate, and because, if one intellection of an angel were to remain sempiternally like his existence, it would have a measure uniformly; but sempiternal existence is not incidental to the measure, because let it be that the angel would be annihilated tomorrow, no less would his existence now be measured by the aevum."

154. The minor is proved, because to the formal idea of the existence of an angel – according to uniformity or deformity – there corresponds a proper idea of measure, according to them [sc. the supporters of this opinion, n.147], distinguishing three modes of the measure of things in narrating them^a; and thus is plain both the major and the minor. Hence it [their view] maintains that the measure in between corresponds to that which has an indivisible duration and is yet defectible (such that it can of itself not be), and it posits that measure as the aevum. But, just as the existence of an angel is indivisible and yet defectible, so also his thinking, according to them.

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], "This doctor [Henry of Ghent] says elsewhere that there are three existences and three measures: existence that is simply independent and invariable, and it is measured by eternity; variable and dependent, by time; invariable and dependent, by the aevum."

155. If it be said that his thinking will not always be and his existence will be always, and so it is not similar as to his existence and thinking – this does not seem to be valid, because even if the angel is going to be annihilated, yet not because of this would he not be measured by the aevum while he lasts

156. If it be said that it is in his power to have this thinking or not to have it, but it is not so about his actual existence - this does not seem to be valid, because just as

potentiality for at some time not going to be does not vary the measure of the existence of an angel while he lasts, so much more will the cause by which this potentiality can be reduced to act – namely by a created or uncreated [cause] – not vary the formal idea of his existence or his duration in existing.

157. Further, second principally: everyone concedes that the beatific act of an angel is measured by the aevum, and it is plain from Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.3 n.20. But that act necessarily includes or presupposes a natural act, and this by positing an angel to have some perfection in his beatific act, although he not have power of himself for total perfection of the beatific act; but it is impossible for the aeviternal necessarily to include or presuppose something posterior to the aevum, which namely is measured by a measure posterior to the aevum; therefore that natural act, which is included in the beatific act, cannot be temporal.

158. Against the way of positing [n.47]:

For it seems to concede a great multitude of times without necessity: for it follows that any angel have his own discrete time, because one can continue his thinking with our day and another his with half day and a third with an hour – and so one angel will have twenty four instants while another has one instant; nay, it follows that in any angel there will be two discrete times, because any at all will be able to continue his intellection, not continuing his volition – and so he will have two instants of intellection and yet one instant of volition.

159. Further, according to this way, the aeva in diverse aeviternals are of different idea, if the actual existences of aeviternals are of a different idea, also be of different ideas – and in angels of diverse species it posits aeva of diverse species; therefore likewise of intellections of different species there will be 'nows of discrete time' of different species.

160. From this I argue: no one quantity is composed of several things of altogether diverse ideas, because although a six can be composed of twos and threes etc. (which however the Philosopher denies, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b7-8, because 'six things are only once six', and Avicenna *Metaphysics* 3.5, f 80va), however no quantity 'composed of parts however much of distinct ideas' can be the same quantity, because then a six could be from tens and twos and from any whatever; but, while our day will have been, an angel could understand any natural intelligibles at all distinctly, as stone, wood, iron, water, and understand anything else at all after anything else at all – and then his time would be composed from instants diverse and of diverse species, corresponding to these intelligibles of diverse species.^a He would also be able not to think these things or understand them, but many more (or as many) of other species, and consequently then his time – corresponding to this day – could be composed of many other parts, and in determinate nature positively disposed to this time; therefore it seems etc. [sc. as above: "and then his time would be composed...intelligibles of diverse species"].

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], "For number is not composed of numbers but of unities, because 'once six' etc. Let it however be so, it is certain that no number can be composed of parts altogether how much of another idea; but an angel's intellection of one object and another is of another idea in its proper genus, because intellection is specified by the object; therefore will the measuring times be diverse and of other idea."

161. Further, that is posited 'one now of that time necessarily coexists with several instants of our time' [n.151] seems to be a subterfuge, and for this reason seems to be posited, so that our time may not be conceded to be discrete; and if instants of that time were precisely to coexist with instants of our time, then it would follow that as that time is discrete so our time would be discrete – and in fleeing this, it seems to be posited without reason that one instant of that time must coexist with many parts of our time.

162. Now that this is not necessary is proved: because whatever intelligibles (few or many) I can understand in some time, an angel can understand in the same time distinctly, because in a created intellect – which cannot understand everything all at once – it seems to be a mark of perfection to be able to understand many things without any interval, for this is present more in the more talented; but the human intellect can have some intellection in some one instant and afterwards immediately have another intellect of an angel, if it understand *a* with some instant of ours, to stand fixed in the understanding of the *a* through some time and instants of the time, in any of which my intellect could have another intellection.

163. But if it be said that after an instant my intellect cannot immediately understand with another intellection, but must remain for a time in that thought, otherwise there would be no giving a first [moment] for the subsequent thought – if it be posited that 'another intellection' is indifferently measured by time and the instant, the argument [n.162] would not be conclusive; for then, just as there is not a middle between instant and time, so neither between my intellection which is in an instant and that which is in the time immediately had – and then there is no giving a first for the second intellection. But if the intellection of an angel be measured by the aevum (as will be said later [n.167]), then also can some intellection be with an instant and some with the time had (and the second has a first of its being as also the first, because the second has an indivisible measure as also does the first), but yet nothing first in our time coexists with a second intellection: and in this way is it about the intellections of an angel, because if he understand anything with our time, it is not necessary that that intellection remain through the time had; but if he at once have another intellection, it will coexist with 'the time had' in the instant which the first intellection was with - and then nothing of our time will be first coexistent with that second intellection.

164. Further, it seems that he [Henry] should say in consequence [sc. with n.147] that our intellections are measured by discrete time, because our intellections seem to be whole all at once (according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 10.6.1176a30-b6, 7.1177a12-8a8), since they are perfect and transient and disposed in a certain order.

165. And if you say (as he himself seems to say) that ours have connection, because we understand discursively, an angel not so [n.147] – on the contrary: this does not make per se a continuation or non-continuation of intellection with intellection; for cognition (or intellection) of a conclusion is not more successively acquired by this, that part is acquired after part, and cognition of the conclusion after cognition of the principle, than if the knowledge of the conclusion were had precisely after knowledge of the principle and without it. Similarly, we can have distinct intellections succeeding themselves non-discursively; and if they are whole all at once, then they will be non-continuous and in a discrete time – which is against the Philosopher *On Memory and Recollection* 1.450a7-9, because we understand along with the continuous and with time.

166. Further, what is said about the difference of number and speech and this sort of time [n.149], because 'the parts of number remain and the parts of speech can be continuous in themselves, but the parts of that time [sc. angelic time] neither remain nor are in themselves continuous, nor can be' [n.149]: all these differences seem to be material and not formally to distinguish the idea of discrete quantity insofar as it is discrete; for they are accidental to the idea of what has parts not joined to a common term, whether those parts remain together or flow, whether any in itself be indivisible or not.^a

a. [*Interpolated note*] In the *Reportatio* [IIA d.2 q.1], "To persist or not does nothing as to discrete or continuous quantity, but to be joined to the same common term or not [does]; and so because of nothing in the universe is it necessary to posit that time is composed of such discrete parts."

B. Scotus' own Solution

167. I concede the conclusion of the first two reasons [nn.153, 157], that namely the intellections of an angel are measured by the aevum – and, in brief, any existence at all actual and invariable, to which, that is, it is repugnant that according to it there be variation or flow or acquisition of part after part; nor does the perpetuity of any or the corruption or annihilation of any vary the measure formally, provided the existence is of the same idea while it lasts.

C. Objections against Scotus' Solution

168. But against this [n.167], – because then it seems that everything permanent would be measured by the aevum; for nothing is permanent whose existence does not remain the same while it remains, and this without the succession properly speaking that is the acquisition or loss of part after part.

169. The consequent seems to be unacceptable, for two reasons:

First, because according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.12.221b7-9, rest is measured by time; therefore those things that motion is of a nature to be about, when they are not in motion, are measured by time as if they were in motion.

170. Second, because generations and corruptions of all generables and corruptibles are measured by an instant of time; but whatever it is whose first 'to be' is measured by the 'now' of time, the 'to be' of it had is measured by time; therefore the 'to be' of all of these had after generation is measured by time.

D. Response to the Instances 1. To the First Instance

171. To the first of these [n.169] I say that in beings these [sc. the following five] are disposed according to a certain order:

Flux of form, form according to which there is actual flux, and form according to which there can be a flux of parts; and fourth the permanent, in which a flux of parts cannot by nature be, although it does necessarily have a subsequent form in which flux

can by nature be; fifth, that in which there cannot be flux, nor in anything consequent to it naturally.

172. The first is essentially measured by time, because permanence (or that some part of it remains the same) is against its formal idea, but its idea requires a part of it to succeed to a part of that; the fifth invariably remains the same while it lasts, and therefore in no way is measured by time (neither according to the whole of itself, nor according to a part of it, nor even per accidens); the fourth is not measured by time per se, - nor according to it is there properly rest, because it is not of a nature to be moved (it rests however per accidens, because rest is according to some form necessarily consequent to it); the third and second is the same form, although taken according to diverse disposition - and according to it taken in one way it is actually rest, and according as another way it is actually motion.

173. About this form [sc. the last mentioned] it can be said that, although it does not have actually varied being (because then there would not be rest according to it), yet it does have variable being – and therefore it is never measured by the aevum (although it is not in act varied), because the aevum requires 'being invariable' in what it measures, which is repugnant to succession of part after part; if however it be said that 'being non-varied' is measured by the aevum, then it can be conceded that this form – when according to it there is not motion in act – is measured by the aevum.

174. But this part seems less probable than the first [n.173], because it [form] actually existing seems to have the 'now' (the instant) of time for measure but not the 'now' of the aevum – which however it would be necessary to posit when positing that it, insofar as it is actually under motion, is measured by the 'now' of time and that, insofar as it is actually in rest, it is measured by the 'now' of the aevum.

175. When therefore it is inferred that 'all permanents are measured by the now of the aevum or by the aevum' [n.168], it is plain it does not follow (according to one way [sc. the first given in n.173]), but that only those that are truly permanent, namely invariable while they last.

176. And then the first rejection of the consequent, about rest [n.169], is not valid, because rest is not according to any such form, but according to that precisely according to which there naturally is motion.

177. But if someone wish to concede that heat, insofar as it has 'non-varied being' is measured by the aevum [n.173], it can be said that its resting is not measured by the aevum and yet its permanent being is measured by the aevum, because rest is only a privation of some succession of part after part, according to what the Philosopher maintains in *Physics* 5.6.229b24-25, where he treats of the contrariety of motion and rest, that 'rest is the privation of motion' – and elsewhere [*Physics* 5.2.226b15-16, 8.8.264a27-28]; but this privation presupposes the actual existence of the form in which the privation is, so that it [the privation] is not the first idea of actual existence. Although therefore this privation is thus measured by time, yet it does not follow that, because of this, the existence of such form is measured by time, but rather by some prior measure.

178. And if you say 'how can this privation, as it is distinguished from actual existence, be measured by time?' – I say that just as a vacuum, if it existed, would be measured by the same magnitude by which the plenum is measured (for if this house were a vacuum, there would be a greater distance from me to one wall than to another, just as there would by nature be a greater plenum between me and this wall than between

me and the other; for then the vacuum would be said to be as great as the body would be (if there were no vacuum) intercepted by the vacuum, and as great as the plenum would by nature be [n.218]), so in the matter at hand there is as much privation of succession in the parts of the form as there is naturally succession by motion in the same form; for this measuring is of the rest (not positively but privatively) by the motion that could then be present when this privation is present (just as in other things privation is measured by the [positive] having; for as great an evil is blindness in an eye naturally apt for seeing, at the time determined, as a good is vision). In this way, although Aristotle says that rest is measured per accidens [n.169], it can be said (in this way) that it is measured per se, in the way namely in which privation is per se measured – because this belongs to privation per se which belongs to it insofar as it is such a nature; but the fact it is this much or that much belongs to it as it is of this or that much positively.

179. Although, then, it be conceded that heat insofar as it is at rest (or the resting of heat) is measured by time, yet it is not necessary that 'the actual existence' of heat be measured by the time which naturally precedes this idea of rest; for that [the actual existence] in itself does not have a relation to time (insofar as such), either actual or aptitudinal.

180. If however it be conceded – according to that other way [n.173] – that every such form, while it lasts, has a variable existence, and an existence not only varied but also variable, to be measured by time – then it must well be posited that some permanents are not measured by the aevum, those namely according to whose forms there can be motion; yet it must well be conceded that substances generable and corruptible are per se measured by the aevum, although per accidens (that is, according to some natural quality consequent to them) are they measured by time.

2. To the Second Instance

181. And then to the second instance [n.170], which is about producibles and corruptibles:

Taking the change of these substances according as the Philosopher [*Physics* 6.5.236a5-7] speaks of it, which is indivisible, such a thing is either change or an indivisible necessarily concomitant to the indivisible that is term of motion – so that 'to change' is to be disposed differently now than before, and 'to be differently disposed' is taken for the indivisible, but 'before' is taken for the divisible. The form's first being, therefore, per se terminating the flux, is per se measured by the first instant, and to that properly the change is – but toward the first being of the form that is not per se term of the flux there is not change properly and first but as it were secondarily, insofar as the first being is concomitant to change properly said.

182. I concede therefore that the first being of generable substance, insofar as it is concomitant to change properly said, is measured by an instant; but it does not follow further that 'therefore the being had after that instant is measured by time' [n.170], because, in the first instant, that being is compared to a particular generating cause, and after that instant it does not have dependence on that particular cause but only on the first conserving cause; and then it has a uniform relation to the conserving cause – just like the being of an angel, which is conserved in perfect sameness without variability.

183. And from this it is plain to a certain argument that could be made about succession in the aevum: because 'if there is succession, therefore innovation, and consequently change' [nn.33, 37]; and further, 'change is measured by an instant of time, therefore the aeviternal is temporal' [n.37], because whatever is measured by time or an instant of time is temporal.

I reply that not every form according to which there is innovation is measured by time, but only that according to which the changeable thing was differently disposed successively than it now is indivisibly – that is, to whose term 'to which' divisibly had is presupposed the term 'from which' indivisibly had in the term, and this either according to which the motion has been measured by time, or which was necessarily concomitant to the motion measured by time.

184. Through this too it is plain that God could create something without any time – given also that creation (or annihilation) would be said to be change to this extent, that there is succession there of form after negation of it [d.1 n.294] – because it is not change in the way in which the Philosopher speaks of change [n.181], because it is not an indivisible necessarily terming the flux of its opposite either as first flowing or as necessarily concomitant to motion measured by time.

II. To the Principal Arguments

185. To the first principal argument [n.144] I say that the doctrine in *On Causes* accords with the erroneous doctrine of Avicenna [*Metaphysics* 8 chs.6-7, 9 chs.1-4 f99vb-105rb], as if that author understood the intelligences to be certain gods and their operations to be measured by the 'now' of time; not indeed that an intrinsic operation (because for this he would not posit potentiality nor succession), but an extrinsic one – about the body – was truly in a moment of time. And therefore that authority is not to be held as an authority, because it is handed on according to an erroneous root [sc. per Vatican editors: that God cannot immediately cause anything save only the first intelligence].

186. To the second [n.145] it can be conceded that the intellection of an angel is not all of a sudden but endures with some time of ours, and yet not because of this does it follow that it is in time; for what is in the aevum can endure with our time. Or it can be said that some intellection can be in an angel precisely with an instant of our time, and after that instant he can have another intellection immediately.

187. And when you say 'nature produces nothing so that it immediately not be' [n.145] – it is true that nature does not intend that which it produces 'immediately not to be'. Nor too does nature produce anything but that between generation and generation – which are in instants of continuous time – there is an intermediate time; and therefore generation and corruption cannot be continued in turn with themselves perpetually, according to Aristotle's intention there [n.145]. However, it is not unacceptable that something is not in continuous time and immediately is not, as is plain of change and the instant, which have being only suddenly and immediately are not.

III. To the Authority of Augustine adduced for the Opinion of Henry

188. To that which is adduced for the first opinion [sc. of Henry], according to Augustine (n.148, 'God moves the spiritual creature in time'), – it can be said that he takes time there for everything that can have being after non-being (as the authorities above were expounded, in the first question about the aevum [n.79]), and in this way anything at all other than God is temporal. And this can be said 'to be moved through time' that has one thing succeeding to another (as being after non-being), although what succeeds – or that to which it succeeds – is not properly temporal, because 'non-being' or 'nothing' has no measure. So must it be said in the matter at hand.

Second Part

On the Place of Angels Question One Whether an Angel is in Place

189. To the second part of this distinction, in which the Master [Lombard] treats of 'where the angels have been created', it remains to ask about the place of an angel [n.1], – and first whether an angel is in place.

190. It seems not:

Boethius, *Hebdomads*, "It is the common conception of the mind that incorporeal things are not in place."

191. Further, Augustine, 83 *Questions* q.20, seems to prove of intention that God is not in place, through this middle, "because he is not a body;" but the premise is true of an angel; therefore also the conclusion.

192. The same also says of God, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.26 n.48, that "he moves the corporeal creature through place and time, but the spiritual creature through time only;" therefore he denies of the spiritual creature motion through place, and so he denies that he is in place.

193. Further, Aristotle, *Physics* 4.4.212a20-21, says that "place is the limit of the containing body," etc. [cf. n.219]; but no body contains an angel, because the container is more actual than the contained and no body is more actual than an angel; therefore etc.

194. Further, everything in place has a site; but a site only belongs to a quantum. The point is plain because 'position' is in one way a difference of quantity, and in this way it belongs only to quantity, – in another way it is taken as it is a category, and thus it is a property founded on quantity; therefore in no way does it belong to an angel; therefore not place either.

195. Against this is:

The Master [Lombard] in the text, d.2 ch.4 n.14, and in d.37 chs.6-8 nn.345-49, - and he also adduces authorities.

196. Damascene, *On the Orthodox Faith*, chs.13, 16 [17], 20; see him there [nn.199, 215].

197. Next to this I ask – without arguments – whether an angel require a determinate place, such that he can be neither in a greater nor a lesser place but precisely in so much place; and it includes this, whether he can be at a spatial point, and whether he can be in however small a place and in however large a one.

I. To the First Question A. Opinion of Others

198. [First way of speaking] – To the first question [n.189], it is said [Aquinas, *Sent*.I d.37 q.3] that an angel is in place precisely through his operation.

199. For the proof of which Damascene is adduced [*Orthodox Faith*, ch.13]: "Where," he says, "incorporeal nature is, it also operates; it is not corporeally contained but spiritually;" and later, in the same chapter: "intelligibly is it said to be circumscribed where it also operates;" and ch.16: "they are intellectually present and operate where indeed they have been commanded to be." So that he always seems to conjoin 'to operate' with the 'to be of an angel in place' – as if that 'an angel is in place' is this, which is that 'he operates in place'.

200. Against this [sc. an angel is in place by his operation] is that it has been condemned as a certain article condemned by the bishop of Paris and excommunicated.⁵⁴

201. But if it be said that 'an excommunication does not pass beyond the sea or beyond the diocese'⁵⁵ – if however the article will have been condemned as an heretical article, it seems to have been condemned as heretical not only by the authority of the diocese but also by the authority of the lord Pope [Gregory IX],⁵⁶ *Extra* 'On Heretics' ch. 'For abolishing'.^a Or at least the opinion is suspect, because it has been solemnly condemned in a university.

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] and in canon law, d.15 last chapter, in the paragraph 'Montanus' [Gratian, p.1 d.15 ch.3 n.81] where it is said that "all heresies that bishops and their disciples have taught or written down we confess to be not only things repudiated but also things eliminated by the whole Roman Church and, along with their authors and authors' followers, eternally condemned under bond of anathema."

202. [The second way of speaking] – Others [Henry of Ghent, Richard of Middleton], not wishing to use a suspect word, namely that an angel is in place by 'operation', say that he is in place through application of it to place.

203. But these seem to hide the same thing under a different word. For 'application' does not seem it can be understood to be anything unless it be first act [sc. act of essence] or second act [sc. act of power]. Not first act, it is plain. Nor second,

⁵⁴ Vatican Editors: by Bishop Stephen Tempier on March 7, 1277. To the extent the articles condemned by Bishop Tempier touched on teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, the condemnation was revoked by Stephen de Bourret, Bishop of Paris, in 1325, so that Thomas' doctrine could be left to free discussion in the schools.

⁵⁵ Vatican Editors: William of Ockham tells of a certain Dominican doctor who claimed there was no problem his holding an opinion condemned by Bishop Tempier because the condemnation did not pass beyond the seas.

⁵⁶ *Decretals* 5.7 ch.9, "In order to abolish the depravity of the diverse heresies that have begun to burgeon in many modern parts of the world, the vigor of the Church should be stirred up... Therefore we...against the heretics... rise up by the general sanction of the present decree, and we condemn by apostolic authority every heresy (under whatever name it is held) one by one in this decree... And in general all those who have been judged heretics by the Roman Church, or by individual bishops in their dioceses, we bind with equal bond of perpetual anathema."

because if second act be understood, then it is operation: and not an immanent one (as understanding or volition), because an immanent operation as abstracts from place as does an angel's essence; therefore 'application' is an operation passing over into a body, and so it will be in place through its operation on a body in place.

B. Against the Conclusion of the Opinion

204. Against the conclusion of this opinion [n.198] it is argued:

First thus: that he who so posits contradicts himself, because in the question 'Whether God is everywhere' [Aquinas, SG 3.68] he proves that he is through this, that according to the Philosopher Physics 7.2.243a3-4 'the mover is together with the moved', and God is the first efficient and therefore able to move every movable; and from this he concludes that God is in everything and present to everything. I ask what he intends to conclude by this? Either that God is present, that is 'moving', and then it is a begging of the question because premises and conclusion are the same [sc. 'because God moves everything, therefore by motion he is present to everything']; and is nothing to the purpose, because he intends there to prove the immensity of God according to which God is present to everything. Or he intends to conclude the presence that belongs to God insofar as he is immense, and then from operation anywhere – according to him – follows the presence that pertains to divine immensity (which is God's insofar as he is God), such that God will first naturally be present insofar as immense before insofar as operating; and this is concluded from this, that he is present by operation, as prior from posterior [sc. as cause from effect]. Therefore by likeness in the matter at hand, first naturally will an angel be present to some place by essence before he is present to it by his operation [sc. contrary to the opinion in question here, which says an angel is only present in place by operation and not first by essence].

205. The reason [n.204] is confirmed, because it less seems about God that he must be present by essence where he operates than that an angel must, because what is of unlimited power seems able to act on a thing however far distant, but what is of determinate and limited power requires a determinate nearness of what is acted on to what acts on it; for there is no agent of limited and determinate power whose action cannot be impeded by too much distance to what is acted on, and so it seems more necessary to posit that an angel is present for the purpose he may act.

206. It is confirmed too, because if any action is in a body from an angel, how is this action disposed to the virtue from which it proceeds? Either mediately or immediately? If it is immediate to the power from which it proceeds, therefore the angel is immediately in such body or next to such body. If mediate, then it is from the virtue through some medium, and about this medium there will be the same question. And then it will be necessary to stop at this, that what is first from such virtue is immediate to such virtue (and consequently to him whose is such virtue), and thus will it be present there.

207. Further, second, it follows [sc. from the conclusion of the opinion, n.198] that an angel sometimes (indeed frequently) is nowhere: for nothing operates in the empyrean heaven (because that is not changeable nor movable, [Aquinas *Sentences* 2 d.2 q.2 a.2]), therefore he is nowhere in the empyrean heaven. And there he is most of all.

208. Again, if he [an angel] pass from heaven to earth, he can operate in the extreme places, doing nothing in all the intermediate places – because there can be some
angel who is not mover of any intermediate sphere; so he is then neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor in between.

209. Further: for he [an angel] is not first where he first operates. For a whole something is first proportioned to the virtue of an angel, so that he first moves the whole (and proportioned such that, according to the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 2.12.293a9-10 [Arabic version], if one star were added, he would move it with pain and labor), and yet he is not first in the whole heaven; therefore etc. [sc. an angel's place is not just where he operates].

210. If you say that he first moves some one part [Aquinas ST Ia q.52 a.2], and there he is, and by the motion of that part he moves another (as by pushing or pulling) – against this:

Although the Philosopher [Aristotle *On the Heavens* 2.2.285a27-b22; Arabic version, 2 com.13-15] imagine the 'rustic' to have his head and feet at the poles and his arms stretched or extended to East and West – yet according to truth, if the first heaven be posited movable, not resting, no point in the heaven is more East than another, but each point is East successively. Also no point there is more capable of motion than another, in truth – and so there is not in the heaven from the nature of the thing a right and left as in an animal (for the right part, which is in an animal, is more capable of the virtue of the soul than the left part). In no part, therefore, can an angel be placed first from the fact he is first moving that part.

211. There is also a confirmation of this, in that if in some part there were an angel resting, as it were, but moved per accidens (like a sailor in a ship), such that he was always being carried around by the motion, it would seem unacceptable to attribute such motion to the angel moving the sphere. Nor even can this angel be posited as per se resting, and that next to him there is part after part of the heaven as it were flowing by, and that he is always moving first the part of it more present to him; for it is impossible to assign where the angel is resting, since he is continually moving the part present to him – and to exist in something insofar as it is moved is not to be resting in it, as it seems.

212. Further, that which is for an angel the idea of existing or being in a place is in him formally – otherwise in no way will an angel be formally in a place; but a transitive operation on a body is not formally in him; therefore etc.

213. Further, that operation is commensurately in a place, per accidens; therefore if by it the angel were in a place (and in no other way), he would be there commensurately.

214. Further, Damascene – on whom they most of all rely [n.199] – is not for them:

Both because all the authorities commonly always conjoin operating with being – where there would be superfluity unless 'an angel being in a place' were formally other than 'an angel operating in a place' (for he [Damascene] says in the first authority that 'where he is at, he operates', in the second authority he says that an angel 'is said to be in a place because of his being there intelligibly and operating', and in the third that 'they are intellectually present and operate where they at any rate have been commanded to be' [n.199]).

215. Likewise, the same Damascene in ch.20 says that "the heaven is the containing of the forms of visible and invisible creatures, and below it are included the intellectual virtues of angels." So therefore (according to him) the angels are in heaven in

a way that they are included 'below the heaven'. But not thus were they confined in the beginning of their creation, because he himself [Damascene] in ch.17 seems to agree with Gregory the Theologian that they were fashioned before the bodily creature; then therefore they were not in place as now, because now they are contained in place, then they were not; and yet then they were able to understand a creature in place, according to Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.32 n.39, because they had morning knowledge before they had evening knowledge, and they were able to understand the object 'on the part of the object' under the same idea under which they now understand it. Therefore not by mere intellection of the object does Damascene posit that they are present to the object.

C. Scotus' own Solution 1. How Body is in Place

216. For solving this question, therefore, it is first necessary to see about the place of the body.

For to all body whatever, beside the ultimate one (of which there is not another outside containing it), five things belong: to be in an actual place, to be in a determinate because equal place, to be in a place commensuratively, to be in this place determinately or in that, and to be in a place naturally or violently.

217. The first four belong to body insofar as it is a 'how much' or body, the last belongs to it insofar as it is a natural body. For although no 'how much' exists unless it is a 'what sort', yet the existent is naturally a 'how much' first before a 'what sort' – and, according to this, it is first naturally a mathematical before a 'what sort', that is, of such sort as is considered by the mathematician per se and first.

218. This does the Philosopher mean in *Physics* 4.8.216a27-b8 'On the Vacuum', because he maintains that "if a cubical body is put in air or water, although it have no natural property, yet it does make as much space as the body put in," so that the space is as great as the body makes; and this does not belong to it insofar as it is only natural, but insofar as it is in itself a 'how much' precisely, and so mathematical.

a. On the First Article

219. Now expounding these [sc. the five of n.216] in order, I say that every such body (other than the first) is first in place, that is, in what precisely contains it and is immovable; for this is understood by that definition of the Philosopher *Physics* 4 'On Place' [n.193], that namely "place is the limit of the containing body, immovable, first."

220. For the divisible, according to the dimension according to which it is divisible, cannot immediately be applied to something, nor contain it; and what precisely is container of something is an indivisible in the genus of quantity, per se, outside (for nothing indivisible of the genus of quantity exists per se but in something divisible); and therefore it follows that the 'precise container' is the limit of some divisible container. And this limitedness is not of the idea of place, as neither is it of the idea precisely of

quantity – because if there could be an indivisible per se and the limit of nothing divisible, it could be a precise container.⁵⁷

221. Now place, beyond this precise containing, still has immobility (whereby it is distinguished from a vessel, according to Aristotle *Physics* 4.4.212a14-16), which immobility (unless they are diverse in diverse ways) they try, and most of all,⁵⁸ to save by respect to the poles and to the center.

222. But briefly I say that if the subject does not remain the same, no relative accident stays the same, according to the Philosopher [*Categories* 5.2b4-6]. And therefore, since it is manifest that every substance that contains this body precisely can be moved locally and not remain the same in number, it is plain that any accident (absolute and relative), which is in what contains that body, is able not to remain the same in number, and so not place either [sc. will remain the same⁵⁹], whether place is posited to be something absolute in such body or something relative.

223. And if it be said [Aquinas, Giles of Rome] that [place] is the limit of the whole universe, and although as it is the limit of the container it is varied, yet as it is the limit of the whole universe it does not vary – neither is this a solution, because [place] is not the limit of the whole universe save because [it is limit] of a part; and therefore, if it is other for one part and for another, it is not the same for the whole universe. For although in some whole there be many parts, yet what belongs to it through one part first and precisely, and afterwards through another part precisely, is not the same in number.

224. I say therefore that place has an immobility opposed altogether to local motion, and an incorruptibility according to equivalence by comparison to local motion.

225. The first is plain, because if it were in some way locally movable, however much it be taken per accidens, it could be said to be in place, and to it could different one and another place be assigned; just as, although likeness may be moved as it were accidentally per accidens, namely as it were in fifth or fourth degree (because first the body, and thereby the surface, and thereby the whiteness, and thereby the likeness), yet surface or likeness are truly in one and another place.

226. Similarly, then something at rest could be moved locally: for, what has one place after another successively is locally moved; and a fixed thing could have different containing places, if the place were moved per accidens.

227. I prove the second [n.224], because although place be corrupted when its subject is locally moved, such that, with the air locally moved, the same idea of place does not remain in it as before (as is plain from what has already been proved [n.222]), nor can the same idea of place remain in the succeeding water, because the same accident numerically cannot remain in two subjects [n.222], yet the succeeding idea of place (which is other than the preceding idea) is in truth the same as the preceding one by equivalence as far as concerns local motion, for it is as incompossible for local motion to be from this place to this place just as [it would be] if it were altogether the same place numerically. But no local motion can be from one 'where' to another 'where' unless which two 'wheres' correspond to two places different in species, because having a

 ⁵⁷ Translator: As stated in n.219, place is the limit of the surrounding body; but the limit of a body is an indivisible, as the limit of a line is an indivisible. These indivisibles do not exist per se but precisely as limits of something else.
⁵⁸ The words "they try, ...of all" are not in the body of the text but are added in the notes by the editors from one the ms. They seem nevertheless necessary to make some sense of the Latin, which even so remains puzzling.

⁵⁹ Added by the Vatican editors.

different respect – not only in number but also in species – to the whole universe; from this do those respects, which are only different in number, seem to be numerically one, because they are as indistinct with respect to local motion as if they were only one respect.

228. An example of this is in some way plain in names signified, because this vocal sound 'man', however often uttered, is called one vocal sound in number, and it differs numerically from this vocal sound 'stone'; since however the numerically same vocal sound cannot be uttered twice (so that there are as many utterings as there are vocal sounds distinct in number), also this vocal sound 'man' and this vocal sound 'stone' are not only in number but also in species distinct – yet because to express the end of vocal sound (namely the concept) 'man' and 'stone' are by equivalence the same in number, however often uttered, therefore they are said to be one vocal sound in number with respect to that end.

229. Thus I say in the matter at hand that place is immovable per se and per accidens locally – however it is corruptible when the subject is moved locally, because then that idea of place does not remain in it; and yet it is not corruptible in itself and by equivalence, because necessarily there succeeds to that body, in which was that idea of place, another body, in which is another idea of place numerically from the preceding one, yet the same as the preceding one according to equivalence in comparison to local motion.

230. But is not all body – different from the first body – necessarily in a place because [it is] a quantum?

Aristotle would say that it is, because he would say there cannot be 'another body than the celestial body' in the sphere of the actives and passives [sc. the elements of earth, water, air, fire, in the sublunary sphere] unless he were to say it was necessarily contained under something precisely containing it.

231. The opposite however seems to be true according to Catholics, because God could make a stone while any other locating body does not exist – or separately existing from every other body, because he could make it outside the universe; and in both ways it would not be in place, and yet it would be the same according to everything absolute in itself. By nothing absolute therefore in anything else does it require necessarily to be in place, but it only has necessarily a passive potency whereby it could be in place; and this with place posited in actual existence, and with the presence of it posited in respect of some other body placing it.

b. On the Remaining Articles

232. About the second article [n.216] I say that – on the supposition of the first – a body quantum is in place in act, because in what precisely contains it actually; for it cannot be in place without the ultimate limit (which is the proximate container) making it actual, because it sets the sides of the containing body apart. But it is otherwise about a part in the whole, which does not make actual the surface in potency containing it; and so it is not a part in the whole as if placed in a place (*Physics* 4.5.212b3-6).

233. About the third [n.216] I say that – because of same quantity – a body necessarily co-requires a place equal to itself.

And because of this a body is in place commensuratively [n.216], so that a part of the contained surface corresponds to a part of the containing surface, and whole to whole.

234. The fifth [n.216] belongs to a body from a determinate place placing it.

235. The sixth, insofar as it is a natural body, belongs to it from this, namely that – insofar as it has a determinate substantial form and determinate qualities – it is of a nature to be preserved and saved by some locater, and by some to be corrupted: and when it is contained by the limit of that which is of a nature to save it, it is said to be in its natural place, though that naturality is very accidental to the idea of place; to this extent therefore it is in its natural place because it is in what naturally locates it, that is, in the ultimate of something containing it which is of a nature to save what is contained [cf. Aristotle *De Caelo*, 1.8.276a22-27, Arabic/Latin translation].

2. How an Angel is in Place

236. Applying these therefore to the matter at hand about the angel, I say [cf. n.219] that an angel is not necessarily in place, because much more could he come to be without creation of the corporeal creature or, with the corporeal creature made, could come to be and be outside every corporeal creature. And yet in an angel there is a passive potency by which he can be in a place; and the potency is either founded immediately in his substance, or in it insofar as it is a limited nature actually existent, or in something extrinsic to the angel (whatever that be). And therefore it is not necessary to ask for any intrinsic reason for an angel's being in place necessarily, because none is there – but there is only in him a passive potentiality whereby he can be in a place, because it is not repugnant to him.

237. So, on the supposition of this first point [n.236], it is not necessary that he [an angel] be in a place in act, because it is not necessary that he be in some indivisible container actually existing; for he does not make the sides of the container to stand apart, and so he does not make the containing surface to be in act.

238. But about the third [n.216] there is a doubt, and about this is a second question moved [n.197]. It is yet conceded that he cannot be in a place however large, because this is proper to God. And from this it seems that he cannot be in a place however small, from Euclid I prop. 35, for Euclid maintains there – seek for him there ["parallelograms put on the same base and on the same parallel lines are equal to each other"].

239. From this I argue as follows: whatever can be in one equal can be in another, if any fashioning according to which one is distinguished from the other is not repugnant to it; but in an angel no fashioning of the place, which he is in, is repugnant to him; therefore if he can be in one equal, also in another, – and consequently if he can be in a little square and it is not repugnant to him to be in a square however tight (which it is necessary to say in saying it is not repugnant to him to be in any sized place at all), it seems that it is not repugnant to him to be in a place however long, because a quadrangle is equal to the little square that he can be in.

240. This is made clear by the opposite in natural bodies. For water, which can be in a square, cannot for this reason be in a quadrangle however long, because it cannot be in a place however narrow; and therefore it cannot be stretched however much in extent; for it cannot be stretched in length unless it be constricted in width, and if it cannot be

constricted to infinity in width, it cannot be stretched to infinity in length. The opposite holds in the matter at hand; for if an angel does not determine however much smaller a place, because then he will be able to be in a place however much narrow and narrower, therefore etc.

241. Further, if some quantity of virtue in an angel according to which he can be in some place proportionally according to the utmost of his power (namely this angel so much and that angel so much), yet he could according to the utmost of his power make himself in this however much lesser [place] adequate to him (and this 'could' is of some active power in him, because it is in his power that he can use it, or not, for an effect adequate to him) – therefore being more able to have this quantity in his power is more perfect, because he has a greater active power: and thus he is able to use this active virtue to infinity, for causing or being in a smaller and smaller place than is the place adequate to him; therefore he has an infinite power. The consequent is unacceptable, therefore also the antecedent; just as therefore, if he could be to infinity in a greater and greater place, the infinity of his power would be inferred, so will the infinity of his power be inferred if he could be in a smaller and smaller place always to infinity.

242. Whether however he could be at a point or not [n.197], – there seems no necessary reason for one side or the other; because although he is indivisible yet he does not have a limited indivisibility as a point does, and so he need not be at a point as in a place; nor perhaps is it repugnant for him to be in a point as in a place, because nothing unacceptable seems to follow from this – because if from this be inferred that he could not be moved locally unless space were of points, it does not follow (for he could immediately from a punctal place put himself into a continuum, of which continuum a point is the term).

243. About this article [sc. the third, n.233] it seems it must be conceded that he has a determinate place, indeterminately however. In this way there is both some [place] than which he could not have a greater, and some than which he could have a smaller (speaking of continuous place), although perhaps he could be at a point.

244. But whether he require a determinate place and determinately, such that having a power so great, if he is present to a place he is of necessity present to a place so great, nor is it in his power that he be present to a larger or smaller place (just as in bodies, because any at all is necessarily in a place equal to it; the intellective soul too is necessarily in the place of the whole animate body, such that it is not in its power to be in a place larger or smaller than that) - this is doubtful, because it does not seem one part nor the other can be proved easily, necessarily. For what is unacceptable if his quantity of power (by which he can be present to any place) be the natural reason for his being in so much place in his own way, just as the quantity of a natural body is the reason for the body's being in a place in its own way (such that, although it be in my power to be in this place or in that, yet it is not in my power to be in this much place or in that much, because this effect is naturally consequent to a quantity that is not subject to my power, and just as neither in itself so neither as to this effect, namely to be in this much place or in that much)? Nothing therefore seems to follow unacceptable if it be thus posited in angels. Or if it be posited that their quantity have some place adequate than which it could not have a greater, although however it be under the angel's will that it be able not always to have that place but a larger or a smaller, nothing unacceptable follows.

245. About the fourth [sc. being in a place commensurately, n.233], it is plain that he is not in place commensurately, because he does not have part and part with a part of place.

246. About the fifth [sc. being determinately in this place or some other, n.234] I say that he is in this place or in that, because he is not everywhere. And the reason for this needs to be looked for.

I say that although something could be in itself in passive potency to some physical genus and not determinately in potency to some species of that genus, yet by the same thing is it reduced to act of genus and species: just as, though a surface (whence it is surface) be of itself determined to a color and not be of itself determined to whiteness or blackness, yet by the same agent is it reduced to act of color and of color of this sort, because it is not colored save because it is colored thus. So I say here that although an angel be in potency to a 'where' in general and is not of himself determined to this 'where' or that, yet by the same agent is he reduced to this, that he actually be in a place, and the agent producing him to be present in this place or in that where first he is in place above the [place] containing the corporeal creature; but from then he can reduce himself to this act, as will be plain in the question about the motion of an angel [n.444].

247. About the sixth [sc. being in place naturally or violently, n.235], I say that he is not in any place naturally, because then he would be in another place violently; then too some body would have a natural disposition to conserving him in place, and another body to corrupting him.

248. And the reason is confirmed through Avicenna, *Metaphysics* 9.2 f.102va, where he maintains that the motion of the heaven is not natural ("because then it would terminate at natural rest, and motion from that rest would be violent" – and so would it be in the matter at hand), and this when taking naturality properly, just as that is said to be moved naturally which is naturally inclined to motion.

249. And in this sixth [n.247] it is plain that this passive potency (which is in an angel for being in place) is not natural nor violent but neither – because neither is this passive thing inclined of itself naturally to this form, nor to the opposite, but is in neither way disposed to them, just as a surface is indifferently disposed to whiteness or blackness.

D. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments [nn.190-194].

All the authorities that deny an angel is in place [nn.190-192] need exposition, that they are saying the truth by saying he [the angel] is not in place circumscriptively. Now circumscription involves being in place 'in act, in the equal, and commensurately' (namely, according to the second, third, and fourth condition of place [nn.237, 243, 245]), which do not belong to an angel.

251. To that of the Philosopher [n.193] it can be conceded that some surface of a body contains the angel; not however on this does it follow that it be acting or influencing or containing in respect of him, because the containing of place is of a different idea from the containing of form or the containing of species. For this is nothing other save that the contained is under this containing surface and there is nothing outside – and this is true in

whatever is contained definitively, because there is nothing of it outside the place going round it.

252. To that about site [n.194], whether as it is taken for a difference of quantity or as it is a category: if that category presuppose quantity, in neither way is the major true [sc. 'everything in place has a site'], because it is not necessary that 'every being in place' has a site in one or other of these ways, unless it is in place circumscriptively.

II. To the Second Question

253. To the second question [n.197], it is plain from what was said in the third article, namely about determinate place [nn.238-244].

Question Three Whether an Angel could be in Two Places at Once

254. Seventh [sc. seventh from the beginning of d.2, but third from the second part of d.2] I ask whether an angel could be at once in two places.

255. That not:

Because then he would be distant from himself as place is distant from place. The proof of the consequence is from the opposite of the consequent [sc. 'if an angel were not thus distant from himself, then place and place would not be distant from themselves'], because things that are simultaneous with some third thing are simultaneous with themselves.

256. Secondly as follows: an angel is a nature altogether limited, therefore according to whatever that can be present in him – therefore also according to place; therefore he cannot be at the same time in several places.

257. Thirdly thus: two 'wheres' are formally contraries, because between them there can be local distance, and motion is between contraries or from contrary to in the middle; and in the preceding question it was said that all distinct 'wheres' differ in species [n.227] – and what differ in species under the same genus are contraries, and contraries cannot be present together in the same thing (because they are maximally distant), just as not contradictories either; therefore etc.

258. Fourth thus: because if so, then he could be at the same time at rest and in motion, because at rest according to one 'where' and in motion according to another 'where'; but to be at rest and to be in motion imply to be at rest and not to be at rest, which are contradictories and incapable of being at the same time in the same thing; therefore etc.

259. Fifth thus: because either he could at the same time be moved to the two 'wheres', or moved from one 'where' to the other and yet remain in the first 'where' and acquire the second along with it. And not in the first way, because two motions of the same species cannot be present in the same thing (*Physics* 3.3.202a34-36); nor much more two contrary motions. Nor in the second way, because the terms of motion are incompossible; and therefore a movable in acquiring the term 'to which' necessarily loses the term 'from which'. Therefore etc.

260. On the contrary:

He can be in some whole place, suppose of a foot; let him therefore put himself at the extremes of this place without displaying himself present to the middle (because he is not there as a form, nor in any way in which he may seem necessarily to display his presence to the whole); therefore he will be in two non-continuous places.

261. Further: a body can be in two places at once, therefore much more a spirit; the antecedent will be made clear in *Ord*.IV [d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24], in the material about the Eucharist; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

262. On this question Damascene (*Orthodox Faith*) ch.13 says that in fact he [an angel] is not at the same time in two places, because – according to him – "when they are in heaven, they are not on earth," nor conversely. And this *de facto*.

263. However about their natural possibility, it seems probable that one [angel] cannot be at once in two places each of which is adequate to him according to the utmost of his power; to wit, if according to the utmost of his power he could be in a place of one mile, he could not by his own virtue be in two such places, because then this place does not seem to be adequate to him according to his natural virtue.

264. But whether he could be in two discontinuous places, neither one nor the other according to the utmost of his power is adequate to him, is dubious, nor does there appear a necessary reason for or against.

But that he could be in two places (whether adequate or not) by divine power I reckon certain, because it includes no contradiction, as will be said in *Ord*. IV [d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.11-24] in the material about the Eucharist.

II. To the Principal Arguments

265. And therefore to the arguments for the first part [nn.255-59], which seem to prove not only an impossibility about the natural power of an angel but also an impossibility simply (because a contradiction), reply must be made:

And first to the first [n.255], that it does not follow. So not conversely either, when that third thing (to which the extremes are compared) is unlimited according to this according to which the extremes are compared to it – as is plain about the soul in the right hand and the left, which soul is not distant from itself, and yet hand is distant from hand; thus God is not distant from himself, and yet those things are distant from themselves that are with him here and in Rome. But whatever is posited the same in two 'wheres', by whatever power it is in them, is in some way thus unlimited with respect to them, and so neither consequence is valid.

266. To the second [n.256] I say that of himself he is limited both as to nature and as to natural properties; but as to an accidental property or respect (of the sort that 'where' states, or at least it is not without a respect), it is not necessary that he be limited altogether (so that it be incompossible for him to have two such ['wheres']), although perhaps he is limited by natural power to one adequately.

267. To the third argument [n.257], look for it [sc. Ord. IV d.10 p.1 q.2 n.25].

268. To the fourth argument [n.258] I say that just as 'to be moved' is to be disposed differently now than before, so 'to be at rest' is to be disposed now as before;

but it is not unacceptable with respect to one 'where' that something is disposed now as before and with respect to another disposed differently than before – and so it is not unacceptable that it could be at rest here and in motion there. And from this I concede absolutely that it at the same time rests and moves – because affirmative predicates simply taken follow from themselves taken with a non-diminishing determination.

269. And when is inferred further, 'therefore it rests and does not rest' [n.258], there is here a mistaking of the question and a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect: for 'to be at rest' does not entail 'not to move' absolutely, but entails 'not to move' only with that determination with which 'to be at rest' was taken insofar as it was antecedent to being at rest simply; and therefore it only follows here that this one is moved in this 'where' and not moved in that 'where', which are not contradictories.

An example of this is: this is double a and half b, therefore it is double and half. But it does not further follow 'therefore it is double and not double'; for it does not follow from the first antecedents save with this determination, that it is double a and not double b – and from these it does not further follow 'therefore it is double and not double', but there is a mistaking there of the question. So that in all such cases where the predicates are contracted [sc. taken with a qualification], they imply affirmatives in which the same predicates simply are included; but they do not imply negatives in which the predicates are included simply to belong to the subjects, for the causes stated.

270. To the last [n.259] I say that in each way it is possible.

271. And when the first way is rejected, I say that there is no incompossibility of motions save because of the incompossibility of the forms according to which they are motions; and therefore, if two 'wheres' are not formally incompossible (neither as to be in motion nor as to be in flux), neither will two motions to two 'wheres' in the same thing at the same time be incompossible. But the statement of the Philosopher in *Physics* 3 [n.259] is true of motions according to incompossible forms, of which sort perhaps are absolute forms (but not of the same species), and of this elsewhere [*Ord.* IV d.10 p.1 q.2 nn.13-17, 19].

272. And when the second way is rejected, I say that just as generation and corruption are two distinct motions and have proper distinct terms, though they frequently concur (and then there are four terms: two namely 'from which' – one privation and one form; and two terms 'to which' – one similarly privation and one form), so there is in motions a departing from the term 'from which' and an approaching to the term 'to which'; and yet just as without contradiction can generation be without corruption or conversely, because they are not the same change – thus can there be motion or change insofar as there is an approaching to the term 'to which' without any motion which is a departing from the term 'from which'. And then: 'the terms of the motions are incompossible' [n.259] is true of the proximate terms of the same motion, but it is not true of terms that can be of any different motions whatever.

Question Four Whether two Angels can be in the Same Place at Once

273. Eighth I ask whether two angels can be in the same place at once. 274. That not:

Because [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.52 a.3] two total causes cannot be together in respect of the same effect; but an angel, existing in a place, is a total cause with respect to operation in such place, because of which he is said to be there; therefore another angel cannot be there with him, because of the other operation there exercised.

275. Another reason is posited by others [Richard of Middleton, *Sent.* I d.37 princ.2 q.4]: because things that have the same mode of being 'in' cannot be together. Which is made clear about two glorious bodies, which cannot naturally be together in the same place, although a glorious body could be together with a non-glorious body. So about two Gods: if they were equal, neither could be with the other (according to Damascene ch.5), and yet God can be together with a creature because of the different way of their being in place. Since, therefore, angels have the same mode of being in a place, they cannot be together in the same place.

II. To the Question

276. In this question the truth is not as certain and clear *de facto* as in the preceding question [n.262], because Richard [of Saint Victor] *On the Trinity* 4.25 seems to argue that demons do not have bodies by this, that a legion was in the body of one possessed (*Mark* 5.1-17): now a legion could not have been in someone if they had had bodies. Therefore he seems to argue that, if they had had bodies with them, their bodies would have been together in the same place; therefore now, when they do not have bodies, it seems it must be said that they were together without bodies.

277. If too one angel moving the heaven is in the south and another good angel, sent by God from heaven to earth, must transit through that place, there seems no necessity that he not pass through as if in a straight line or that the other yield to him.

278. If tool all the angels had been created before the corporeal creation (as seems true according to Damascene ch.17 [n.215]), it does not seem easy to assign how then they would have been together – and if they had not then been together, not now either.

279. Whatever may be about the fact and the possible natural power of them, yet about the possible in respect of divine power it does not seem impossible but that thereby they could be together.

II. To the Principal Arguments

280. And then to the arguments, after they seem to prove the opposite, must reply be made.

To the first [n.274] I say that it presupposes something false, namely that an angel is not in a place save by operation – which was rejected in the first question of this matter [nn.204-215]. If also that supposition were admitted, one angel could operate about it with one operation and another with another operation, and each according to them could be put by his operation in the place (namely of that body) where he operates and so be together, which is the opposite of the conclusion of the argument.

281. And if you say that they could not operate save by moving bodily – neither does this help, because just as an angel moves freely, so he can move according to the utmost of his power, or below the utmost; and if he move something below the utmost of his power, the other angel could move the movable thing with him (as is apparent about a

man who, being able according to the utmost of his power to carry ten stones, can below the utmost of his power carry five, so that his active power not have an act save about the five – and then he can have a cooperating other carrying the same), since an angel is a substance acting freely.

282. To the second [n.275] I say that the major [sc. 'things that have the same mode of being 'in' cannot be together'], which is famous in many matters, is not reasonable. For to be 'in' states no essential relation necessarily to that in which it is, but to be 'by' [or from]' does state an essential relation to that by which it is. What reasonableness [is there] then, that several things can be *by* the same and in the same way and that several things cannot be *in* the same and in the same way of being *in*? For why is a respect accidental in species of one idea more repugnant than the dependence of an essential respect? Similarly, temporal things have the same respect to time as things in place to place; therefore it seems to follow from this that several temporal things are not in the same time, which seems absurd.

283. And as to that which is adduced about two glorious bodies and about two Gods if they were together [n.275] – if this is true, it is necessary to prove it from elsewhere than from the idea of that which is 'to be in a place in the same way of being', because from this there does not seem to be any repugnance of simultaneity.

Question Five

Whether an Angel can be moved from Place to Place by Continuous Motion

284. Ninth I ask whether an angel can be moved from place to place by continuous motion.

285. I prove that not:

Because "motion is the act of a being in potency according as it is such," from *Physics* 3.1.201a9-11; but a 'where' or place is not an angel's act or perfection, because every perfection seems to be nobler than the perfectible in some way, not so however a 'where' in respect of angelic nature.

286. Secondly, it is argued that he cannot move with continuous motion:

And first I prove in general [vs. in particular: nn.301-308] that nothing successive is continuous, and this in double way: first I prove it from this, that everything such is composed of indivisibles, – second, because it is composed of minima.

287. The first consequence Aristotle proves, *Physics* 6.1.231a24-28, because "an indivisible cannot be continuous with an indivisible, since it does not have an ultimate."

288. The antecedent, namely that 'the successive is composed of indivisibles', I prove in two ways:

First because the successive is divided into indivisibles; therefore it is composed of them. – Proof of this antecedent: it is possible for it to be divided into all that into which it is divisible (the subject of this proposition seems to include the predicate), and from this it seems further that it can be divided into everything into which it is possible for it to be divided (this consequence is proved by that [remark] of *Physics* 6.6.237b19-20 that "what is impossible to come to be is impossible to have come to be;" and in *Metaphysics* 3.4.999b11 and *On Generation* 2.11.337b14-25 Aristotle says the same); further, let this about the possible be posited in being, and it follows 'therefore it is

actually divided into everything into which it is possible for it to be divided', and from this follows that it is divided into indivisibles (because if not, it would not be divided in everything in which it could be divided, since it could still be further divided into the parts of those divisibles).

289. Second I prove the same [sc. the successive is composed of indivisibles] because nothing successive is actual unless indivisible – because if something of it were divisible it would at the same time be successive and non-successive, or successive and permanent. With that then not existing in act but passing by suddenly, I ask what succeeds to it? If something indivisible succeeds to it in the continuous, the thing proposed is got, that the indivisible is immediate to the indivisible, and so the continuum will be composed of indivisibles. If no other indivisible, therefore then it will not be, for the indivisible of it is not; and as was argued, 'it is not unless because some indivisible of it is', therefore etc.

290. The second way [n.286] is because it is composed of minima; therefore it is not continuous.

291. The consequence is proved, because the minimum simply (than which, namely, there is not anything less than it) does not have a part from which it is, because then that would be lesser than it; therefore it is altogether a non-quantum, because every quantum has a part smaller than itself. But a non-quantum cannot be continuous with a quantum; therefore the minimum cannot be continuous.

292. The antecedent [sc. the successive is composed of minima] is proved both by authorities and by reason:

First by the authority of the Philosopher *Physics* 1.4.187b35-188a2, where his reasonings seem they want – against Anaxagoras – to rest on this principle, that it is possible to take a natural minimum, as minimum flesh or minimum fire; but according to him *Physics* 6.1.231b18-29, "it is of the same idea that motion and magnitude and time are composed or are from indivisibles and divided into them;" therefore it will be necessary to posit a minimum motion and minimum time, just as a minimum permanent.

293. The same appears from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.4.416a16-17, where he maintains that "of all things existent by nature there is a determinate idea of magnitude and of increase;" now there are not permanent naturals only but also successive ones; therefore they have determinate smallness and greatness.

294. The same is also plain from Aristotle *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.445b3-11 in the first doubt, where he seems to maintain that 'natural properties are not divisible infinitely'; and this he seems to prove because 'then the sense could be intensified infinitely', because,⁶⁰ for perceiving an indivisible minimum, a sense acuter ad infinitum is required.

295. A reason for proving this [n.292, sc. that the successive is composed of minima] is from this, that it is possible to give a first part of motion; therefore also a minimal part.

296. This consequence is plain, because if anything whatever has a part smaller than itself, it would have also a 'something of itself' prior to something of itself ad infinitum.

⁶⁰ The Vatican editors put this 'because' in place of the ms. 'therefore'. But 'therefore' does not seem impossible or out of place in context.

297. This antecedent about firstness (namely that 'it is possible to grant a first part of motion' [n.295]) is plain in two authorities from Aristotle, *Physics* 1.3.186a10-16, 8.3.253b23-26, where the Philosopher says that: "if what is altered is divisible ad infinitum, not for this reason is alteration also divisible ad infinitum, but many times it is quick," where the Commentator [Averroes, *Physics* 8 com.23] has "sudden" and gives this exposition, "that is, it happens in an instant, not in time." And he quasi-objects against him [sc. Aristotle], because "this seems to conflict with what is said in *Physics* 6.6.236b32-7b22, that before every being moved there precedes a having moved, and before a having been moved a moving;" and he responds by giving a solution, that "that [*Physics* 1.3, 8.3] is understood here about motion insofar as it is generated or brought forth into act."

298. For this purpose Aristotle seems there [sc. in *Physics* 8.3] to have premised a certain example about drops of water, that "it is not necessary, if many drops take away some part of a stone by penetrating the stone, that also any drop whatever take away something, and that always part is removed before part, but sometimes the whole is taken away at once." When therefore he says "so many drops take from the stone so much in some time, and a part of them takes away so much in no time" (and he gives an example, "just as many men pull a ship," but none will pull the ship by himself, not even in any time⁶¹), he seems to intimate that after a number of drops eventually a whole part of the stone will be taken away at once. And so it is in alteration, that not always does part follow part, but sometimes the whole alteration at once.

299. This seems more expressly in the second puzzle of *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.446b28-7a6, where he maintains that "it is not necessary that it be in like manner in alteration and transference; for it happens that something is altered whole at once and not half first, as when water freezes whole at once – if however there has been much that heats and freezes, what is had comes to be or undergoes from what is had; but it is necessary that first it is changed by the causer and at the same time altered and at once."

300. Again, it [n.297] is proved by reason – because between contradictories there is no middle; therefore, between the not-being of the form to be induced through motion and the being of it, there is not a middle (and the not-being of it was in the ultimate instant of the preceding form, therefore between that instant and that which measures the being of the succeeding form there is no middle). But if there were no first between the being of the form to be induced through motion and the non-being of it, that 'first' would be indivisible. And from this proved firstness it is concluded that that 'first' is a minimal part; for that 'first' cannot be indivisible, because the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.5.236a7-b18 shows that it is not possible to take a first change in motion [n.297].

301. Third principally [n.286] I argue thus, that an angel cannot move [sc. with continuous local motion] because he is indivisible.

302. For Aristotle proves, in *Physics* 6.4.234b10-20, 10.140b8-31, that no indivisible can move (and this from intention, and the reason that he gives in ch.4 he repeats in the last chapter [ch.10]), because everything that moves is partly in the term 'from which' and partly in the term 'to which': for when it is totally in the term 'from which' it is not moving but at rest – when it is totally in the term 'to which' then it has

⁶¹ Strictly the Latin says 'even in no time', of which the sense in context must be 'there is no time in which it will do it' and not 'it will do it in no time', i.e. instantly.

totally moved. Therefore, when an indivisible [as an angel] moves it cannot be partly in the term 'from which' and partly in the term 'to which', because it does not have part and part; wherefore etc.

303. His second reason is (in the last chapter [ch.10]), because everything that moves passes first through a space equal to itself or less before a greater; but an indivisible cannot first pass through a space less than itself; therefore it passes first through a space equal to itself before a greater than itself. But, in passing always through a space equal to itself, it will pass through the whole continuum over which it moves; therefore it would be composed of indivisibles equal to the indivisible moved. The consequent seems false, therefore the antecedent too.

304. His third reason seems to be because every motion is in time (as he proved before in *Physics* 6.10.241a15-23); and it is possible to take in any time a lesser time, in which lesser time a lesser movable can move; so for every movable it is possible for a lesser movable to be taken ad infinitum; and so an indivisible movable.

305. Fourth, that he [an angel] cannot continuously move through place because he does not have resistance.

306. Because, as the Commentator [Averroes] says on *Physics* 4 com.71, ch. 'On the Vacuum', succession in motion is from the resistance of the movable to the mover, or of the medium to the movable, or of the medium to the mover; but none of these resistances exist in the matter at hand, for an angel is not resistant to a medium, nor to himself as mover. And the reason is confirmed, because according to him a heavy object in a vacuum would move in non-time, because no resistance would be there that could cause succession in motion; and no more is an angel resistant to himself or to the medium than the heavy to the vacuum (or the vacuum to the heavy), if it be posited; therefore etc.

307. Again, by the Philosopher's reason. For there [*Physics* 4.8.215a24-b21] he argues thus: what the proportion is of medium to medium in rareness and density, the same is the proportion of motion to motion in quickness and slowness; but there is no proportion of vacuum to plenum in rareness and density; therefore neither of motion to motion in quickness and slowness. But of every possible motion to every possible motion there can be some proportion in quickness; therefore no motion is possible in a vacuum, but some is possible in a plenum. – In the same way he himself [Aristotle] argues on the part of the medium, so can it be argued in the matter at hand; for (ceteris paribus) what the proportion of movable to movable is in quickness, the same is the proportion of angel to body in rareness; therefore etc. (as in his [Aristotle's] own reason).⁶²

308. Another reason of his is there: because if motion happen in a vacuum, let it be taken that some other full rare body exceeds [a rare plenum] in as great proportion as the time of motion of a vacuum is quicker than the time of motion of a plenum; motion through that full rarer medium will be in an equal time with the time of motion in a vacuum – which he [Aristotle] holds for impossible. – So can it be argued in the matter at hand on the part of movables: for if an angel moves however much more quickly than a body, let some other body be taken rarer relative to that given body in a proportion as great as that in which the time of motion of an angel is less than the time of motion of the

⁶² The Vatican editors helpfully supply this reasoning of Aristotle's as follows: 'therefore neither of motion of an angel to motion of a body in velocity; but of every possible motion to every possible motion there can be some proportion in velocity; therefore no motion is possible for an angel but some is possible for a body'.

given body – that body, rarer in such proportion, will be moved in equal time with the angel.

309. To the opposite seems to be Damascene chs.13, 17, where he maintains that they [angels] are not at once in heaven and on earth [n.262]; and frequently they are sent to earth, which appears from Scripture [nn.312-313].

I. To the Question

310. To the question [n.284] I say that yes – because everything receptive of forms of some genus which is not of itself determined to any one of them, nor is unlimited, can be moved or changed from one of these forms to another (this proposition is per se plain, because the subject includes the predicate); but an angel is receptive of some 'where' definitively and not circumscriptively (as is plain above, in the first question about the location of an angel [nn.245-246]), – nor is he unlimited to all of them, because he is not immense; therefore he can be continually moved from one 'where' to another 'where'. And that continually is plain – because between two 'wheres' there are infinite intermediate 'wheres' (which is proved from the continuous movement of a body through all those 'wheres'); but through all of them an angel can pass such that he is in none of those 'wheres' save indivisibly – and consequently he cannot pass through them all unless he move continually.

311. This is also confirmed, a blessed soul will be equal to an angel, according to the promise of the Savior in *Matthew* 22.30; but a blessed soul – rather the most blessed soul – which is Christ's moved locally, because it descended into hell, as an article of faith says [sc. in the Creeds].

312. It is plain too from the Scriptures that angels are sent sometimes in an assumed body [e.g., from Vatican editors: *Genesis* 19.1-22, *Numbers* 22.22-35, *Judges* 6.11-22, 13.3-21, *Tobit* 5.5-12, 22, *Matthew* 18.2-7, *Luke* 1.11-20, 26-38, 2.9-15, *Acts* 12.7-10]; and if then they moved with the body, it seems that then there was some passive motion of them, different formally from the passive motion of the body, because they were not formally anything of the body.

313. Likewise it is credible that they are frequently sent without a body, as of the one sent to Joseph about the conception of the Blessed Virgin [*Matthew* 1.20-21, also 2.12-13, 19-20].

II. To the Principal Arguments A. To the First Argument

314. To the arguments of the question [nn.285-308].

To the first [n.285] I say that it is not unacceptable that every creature, however perfect it be (provided however that it not in essence have all perfection), is capable or potential with respect to any perfection, although that perfection be lesser than its nature, – just as an angel has intellection, which is a perfection of his intellective [power], and yet intellection is simply more ignoble than angelic nature; and thus can it be conceded about 'where' or corporeal presence with an angel [sc. that it is some perfection or act of an angel], just as any 'act' (though in a far other way) is called the nature in which it is.

B. To the Second Argument

315. To the second [n.286] I deny what is assumed, namely 'no successive is continuous'.

1. Rejection of the First Antecedent

316. The antecedent of it (which is assumed for its proof), namely that 'it is composed of indivisibles', I deny. And I prove the falsity of it from the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.2.233b19-32 about sesquialterate proportion [sc. the proportion of one and a half to one] (which more convinces the adversary, although perhaps some of his reasons are more 'from the cause'), because he [Aristotle] supposes that in any proportion a motion can be taken quicker than any given motion – and consequently, with some motion given measured by three instants, it will be possible to take a motion twice as quick that will be measured by an instant and a half only [sc. which is impossible, because an instant is *ex hypothesi* indivisible].

317. This too about the successive [sc. that it is not composed of indivisibles, n.316] I prove by the continuity of the permanent; because the permanent is continuous, therefore also the successive.

318. I prove the consequence, because if indivisibles immediate to each other are in motion, I ask about the movable and about the 'wheres' it has in the immediate instants; if between the ultimate of one 'where' and of another there is nothing in the middle, then the ultimate of one is immediate to the ultimate of the other; but if between these two 'wheres' there is some middle, I ask about the ultimate of the movable when it is in the middle (and not in either instant): because in the two indivisibles it is in the 'wheres' between which this middle is placed, – it is therefore in that middle in some middle between these two instants; therefore these two instants were not immediate. – And this consequence Aristotle makes clear in *Physics* 6 [n.292], that namely "it is of the same idea that motion, magnitude, and time are composed of indivisibles."

319. The antecedent [sc. 'the permanent is continuous', n.317] can be proved, more manifestly about permanent than successive things, through Aristotle's reasons, *Physics* 6.1.231a21-b18, because it is more evident and manifest that permanent indivisibles do not make a greater than about indivisibles succeeding to each other.

320. However the antecedent is more efficaciously proved by two geometrical reasons or propositions, of which the first is this:

'On any center at all, occupying however much space, it is possible to describe a circle', according to the second postulate of I Euclid [*Elements* 1 postul.3]. Therefore on a given center, which may be called a, let two circles be described: a smaller, let it be called D, and a larger B. If the circumference of the larger is composed of points, let two points immediate to each other be marked, and let them be b c; and let a straight line be drawn from a to b and a straight line from a to c, according to the postulate of Euclid [*Elements* 1 postul.1], 'to draw a straight line from point to point'.

321. These straight lines, so drawn, will pass straight through the circumference of the smaller circle. I ask therefore, will they either cut it at the same point or at another?

If at a different point, then there are as many points in the smaller circle as in the larger; but it is impossible for two unequals to be composed of parts equal in size and number: for a point does not exceed a point in size, and the points in the lesser

circumference are as many as in the circumference of the larger circle; therefore the smaller circumference is equal to the larger, and consequently a part is equal to the whole.

But if the two straight lines *ab* and *ac* cut the smaller circumference at the same point (let it be *d*), on the line *ab* let a straight line be erected cutting it at the point *d*, and let it be *de* – let it also be contingent with respect to the smaller circle, from Euclid [*Elements* 3 prop.17, 'from a given point to draw a straight line contingent to a given circle']. This line *de*, from Euclid *Elements* 1 prop.13 ['if a straight line erected on a straight line makes angles, it will make two right angles or angles equal to two right angles'], forms with the line *ab* two right angles or angles equal to two right angles; also from the same prop.13, the line *de* with the line *ac* (which is posited straight) will make two right angles or angles equal to two right angles or angles equal two right angles; by parity of reason, the angle *ade* and the angle *cde* equal two right angles. But any two right angles are equal to each other']; so with the common angle taken away (namely *ade*), the remaining angles will be equal; therefore the angle *bde* will be equal to the angle *cde*, and so a part will be equal to the whole.⁶³

322. But to this would an adversary say that the db and dc do not include any angle, because then to that angle a base could be subtended from point b to point c, which is the opposite of the posit, because b and c are posited immediate points. When therefore it is taken that the angle cde is the whole with respect to the angle bde, it is denied, because to the angle bde nothing is added from the angle cde, because between b and c, in their coming together at d, there is no angle.

323. This response, although it at first seems absurd by denying an angle where two lines come together that are extended over a surface and are not coincident [lit.: directly joined], and in this contradicts the definition of an angle in Euclid *Elements* 1 [def.8, 'A plane angle is the inclining of one line to another when two lines in a plane are tangential and not placed in the same direction'], – by denying too that from *b* to *c* a line can be drawn, it denies the first postulate of Euclid [n.320, 'from a point to a point a straight line may be drawn'] – yet because these may not be reckoned unacceptable (because they follow on the thing proposed [n.322]), I argue against the response in a different way:

The angle *cde* includes the whole angle *bde* and adds to it at least a point (although you perversely say it does not add an angle), and a point for you is a part; therefore the angle *cde* adds to the angle *bde* some part; therefore it is the whole for it.

324. The assumption [sc. '*cde* adds to *bde* at least a point'] is plain, because if an angle be called the space intercepted between lines, not including the lines, – then the first point of the line *db* outside the smaller circumference will be nothing of the angle *bde* and will be something of the angle *cde* [sc. because the angle *bde* and the line *db* are, ex hypothesi, included within the angle *cde*]; if the angle include, beyond the space included, the including lines, – then the first point of the line *dc* outside the smaller circumference will be nothing of the angle *cde*]; if the angle include, beyond the space included, the including lines, – then the first point of the line *dc* outside the smaller circumference will be nothing of the angle *bde* and will be something of the angle *cde*]

 $^{^{63}}$ Since points *b* and *c* are, by hypothesis, not the same, the lines from *b* to *d* and from *c* to *d* must form an angle when they meet at *d*. Hence, since also by hypothesis *b* is not the same point as *c* but spatially separate, the angle *bde* will not equal the angle *cde* but one will be larger. However by hypothesis *bde* does equal *cde*, so a part will equal the whole.

[sc. because the line *dc* is, ex hypothesi, not part of the line *db* but outside it]. And so in either way the angle *cde* adds a point to the angle *bde*.

325. Nor is it possible in any way to oppose the principal demonstration [sc. that the lines are divergent at point d on the smaller circumference], as if in this circumference the lines do not begin to be divergent from each but elsewhere, closer to the center or further away, – because wherever you put this, I will describe there a smaller circumference.

326. This second part, namely that the smaller circumference is not cut at one point if it is cut by two lines, it should not be necessary to prove save because of the perversity of the opponent, – because it is sufficiently manifest that the same line, if it be protracted continuous and straight, will never from the same point end at two points; and if this 'manifest' truth is conceded, at once from the deduction in the first part [n.325] the matter at issue is plain.

327. The second proof [n.320] is from Euclid *Elements* 10 prop.5, 9. For he says in prop.5 that "the proportion of all commensurable quantities with each other is as of one number to another number," and consequently, as he maintains in prop.9, "if certain lines are commensurable, the squares on them will be to each other as some square number is to some square number;" but the square on the diagonal is not related to the square on the side as some square number to some square number; therefore neither will the line, which was of the diagonal of the square, be commensurable with the side of the square.

328. The minor of this is plain from *Elements* 1 prop.47 ["the squares on straight lines commensurable in length have a proportion to each other that is a square number to a square number"], because the square on the diagonal is double the square on the side, to the extent it is equal to the squares on two sides; but no square number is double another square number, as is plain by running through all the squares, whatever the roots drawn in themselves.

329. From this is plain this conclusion, that the diagonal is asymmetrical with the side, that is incommensurable. But if these lines were composed of points, they would not be incommensurable (for the points of the one would be disposed to the points of the other in some numerical proportion); and not only would it follow that they were commensurable lines, but also that they were equal, which is plainly nonsensical.

330. Proof of this consequence [sc. 'if diagonal and side were composed of points they would be equal'].

Let two points be taken immediate in a side, and another two opposite in the other side, – and from these and from those let two straight lines be drawn, equidistant from the base. These lines will cut the diagonal.

I ask therefore, either at immediate points or mediate?

If at immediate, then there are no more points in the diagonal than in the side; therefore the diagonal is not larger than the side.

If at mediate points, I take a middle point between the two mediate points on the diagonal (it falls outside each line, from the givens). From that point I draw a line equidistant from each line (from Euclid *Elements* I prop.31 ["Through a given point draw a straight line parallel to a given straight line"]); let this equidistant line be drawn continuously and straight on (from the second part of the first postulate: Euclid *Elements* 1 postul.2 [Postulate: "A finite straight line may be drawn further directly and continuously"]); it will cut the side, and at neither given point of it but between both

(otherwise it would coincide with the other line from which it is posited equidistant – which is contrary to the definition of equidistance, which is the last definition put in *Elements* 1 [def.23, "Parallel lines are those that, drawn in the same plane and produced to infinity in either direction, meet on neither side"]). Therefore between these two points, which were placed immediate on the side, there is an intermediate point; this follows from this, that it was said [sc. earlier in this section] that between points on the diagonal there is a point in the middle; so from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent [sc. 'if there is no intermediate point in the side, there is none in the diagonal; but there is an intermediate in the diagonal, therefore there is one in the side'], therefore etc. [sc. 'therefore since, ex hypothesi, there is no intermediate point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side. [sc. 'therefore since, ex hypothesi, there is no intermediate point in the side point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side. [sc. 'therefore since, ex hypothesi, there is no intermediate point in the side point in the side, there is no intermediate point in the side.]

331. Indeed, in general, the whole of Euclid *Elements* 10 destroys this composition of lines from points, because there would be no irrational lines or surds at all, although however he is there treating principally of irrationals, as is plain there about the many species of irrational line he assigns.

2. Rejection of the Second Antecedent

332. From the same [nn.316-331] is also apparent the rejection of the second antecedent, about smallest parts ['minima', nn.286, 290] – because either the minimum could precisely end a simply indivisible line, or it could be intercepted between the ends of two lines.

If in the first way, a minimum is posited as a simply indivisible point; and then it is the same as to posit, in that way [sc. here], a minimum and simply indivisible for a part.

If in the second way, let therefore two lines be drawn – extended from the center - to the end points of such a minimum in the larger circumference, so that they precisely enclose such minimum in the circumference. I then ask: either they enclose some minimum in the smaller circumference, or they precisely include nothing but have altogether the same indivisible continuing. If in the first way, then there are as many minima in the smaller circle as in the larger; therefore they [the two circles] will be equal. If in the second way, it follows that the smaller circumference will be cut at one point by two straight lines (proceeding from the same point), which was rejected in the first member [sc. when arguing against the first antecedent, nn.316-331, esp. 321]. Rather, there follows something more absurd, namely that these lines in the larger circumference include that minimum: and let a straight line be drawn from the end of one [of these lines] to the end of the other, according to the first postulate in Euclid *Elements* 1 ['From any point to any point a straight line may be drawn']; and then it will be the base of two sides of a triangle, and consequently it will be able to be divided into two equal parts (from *Elements* 1 prop.10, 'to divide a given finite straight line into two equal parts'); and so what was given as a minimum will not be a minimum. Indeed further: let some other line be drawn [within the triangle] parallel to the base of the triangle; it will be shorter than the base [Elements 1 prop.21], and so there will be something less than the minimum.

333. Likewise, that position [sc. about minima; n.332 *init*.] whether in one way or another (provided however it be understood to be such that it does not have a part in a

whole), involves the commensurability of the diagonal with the side (indeed, its equality), as was deduced before against the first opinion [sc. the first antecedent, n.330].

334. [Instance about the minimum according to form] – To these arguments [nn.332-333] it is replied that they do not conclude against a minimum according to form, and so a minimum according to form is posited, and not a minimum according to matter.

335. And this distinction is had from the Philosopher *On Generation* 1.5.321b22-24, 'On Growth', where he maintains that "any part according to species may be increased but not according to matter."

336. However this saying can be understood in three ways:

Either that 'a part according to species' be called a part according to form - and 'a part according to matter' be called a part of a quantum insofar as it is a quantum, because quantity follows matter. And then it returns to a certain old saying, namely that 'quanta, according as they are quanta, are divisible ad infinitum - and not as they are natural things'.

337. Or 'a part according to species' can be understood as what can per se be in act, – and 'a part according to matter' be called a part according to potency, namely a part as it exists in the whole. And then it returns to the same as another old saying [Giles of Rome, *Quodl.* VI q.17], that 'it is possible to grant a minimum that can per se exist, – but there is not a minimum in the whole than which there is not a smaller existing in it potentially'.

338. Or it can be understood in a third way (discordant from these old sayings), that it be in something as the smallest part of the form, or of the whole insofar as it has the form, and not any minimal part in respect of the matter or of the whole according to matter. And then it seems manifestly false, because no part of matter in the whole is without form in act, – nor even without a form of the same idea in homogeneous wholes; rather, just as there the 'whole' is divided into homogeneous parts, so is matter per accidens and form per accidens divided into its homogeneous parts, and in the way that a minimum of the whole is a minimum of each part, and conversely.

339. [Response to the instance] – Dismissing, then, this third understanding [n.338], I show, excluding the other two understandings [nn.336-337], that they do not impede the preceding proofs [nn.332-333].

First, indeed, I argue against the first way [n.336] by the authority of the Commentator [Averroes] *ad loc.*, *Physics* 3.6.206b27-29, on the remark "And we saw Plato etc.;" look there.⁶⁴

340. Second, by the authority of Aristotle *On Sense and Sensibles* 6.445b20-27, in the first doubt where it is alleged against the opposite [n.294]. For although he solves the puzzle obscurely, yet this he declares certain, that 'sensible qualities are determinate according to species' (which he proves, because 'when extremes are posited, it is necessary that the intermediates are finite; but in every genus of sensible qualities

⁶⁴ Aristotle in the Arabic-Latin translation: "And we see Plato for this reason posit two infinites, because he thought that a thing can pass through and proceed to infinity both according to increase and according to decrease." Averroes: "When he [Aristotle] declared that an infinite is found in decrease simply and in addition non-simply (but in that which is converse to division), he began to accuse Plato because he equated infinity in each way (namely both in addition and in decrease), and he [Aristotle] said 'And we saw Plato etc.'; that is: and Plato, because of this, that he thought an infinite proceeds to infinity in increase and to infinity in decrease, posited an infinite as to two species, in addition and in decrease; and he [Aristotle] introduced the noun 'increase' in place of this noun 'addition', for distinguishing between a natural and a geometrical proposition."

extremes, because contraries, are posited'). But about whether any one singular quality can have a terminability in itself – he seems to say no: 'because they exist with continuity, therefore they have something in act, something in potency', just like the continuum; that is, as the continuum is one per se in act and many in potency (into which it is per se divisible), so a sensible quality as existent in the continuous is one in act and many in potency, although per accidens. And then, with the potentiality of the quantum reduced per se to act, the potentiality of the property is reduced to act per accidens, so that never is the quantity by division divided into mathematical quanta; because, just as he himself argued to the question [sc. to the aforesaid doubt] that 'the natural thing is not composed of parts mathematical but natural', so too is it [sc. the sensible quality] divided into such parts, namely natural ones.

But as to how it [sc. the first way [n.399], does not make for the thing proposed, it will be plain in the response [n.344].

341. That too, for which the authorities are adduced of the Commentator and Aristotle have been adduced [nn.339-340], is proved by reasons:

Because when some property belongs to something precisely according to some idea, – whatever it belongs to equally according to that idea, to the same it belongs simply equally (just as if 'to see' is of a nature to belong to an animal precisely according to eyes and not according to hands, to whatever it belongs equally according to the eyes, it will simply belong to equally, though it not belong to it according to the hands); but to be divided into such integral extended parts of the same idea belongs to none save through quantity formally, and not to the natural greatest more than to the smallest; therefore since it belongs to the smallest according to this idea, so will it simply belong to it just as to the greatest.

342. But if it be said that the form of the minimum prevents it competing from quantity (as far as is of itself, on the part of quantity) – on the contrary: if per se some consequents are incompossible, also are those on which they follow incompossible, – and much more, if those which are of the essential idea of some things are incompossible, they too will be; but divisibility into such parts either essentially follows quantity or is of the per se idea of it (of the sort of idea that the Philosopher assigns for it, *Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-8); therefore, to whatever natural form this is posited incompossible, to it is quantity incompossible, and so it will not be simply divisible insofar as it is a quantum, because it is not simply a quantum.

343. This is also proved, because it is not intelligible for something to be a quantum without being of parts, nor that it be of parts without the part being less than the whole; and so it is not intelligible that something be an indivisible quantum, so that there not be anything in it less than it existing in it. Nor too can any simply indivisible flesh be posited in the whole flesh [n.292], because just as a separate point would not make a separate quantum, so neither would a separate point of flesh (if it existed) make with another one anything greater, either continuous or contiguous; hence in this way do the reasons of the Philosopher in *Physics* 6 [n.319] reject the indivisibility of any natural thing, just as of any part of a quantum insofar as quantum.

344. I say therefore that this response [n.366] about a natural thing both insofar as quantum and insofar as natural, if it can have any truth, must be understood by affirming and denying the formal idea of divisibility, such that that which says that it is divided insofar as quantum says that it is divided insofar as natural, and that that which says that

it is not divided insofar as natural denies that naturalness is the idea of this division – as if it were said that an animal insofar as it has eyes sees, not insofar as it has hands; and this understanding is true. But from this does not follow that that does not belong simply to it which belongs to it according to quantity: for that is not impeded by concurrent naturalness which belongs naturally to quantity, just as neither by the concurrent hands in an animal is that taken away which simply belongs to the animal according to the eyes. So therefore, absolutely, is everything natural divisible into always divisibles (ad infinitum), just as if the quantity, which is with the natural form, were per se without all natural form. And so all the reasons that proceed of quantity absolutely (according to the idea of quantity) are conclusive about it as it is in natural things, because divisibility is a natural property of it – and as a consequence they are conclusive about the natural thing which this property is of.

345. The second response [n.337] does not seem to exclude the aforesaid reasons without a whole not being composed of indivisibles, or of smallest parts in the whole [nn.332-333]. However, it does seem possible to posit a minimum in motion, to the extent that a part of motion is per se before it is something of another, of a whole; and so the part of a form according to which there is motion precedes all the parts of that form (not only in nature but also in duration), and so then it seems to be per se, and not in ta whole. So if there is a minimum in natural things that can be per se, – it seems to be the smallest part of form that could be induced by motion, and so a smallest motion [cf. response, nn.350-352].

346. But against this response [nn.345, 337] I argue that just as it is essential to quantum to be able to be divided into parts, so it is essential to it that each singular of them into which it is divided could be a 'this something'; therefore to none of them is it repugnant to exist per se.

347. This reason and this consequence is confirmed:

First because these parts are of the same idea, as to matter and form, as the whole; therefore they can have per se existence just as also can the whole.

Second because if they were per se, they would be individuals of the species of which the whole is the individual; but it seems absurd that something have in itself the nature whence it is an individual (or can be an individual) of some species, so that it not be repugnant to it to be able to be an individual of it and repugnant to it to be able to be simply, and this at any rate as to those that are not accidents (we speak now of homogeneous substances that do not inhere essentially).

Third too because parts are naturally prior to the whole; therefore it is not repugnant to them, contradictorily, to be able to be prior to the whole naturally, because it is naturally not repugnant to the whole [for them] to be prior in time (in this way, because it is not repugnant to it contradictorily – on its own part – [for them] to be prior in duration).

348. It seems therefore that, as concerns this [nn.346-347], it must be said that just as a natural form does not take [anything] from a natural whole so that it thus is not a whole always quantitatively divisible – just as a quantity would be if it were by itself [n.344], – so too it does not take [anything] away so that no division could be as per se (to the extent it is from itself and on its own part) as any quantitative part could be into which a quantum was divided.

349. And if you say that it would at once be changed into its container [sc. as water would be changed into air when divided, as per below], - this response does not seem to be to the meaning of the question. For we are looking for a minimum, able per se to be from its intrinsic idea, that is, to which it is not contradictorily repugnant that, through something intrinsic to it, a less than it is per se; but no intrinsic idea of this sort of incompossibility is assigned if the whole is corrupted. For let us circumscribe everything containing and everything corruptive, and [suppose] that water alone exists in the universe; let any given amount of water be divided, because this is possible, as is proved above against the first response [nn.341-344]. That into which the division is made will not be nothings, because this is against the idea of division, - nor will they be non-water from the idea of division alone, because then water would be composed of non-waters; nor even is this smallness, which is already in act, repugnant to the form of water, because this 'little' [water] was there before (although in the whole), - nor is the water corrupted through division, because everything corruptive of it has been circumscribed. There does not then seem any intrinsic reason why it is repugnant to what is natural that always, whatever is per se existent, something less could be per se existent, although perhaps the contrariety of a corrupting agent may be assigned as an extrinsic reason preventive of such per se existence [nn.341-344].

350. I argue also against each response together [nn.336-337], because neither saves a minimum in motion (for the rejection of which was the preceding deduction [n.345] in some way touched on); for although a middle in local motion could not yield to a movable thing unless it were natural, yet if *per impossibile* a mathematical medium could yield to a mathematical movable, there would truly be succession in such motion, because of the divisibility of the medium; for a movable thing would pass through a prior part of space before it passed through a later. And even now, just as it is per accidents in a placed thing (on the part of the placed thing as it is in place) that it have natural qualities (as is plain from the Philosopher about a cube in *Physics* 4.8.216a27-b8 [n.218]), and just as it is per accidents in a place (on the part of a place insofar as it is a place) that it have a natural quality (from q.1 n.235 'About Place', because although naturalness belongs to what gives a thing place, yet it does belong per accident to place) - so too, although necessarily, however, altogether per accidens, it belongs to motion⁶⁵ in place, or to motion in 'where' (which is in a thing in place, per se, insofar as it per se regards place), that a natural quality is in motion, or that it is in it according as it is motion or is in the magnitude over which motion happens. Per se, therefore, the idea of succession is quantity: whether in magnitude or in movable or in both.

351. Hereby is the first response [n.336] destroyed, because it does not make for a minimum in motion; because from the fact, according to it, that there is no taking a minimum in motion as it is a quantum [n.336], and that succession is in local motion per se by reason of something insofar as it is a quantum, it follows that in local motion in no way could there be a minimum. And so not in other motions either, because although it not be as immediately conceded about alteration (if motion or succession is posited according to form), yet it does follow by the place 'a maiore' negatively: for no motion is quicker than passage through place, and so none can have indivisible parts if this necessarily has divisible parts.

⁶⁵ The Latin word 'motus' can mean either 'motion' or 'thing moved'. It is a nice question whether in the following lines Scotus means 'thing moved' or 'motion' or both or either, and whether, indeed, much hangs on the difference.

352. From the same point is the second response [n.337] also destroyed, that it does not make for a minimum in motion [n.345]: because in a magnitude over which there is motion, it is not possible to take a smallest part existing in it; therefore neither a smallest passage over that magnitude, because in that minimal passage it would have to pass through a minimal part of the magnitude.

353. The second response also - as to minimal motion - is destroyed also by other facts:

First because when a mover is present and is conquering over the moved, that extrinsic reason cannot be posited because of which such a minimum is denied to be capable of existing per se, namely the presence of the corruptive [n.349]—because the presence of the cause moving and producing such minimum is then overcoming every corruptive contrary.

Likewise: that a minimum in successive things can exist in flowing, this is for a minimum there simply to be in the whole, because the part of something successive does not have another being in the whole than that one part flows before another, which flowing parts integrate the whole; just as therefore in a permanent whole 'this is to be a part in the whole which is to be a permanent part in the whole', so in successives, 'this is to be a part in the whole which is to be a flowing part continuous with another part'.

So therefore, with the two antecedents [nn.286, 290] rejected, response must be made to their proofs, adduced on their behalf [nn.288-289, 292-300].

3. To the Proofs of the First Antecedent a. To the First Proof

354. [On the division of the continuous as to every point] – To the first [n.288] it is said that 'although it is possible for the continuous to be divided at every point, yet it is not possible that it is divided, because this division is in potency and in coming to be, and never can be whole in having come to be'. And then to the proofs adduced for the opposite [n.288], it is about any single potency conceded as to a single being made, not however as to infinite beings made, with one of which, reduced to act, stands necessarily another not reduced to act; so it is in the matter at hand, because there are infinite potencies for being divided infinitely (with one of which, reduced to act, necessarily stands another not reduced to act), and so, although the possibility for being divided is conceded, not however for having been divided.

355. This response is confirmed by the Commentator on *Physics* 3.7.207b15-18 where, for the proposition of the Philosopher 'it happens there is as great a magnitude in act as it happens there is in potency (not so with numbers)', he assigns the reason: 'Because of this, that all these potencies, which are for parts of magnitude, are potencies of the same potentiality and of the same idea – not so in numbers.''

356. Against this: it follows for you that 'a continuum can be divided at a, therefore it can exist divided at a' [from the concession made in n.354] – and so on for b and c and for any singular point (and this determinate or indeterminate), because no single division is possible that cannot be completed. Therefore, all the singulars of the antecedent entail all the singulars of the consequent: the antecedent therefore entails the consequent: if it can be divided to infinity, then it will be possible for this division into infinites to be actually done.

357. But if you say that the singulars of the consequent are repugnant but not the singulars of the antecedent, – on the contrary: from the possible incompossibles do not follow; but from these singulars [sc. in the antecedent] those [sc.in the consequent] follow (as is plain by induction); therefore etc.

358. [On the division of the continuous at any point] – But this proposition, 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point whatever', could be distinguished according to composition and division – so that the sense of composition would be this, that this proposition is possible: 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided' etc.; the sense of division is this, that in the continuous there is a potency for being divided up to every point. The first sense is true, and the second false.

359. Or it could be distinguished thus, according as it would be possible to distribute the term divisively or collectively [sc. 'it is possible at every point to divide the continuous', i.e. one point after another, and: 'it is possible to divide the continuous at every point', i.e. all points at the same time].

360. It could also be distinguished according as 'possible' could precede the term or follow it: and if it were to precede, the proposition would be false, because one potency would be indicated for attribution of the predicate; if it were to follow, it would be true, because it would be indicated that the potency is multiplied on the multiplication of the subject [sc. 'it is possible that the continuous is divided at every point' and 'the continuous is able to be divided at every point'].

361. These responses do not seem very logical; the third not [n.360], because the mode of putting the proposition together – namely possibility – does not seem it can be distributed to several possibilities (or one possibility for several possible instants), and the predicate would not be indicated to be united to the subject for any single instant; nor is the second response [n.359] valid, because it is not in place save when taking this word ['every'] in the plural ['all'], as in the proposition 'all the apostles of God are twelve'; nor is the first response valid, because it is necessary, when taking the extremes for the same time (or for a different time), that that possibility state the mode of composition uniting the extremes [sc. regardless of the distinction between 'composition' and 'division', 'possible' remains the mode by which the proposition combines subject and predicate; n.362].

362. Omitting, therefore, the long and prolix evasions of these refutations [n.361], I say that this proposition [sc. 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point whatever', nn.359, 360] indicates the union of predicate with subject, possibly, for some single 'now' (although the 'now' be indeterminate), provided such ampliation of composition could be done by virtue of possibility; for ampliation cannot be done up to several 'nows' so that the possibility of composition for any single 'now' not be noted, whether the extremes be taken for the same 'now' or for another (to wit, if 'sitting' be taken for one instant and 'standing' for another). In every sense it is necessary that possibility modify the very composition uniting the extremes for some single though indeterminate 'now'.

363. So it is in the matter at hand, that 'to be divided' is indicated to be united with 'continuous' at a point, and at any point of it whatever – and this for some indeterminate 'now'. But this is impossible, because whenever the predicate [sc. 'divided'] is united to it for any singular or singulars [sc. 'at point *a*, or at point *a*, *b*, *c*'], it is necessarily repugnant to it for other singulars; for it is necessary – as the first

response says [n.354] – that with the reduction of a potency (not only to having become but also to becoming) there stand another potency, not reduced to act of having become nor even to [act of] becoming, because it is necessary that, when division exists 'in becoming or having become' at *a*, something continuous is terminated by *a* – and thus that the potency which is in that part of the continuous is not reduced to act.

364. But if you argue that any singular is true, therefore also the universal, it could be said that the singulars are true, not however compossible, and each is required for the possibility of a universal.

365. On the contrary: at once is this proposition true, 'a continuum can be divided at a and at b and at c', and so on about any other singular at once.

366. I reply. I say that singular propositions about the possible, taken absolutely, do not entail formally a universal about possibility, but there is a fallacy of figure of speech 'from many determinates to one determinate'.⁶⁶ For singulars can by force of signification unite a predicate with a subject for some 'now', but a universal unites a predicate with a subject for any 'now' of it universally; and so from the form of signifying there is a process 'from many determinates to one'. This is the reason why from a premise possible for some 'now' and a premise possible for another 'now' there does not follow a conclusion about a universal as now possible, because the premises do not signify – of their form – that the extremes are united with the middle; and so the union of the extremes among themselves does not follow, nor is it even possible for any same ['now'].⁶⁷

367. And if you say that singulars are compossible by taking the potency (but not the act terminating the potency) for the same ['now'], to wit 'it is at the same time possible [for the continuous] to be divided at *a* and at *b* etc.' (not however 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided at the same time at *a* and at *b*' etc.) – I argue that it is not necessary that the possibility is divided at the same ['now'] for the universal be true, because singular propositions, asserting the predicate absolutely of singulars adequately asserted, entail a universal asserting the predicate absolutely; if such singulars are true, all of them in themselves and absolutely – therefore also the universal.

368. And if you ask how singulars of possibility are to be taken, as sufficiently [asserted] – I say that it is necessary for them to be taken with specific composition for the same indeterminate 'now'; to wit, 'it is possible [for the continuous] to be divided at a for some now, and it is possible for it to be divided at c and at b for the same now', and so on about each; and then the universal follows – otherwise not.

369. And if you argue that these are singulars of a different universal, namely of this 'it is possible for the continuous to be divided at any point, according to one now' which differs formally from the other [n.368] - I reply that they differ in word, because that which the former expresses the other by the co-signification of the verb denotes, namely that the extremes are united.

⁶⁶ Vatican Editors quote from Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.7 n.37: "The third mode of fallacy of figure of speech comes from diverse mode of supposition, as 'an animal is Socrates, an animal is Plato, and so on of singulars; therefore an animal is every man'; for there is a process made from many determinate suppositions to one determinate supposition. And this third mode of supposition is wont to be called univocal, because this term 'animal' is equivocally and univocally disposed to all these supposits. Hence, since in each of the premises it supposits for one supposit, in the conclusion for diverse supposits, the supposition of it varies."

⁶⁷ That this division is possible at this 'now' and that division possible at that 'now' does not entail that all divisions are possible 'now', because the particulars do not combine the same 'now' with each division, nor can they.

370. And if you say that even in this way, by specifying the predicate for some determinate or indeterminate 'now', no singular [proposition] is repugnant to the other, because, just as it is possible [for the continuous] to be divided at *a* for some 'now', so it is possible for it to be divided at *b* for the same 'now', and so of *c*, and so of any other singular (because if any were repugnant, it would be either that which would receive an immediate point, or a mediate one [sc. to point *a*]; not that which takes a mediate point, because division at one point does not impede division at another point, even an immediate one; nor at an immediate point, because none is immediate; therefore singulars [propositions], as they induce this universal as now, are true and compossible) – I reply: I say that to any singular [proposition] whatever, taken or takeable, no singular proposition, determinately taken or takeable with indeterminate composition, is repugnant for the same 'now', nor are they repugnant among themselves; yet to whichever is taken infinite indeterminate propositions are repugnant – and the reason for this repugnance was assigned before, a real one, from the incompossibility of reduction of all potentials at once to act [n.363].

371. A likeness for this is not had easily in other things. For an example can well be posited where any singular is possible, and yet a universal is not possible, because any one singular is incompossible with any one singular, just like 'it is possible for every color to be in you'; this is impossible because any one determinate singular is repugnant to another determinate [singular], as 'you are white' is repugnant to this 'you are black'. However, let us posit that this man cannot carry ten stones but nine only (and let the stones be equal), this proposition 'it is possible for every stone to be carried by this man' is false; and not because any singular is in itself false, nor because any determinate singular is incompossible with any other determinate singular – but to some determinate [singulars] is some indeterminate [singular] incompossible: for any nine singulars are compossible and a tenth is indeterminately incompossible with them.

372. And in this way must be understood the response of the Commentator about *On Generation* 1 com.9, who says that "when a division has been made at one point, a division at another point is prevented from being made,"⁶⁸ namely not indeed at any indeterminate point (marked or mark-able), but at some determinate one.

373. And then I reply to the argument made before against me, about mediate and immediate [points] [n.370], namely that it is against him [sc. the one making this argument]. I say therefore that it must not be granted that a division is made in something immediate, but in something mediate; not however a determinate one (whether marked or mark-able), but an indeterminate one – because whatever determinate mediate is taken, a division also could stand at that point simultaneously with a division at this point; yet to this division will be repugnant a division at another mediate point, namely at one that in the determinate continuum is not an indivisible for it.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ Averroes: "And it would be possible for a magnitude to be divided at every point at once if the points were in contact with each other, which is impossible... And so we see that when we divide a magnitude at some point, it is impossible for a division to be made at the point following on that point, which was possible before the same division fell at that point...; but when the division fell at the first point, the power for division at the second point was immediately destroyed. When therefore we have taken some point, it will be possible for the magnitude to be divided at it, in whatever place we wanted; but when the magnitude has been divided at a point and at some place, then it will be impossible for it to be divided at a second point in the place where we wanted, since it is impossible for it to be divided at a point consequent to the first point."

⁶⁹ The Vatican editors want to change the 'for it' or 'ad hoc' of the mss. to 'still' or 'adhuc'. Eligat qui vult.

374. [On the division of the continuous at any and every point in it] – If however you ask about this proposition, 'it is possible for the continuum to be divided at any point whatever' – this can be conceded, because 'any whatever' is not only distributive but also partitive, so that for the truth of a universal, whose subject is distributed by 'any whatever', a singular attribution of the predicate to any singular whatever suffices: so not to every singular at once, but to any at all indifferently (it is not necessary that to all). Now 'all' does not signify in this way, but it signifies that the subject is taken at the same time for any respect of the predicate.

375. But about the term 'any it please' there is doubt whether it signifies the same as that which is 'all' or as that which is 'any whoever': whichever of these is posited, it must be said of this as of that to which it is equivalent; for when it is clear about the sense, force is not needed on the word.

b. To the Second Proof

376. To the second proof of the antecedent [n.289] it is said that 'the indivisible is nothing but lack of the continuous, so that nothing is formally an instant save lack of continuous succession – and so a point is lack of length and states nothing positive'. And then the proposition would have to be denied that 'the successive precisely has being, because its indivisible is' [n.289]; rather it precisely has successive being because a part of it flows, and never because an indivisible of it is something positive.

377. Many things seem to make for this opinion:

First, because when the idea alone of the continuous is posited, with everything absolute removed, it seems to have a term if it not be absolute; nor does it seem that God can separate the finite from line nor – as a consequence – the point, which does not seem probable were a point 'another absolute essence' than line.

378. Likewise, if they [point and line] were two absolute essences, it does not seem possible that something one would come to be from them, unless one were accident to the other; for they are not one by perfect identity because they are posited two absolute essences; nor one third thing composed of themselves, because neither is act or potency with respect to the other. The indivisible therefore has being and not-being without generation and corruption, because if it is only in the middle of a continuous line it is only one point, but with it divided they are two points in act; so there is some point there which before was not, – and without generation, because it does not seem probable that a generator would have generated there some absolute essence.

379. Likewise does it seem about the figure of incision, from the author of *Six Principles*,⁷⁰ that it is not anything positively said, and yet there is a surface there in act that before was not in act.

380. But against this [nn.376-379]:

Then it follows that the generation of a substance which is not per se the term of a continuum will be nothing (or at any rate in nothing), because there is not any positive measure of it; and so it is about illumination and about all sudden changes that are not per se terms of motion. And although this could be evaded about changes that are terms of motion and happen in an instant (as a nothing in nothing or a privation of continuity in

⁷⁰ Book of Six Principles 1.4, "In certain things there is doubt whether they begin from nature or from act, as in the figure of incision; for nothing of addition is made but a certain separation of parts."

privation of continuity), yet about these [the above] it seems absurd, because they are not per se terms of the continuity of anything continuous, because they are nothing of anything continuous, neither positively nor privatively.

381. Further, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.7334-37, the idea of line is from points, that is, point falls into the essential idea of line and is said of line in the first mode of saying per se [sc. the mode of per se when the predicate falls into the definition of the subject]; but no privation pertains per se to the idea of something positive; therefore etc. [sc. point must state something positive, contra n.376].

382. From the same [sc. statement of the Philosopher, n.381] it also follows that if a point is only a privation, that a line too will be only a privation, – and surface and solid; for always the termed is defined by the terminating, and the positive does not essentially include privation.

383. Similarly, the same [n.382] follows (because of something else [sc. from what is said in n.376 and not from Aristotle's statement in n.381]) that a line will be only lack of breadth and a surface will only be lack of depth; and then there will not be but a single dimension that would be posited a solid, although however the dimension which is called 'depth' could in another respect be called 'width' (for these three dimensions are distinguished by imagination of three lines intersecting each other at the same point).

384. And from this further is inferred something unacceptable, that if a surface is only the privation of depth, how will a point be the privation of a privation? For nothing seems to deprive a privation unless it is something formally positive.

385. In addition, according to a surface there are many corporeal or sensible qualities, as it seems; therefore it is not only privation.

The antecedent is proved of colors and figures, each of which is per se visible, and consequently a positive. Figure too most properly follows species, and so seems to be an accident manifestive of species; and it does not seem probable that there is no positive entity to the sort of thing that is consequent to species naturally and manifests it.

386. If it be said otherwise [sc. than the proof, nn.289, 376] that 'the indivisible by which the successive has being is only in potency' – this does not help: because when as it has being in the whole it cedes, I ask what succeeds to it? If another indivisible, the argument [n.289] stands; if not, then it will not be successive.

387. I respond to the argument [n.289], that, when it cedes, a continuous flowing part succeeds and not an indivisible; and not anything immediately, save as the continuous is immediate to the indivisible.

388. And if it be objected 'therefore time does not always have being uniformly and equally (because when that instant is posited, time is, because its indivisible is, – with it gone, immediately it [time] is not, because another indivisible of it is not)' – I reply: just as a line does not have being uniformly everywhere, insofar as 'everywhere' distributes for the parts of line and the indivisibles of line (because in the former it has being as in parts, and in the latter as in ultimates), and everywhere it is uniformly, according as 'everywhere' distributes precisely for these or precisely for those, – thus it is in the matter at hand: if the 'always' [at the beginning here, n.388] distributes precisely for indivisibles or precisely for parts, then it has being uniformly, – but if for both at once, it does not have being uniformly.

4. To the Proofs of the Second Antecedent

389. To the proofs of the other antecedent, about smallest parts [nn.292-300], I reply:

To the first [n.292], that the Philosopher has enough against Anaxagoras if, by a taking away from the whole, the whole is made smaller, so that it is not always possible for an equal to be subtracted from it; for it was necessary for Anaxagoras to say (as Aristotle imputed to him [Averroes *Physics* 1 com.37]) that, with segregation made from flesh of anything generable from flesh, – that there could still remain so much flesh that from it could be further separated anything generable whatever; and this is impossible, because however much flesh could be ad infinitum divided and diminished, at any rate not as much flesh would remain that anything generable could be generated from it, because anything generable requires a determinate quantity of what it is generated from (especially if generation is only separation or local motion, which is imputed to Anaxagoras, and if, beyond all the quantity that it is generated from, flesh is diminished by continual separation of other things from it). Not therefore because of Aristotle's intention there [n.292], is it necessary to posit a minimum in natural things, even separate, per se existent, nor in the whole.390. To that of the Philosopher On Sense and Sensibles [n.294], I say that properties are divisible to whatever extent, so that a quantum could not be divided save with the property divided; and yet it is not divided ad infinitum insofar as it is sensible (that is, insofar as it is perceptible by sense), just as he himself means there that 'a part, however minimal, can be sensible virtually although not in action'; that is, that it in the whole can cooperate with other parts for affecting the senses - and yet, although division could be made in it even existing per se, yet it would not affect the senses.

And then to his argument [Aristotle's, n.294] – which is adduced for the opposite [n.390] – it is plain that 'the senses grow ad infinitum in intensity if a property divisible ad infinitum is applied to them': it is true, if the sensible, insofar as it is actually perceptible by sense, could be divided ad infinitum – but it does not follow if that which is sensible can be divided ad infinitum.

390. To that of the Philosopher *On Sense and Sensibles* [n.294], I say that properties are divisible to any extent whatever, so that a quantum could not be divided save with the property divided; and yet it is not divided ad infinitum insofar as it is sensible (that is, insofar as it is perceptible by sense), just as he himself intends there that 'a part, however minimal, can be sensible virtually although not in action'; that is, that it is able in the whole to cooperate with other parts for affecting the senses – and yet, although division could be made in it even existing per se, yet it would not affect the senses.

And then it is plain to his argument [Aristotle's, n.294] – which is adduced for the opposite [n.390] – that 'the senses grow ad infinitum in intensity if a property divisible ad infinitum is set before them': true it is, if the sensible, insofar as it is actually perceptible by sense, could be divided ad infinitum – but it does not follow if that which is sensible can be divided ad infinitum.

391. To that from *On the Soul* [n.293], it is plain that he is speaking of the quantity of the augmentable and diminishable; which I concede, because the quantity that is a quantity perfect for any natural thing is determinate in greater or lesser, speaking of the quantity in which it is naturally produced, – or at any rate in the lesser in animate

things, speaking of the quantity to which diminution leads. However, the Philosopher is only speaking there [sc. in the passage from *On the Soul*] of the limit of magnitude and increase; and so precisely in that place the Philosopher is understanding that the perfect quantity of any natural thing is determinate in being greater, – from which he gets his proposal, which he intends to prove, namely that 'fire is not the principle of increase in any generation or in any species'; for the principal agent in any species must be determinate as to the perfect quantity of that species, so that it may produce that only and not beyond; but fire is not determinate to a determinate quantity in any species, because – as for as is of itself – it would produce a greater amount, because it grows ad infinitum if combustibles are placed on it ad infinitum.

392. And when the antecedent is proved about the minimum [n.290] through this [n.295], that 'it is possible to take a first in motion', the consequence could be denied [= 'therefore it is possible to take a smallest part of motion', n.295], because those who asserted a first in motion asserted that change is this part of motion; however I deny a 'first' in both ways (both a first motion and a first change), because the Philosopher in *Physics* 6.6.236b32-7b22 of intention shows the opposite, namely that all 'to move' precedes 'to have moved', ad infinitum, and conversely [n.297].

393. And this is made convincing as follows: because if fire were to cause some first thing in motion, by parity of reason it could cause an equal to it, simultaneous with it, immediate. And so either it would be necessary to imagine that between the first thing 'caused together' and the second thing – equal to it – caused, the agent would have to be at rest, and so the motion would be composed of motions and intermediate rests; or the agent would, after the first has been induced, have to induce the whole successive habit, which seems thoroughly irrational because, since it is of equal virtue and equally close to the subject acted on, just as it can at the same time induce any first degree caused at the same time, so it can, with that [degree] induced, at the same time induce the whole, and so the whole motion would be composed immediately of immediate changes, or of changes – whether motions or rests – that are intermediate.

394. There is therefore this process. Let there be a form, under some change, that is to be corrupted by motion, to wit in an alteration, under a heat at rest in being *in esse* quieto].⁷¹ Of this motion, I say, it is possible to take an ultimate, namely a change terminatively, because the movable is now disposed indivisibly as before divisibly, and this 'being affected' – just as 'being changed' – is differently disposed now indivisibly than before divisibly [n.181]. And therefore it is under the same form – under which it was at rest - in the instant of change, because the agent then, that has to move it, has done nothing before, nor now is it doing anything in respect of it. From this instant it begins to move the movable, and that successively: either because of the parts of the movable, because no part of the movable is equally close to the agent, but a part is closer to another part ad infinitum (only a point of the movable is in its whole self immediate to the agent, and it is not movable); or because of the parts of the form according to which the motion has to be, each of which parts is inducible before another by the mover present, because the extrinsic reason because of which there could not be a minimum per se in natural things is the presence of a corrupter – but this is taken away because of the presence of the agent corrupting everything corruptive of its own effect [nn.349-353].

⁷¹ A remark not entirely clear, which is repeated in n.396.

395. From that instant of change, therefore, the heat that was present is continually lessened, and coldness is acquired. For it is not likely that there is only a movement of lessening up to some instant and then first something of coldness is induced; for either the heat to be lessened would have the last of itself in being (which the Philosopher denies in *Physics* 8.8.263b20-26), – or if not, at least the cold immediately following it would have a first of itself, and then there would be a first change of motion of the cooling, which is as unacceptable as of a first lessening of motion of the heat. It also seems unacceptable that an agent lessen heat save by causing in it something incompossible according to some degree; and according as it causes it in greater or lesser degree, it corrupts degree after degree of existing heat; now Aristotle manifestly maintains, in *Physics* 6 [n.302], that everything that is moved has something of each extreme – and it seems manifest to sense that there is something of heat in water being successively heated, while coldness still remains and is not yet wholly corrupted.

396. So, from the instant of change, the motion of lessening of heat and the motion of intensifying of cold run together, of neither of which is anything first and in any instant in which, by sudden change, some degree of coldness is induced that is altogether incompossible with heat: in that first instant there is not heat and up to it there was heat – such that heat has no ultimate of its being but did have an ultimate in being at rest [*in esse quieto*]; and coldness has no first simply of its being, although it has a first in being of rest (namely what it receives through change, although it not be rest).

397. When therefore it is proved by the Philosopher, in *Physics* 8 [n.297], I say that the intention of the Philosopher is this, namely to prove that not all things are always moving. And against those who say that 'all things are always moving' he says that they are manifestly refuted if we consider the motions by which they were moved; for they were moved to positing this by the increase and decrease of animate things, which they saw coming to be in some long time (as in a year), and yet from that in no [time] they concluded that they were coming to be in the whole time and in no part of the time perceptibly. To whom Aristotle objects that well can such a movable rest for some time and in some little time be moved, so that it is not necessary they are always moving with that motion; and he proves this through an example about drops of water wearing away a stone, which are falling in some certain number and removing nothing from the stone – eventually, however, one drop falling (let it be the hundredth) removes, in virtue of all, some part of the stone, which is removed whole at once and not part before part.⁷²

398. By this the Philosopher does not intend that this removal of a part of the stone is in an instant and thus whole at once, for this removal is a local motion (and so the motion is local), which cannot in any way happen unless a part of the movable pass through the space before the whole movable; but this one part of the stone – which is removed by the last drop in virtue of all the preceding drops – although it be successively being removed, yet the removal of it is not successive, corresponding to the whole succession of the fall of the drops; for there were not as many drops falling as there were parts of this removal of part of the stone, but this whole small part is removed by the last drop, although by succession. The Philosopher, therefore, is denying a succession corresponding to this, namely to the whole falling of a succession of drops – and thereby

⁷² The Vatican Editors helpfully point out that, in his interpretation of Aristotle here, Scotus is in agreement with the like interpretation of Aquinas in his commentary, *ad loc.*, on the *Physics*.

was that motion of the stone not always being moved, although when it was moved by the last drop it was then being successively moved.

399. And according to this intention, he supplies afterwards about alteration that "it is not necessary that because of this the whole alteration be infinite, – for frequently it is quick" [n.297]. Where the translation of the Commentator has "sudden" for the "quick" in our translation; but he expounds 'sudden' thus, "that is, in an instant," and inferring "not in time." Which exposition is contrary to the text: which is plain from our translation 'for frequently it is swift', and from his translation which has 'suddenly', – because in *Physics* 4.13.222b14-15, where our translation has "quickly," his translation has "suddenly;" and it is noted there that "that is said to happen suddenly which happens in imperceptible time" – and thus does he himself expound it there. Therefore to expound 'swiftly' or 'suddenly' by 'instant' is to expound time by 'instant'.

400. But the intention of the Philosopher [sc. in *Physics* 8, nn.297, 399] is this, that it is not necessary that as the alterable is divisible ad infinitum so time ad infinitum correspond to the alteration of the alterable – or that always, while the alterable is, part of it after part alter continuously, as a succession could be by reason of the parts of the alterable; but 'frequently alteration is swift or sudden', that is, with the alterable at rest, – and then the parts are not simultaneous (neither according to the first change nor according to the first part of motion), but successive.

401. And this is what the reason, added by the Philosopher, at once supplies for the same conclusion, namely that when someone is healed the healing is in time "and not at the end of the time;" and yet the movable is not always moved by this motion, because this motion is finite, between two contraries. How then would he himself be taking, in the preceding reason [n.400], that 'alteration happens in an instant' [sc. as Averroes interprets Aristotle, n.399] for this purpose, that he may prove that 'not everything is in motion'? And in this second reason [here n.401] he is taking the opposite, namely that 'healing is not at the limit of time but in time', and yet therefore 'not always' because it is between contraries. And so, when the contrary is acquired, the motion ceases.

402. Therefore the Philosopher supplies that "to say 'everything is continually in motion' is much quibbling" (where 'continually' is taken for 'always', because he rejects, for all these reasons [nn.397, 399, 401, 402], the second member of the five membered division⁷³). And yet a further exposition is also put there, because 'a stone remains hard'; therefore not altered.

403. Not therefore from anything that he says here [*Physics* 8; nn.297] does he deny his whole opinion in *Physics* 6 [n.392]; and granted that here [*Physics* 8] there was some word that expressly seems to say this (although there be nothing but what is taken from false understanding [n.297]), yet it should rather be expounded according to what is said here [*Physics* 6] than to retract elsewhere [*Physics* 8] the whole of what is principal here [*Physics* 6], because of certain things that are elsewhere not said as chiefly or intentionally as here [*Physics* 6].

404. To the other, *On Sense and Sensibles* [n.299], statement will be made in the final argument of this distinction [nn.519-520].

⁷³ Aristotle in the passage at *Physics* 8 gives five arguments against the thesis that everything is always in motion: from increase and decrease, from the wearing away of a stone, from the freezing of water, from health, and from stones remaining hard.

405. To the argument about contradictories [n.300] it is said that those are contradictories which are taken for the same time (and according to the other required conditions), and statements are not contradictories that are not taken to hold for the same time – which is proved by the definition of contradiction set down in *Sophistical Refutations* 1.5.167a23-27 ['A refutation is a contradiction of a same and single thing in the same respect and in relation to the same thing and in like manner and at the same time']; and so the non-being of heat as it preceded in the last instant of change, and the being of heat taken up in the time next, are not contradictories with respect to heat.

406. On the contrary: the being and non-being of color, taken absolutely (not insofar as they understood in the same instant), are incompossible simply, so that because they are incompossible simply they cannot be in the same instant – not conversely; and the reason for this incompossibility 'for the same instant' is different only because they are formally opposed, with no other opposition formally than contradictory opposition.

407. This is confirmed by a likeness in other things, because a contrary succeeding to a contrary is truly contrary to it, although they are not together in the same instant; likewise, a form as the term 'to which' of privation is truly opposed to it privatively – and this motion is between opposites formally. Hence the Philosopher in *Physics* 1.5.188a30-b26, 5.5.229a7-b22 maintains that every motion is between opposites contrary or privative, or intermediate between them, and yet these, as they are terms of changes, are never simultaneous.

408. It could also be argued that the terms of creation would not be contraries, because the non-being that precedes the being of the created cannot be a contrary or a privative or an intermediate between them because it is in no susceptive subject – and thus it would not be contradictory to it. Creation therefore would not be between contradictories or contraries, which seems absurd.

409. And as to what is adduced about the definition of a contradiction [n.405], there is an equivocation because contradiction exists in one way in propositions and in another way in terms. Propositions are not contradictory unless they are taken for the same instant, for which both of them must assert the predicate of the subject; but terms absolutely taken, without determination to any being, are contradictories. About the first contradiction the Philosopher speaks in *On Interpretation* 6.17b16-26, and about the second in *Categories* 10.13b27-35.

410. I reply in another way to the argument [n.300], because 'immediate' can be taken in two ways: in one way between what is in itself a whole and something else there is no middle, and in another way what is in itself a whole is immediately with another or after another. In the first way, the continuous is immediate to its term, because between the terminating indivisible [point] and the terminated divisible nothing falls in the middle. In the second way, to an indivisible point terminating a continuum nothing is immediate: for nothing in itself a whole immediately follows the indivisible, but a part of the whole does; what is an immediate whole in the first way follows an indivisible according to part before part, ad infinitum.

411. To the matter at hand therefore I say that as the measures are disposed to each other so too the measureds, namely that when one contradictory is measured by an indivisible the other too is measured by an indivisible. And then the minor is false [sc. in n.300, 'if there is no first *between* the being of the form that is to be introduced through motion and the non-being of it, the 'first' would be indivisible']: for there is no middle

between a contradictory 'according as it is in its whole measure' and another contradictory, just as neither between its whole measure and the measure of the other; a contradictory, however, that is measured by an indivisible is not immediate to anything, such that according to some being of it (namely according to which it is in its measure) it at once follows the other contradictory. So I say in the matter at hand that non-being was in the indivisible, but the being of the form induced by motion is in the whole time following – and so nothing is intermediate between them; and yet what follows in time is not immediate – in the second way [n.410] – to what pre-exists in an instant.

C. To the Third Argument

412. To the third principal argument of the question, when it is argued that 'an angel could not be moved because he is indivisible' [n.301]:

Although it could easily be replied that an angel occupies a divisible place, and so in respect of place he is disposed as if he were divisible – or if he occupy a punctal place as existing punctally, he cannot be moved continuously so that he always have punctal being – yet, because there does not seem a reason why it is denied that an indivisible is moved (even if it were an indivisible of quantity, per se existing), therefore it can be conceded that an angel, occupying a punctal 'where', can be continually moved as existing always at a point,.

413. And this that is assumed about an indivisible can be proved in many ways [nn.413, 417-419]:

First, because a sphere moved over a plane describes a line on the plane and yet only touches the plane at a point; therefore that point passes over the whole line, and yet not for this reason is the line, which is thus passed over by the point, composed of points. Therefore, by similarity, neither would this follow if a point existed per se.

414. Here it is replied in many ways:

That there is no spherical thing in nature but only in the intellect or imagination. – But this is nothing, because the heaven is simply spherical; and yet, given that there was not anything simply spherical in nature, still it is not a contradiction on the part of a sphere and plane that this move over that as a sphere over a plane (but there would be a contradiction if from indivisible motion over something would follow that it was indivisible).

415. In another way it is said that a natural sphere touches a plane in a line and not at a point. – But this seems impossible, because what is applied to a circular line (so as to touch it whole) is necessarily circular, because any circular part is in any part circular; but of a straight line no part is circular or curved.

416. In another way it is said that, because that point [sc. of a sphere; n.413] is moved per accidens, therefore it is not necessary that the space over which it moves be commensurate with it; but the sphere is moved per se and is divisible. – But against this, because although a part in a whole is moved per accidens, yet it is always in a space equal to it, and – in passing through – it describes the whole space; indeed, if a whiteness (which is more moved per accidens when a quantum is moved than anything that is part or term of the quantum) is compared to a space according to the quantity it has per accidens, its accidental quantity would still be commensurate with the space. Hence it
does not seem that - as concerns commensuration - 'being moved per accidens' takes anything away other than 'being moved per se'.

417. Again, this supposed line [n.413] is not commensurate with the sphere (because then it would be a solid), and is commensurate with something moved over it; therefore only with the point moved over it. If too the sphere be posited to be in a vacuum and only the line to be a plenum, and *per impossibile* the sphere could be moved in a vacuum and this point over the line-plenum, this line-plenum would not be precisely described except from that point. And so the intended conclusion follows from these.

418. Further, let a solid cube be taken and let it be moved. Its first surface is always on something equal to it, and so always on a surface. Or something corresponds to it on the supposed magnitude [sc. over which it is moving], to wit a line – and so, by passing always over some part of the magnitude before another, it passes over the whole magnitude; therefore the whole supposed magnitude is composed of a line, if their reasoning be valid [sc. those who say an indivisible cannot be moved, or moved over, continuously, n.412].

419. Further, let a first point be marked on the line over which another line is moving. This point on the supposed line describes the whole moved line, because just as any point of the moved line is continually on different points of the supposed line, so also conversely any point of the supposed line is put under different points of the moved line; and yet, along with all of these, the continuity of motion stands.

420. It can therefore be conceded (since the statement about motion per accidens [n.416] seems but a subterfuge) that an indivisible could be moved per se if it existed per se, and yet continuously; nor from this does it follow that the magnitude passed over is composed of indivisibles.

421. Because, however, of the intention of Aristotle that is alleged [nn.302-304], it is necesary to understand that in local motion there is succession from a double cause, namely from the divisibility of the movable and from the divisibility of the space, each of which causes, if it existed per se and precise, would be a sufficient reason for succession: for any movable first passes over one part of the space before another, and so there would be succession on the part of the space, comparing the same thing to the diverse parts of it; also anything the same in the space first passes by a first part in the movable before a second, and so there would be succession on the part of the space. So too could it be assigned in the motion of alteration, and perhaps in the motion of increase.

422. The philosopher therefore denies, and well denies, that an indivisible 'as far as concerns itself' cannot be moved or move, such that on its part there can be taken a continuity of motion, such that it be a moveable having in itself the complete idea of continuous moveable, because it does not have in itself that it is continually moved; not however is that to which it is repugnant to be continually moved or move, taking from another the continuity of motion [n.421].

423. And this do his reasons prove, and not more, as is plain by running through them all:

For when first he takes that 'everything that is moved is partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which' [n.302], it is true indeed if there be such a movable of whose idea there is a succession of motion; for such a movable is according to part and part of itself in term and term. And yet here [sc. an indivisible] it is not so, but according

to the same [part] of itself it is partly in one term and partly in another term – that is, in some middle, not by resting but insofar as it is something of each, that is, insofar as it is through that which tends from one to the other: that is to say that it is under change and under something lying under change, and thus does it join parts of motion. – But when is taken that 'the indivisible cannot be partly in one term and partly in another term, because it does not have parts' [n.302], it is true of the first partibility [here *supra*: 'everything that is moved is partly in the term from which and partly in the term to which'] (and therefore I conclude that not thus is it movable, and I concede it), but it is false of the second partibility [here *supra*: 'according to the same [part] of itself it is partly in one term and partly in another term...'].

424. To the other [n.303], when it is said that 'a movable first passes through a space equal or less than itself before it passes through a greater space', I reply and say that 'to pass through' can be taken for a divisible passing-through or for an indivisible one.

If for an indivisible one, the proposition is false if it is understood that before the whole passes through a larger it universally passes indivisibly through an equal; for then it would be necessary to grant that there would be a first change in local motion, which also not even the perverters themselves (not expositors) – who say that he [Aristotle] retracts [in *Physics* 8] what he said in *Physics* 6 [n.297] – can reasonably say, that within [*Physics*] 6 itself he contradicts himself. Not therefore is it necessary that an indivisible passing-through precede every successive passing-through that is greater than the movable.

But if he understand it of a divisible passing-through, then it could be understood, not of the whole by reason of the whole, but by reason of a part; and this not by comparing a part to a 'where' equal to it and the whole to a 'where' equal to it, because the continuous is that 'whose motion is one and indivisible', *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016a5-6; and thus does a part pass at once through a space corresponding to it, and the whole movable through the whole space corresponding to it. But, by understanding it in respect of some certain and determinate point in space, first the whole passes through that point by reason of some part (and in this which has passed through that, it has passed through something less than itself, speaking of a 'where' different from its first total 'where'), before it passes through an equal or greater [space]; and this is per accidens, insofar as the movable can have a 'where' less than its total 'where'.

425. But if we speak of 'wheres' greater and lesser and equal according to which the continuity of motion is immediately considered (infinites of which are something of the first 'where'), it passes simply first through a greater than itself before an equal to itself. To the matter at hand therefore – by saving that which is of the per se idea of continuous motion, not that which is not of the per se idea of it.

426. And if you object that whatever may be about Aristotle's reason in itself [n.303], always is this point in a space equal to itself, and thus does it pass through the whole (therefore it commensurates the whole line beneath it, and so that line beneath will be composed of points) – I say that 'always', that is in any indivisible, it is in a space equal to itself; but not 'always', that is in any part at all of time.

The same could be argued of the first surface of a cube solid [n.418], that although in any 'now' of time it is placed precisely over the line over which it is moving,

yet in the time in the middle between two instants it is flowing over the continuous middle between the extremes.

427. To the last reason [n.304], I do well concede that it is possible to take a less time than any given time, but from this does not follow that in that lesser time a lesser movable can move, save by speaking of a continuous movable, which was, on its own part, cause of the continuity of the motion.

D. To the Fourth Argument

428. To the fourth principal [argument, nn.305-306], about the cause of succession in motion, I say that, although there could be contention and dispute about Averroes' intention and wherein he contradicts Avempace in (as appears in Physics 4 com.71, 'On the Vacuum'), yet I say briefly that the cause of succession in any motion is the resistance of the movable to the mover; not indeed such that the mover cannot overcome the movable (for then it would not move it), but neither too such that the movable incline back to the opposite (because thus it is precisely in violent motion) – but such resistance that the movable is always under something to which the term intended by the mover cannot immediately succeed. And this resistance of the movable to the mover is because of a defect of virtue of the mover, – and with this, because of the resistance of the medium to the mover and the movable, by which 'medium' can be understood all that which necessarily precedes the induction of the term to be induced. But such a medium is necessarily a medium only for a limited virtue; for if it were an infinite virtue, it could put the movable at once in the term 'to which', – such that neither because of the form opposed to the term 'from which' (which the movable would already have), nor because of the means naturally ordered between the form that the movable has and the term 'to which', would there be a necessity that such mover first move through such media before it would induce the term.

429. The possibility, then, of succession is from the resistance of the movable to the mover, which is from the resistance of the medium to the movable and to the mover, such that this is one resistance. For the movable, insofar as it has the sort of form between which and the term such media are of a nature to be, can continually moved through them to the term – and through these media, which resist the movable so that it cannot at once be in the term, can be understood the divisibility of the parts of the movable or the divisibility of the parts of the form according to which there is motion, or both together. The necessity, however, of succession is never from this resistance, but is precisely by comparing it to the agent, which the movable resists because of this resistance of the medium to it, – so that, just as the possibility was from the resistance alone of the medium to the movable, so can that limited virtue not take away this resistance; and therefore this resistance resists the agent so that it not at once induce the term.

430. Then to those [arguments] that are adduced for the opposite [n.306], namely that 'of an angel to himself there is no resistance' – I say that from the fact that he [an angel] does not act from an infinity of active virtue when he is in heaven, between which 'where' and his own 'where' on earth many media are of a nature to be, which are also media for his own motive virtue – so neither can his own motive virtue make all those media and the term, nor even can he at once make the term save by first making those media; and so there is here the whole resistance that is required for succession in motion.

431. And when it is argued about the saying of that Averroes, about a heavy object 'if it be put in a vacuum that it would descend at once because of the defect of resistance on the part of the medium' [n.306] - I say that if a vacuum is posited, the heavy would not move (according to the Philosopher, *Physics* 4.8.214b12-215a24), because a vacuum could not yield to the heavy and separate dimensions could not be together. Yet if a vacuum were posited able to yield and to be a space, and not that the sides of the plenum would be together (because then it would not be a vacuum), -I say then that there would be motion of the heavy successively in a vacuum, because a prior part of the vacuum would be prior and also the whole heavy would pass through this part of space before that part; and, as was said before in the second argument [n.350], only per se succession is in local motion and in space insofar as a quantum.

432. To the arguments of Aristotle as far as they are adduced for the matter at hand [nn.307-308]:

I say that that proposition 'what the proportion of medium to medium etc. [is in rareness and density, so the proportion of motion to motion is in quickness and slowness'] is true (ceteris paribus), and therefore it follows that motion is not in a vacuum – or at least it is true against those [sc. the ancient atomists, Democritus and Leucippus] who posited the vacuum to be the whole cause of motion or of succession in motion; but to the matter at hand, by arguing similarly here about movables as there about spaces, this proposition can be denied 'what the proportion of movable to movable is in rareness, the same is the proportion of motion to motion in quickness'. And if you take 'what is the proportion of this under the idea in which it is movable, is also of that under the idea in which it is movable', I concede it but then is the minor false [sc. that 'there is no proportion of angel to body in rareness', n.307]; for an angel is movable continuously insofar as he has a virtual quantity, according to which he can coexist in so much place, just as a body according to its quantity can stand in so much place.

433. Likewise, as to what the Philosopher infers from his second reason, that 'motion is in equal time through vacuum and plenum' [n.308] – if something similar to that be inferred, namely that angel and body would be moved in equal time, it is not impossible; but there is an impossibility there from the idea of media, according to which this sort of reason seems to proceed.

434. But given that Aristotle's reasons would not prove much for the purpose (because movables are not disposed here as spaces there), yet his reasons are simply valid, such that his major is probative and leading of the rest to the impossible [sc. the major of the reason in n.307 is probative and is allowed to be true in n.432, and the second reason in n.308 leads to an impossibility by reason of the media, n.433].

435. I reply, therefore, that if a vacuum could yield and motion could be in it, I say that, from the divisibility of space, motion would have divisibility and succession, just as now, from the divisibility of the space of the plenum, motion has per se essential succession; but beyond this succession can speed or slowness be added, by reason of the accidental condition of the medium (insofar as it is promotive or impeditive of motion), either by reason of rareness (whereby it promotes or at least does not impede), or of the density opposed. So then there would be motion of succession in a vacuum, and it would be proportionable to motion in a plenum, – and this when speaking of essential succession; not about superadded speed or slowness, because the movable would

altogether have no superadded velocity or slowness in a vacuum (and it would have some in a plenum, but 'nothing' to something is not a proportion).

436. Therefore Aristotle [n.307] precisely has from this fact [n.435] – against an adversary saying there is motion in a vacuum [n.432] – that no motion, having any speed or slowness superadded to essential succession, could be in a vacuum. And this would not be unacceptable if he were to posit motion precisely to be in a vacuum – but it would be if with this he were to posit a vacuum [to be] a promotive medium in motion (or a medium necessary in motion), on part of which could speed or slowness of motion be taken.

437. In the same way, that which is inferred in the second reason [n.308] is not impossible for an adversary who says precisely that motion is in a vacuum, because a plenum-medium can be equated with a vacuum-medium insofar as it is reason or cause of the succession essential in motion; and if some plenum were taken in the sort of proportion that Aristotle takes it in to a given motion, it would be altogether neutral (bestowing no accidental quality), neither a plenum-medium nor a vacuum-medium.

438. What therefore does the Philosopher have against the adversary from that reason [n.308]? – I say that he has only that a vacuum has no accidental quality over and above essential succession; because if so, some equal medium could be given and then through the plenum- and vacuum-medium motion would happen in as much time as corresponds to the accidental condition of the motion, which is impossible – because if so the media would be proportional.

Question Six

Whether an Angel can move himself

439. Whether an angel can move himself [*Ord*.II d.1 interpolation to n.296]. 440. That not:

Because nothing can at the same time be in act and in potency according to the same thing; but a mover, insofar as it is mover, is in act, and according as it is moved, it is in potency; therefore it does not move itself.

441. The reason is confirmed by this, that some divisions of being – as quantity and substance – are incompossibles in some one same thing; therefore, by parity of reason, act and potency in any one thing are incompossibles.^a

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A]. The consequence is plain, because if dividers [of being] more remote from being are incompossible, much more too immediate ones.

442. Again, everything that moves itself is divided into two, of which one is first mover, the other first moved, from *Physics* 8.5.257b12-13. And it is proved from the first conclusion in *Physics* 7.1.241b33-242a15, that 'nothing moves itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part and would not rest on the resting of it', which proof holds of moved body; and from this it follows that in any body moving itself there is such a distinction, and from this seems universally to follow that in any self-mover such a distinction is required (for it seems the same incompossibility that the same non-body

move itself first as that the same body move itself first). But an angel is not divided into two, one of which is first mover and the other first moved; therefore etc.

443. On the contrary:

An angel can be moved locally (from the preceding question [n.310]); and not by a body effectively (as it seems), nor only miraculously by God; therefore he is moved by himself.

I. To the Question

A. Scotus' own Response

444. I concede that that he can be moved by himself locally, because whatever there is a passive potency in for acquiring or having something through motion, it is not a mark of imperfection in it but of perfection that it has an active power through which it can acquire it. – Which is apparent, because to animate things has been given an active power in respect of the perfect quantity that they are in potency to when generated; it is plain too in heavy and light things, where there is an active power for the 'where' of which they are naturally receptive; similarly, animals have an active power in respect of the sensation to which they are in passive potency (however they cannot have it whole, as was made clear in 1 d.3 n.547 – because a power cannot have all objects, namely consubstantial with it). Therefore, since in an angel there is a potency for a 'where' that he can acquire by motion, it is not a mark of imperfection in him if he not have such active power, from the fact it is not repugnant to other less perfect beings to have such active power.

B. Instance

445. And if it be said that this only belongs to more imperfect things (as animals) as to a part, because they can be divided into two (namely mover and moved), and what is assumed about heavy and light things [sc. that they have an active power, n.444] is false and against the Philosopher's intention (as it seems [*Physics* 8.4.255a4-18]), where he seems to make against this specifically four arguments (first by this, that the heavy is not an animal, second by this, that it cannot stop itself, third because it cannot move itself with diverse motions, fourth because it is a continuum, that is, of the same disposition in a part and in the whole, and such cannot move itself), and in solving the question he says that 'natural things have only a principle of undergoing with respect to motion and not a principle of making' – I first show the opposite by authorities and second by reasons.

C. Rejection of the Instance

446. [By authorities] – The first authority is Aristotle's, *Physics* 8.4.255b19-31, where solving a doubt about things heavy and light, he says that 'because potency is said in many ways, it is therefore not manifest what a heavy thing is moved by'. Now he distinguishes 'potency' into potency for first and second act (as is plain about potency for science and consideration), and applying it to the matter at hand he says that 'fire is in essential potency to become cold, namely insofar as water is generated from it – but when

water has been generated, it is in accidental potency to making [things] cold, unless it is impeded'.

447. In this way too does he speak about the heavy and light [*Physics* 8.4.255b8-12]: "For the light comes from the heavy, as air from water; and when it is already light it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited; and the act of the light is to be somewhere and up above, but it is prevented when the contrary is in it."

Where it is of no worth to expound that, since it is light in act, it is actually light such that it is a mark of the light to go upwards, because then it is the same to say that 'it is actually light' and to say 'because it is actually light, it ascends', which is nothing different if not said causally. For he says that 'it will at once operate, unless it is prohibited', which cannot be understood of the actually light in first act, because the act of a light thing cannot thus be prohibited or prevented while it is actually such. Likewise, he says that 'it is prohibited when it is in the contrary place': and it is not non-light 'because it is in a contrary place'. Therefore, he intends it of second act, namely that 'its act is to be elsewhere' – that is, that its act, which is upward-ness, is the operation of it. Therefore, just as fire possessing heat as first act is truly and effectively disposed to heating (which is second operation), so also fire actually being light is effectively disposed upwards or to the second operation whereby it exists up above.

448. The same in *Physics* 4.9.217b16-18 'About the vacuum': for he says that 'two contraries accompany the dense and the rare, namely heavy and light, hard and soft' – and, speaking of the contrariety of heavy and light, he says that "according to this contrariety they will be active of motion," but according to hard and soft passive. Therefore etc.

449. And if you say that that is not his intention (although the words sound that way), because, in *On Generation* 2.2.329b18-22, when enumerating the active qualities, he excludes heavy and light from qualities truly active and passive – I reply:

I say that he would be contradicting himself in *Physics* 8 [n.445] by that [said] in *On Generation* 2 unless his understanding were another way here and there; for in *Physics* 8 he says, as was asserted for these latter, that 'they have a principle not of acting but of undergoing' – but in *On Generation* 2 he says that "heavy and light are neither active nor passive," and his proof there is plain.

450. Therefore he is speaking in one way about action and passion in *Physics* 8 and where the discussion about action and passion occurs, and in another way in *On Generation* 2 and where the discussion occurs about generation: for just as in the book of *Physics* he is speaking in general and universally about motion, and in the book *On Generation* about motion toward form, so also in *Physics* 3 he is speaking of action and passion in general and universally – and thus is what he says in *Physics* 8 true, that 'they have a principle of undergoing', namely with respect to local motion; but in the book *On Generation* he is speaking of action toward form, where agent and patient are contraries (which indeed is true of univocal action^a), which are in the beginning equivocal, and at the end are alike with univocal likeness (in equivocal action the agent is alike in form to the produced thing with equivocal likeness, as he himself concedes in *On Generation* 1.7.324a34-b1, that some agent does not communicate with the passive thing, as that neither does medicine with the healed body).

a. [*Interpolation*] wherein agent and patient are at the beginning dissimilar and contrary, and at the end similar.

451. Now in this way [sc. by understanding action as motion toward form] he denies in *On Generation* [2.2.329b22-26] that the heavy and light are not only principles of acting or doing but also of being acted on [n.449] – and this does his reason expressly say, that these are 'not principles of doing other things nor of being acted on by other things'; and therefore they are not principles of producing anything according to some substantial form (of which producing he is there speaking [*On Generation* supra]), nor principles of being acted on by some agent corresponding to such action. They are however passive principles in some way in respect of local motion to a 'where', and in some way active in respect of the same – both of which he himself expressly says in *Physics* 8: that passive in this, that 'natural things have in themselves a principle of being acted on' [n.445]; that active in this, that he said the operation of a light thing is 'to be somewhere' [n.447], as of a knower it is to consider [n.446].

452. For this too could the authority of the Commentator [Averroes] be adduced, *De Caelo et Mundo* 3 Com.28: "In simples," he says, "mover and moved are the same in idea but differ in mode: for a stone moves itself insofar as it is heavy in act and is moved insofar as it is potentially lower down; for it is found in one way in act and in another way in potency – and the cause of this is this, because it is composed of matter and form." But about this he seems to speak in varied ways, because in his comment *De Caelo et Mundo* 3 Com.28 he seems to mean that 'it moves itself per accidens, pushing the means, as a sailor moves himself by moving the ship on which he is' – and therefore his authorities are not much to be relied on.

453. [By reasons] – For this conclusion there are reasons.

The first is such: every effect, when it is caused in act, has a cause in act (this is plain from Aristotle *Physics* 2.3.195b17-20 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a21-23, chapter 'On cause': "The efficient cause in act and the caused in act are and are not at the same time;" it is plain too – if there were no authority – by manifest reason, because what is not, when it is not, does not bring anything to be); therefore when the descent of the heavy is in act, then something is causing in act.

454. And it is not then in act by what removes the thing prohibiting. Nor consequently is the heavy [borne] downwards 'because what impels it per se moves it downwards', because in this it is as it were removing the prohibiting – and such mover, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.4.255b24-27, is as it were a mover per accidens; and besides the mover per accidens there must a mover per se efficient, because everything per accidens has to be reduced to the per se.

455. Nor can this [per se cause] be the center pulling, because if *per impossibile* there were nothing heavy in the center but the whole earth [was] moved away from it (and with the center remaining under the respect of center, as before), the heavy would still tend naturally to the center [Averroes, *De Caelo etc.* 1 com.19]. – What then is drawing it? The 'where'? It is manifestly plain that it is not, because it is not an active form.

456. Nor too is it the influence of the heaven, because this seems to be a subterfuge, to have recourse to a universal cause, - which is to deny particular effects and particular causes; the influence also of the heaven (as far as is of itself) is uniform in the whole of the middle, - so there is no reason why it would move one part upwards in the

whole of the middle and another downwards, unless a particular determining agent were posited.

457. Nor can this 'mover in act' (when it is moving in act) be posited the heavy moved in act, because nothing moves itself univocally toward that which it has – and besides this, motion is something extrinsic to the heavy; nor [can it be] the generator of the heavy, because it can then not be.⁷⁴ Therefore it is necessary to grant that it is something intrinsic.^a

a. [Interpolation] ...to the heavy, or the heavy itself through something intrinsic.

458. It is said that the generator remains virtually in the heavy, and by this it moves the heavy [cf. 1 d.17 n.89]. – On the contrary: it does not remain in virtue save as a cause in its effect, and what thus remains is not in itself but only because it remains in its effect, – and then this virtue in respect of motion pertains to the genus of efficient causality. For if the generator be said to effect, and it does not effect save according as it is in act, it must be that it does effect, because that which is effective in virtue does effect, and so still the proposed conclusion follows.^a

a. [*Interpolation* from Appendix A] Again, if [the generator] remained in virtue in the heavy, then either in its own virtue or in that of its effect, because to act presupposes to be. If it only remains in virtue of its effect, namely of the heavy, and from this act it is cause of the motion of the heavy, then the heavy moves itself.

459. Besides, what does not move something else unless first naturally moved by something else, has from the same thing that it moves and that it is moved; but the heavy to which the light is tied (whose lightness does not exceed the heaviness of it) moves the same light by drawing it with itself to the center – and it does not move save because moved; therefore it is first moved naturally before it moves. And it is moved by the same thing by which the thing tied to it is moved: but it moves that too by another, because by its heaviness; therefore also itself.

460. This reason could be confirmed, because when something has an active power in respect of some form, it can cause it in any proportioned and proximate passive thing; but the heavy has active power in respect of a 'where' downward, just as it has in respect of that which it draws with it, and it itself – when it is outside that place – is receptive of that form, which it lacks, and it is proportionate and proximate to itself; therefore it can cause that form in itself.

461. This will also be able to be sufficiently plain if it be considered that rest requires a cause actually causing, just as does motion: for then it would be necessary to grant a cause coevally causing rest naturally of the heavy with the heavy; but there is no such cause coevally causing rest with the heavy save the heavy itself, and consequently the heavy moves effectively – and consequently causes the motion toward that rest, because these two [sc. motion and rest] are from the same cause.

462. Further, the heavy prevented from motion removes what is preventing it if its heaviness conquers the virtue of the impeding or resisting thing; to wit, if it is superimposed on something continuous [e.g. a plank: –Vatican editors] and the heaviness

⁷⁴ That is, the generator of the heavy need no longer exist after the heavy exists and is already in motion downwards.

of it overcomes the nature of the continuity, it breaks it and, by thus removing the continuity of it, removes the impediment of its descent. Now of this breaking, since it is forced motion, it is necessary to posit an existent extrinsic cause, and it does not seem reasonable to imagine another cause than the heavy itself; but it does not break it [sc. a plank etc.] save because it intends to put itself in the center; therefore from the same active principle it has to put itself in the center from which it has to remove the impediment.

463. This could also be made clear in another way, because the heavier is moved with more velocity,⁷⁵ and yet by the same generator could something heavier be generated and something less heavy, and these two could be at the same distance to the center and under the same influence of the heaven; therefore the difference of motions in them is from something intrinsic to them.

464. Again "natural motion is intensified at the end," according to the Philosopher *On the Heaven* 1.8.277b5-7, of which it would be difficult to assign a cause if what is effective of this motion were precisely something extrinsic.

465 [Response to the statements of Aristotle] – I respond then to Aristotle, who is adduced for the contrary [n.445], that he is for me (the way I have adduced him [nn.446-448]) – that the heavy moves itself effectively, as the knower moves himself effectively to act of speculation. And I understand it thus: just as what has some form, which is of a nature to be a principle of some univocal action, can by that form act on what is an approximate and proportioned receptive [of it], so too what has a form that is of a nature to be principle of some equivocal action can by it act equivocally on a passive thing next to it; and if it itself be receptive of that equivocal action or effect and lacks it – from the fact it is maximally proximate and proportioned to it, not only will it be able to cause, rather it will supremely cause this effect in it. So too is it in the matter at hand, because a stone existing above is in potency to a 'where' below – and heaviness with respect to that 'where' is an active equivocal principle, just as universally in respect of a 'where' it is not necessary to posit an equivocal principle (for a mover does not move a movable to some 'where' because the mover is formally in act according to that 'where', but only because it is virtually so). Because therefore the heavy is receptive of the equivocal effect and lacks it, it causes this effect in itself first, and in nothing else save by causing it first in itself; such that 'to cause this' is the operation of the heavy – as Aristotle says [Physics 8.5.257b9 – as heating is of the hot. But that it cause in itself, this is accidental to it insofar as it is active (because namely it itself is receptive in respect of this causing, or in respect of this causable); this could be understood if the heavy – while remaining above – could propel itself, or something else, to the center: then would not anyone there doubt how the heavy would be a principle of descent in something else; nor is it now less an active cause of its own descent.

466. However, because of the word of the Philosopher [n.445, that natural things have, in respect of motion, only a principle of receiving and not of acting], I add further that this motion is not 'natural in itself' from this, that it has an active principle in itself, but only from this, that the movable has an intrinsic passive principle naturally inclining to motion. – Which is plain from the definition of nature in *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23,

⁷⁵ A curious but common opinion famously refuted by Galileo. It perhaps reflects in part the fact that heavier objects land harder or with more force; and speed and force, at least in the immediacy of phenomenological experience, are neither easy, nor for the most part necessary, to separate.

because it is "a principle of motion in that in which it is per se and not per accidens" (for nothing is a principle of naturally moving for something save insofar as it is per se in that which is moved; and it is not per se and first in anything that is moved save insofar as it is passive; therefore it is not anything by nature nor a natural principle of anything unless because it is a passive principle in the moved). This is also plain, because for this reason is something naturally moved, because it is moved as it is of a nature to be moved.

467. So it is in the matter at hand, so that, although here (as in many other things) an active principle is the principle of moving, yet not because of that active principle of moving is it moved naturally, but because of the passive principle, because of which it is thus moved. And this is what the Philosopher supplies (after he has said that "the act of a light thing is to be somewhere, upwards" [n.447]): "And yet," he says himself [*Physics* 8.4.255b13-15], "it is asked why they [sc. light and heavy things] are moved to their places;" and he responds that "the cause is because they are naturally apt to be there." And he says pointedly 'into their places', that is, they are naturally moved into those places, – "because they are of a nature to be there," that is, they have a natural inclination to that 'where'. And in this way he afterwards adds that "they have only a principle of undergoing and not of doing" [n.445], namely in respect of motion insofar as it is natural – and so there, in solution of this doubt about the motion of the heavy, he speaks, as if by the by, of the natural principle of this motion, and of the effective principle of it, that it is only passive.

468. Now Aristotle's reasons [n.445] do not conclude against me, for the first three (which have a single force) show that the heavy object does not move itself the way what acts by thought moves itself; for an animal could not move itself short of the ultimate end intended – nor even could it direct or stop itself – unless it acted by knowledge. And from this is sufficiently got the Philosopher's proposed conclusion, that these [sc. the heavy and light] are not first movers [sc. do not move themselves] – for a first mover moves by knowledge (because "to direct is the mark of the wise man" [*Metaphysics* 1.2.982a17-18]), as was shown above in distinction 3 of the first book 'On the knowledge of God', and in distinction 2 of the same first book 'On the being of God' [1 d.3 nn.261-268, d.2 nn.76-78].

469. His fourth reason too about the continuous [n. 445] does not conclude precisely insofar as it is a 'quantum'. But about the continuous, that is, what is of the same disposition in every part– he proves that the heavy does not move itself effectively, because there is not one part in act which can put another in act according to the same quality, in the way he himself states in *On Sense and the Sensed* [6.447a3-4; n.299 supra]. And I concede that in this way an actually existing part of the heavy does not cause motion to be in another part; but the whole of the heavy is in act according to first act, and it causes in itself second act.

470. But if you object, 'how will Aristotle, if he concede that the heavy is thus moved by itself effectively (although not through knowledge, nor even that its naturality is from it insofar as it has an active principle) – how will he get his proposed principal conclusion, that these [the heavy and light] are necessarily moved by another – which he intends to prove principally [n.445]?' – I say that he gets this sufficiently from distinction of power [n.446]. For these [sc. the heavy and light] do not reduce themselves from second potency [sc. accidental potency, n.446] to act unless they will have first been reduced from first potency [sc. essential potency, n.446] to first act, or at least could be

reduced to first act; which I assert for all elements, which are all – according to him – ingenerable and incorruptible, and yet, because they are of the same idea as their parts, it is not repugnant to them to be reduced from first potency to first act, just as their parts are reduced. It follows therefore that although the heavy and light move themselves from second potency to second act, yet a movable is or is moved from first potency to first act by something else extrinsic; for it is not necessary that 'if everything that is moved is moved by another', that it be in every motion moved by another – and the first [sc. everything that is moved is moved by another] suffices for the Philosopher, because thereby is something 'other than all these things' come to, which neither in one motion nor in any will be able to be moved by another but is altogether 'an unmovable mover' [*Physics* 8.5.256a13-258b9].

471. Similarly too it can be said that even if - in this motion - they [the heavy and light] are moved by themselves effectively, yet they are not moved as by first movers; from the fact too they do not move by knowledge, it follows that they presuppose something moving thus by knowledge - and so, although they move themselves effectively, yet they do not do so without being moved by another, although not as by a proximate cause.

II. To the Principal Arguments

472. To the first principal argument [n.440], it was said in distinction 3 of the first book [*Ord*.I d.3 nn.513-517] how something can act on itself, and response was made there [n.440] to that argument.

473. But as to what is added for confirmation, that 'some divisions of being are not compossible in anything, therefore these too' [n.441] - I concede it of these [sc. act and potency] as they are opposites. But they are opposites insofar as they state modes of any being whatever, namely insofar as the same thing is in potency before it is in act a being (or a being in act), when it already is; and in this way they [divisions of being] belong to nothing the same, neither formally nor denominatively, namely that 'the same' should be said to be denominated at the same time by something in some act and by the same thing in potency. As however act is taken for active principle and potency for passive principle, which fall under the essence of anything at all definable or defined, – thus are they neither opposites nor thus do they divide being nor are repugnant to anything the same.

474. To the second argument [n.442]: I say first to the authority of *Physics* 8, that namely everything 'that moves by knowledge' is divided into two, of which one is first mover and the other first moved; and the reason is of this sort, because the motive power of such mover is an organic power, so that it requires not only a distinction between body and soul as between mover and moved, but perhaps in the body itself – in which is the organic power – it requires a moving part of the body distinct from the moved part. But not necessarily is it so of what moves itself non-organically, because it is a uniform whole as to first act, and a whole in potency as to second act.

475. But as to the proof of the proposition that is taken at the beginning of *Physics* 7 [n.442], where it is proved that 'nothing moves itself first' – I say that this, which he calls 'first', can be taken in two ways:

In one way as it says the same as 'according to the whole' and is opposed to that which is 'according to a part'. And in this way does Aristotle take it in *Physics* 5.1.224a21-29, where he draws the distinction that something is moved per accidens, or according to the whole, and something according to the part; in this way too does Aristotle take 'to be moved first' in *Physics* 6.6.236b19-23, where he says that 'whatever is moved in some time first, is moved in any part of the time' – and elsewhere frequently.

476. In another way, this which I call 'first' states precise causality, in the way it is taken in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b26-33 in the definition of universal.

477. I say therefore that the reasoning of Aristotle at the beginning of *Physics7* [n.442] does well prove that no body is moved by itself first in this double firstness at the same time:

Because if it is moved by itself first, that is, according to itself whole, then motion is in any part of it. This consequence holds by this, that a whole, insofar as it is moving, is homogeneous, and 'to be moved' is a homogeneous passion; but a homogeneous passion is not in a whole first by this firstness unless it is in any part of it. So it follows that if the whole is moved first in this way, that if a part is at rest, the whole of it is at rest.

478. But in taking the other firstness, that 'of precise causality', if the whole is moved by itself first, then this predicate, which is 'to be moved by itself', is not removed because of this, that it is removed by something which is not it, nor is it moved away by itself because of this, that it is removed by something which is something of it; for if a triangle has three angles [sc. equal to two right angles] first by this firstness, not only is 'having three angles etc.' not removed from it if it is removed from a quadrangle, but it is also not removed from it because of this, that it is removed from a part of triangle, to wit from this angle or that. Therefore 'to be moved' is not removed from a whole in which it is first by this firstness, even if it be removed from a part of it, which part is not it; and therefore if a whole is moved first by this firstness, it does not rest at the resting of a part.

479. But it was was first inferred that it is moved first by the other firstness [sc. the firstness of 'according to the whole', nn.477, 475]; so it is impossible that the whole is moved first by each firstness at the same time [nn.477-478], because it includes a contradiction in the way a contradiction follows. However, by the other firstness precisely [sc. the firstness of 'according to the whole' n.475] some whole can be moved by itself first.

480. Now in the matter at hand I say that the heavy is moved by itself first in the first way [n.475], because according to any part at all it moves and is moved, and to any part at all it belongs – although not first but insofar as it is in the whole – both to move and to be moved.

481. But does it belong to a heavy 'to be moved first downwards' by the firstness said in the second way [n.476]?

I say that we can speak of being moved downwards in general, either about this 'to be moved' which belongs to this whole heavy [thing] or about a part of this being moved which belongs to a part of this heavy [thing]. And I say that just as the whole heavy and a part of the heavy are homogeneous in heaviness, so to be moved totally (which is a total property of the whole) and to be moved partially (which is a property of a part) are 'to be moveds' of the same idea; and just as to be moved downwards naturally in general is first, by the firstness of precise causality, in the heavy generally, so this to be moved totally is in this total heavy by a like firstness, and this to be moved partially (which is a part of this total to be moved) is in a part of this heavy [thing] by a like firstness.

482. Not therefore is this whole homogeneous heavy moved by itself first, so that 'to be moved', as it is common to itself and to any part of it, is in it first according to this firstness [sc. of precise causality], because then it would not be removed from the whole although it were removed from a part; but this is false because of the other firstness [sc. firstness 'according to the whole'] necessarily concurring with this one, if this is posited in a homogeneous subject with respect to a homogeneous property.

483. However, the heavy too with this firstness of causality, namely precise causality, is moved by this motion [n.481] – and it is true that this total motion is not removed from the whole heavy because of this, that it is removed from anything that is not this total heavy; but it is true that a part of this total heavy is not moved by this total motion, and yet not because of this is this total motion removed from this total heavy.

484. If you object that at least total motion is removed from the total heavy if partial motion is removed from a part of it – therefore total motion is not in the whole by the firstness of precise causality (because if it were thus in it, in no way would it be removed from it because of the removal of any other thing from the whole which is not it) – I reply:

I say that the whole heavy, insofar as it is homogeneous, is from like parts (and these parts are prior in some way to the whole), such that, with these destroyed in idea of parts, the whole does not remain; thus I say that it is not unacceptable that in them are their partial properties and motions (and in some way before the whole motion belongs to the whole itself), because total motion too is composed of the partial motions of parts, just as the whole heavy is of the parts of the heavy. And then I deny this assumed proposition that 'what belongs to something first (that is, according to precise causality) is not removed from it', – because something that is not the predicate itself is removed from something that is not the subject itself. For this [assumed] proposition is false universally when the subject has a prior subject and the property a prior property; for then on the removal of a prior property from a prior subject it follows that a posterior property is removed from a posterior subject.

485. Precisely therefore does Aristotle's reason [nn.477, 442] prove that the whole is not moved by itself first: that is, that 'to be moved', which is a homogeneous property, is not in the homogeneous whole first (that is, according to precise causality), insofar as that property is taken as homogeneous (that is, of the same nature) to the whole quantum and to a part of the quantum – because thus would it not be removed from the whole though it were removed from a part; which is false, because of the firstness of the totality, which is inferred here from the idea of precise causality. Yet it does not prove but that the whole can be moved by itself first, speaking of that total motion whose parts are motions of parts, and of the firstness of precise causality; and with this stands that it is moved first by another firstness (namely of the totality), taking 'to be moved' in general (namely as it belongs to the whole and to any part of the whole), so that in some way it is necessary to take a predicate that must be in the whole with this firstness and with that.

486. Eleventh I ask whether an angel can move in an instant. 487. That not:

Because then a greater power could move in less than an instant. Proof of the consequence: for thus does the Philosopher argue in *Physics* 6.3.234a22-31, that if a greater power were to move in time, then the greatest in an instant.

488. On the contrary:

Some motions by some moving bodies are in an instant, as illumination of a medium; therefore too the much stronger motion of an angel can be in an instant, because the greater the power of the mover is, the lesser too the resistance of the medium.

I. To the Question A. The Opinions of Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent

489. Here it is said that an angel can move in an instant, not indeed of continuous time but of discrete; which is proved – get in Thomas [Aquinas].⁷⁶

490. Another doctor speaks of this time; get [in Henry of Ghent].⁷⁷

II. Rejection of the Opinions

491. Against the first position [n.489] I argue:

For he seems to contradict himself. For he seems to posit that an angel is in place through operation [n.198]: and if he understand it of an operation passing over into a body, that operation will be in time or in an instant of common time; but if he understand it of an immanent operation, namely of intellection or volition, – that (from what was said before in the matter about the aevum [nn.153-67]) is neither in our common time nor in another, but is in the aevum according to him. Therefore etc.

492. Besides, his reason [n.489] does not seem conclusive, because then it follows that, in the ultimate instant of pronouncing the words of consecration [sc. in the eucharist], the true form of bread would be there that was there before during the whole time of the pronouncing.

⁷⁶ ST Ia q.53 a.3 ad 3: "Now the time of motion of an angel can be non-continuous, and thus an angel can in one instant be in one place and in another instant in another place, no time existing in between. But if the time of motion of an angel be continuous, the angel in the whole time preceding the ultimate 'now' changes through an infinity of places." *Ibid.* in corp.: "And thus it is plain that to rest in the whole time in something, as in whiteness, is to be in it in any instant at all of the time; hence it is not possible that something in the whole preceding time rest in one term, and afterwards, in the last instant of the time, be in another term… Now the local motion of an angel is not the term of any other continuous motion…; hence it is impossible to say that in the whole time he is in some place and in the ultimate 'now' he is in some other place, but it is necessary to assign a 'now' in which he was last in the preceding place."

⁷⁷ *Quodlibet* 13 q.7: "And the time measuring these sudden changes of an angel is a discrete quantity..., but its parts have no permanence but are only in transit, and the individual instants coexist with the individual instants of our time; nor do they have continuity among themselves, because between any two instants and stated changes it is necessary to posit a pause of the angel at the moment at which the preceding change ends, in which the angel does not change but as it were rests through some pause and and part of our time."

493. Likewise, when air has rested in being dark for the whole time, it follows that, in the ultimate instant of illumination of the dark air, the air would be dark,⁷⁸ and so it follows that the illumination would not come to be in an instant.

494. And if you say that this illumination is 'term of the local motion' whereby the sun becomes present to the medium – on the contrary:

Let the sun be posited created *de novo* and the medium pre-existent. Now also, although along with the 'where' terminating local motion concurs the illumination of the medium (by the sun made thus present), yet the illumination is not per se the term of the local motion but is some 'where' acquired by the sun itself: nor even by this is it possible to avoid the air's being at rest under being dark up to this instant.

495. Further, if an angel - in whatever time at rest - must in the ultimate of that time have been changed in the same 'where', then he never moves, neither in continuous time nor in discrete time.

496. Proof of the consequence:

I take some part of the time at which he is at rest and consequently with the ultimate of which he is changed.

If too in some instant of discrete time he ought to move locally, I ask: either it is an immediate instant to our instant terminating the time of rest, or a mediate one. If mediate then between our instant (in which the angel changed) and this instant there is a time in between, with which too the angel would be at rest; therefore in that and with that ultimate instant of the time he will be changed, and so in that mediate instant (in which he was posited to change) he does not change. But if it is a mediate instant, I ask what corresponds to it in our time? If an instant, then an instant in our time is immediate to an instant, therefore discrete time [sc. our time is discrete like the angel's]; if time, then in that instant the angel does not change instantaneously, because that instant – for you – coexists with a part of our time, in which or with which he can continuously change or be at rest.

497. Because of this argument perhaps, the second position [sc. of Henry, n.490] posits that between two instants of discrete time falls a quasi-intermediate rest of the angel with an intermediate part of our time.

498. But against this second position it was proved above [nn.161-62] that it is not necessary that the operation of an angel endure with an instant of our time; therefore neither will that duration be the reason for rest in the term of the transition undergone. 'Why will it even be necessary to posit that the angel rests after the transition undergone?' seems not to be a reason but a subterfuge only, lest our time be posited discrete from the fact such transit of his is posited discrete time.

499. Further, that it [sc. this second position] posits that in such a 'now' he can be changed, so that he has at the same time several equal 'wheres', between which there will not be an order save only of nature or in imagination, but not in duration – it seems impossible that an angel by his own natural power have "in one instant of his time and of ours" several equal 'wheres'. And this does an example make clear about the heavy

 $^{^{78}}$ ST Ia q.53 a.3: "But sometimes the term 'to which' is immediate to the term 'from which', as in those changes where the change is from privation to form..., as in illumination; and in these changes too time must be annexed, since it is clear...that the air is not in light and in transit at the same time. But not such that the exit or passage from one extreme to the other happen in time, but one of the extremes...is conjoined...to the local motion of the sun (as in illumination), and in the term of that motion is also the term of change... Hence all such instantaneous changes are terms of the same motion."

(which they [sc. Henry et al.] adduce for the opposite): for if a vacuum could yield to a body put in it (and so there would be motion in a vacuum), it would not be intelligible that the heavy was in several 'wheres' equal to it, but first in one 'where' before in another 'where', and first in a prior 'where' before in a later [n.431]; and one part of the heavy would be prior in duration with a space than another part.

500. What too he himself [sc. Henry] adduces about the body, that it passes through infinite 'wheres' in a finite time, because of this, that it is not in those 'wheres' save in potency – does well prove that the time of an angel can be of infinite parts of the same quantity and yet in that time he can pass through infinite space; but it does not prove that in one instant he can pass through so great a space, rather it proves the opposite: for a body so passes through a whole space in some time that in different parts of the time it passes through different parts of the space.

C. Scotus' own Response

501. I say therefore to the question [n.486] that plurality is not to be posited without necessity,⁷⁹ and there is no necessity why a discrete time should be posited measuring the motion of an angel – for whatever is saved through that discrete time is saved also through continuous time in general: for just as it is necessary for them [sc. those who posit such discrete time] to say that, if he [an angel] transit in an instant, he cannot immediately have another instantaneous transit, so it can be posited – if he transit instantaneously in an instant of common time – that although he can immediately have after that instant a continuous motion in the following time, yet he cannot have an immediate instantaneous transit. It is not therefore unacceptable to posit that an angel, to the extent he participates bodily condition (which, that is, can be in some way of the same idea in him and in a body), that he also participates the 'where' (which is a bodily property in some way of the same idea in himself and in the body); therefore also he can be measured by the measure of the first moved body.

502. And if you object that he could be moved while the heaven is stationary, therefore it is not necessary that his motion is in time - I reply:

With the heaven thus stationary, Peter will be able after the resurrection to walk about, and yet this walking about will not be feigned to be in some other time than our continuous common time, and yet it is with the first motion of the heaven non existent. The resting, indeed, of the heaven is potentially measured (as was said before [n.178]) by the time by which the first motion would be measured – if it existed – positively and actually; and by that potential time can another motion be measured then actually existing, such that it is not necessary that what is measured of the first heaven depend in essence (or in being) on that motion (as was the motion in the time of Joshua with the heaven standing still [*Joshua* 10.12-14]), because this mensuration of a quantum by quantity and quality is not by something on which the measured essentially depends (as in quidditative measures), but it is enough only that that motion – when it is – be able to be distinctly known according to its quantity from distinct knowledge of time, actual or potential. And so I say that when this motion of the heaven will not be, another motion will yet be able to be measured by the time of this motion of the first heaven, insofar

⁷⁹ A version of Ockham's famous razor which, at least in this form, is not original to Ockham.

namely as that motion could come to be with as great a part of this motion, if it existed, and is now with a part of rest as great as a part of motion could be with.

503. On this supposition then, that there is no need to posit for the motion of an angel a measure other than common time [n.501] – when it is asked 'whether an angel can change or move in an instant' [n.486], I say that change can be understood in two ways and can be called a double change: one including the whole reality of motion, the other precisely including the reality of the term of motion.

An example of this is: that this is changed from 'where' *a* to 'where' *b* can be understood in two ways: either that it has at once all the intermediate 'wheres' (as it would have if precisely it were moved successively), or that it would by that change precisely have the ultimate 'where' (as it would have if the change were the ultimate term of motion).

504. In the first way – contradicting the second opinion [n.490] - I do not see in what way an angel could by natural power move or change in an instant, because it does not seem that by his natural power he couldhave several 'wheres' equal to himself [n.499]; in the second way [n.503] it does not seem but that he could move in an instant, because that the term of motion is not immediately induced, this is from the imperfection of the power of the mover itself – which imperfection is not to be attributed to an angel unless some necessity appear, because nature is to be dignified as much as appearances permit.

II. To the Principal Argument

505. To the argument for the opposite [n.487] I say that the consequence of the Philosopher [sc. if a greater power moves in time, a greatest would move in an instant] holds from this, that in the antecedent is included that the measure is divisible, because of this which is posited in it [sc. time]; and in whatever divisible measure some power can do something, a greater power can do it in lesser measure. But in this antecedent, 'an angel changes in an instant', is not included that the measure is divisible.

506. This consequence, therefore, 'it moves in an instant, therefore something can move in less', holds not only from true propositions and the nature of the thing, but from something false which is included in this antecedent ['it moves in an instant']; for this is true from the nature of the thing, 'whatever some power causes in a divisible measure, a greater power can cause it in lesser measure', but the minor [sc. 'an angel moves in an instant'] – which will there need to be subsumed under this true major– is not true from the nature of the thing, but only by hypothesis, namely this, that 'there is motion in an instant'. But if it be said that 'an angel changes in an instant', and through this must be inferred that 'some power should change him in less than an instant' – the minor thus needing to be assumed will not be true from the nature of the thing, nor by hypothesis, and therefore the consequences [sc. consequences where one premise is left unexpressed] do not hold precisely by virtue of some truth implicitly understood, but sometimes by virtue of something false implicitly understood, provided however it be included in the antecedent.

Question Eight

Whether an Angel can Move from Extreme to Extreme without Going through the Middle

507. Twelfth and lastly I ask whether an angel can move from extreme to extreme without going through the middle.

508. That yes:

Because either an angel is in place by operation (according to some), and it seems plain that he can operate at the extreme not operating in the middle [Aquinas *Sent.* 1 d.37 q.3 a.1, q.4 a.2]; or at least by command of will he moves himself (although through some other executive power), and he can will to be at the extreme not willing to be in the middle, just as he can understand the extreme not understanding the middle [Aquinas *Quodlibet* 1 q.3 a.2].

509. Second thus: the body of Christ, existing in the empyrean heaven, is now on the altar, and it does not go through the middle; therefore this will an angel be able to do, since a body seems more to follow the laws of place than a spirit [William of Ware, *Sent*. 2 d.2 q.11 arg.1].

510. On the contrary:

No part of time can pass from future to past save through the present; but there seems to be as essential an order between the parts of place as between the parts of time; therefore a transiting from extreme to extreme will not be possible save through the middle [William of Ware, *Sent.* 2 q.11 arg.2 to the opposite].

I. To the Question

511. Here some say that extremes can be understood either as two distant 'wheres', between which there is some middle that is nothing of the extremes, - or as two immediate ['wheres'] between which there are middles any of which, however, is something of the extremes.

512. Speaking of middles in the second way and of the continuous motion of an angel, I say that he cannot continuously transit from extreme to extreme (speaking thus [sc. in the second way] of extremes) save by passing through such a middle as is of each extreme, because such a middle is the idea of continuity between transited extremes, as is plain from the definition of a middle in *Metaphysics* 10.5.1057a21-26.⁸⁰

513. It seems also to be similar when speaking of continuous motion and of a middle said in the other way [sc. the first, n.511], because if he [an angel] moves continuously, he is not totally in either term: therefore partly in one and partly in the other, or in the middle between both; for it cannot be said – as it seems – that he is in part of one extreme and in part of the other and yet that altogether he is not in such middle between such extremes, because then he would be in two discontinuous places and in no way in a middle place, which does not seem it can belong to him by natural power [nn.262-64].

514. And if we speak of indivisible motion, I say that in such motion he can pass from extreme to immediate extreme not passing through a middle that is something of

⁸⁰ "For we call those middles into whatever that which changes must change first, as...in colors, if it come from white to black, it will come first to red and grey before to black."

either extreme; rather this must be so, because if he were to pass through such a middle he would pass through continuously and not instantaneously [n.512].

515. But about distant extremes there is doubt. It is plain indeed, from the preceding question [nn.503-504], that he cannot put himself in a distant extreme by a change that includes the whole reality of motion. – But can he really put himself at a distant extreme, including precisely the reality of the term of motion, so that in some whole time he is in 'where' a and in part of that time he is precisely in 'where' b (such that 'where' b is distant from 'where' a by some middle, in which middle he will never have been, neither in time nor in an instant)? It seems probably that not, because an order pre-fixed by a superior agent seems to be necessary for any inferior agent when he has an action precisely about such ordered things (example: the order of natural forms, succeeding themselves in natural generation, is determined by the institutor of nature, and therefore in respect of any natural agent is necessary, so that no natural agent can make vinegar immediately save from wine); therefore, since by God has the order of the principal parts of the universe been imposed on every created agent and created power, this order seems to be necessary when he [any such natural agent] has to act about these things of which there is such order. Therefore an angel, when he moves himself through bodies of which there is such an order, he cannot, without any order about any 'where', put himself in any 'where' immediately; for then no distance would seem to impede his action.

516. And if you object that this reason [n.515] is conclusive against the other member, 'about middles that are part of the extremes' [n.514], I said that it is not, because there, by passing from one 'where' immediately to another 'where' in an instant, he has all the 'wheres' in some order of nature (between which there is a potential order from the nature of the thing), but it is not necessary that he have them in order of duration; and if he were to pass from distant to distant without order in any way, then in no order – neither of nature nor of duration – would he have them, of which there is a natural order, about which however he operates necessarily presupposing an order of them.

II. To the Principal Arguments

517. To the first argument [n.508] I say that a bad angel can will disorderedly; and it is not necessary, that the fact a good angel only wills in ordered way, that he will by his own virtue – and so if he wills at once to be in some 'where', yet he does not will that by his own virtue he be there, because this would be to will disorderedly. If however such power does not belong to him, but to will by the power of God to be immediately there [sc. does belong to him], it is likely that God condescend to his will (if it be such), so as to put him in such 'where'; but never by his own power can he be anywhere save in the way in which it belongs to his power.

518. To the second [n.509] I say that the body of Christ is by his infinite power made present on the altar, about which in book IV [d.10 p.1 q.3 n.5]. But that infinite power can have any middle between extremes for no middle, and order for no order, because it is above that order, prefixing it and not holding it for prefixed; but not so the limited power of an angel.

519. From this it is plain to that from On Sense and Sensibles 6.446b28-7a6, which was omitted in question 5 about the location of an angel [n.404]. For it is not unacceptable that some alteration is all at once, when namely the agent has regard to the whole passive subject as indivisible term and to the form according to its ultimate degree (according to which it induces it whole as an indivisible); then by an indivisible change is a perfect form induced in a divisible subject. But according to such form there is not motion, but only one change – or perhaps several are had (either in order of duration or of nature), as he [Aristotle] himself there says, that "if there has been much, what is had undergoes from what is had" [n.299];⁸¹ which can be understood in two ways: in one way that a later part by a prior part – naturally perfect before –, is perfected naturally later, so that there be only an order of nature between the change of the prior and the later part; in another way that there is an order of duration, namely that a later part is moved successively by a prior part and yet the prior part was changed precisely by the very extrinsic agent (this second way seems more improbable, unless it be posited that the prior part, having been changed, is more imperfect than what changes it, and so it could not suddenly change [sc. another] the way it itself was suddenly changed by the extrinsic agent).

520. Therefore does the Philosopher there say that "it is not so in the multiplication of sound as in light," because the multiplication of sound in quantity, which happens with local motion, is necessarily successive – not so the multiplication of light; and thus is simultaneity not repugnant to the idea of alteration as it is to the idea of change of place, and this in comparing to natural power. But yet there is never [simultaneity], neither in alterations, which are motion's first change, as neither in changes of place, because where the change is instantaneous, there it is not a change initiating motion; nor too does it [simultaneity] follow universally where motion follows, if it is possible for a change to be that is the term of the preceding rest (but where change follows rest immediately because of the perfection of the power of the agent, there is there no change terminating the preceding rest).

Third Distinction First Part

On the Principle of Individuation

Question One

Whether Material Substance is of Itself or of its Nature Individual or Singular

1. Concerning the third distinction a question about the personal distinction in angels is to be asked. But to see about this distinction in angels it is first necessary to ask about individual distinction in material substances; about which, just as different people speak in different ways, so do they accordingly speak about the plurality of individuals in the same angelic species. And so that a distinct view may be had of the diverse opinions

⁸¹ "If however there has been much that heats and freezes, what is had comes to be or undergoes from what is had."

that are queried about the distinction or lack of distinction in material substance, I inquire one by one about the diverse ways of positing the distinction^a – and first whether material substance is of itself or from its own nature individual or singular.

a. [Interpolation] "Behold, it has been shown where the angels were as soon as they were created; now it follows to investigate of what sort they were made at the very beginning of their condition etc." Lombard Sent. 2 d.3 c.1 n.17. Concerning this third distinction, where the Master considers of what sort are angels created as to their natural conditions, the question is asked principally about two things, - first about the their personal distinction, second about their natural knowledge [n.255]; but because from the personal distinction of material substance we are led to knowledge of the personal distinction of spiritual substance, so first it is necessary to see about individual distinction in material substance, and lastly in spiritual substance. And because about individual distinction in material substance there is a variety of opinions, therefore according to the variety of opinions will the variety of questions be formed: first therefore the question is asked whether material substance is of itself or of its nature individual or singular; second whether it is individual through some positive intrinsic thing; third whether it is individual through actual existence, or something else is the idea of individuating; fourth whether by quantity; fifth whether by matter; sixth whether by some positive entity determining nature to singularity per se; seventh and lastly whether it is possible for there to be several angels in the same species.

2. That it is:

The Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7.13.1038b10-11 proves against Plato, that "the substance of anything whatever is proper to that of which it is, and is not in another;" therefore etc. Therefore material substance of its own nature, with everything else removed, is proper to that in which it is, so that of its nature it cannot be in another; therefore of its nature it is individual.

3. On the contrary:

Whatever is in something from its idea per se, is in it in any whatever; therefore, if the nature of a stone of itself were a 'this', whatever the nature of a stone was in, that nature would be 'this stone'. The consequent is unacceptable speaking of determinate singularity, about which the question is.

4. Further, that to which of itself one opposite belongs, to it is the other opposite repugnant of itself; therefore if a nature of itself be one in number, to it is a numerical multitude repugnant.

I. To the Question A. Opinion of Others

5. [Exposition of the Opinion] Here it is said that as nature is of itself formally nature, so is it of itself singular, such that there is no need to seek for another cause of singularity than the cause of nature, as if nature first - in time or nature - is nature before it is singular, and then by something additional is it contracted so as to become singular.

6. Which is proved by a likeness: because just as nature has of itself true being outside the soul, but does not have being in the soul except from another, that is, from the soul itself (and the reason is because to be true belongs to it simply, - but to be in the soul is the to be of it in a certain respect), so universality does not belong to a thing save according to being in a certain respect, namely in the soul; but singularity belongs to a

thing according to true being, and so of itself and simply. Therefore a cause must be sought why nature is universal (and the intellect must be given as cause), – but not any cause is to be looked for why nature is singular other than the nature of the thing, mediating between it and its singularity, but the same causes that are causes of the unity of the thing are also of its singularity; therefore etc.^{a 82}

a. [Interpolation⁸³] Against this it is argued thus, first on the part of the commonness of nature: if of itself it is a 'this', it is repugnant to being communicated, as is plain of the divine essence⁸⁴ – and so also in angels, if [their essence] were of itself a 'this'. It is proved too, because that to which one opposite belongs of itself, to it is the other repugnant; but to material nature communicability is not repugnant. Again, if nature, according to that which it is in reality, were of itself a 'this', it would be impossible to understand it universal unless it is understood under the opposite idea of understanding such an object [n.7]. Again, if in the idea of nature singularity is included, then it is repugnant to it to be 'not-this' (and so to be a universal [n.38]), because whatever is repugnant to the included also is to the including [cf. Scotus *Rep* II A d.12 q.5].

7. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this [n.5] it is argued as follows:

An object insofar as it is object is prior naturally to the act, and in that prior – for you – the object is of itself singular, because this always belongs to nature not taken in a certain respect or according to the being that it has in the soul; therefore the intellect, understanding that object under the idea of universal, understands it under an idea opposite to its idea, because as it precedes act it is determined of itself to the opposite of that idea, namely of the universal.

8. Further, of whatever the unity real, proper, and sufficient is less than numerical unity, that is not of itself one with numerical unity (or is not of itself a 'this'); but of the nature existing in this stone there is a unity proper, real or sufficient, less than numerical unity; therefore etc.

9. The major is of itself plain, because nothing is of itself 'one' with a unity greater than the unity sufficient for it: for if its proper unity – which is due to something of itself – is less than numerical unity, numerical unity does not belong to it of its nature and in itself (otherwise precisely from its nature it would have a greater and a lesser unity, which about the same thing and according to the same thing are opposites, – because with a lesser unity can stand, without contradiction, a multitude opposed to a greater unity, which multitude cannot stand with a greater unity, because it is repugnant to it; therefore etc.).

10. Proof of the minor [n.8]: because if there is no real unity of nature less than singularity, and all unity 'other than the unity of singularity and of specific nature' is less than real unity, – therefore there will be no real unity less than numerical unity; the consequent is false, as I will prove in five or six ways [nn.11, 16, 18, 19, 20, 23, 28]: therefore etc.

11. The first way is of this sort:

⁸² Vatican Editors: Several other reasons for this opinion are adduced by Scotus in *Metaphysics* 7 q.13 n.16.

⁸³ Cf. Scotus *Rep*. II A d.12 q.5

⁸⁴ The Vatican editors note that this remark is not strictly true: the divine essence can indeed be communicated, as it is to the divine persons, but it is not communicated by way of division.

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b19-24, "in every genus there is one first, which is the standard and measure of everything that is of that genus."

12. This unity of the first measurer is real, because the Philosopher proves [*ibid*.] that the first idea of measure belongs to a 'one', and he makes clear by order how that is 'one' to which the idea of measuring belongs in every genus. Now this unity is of something insofar as it is first in the genus: it is therefore real, because measureds are real and really measured; but real being cannot be really measured by a being of reason; therefore it [sc. the unity of the measurer] is real.

13. But this unity is not numerical, because no singular is in a genus, which is the measure of all that which is in that genus – for according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 3.3.999a12-13 "in individuals of the same species it is not [the case] that this is prior and that posterior."

14. Which prior, although the Commentator [Averroes *Metaphysics* 3 com.11] expounds it of a prior constituting a posterior, yet it is nothing to the *b* [sc. the minor premise, n.13], because the Philosopher intends there [*ibid*. 999a6-13] to assign the reason why Plato posited that the idea of species is separate and not in a genus, – because in species there is an essential order, because of which the posterior can be reduced to the prior (and so according to him [Plato] it is not necessary to posit an idea of the genus, 'through participation in which the species are what they are', but an idea of the species, to which all the others are reduced); but in individuals, according to Plato and according to the Philosopher reporting him, there is not such an order, whether one constitute another or not; therefore etc.

15. So the Philosopher's intention there is to agree with Plato that in individuals of the same species there is not an essential order. Therefore no individual is the per se measure of those that are in its species – therefore neither numerical unity or individual.

16. Further, second, I prove that the same consequent [n.10, 'there will be no real unity less than numerical unity'] is false:

Because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.249a3-8⁸⁵ comparison happens in an undivided [a-tomic] species, because it is one nature – but not in a genus, because a genus does not have such unity.

17. This difference [sc. between unity of species and unity of genus] is not of unity according to idea, because the concept of a genus is as one in number in the intellect as is the concept of a species; otherwise no concept would be said in the 'what' of many species (and so no concept would be a genus), but there would be as many concepts said of species as there are concepts of species, and then in singular predications the same thing would be predicated of itself [sc. the species would be predicated of the species]. Likewise, unity of concept or of non-concept is nothing for the Philosopher's intention there, namely for comparison or not [n.16]. Therefore the Philosopher intends there that the specific nature is one with unity of specific nature; but he does not intend that it is thus one with numerical unity, because in numerical unity no comparison is made. Therefore etc.

18. Further, third:

⁸⁵ "If then comparable things must not only not be equivocal but must also have no difference..., then a thing is not comparable in this way, namely whether something colored is more white than black (for these are not compared as to some color but insofar as there is color), but in whiteness [sc. whether something white is more white]."

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a9-12, in the chapter on 'Relative to', same, like, and equal are founded on 'one', so that although likeness have for foundation a thing of the genus of such a quality, yet relation is not real unless it have a real foundation and a real proximate idea of founding; therefore the unity that is required in the foundation of the relation of likeness is real: but it is not numerical unity, because nothing one and the same is like or equal to itself.

19. Further, fourth:

Of one real opposition there are two real extremes; but contrariety is a real opposition (which is apparent, because one [contrary] really corrupts or destroys the other, all work of the intellect being removed, and only because they are contraries); therefore each first extreme of this opposition is real and 'one' with some real unity; but not with numerical unity, because then precisely this white would be first contrary to this black (or precisely that white), which is unacceptable, because then there would be as many first contrarieties as there are contrary individuals; therefore etc.

20. Further, fifth:

Of one action of sense there is one object according to some real unity; but not numerical; so there is some other real unity than numerical unity.

21. Proof of the minor, because a power knowing an object thus (insofar namely as it is 'with this unity' one) knows it insofar as it is distinct from anything that is not one with this unity – but sense does not know an object insofar as it is distinct from anything which is one with that numerical unity: which is apparent, because no sense distinguishes that this ray of the sun differs numerically from another ray, although however they are diverse because of the motion of the sun; if all common sensibles be removed (to wit, diversity of place or of position), and if two quanta were posited to be at the same time by divine power which also were completely alike and equal in whiteness – sight would not distinguish that there were two whites there (if however it [sight] knew either of them insofar as it is one with numerical unity, it would know it insofar as it is a one distinct by numerical unity).

22. It could also, continuing from this [n.20], be argued about the first object of sense, that it is one in itself by some real unity, because just as the object 'of this power' – insofar as it is object – precedes intellect, so too does it, according to its real unity, precede every action of intellect. But this reason is not as conclusive as the preceding one [n.20]: for it could be posited that some first object – as it is adequate to the power – is something common, abstracted from all particular objects, and thus does not have a unity save of commonness to those several particular objects; but of one object of one act of sensing [this argument] does not seem to deny that it necessarily has a unity real and less than numerical unity.

23. Further, sixth:

Because if every real unity is numerical, then every real diversity is numerical. But the consequent is false, because every numerical diversity, insofar as numerical, is equal – and so everything would be equally distinct; and then it follows that no more could the intellect abstract from Socrates and Plato something common than from Socrates and line, and any universal at all would be a pure figment of the intellect.

24. The first consequence is proved in two ways:

First, because one and many, same and diverse are opposites (from *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054a20-21, b22-23); but as often as one opposite is said, as often is also the one

remaining said (from *Topics* 1.15.106b14-15); therefore to any unity corresponds its own proper diversity.

25. It is proved secondly, because each extreme of any diversity is in itself one – and in the way in which it is one in itself, in the same way it seems diverse from the remaining extreme, so that the unity of one extreme seems to be the per se idea of the diversity of the other extreme.

26. It is confirmed also in another way, because if there is only in this thing real numerical unity, whatever unity is in that thing is of itself one in number [sc. it is 'one' in its own and different way]; therefore this thing and that according to the whole entity in them are first diverse, because diverse when in no 'one' in any way agreeing.

27. It is confirmed too also from this, that numerical diversity is this singular not being that singular, supposing however the entity of each extreme. But such unity is necessarily of the other extreme.

28. Further:

With no intellect existing, fire would generate fire and would corrupt water, and there would be some real unity of generating to generated according to form, because of which generation would be univocal. For the intellect when considering does not make generation to be univocal but recognizes it to be univocal.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

29. To the question therefore [n.1], conceding the conclusion of those arguments [nn.7-8], I say that material substance of its nature is not of itself a 'this', because then, as the first argument deduces [n.7], the intellect could not understand it [material substance] under the opposite unless it understood its object under an idea of understanding repugnant to the idea of such object.

30. As too the second argument [n.8] deduces (with all its proofs [nn.9-28]), there is some unity real in a thing, without any operation of the intellect, less than numerical unity or than the proper unity of a singular, which 'unity' belongs to nature in itself, – and according to this proper unity of nature as it is nature, nature is indifferent to the unity of singularity; not then is it of itself thus a 'one' by it, namely by unity of singularity.

31. But how this should be understood can in some way be seen from a dictum of Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.1 f.86va,⁸⁶ where he maintains that "horseness is only horseness, – nor is it of itself one nor many, nor universal nor particular." I mean: it is not of itself one by numerical unity, nor many by a manyness opposed to that unity; nor a universal in act (in the way namely that something is universal as it is an object of the intellect), nor is it a particular of itself.

32. For although it never is really without any of these, it is of itself however not any of them, but is prior naturally to all of them, – and according to natural priority the 'what it is' is per se object of the intellect and per se, as such, is considered by the metaphysician and expressed by a definition; and propositions 'true in the first mode' are

⁸⁶ "For the definition of horseness is tangential to the definition of universality, nor is universality contained in the definition of horseness; for horseness has a definition that does not need universality, but is that to which universality is accidental; hence horseness itself is not anything but horseness only: for it is of itself neither many nor one, nor is it existent in these sensibles nor in the soul, nor is it any of these in potency or in effect, so that this be contained within the essence of horseness, but from this which is horseness only."

true by reason of the 'whatness' thus taken, because nothing is said 'per se in the first mode' of a 'whatness' save what is included in it essentially, insofar as it is abstracted from all these which are naturally posterior to it [on the modes of 'per se', see *Ord*.I d.3 n.164, d.5 n.18, d.2 nn.19, 25].

33. And not only is nature itself indifferent of itself to being in the intellect and in the particular, and thereby to being universal and particular (or singular), – but also, as having being in the intellect, it does not first have of itself universality. For although it is understood under universality as under the mode of understanding it, yet universality is not part of its first concept, because it is not [part] of a metaphysical concept but of a logical one (for the logician considers second intentions applied to first intentions, according to him [Avicenna]). The first intellection, therefore, is of 'nature' as is not understood along with it any mode, neither one which is of it in the intellect nor which is of it outside the intellect; although universality is a mode of understanding of the intellect, but not a mode of the intellect.

34. And just as according to that being [sc. being in the intellect] the nature is not of itself universal, but universality is accident to that nature according to the first idea of it, according to which it is object, - so too in the thing outside, where nature is with singularity, that nature is not of itself determined to singularity, but is prior naturally to the idea that contracts it to that singularity, and insofar as it is prior naturally to what contracts it, there is no repugnance for it to exist without what contracts it. And just as the object in the intellect, according to the primacy of it and universality, truly had intelligible being [nn.32-33], so too in the real thing does nature according to that entity have true real being outside the soul, - and according to that entity it has unity proportional to it, which is indifferent to singularity, so that it is not repugnant to that unity from itself that it be posited with any unity whatever of singularity (in this way therefore I understand that 'nature has a real unity, less than numerical unity'); and although it not have it of itself, so as to be within the idea of nature (because 'horseness is just horseness', as Avicenna says in *Metaphysics* 5 [n.31]), yet that unity is the proper property of nature according to its first entity, and consequently it is not of itself a 'this' inwardly nor according to the proper entity necessarily included in nature itself according to the first entity of it.

35. But against this [n.34, about the indetermination and indifference of nature to singularity] seem to be two objections:

One, because it seems to posit that the universal is something real in the thing (which is against the Commentator [Averroes], *On the Soul* 1 comm.8,⁸⁷ who says that 'the intellect makes universality in things, so that it does not exist save through the intellect', and so is only a being of reason) – for this nature, according as it is a being in this stone, prior naturally however to the singularity of the stone, is from what was said [n.34] indifferent to this singular and that.

⁸⁷ "It is demonstrated by this that he himself [Aristotle] does not think that definitions of genera and species are definitions of universal things existing outside the soul, but they are definitions of particular things outside the intellect; but the intellect – which acts – makes in them universality; and as if he is saying: and the being of definitions is not attributed to species and genera such that those universal things are existent outside the intellect. For the universal living thing [or animal] is either altogether nothing, or its being is posterior to the being of sensible things, if there is a something universal, a being per se; and he said this because it appears here that definitions are of these sensible things existing outside the intellect: and then either they are not universal things existing per se, the way Plato used to say, or if they are, the being of them is not necessary in understanding the substances of sensible things."

36. Further, Damascene *Orthodox Faith* ch.8 n.16 says, "It is necessary to know that it is one thing to be considered in reality and another in reason and thought. Therefore, and more particularly, in all creatures indeed the division of hypostases [supposits] is considered in the thing (for in the thing is Peter considered separate from Paul), but commonness and union are considered in the intellect only, by reason and thought (for we understand by the intellect that Peter and Paul are of one nature, and have one common nature);" "for neither are these hypostases in each other, but each is singly parted, that is, separated in reality." And later [ch.8 n.17], "But in the holy and supersubstantial Trinity it is conversely: for there the common indeed is considered one in the thing," "but in thought afterwards, divided."

37. To the first [n.35], I say that the universal in act is that which has some indifferent unity, according to which the very same thing is in proximate potency to being said of any supposit at all, because, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b26-33, a 'universal' is what is one in many and of many. For nothing – according to any unity – is in reality such that according to that precise unity it is in proximate potency to any supposit by a predication saying 'this is this'; because, although it is not repugnant to anything existing in reality to be in another singularity than that in which it is [n.34], yet that cannot truly be said of any inferior at all, that 'anything at all is it'; for this is only possible of an object the same in number, actually considered by the intellect – which indeed 'as understood' has the numerical unity also of an object, according to which it the same is predicable of every singular, by saying 'this is this'.

38. From this is apparent a refutation of the statement that 'the agent intellect makes universality in things' [n.35, cf. Scotus *On the Soul* q.17 n.14], through this, that of every 'what it is' existing in a phantasm it can be said that it is the sort to which it is not repugnant to be in something else, and by this, which denudes⁸⁸ the 'what is' existing in the phantasm [Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 8 q.12, 13 q.8] – for wherever a 'what is' is before in the possible intellect it has objective being, whether in the thing or in a phantasm, whether it has certain being or being deduced by reason (and thus not by any [intelligible] light, but it is always such a nature of itself that to be in another is not repugnant to it), not however is it of the sort that it belongs to it in proximate potency to be said of anything, but it is only in proximate potency in the possible intellect.

There is then in reality a 'common thing', which is not of itself a 'this', and consequently 'not-this' is not of itself repugnant to it. But such a common thing is not a universal in act, because the indifference is lacking according to which a universal is completively universal, according to which namely it the same by some identity is predicable of any individual, such that any at all is it.

39. To the second objection – from Damascene [n.36] - I say that the way in which in divine the 'common' is one really, the common in creatures in that way is not one really. For there [in divine reality] the common is singular and individual, because the very divine nature of itself is a 'this', and in that way it is manifest that no universal in creatures is really one; for positing this would be to posit that some created non-divided nature would be predicated of many individuals by a predication saying 'this is this', just as it is said that the Father is God and the Son is the same God. In creatures, however, there is some common thing one by a real unity less than numerical unity, – and

⁸⁸ That is, denudes the quiddity of all the particular and material conditions it has in singulars, whether in imagination or reality.

this indeed 'common thing' is not so common that it is predicable of many, although it is so common that it is not repugnant to it to be in another than in that in which it is.

40. So it is doubly plain how the authority [of Damascene, n.36] is not against me: first because he is speaking of the unity of singularity in divine reality, - and in this way not only is the created universal not one but not the common in creatures either; second because he is speaking of a common predicable, not precisely of a common that is determinate in fact (though it is not repugnant to it to be in another), which sort of common precisely can be posited in creatures really.

II. To the Principal Argument

41. And by this, which has been said, it is plain to the principal argument [n.2], because the Philosopher rejects the fiction that he imputes to Plato, that namely 'this man' per se existing – which is posited an 'Idea' – cannot be per se universal to every man, because 'every substance per se existing is proper to that of which it is' [n.2], that is: either it is of itself proper or it is by something contracting it made proper and, with this contracting thing posited, it cannot be in another, although it is not repugnant to it of itself to be in another – and this gloss too is true, speaking of substance of Socrates because not the nature of Socrates either – because neither of itself proper, nor made proper, to Socrates so that it only be in him, but it is also in another, according to him [Plato]. But if substance be taken for first substance,⁸⁹ then it is true that any substance is of itself proper to that of which it is, and then much more does it follow that the Idea – which is posited 'substance per se existent' – cannot in that way be the substance of Socrates or of Plato; but the first member [sc. here above "either it is of itself proper...] suffices for the matter in question.

III. To the Confirmation of the Opinion

42. To the confirmation of the opinion [n.6], it is plain that commonness and singularity are not related so to nature as are being in the intellect and true being outside the soul, because commonness belongs to nature outside the intellect, and likewise singularity – and commonness belongs of itself to nature, but singularity belongs to nature through something in reality contracting it; but universality does not belong to a thing from itself. And therefore I concede that a cause of universality must be looked for, but a cause of commonness need not be looked for other than nature itself; and with commonness posited in nature itself according to its proper entity and unity, there is necessarily need to look for a cause of singularity, which super-adds something to the nature of which it is [the topic of the next five questions, nn.43-211].

Question Two

Whether Material Substance through Some Positive Intrinsic thing is of itself Individual

"Substance taken for nature is called second substance, and taken for a supposit, it is called first substance". Godfrey at

⁸⁹ Meaning of 'first and second substance': Vatican editors at n.43, referring to Scotus Ord.I d.26 nn.57, 60-61:

fn. 95 infra. "First substance, which is an individual in the genus of substance, is one-something and this-something,"

43. I ask second whether material substance through some positive intrinsic thing is of itself individual.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Argument about the second, namely whether material substance is individual through some positive intrinsic thing.

44. That not:

Because 'one' states only privation of division in itself and privation of identity with another; therefore, since singularity or individuation only states a double negation, it is not necessary to seek something positive as its cause, but negation suffices.

45. The first proposition is proved, because if 'one' were to state a positive idea, not the same as being states (for then saying 'being is one' would be idle); nor does it state another idea, because then in any being there would be entity added to entity, which seems unacceptable.

46. On the contrary:

First substance is per se generated (from *Metaphysics* 7.6.1033a24-b19) and per se operates (from *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16-19), and in this it is distinguished from second substance, to which neither per se belongs; therefore these belong to first substance through what it adds above second substance. But these do not belong to anything formally through negation; therefore first substance does not add only negation beyond second substance [n.53].

I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

47. Here it is said that individuation in created things is done through a double negation – which opinion seek in [Henry] *Quodlibet* 5 q.8.⁹⁰

48. But against this opinion:

First I expound the meaning of the questions moved about this material [sc. the six about individual distinction in material substances, above at *Ord*.II d.3 pt.1, nn.1, 43, 59, 66, 129, 142]; for I am not asking by what a nature is singular or individual, if these terms signify a second intention (because then by a second intention formally would a nature be singular and effectively from the intellect causing that second intention, namely by bringing 'this nature' to 'nature' as a subject-able to a predicable), – nor too am I asking about real numerical unity, whereby formally a nature is thus one (for by numerical unity a thing is formally one, whether that unity converts with being or is in the genus of quantity or states a privation or a positing); but because in entities there is something indivisible into subjective parts, that is 'to which it is formally repugnant to be

⁹⁰ Henry: "It is necessary then that [the cause of individuation] be something negative or positive-relative; but not positive-relative, because that respect would necessarily be founded on the thing itself as it has been made and so as determinate in a supposit; it is necessary then that it be some negative condition. It must therefore be said that in specific created forms...the idea of individuation...is negation, whereby the form itself..., as it is the term of making, is made altogether undivided in the supposit and individual and singular, by privation of all divisibility (per se and per accidens), and divided from anything else whatever... Which negation, indeed, is not simple but double – because it is a remover from within of all plurifiability and diversity from within and of all identity from without... And this double negation altogether formally determines the idea of the form, by which determination an absolute supposit over and above the essence of the form is constituted... Thus, therefore, only by the determination of negation about form...does completely there come to be – as by formal idea – both the individuation and constitution of a supposit."

divided into several things any one of which is it', the question being asked is not whereby that is formally repugnant (because by repugnance it is formally repugnant), but by what as proximate and intrinsic foundation this repugnance is in this. Therefore the meaning of the questions about this matter is what is in this stone by which 'as by proximate foundation' it is simply repugnant to it to be divided into several things any one of which is it, which sort of division is proper to a whole universal into its subjective parts.

49. By understanding in this way, I prove that there is not any individual formally as the position [n.47] seems to posit.

First,⁹¹ because nothing is simply repugnant to any being through a mere privation in it, but through something positive in it; therefore to be divided into subjective parts is not repugnant to a stone – in that it is a certain being – through any negations.

50. Proof of the antecedent: because however much negation may take away the proximate potency for acting and undergoing, so that thereby the being which negation is in is not in proximate potency to anything – it yet does not posit a formal repugnance of that being to something, because when *per possibile* or *impossibile* those negations are removed (since they are not), such a being would stand with the opposite of those negations, and so with that to which it is said to be repugnant per se, which is impossible.

An example of this: if substance be understood to be a non-quantum, it is not divisible (that is, it is not able to be divided in proximate potency), yet it is not repugnant to it to be divided, because then it would be repugnant to it to receive quantity through which it could be formally divided; therefore, with the nature of the same bodily substance standing, it is not repugnant to it that it be divisible. Likewise: if 'not to have sight' take away the proximate potency for seeing, yet it does not create a repugnance for seeing, because the same positive nature (in which this negation was) can stand, and the opposite of that negation can be in it without repugnance on the part of nature.

51. So could it be argued in the matter at hand: although he [sc. Henry] posit nature 'of itself one and individual',⁹² yet never through any negation posited in nature will it be repugnant to it to be formally divided, and so never will there be any positive being in things that will be completely individual.

52. And if in any way it be objected to the first proposition of this reason [n.49], at least I assume this proposition: 'no imperfection is repugnant to anything formally save because of some perfection' which is something positive and a positive entity; but 'to be divided' is a certain imperfection (and therefore it cannot belong to the divine nature); therefore etc.

53. Again, by negation is there not constituted anything formally in a more perfect entity than is the entity presupposed to the negation (otherwise the negation would be

⁹¹ Four proofs are given altogether: nn. 49, 53, 54, 55-56.

⁹² *Quodlibet* 5 q.8, "Now there is another form which, according to thing and nature, is in itself thus one and undivided and divided from another, as it subsists in supposits with nothing formal added to it, – as it is a form of any most specific species, whose unity is only according to reason; 'undivided' I say, as far as is of itself, as to subjective parts... But any specific form does not of itself and by its nature admit division into supposits, but is simple, – and in whatever it exists, it is whole in it." ... "An individual form (as humanity or assinity) of itself and by its nature is simple and indivisible, by the fact that of itself and by its nature it does not have parts differing in form, as the form of genus does – which in this differs from the form of species, that the form of a genus...of itself and by its nature is divided through parts differing in form, and of itself does not have a natural unity, but according to idea and concept of the intellect only; but the form of a species of itself and by the nature of species is individual according to form, having of itself a unity terminated in being of nature and in the intellect together."

formally some positive entity); but first substance (according to the Philosopher in *Categories* 5.2a11-15) is most of all substance, and is also more substance than second substance; therefore it is not constituted formally in the entity of first substance by a negation, insofar as it is distinguished from second substance [n.46].

54. Again, of a singular there is predicated per se in the first mode that of which it is the singular; but of any being 'taken under negation' is not predicated per se any entity by reason of the whole subject, because the whole is not per se one (if by reason of a part, then it is not predication of a superior of an inferior but of the same thing of itself).

55. Further, although this position [of Henry, n.47] may seem to be false in itself, because of the arguments already made [nn.49-54], if the individual is understood to be constituted in entity and unity of singularity by negation, - yet it seems altogether superfluous and not to respond to the question because, with it posited, still the same question remains:

For about the double negation, which he posits, I ask what is the reason why this negation belongs to it. If he says this double negation is per se cause, the question is not responded to: for that by which the opposites of these negations are repugnant is being queried, and consequently by what are these negations in it.

56. Likewise, I ask whence this negation is, since it is of the same idea in this and in that? For just as in Socrates there is a double negation, so in Plato there is a negation of a double idea; whence then is Socrates singular by this singularity (proper and determinate) and not by the singularity of Plato? It is impossible to say unless there is found whence this negation is negation, and this cannot be if not through something positive.

B. Scotus' own Solution

57. I concede therefore the conclusions of these reasons [nn.49-56], that it must be through something positive intrinsic to this stone, as through a proper idea, that to be divided into subjective parts is repugnant to it; and that positive thing will be that which will be said to be the per se cause of individuation, because by individuation I understand that indivisibility, or repugnance to divisibility.

II. To the Principal Argument

58. To the argument for the opposite [n.44]:

Although the assumption [sc. 'that 'one' states only privation of division in the thing itself and privation of its identity with something else'] is perhaps false (about which elsewhere [not in the *Ordinatio*; see *Metaphysics* 4 q.2 nn.2, 4, 7, 9, 13; 7 q.3 n.17]), yet if it were true that 'one' signified formally that double negation, it does not follow that it not have some positive cause whereby that double negation is in it – for both would specific unity, by parity of reason, signify double negation, and yet none denies that positive entity is in the idea of specific entity, from which positive entity the idea of specific difference is taken. And this is a good argument for the solution of the question [n.43] and for the opinion [n.47] because, since in any unity less than numerical unity it is possible to grant a positive entity (which is the per se reason of that unity and

of repugnance to the many-ness opposed), most of all - or equally - will it be possible to grant this in the most perfect unity, which is numerical unity.

Question Three

Whether Material Substance is Individual, or the Reason for Individuating Another, through Actual Existence

59. Third I ask, without arguments, whether material substance through actual existence is individual or reason for individuating another.

I. Opinion of Others

60. It is said that it is so,^a because, from *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a3-7, 'act determines and distinguishes', therefore ultimate distinction is through ultimate act; but the ultimate act of individuals is according to being of existence, because anything whatever other than it is understood in potency to it.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the third, namely whether material substance is individual through actual existence or something else is reason for individuating, it is said without arguments that material substance is individual and singular through actual existence.

II. Rejection of the Opinion

61. Against this:

First, because what is not of itself distinct or determinate cannot be first distinguisher or determiner of something else; but being of existence, in the way in which it is distinguished from being of essence, is not of itself distinct or determinate (for being of existence does not have differences proper to it other than the differences of being of essence, because then it would be necessary to posit a co-ordering of existences proper to them other than the co-ordering of essences), but it is precisely determined from the determination of another; therefore it does not determine anything else.

62. From this it could in another way be argued: because that which presupposes the determination and distinction of another is not the reason for distinguishing or determining itself; but existence, as determinate and distinct, presupposes the order and distinctness of essences; therefore etc.

63. And if it be said that it presupposes every distinction other than that which is for individuals, but that which is for an individual it does cause, – on the contrary: in predicamental co-ordering [sc. the categories] are all the things that per se pertain to that co-ordering, with whatever that is nothing of that co-ordering removed, because, according to the Philosopher, *Posterior Analytics* 1.20.82a21-24, 'there is a stand in any category at all upwards and downwards'. Therefore, just as the supreme in a genus is found precisely by considering it under the idea of essence, so are found the intermediate genera and species and differences; also is found there the lowest, namely the singular, actual existence being altogether removed – which is evidently plain, because 'this man' no more includes formally actual existence than 'man'.

64. Further, there is the same question about existence – by what and from what it is contracted so as to be a 'this' – as there is about nature; for if the specific nature is the same in several individuals, it has an existence in them of the same idea: just as is proved in the solution to the first question, that that nature is not of itself a 'this' [nn.29-30], so can it be asked by what existence is a 'this' (because it is not of itself a 'this'), and so it is not sufficient to grant the existence by which nature is a 'this'.

III. To the Argument for the Opinion

65. Hereby to the argument for the opinion [n.60], I say that an act distinguishes in the way in which it is an act, – but an accidental act distinguishes accidentally, as an essential act distinguishes essentially. So I say that the ultimate distinction in predicamental co-ordering is individual distinction, and that is through an ultimate act pertaining per se to predicamental co-ordering, – but to this does not pertain actual existence; and actual existence is ultimate act, but posterior to the whole of predicamental co-ordering, – and therefore I concede that it distinguishes ultimately, but by a distinction that is outside the whole of per se predicamental co-ordering. Which distinction is as it were in some way accidental; although it is not truly accidental, yet it does follow the whole co-ordering according to quidditative being; in the way, then, in which it is act it distinguishes, and in which it is ultimate act it ultimately distinguishes.

Question Four Whether Material Substance is Individual or Singular through Quantity

66. I ask fourth whether material substance is through quantity individual or singular.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] About the fourth, whether namely material substance is individual through quantity, it is argued:

67. That yes:

Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.1, "Variety of accidents makes difference in number, for three men differ neither in species nor genus but in their accidents; for if at least in mind we separate all the accidents, still the place for them all is diverse, which we can in no way imagine one for two: for two bodies will not get one place, which is an accident, and therefore they are in number as many as the accidents are many." And among all accidents the first accident is quantity, which also 'in place' seems specially to express, in saying 'we cannot imagine the same place', which belongs to them [bodies] insofar as they have quantity.

68. Further, Damascene *Elementary Introduction to Dogmas* ch.4 (not counting the preface): "All that in which a hypostasis differs from a hypostasis of the same species is called adventitious difference and characteristic property and hypostatic quality; now this is an accident, even as a man differs from another man, since he here indeed is tall and he there short."

69. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.2 f.87va says, "A nature which needs matter, – to the being of it do the accidents and dispositions come extrinsically by which it is individuated."⁹³

70. On the contrary:

As is argued for the second question [n.46], first substance is per se generated and per se operates, and this insofar as it is distinguished from second [substance], to which these do not belong per se. But these do not belong to being *per accidens*: about 'to be generated' it is plain in *Metaphysics* 6.2.1026b22-24; about 'to operate' it is also plain, because one per se agent is one per se being, and this in one order of cause.

I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others 1. Exposition of the Opinion

71. Here it is said that so, namely that material substance is singular and individual through quantity.⁹⁴

72. And for this is put forward this sort of reason,⁹⁵ because what belongs first and per se to something belongs to any other by reason of it; but substance and quantity do not make a one per se but only a one per accidens; therefore, to which of these first and per se belongs divisibility into parts of the same idea, to it will singularity belong: of this sort is quantity, because it has of itself that it can be divided to infinity (*Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-8), – therefore what belongs to quantity first and per se does not belong to another save by reason of it. Such is the division of a species into its individuals, because these dividers are not formally of a different idea, as are species dividing a genus. – But from this further:⁹⁶ to be divisible into parts of the same idea belongs to something by

⁹³ See Henry of Ghent Quodl. V q.8 corp., Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. VII q. 5 corp.

⁹⁴ Thomas Aquinas, Giles of Rome, Godfrey of Fontaines. Aquinas *SG* IV ch.65: "Now wherever a diversity of parts is understood of the same species, it is necessary for individuation to be understood; for things that are of one species are not multiplied save according to the individual... And because dimensive quantity alone has of its idea whence a multiplication of individuals in the same species can happen, the first root of this sort of multiplication seems to be from dimension: because also in the genus of substance multiplication happens according to division of matter, which neither could be understood save according as matter is considered under dimensions; for, with quantity removed, every substance is indivisible, as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 1.2.185a32-b5."

⁹⁵ Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* 7 q.5: "For it belongs per se to quantity to be thus divided [into parts of the same idea, as lines into many parts of the same idea], and to be the reason of dividing for every substance in which it is; hence just as this per se belongs to quantity, so to matter insofar as it is extended – and consequently, to all that which thus in matter has being through quantity it belongs also to have substantial parts of the same idea, insofar as through quantity the substance of matter is truly extended and is made truly divisible and divided. For it is clear that in two individuals there are two quantities essentially and formally differing from each other in the genus of quantity, such however that for this, that the two quantities in themselves thus differ, there is not presupposed anything else by which they thus have being divided or extended save only a subject 'in which'; but for this, that two substantial forms thus differ from each other formally, there is something else presupposed whereby the matter (in which such extended and divisible forms are) may have extended and divisible being;" *ibid.*: "composites of substance and accidents…are one not per se but per accidens."

⁹⁶ *Ibid*.: "The aforesaid are plain from the description of quantity in *Metaphysics* 5, where it is said that 'a quantum is what is divisible into those that are in it, each one of which is of a nature to be either a single one-something and a thissomething'. From which it is plain that neither quantity per se nor substance per se is divided, but the composite which is a quantum; but yet this divisibility belongs to the composite by reason of quantity, since the formal in a quantum according as it is a quantum (which here is being defined) is quantity. And the divisibility is into parts of the same idea, because the parts that are in some one quantum (according as it is a quantum) are of the same idea, because of the same species and form; which parts, indeed, when they are actually divided, are diverse individuals under the same species, –

reason of quantity (from *Metaphysics* 5, above), and the same is principle of division in any nature, and of distinction of things divided; therefore by quantity are individuals distinguished individually from each other. And from this it is concluded that by quantity does division into individuals belong to a thing to which such distinction belongs; therefore by quantity is an individual individual.

73. Further,⁹⁷ this fire does not differ from that fire save because form differs from form, nor does form differ from form save because it is received in a different part of matter, nor a part of matter from another part save because it is under another part of quantity; therefore the whole distinction of this fire from that fire is reduced to quantity as to first distinctive.

74. This reason is confirmed,⁹⁸ because a generator does not generate another save because of distinction of matter; but the matter of the generated is necessarily presupposed [as] a quantum and under distinct quantity; that [it is] a quantum is plain, because a natural agent cannot act on a non-quantum; it is plain too that [it is] a quantum with another quantity, because it cannot be a quantum with the quantity of the generator. But this quantity precedes naturally the being of the generated, therefore also the distinction of generator and generated; and it would not precede naturally if it were not naturally required, and per se, as distinctive of it; therefore etc.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

75. Against this conclusion [n.71] I argue in four ways: first from the identity of numerical idea or of individuation or singularity, second from the order of substance to

⁹⁸ Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 7 q.5: "Hence it is said in *Metaphysics* 7, "A diverse species (that is a form) is in the generator and generated because of matter' (the Commentator, 'the cause in a multitude of generables by one generator is the multiplication of materials on which the agent acts'). But when matter in itself is one and indivisible, it seems that the causality of such division and distinction or individuation should not be attributed to matter in itself, but it is necessary that this be attributed to it insofar as it is understood under quantity, from which it has extension and divisibility into parts of the same idea etc." Ibid., 11 q.3: "Again, because matter is not susceptible of several forms in succession save through change, and matter is not changeable unless it be as presupposed extended and divisible through quantity (otherwise the indivisible could be changed and moved), - because too the generator generates another because of other matter and from other matter, and this matter does not have without quantity, - therefore, just as matter must precede before the inducing of substantial form through generation, so too quantity as well. And this quantity [according to Averroes Substance of the Orb ch.1] is called indeterminate...namely because of itself it does not determine for itself a form to be corrupted nor even to generated, because when a form to be corrupted is corrupted, the quantity itself does not seem to be corrupted, and when a form to be generated is generated, it [quantity] does not seem to be generated, but just as the matter remains according to substance under both terms, so too the quantity seems in some way to remain... And for the same reason it is necessary to presuppose an indeterminate quantity in matter, because just as nothing is changed save what is under a contrary, so is nothing changed save what is a quantum."

because, as he [Aristotle] says, each one of such things 'is of a nature to be one-something and this-something'; but first substance, which is an individual in the genus of substance, is one-something and this-something." *ibid.*: "The principle...of 'distinction according to substance' of several individuals is quantity, since it is the principle of division and of the matter and also of the form in divided matter; for if quantity were not pre-understood in matter, which would make it divisible, it could not receive many forms... Hence, according to this, there are many beings according as quanta or according to division of quantity...; for in this, that quantity extends substance really, it happens that substance...has also parts really and essentially differing from each other."

⁹⁷ Aquinas, *SG* 2 ch.49 arg.3: "The principle of the diversity of individuals of the same species is the division of matter according to quantity; for the form of this fire does not differ from the form of that fire save by this, that it is in the diverse parts into which matter is divided – and divided not otherwise than by division of quantity, without which a substance is indivisible; but what is received in a body is received in it according to division of quantity; therefore only form as individuated is received in a body." *Ibid.*, chs.80-81 ad 2: "For it is clear that the essence of the form of this fire and of that is different, nor yet is there another fire nor another form according to species."
accidents, third from the idea of predicamental co-ordering – and these three ways will prove in common that no accident can per se be the reason by which material substance is individuated; the fourth way will be specifically against quantity as to the opinion's conclusion [n.71], and fifth it will be argued specifically against the reasons for the opinion [n.72-73].

a. The First Way: from the Identity of Individuation or Singularity

76. As to the first way I first expound what I understand by individuation or numerical unity or singularity. Not indeed indeterminate unity (by which whatever at all in a species is said to be one in number), but signate unity (as a 'this'), – such that, just as it was said before [n.48] that it is incompossible for an individual to be divided into subjective parts, and the reason is being sought for that incompossibility, so I say that it is incompossible for an individual not to be a 'this' signate by this singularity, and the cause is being sought not of singularity in general but of 'this' signate singularity in particular, namely as it is a 'this' determinately.

77. Understanding singularity in this manner, I argue doubly from the first way:

First thus: an actually existing substance, not changed by any substantial change, cannot from 'this' become 'non-this', because this singularity – according to what was just said [n.76] – cannot in one way and another be in the same substance that is remaining the same and is not substantially changed; but a substance actually existing, with no substantial change made in it or changed, can without contradiction be under one and another quantity and any absolute accident whatever; therefore by none such is it formally 'this substance' with this signate singularity.

78. The minor is plain, because it is not a contradiction that God keep a substance quantified by this quantity the same, and inform it with another quantity; nor because of this will this substance, existing in act, be changed by any substantial change, because there will not be a change save from quantity to quantity. Likewise, if it be changed by any accident at all, the substance will not be changed with any substantial change; whether this be possible or impossible, not because of this will it formally be not-this.

79. And if you say that this is a miracle and therefore it does not conclude against natural reason, – on the contrary: a miracle is not in respect of contradictories, for which there is no potency. But it is a contradiction that a substance abiding the same is two substances without substantial change, and this both successively and at once, – which however follows if through some accident formally it were 'this substance'; for then, with accident succeeding to accident, the same substance, not changed, would be successively two substances.

80. This is confirmed also through a likeness about specific unity, because it is incompossible that one abiding substance – not substantially changed – is at once or successively this species and not this species; therefore similarly in the matter at hand.

81. Second thus: of two productions complete in substantial being there cannot be the same first term (proof, because then both would receive the perfect substantial being out of which each is complete and so the same thing would be twice produced completely, – and also if the two productions were not together, the same substance per se and actually existing would be produced when it already actually exists; so at least of two successive productions there cannot be the same term). But of the generation of

bread was 'this bread' the first term, and that is transubstantiated with the same quantity remaining. Let therefore another bread be created and be furnished with this remaining quantity – it follows that the term of the creation will be 'this bread', the same as that bread which was the term of generation, because by the same singularity in number by which that bread was 'this' will this bread be 'this'; it follows further that the same 'this bread' is transubstantiated and non-transubstantiated – indeed it follows that no bread is transubstantiated (because not universal bread, nor bread here, the singular, because this bread remains with the quantity non-changed by which it was formally 'this' – from what was granted [n.71]); therefore nothing altogether is transubstantiated into the body of Christ, which it is heretical to say.

b. The Second Way: from the Order of Substance to Accidents

82. From the second way I argue thus: substance is naturally prior to every accident, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a10-b2. And his intention is about substance, which is one of those [sc. the ten categories] that divide being, so that to expound 'substance' there for God or first substance is nothing to his intention. For he is thus proving that substance is first, in the way he proves that substance is of the number of the dividers of being – that it is prior to every accident, namely such that, for determining about everything that divides being, it suffices to determine about substance as about what is first, to the extent that the knowledge of accidents is had from the fact they are attributed to substance; but this is not to the purpose unless substance according to its whole co-ordering; therefore nothing posterior to this co-ordering can be the formal idea by which something is in this co-ordering. From the idea, then, of the priority of substance universally, as it is common, the determination of the co-ordering is sufficient that is of first substance, to which belongs this natural priority to every accident; therefore it belongs to first substance, from its idea, that it is a 'this' first naturally before it is determined by any accident.

83. And the consequence could be confirmed, because when something is prior to something, the maximally first of it is prior to that; but the maximally first of substance in general is first substance; therefore it is simply prior to every accident, and so a 'this' is first before it is in any way determined by anything else.

84. Here it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines] that first substance, although it is prior to quantity in being, not however in dividing - just as also second substance is prior in entity, not however in divisibility.

85. On the contrary:

This response destroys itself, because if first substance is naturally prior in being to quantity, and first substance cannot be understood in its being save insofar as it is a 'this', then it is not prior in being unless it be prior insofar as 'this'; therefore it is not a 'this' by quantity.

86. Further, form is simply prior to the composite, according to the Philosopher's proof, *Metaphysics* 7.2.1029a507. Therefore if quantity is the form of first substance insofar as it is first substance, then it will be simply prior to first substance in being, – because if it is not the form in being, then not in dividing either, nor in the unity belonging to first substance insofar as it is such being (for its proper unity follows any entity whatever, not having another proper cause of itself than the cause of entity).

87. Further, substance is prior naturally to every accident in the way in which it is the subject for every accident. For, insofar as it is subject, it is proved to be prior in definition to every accident, because it is thus posited in the order of definition of any of them whatever by addition; but as it is subject it is 'this substance': because, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.3.195b25-26 and *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a16-19, of singulars are the causes singular (in any genus of cause), therefore of a singular accident is a singular subject cause. And it is confirmed especially of an accident *per accidens*, because that is in a first singular, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.9.1017b35-1018a3, ch. 'On the Same'.

88. Further, everything that is prior to another in nature is prior in duration [cf. n.82] in this way, that – as far as is of itself – it is not repugnant to it contradictorily to be able to be prior in duration to its posterior; for universally priority of nature includes in the prior 'being able to be without the posterior' without contradiction, from *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a2-4 ch. 'On the Prior'. Therefore without contradiction could any substance (as far as is of itself) be prior in duration to every accident, and so to quantity.

c. The Third Way: from the Idea of Predicamental Co-ordering

89. From the third way I argue thus: in any predicamental co-ordering is everything pertaining to that co-ordering, all else being removed that is not anything essentially of that co-ordering (this is proved, because two co-orderings are first diverse, and so nothing of one is such through the co-ordering of another); but that co-ordering, insofar as it is finite both upwards and downwards (according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 1. 20.82a21-24 [n.63]), just as pertains to it the first predicate, of which nothing is predicated, so pertains to it the lowest subject, to which nothing is subject; therefore the singular or the individual is in any co-ordering through nothing of any other co-ordering.

90. Further second: in any co-ordering, anything of another co-ordering being removed, is the idea of species, – for no opinion imagines a species to be in some genus by reason of an accident, speaking of absolutes; but of the idea of species is that it is predicable of several things differing in number; therefore in any co-ordering can something be found intrinsically individual and singular of which the species is predicated – or at any rate something can be found 'not predicable of many' (otherwise not will anything be in this co-ordering a most specific species, of whose idea it is to be a predicable, if nothing is this sort of subjectable [i.e. something able to be a subject].

91. Further third: the lowest subjectable and subject receives per se the predication of any predicable at all, just as the first predicate is predicated per se of any predicate at all of that co-ordering; but a being per accidens, insofar as per accidens, receives the predication per se of nothing; therefore the lowest subjectable cannot be a being per accidens (and what aggregates things of diverse genera is a being per accidens, according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-36, ch. 'On One').

92. Further fourth: when something is precisely of a nature to belong to something according to some idea, whatever it belongs to essentially according to that idea, it simply belongs to it according to that idea and essentially; but to be a universal in the co-ordering of the genus of substance belongs to something precisely insofar as it is of that co-ordering, with everything removed that is of another; therefore, what essentially

'commonness' belongs to insofar as it is of that co-ordering, belongs to it simply and essentially. But however much it is contracted by something of another genus, nothing is taken away concerning it that pertains to its very co-ordering: for however much Socrates be determined by white or black (to which he was in potency), Socrates is not more determinately in the genus of substance than he was before, because he was before a 'this'. Therefore, however much a nature in the genus of substance be posited to be contracted to individuals by something of another genus, that nature will remain formally common (contracted, just as not contracted) – and therefore to posit that the common becomes individual by something of another genus is to posit that it is common at the same time as individual or singular.

93. For escaping perhaps the arguments of these two ways [nn.82, 89-92], a position is held about quantity in another way [Giles of Rome, seemingly via Godfrey of Fontaines]: namely in this way, that just as the extension of the matter is different in nature from the nature of the quantity of the matter and adds nothing above the essence of matter, – so signation⁹⁹ of the matter, which it has causally through quantity, is other than signation of the quantity, prior naturally to the signation that it has through quantity; and this signation is different from that which belongs to quantity, but it is not different from substance – so that, just as matter is not haver of parts though the nature of quantity (because part of matter is matter), so signate substance is only substance (for 'signation' only states a mode of being disposed).

94. On the contrary. This position seems to include contradictories in two ways: First, because it is impossible for anything dependent naturally on a posterior to be the same naturally as a prior, because then it would be both prior and not prior; but substance, for them, is prior naturally to quantity; therefore nothing, in whatever way prerequiring the nature of quantity, can be the same as substance. Not therefore is that signation [a signation] of substance and yet caused by quantity.

95. Proof of the major: where there is true and real identity (even though it not be formal), there it is impossible that this is and that is not, because then the same thing really would be and not be; but it is possible for the naturally prior to be without the naturally posterior – therefore and by consequence much more without that which is left behind from or caused by the naturally posterior.

96. Further, that which is a necessary condition of a cause in causing cannot be had by the caused, because then the cause – insofar as sufficient for causing – would be caused by the caused, and that caused would be cause of itself and to that extent could give the cause the causation of itself; but singularity – or signation – is a necessary condition in substance for causing quantity, because (as was argued [n.87]) a caused singular requires a singular cause; therefore it is impossible for this signation of signate or singular substance to be from a singular quantity (or to be from a caused), not from a substance insofar as singular.

97. Further, what is it for quantity to leave behind or cause such mode in a substance? If it is nothing but what was before quantity, then in no way is signation

⁹⁹ A literal translation, or transliteration, of the Latin 'signatio', and an obsolete word now in English. It is the abstract noun from 'signate' and refers in context to the pointing out or designating of a 'signate' or concretely identified individual. 'Individuation' or 'identification' or 'designation' might all in different ways or contexts capture the sense of such term, but given the subtlety of Scotus' thinking, as well as some of his novelty in vocabulary (as famously 'haeceity'), 'signation' seems not unworthy of rescue from obsolescence and of standing alongside the still used term 'signate'.

through quantity, because then simply would signation of substance naturally precede quantity. – But if it be something else, I ask how it is caused by quantity, and by what genus of cause? It seems that only can the genus of efficient cause be assigned; but quantity is not an active form; therefore etc.

98. Further, why does quantity more leave behind such mode in substance, the same really as substance, than quality, as whiteness? No reason appears, because just as whiteness is itself a form of surface, and not with any other form left-behind mediating, so it seems that quantity is a form of substance, whereby substance is a quantum and never leaves behind another form.

d. The Fourth Way: on the Part of Quantity

99. From the fourth way I argue thus: this quantity by which a substance is a 'this', so signated, is either a terminated quantity or a non-terminated quantity. It is not a terminated quantity because that follows the being of form in matter, and consequently singularity of substance, – because if substance is the cause of it as terminated, 'this substance' is the cause of it as it is 'this terminated'. If quantity non-terminated is cause why this substance is 'this' – on the contrary: that quantity, namely unterminated, remains the same in the generated and the corrupted; therefore it is not cause of any terminated signation.

100. If you say that it does not follow, because quantity is not posited cause of singularity save with specific unity presupposed, but the generated and corrupted are not of the same species – on the contrary: I posit that from water is fire first generated, secondly from fire is water generated. In the first water corrupted and in the second water generated there is the same quantity – and not only unterminated quantity, but also terminated, because it can have the same term from the form; or at any rate the same 'unterminated' suffices, and that, for you, is cause of singularity, specific unity being presupposed [nn71-73]. Therefore, the first water and the second water are 'this water' the same in number – which seems impossible, because the same individual in number does not return by natural action, from *Physics* 5.4.228a4-6 and *On Generation* 2.11.338b16-18.

101. Further, if quantity is what first individuates substance, it is necessary that it – in itself – first be a 'this' and of itself distinct numerically from that, just as this substance from that; but then that proposition of yours is not true, namely that 'every formal difference is specific';¹⁰⁰ for this quantity and that are forms, therefore they differ specifically!

102. And if you except from this fundamental proposition the quantity of a building going to ruin, whence will it be proved that formal difference is specific [nn.71-73 footnotes]? For whatever idea will have been adduced from a form will equally have place in the matter at hand, since quantity is a form just as also other categories [predicaments].

103. And if you say, 'no, quantity has of itself a determinate position, and is by this distinguished of itself from another quantity' [e.g. Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.12 q.1 a.1, q.3 ad 3, *ST* III q.77 a.2 et alibi] – on the contrary: of which position are you speaking?

¹⁰⁰ Vatican editors: that is, 'every difference which is by reason of form is, in itself and absolutely considered, specific' (according to *Lectura* II d.3 n.68, but omitted n.73 supra).

Either of predicamental (which is a certain category), and this is naturally posterior to quantity.¹⁰¹ Or of position which is a difference of quantity, insofar as quantity is said to consist of parts having position – and then it is the same question as before [n.101], namely why this position of this quantity differs from that position of that quantity: which question is 'how numerically does this quantity differ from that?', and thus it seems that you are assigning an idea of itself; for it is not more known that the permanent and continuous parts in the whole are in themselves distinguished from the permanent and continuous parts in this whole (which two, namely continuity and permanence, does position include as it is a difference of quantity), than that this quantity differs by itself from that.

104. Further, all the arguments that are made against the opinion in the first question for proving that flesh is not of itself a 'this' [nn.7-28], the same be made for proving that quantity is not of itself a 'this'; and it is manifest that the idea of line is of itself common to this line and to that, nor is it a greater contradiction to understand line under the idea of a universal than flesh. And a line too has some real unity less than numerical unity, just as also flesh has, because of the same proofs that have been set down in the second reason against the opinion of the first question [nn.8-28]. It is plain too that line and surface are of the same idea in this water and in that: why then is this water 'this water' and singular? And I am not speaking of singularity vague and indeterminate but signate and determinate.

e. Against the Reasons for the Opinion

105. Against the reasons for the opinion [nn.72-73] I argue:

First against the first [n.72], that quantity is not the idea of divisibility in individuals:

Because whatever is the formal idea of some divisibility is formally in that which is divisible by that division; but quantity is not formally in a species insofar as it is divisible into subjective parts; therefore it is not the formal idea of the divisibility of such a whole into such parts.

106. The reason is confirmed, because a universal 'whole', which is divided into individuals and subjective parts, is predicated of any whatever of those subjective parts (so that any subjective part is it) – but quantitative parts, into which is made the division of a continuous whole, never receive the predication of the whole divided into them. And although the division of a homogeneous 'whole' into quantitative parts, and the division of a species (or of a universal 'whole') into subjective parts (which parts are individuals), go together, – they are not, however, of the same divided 'whole', because a quantitative 'whole' is divided by quantitative division, and is not predicated of any dividing part, just as neither a heterogeneous quantum of its divider; for universally no quantitative part is the whole of that of which it is a part, but with this is concomitant that there are many individuals having the same being common, which common is divided by quantitative division and that common was not that quantum which was divided by quantitative division and that; and into the same parts per accidens, but parts of 'another idea' formally, in respect

¹⁰¹ The ten categories/predicaments follow in order of priority thus: substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, position, having, where, when (cf. Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.2 n.6).

of this whole [sc. quantitative] and that [sc. universal] – because in respect of 'this' integral, and in respect of 'that' subjective.

107. And [as to] what is taken from the Philosopher [n.72], it must be said that the Philosopher does not say a 'quantum' is divided into parts of the same idea, but that "a 'quantum' is divisible into what are in it, of which a singular or either is of a nature to be something and this-something" [supra n.72: Metaphysics 4.13.1020a7-8]: "into what are in it," he says, as if components of the whole that they are in, - therefore not so into subjective parts, which are not thus in it; "of which either" (if the division be made into two) "or a singular" (if the division is into several) "is of a nature to be something," namely per se existent, in the way in which 'a whole' is (because to the extent something is a dividing quantitative part, so can it per se be as a whole divided), and this against the division of a composite into matter and form; "and this something," - and this against division of genus into species. And if a number were composed of diverse numbers, it would not be against the idea of number that it were divided into numbers of different idea,¹⁰² and in the same way it would not be against an arm that it were divided into parts of different idea if it were composed of two cubits or three cubits – and they differ in species; so too not against quantity would be the division of its subject into parts of different idea.

108. I concede therefore universally *de facto*, that although the whole not require that it be divided into parts of the same idea, yet it does not require them to be of distinct idea, because insofar as they are parts of a quantum they are not of another idea; for although head, heart, and hand are quantitative parts and of another idea, they yet are not parts of another idea insofar as precisely they are parts of a quantum.

109. In the way, then, that it is true (although it could not taken from the Philosopher [n.107]) that a quantum may be divided into parts of the same idea, it is altogether not to the purpose, because it is not divided into parts in which the idea of the divided is included, but into parts which were in the divided thing, – and they do have one idea, not of that, but of something common to that and themselves; now the species is divided into parts of the same idea, because namely they include the idea of it divided [e.g. as 'this man' and 'that man' include 'man'] and not anything else that is of a different idea, common to the divided and the dividers.

110. Further, I argue against the second reason [n.73]: a generator insofar as generator (everything else removed) is distinguished from the generated insofar as generated (everything else removed from the generated), because it is not intelligible that the same thing generate itself (even in divine reality a person does not generate himself); but the generator insofar as generator does not include quantity as if a proper generative principle; nor does the generated insofar as generated include quantity as the per se or formal term of generation; therefore, with each quantity removed, namely of generator and generated, this substance is distinguished from that numerically.

B. Scotus' own Conclusion

111. I concede therefore the conclusions of all these reasons [nn.76-110], that namely it is impossible that through some accident substance is individual, that is, that it

¹⁰² Vatican editors: e.g. if 6 were composed of 2 and 4, which are of different idea.

be divided through something accident to it into subjective parts, and thereby will it be repugnant to it to be 'not-a-this'.

II. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

112. To the first reason for the opinion [n.72], it is plain from the fifth article [nn.105-109] how it badly takes the minor [n.72: 'to be divisible into parts of the same idea belongs to something by reason of quantity'], and that it cannot be had from the Philosopher [n.107]; and in the way in which that minor can be held true it is not to the purpose about the division of a whole into quantitative parts [n.109].

113. When also further it takes that 'by the same thing is something divisible and distinguished through dividing parts' [n.72: "and the same thing is principle of division in any nature and of distinction of the things divided"] – this is false, for 'common nature' is divisible of itself into individuals, but the dividers are not distinguished by idea of nature but by proper distinguishers: for thus does it appear in a genus, because a genus is divisible according to itself into several genera and into several species, and yet the genus is not the reason for the distinction of species but the differences constituting the species.

114. To the second reason [n.73], it is plain how from it could it be concluded that the same thing would generate itself [n.110]. But to the form of the argument I say that both premises are false: for although 'a different form be in a different matter' [n.73, 'form does not differ from form save because it is received in different parts of matter'], yet not because of otherness of matter is it another form, but as the entity of a form is prior so also its otherness; likewise the other premise – namely that 'there is another part of matter because another part of quantity' [n.73, 'nor does one part of matter differ from another save because it is under a different part of quantity'] – is false, because whether the distinction of parts of matter in themselves be quantitative or not, prior is the distinction of parts of matter than of quantity (because the subject of this sort of accident is this-something).

115. To the proof, when it is said that 'the generating does not generate save from a matter-quantum with a different quantity' [n.74, 'the generating does not generate another save because of distinctness of matter etc.'] – whether so it be or not (about which elsewhere <math>[n.208]), at any rate in parts of matter distinct according to form of quantity I say that unity is a metaphysical property [n.128], such that the unity of it [sc. matter] naturally precedes any idea whatever of quantity; for the idea of quantity precedes the sort of natural generator that requires, outside, its own matter from which it generates, and requires that quantity as concomitant distinction of matter from matter. And it would need to be proved that quantity would be the proper idea of such unity, namely of singularity in substance – and it is proved that there is a reason sine qua non in respect of what is ultimate [sc. the thing generated, n.74]; hence the place for that consequence is null.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Vatican editors: "in other word: hence to argue from quantity as it is the reason sine qua non, to quantity as it is the reason simply (whether proper or formal) is nothing." Translator: The contention is perhaps that in the argument [in n.74]: "the generator does not generate save from a matter quantified by a different quantity; therefore quantity is the idea of distinction in the generator" the conclusion does not follow. What follows rather is that a difference of quantity in the matter on which the generator works is required for the generator to be able to work on it. So all that follows is that such difference of quantity in the matter worked on is the sine qua non of the generator's generating. It does not follow that the difference of the quantities in the matter of the thing worked on and in the matter of the generator

116. If it is objected that at least from the confirmation [n.74] will be had that quantity naturally precedes individuation of substance (which is against the conclusion of the second way rejecting the opinion [nn.82-83]) – for if the generator first requires a matter-quantum before it generate, then the quantity of the matter is naturally presupposed to the individuation of the generated – I reply: I say that to the individuation of the thing generated is presupposed the quantity of the thing corrupted and all the accidents of the thing corrupted, in order of duration, because the corrupted preexists with all its parts preexists; but from this nothing follows as to *b* [the minor], that there is a 'natural priority' of quantity to the individuation of it [sc. the thing generated'], or to the individuation of that substance in which there is quantity, – for the accidents of the thing corrupted in time the thing generated, follow the substance in which they are (and also [follow] it as a singular), and in the same way do the accidents of the generated follow the substance generated.

117. But the argument [n.74] is still further reduced [sc. as in the statements of Godfrey, *ibid*.]: because 'quantity not only – as in the corrupted – precedes the generated, but precedes naturally in the generated the form of the generated'. Proof: otherwise in the instant in which the generator induces the form, it would induce it not into a quantum, – which seems against the proposition that 'a particular agent does not attain to the substance of matter but precisely attains to it insofar as it is a quantum' [n.74, 'a natural agent cannot act on a non-quantum']; similarly, this seems to be against Averroes in his treatise *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.1, where he seems to mean that the same quantity remains in the generated and corrupted, otherwise the generator would generate from non-body a body.

118. Against this I argue as follows:

And it seems first that this reason [n.117] should not be adduced for that opinion [n.71], because he [Godfrey] who seems founder of that position seems to hold against what is here adduced [n.117]. For he holds [*Quodlibet* 11 q.3, 7 q.5, 6 q.5, 2 q.7] that since quantity is not the first act of matter, neither does any form of corporeity remain the same in the generated and the corrupted (speaking of corporeity in the genus of substance, he says that no quantity remains the same in number in this and in that); and also since he posits that it [quantity] perfects the composite substance (and not the matter) immediately as subject, he should put that other quantity of the generated posterior naturally to the thing generated, just as also posit that of the thing corrupted naturally posterior to the corrupted – and so this deduction about priority of quantity to substance or form of the generated (whatever it may be about Averroes) is not about the opinion of him positing that opinion [n.71]. This as to the man [sc. Godfrey]. But to the conclusion in itself, I say with him (as to these things) that if no form of corporeity remain the same formally in fire and in water, no accident at all – which requires for subject a composite substance – can remain the same in number, but any whatever will either be in the corrupted as in a subject or in the generated as in a subject; and so quantity, and whatever other accident, will be posterior naturally to substance – and thus the quantity of the

working on it is what formally makes the generator's own quantity to be 'this quantity'. For it could still well be, as for as this argument goes, that 'this quantity' is a 'this', not because of itself, but because it is the quantity of 'this substance'. So the argument in n.74 does not prove, as it needs to, that the 'this' of 'this substance' is the result of the quantity's being a 'this' and not, as Scotus contends, the other way round.

corrupted, and whatever other accident of it, was posterior naturally to the substance corrupted.

119. And then about that proposition [n.117, 'a particular agent does not reach the substance of the matter but reaches the matter precisely insofar as it is a quantum'] I do not much care, because it seems impossible: for it seems nothing else to be agent, reaching the passive in idea of passive, than to induce in it the act by which it is perfected; but a particular agent induces the substantial form by which the matter insofar as matter is perfected, – and not matter insofar as quantum, such that quantity be the 'mediating idea' between agent and passive; therefore a natural agent reaches matter according to bare essence, as the passive immediately changed by it.

120. To Averroes [n.117], I say that from that, which at one time was non-body, a body could be generated, but perhaps a natural agent could not generate a body from a non-body as from the corrupted; but from that which was body up to the instant of generation, and this by the quantity inhering in it, a natural agent can generate in that instant another quantum with another quantity, because just as it can generate a substance that was not before, so it can produce all the accidents consequent to it.

121. And if you say that although it not produce a body from non-body as from the corrupted, yet it will produce from matter as a non-quantum another body-quantum, – I say that the composite must come to be or be produced from the non-composite as part, or there will be a process to infinity; and so from matter, according to its substance absolutely as from a part, can a body be produced that is a composite substance, – and the substance-quantum is concomitant, because quantity is a property of the composite substance (this response denies that an unterminated dimension the same in number remains in the generated and the corrupted, about which elsewhere more diffusively, if occasion arise [*Ord.* 4 d.11 p.1 princ.1 q.2 nn.6-7, princ.2 q.1 nn.18-21 and 50]; but now it is touched on because of the arguments [nn.118-121]).

III. To the Principal Arguments

122. To the first principal, from Boethius [n.67], I concede that variety of accidents makes a numerical difference in substance, in the way form is said to make a difference, because all distinct forms make thus some difference in those in which they are; but accidents cannot make a specific difference in the substance in which they are (from *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29-b25), – therefore they make a difference in substances, and this a numerical one; but they do not make the first difference (but there is another, prior, numerical difference), nor do they alone make a numerical difference. And of neither of these two does that authority say [Boethius], – and unless either of these were had, the proposition that is intended would not be had.

123. But what as to the intention of Boethius?

I say that Boethius intends to prove that there is not a numerical difference of the divine persons. And although scattered about at the beginning of that little book *On the Trinity* such could propositions be had, yet he seems to argue thus: 'a variety of accidents makes difference in number; but in the divine persons there is no such variety of accidents, because a simple form cannot be a subject; so there is not there a numerical difference'.

124. The argument seems not to be valid, unless he meant that only accidents could distinguish numerically; for if numerical distinction could be through some other things, then from negation of accident would not follow negation of numerical distinction. I say that a distinction of accidents is concomitant to every numerical distinction, and so where no variety of accidents can be, there no numerical distinction can be; and from this the argument of Boethius can hold, because since there cannot be any accident in divine reality (nor variety of accidents), there cannot be there a numerical distinction or difference, – not as from a cause precisely denied to the negation of that of which it is cause, but as from a necessary concomitant [denied] to the negation of that which is necessarily concomitant with it.

125. But how is it true for this intention that a variety of accidents makes a numerical difference?

I say that it makes some difference but not the first, – and it is necessarily concomitant to every [difference]; and so it has to be understood that 'they make a numerical difference'. Nor does this gloss seem forced from the text [of Boethius], but the text itself makes it to be understood so, since they must necessarily expound what he himself supplies there about place. For place is not first distinguisher of individuals from each other, not even when speaking of place which is a property of the locator or when speaking of place as it is the property of the locating thing (namely of the 'where' left behind in the thing contained). If therefore it be necessary for them to expound place by quantity (according to their opinion [n.71]), what of bad is there in expounding 'make a difference' as 'make not the first difference but to make some and be concomitant to the first'?

126. To the second argument, from Damascene [n.68], it is plain from himself at the end of that chapter, where he expounds how he there understands 'accident', and he speaks thus: "Whatever are in some of those that are hypostases of one species, but in some are not, are accidents and adventicious." I concede therefore that whatever is outside the idea per se of the specific nature itself, and is not per se consequent to that nature, is accident to such nature – and in this way whatever is posited as individuating is an accident; but it is not properly an accident, the way others understand [n.128].

127. And that he [Damascene] does not understand it properly about accident is plain from what he says in *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: "For we mean that Peter and Paul are of the same idea." Later, "Hypostases have many separators in them: and they are divided in mind and in strength and in form (that is, in figure) and in habit and in complexion and in dignity and in invention and in all characteristic properties;" and he supplies the notable [addition]: that to 'all [characteristic properties]' etc. "by the fact that they are not in themselves in relation to each other but exist separately; hence also they are called two and three men, and many. This too in every case." – Note well: he says that, rather than by characteristic properties, all created hypostases whatever differ by 'not being in relation to each other but separately'; and this is said through the opposite in the same place: that "the holy hypostases of the Trinity are in each other mutually," – of which the cause is unity of nature, personal distinction being presupposed (from *Ord*. 1 d.2 nn.376-87). The division then of nature in created supposits is the first and greatest reason for distinction.

128. To the third, from Avicenna [n.69], I say that he is most principally considering quiddity insofar as it includes nothing that does not pertain to per se idea of

it, and in this way horseness is 'only horseness, and is neither one nor many'. However much the unity of it is not another thing added but is necessarily consequent to that entity (just as also to every being, according to any entity, its unity is consequent), not however is that unity within the formal idea of quiddity (as it is quiddity), but is a sort of property consequent to quiddity [nn.31, 34] – and everything such with him [Avicenna] is called an 'accident'. And in this way too does the Philosopher sometimes take accident (by whom it is called the 'fallacy of the accident') for everything that is outside the formal idea of another (for everything such is extraneous to that other, by comparison to something else);¹⁰⁴ and in this way does the fallacy of the accident happen, and in this way genus is accidental to difference, – and whatever is individuating is accident to the specific nature, but not as they [Godfrey and others, fn. to n.69] understand accident. And so there is equivocation there about 'accident'.

Question Five

Whether Material Substance is a This and Individual through Matter

129. Fifth I ask whether material substance is a 'this' and individual through matter.

130. That yes:

Because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b32-33, ch. 'On One', "Things whose matter is one are in number one;" therefore etc.

131. On the contrary:

Metaphysics 5.4.1014b26-32 (in the ancient translation), "in nature's foundation nothing is distinct." But what is not in itself distinct nor diverse cannot be the first idea of diversity or distinction for another; but matter is a foundation of nature altogether indistinct and indeterminate; therefore it cannot be the first idea of distinction or diversity for another.

I. The Opinion of Others

132. [Exposition of the opinion] – Here it is said that yes [Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey], – which is above all held because of many authorities of Aristotle that seem to say this.

One of which is *Metaphysics* 7.8.1034a4-8, that the generator generates another because of matter: "Callias," he says, "and Socrates, diverse indeed because of matter (for they are diverse), the same however in species, for the species is individual."

133. Again because of the same, 7.11.1037a37-b5, ch. 'On the Parts of Definition': "The 'what it was to be' and the singular, in certain substances is the same, but whatever are in matter, or taken along with matter, not the same;" and 8.3.1043b2-4 seems the same, "For soul and the to be for soul, the same; man and the to be for man,

¹⁰⁴ Peter of Spain, *Summulae logicales*, tr. 7 nn.40, 45: "Accident is when some two things, diverse among themselves, agree in part in some third thing, and because of this are believed to be the same as each other, – as 'man is a species, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is a species'... For to man according to himself it belongs to be a species, but it is accident to Socrates...and so man will be the subject thing, but Socrates the accident, and species is assigned to be present in both... The aforesaid diversity some name 'extraneous'; hence according to them, accident as it is here taken is the same as 'extraneous', that is in part the same and in part diverse."

not the same, unless also the to be for soul is called man." Therefore it seems that matter is outside the idea of quiddity and of whatever has quiddity first, and so, since it is something in beings, it seems to be part of the individual or the individuation of the whole; whatever is in the individual that is repugnant to the idea of quiddity altogether, this can be posited as the first idea of individuating; wherefore etc.

134. Further, *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a31-38 proves that there cannot be several heavens: "For if," he says, "there were several heavens as there are men, – the principle indeed concerning any singular would be one in species, but many in number; but whatever things" he says, "are many in number have matter, – but the what-it-was-to-be does not have matter first (for [it is] actuality); the one therefore both in idea and in number is the first mover, immovable." This reason, whereby is concluded the unity of the heaven from the unity of the mover, and the unity of the mover is not only in species but in number, because of this, that it does not have matter – would not seem valid unless numerical distinction came to be through matter; therefore etc.

135. Further *On the Heaven and the World* I.9.278a10-15: "When I say 'heaven' I say form, – when I say 'this heaven' I say matter."

136. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this [n.132], – first through authorities of the same [Aristotle]:

According to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a5-10, ch. 'On the Parts of Definition': "It is clear that soul is first substance and body matter; but man or animal – which are from both – as in universal way, and Socrates and Coriscus (supply: from these) as in singular way: since indeed soul is said in two ways." And afterwards he adds: "and if soul this and body this, as universal indeed and singular."

137. And before, in the same chapter, 10.1035b27-31: "Man and horse and things in this way among singulars are universally not substance," that is, form, "but at the same time a certain whole," that is, a composite, "from this matter and this idea" (where he does not mean by the 'this' uniform and singular matter but determinate, otherwise he would contradict himself; hence he supplies in the same place, "as universally"). And he adds later: "From ultimate matter Socrates now is etc."

138. The same is also plain through the same [book] 12.5.1071a27-29, where he maintains that the principles are the same just as also the things principled: "And of these," he says, "that are in the same species, [the principles are] diverse, not in species but because [principles] of singulars; different are your matter and mover and species, and mine, but in universal idea however the same." Therefore thus does he concede a distinction of form just as of matter in the particular, and thus a unity of matter in general as of form; and therefore it is still necessary to ask 'by what is matter this'.

139. Further, as is proved from many places of *Metaphysics* 7 ch. 'On the Parts of Definition': matter is of the essence of composite substance, namely of man, and such composite is not precisely the essence of form. Therefore, just as the composite cannot be of itself 'this' (from the first question, n.29), so neither will the matter – which is part of it – be of itself 'this', because there cannot be a 'composite common and of the same idea' in diverse things without whatever that is of the essence of it being able to be of the same idea as them.

140. Further, by reason: matter is the same in the generated as in the corrupted; therefore it has the same singularity in the generated and the corrupted.

141. And if you reply that the matter is not of the same species in the generated and the corrupted, I argue as before 'against non-terminated quantity' [n.100], and so generation will be circular: first of fire from water, second of water from fire; the water first corrupted and the water second generated have the same matter and are of the same species, – therefore they are really 'this water'; therefore the first returns naturally the same in number, which is against them [sc. those who hold that matter is the principle of individuation, nn.132¹⁰⁵].

[The treatment of Question Five continues after Question Six, at n.200]

Question Six

Whether Material Substance is Individual through Some Entity per se Determining Nature to Singularity

142. Because the solution of the authorities of the Philosopher for the opposite [nn.130, 132-135] requires a solution of the sixth question, namely by what completively a material substance is individual, therefore sixth I ask whether material substance is individual through some positive entity per se determining nature to singularity.

143. That not:

Because then the 'determinant' would be disposed to nature as act to potency; therefore a single composite would truly and properly be from the specific nature and the determinant, which is unacceptable: for this 'determinant' either would be matter or form or some composite of them; whichever be given, it is unacceptable, – because then in the composite there would be a matter other than the matter that is part of the nature, or a form other than that which is posited part of nature, or a composite other than that which is a composite of nature.

144. Further: then the singular, composed of nature and that per se determinant, would be per se one, therefore per se intelligible, – seems against the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.5.417b22-23 and *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b33-6a8, where he seems openly to maintain that intellection is of the 'universal', and sense and sensation of the 'singular'.

145. Further, if it [the singular' were per se intelligible, there could of it be demonstration and science, – and so of singulars there would a science proper insofar as they are singulars, which the Philosopher denies, *Metaphysics* 7.10.1035b33-6a8, 15.1039b26-40a5, ch. 'On Parts of Definition'.

146. Again, if it were to include the specific nature and the per se determinant, it could be per se defined by those two (included per se in its idea), and so there would be one definition of the individual and another of the species, - at any rate adding to the definition of species as the definition of species adds to the definition of genus.

147. To the opposite:

Every [logical] inferior includes per se something that is not included in the understanding of the [logical] superior, – otherwise the concept of the inferior would be as equally common as the concept of the superior, and then the 'per se inferior' would not be per se inferior because it would not be under the common and superior; therefore something is per se included in the idea of the individual that is not included in the idea

¹⁰⁵ Vatican editors: That the same individual cannot return by natural action does Scotus also hold (along with others), as is plain above n.100.

of the nature. But that included is a positive entity, from the solution of the second question [n.57], – and makes a 'one per se' with the nature, from the solution of the fourth question [n.111]; therefore it is per se determining the nature to singularity, or to the idea of the inferior.

A. To the Question1. The Opinion of Othersa. Exposition of the Opinion

148. Here it is said [Godfrey of Fontaines] that the specific nature is of itself a 'this', and yet by quantity it can be the common nature for several singulars, or quantity can be the idea why several singulars can be under the nature.¹⁰⁶

149. The first [sc. specific nature is of itself a 'this'] is made clear thus: the most specific species is of itself an atom/uncut; therefore it is indivisible.

150. And it is confirmed by that [comment] of Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.2 2b14-16], "When we descend from the most general to the most specific, Plato [*Politicus Latinus* I 596] bids us rest;" but if it were possible that there was a further division of this nature, a rest should not be made at that nature; therefore etc.

151. Likewise Boethius in his book *Of Divisions*, when enumerating all the divisions not only per se but also per accidens, does not enumerate a division of species into individuals; therefore the specific nature is a not a 'this' by something else.

¹⁰⁶ Godfrey, *Ouodlibet* 7 q.5: "For just as the common that is genus cannot be divided into several things differing in species save by the addition of something pertaining to the idea of the species...so too it seems that the common that is species cannot be divided into several according ot the individual unless each individual add something above the nature of the species, which - as far as of itself - is one in all individuals... But it does not seem that something can be understood to be added pertaining to the essence and nature of the individual, because species states that whole, which is the whole being of individuals; therefore if something is added, it seems that it is something pertaining to accidental nature... For, in the predicamental line, the division stands in the most specific species, by the fact that it includes the ultimate difference, under which it is not possible to take a more determinate difference whereby it could be determined in the individual (as happens in species in respect of genus), unless there were a process to infinity; and so, as Plato says [Politicus Latinus I 596], it is necessary to rest in singulars - namely thus, that one is not to posit in them something formal pertaining to essence and quiddity, beyond what is included in the idea and quiddity of the species. Therefore, if anything is added whereby thus a nature common in itself may be determined and contracted, it must be that it is something pertaining to accidental nature [sc. to the nature of quantity], as was said." Ibid.: "But since material substance is in itself undivided into several things of the same idea or species..., therefore, just as it is a 'how much' that comes per accidens, so it is divided per accidens into several of the same idea, namely through quantity. Now a one according to number seems properly to be called what is one in number or one of a number; but number is properly caused by division according to quantity; therefore 'one in number' seems properly to be called what is undivided first in that nature by which it is distinguished first from another of the same species: and this is quantity, and therefore 'one in number' seems properly to be an undivided in the nature of quantity. Wherefore, quantity is the per se principle of one according to number, just as form...is the principle of individuation: and thus, properly speaking, there is not the same principle of per se individuation in the genus of material substance and of a one according to number, - because the principle of a one according to number is quantity, in so far asaccording to quantity it is undivided in itself and divided from another of the same idea...; but the principle per se of individuation is form, according to which substance is divided into several things of the same idea... And according to these, it seems it must be said that the formal principle (or formal idea) of this sort of distinction... is each individual's substantial form undivided in itself and divided from another, and thus they differ in substantial number... The principle...of 'distinction according substance' of several individuals is quantity etc." Scotus then adds the following already cited in fn.96 to n.72 above: "since it is the principle of division and of the matter and also of the form in divided matter; for if quantity were not preunderstood in matter, which would make it divisible, it could not receive many forms... Hence, according to this, there are many beings according as quanta or according to division of quantity...; for in this, that quantity extends substance really, it happens that substance...has also parts really and essentially differing from each other."

152. Again, if there were some reality in the individual beside the reality alone of specific nature, the species would not state 'the whole being of individuals' – which is against Porphyry [*Predicables* ch.2 3a5-9].

153. The second [n.148] is made clear, because although quantity is not the formal idea of any division [or: division of anything] into subjective parts, yet, when a quantitative whole is divided into quantitative parts, it is divided per se into those that are of the same idea; now the same thing is principle of the division into some things and principle of the distinction of dividers; therefore just as quantity is the principle of that division, so it is the principle of the distinction of those dividers. But they are the subjective parts of a common nature; therefore quantity is the principle of the distinction of such parts.

154. But how these two members [n.148] can stand together can be clear through an example, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.2.185a32-b5, 'substance of itself is indivisible', speaking of parts of the same idea – and yet when quantity arrives it is partible into such parts, indeed it then has such parts. In this way therefore can the nature of a species be of itself a 'this', and yet, though a nature reaching it from outside, be this and this.

b. Rejection of the Opinion

155. This position [n148] seems able to have a double understanding:

One such, that material substance, insofar as it is distinguished essentially from quantity, remains the same, wholly non-distinct according to idea of its proper and essential entity, and yet receives many quantities, – and, in receiving them, constitutes with them many wholes at the same time; that is to say – in plain words – that the same material substance, in itself not divided nor distinct, is informed with many quantities, and from this there are many individuals under a species.

156. In another way it can be understood that that material substance, which of itself would be a 'this', all quantity being removed, the quantity informing it posited, will be this and that, so that it not only receives distinct quantities but also has distinction in itself, in proper substantial entity: so that that substance, which is subject for that quantity and distinguished from it essentially, is not that which is under another quantity and distinguished from it essentially, although however this [fact], that this is not that, cannot be without quantity in this and in that.

157. The first understanding [n.155] seems impossible, because from it there follow things unacceptable in theology, metaphysics, and natural science.

158. In theology indeed this unacceptable [result] follows, that it is not proper to the infinite divine essence to be a 'this', namely that it, existing one, in itself indistinct, can be in several distinct supposits, – which however is not understood commonly save of persons only relatively distinct; here, however, it would be posited that one substantial nature, in no way in itself distinct, would have several supposits distinct in absolute reality.

159. Second, it follows that not any substance of wine can be transubstantiated into the body and blood [of Christ] unless the whole substance of wine were transubstantiated, because the wine is only transubstantiated according to its substance, for the quantity remains the same, – and for you [Godfrey, n.148] the substance which is

in this wine is the same as that which is in that wine; but the same thing is not transubstantiated and not transubstantiated; therefore etc.

160. In metaphysics unacceptable things follow:

First, because the Idea would be posited that Plato posited. For Plato posited that the Idea is a substance existing per se, a separate nature, without accidents (as is imputed to him by the Philosopher), in which would be the whole nature of the species, – which, according to what Aristotle imputed to him, would be said of any individual by a formal predication saying 'this is this' [n.41]; but this opinion posited that 'this substance' is said of anything at all of this species by a predication saying 'this is this', and yet it is under this accident and that [n.148]. This opinion, therefore, posits as much commonness as Plato posited in the Ideas.

161. Second, because for them [Godfrey and his followers] two accidents of the same species cannot be in the same subject (if they were absolute accidents [sc. quantity or quality]),¹⁰⁷ because according to them a manifest contradiction would follow, namely that the same thing would be in act and in potency in the same respect; however the opposite hereby follows, because the same nature is in act according to many acts of the same species.

162. And according to this, could something else impossible could be inferred, a mathematical one (insofar as a quantum pertains to the consideration of the mathematician), namely that two dimensive quantities of the same idea would at the same time perfect the same subject, – which is against the proper idea of dimensive quantities of the same idea, speaking according to the intention of the mathematician.

163. Third, in natural science two unacceptable things follow:

First, that no material substance can be generated and corrupted. Not indeed generated, because if 'this stone' is, all the substance will be in it that there can be in any stone at all; however, by this substance of a stone can so much and so much quantity be acquired, different in number: but the acquisition of new quantity is not generation (as is plain from the terms of this generation); therefore etc. – Similarly: while this stone remains, the specific nature of stone remains in it; but every nature of stone is 'this nature', – therefore, with this nature remaining, all the nature remains; therefore some material substance cannot be corrupted while the stone remains, although the quality – or the quantity – not be the same.

164. Second, it follows that although according to the fiction of that cursed Averroes, about the unity of the intellect in everyone, he can feign so about your and my bodies as about this and that stones, – however by holding, not only according to the faith but according to philosophy, different intellective souls to be necessary, human nature cannot be of itself an atom [uncut] and yet different through quantity, because in this and in that man there is a different substantial form, by a difference naturally preceding quantity. And therefore to this objection – as if insoluble – they do not try to respond, but betake themselves to other 'homogeneous' things, stone or water; and yet, if they had anything on their behalf from the idea of specific atom-nature, they would thus conclude

¹⁰⁷ Godfrey, *Quodlibet* 6 q.5, "It must be said that, just as several accidents of the same species cannot be at the same time in the same subject, so also one accident cannot, by any agent, be at the same time in two subjects… For accidents that have in themselves no distinction do not acquire distinction from being in the same subject, but unity; hence, just as two points cannot be at the same time in the same subject (but they become one point), nor two lines,… so neither two whitenesses… Therefore it is impossible that two accidents that are of the same idea and species become one in subject and that they remain two and distinct."

about man as about stone. They can therefore see that the principles are null from which they proceed, since from them follow manifest impossibilities.

165. The second understanding [n.156] seems to destroy itself, because what is of itself this, in the way in which it was expounded before that 'something is of itself a this' (that is, to which it is repugnant per se to be divided into several subjective parts, for which it is also repugnant to be of itself not-this [nn.48, 76]) – such a thing can by nothing coming to it be divided into several parts, because if it be repugnant to it of itself to be divided, it is repugnant to it of itself to receive anything by which it may become not-this. Therefore to say that a nature is of itself 'this' (according to the understanding expounded before about a nature that is of itself 'this' [n.155-56]), and yet that it can be this and that when something else comes to it, is to state contradictories.

166. And this is plain in the example set down in that position [n.154], because although a material substance not be of itself divided into parts of the same idea, yet it is of itself not indivisible into such parts, – because if it were of itself indivisible (that is, if division were repugnant to it), it could not receive the quantity by which formally it is divided into such parts; which is apparent, for a soul – or an angel (which is of itself indivisible in this way) – cannot receive quantity, just as parts either.

167. There seems therefore to be deception in this consequence, 'it is not of itself such, therefore it is of itself not-such' (fallacy of the consequent). For truly substance, according to some position, is not of itself a haver of parts of the same idea, – and yet it is not of itself a non-haver of parts of the same idea, so that it be repugnant to it to have parts, because then it could not receive such parts formally through 'something coming to it'. And so the nature of a most specific species is not of itself a 'this', just as neither is anything divisible of its nature of itself a 'this'; it is not however of itself not-this, such that it be repugnant to it of itself to be divided into several parts, because then it could not receive anything by which such division would formally belong to it.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

168. 168. To the question therefore [sixth question, n.142] I respond that so.

169. For which I bring apply this sort of reason: just as unity in general per se follows entity in general, so any unity per se follows some entity; therefore unity simply (of which sort is 'unity of the individual' frequently described before [nn.48, 76, 165], namely to which is repugnant division into several subjective parts and to which is repugnant not being this signate thing), if it is in beings (as every opinion supposes), it follows per se some per se entity; but it does not follow the per se entity of nature, because there is of that some unity proper and per se real, as was proved in the solution of the first question [n.30]; therefore it follows some other entity determining this one, and it will make a one per se with the entity of nature, because the whole of what this unity is, is perfect of itself.

170. Again, every difference of differences is reduced ultimately to some things first diverse (otherwise there would be no stand in differences); but individuals properly differ, because they are 'diverse something-the-same beings' [*Ord.*I d.3 n.132]; therefore the difference of them is reduced to some things that are first diverse. But those 'first diverses' are not the nature in this and the nature in that, because that by which some things formally agree is not the same as that by which they really differ, although the

same thing can be distinct really and agree really; for it differs much to be distinct and to be that by which something is first distinct (therefore it will be thus about unity). Therefore, beside the nature in this thing and in that, there are some things first diverse, by which this and that differ (this in this and that in that): and they cannot be negations, from the second question [n.57], – nor accidents, from the fourth question]n.111]; therefore they will be some positive entities per se determining nature.

171. Against the first reason [n.169] it is objected: because if there is some real unity less than numerical unity, either it is of something in the same thing numerically or in something else. Not in the same number, because whatever is in the same number is one in number; nor in two, because in them nothing is one really, because that is proper in the divine supposits (as the saying of Damascene was expounded, n.39 above).

172. I reply: as was said in the solution of the first question (about this matter, nn.32, 34) that nature is naturally prior to this nature, and proper unity – consequent to nature as nature – is naturally prior to the unity of it as this nature; and under this idea there is metaphysical consideration of nature, and the definition of it is assigned, and there are propositions per se in the first mode [n.32]. In the same thing, therefore, that is one in number, there is some entity, which a lesser unity than is numerical unity follows, and it is real; and that of which there is such unity is formally 'of itself one' with numerical unity. I concede therefore that real unity is not of anything existing in two individuals, but in one.

173. And when you object that 'whatever is in the same individual in number is one in number' [n.171], – I reply, first in a similar more manifest other: whatever is in one species is one in species; color therefore in whiteness is one in species, 'therefore it does not have a unity less than the unity of the species' does not follow. For as was said elsewhere (namely in *Ord*.I d.8 n.214, in the question 'About Attributes', before the solution of the principle reason about attributes, solving the first doubt), that 'something can be said to be animate denominatively, as body, – or per se in the first mode, as man' (and thus a surface is called 'white' denominatively, and a surface-white is called 'white' per se in the first mode, because the subject includes the predicate) – so I say that a potential that is contracted by an actual is informed by that actual, and thereby informed by the unity consequent to that actuality or that act; and so it is 'one' by the proper unity of that actual, but denominatively it is thus one (and it is not of itself thus one, neither in the first mode, nor through any essential part).

174. The color therefore in whiteness is one in species, but it is [so] neither per se nor first but only denominatively; but the specific difference is first one, because to it first is it repugnant to be divided into several in species; whiteness is one in species per se, but not first, because through something intrinsic to it (as through that difference).

175. So I concede that whatever is in this stone is one in number, – either first, or per se, or denominatively: 'first' perhaps as that by which such unity belongs to this composite; 'per se' this stone, of which that which is first one by this unity is per se part; 'denominatively' only, that potential which is perfected by this actual, and which quasi-denominatively respects its actuality.

176. By further clarifying this solution [nn.168-170], – what this entity is, by which that unity [sc. in the individual] is perfect, can be made clear by what is like the entity from which the specific difference is taken. The specific difference to be sure, or

the entity from which the specific difference is taken, can be compared to that which is below it, or to that which is above it, or to that which is next to it.

177. In the first way [sc. to what is below], to the specific difference and to that specific entity it is repugnant to be per se divided into several things essentially, in species or nature, and thereby this is repugnant to the whole of that of which that entity is per se part; so in the matter at hand, to this individual entity it is first repugnant to be divided into any subjective parts whatever, and thereby such division is per se repugnant to the whole of which that entity is part. And the difference is only in this, that the unity of specific nature is less than this unity [sc. of the individual entity], and because of this that [specific nature] does not exclude all division that is according to quantitative parts, but only that division which is of essential parts; but this [sc. unity of individual entity] excludes all [division].

178. And from this is the thing proposed sufficiently confirmed, because from the fact any unity less than this unity has a proper entity which it per se follows, it does not seem probable to deny to this most perfect unity [sc. numerical, n.58] a proper entity that it follows.

179. Now, comparing specific nature to that which is above it [n.176], I say that the reality from which the specific difference is taken is actual with respect to the reality from which the genus or the idea of the genus is taken, – such that this reality is not formally that; otherwise there would be trifling in the definition, and the genus would be sufficient definition (or the difference would), because it would indicate the whole entity of the defined. Sometimes, however, this which contracts [the definition] is other than the form from which the idea of the genus is taken (when the species adds some reality beyond the nature of the genus), – and sometimes it is not another thing but only another formality or another formal concept of the same thing; and according to this, some specific difference has a concept 'not simply simple', namely which is taken from the form, – some does have a concept 'simply simple', which is taken from the ultimate abstraction of the form (which distinction of specific differences was spoken about in 1 d.3 nn.159-161, how some specific differences include being and some do not).

180. To this extent, this reality of the individual is similar to specific reality, because it is quasi act determining the quasi possible and potential reality of the species; but to this extent it is dissimilar, because this is never taken from an added form, but precisely from the ultimate reality of form.

181. As to something else it is also dissimilar, because the specific reality constitutes the composite (of which it is part) in quidditative being, because it is a certain quidditative entity, – and this reality of the individual is first diverse from every quidditative entity. Which is proved from this, that in understanding any quidditative entity (speaking of limited quidditative entity), it is common to many, nor is it repugnant that it is said of many things each of which is it; therefore this entity [sc. of the individual], which is of itself a different entity from quidditative being, but in being of another idea.

182. And because with the Philosopher quiddity is frequently called form (as is plain from *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a26-28 ch. 'On Cause' and in many other places; and from *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a32-b5 ch. 'On Parts of Definition', that "in whatever there is not matter, the what-it-is is the same as that of which it is:" as will be explained

[nn.204-207], he is speaking of matter and form), and whatever has a contracted quiddity is with him called 'material' [nn.206-205] (and Boethius in his little book *On the Trinity* maintains that no form can be the subject of an accident, because form is predicated in the 'what' of some other thing: and if humanity is the subject, this however does not belong to it insofar as it is form; humanity indeed is not form of another composite part, as of form or matter, but of the whole composite that has a contracted quiddity, or in which there is a contracted quiddity) – therefore every specific reality constitutes in formal being (because in quidditative being), and the reality of the individual constitutes precisely in material being (that is, in contracted being). And from this follows that logical [doctrine] that 'that essentially is formal, this material', because this constitutes in idea of what can be subject and that in idea of what is predicable simply; and a formal predicate has the idea of form, and what can be a subject has the idea of matter.

183. But comparing, third, specific difference to what is next to it, namely to another specific difference [n.176] – although sometimes it could be not first diverse from the other, just as the entity is which is taken from form, yet the ultimate specific difference is first diverse from another, namely from that which has a concept simply simple [n.179]. And as to this, I say that individual difference is likened to specific difference universally taken, because every individual entity is first diverse from any other.

184. And from this is the answer apparent to this objection: for it is objected, either this entity and that are of the same idea or they are not. If so, then from them can some entity be abstracted, and this a specific one (and about it the question must be asked through what it is contracted to this entity and that: if of itself, then by equal reason could a stand be made in the nature of stone; if by something else, then a process to infinity); if they [sc. the individual entities] are of another idea, then also the things constituted will be of another idea, and so they will not be individuals of the same species.

185. I reply [to n.184]. Ultimate specific differences are first diverse, and so from them can nothing per se one be abstracted; yet not because of this does it follow that the things constituted are first diverse and not of some one idea. For that some things are equally distinguished can be understood in two ways: either because equally incompossible (because namely they cannot be in the same thing), or because they equally agree in none. And in the first way it is true that distinct things are as equally diverse as what distinguish them (for what distinguish them cannot be incompossible without also the distinct things being incompossible); in the second way it is universally impossible, because distinct things include not only what distinguish them but something else (which is as it were potential in respect of the distinguishing things), and yet the distinguishing things in it do not agree.

186. As was replied about differences first diverse [n.185], so do I reply about individual entities, that they are first diverse (that is, agreeing in nothing the same), and yet it is not necessary that things distinct are simply diverse; however, just as the entities are incompossible, so too the individuals that have those entities.

187. And if you ask of me what this 'individual entity' is from which the individual difference is taken, is it matter or form or the composite, -I reply:

Every quidditative entity – whether partial or total – of any genus is of itself indifferent 'as quidditative entity' to this entity and that, so that 'as quidditative entity' it is naturally prior to this entity as it is 'this', – and as it is naturally prior, just as it does

not belong to it to be a 'this', so its opposite is not repugnant to it of its idea; and just as the composite does not include its own entity (by which it is formally 'this') insofar as it is nature, so neither does matter 'insofar as it is nature' include its own entity (by which it

188. Therefore 'this entity' is not matter or form or the composite insofar as each of these is a 'nature', – but there is of a being an ultimate reality which is matter or which is form or which is the composite; such that whatever is common, and yet determinable, can still be distinguished (however much it is one thing) into several realities formally distinct, of which this one formally is not that one: and this one is formally the entity of singularity, and that one is the entity of nature formally. Nor can these two realities be thing and thing, as they can be the reality from which genus is taken and the reality from which difference is taken (from which [two] is specific reality taken), – but always in the same thing (whether in part or in whole) they are realities of the same thing, formally distinct.

is 'this matter'), nor does form 'insofar as it is nature' include its.

B. To the Principal Arguments

189. And from this is apparent the response to the first principal argument [n.143]. For when it is concluded that 'every individual in which nature is contractible is more composite than the nature itself', ¹⁰⁸ I say that composition can be understood properly, insofar as it is from an actual thing and a potential thing; or less properly, insofar as it is from a reality and from an actual and potential reality in the same thing. In the first way the individual is not a composite with respect to the specific nature, because it adds no reality, – because neither matter nor form nor composite, just as the argument proceeds [n.143]). In the second way it is necessarily a composite, because the reality from which the specific difference is taken is potential with respect to the reality from which the individual difference is taken, just as if they were thing and thing; for the specific reality does not of itself have whence it include by identity individual reality, but only some third thing includes those two by identity.

190. And this is the sort of composition that cannot stand with divine perfect simplicity. For that [divine simplicity] not only does not allow with itself a composition of thing and thing actual and potential, but neither of actual reality with potential reality: for when comparing anything essential with anything in divine reality, the essential is formally infinite, - and therefore it has of itself that whence it may by identity include whatever can be with it (as was frequently touched on in Ord.I [d.8 nn.194, 209, 213, 215-217, 220-221, d.5 nn.117-118, 127, d.2 n.410]), and not precisely are those extremes [wisdom-goodness, deity-paternity etc.] precisely the same perfectly 'because some third thing includes both perfectly' [sc. *ibid*.: 'but because of the formal infinity of one or both extremes']. But, in the matter at hand, neither does specific entity include by identity individual entity, nor conversely, but only does some third thing - of which both these are quasi per se parts – include both these by identity, and therefore that most perfect composition is taken away which is of thing and thing; not however all: for universally, whatever nature is not of itself 'this' but is determinable to being 'this' (whether so that it be determined by some other thing, which is impossible in anything, - or so that it be determined by another reality) is not simply simple.

¹⁰⁸ Not express in n.143 but implied. It is express however in *Lectura* 2 d.3 n.140.

191. To the second argument [n.144] I concede that a 'singular' is per se intelligible, as far as is on its own part (but whether to some intellect it not be per se intelligible, namely ours, about this elsewhere [n.294]); at any rate there is not on its part an impossibility but that it can be understood, just as neither on the part of the sun is there an impossibility of seeing or of vision in an owl, but on the part of the eye of the owl.

192. To the other about definition [n.146] I say that if any account could express whatever concurs for the entity of an individual, yet that account will not be a perfect definition, because it does not express the 'what it was to be', – and according to the Philosopher, in *Topics* 1.5.101b39, 'a definition is the expressing etc. [of the 'what it was to be' of a thing]'. And therefore I concede that the singular is not definable by a definition other than the definition of the species, and yet it is a per se being, adding some entity to the entity of species; but the per se entity which it adds is not quidditative entity.

193. By this is it plain to the other [arguments], about science and demonstration [n.145], – because the definition of the subject is the middle term in the strongest demonstration; but the singular does not have a definition proper, but only the definition of the species, – and so there is not of it a demonstration proper, but only a demonstration which is of the species (for it does not have a proper property but only the property of the species).

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

194. To the arguments for the opinion.

When it is first said that a species is an atomic unit [n.149], I say that it is an atom [uncut], that is, it is not divisible into several species; it is however not purely an atom, that is, simply indivisible: for indivisibility into several species is compatible with divisibility into several of the same species.

195. And when indivisibility is proved by the remark of Plato, which Porphyry states [n.150], -I say that division by art stops at the most specific species, because to proceed further is to proceed to infinites, which "are to be left behind" by the art, according to him; for there is not on the part of individuals that whereby the number of them may be fixed, but they could be infinite, if their nature is not repugnant [*Ord*.I d.2 n.176].

196. But if division is taken strictly [nn.150-151], to the extent there is in it what requires parts determinate in multitude and magnitude, in this way is a species not divided into individuals; but a genus requires a determinate multitude of species (because, according to Boethius *On Division*, the first divisible is into two), – and a quantum requires a determinate magnitude, and they are presupposed in the whole terminating the halves, because they are two. And if division is taken strictly as it is into parts having a proportion to the whole that they either constitute or are under it contained in a determinate multitude or magnitude – a species is per se not divided into individuals; and by this can both Plato and Porphyry be explained. But if division is taken commonly, insofar as it is into whatever things participate in the nature of the divided thing (whether they have such a proportion to the whole in integrating or in being subject, or not) – a species is per se divided into individuals; and this division [sc. of species into individuals] is reduced to genus in Boethius, because the conditions and properties that

Boethius assigns in the division of genus agree with this division that is of species into individuals.

197. To the other [argument], 'the species states the whole being of individuals' [n.152], – I say that there 'being' is taken for quidditative being, as Porphyry says in his chapter 'On Difference' [*Predicables* 3.3a45-48], where he maintains that difference per se does not receive the more and less; which he proves: "For the 'to be' of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease" (he takes the 'to be' for quiddity, like the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 8 [n.133], "soul and the 'to be' for soul are the same"). And because the entity that the singular adds over and above species is not a quidditative entity, – I say that the whole quidditative entity that is in the individual is the entity of the species, and therefore species states the whole 'to be' of individuals; but not so does the genus state the whole 'to be' of species, because species further adds quidditative entity.

198. To the argument for the other member, about quantity [n.153], -I say that the proposition is false, 'the principle of divisibility and of the distinction of the dividers is the same'; a concept indeed in itself common to species is the idea of the divisibility of it into species, but it is not the idea of distinguishing species from each other, but this species is distinguished from that by the difference. Now in a quantitative division, the whole quantity, as it confusedly contains all the parts, is the idea of divisibility in the whole quantum, - but it is not thus the idea of the distinction of parts from each other, but insofar as 'this quantity' distinctly in act is not 'that one' in act which is in the whole.

199. When too it is deduced further that 'when a whole homogeneous quantum is divided, division is had through quantity' [n.153] – let it be so. However that division is not the first division of individuals, but this substance and that have a division and distinction from each other – insofar as [they are] 'this' and 'this' – prior naturally to the distinction insofar as they were parts of distinct quantity per accidens (for it was accidental for them to be parts); yet once a division has been made according to quantitative parts, per accidens is a division made according to subjective parts.

Question Five [Continued] II. Scotus' own Solution to the Fifth Question

200. To the preceding fifth question, about matter [n.129], the solution is plain from the arguments against the opinion [nn.132, 136-141]. For I concede that matter absolutely, as it is nature, is not the idea of distinction or individuation; for whatever is a nature in any genus, total or partial, is not of itself a 'this'; and therefore it is necessary to ask by what it is a 'this'.

III. To the Authorities of the Philosopher for the Opposite

201. To the authority of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5 [n.130] ("One in number" etc.), I reply: I say that he there takes matter for that individual entity which constitutes in material being, and not in formal being (according as quiddity is called 'form'), because that entity is not quidditative. And this exposition is plain through that which he supplies, "[one' in species, whose idea is one," etc.; 'idea' indeed there is taken for quiddity, which is called form in respect of individual being.

202. By the same is it plain to that in *On the Heaven*, about heaven and this heaven [n.135] – which confirms the matter at hand.

203. By the same too is it plain to that in *Metaphysics* 12 [n.134]. For I concede that there cannot be several first movers because in the first mover there is no matter: that is, there is not in it anything contracting it, as matter or anything else, – but it is of itself a 'this' without anything else contracting it, for such contraction does not stand with perfect simplicity; and therefore the quiddity of the first is of itself a 'this'.

204. To that from *Metaphysics* 7 [n.133], 'in those things that are without matter, the what of the thing is the same as that of which it is', -I say that 'the what of a thing' can be compared to that of which it is per se and first, and to that of which it is to per se and not first; and universally, in the way in which it is of something, in that way it is the same as it, because – just as the *Philosopher* argues in [*Metaphysics*] 7.6.1031a17-18, "The singular [seems to be not other than its substance,] and the 'what it was to be' is called the substance of the singular" (for if the 'what it is' is not a being, it is nothing). But the 'what' is that which a thing first is, and so what the 'what it is' is per se of, it is the same as it per se, – what it is per accidens of, it is the same as it per se, and therefore it is not simply the same as it (hence too he himself maintains there [*Metaphysics* 6.1031a19-21] that in things said per accidens, the 'what it is' is not the same as what it is of – and no wonder, because he earlier declared [4.1029b12-30a17] that nothing of them is the 'what it is' nor the definition).

205. Now the haver of the 'what it is' can be understood either as the nature itself, of which the 'what it is' is first, - or as the supposit of nature, of which it is per se, though not first. In the first way the 'what it is', both in material and in immaterial things, is the same as that of which it is - also first, because it first has the 'what it is'. In the second way, the haver is not the same, when it includes some entity outside the idea of its own quiddity; for then it is not the same as the 'what it is' first, because the 'what it is' is not of it first, according as the haver includes some entity outside the idea of that which is the 'what' first.

206. To the matter at hand therefore of the Philosopher, I say that in things not conceived with matter (that is, not with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the 'what it is' is the same first as that of which it is, because the 'such' of which it is has no idea outside the idea of that which is the 'what it is'; but in things conceived with matter (that is, with an individual entity contracting the quiddity), the 'what it is' is not the same first as that of which it is, because a thus conceived first would not have the 'what it is' of itself but only through a part, namely through the nature which is contracted by that individual entity.

207. Not then from this is had that the matter which is the other part of a composite is outside the idea per se of the quiddity, – rather, matter truly belongs to the quiddity, and the species (and what has the form universally) has first the 'what it is' and is first the same as it; and so it does not follow that the matter that is the other part of the composite is what individuates it, but it only follows about the matter that is the entity contracting the quiddity, which I have conceded [n.206]. Now whether the lack of matter which is the other part entails the lack of this sort of individual entity according to the Philosopher, about this in the following question [nn.238-239].

208. To that [remark] of the Philosopher that 'the generator generates another because of matter' [n.132], I say that the intention of the Philosopher there is that the

[Platonic] Ideas are not necessary for generation, because both the distinction of the generator from the generated and the assimilation of the generated to the generator (which are required for univocal generation) can be had without the ideas. For the particular agent has from its form wherefrom it may assimilate the passive thing to itself, and the generator the generated – and from matter it has that it is distinct from the generated: not principally, although however it follow that it is distinguished by matter from the generated, because it perfects, not its own matter, but another [matter] through the form terminating generation (for its own [matter] is already perfected by a form); and from this that it assimilates through the form, it perfects another matter than its own, and so its own is other than that which is deprived of such form. But of whatever there is another matter, from the fact matter is an essential part of the thing, it is other than it.

209. I say then that the principal reason for assimilation (or likeness) is the form between the generator and the generated, and this not according to that lesser unity and identity 'insofar as form is a this', but according to a lesser unity and identity 'insofar as it is form', and in accord with this is it a reason for generating; the form too is a more principal reason for distinction than matter, because as form is more principally that by which 'a composite' is than matter, so it is more principally that by which 'a composite' is one and consequently in itself indistinct and from another distinct.

210. Appropriately however (distinguishing 'assimilative' from 'distinctive') form is assimilative, so that not matter properly because it is not a substantial or accidental quality; but matter is a distinctive (appropriately speaking), because necessarily from this, that it is lacking form, it distinguishes from matter that has form before, and so composite from composite.

211. Also in another way can the composite be understood 'other because of matter', just as because of a pre-existing cause of otherness: for the form of the generated, although it be a cause of otherness in the composite more principal than is matter, is however not a pre-existing cause of this otherness, but matter is, – and this because it pre-exists deprived; and therefore it cannot be the same as informed matter.

Question Seven

Whether it is Possible for there to be Several Angels in the Same Species

212. Seventh and last about this matter I ask whether it is possible for several angels to be in the same species.

213. That not:

Because the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7.11.1037a32-b5 ch. 'On Parts of Definition', at the end, says that "in these things that are without matter, the same thing is the what it is and that of which it is" [nn.133, 182, 204]; therefore since an angel is without matter, his 'what it is' is the same as the angel himself. Therefore it is impossible for an angel to be distinguished from an angel unless his 'what it is' be distinguished from the 'what it is' of the other angel; therefore there cannot be a distinction of individuals in angels under the same 'what it is'.

214. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 9.4 f.104vb-105rb posits an order of intelligences wherein he seems to maintain that a lower intelligence is produced by a superior that is as if creating it; and this causality is not in anything with respect to another of the same species.

215. Further, I argue by reason: every formal difference is a specific difference; angels, since they are several and are forms, differ by some formal difference; therefore specifically.

216. The proof of the major is taken from *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11 where forms are compared to numbers, in which any addition or subtraction at all varies the species; therefore etc.

217. Again, it is proved in another way in *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058a29-34 and b21-23, "Masculine and feminine do not differ in species, because masculinity and femininity are only material differences of the form of humanity," intimating from this that all formal differences make distinction in species, and also because form and species are the same; wherefore etc.

218. Further, every form separated from matter has in itself the whole perfection of the species; therefore if some such form be posited in a species (as the form of this angel) and another, – that will be this and this will be that, because each angel is a form separated from matter, and consequently any one at all has the perfection of the whole species.

219. Proof of the antecedent [n.218]: because that a form not have the whole essence of the species, this is because it participates it; but it does not have the essence of the form by participation save because it is in matter; therefore etc.

220. Further, in perfect beings there is nothing that is not intended by nature; but numerical plurality is not per se intended by nature because numerical difference – as far as it is of itself – can be intended to infinity: now infinity is not intended per se by any agent, so there is not a numerical difference in perfect beings. But what is in angels belongs to them as to the most perfect beings of the universe; therefore there is not in them a numerical difference but only a specific one, in which principally consists the beauty of the universe.

221. There is a confirmation: the intention of nature stops per se in those beings that pertain to the order of the universe, – but of this sort are species and not individuals; and nothing is in angels that does not pertain to the order and beauty of the universe; therefore no numerical difference is in them.

222. Further, the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.4.415a26-b7, seems to say that the multitude of individuals is only because of preservating the species; but in incorruptible things nature is sufficiently preserved in one individual; therefore etc.

223. There is confirmation too through the same, *On the Heaven* 1.9.278a22-b8, because in the heavenly bodies there is only one individual of one species, as one sun and one moon; therefore etc.¹⁰⁹

224. On the contrary:

Damascene in his *Elementary* (= also *On the Two Wills etc. in Christ* n.3) ["Wisely then did the founder of natures (that is, of species) make much difference for displaying his riches and wisdom and virtue, so that, by being at least wondered at, he might be the more desired... On this account he made, according to each order of angelic virtues, different hypostases, not only but also according to each species, [so that] they might, by at any rate communicating nature with each other nature, rejoice in each other, and might, by being joined together in natural condition, care for each other and be amicably disposed to each other."]

¹⁰⁹ Arguments like those in nn.222-223 are also found in Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.

I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others

225. Those who say to the preceding questions about individuation, that the principle of individuation is quantity or matter [nn.71, 132, 148, 153-154], in accord with this consequently speak negatively to this question,¹¹⁰ namely that there cannot be several angels in the same species, because in angels there cannot be found the principles of such 'individual difference' of species; and they have to say that not only is this impossible by intrinsic impossibility [sc. on the part of an angel's nature] but also by extrinsic possibility [sc. on the part of divine power], because simply incompossible, – so that to this nature [sc. angelic] there cannot belong an individual distinction, whereby to it is that repugnant which precisely can be the principle of such distinction, just as it would be incompossible that there were several species under animal, if to animal were repugnant the different actualities by which species were distinguished.

226. Now the foundations of this opinion were rejected before, in the preceding questions [nn.75-104, 136-141, 155-167, 200].

B. Scotus' own Opinion

227. The simply opposite conclusion must be held, that namely it is simply possible that there are several angels in the same species.

Which is proved:

First, because every quiddity – as far as is of itself – is communicable, even the divine quiddity; but none is communicable in numerical identity unless it be infinite; therefore any other at all is communicable, and this with numerical distinction – and thus the thing proposed. But that every quiddity is communicable is plain, because this is not repugnant to it from perfection, since this belongs to the divine quiddity, – nor from imperfection, since this belongs to things generable and corruptible; wherefore etc.

228. Further, any quiddity of a creature can be understood under the idea of a universal without contradiction; but if it were of itself a 'this', it would be a contradiction to understand it under the idea of a universal (just as it is a contradiction to understand the divine essence under the idea of universality), because the idea of understanding is repugnant to its understood object, – that is, that the understanding is false; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: no created quiddity is of itself a 'this', but as a universal it can be conceived, because in its idea is not included singularity (and therefore God cannot be a universal, because he is of himself a this, – not having genus and difference, which belong to created quiddity); therefore, since any quiddity has principles that of themselves are not 'this', it will be able to be understood under the idea of a universal. But of the idea of a universal is that it is multipliable into many, because 'universal' is from this, that it is understood according to an indifference to this and to that, as sayable of many things according to the same idea, – and it is confirmed through the idea of species [sc. 'because a species of itself is sayable of many'].

¹¹⁰ For example, Aquinas, Giles, Godfrey. This view was condemned by Stephen Tempier, Bishop of Paris, in 1277 (Vatican editors) – therefore after the death of Aquinas (1274), but while the others were still alive.

229. Further, if God can annihilate this angel in this species, he can, with this annihilated, produce this species anew in some other individual, because by the annihilation of this singular it is not repugnant for the species to be; for otherwise it would be only a fictitious being, like a chimaera. He can therefore again produce the very species in some individual, otherwise he could not make the same order of the universe which he made from the beginning; but not in this one [sc. the angel annihilated], according to those [e.g. Aquinas, *Sent.* IV d.44 q.1 a.1] who are of this opinion 'that a man would not be able to rise again the same in number unless the intellective soul were to remain the same in number'.

230. Further, intellective souls are distinguished by number in the same species, and yet they are pure forms although perfective of matter; there is not, then, an impossibility on the part of forms that they be distinguished in number in the same species: for whatever would prove this impossibility by reason of form in angels, would prove it also in souls.

231. But if you say that souls have an inclination to diverse bodies and thus they have an aptitude for perfecting matter, and so they are distinguished by diverse relations¹¹¹ – on the contrary:

This inclination is not an absolute entity, because it is not possible for anything to be inclined to itself; therefore it presupposes some entity absolute and distinct, and so in that prior stage this soul is distinguished from that. Therefore souls without these sorts of relations, as without a formal idea of distinguishing, are distinct.

232. It is confirmed, because this aptitude cannot be of the formal idea of the soul, because it is a respect; but a respect is not of the formal idea of anything absolute.

233. Again, because it is this soul, therefore does it have this inclination, and not conversely (because form is the end of matter, and not conversely); therefore this inclination is not the idea of being this soul, but presupposes this idea.

234. This [n.230] is even confirmed by some [e.g. Aquinas] for whom it is unacceptable that any species of intellectual nature simply be at once damned whole; but there would be many species of angels in which none would be saved, that position being posited; therefore the position is not true.

235. And the first proposition [n.234] is proved by this which Augustine says *Enchiridion* ch.29 n.9: "It has pleased the universal Lord that, since not the whole multitude of angels, by deserting God, had perished, – that which had perished would remain in perpetual damnation, – but that which, with that part deserting, had stood with God, should rejoice in their happiness most certainly known to be always going to be; but yet the rational nature that was in man, since it had in sins and punishments all perished, deserved to be in part repaired, – hence would there be joined to the curtailed society of angels what that ruin had diminished." This totality and partition in angels does not seem to be rational unless it be posited that no angelic species as to all individuals had totally perished, and so some from each species fell and some stood; wherefore etc.

236. Further, if it be conceded that the quiddity of an angel of itself is communicable to many and consequently - as far as is of itself - to infinites (for there is

¹¹¹ Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodlibet* 7 q.16: "...just as also the separated rational soul is not as purely a metaphysical being as the intelligences or angels, because of th natural relation and inclination to a natural body, which includes natural and material dispositions... Notwithstanding this, however, several souls differing in number are posited; but this is said to happen from the fact they are forms of diverse bodies differing in number, with which too they attain this sort of individuation or numerical distinction."

no idea of impossibility on the part of a numerical multitude), if by this, that the nature is produced in this individual, its possibility of being in many is taken away, therefore it is in this individual according to its whole communicability, – and so infinitely, because it is infinitely communicable according to its quiddity; therefore that one angel would be formally infinite. The consequent is unacceptable, therefore also some antecedent.^a

a. [Interpolation] Or it is argued thus: if the quiddity of an angel is in itself multipliable into many, therefore also into infinites; therefore through its reception in some one angel it cannot be made incommunicable to another unless it be in him according to its whole commonness; but this does not belong to him unless it be in him infinitely, because according to itself it is communicable to infinites. But this reasoning of others supposes that the quiddity of an angel is of itself multipliable and that its whole commonness is received in this one; and then the reasoning would proceed, but others would have to deny the antecedent.

237. I say therefore that every nature that is not of itself pure act can – according to the reality according to which it is nature – be potential to that reality by which it is this nature, and consequently it can be a 'this'; and just as of itself it does not include any quasi singular entity, so such entities, however many, are not repugnant to it, and so it can be found in however many such. In that, however, which is of itself necessary being, there is a determination in nature to being 'this', because whatever can be in nature is there – so that determination cannot be through anything extrinsic to singularity, if there is in nature of itself a possibility for infinity; it is otherwise in any possible nature where multiplication can be.

II. To the Principal Arguments

238. To the first argument [n.213] I say that although the Philosopher's understanding there be per se about matter (that is, about the entity per se contracting quiddity [nn.182, 206-207]), yet by application to what has matter, which is the other part of the composite, and to what does not have matter – I concede that the Philosopher's intention was that everything not having matter as some nature composing it is the same as its 'that which it is' first [cf. nn.206-207], because every such 'that which it is' posits per se a 'this'; and the reason for this is because everything such as does not have matter a part of itself, he posited to be formally necessary. Now whatever can be in a nature formally necessary, is in it; therefore anything whatever that can have that quiddity does have it, because there is not there a potency distant from act; hence, every possibility that he posited in such nature for supposits, he posited to be in act. But if there were a possibility there for several individuals, there would be a possibility for infinite individuals, – therefore they would be infinite in act; wherefore, since infinity is impossible in any nature, therefore also in this nature (according to him) there is an impossibility for infinity. Therefore it is of itself a 'this', according to him.

239. But we disagree with him in this proposition 'every quiddity not having matter is formally necessary' [n.238], – and therefore in the conclusion [sc.: 'every quiddity not having matter as part of itself is of itself a this or singular']. For it is more reasonable for a theologian to disagree with a philosopher in a principle because of which he holds some conclusion, than to err with him in the conclusion and to disagree with him in the principle because of which he himself has erred. For thus to agree with him is

neither to philosophize nor to think theologically, because such [theologian] does not have a reason that would be valid with the Philosopher, because neither would the Philosopher concede the conclusion if not because of that principle; nor even does such [theologian] have for his conclusion a theological principle, because there is precisely for it a philosophical principle, which he himself [the theologian] denies.

a. [Interpolation] The response [to the first argument, nn.238-239] stands on this, that matter is taken in one way for the other (potential) part of the composite, in another way for the disposition contracting the quiddity or for any entity that is outside the idea of quiddity; and according to this, things not having matter can be understood in two ways. Likewise, a distinction must be made on the part of the predicate, for that 'the what it is' is the same as that of which it is' can be understood in two ways: in one wayof real identity, and thus the 'what it is' is the same really as that of which it is, whether it have matter or not (because as [Aristotle] argues in the beginning of the chapter 'On the Unity of Definition' [n.213], "The singular does not seem to be other than its own substance;" and the argument is not sophistical but demonstrative); in another way it can be understood of the most precise identity, and thus the 'what it is' is the same as that of which it is when what has guiddity is only quiddity and not anything else (which indeed the Philosopher would place among things that do not have matter 'the second part of a composite', because he posits that on this it follows that there is not in them matter in the second way but only quiddity is there and not any condition contracting quiddity, because of the reason above posited, because they are formally necessary [n.238]). – Thereby to the form of the argument [n.213]: that in things not having matter, neither in the first way nor in the second, is the 'what it is' the same as that of which it is. But then the minor is false, when it is said that angels are of this sort [n.213]; for in them there is matter in the second way in truth (though not first), because none is of himself a 'this', although Aristotle would posit this because of a principle that the theologian has to deny.

240. Through the same to Avicenna [n.214], I say that his intention was that there is only one angel in one species, but the proposition on which this conclusion relies – namely that 'a superior angel causes an inferior angel' – by that which he posits, that 'from one thing, disposed in the same way, there can be only be one thing', is conceded by no theologian assuredly Catholic; wherefore neither should his conclusion be conceded by any theologian.

241. To the first reason [n.215], it was said elsewhere [*Ord*.I d.17 n.255] that a formal difference can be taken for a difference in form (and this properly seems to signify this that is called 'formal difference'), - or 'formal difference' can be taken for difference of forms, although it not be in the form as in the reason for differing.

242. In the first way can the major [n.215: 'every formal difference is a specific difference'] be conceded, and thus the minor [sc. 'angels differ by some formal difference'] is false. And the proof of the minor, namely that 'angel differs from angel because he is a form, therefore they have a formal difference', involves a fallacy of the consequent: for it does not follow 'the forms differ, therefore they differ formally (or they differ in form)', just as it does not follow 'many men differ, therefore they differ in humanity'; for it is one thing for 'something to be distinct' and another for 'it to be the first idea of distinguishing (or of distinction)', because with this, that it is distinct, stands that it is also the idea of distinguishing, – but with this, that it is the idea of distinguishing, does not stand that it is distinct. And there is a logical reason for this, because the negation included in the term 'difference' not only confounds the term of this

relation confusedly and distributively, but also that which specifies the difference, as in what the difference is indicated to be; this certainly is confounded (as far as concerns the negation included in this noun 'difference'), because if Socrates differs from Plato in whiteness, he is not the same as him either in this whiteness or in that.¹¹² – But if the major [n.215] be taken improperly, according to the second understanding [n.241], I deny the major.

243. To the proof [sc. of the major, n.216] I say that the Philosopher (in *Metaphysics* 8) is speaking of form as it indicates quiddity. Which is apparent from the first comparison of forms with numbers; for he says [8.3.1043b32-36]: "If" (he says) "substances are in some way numbers, they are in this way – for a definition is a certain number, divisible into indivisibles (for reasons are not infinite); and number is such." That is: the resolution of definitions stops at the indivisible just as the resolution of numbers stops at the indivisible; and such is a definition of that which he calls 'substance', that is of 'quiddity', – not of form, which is the other part of it.

244. In this way I say nothing is added to form without varying the species: either 'simply', that is from one species it makes another species (contrary or disparate), – or in a certain respect, that is, from a species not-such it makes another species (for example, if a difference pertaining to quidditative being be added to a genus, it makes a most specific species, and there was not such a most specific species before, but there was only an intermediate species before).

245. And in this way I say that whatever concerns the nature in matters inferior adds nothing to the form. Whether it be an individual property or a more or less (or whatever else that does not regard the nature as it is in its quidditative being), it does not take away, nor does it add, anything of the substance in this way. An example of this would be: if a unity insofar as it is part of a triple were a part precise insofar as a numerical individual difference, and yet it could be in itself intensified or relaxed, – this difference would be of it per se, and per accidens insofar as it is part of the triple; therefore the triple would not be different with a unity intense or relaxed.

246. When therefore you say that 'any distinction at all of forms is just like a distinction of number' [n.216], it is false, unless it be of them [=numbers] according to that formal being which pertains to quiddity per se; and not such is it here.

¹¹² Translator: The logical point in this paragraph seems to be as follows. The statement 'A is different from B' does not so much assert something of A as deny of it some relation with B (that A is not the same as B). So it distributes the term of the relation 'different', namely 'B' and everything about B in which something could differ from it. Or, alternatively, it distributes the whole predicate 'same as B' (negative propositions logically distribute the predicate of the proposition). Accordingly, it takes the predicate confusedly, that is, takes it to apply to everything that belongs to 'B', or to 'same as B', and leaves indeterminate what sort of sameness with B is being denied of A. Hence one cannot conclude from 'A is different from B' that A is not the same as B in humanity, say, or whiteness. One needs further premises for that purpose. Further, if the proposition does specify what the difference is in, as that A is not the same as B in humanity or whiteness, then the negation distributes and takes confusedly the specification as well. For the proposition 'A is not the same as B in whiteness', because it distributes and takes confusedly, or universally, the predicate 'same as B in whiteness', denies of A, if not further clarified, all likeness with B in all whiteness. But of course it could well be that A is not different from B in all whiteness but only in this or that shade of whiteness (A and B are both white, say, but A is a paler white). Thus the proposition 'A differs from B in whiteness' is, by itself, far too universally stated or confused to form the basis of any valid inference about what sort of difference in what sort of whiteness. And this error is committed by the argument 'an angel differs from an angel because he is a form, therefore angels have a formal difference'. For in fact, as far as the premise is concerned, an angel could differ from an angel in form or because of form in many ways. So to conclude that the angel differs in this way (namely in 'formal difference') is to infer something not warranted by the premise, and so to commit the fallacy of the consequent (because the supposed consequent does not in fact follow).

247. To that from *Metaphysics* 10 [n.217] I say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in inferring from the text that 'all forms differ in species'. For truly the Philosopher is maintaining there that 'a non-formal difference is not specific', but from this it does not follow that 'a non-specific difference is not formal' (which they themselves want to have), - just as it does not follow in affirmatives equipollent with these, because a universal affirmative does not convert with terms disposed in the same way.¹¹³

248. From the Philosopher then is got that 'only a formal difference is specific', not that 'every difference in form is specific', because although an exclusive proposition [sc. a proposition of the form 'only A (an animal) is B (a cat)'] entails an affirmative proposition with the terms transposed [sc. 'only A (an animal) is B (a cat)' entails 'every B (cat) is A (an animal)'], it does not do so in the same way with the terms not transposed - but there is a fallacy of the consequent in converting an indefinite into a universal affirmative [sc. 'only A (an animal) is B (a cat)' converts to, or has as consequent, the indefinite 'some A (animal) is B (a cat)' and not the universal 'every A (animal) is B (a cat)]. Indeed from that place [n.217] it more seems that the opposite can be taken of this proposition 'every difference of forms is specific': for the difference of a white man and a black horse is a difference of forms and in some way through forms, - not however is it a specific difference (according to him there), because those forms in respect of the natures that they are in are 'formal', that is, consequent to individuals [sc. white and black are formal with respect to this man and this horse], but not per se consequent to, or per se terminative of, the quidditative being [sc. white and black are not forms determining the quiddity, or species, but the individuals].

249. To the other [n.218] I say that if some individual – from this alone, that it is without matter – had in itself the whole perfection of a species which of itself is of a nature to be in infinite [individuals] (as far as concerns itself), then it would seem to have infinite perfection from the mere lack of matter; but whatever can have infinite perfection has it, – and so in any species there would be infinite perfection, and consequently the perfection of a species would not be limited or determined by the determination or specification or limitation of the ultimate difference (which added to the genus constitutes the ultimate species), which is false and contrary to all philosophers. False then is the assumed proposition, that 'the individual which can be without matter has from this sole privative cause – because it is without matter – the whole perfection of the species' [n.218], because if with this be posited that nothing positive is done concerning it (but only separation), nothing is posited that was not before.

But if it be understood according as it has some probability, namely that 'if a form were separated from matter, it would have the whole perfection of the species, because

¹¹³ The objectors want to argue from 'no non-formal difference is specific' to 'every formal difference is specific', and in order to do so they have to go through a series of logical obversions and conversions. So: 'no non-formal difference is specific' is obverted to 'every non-formal difference is non-specific', which is converted to 'every non-specific difference is non-formal', which is obverted to 'no non-specific difference is formal', which is converted to 'no formal difference is non-specific', which is obverted to 'every formal difference is specific'. But in this series of obversions and conversions an invalid conversion is made, namely from 'every non-formal difference is non-specific' to 'every non-specific difference is non-formal'. For a universal affirmative does not convert to a universal affirmative but to a particular affirmative, or as Arsitotle says, it converts 'with terms not disposed in the same way'. So in this case, from 'every non-formal difference is non-specific' one gets 'some [not every] non-specific difference is nonformal'. And from this latter one can no longer get, as the objectors wish, the intended proposition 'every formal difference is specific'.

not able to be participated by matter' [n.219], – this is false and begs the question, unless it be understood according as matter states the individual entity, contracting the form. Thus understanding the equivocation of this assumed proposition [*supra* here], every form has the whole perfection of the species and is of itself a 'this'; and then the minor – assumed thereunder, about an angel [sc. 'an angel is a separate form not able to be participated by matter as by an individual entity contracting form'] – is simply false, because although that essence cannot be participated by the matter which is the other part of a composite, it can yet be participated by several materials, that is, by several individuals having material entities, which are called 'material' – as has often been said – in respect of a contracted quiddity according as quiddity is called form [nn.182, 201, 206-207, 238, 243].

250. To the other [n.220] I say that there is a fallacy of the consequent in the form of arguing, 'infinity is not intended, therefore not plurality either'; for numerical plurality is not of itself infinite, but infinity can only stand when it [numerical plurality] is not repugnant. Therefore although no one per se intend infinity, yet someone can intend a numerical plurality which is not of itself infinite, – which, as it admits of infinity with itself, so also finitude.

251. And thus can be understood that common saying of theirs [sc. that the order and beauty of the universe consists in species, nn.220-221], and according to the truth:

Although in the whole universe order is principally considered according to distinction of species, wherein there is an inequality pertaining to order, – yet because, according to Augustine, *City of God* 19.13.n.1, "order is the fitting disposition of things equal and unequal, bestowing on each its place," – by that agent who principally intends the order of the universe (as the principal good, intrinsic to it), not only is this inequality intended, which is one requisite for order (namely of species), but also the equality of individuals (namely in the same species), which is the other thing concurring for order. And simply are individuals intended by the First himself, according as he intends something 'other than himself', not as end, but as something other for the end; hence, for communicating his goodness, as because of his blessedness, he has produced many in the same species. But in the most principal beings the individual principally is intended by God.

252. And when in this way is 'numerical difference is not extended' [n.220] taken, it is false; and when it is proved in this way 'it can be infinite,' it does not follow. 'It can be infinite, and the infinity is not extended, therefore the difference is not extended' does not follow; for there can be some finite numerical difference, and there is; and it can be extended, and it is extended.

253. To the last [n.222] I say that although the Philosopher says that generation is perpetual 'to preserve being divine', and this in corruptible things, in which the species cannot remain always in one individual, – he does not however himself say that a multitude is precisely on account of preservation of the species in corruptible individuals; hence that is one cause of the multitude of individuals in the same species but not the precise cause, but that which was said before [sc. communication of the goodness of God, n.251].

254. And what is adduced about the celestial bodies, that 'in one species there is only one singular and one individual body' [n.223], -I reply: his reason was that such singular body was from the whole matter of the species (and this not only from actual but

also potential, according to him), because according to him there was no possible matter in any such species which was not totally in one singular in such species; for he posited that nothing could be produced new in immobile or in eternal things according as they are such, namely immobile and eternal [n.222]. And because theologians¹¹⁴ [e.g. Aquinas, Henry] do not agree with him in this proposition 'every eternal body is from the whole matter of the species, actual and potential', therefore he is not to be agreed with in the conclusion.

Second Part On the Knowledge of Angels

Question One Whether an Angel can Know Himself through his own Essence

255. Concerning the knowledge of angels I ask^a whether an angel could know himself by essence, such that his own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing preceding the act naturally.

a. [*Interpolation*] About the second principal point, namely the knowledge of angels, four questions are asked: first, whether an angel can know himself by his essence as by idea of knowing, without any representing thing preceding the act naturally; second, whether an angel has distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence; third whether for this, that an angel distinctly know created quiddities other than himself, it be necessarily required that he have proper and distinct ideas of knowing them; fourth, whether angels can make progress by receiving knowledge from things.

256. That not:

Because this would only be because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect; but our soul is actually intelligible and actually present to itself, according to Augustine in many places [*On the Trinity* 9.3 n.3, 9.4 nn.4 & 7, 9.5 n.8, 9.6 n.9, 9.12 n.18, et al.; 10.12 n.19; 14.4 nn.6-7]; therefore it would be the idea of understanding itself in respect of itself. But this is against the Philosopher, *On the Soul* [3.4.429b26-29, 429a21-24, 429b5-10], who maintains that the soul understands itself as it does also other things, and that "it is nothing of the things that are before understanding," and that it cannot understand itself with other things not understood.

257. Further, the essence of an angel is singular; a singular is not per se intelligible, nor per se the reason for understanding; therefore etc.

258. Further, it is necessary that every cognitive power is, according to itself, denuded of that which is the reason for knowing; but an angel, insofar as he is cognitive, is not denuded of his essence; therefore his essence is not for him the reason for knowing himself.

¹¹⁴ So Henry of Ghent, *Quodl*. XI q. 1c: "Although the sun contains all the material of it, which is possible for the form of the sun, already made, – it does not however contain the whole to be made, able to be made by God; because of which, just as God can make *de novo* matter possible for the form of the sun (of such sort as is that which now is under the form of the sun), so he can make a new sun, if he will."

259. Proof of the major: first from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2 [7.418b26-28] – it is necessary that the eye is outside all color for this, that it may be able to see every color; second from *On the Soul* 3 [4.429a18-20], where he maintains that the soul is unmixed and immaterial for this, that it may be able to understand all things.

260. Further, nothing the same is acted on by itself, because then the same thing would be in act and in potency; the essence of an angel is the same as himself; therefore it is not the object immediately making impress on the intellect.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or thus: the active and passive are distinct in subject (from *Physics* 3.1.200b29-31, 3.3.202a25-27, 7.1.241b24, 8.1.251b1-4, 8.4.255b12-17); but the essence of an angel is either not distinguished really from his intellect, if the power not differ from the essence, – or at any rate not in subject; therefore the intellect of an angel is not acted on by his essence. But the intellect is acted on by the intelligible object, from *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072a30; therefore etc.

261. Further, if an angel could understand himself through his essence, then that intellection would be the same as the object or the same as his essence. The consequent is false, because this is proper to God alone, that his intellection is the same as his essence; therefore the antecedent too is false. The consequence is proved, because the middle between extremes agrees more with each extreme than either extreme with the other; but 'to understand' is intermediate between power and object; therefore if power and object are the same, much more will the act be the same as the object (there is confirmation, because intellection does not get distinction save from the object or from the power).

262. On the contrary:

Some material form is the reason for acting according to its essence (as heat in fire, for heating), or at any rate something in common is, – else there will be a process to infinity in reasons for acting; therefore, since immaterial things are more active than material, an immaterial form will be through its essence the reason for doing the action belonging to it; such is the idea of object to act of knowing.

I. To the Question A. The Opinion of Others

263. Here it it is in this way said^a [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1, *SG* II ch.98],¹¹⁵ that although in a transitive action the object is separate from the agent, yet in an immanent action the object must be united to the one operating, – and as united it is the formal idea of such immanent operation, as the species of vision is in the eye; and from this further: since the essence of an angel is of itself united to his intellect, it can be the principle of intellection, which is an immanent operation.

¹¹⁵ *ST*: "In the case of an action that remains in the agent there is need for the object to be united to the agent in order for the action to proceed, just as there is need for the sensible to be united to the sense so that it may actually perceive. And the object united to the power is, for this sort of action [sc. intellection], disposed in the way that the form is that is the principle of action in the case of other agents; for just as heat is the formal principle of heating in fire, so the species of the seen thing is the formal principle of vision in the eye." *SG*: "Hence a separated substance, although it is per se intelligible in act, is not however understood according to itself save by the intellect with which it is one. And thus does a separated substance understand itself through its essence."
a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Here there is an opinion of Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 5 q.14c., that an angel does not know himself through his essence but through a habit of science, in which his essence is presented to his intellect, as also the essences of other things, "such that if per se, in his bare substance, he is *per impossibile* posited without any habit of science, he would be moved by altogether nothing to an act of understanding, neither by his own essence nor by another."

Now the reason that is there relied on is the following: "The angelic intellect per se and first understands no particular essence per se, just as neither our intellect," because "essences are not represented to the intellect save as they are abstracted from all particular conditions, because science is only of things that are necessary and are allotted an unchangeability of their essence (according to Boethius *On Arithmetic* 1 ch.1), of which sort are only essences as abstracted from singular conditions;" but the essence through itself, in actual existence, is not presented to the intellect save particularly, but in the habit it is presented and shines forth under the idea of a universal; therefore it first understands its essence as it shines forth in the habit, and that [essence] "known in the universal by the angel's intellect is the means of knowing its own singular essence, just as also any other species is for it the idea of knowing any singular under it."

Against this opinion I argue:

It is unacceptable that a created perfect intellect, out of the whole order of natural causes, has no power for an act of understanding an intelligible [object] proportioned to it, because this is a more imperfect intellect – as the human – capable of along with the order of natural causes, as with phantasms and agent intellect; but this follows if an angel can understand nothing save by that habit, because that habit is from God alone [Henry *Quodlibet* 5 q.14], – and thus all natural causes, active and passive, cannot cause that habit.

Further, if he [an angel] cannot understand his essence save as it shines forth in the habit, either this is because the object is not intelligible unless it be shining forth in the habit, or because it is not intelligible to this intellect save as thus shining forth, or because it is not proportionally present to it in idea of being intelligible save as shining forth in the habit. Not in the first way, because then God could not know it [the angel's essence] save in the habit, because he cannot know anything unless it be intelligible. Nor in the second way, because to this intellect it is supremely proportioned, – for everything intelligible in itself is for some intellect a proportioned intelligible, and an object is not more adequate and proportionate to any intellect than its own. Nor in the third way, because presence through informing is not required for this, that something intelligible be present to the intellect, because then God would not know his own essence; hence it is sufficient that it be present under the idea by which he can return to it by a complete return; therefore it is proportionately present to his intellect otherwise than through a habit, – therefore it is in another way intelligible by him than by a habit.

Further, according to him who thus thinks [Henry], the idea of immateriality and of intelligibility is the same; but the essence of an angel is immaterial in itself, therefore in itself it is intelligible; but there is as much intellectivity of any single thing as there is intelligibility of it; therefore an angel in himself, without such habit, is intellective.

Further, if an angel cannot understand save through such habit, it follows that he cannot know a thing's existence. Proof: that knower cannot precisely know the existence of a thing which knows through an idea indifferent to existence and non-existence; but such a habit, if it be posited, is indifferently disposed to representing the existence of a thing and the non-existence, because whatever it represents it naturally represents: either then it represents that *a* will be and *a* will not be, and then it represents nothing, because contradictories; or only that *a* is, and so it would not know it when it is not, and so conversely; therefore etc.

It is confirmed, because it is impossible that something be representative of something secondarily unless the first represented object determine for that; but the quiddity, which first is represented through that habit, is not determined to existence; therefore etc.

Further, against this which is said, that he [an angel] does not per se understand the particular save through the universal: because singularity does not prevent a thing from being understood (otherwise God could not understand himself), nor limitation either (because thus the angelic quiddity would not be intelligible per se by him), nor is there materiality there or another impeding condition; therefore etc.

Further, the reasons that he gives against the species [Henry, *ibid*.] work equally against the habit, as is plain to him who looks.

Therefore it is necessary to say in another way:

264. And if it be objected that it is necessary there is such a form in that in which there is such an operation (in this way is an angel's essence not in himself, for whom however it is the idea of acting), he seems [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1] to reply that a form existing in another and inhering in another is the principle of operating; and if it were per se, it would no less be the per idea of acting – just as heat, if it were separate, would be the principle of heating, to the extent it is from itself. Therefore so it is about the essence of an angel, that although it per se subsist, it can yet be the idea of operating with this immanent operation.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] The reason therefore for the opinion is formed as follows: that which is the per se idea of acting for something – if it be separate – can be the principle of acting, as is plain of heat; but an object united to what is active with intrinsic or immanent action is the idea of acting, – therefore although it be separate, it will be the principle of that action; therefore the essence of an angel, although it not be united to the intellect of an angel by informing it, but by another idea of uniting, will be for itself the reason for understanding itself.

265. And if it be objected again that the thing acted on must receive something from the agent (and here the intellect receives nothing from the essence, because a species preceding the act is not posited), he replies [Aquinas *ibid.*] that some cognitive power is sometimes knowing in potency, sometimes in act, and some [cognitive power] is not. But that it has to receive it, this is not because [it is] a cognitive power but only because sometimes it is in potency to act; not so in the matter at hand; wherefore etc.

266. Against this:

This opinion posits – as it seems – that the intellect is in essential potency to operation and intellection (which it posits an immanent operation), and that the whole idea of that operation is the object as it is united with its power, as heat in wood is the whole idea of heating [nn.263-64].

From this I argue: nothing can have the principle of immanent action of any agent unless it be in act through that which is the principle of such action; but the intellect is not in act through its essence in this, that it is per se subsistent, because it does not inform nor bestow any activity on the intellect; therefore by this – that such essence per se existing is present to the intellect – the intellect cannot have an operation of which the essence (or its likeness) is through it of a nature to be the idea of understanding.

267. This is confirmed, by his example [about heat, n.264], against him: because although heat is the heating or the idea of heating, yet it would not be for the wood – from which it had been separated – a reason for heating, so that, if 'to heat' is called an immanent operation, it would be impossible to heat with a heat separated from the wood;

therefore it is impossible that the wood has this immanent operation, which is 'to heat'. So it is in the matter at hand; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Hence that which is the per se idea of the operation, if it is per se, is the principle of the operation – but it is not for anything susceptive the principle of that operation: as if heat were separate, it would not be for fire the principle of heating. It is impossible, therefore, for anything to act through that which is separate from it; hence the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 2.1.412a27-b6, 414a12-13, proves that the soul is "the first act of the body," etc., because it is "that by which we live and sense" etc. Nothing therefore acts by any idea of acting unless it be what informs it; but the essence of an angel is posited subsistent; therefore it cannot for the angelic intellect be the idea of understanding.

268. Further, second, against what he says, that 'a power receives nothing because it is not sometimes in potency, sometimes in act' [n.265]: the object in respect of what is in the intellect about it (namely in respect of intellection) is not only cause in coming to be (as a builder in respect of a house), but is cause both in coming to be and in being (otherwise just as, with the builder gone, the house remains, so with the object absent to whatever extent or corrupted in idea of object, that which is of it as of object in the intellect would remain); but a cause in being and in coming to be always equally causes, as is plain of the sun with respect to a ray [of light: *Ord*.I d.3 nn.602-603]; therefore the object that is posited as the principle of the operation of intellection [n.263] always equally causes, and consequently the intellect always equally receives. The intellect then not only receives from the object 'because it receives a new act that it sometimes does not receive', but because it is cause in the 'to be' in respect of what it always receives from it.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Further, according to him who thinks thus, 'the more an angel is higher the more he understands through a species more universal' [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.55 a.3], which is not true by the universality of commonness but of virtue and perfection. And they [sc. who think like Aquinas] do not first have to posit the species in respect of accidents, because these are known through the species of the substances in which they are included virtually; nor even in respect of subalternate species, because through the species of the most specific species can all the intermediates be known. Therefore, they have to posit this sort of intelligible species in respect of the most special species, so that an angel is so much the higher the more he knows more things (such as inferior species) through the species of the superior species; therefore the highest angel knows inferior species through that by which he knows his own quiddity. If therefore he knows himself through his own essence, he would know all other created things through his own essence, which he [the author of this opinion] himself denies [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.55 a.1].

B. Scotus' own Opinion

269. To the question therefore I say that an angel can understand himself through his essence according to the understanding expounded at the beginning of the question [sc. 'his [an angel's] own essence is the reason for knowing himself without any representing thing preceding the act naturally, n.255].

270. Which I prove:

First, because an object has some partial causality in respect of intellection (and this object insofar as it is intelligible in act), and the intellect has its own partial causality

in respect of the same act, according to which it concurs with the object for perfectly producing such act, – so that these two, when they are in themselves perfect and united, are one integral cause in respect of intellection [1 d.3 nn.486-494].

From this I argue as follows: every partial cause that is in perfect act proper to itself, according as it is such a cause, can cause an effect with the causality corresponding to itself, – and when it is united in its act to the other partial cause, it can cause perfectly with it; but the essence of an angel is of itself in first act corresponding to the object, because it is of itself intelligible in act, and it is of itself united to the intellect with the conjunction of each partial cause; therefore it can immediately, when united with the other partial cause, have a perfect act of intellection in respect of its own essence.

271. Further, in intelligibles that have intelligible species, those species, in virtue of the objects together with the intellect, cause intellection, in which however the objects have diminished being; therefore, if they had in themselves such absolute being and being simply (namely intelligible in act), they could more truly cause the same effect, because whatever can be caused by something diminishedly such in some being, can be caused by virtue of something simply such and by it simply. But the essence of an angel is as in itself present to his intellect, which essence indeed is simply such (namely, actually intelligible in itself, and intelligible in a certain respect in intelligible species); wherefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*: cf. *Rep*.] Or let the reason be formed thus: if something having some sort of diminished being has power for some operation, what has perfect such being has power for that operation; but an intelligible object, having diminished being in species, is the idea of understanding itself – for the object has being in a species in the intellect (as was said in *Ord*.I d.3 n.249), and there it has diminished intelligible being, because where it is diminishedly a being, there it is diminishedly intelligible; therefore when the object has simply intelligible being in the intellect, it will be simply the idea of understanding itself. And such being does the essence of angel have in respect of its intellect; wherefore etc.

Further, that thing can be the idea of understanding some object in which the object, 'as actually intelligible', is sufficiently present to the intellect, because that along with the intellect, constitutes perfect memory and this is sufficiently parent; but the essence of an angel is intelligible in act, and is sufficiently present to the intellect in idea of object, because it is not required that it be present by informing (for then God would not understand his own essence); therefore in it and through it can an angel understand himself.

Further, an angel can have intuitive cognition of his essence, because our soul also can do this unless there were an ordering to phantasms; but this knowledge cannot come to be except through the essence of the thing (or it cannot as perfectly come to be through something else), because whatever other idea is posited, it can remain when intuitive cognition does not remain, and it would be indifferent to representing the thing whether it be existent or not; therefore etc.

C. Instances against Scotus' own Opinion

272. It is objected against this [n.271], because then a sensible thing could immediately, without an intelligible species, cause intellection (which was denied in *Ord.*I d.3 nn.334, 382), because a sensible thing present to sense is simply of the sort it is in a certain respect in the intelligible species; therefore if in the intelligible species (where it is in a certain respect) it can cause intellection, much more as it is in itself according to its being simply and absolutely.

273. Further, it seems that it can be argued against this position [n.269] as against the opinion [of Aquinas, n.266], – because nothing is for anything the idea of operating with an immanent operation unless it inform it; and the essence of an angel, although it be intelligible in act and present to the intellect, yet does not inform the very intellect; therefore the it is not for it the idea of operating with immanent operation.

274. Further, if these two agents always concur for the same common effect [n.270], therefore they have an order, since they are not of the same idea; therefore one of the two is prior or superior, the other posterior and inferior, – and so one will be a 'moved mover' and the other with respect to it will be an 'unmoved mover'. But the object is not a 'moved mover' with respect to the intellect but an 'unmoved mover'; therefore the intellect is a 'moved mover' with respect to the object [1 d.3 n.554].

275. Further, fourth: what is said about these partial causes concurring for one common effect [sc. they are one integral cause of intellection, n.270] seems unacceptable, because two things 'distinct in genus' cannot cause an effect of the same idea; but the spiritual and bodily, or the intelligible and sensible, differ in genus; wherefore etc.

276. Proof of the major, because to these two ideas in there partial causes there correspond some two distinct things in the effect, and so the same effect would be bodily and spiritual, which is unacceptable. Second, because every agent is more excellent than the patient [1 d.3 n.507]; but the bodily or sensible is in no way more outstanding than the spiritual; therefore, there cannot be an agent in respect of it save in virtue of some more outstanding agent, and so it will be the 'moved mover'. Next third, because then one could be so intensified that the whole virtue of both would be in one of them, and then that alone could sufficiently cause the effect without the other [*Ord*.I d.3 n.497], which is unacceptable about two such agents.

277. To the first [n.272]. In *Ord*.I d.3 [nn.349-350, 382] for this reason is the intelligible species posited different from the act, because the object – whether as existent in itself or in any species whatever outside the possible intellect – does not have the idea of intelligible in act. And then I concede this, that wherever there is something existing in a certain respect such and able to make something simply such, there, if it were simply such in act, it could do the same simply; but the sensible object is in a certain respect in the intelligible species, and is not intelligible in act outside that specie, – and therefore although in that [the species] (where it is in a certain respect such) it could cause a diminished intellection, never however outside it [the species] can it cause it [an intellection] either diminished or perfect, because it is not outside it the sort of being in act (but potentially only) as is that which activates it. Now the essence of an angel is diminishedly such a being and a being that is such in species (if it has [a species]); but it is simply in itself also such a being intelligible in act; wherefore etc.

278. To the second [n.273] I say that on the opinion that does not posit the intellect to have any activity, different from the activity it has formally from the object or through the species of the object (just as neither does wood have an action in heating different from the action which is that of heat [1 d.3 nn.456-459]), [on this opinion] it necessarily follows that the intellect (not having anything formally) does not do anything formally; and so was it argued against the first opinion [of Aquinas, nn.266-267], which seems to think this same thing about the intellect. But as was said in 1 d.3 [nn.486-489, 494, 498, 500], the intellect does have its own proper activity with an object present (in itself or in its species), but [an object] concurring with it to cause an effect common to

both, so that the union and coming close of these formal parts suffices; and yet it is not required that one inform the other, because neither gives to the other an act pertaining to its own partial causality.

279. To the third [n.274] I say that 'moved mover' can be understood in two ways: either that it receive from the mover not moved some form (by which it may move) as first act – or that the form, had as first act, receive from it [the unmoved mover] some (further) form as second act, by which it may act.

280. Now in the first way it exists in certain ordered causes, that a first gives virtue to a second; but in this way it does not exist in the matter at hand, because neither does the intellect, 'as acting by its own partial causality', give to the species of the object this act whereby it operates for intellection; and much more not conversely, because the species of the object gives to the intellect no activity pertaining to the causality of it.

281. In the second way it seems to exist in certain things moving locally, as the hand moves the stick and the stick moves the ball: for the hand does not give to the stick the hardness by which it drives the body away to some place; rather it gives precisely to the stick a local motion whereby, namely, it is applied to this driving away because of the incompossibility of one hard body with another hard body, which does not yield to it.¹¹⁶ In this way does it seem to be in things acting for some effect produced by generation or alteration, because although there ordered causes have some idea of causing and an inferior does not cause save in virtue of a superior, yet this virtue or assistance or influence – in whatever way it be named – is not the impression of some form or of something or other inhering in the inferior or superior cause, but is only an order and actual conjunction of such active causes, from which, thus conjoined and with their proper activities presupposed to the conjoining, an effect follows common to both causes [1 d.3 nn.495-496].

282. To the matter at hand therefore [nn.274, 279] I say that not only are these not mover and moved in the first way, but not in the second way properly either (as the sun and a father are disposed in generation), but they are only two causes as if equally disposed as far as this, that neither per se totally moves and yet one has a causality prior in respect to the effect than the other.

283. For perhaps the inferior cause never acts in virtue of the superior cause (properly speaking), unless in its form, whereby it acts, it in some way depends on the superior cause, although not then – when it acts – does it receive it from that [sc. superior cause] but prior in duration or nature. For neither does the object depend on the soul (at any rate as it is the possible intellect) as to the form by which it actually operates for this intellection, and much more not conversely; and therefore in no way is the object a mover not moved in respect of the soul as it operates for intellection.

284. It can however be a mover in respect of it insofar as it [the soul] receives the intelligible species, but then it does not move the soul as to the causality that the soul has per se, but per accidens as to the form in respect of the partial cause, insofar as it operates on it [the soul]. And in this way was it said in *Ord*.I d.3 [n.563] that 'the agent intellect and the phantasm are one total cause of the [intelligible] species', and further that 'the intelligible species and something of the soul (whether the agent intellect or the possible intellect) are one total cause of intellection' [*ibid*. nn.563-564]: so that in the first it is the

¹¹⁶ Translator: A reference to an early form of golf? The description however is general enough to be common to many a stick and ball game.

object (or phantasm) moving the soul to intellection, and not to the first act that is of the soul as it is soul, but to that which is from the rest of the partial cause previous to it; and in the second the object altogether does not move the soul, neither to the first act of the soul nor as to any other concurrent cause, but it precisely acts for the common effect, – and then the soul, through the act which it had [sc. through its first act], shows the 'to act' perfect in its own order [or: shows the 'to act' in its own order through the effect¹¹⁷], so that there is no motion there of the soul for acting prior naturally to the effect produced. To the effect, however, the soul is not moved insofar as it is active, but insofar as it receptive of the effect, and so although it is moved, it is however not a moved mover, because it is not moved to moving actively but to receiving.

285. To the fourth [n.275] I say that that first proposition [sc. 'two things distinct in genus cannot cause an effect of the same idea'] is false of partial causes ordered in some way or other to the same effect, – that is, that there is an essential order of them and they are not altogether of the same idea. For such [partial causes], which are of different idea, are not only distinct in species (because this sort do not concur commonly as causes ordered to the same effect), nor only distinct in number (because then they are not of such idea [sc. ordered partial causes]), – therefore they are distinct in genus; and if you take it that not 'in this sort of genus', from idea of distinction of genus it cannot follow more in this genus than in that.

II. To the Principal Arguments

286. To the principal arguments [nn.256-261].

To the first [n.256] I concede that the soul of itself is intelligible in act and present to itself, and from this follows that it could understand itself if it were not impeded; for nothing is lacking to first act, neither on the part of one cause nor of both, nor from the part of the union of them, – and so the whole first act is of itself perfect, on which should this second act follow that is intellection. Because of this, perhaps, does Augustine frequently say [n.256] that the soul 'always knows itself', because of this proximity to the act of knowing, where there is no imperfection in first act.

287. Now in this way the soul does not always know a stone, because although it always has a perfect act of understanding a stone with respect to its own proper partial causality, it does not however always have the other partial cause in act and present in act, – and therefore it can be said to be 'sometimes in essential potency' to understanding a stone, namely when it lacks the form that is of a nature to be the other partial cause in act and to be united to it in act. And in this way does Augustine posit a trinity [*On the Trinity* 14.6 n.9, 7 n.10], and yet that it pertains to memory alone, because this whole is only the presence of the object under the idea of intelligible (which pertains to memory [1 d.2 nn.221, 291, 310, d.3 n.580]), – but in this is the virtual intellection of that object, which pertains to intelligence; and in this way, since the will is present as first act, it [first act] is in some way perfect for having second act in respect of itself as effect, in the sufficient cause as in the will, and in the *sine qua non* as in intellection. But because nothing is of this whole in act save only what pertains to memory, therefore this whole

¹¹⁷ The mss. have 'through the effect' but the Vatican editors think 'through the effect' or 'per effectum' is an error for 'perfect' or 'perfectum'. Eligat qui vult.

trinity (which namely is of a nature to be a trinity) is only in the memory, as to its actual reality.

288. But why does this total first act not exit into second act [n.286], since it is per se a sufficient principle for eliciting second act? – I reply: because there is an impediment which this cause cannot overcome; just as, however much a perfect natural cause were posited, it yet could never act because of an overcoming impediment.

289. But which is this impediment? – I reply: our intellect for this present state is not of a nature to move or to be moved immediately, unless it be first moved by something imaginable or sensible outside.

290. And wherefore this? Perhaps because of sin, as Augustine seems to say *On the Trinity* 15.27 [cf. 1 d.13 n.78], "Infirmity has done this to you, and what cause of infirmity but sin?" (he same does the commentator say on *Ethics* 6 and Lincoln [Grossteste] on the same place and on *Posterior Analytics* likewise.)¹¹⁸ Or perhaps this cause is natural, according as nature was in this way instituted (not absolutely natural), namely, if this order of powers (which was spoken of at large in 1 d.3 nm.187, 392) necessarily requires this, that whatever universal the intellect may understand, a phantasm in act must phantasize a singular of the same; but this is not from nature (nor is this cause absolutely natural), but from sin, – and not only from sin, but from the nature of the powers for this present state, whatever Augustine say.

291. To the form, then, of the argument [n.256] I say that that cause which is on the part of the angel [n.256: '...because his essence is intelligible and present to the intellect', n.256] is sufficient for this, that the essence of the angel is an idea sufficient for understanding himself; it is also such on the part of the soul, but in the soul it is impeded, in an angel it is not impeded: for the intellect of an angel does not have the sort of order to imaginables as our intellect has for this present state.

292. And because of this impotency of immediately understanding intelligibles in act (which impotency is not from an impossibility intrinsic but extrinsic, which impossibility the Philosopher also experienced, and not any possibility), the Philosopher himself said that 'the intellect is not any of the intelligibles before it understands' [n.256], that is, 'it is not able to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things': which proposition is multiple, according to composition and division (like that in *Topics* 6.6.145b21-30, 'this now is first immortal or incorruptible'), from the fact that the preposition with its case [sc. the 'before...' which determines the grammatical case of "...the understanding of other things" (which is equivalent to an adverbial determination) can be composed with the infinitive ['the understanding of...' is infinitive in the Latin] indicating the term of the power (and it is the sense of composition), or with the composition itself signified by the term or the indicative verb (and it is the sense of division): so that the first sense is this, 'it is not possible for the intellect to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things', and this sense is true according to him [Aristotle], – the other sense [sc. of division] is that 'before the understanding of other intelligibles it is not possible to understand the intellect',¹¹⁹ and it is false (just as the 'this now first is immortal' is false about man for the state of innocence, Topics 6 above). And

¹¹⁸ Eustratius, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 f.106rb-va, as translated and annotated by Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, *ibid.*, and on *Posterior Analytics* 1.14 f.14ra.

¹¹⁹ The Latin here could also be rendered: "it is not possible for the intellect to understand"

in this way does the Philosopher say that 'the soul understands itself just as other things' [n.256].¹²⁰

293. And, according to this mode of exposition, the intellect is moved by imaginable objects, – and with these known, it can from them know ideas common both to immaterial and to material things and thus by reflecting know itself under an idea common to itself and to imaginables. But it cannot immediately understand itself with nothing else understood [n.256], because it cannot be immediately moved by itself because of its necessary ordering for this present state to imaginables [*Ord*.I d.3 nn.541-542].

294. To the second [n.257], one doctor says [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.56 a.1 ad2] that a singular can be per se understood although not a material singular, because singularity does not prohibit but materiality' (otherwise God would not be intelligible since he is singular, – which is false); and then the response is plain, that the proposition assumed 'about the singular not understood' ['a singular is not per se intelligible', n.257] is only true of a material singular. Another [doctor] says [Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 5 q.15] that [an angel] 'is not able to understand either itself or other things under the idea of a singular (material or immaterial) but of a universal, which is per se the object of the intellect, which shines forth in the intelligible habit'; and according to this is the response also plain to the argument. – I believe neither, however, to be true, except in speaking of the material intellect, which because of its imperfection is not able, perhaps, to understand any intelligible at all that the angelic intellect can understand.

295. To the third [n.258] I say that the reason for the major proposition [sc. 'it is necessary that every cognitive power is, according to itself, denuded of that which is the reason for knowing] – first in the case of the sensitive powers – is this, 'because every sensitive power requires a determinate organ'; hence from the determinate number possible of organs the Philosopher concludes, *On the Soul* 2.6.418a7-17, 3.1.424b22-27, 3.2.426b8-12, to a determinate number of actions or objects. And this organ must be so disposed that it can receive the sensible without matter [*De Anima* 2.12.424a17-21], –

¹²⁰ In the *Topics* passage Aristotle discusses the sentence 'this animal is incorruptible now' and says it can be understood to mean 'this animal is not corrupted now' or 'it is not possible for it to be corrupted now', or 'it is of the sort now as never to be corrupted'. He further remarks that when we say an animal is incorruptible now, we do not mean that now the animal is such (sc. such as never to be corrupted) but that it is now as never corrupted (sc. though it can or will be corrupted sometime later, as was also true of man in the state of innocence before the fall, that he was immortal then but not such that, through sin, he could not die later). Hence the 'now' is either taken in divided sense where it is outside and governs 'this animal is incorruptible', so that the sense is that the animal is uch as never to die, and this sense is false; or in composed sense where the 'now' is part of 'this animal is incorruptible', so that the sense is that the animal is at this time now incorruptible (though nothing is implied about whether it can or cannot be corrupted later), and this sense is true.

So the sentence discussed here by Scotus, 'the intellect is not able to be understood by itself before the understanding of other things', can be taken either in divided sense where the 'not able... before it understands other things' is outside and governs 'the intellect understands itself', so that the sense is that the combination of 'the intellect understands other things' is impossible, because the intellect is such as never to understand itself before understanding other things. This sense is false. Or the sentence can be taken in composed sense where the 'not possible before it understands other things' is part of 'the intellect understands itself', so that the combination of 'the intellect understands itself' and 'before it understands other things' is part of 'the intellect understands itself', so that the combination of 'the intellect understands itself' and 'before it understands other things' is not impossible simply but only given the intellect's current ability. This sense is true because it allows that the intellect might, in other conditions, be able to understand itself before it understands other things.

So, finally, when the Philosopher says 'the soul understands itself as it understands other things', he should not be taken as meaning that it is impossible simply for the soul to understand itself in any other way, but that this way is how it does in fact understand itself – without implication about what it may or may not be able to do in other circumstances.

and in bodily things whatever is receptive of the form without matter is not receptive commonly of any form whatever (for this reason did I say 'commonly', because the discussion is not now about the organ of taste, about which there is a special difficulty [the *Reportatio* speaks to this point, *ad loc*.]). The organ, therefore, of sense must be not such, that is, lacking the object according to its material and sensible being, not only in act but also in potency, so that it not be receptive of it according to its material being (according to which 'being' it is an object of sense), – just as well appears about color, of which the receptive thing 'according to material being' is the surface of a determinate body, and the receptive of the same 'without matter' is a transparent or non-determinate body [sc. the medium, as water or air, through which colors are seen]. And thus opposed dispositions are required in the organ of sense: that it must be receptive of the sensible without matter, and in what must receive the object according to material being [sc. the eye, qua seeing, is transparent but qua a physical body has a colored surface]; so therefore the organ must be denuded of the form that it receives, and consequently the sense which is in such organ.

296. From this also follows what is proposed by the Philosopher, On the Soul 3.4.429a24-27, namely that the intellect is not an organic power and so is separated from all matter, just as from every organ by which it operates. For if some [organ] were required, it would be of a determinate disposition (as is every bodily organ), and so from this, that it is receptive of some things according to determinate material being (because of the determinate disposition of the body), it would not be receptive of all bodily forms according to immaterial being; and so the intellect could not receive the forms of all material things as objects if it were a material and organic power. However with this had, that it is a non-organic power, it is not necessary that it is not of the sort really as that which must be, or of which there must be, something receptive intellectually; for it is not necessary that there is an opposite disposition in what is receptive of something really and intellectually, on the supposition that the intellect is not an organic power, which however would be required if it were an organic power: for the same intellect can be itself really and in act through a habit really, and yet receptive intellectually of itself and of its habit and of anything whatever that informs it really; and the whole reason is because such things thus intellectually received do not require in the receiver a determinate disposition, opposite to a real intelligible being [Ord.I d.3 nn.383-390].

297. That proposition, therefore, which says that 'it is necessary that the knower be not such, or be denuded of that which it knows or receives and of the idea of knowing' [n.258], if it be taken generally, proves that every intellect is nothing, because every intellect according to itself is of the whole of being, – and so it will be nothing of beings; and this understanding is false. But however it is not material or organic so that it may be capable of all of them, – because if it were material or organic it would only be capable of some things without matter, the reception of which would not be repugnant to its material entity; but to its intellectual entity is not repugnant the intellectual reception of anything at all.

298. To the fourth [n.260] it is frequently replied [1 d.3 nn.430, 513-520] that the same thing can move itself (not only with bodily motion but also with spiritual), and universally any univocal virtual action whatever can stand with a power for a second formal act [*Ord*.I d.3 nn.430, 513-520, d.26 n.97]; and then how the same thing is not in power and in act 'according as they are opposite differences of being', neither per se nor

denominatively, and yet the same thing is in potency (that is, a passive principle) and in act (that is, an active principle of the same), this has frequently been said [*Ord*.II d.2 nn.472-473, I d.2 n.231, d.7 n.72].

299. To the last [n.261], although some [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 12 com.51] concede the conclusion there inferred [sc. 'then that intellection would be the same as the object or the same as his essence'] – which seems impossible, because then it would follow that that intellection would be infinite in act (for any intellect at all can be of infinite intelligibles, and if it then had an intellection the same as itself, by equal reason would the intellection of anything whatever be the same as itself, – and thus it would have an intellection, the same as itself, which would be or could be of infinite intelligibles) – I deny however the consequence [sc. 'if an angel could understand himself through his essence then that intellection would etc.' as above].

300. And to the proof ['the middle between extremes agrees more with each extreme than either extreme with the other; but 'to understand' is intermediate between power and object; therefore if power and object are the same, much more will the act be the same as the object', n.261] I say that that understanding – according to truth – is an extreme both in respect of the power and in respect of the object, because the effect is of both: because just as when by diverse things – by knower and known – knowledge is brought forth, there is an effect common to them both (Augustine *On the Trinity* IX.12 n.18), so too when an effect is generated by a same thing having the idea both of the power and of the object, it is the effect of that one thing (having really that double causality) and not mediating between the same thing and itself according to the nature of the thing, the way the mean mediates between contraries; and about such a mean, according as it is from the nature of the thing, that proposition is true that 'the mean agrees more with the extremes than the extremes agree among themselves' [n.261].

301. To the confirmation [n.261] I say that an intellection is distinguished from another intellection by the object, but by the object and the power is it distinguished by itself formally; but that it is distinguished from them causally, that it gets from extrinsic causes (as from the power and the object), as the ray has causally from the sun that it is distinguished from it.

Question Two

Whether an Angel has a Distinct Natural Knowledge of the Divine Essence

302. Second I ask about the intellection of an angel in respect of things other than himself, – and first whether an angel has a distinct natural knowledge of the divine essence.

303. That not:

Because either this would be through the divine essence or through a species of the essence. Not through the essence, because then he would be naturally blessed, which cannot belong to a creature. Nor through a species, because the divine essence is more intimate to the intellect than that species would be; therefore it would be superfluous to posit a species there, because the essence by itself could more efficaciously do that which the species is posited [to do] than the species itself. 304. Further, the Philosopher, *On the Soul* 3.8.431b29-432a1, does not seem to reckon a species necessary save because the object is not per se in the soul, "For a stone is not in the soul but the species of a stone is;" wherefore etc.

305. On the contrary:

Either then the angel would have no knowledge of the divine essence, and then in vain would that precept be told him, 'Thou shalt love the Lord thy God etc.' (for in vain is a love of that prescribed which is altogether unknown), – or he would only have a confused knowledge of that essence, and then that intellect seems to be potential just like ours (which can proceed from the confused to the distinct), which seems unacceptable.

I. Response of Others to the Question

306. Here some [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.12 a.4, q.56 a.3, Henry *Quodlibet* 3 q.1] agree in this negative, that 'angels do not have a distinct knowledge of the divine essence naturally'.

A. First Opinion

307. In holding this negative [proposition], if you ask through what affirmatively, - it is replied that an angel does not know the divine essence naturally through any species.¹²¹

308. Which is proved:

Because any proper idea of understanding any object represents that object adequately; no created essence or species can adequately represent the divine or uncreated likeness, because anything such is finite, – but the object infinite (of the finite to the infinite there is no proportion); therefore etc.

309. Again, the created species of one thing is more assimilated to another created thing than to God, because each is finite; therefore it more distinctly represents the creature than God. Therefore it is not the proper and distinct idea of understanding God.

310. Again, the formal reason according to which an object is apprehended (as also the idea of the object) is determinate, – otherwise it would not more represent this object than that; God is maximally indeterminate and unlimited, because infinite; therefore etc. Hence Augustine, *On the Trinity* 8.3 n.4, "Take away this good and that, and see the good itself, if you can, – and God indeed you have seen, the good of every good, beyond every good;" therefore he cannot be known by such species distinctly.

311. Again, if it be necessary to posit such a species through which God may be known distinctly, it follows that that species will be more an image of God than an angel or the soul in itself; but this is against Augustine (*ibid.*, 14.8 n.11), who says that "by that is something an image of God whereby it can be capable of and participant in him;" but an angel can more be participant than a species; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolated note*] Here two arguments are missing, as is plain in the responses [nn.342, 345]. However, according to what can be elicited from the response, the first [n.342] can be thus formed enthymematically: if an angel can have a distinct knowledge of the divine

¹²¹ Translator: This proposition is grammatically negative but it implies the affirmative proposition that what is known by creatures naturally is known through a species.

essence through some species distinctly representing it, it follows that he will naturally be able to know the Trinity and the whole of that mystery. The second [n.345] follows: since a blessed angel can see the species in the intellect of another angel, as suppose Michael in the intellect of Gabriel, it follows that Michael, by virtue of that species seen in the intellect of Gabriel, will see everything supernatural.

B. Second Opinion

312. Another way of speaking [Aquinas, *ST* Ia q.56 a.3] is to say that an angel knows God through his own proper essence, that is, through the essence of the angel, – because the essence of an angel is an image and likeness of God; and each thing is known through its likeness and image; therefore through his own nature and essence, insofar as image of God, is an angel able to know him. And this image is called a 'mirror' image; therefore etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Which is proved in Henry, *Quodlibet* 5 q.9 [3 q.1, 4 q.7] and in Thomas, *ST* Ia q.56 a.3.

C. Rejection of the Opinions

313. Against the first [Henry], who posits those reasons for that negative conclusion [nn.307-311], it is argued thus:

Because from the same things it could be proved that through no representative created thing does an angel naturally know the divine essence, – and not through the essence does he know (according to him [Henry]), because no creature can naturally see that essence. And from this it seems to follow that an angel can have no natural knowledge of that essence: for not anything about it is distinctly and in particular seen, because this does not seem to be possible save through the essence or through something representative distinctly, each of which is denied [sc. by Henry]; and it is not seen indistinctly or in any concept more common (which is not proper to this essence), because every concept common and univocal to this essence and something else he denies.

314. Further, the divine essence, according to him, is of a nature only to make a single concept in the divine intellect, so that no other is had about it save through a busying intellect [cf. Scotus *Ord*.I d.8 nn.55, 174-175, 188]; therefore that essence is of a nature only to make of itself one real concept of any intelligible whatever. Proof of the consequence: every concept, which is of a nature to be had and to be caused by virtue of this essence in any intellect, is of a nature to be had by virtue of it in an intellect comprehending it; such is the divine intellect. And further it follows that no real concept can be had about this essence save one; proof of this consequence, because every real concept, which any intellect can have of this essence, it [this essence] can cause (otherwise it would not be perfect in idea of object), because that which is most perfect in idea of object can cause every real concept causable of itself. And then it follows further that either the intellect of an angel will have that one concept, whence so ever it be caused, – or it will have altogether none; but it will not be able to have that (namely 'to know through the essence' or 'through a proper representing idea', nn.306-311); wherefore it will have none.

315. Against the second [Aquinas, n.312], who posits that an angel understands that essence through himself, insofar as he is image of God, I argue:

Although the image, which is only the reason not 'as known' of knowing (just as it is about the visible species in the eye and about the intelligible species in the intellect), represents the object immediately, non-discursively, – yet the image through which that is not known of which it is except as through a species known, is not the reason for knowing it save only discursively, just as is discursion from knower to known; but the essence of an angel can only be posited as an image in the second way and not in the first way; an angel therefore does not know the divine essence through that image, save discursively. But this is unacceptable, because according to them the angelic intellect is not discursive [Aquinas ST Ia 1.58 a.3]; therefore etc.

316. Further, all discursive [knowledge] presupposes simple knowledge of that for which the discourse is; therefore, if through this 'known essence' [sc. of the angel] is had knowledge of the divine essence discursively, a simple concept of the divine essence must first be had, – and then of that there must be sought another reason, prior to it.

317. It is confirmed too, because no object causes distinct knowledge of another object unless it include in itself that other object virtually, – because 'as each thing is disposed to being so is it to being known [cf. *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31]; what therefore does not include anything virtually in entity does not include it in knowability. But the essence of an angel does not include virtually the divine essence under any distinct idea; therefore neither does it thus know it.

II. Scotus' own Response to the Question A. About the Distinction of Intellection

318. To the question therefore [n.302] I reply in another way. First I distinguish about a double intellection: for there can be some knowledge of an object according as it abstracts from all actual existence, and there can be some of it according as it is existent and according as it is present in some actual existence.

319. This distinction is proved by reason [nn.319-322] and by a likeness [nn.323]:

The first member is plain from this, that we can have science of some quiddities; but science is of an object as it abstracts from actual existence, otherwise science could sometimes be and sometimes not be, and so it would not be permanent, but with the thing corrupted the science of that thing would be corrupted, which is false [*Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b31-1040a4].

320. The second [sc. knowledge of actual existence, n.318] is proved, because what is of perfection in a lower power seems to be more eminent in a higher that is of the same genus; but in the sense – which is a cognitive power – it is of perfection that it is cognitive of a thing according as it is in itself existent and according as it is present according to its existence; therefore this is possible in the intellect, which is the supreme cognitive power. Therefore it can have the sort of intellection of a thing according to which it is present.

321. And, so that it may use words brief, I call the first abstractive, – which is of the quiddity, according to which it abstracts from actual existence and non-existence. The second, namely which is of the quiddity of the thing according to its actual existence (or which is of the thing present according to such existence), I call 'intuitive intellection';

not according as 'intuitive' is distinguished from 'discursive' (for thus some abstractive is intuitive), but simply intuitive, in the way in which we are said to intuit a thing as it is in itself.

322. This second member too is made clear through this, that we do not expect a knowledge of God of the sort that can be had of him, when he – *per impossibile* – is non-existent or non-present by essence, but we expect an intuitive one, which is called 'face to face' [*I Corinthians* 13.12], because just as sensitive [knowledge] is 'facially' of the thing according as it is presently existent, so also that expectation.

323. Second declaration of this distinction [n.318] – through a likeness – is in the sensitive powers: for in one way does a particular sense know an object, in another way imagination. For a particular sense is of an object as it is per se and in itself existent, – imagination knows the same according as it is present through a species, which species could be of it although it were not existent or present, so that imaginative knowledge is abstractive with respect to the particular sense, because what are dispersed among inferiors are sometimes united in superiors. So these two modes of sensing, which are dispersed in the sensitive powers because of the organ (because the organ is not the same that receives well the object of a particular sense and that receives well the object of imagination), are united in the intellect, to which – as to one power – both acts can belong.

B. Solution

324. With this distinction premised, then, I reply to the question [n.302] that, although according to what is commonly said an angel cannot, on the basis of his natural powers, have intuitive knowledge of God (on which in book 4 [not in the *Ordinatio* where the relevant d.49 is missing]), yet it does not seem it should be denied but that he can naturally have abstractive knowledge of him, – understanding it in this way, that some species does distinctly represent that essence, although it not represent it as existing in itself in its presence; and then indeed it is very possible to have a distinct though abstractive intellection of God, for the abstractive is distinguished into confused and distinct in the presence of different ideas of knowing.

325. And it does not seem unacceptable to posit that that sort of species, representing the divine essence, is imparted to the intellect of an angel from the beginning, – so that although it not be natural to that intellect (in the way, that this intellect be able from its natural powers to acquire it, – nor even that it can have it from the action of any object naturally acting, because it cannot have it in the presence of any moving object save of the divine essence only, which causes nothing other than itself naturally by natural causation), yet just as perfections given to an angel in his first creation (although they were not necessarily following his nature) might be called 'natural' (by distinguishing them from the 'purely supernatural' ones of grace and glory), so this perfection given to the angelic intellect – whereby the divine essence would be present to it distinctly (albeit abstractly) – can be called 'natural' and to pertain to the natural knowledge of the angel; so that whatever an angel knows about God by virtue of this species, he knows in some way naturally and in some way not naturally, insofar as this is not the principle of a gratuitous or glorious act, – supernaturally, insofar as to this he could not attain from his natural powers, nor from any natural action.

326. Now that such species should be posited, distinctly representing the divine essence (although abstractly), is made convincing:

First thus, because the natural beatitude of the angel exceeds the natural beatitude of man (even if both angel and man had been in the state of innocence for however much time); therefore, since man in the state of fallen nature can have knowledge of the ultimate end in general, and for the state of innocence he could have in some way had a distinct knowledge, and volition of the supreme good follows knowledge of the ultimate truth as such, – it follows that, in such knowing and willing of the highest good distinctly, the angel could have a greater blessedness than man.

327. It is made convincing, second by this, that someone in rapture seeing transitorily the divine essence can, when that act of seeing ceases, have a memory of the object, and this under a distinct idea (under which the object of vision was), although not under the idea of it present actually, because such presence does not remain in idea of knowable after the act; therefore, through some idea perfecting such intellect can this object, in that way, be objectively present, and so it is not against the idea of the essence that a species of it be in some intellect distinctly representing it. Therefore, neither does it seem that such is to be denied of the most perfect created intellect: for nothing seems it should be denied of the highest created intellect that is not repugnant to any created intellect in its natural powers, because it is not a too greatly excelling perfection. – The assumption can be made clear through the rapture of Paul who, with the passing of that rapture, made record of the things seen, according to what he himself writes, 2 Corinthians 12.2-4, "I know," he says, "a man fourteen years ago, whether in the body or out of the body I know not, God knows" etc., who "heard secret words that it is not permitted for a man to speak." Now, it seems that after the rapture the species can distinctly remain, because this is of perfection in the intellect, that it can conserve the species of an object when the presence of the object ceases.

328. Third, the proposed conclusion is made convincing, because according to Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis 4.32 n.49, 26 n.43, ch.22 n.39, 18 n.32, those six days [of creation] were not in succession of time but in angelic knowledge of creatures having a natural order. – so that first naturally the angel knew the creature in the Word, second in its proper genus; and, not remaining there, he returned to praise of the Word 'from his work', - and in that again he sees the idea of the following creature naturally: so that when God said 'Let there be light', the angel saw himself in the eternal Word when 'there was light', - and when evening was made he saw himself in his proper genus, - and when 'evening' was made 'and morning one day', he rose out of himself in praise of God, in whom he saw the creature fortunate; so that that vision was the 'term' of the preceding day – insofar as from knowledge of the first creature in the Word he rose to knowledge of the Word, – indeed the 'rest' of all creatures in the first artist or craftsman (thus does Augustine distinguish the individual days up to the seventh day, of which there was a 'morning' of the last creature in the Word, and no 'evening' followed), and it was the 'beginning' of the following day insofar as he saw another creature in its proper genus.

329. And although he [Augustine] himself posited this knowledge of things in the Word as beatific knowledge – (as is plain there, in ch.24 n.4, "Since the holy angels always see the face of God the Father in the Word, because in his Only Begotten – as he is equal to the Father – they take joy, in the very Word of God they first knew the

universal creature, among which they themselves were made first;" the enjoyment therefore pertains to beatitude. Likewise *ibid.*, "Then night pertains to day, when the sublime and holy angels refer the fact they know the creature in the creature to the love of him in whom they contemplate the eternal reasons by which the creature was created; and in the most concordant contemplation they are one day, with which the Church, freed from this pilgrimage, will be conjoined, so that we too may exult and have joy in him" etc.) – yet can it be proved from his words that this knowledge (which is very commonly called 'morning knowledge') is natural and not precisely beatific, because – according to him – this order was in the angelic knowledge 'of creature after the creature', and it naturally preceded the knowledge of creatures in their proper genus: but when the creatures were made in their proper genus, at once could the angel have knowledge of them in their proper genus; therefore all these knowledges in the Word preceded naturally the knowledge of creatures in their proper genus; all therefore (according to Augustine) were produced together. Therefore this 'knowledge in the Word' preceded naturally the production of creatures in their proper genus; but then the angels were in the state of innocence and not blessed, because there was some little delay – as will be said below [Ord.II dd.4-5 qq.1-2 nn.5-7] – between creation and the fall; there belonged, then, some morning knowledge (namely 'of creatures in the Word') to the angels existing in their natural condition (or at least not blessed), and so it does not seem that it be necessary to grant a distinct knowledge of the angel standing in his natural condition or in grace, because otherwise he could not know the creatures first in their cause precisely known before he knew them in their proper genus, for the idea of knowing a cause confusedly is not the idea of knowing it distinctly and its ordered effects.

330. And if objection be made how in the Word not intuitively but abstractly known he [the angel] could know other things, – I reply: our whole knowledge is now of properties abstractly through the intellect, so that not only the object intuitively known, but also abstractly, is that in which, as in the known, the property is known.

331. Briefly then to the question [n.302]:

Because we do not have a rule about the angelic intellect (for neither are we able to attribute to it whatever is of perfection in an intellect simply, nor as much imperfection as we experience in our own intellect), because it is reasonable to attribute to it all the perfection that belongs to a created intellect, and no repugnance occurs why a created intellect would have such knowledge distinctly representing the divine essence (provided however not intuitively), it seems reasonable to concede it, even if it be objected that God can immediately cause intellection without a species [nn.303, 347].^a

a. [*Interpolation*] I reply: "Thus does God administer things," etc. *City of God* 7.30; for he could cause this act immediately, but then this act would not be in the power of the angel (see the end of the fourth distinction [in fact below at d.3 n.347]).

III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

332. To the reasons for the first opinion [nn.308-311], which reject this species. To the first [n.308] I say that, when speaking of God, this designation 'effigy' does not seem to be a proper designation; for perhaps nothing is properly said to be 'effigiated' save what is figured. 333. But by using proper words, if that proposition be taken 'any proper idea of understanding any object represents that object adequately' is taken, – I say that here can 'adequation' be understood simply of entity to entity, or adequation according to the proportion of representing to represented (as matter is said to be adequate to form according to proportion, although not according to entity, to the extent that their entities are unequal; yet this [matter] is as perfectible as that [form] is perfective, that is that this [matter] represents that [form] as much as that is representable), or, in a third way, 'adequately' according to proportion, not absolutely, but by comparison to such act (to wit, that this represents an object as perfect and as perfectly as it is apprehended by the power, through the sort of act which it represents).

334. In the first way, universally, no per se representant (which is the idea of representing and is not the thing known) is adequate to that which it represents but is deficient, – as is plain of whiteness and the species of a white thing. In the second way, some idea does represent adequately, – as the most perfect species of white represents that white thing, and it is the idea of quasi comprehensively seeing that white thing. In the third way any species at all of white – even in an eye going blind – although it not as perfectly represent the white thing as it would be representable, yet it does perfectly represent it by comparison to the act following [sc. of sight], because it as perfectly represents [it] as is required for having such a species about the object.

335. To the matter at hand, therefore, I say that no species can adequately represent the divine essence in the second way (nor even in the first way), because that essence – which is comprehensible to its own intellect – cannot be comprehended save through the essence as through the idea; but in the third way, by comparing to a created intellect, in some way it can represent [sc. adequately the divine essence], that is, as perfectly represent that essence as such act attains it.

336. When the minor proposition is proved through that 'infinity' [sc. 'no created essence or species can adequately represent the divine or uncreated likeness, because anything such is finite, but the object infinite, n.308], I say that just as a finite act can have an infinite object under the idea of infinite, and yet the act more immediately attains the object than the species does, so a finite species can represent an infinite object under the idea of infinite; it is not however adequate in being, nor even in knowing simply, – because it is not a principle of comprehending [*Ord*.I d.3 n.65, n.249].

337. To the other proof [n.309], when it is argued about the species of one creature in respect of a second, ¹²² – I say that a natural likeness in 'being' is not the per se idea of representing one in respect of another, because 'this white', however much it is more similar to another white than is the species, is not the idea of representing it; but the species of this, which is much less in natural entity, is more similar to this in agreement and likeness of the proportion 'that is of representing to represented' [n.333]. So here, although the species – because of its finitude – in entity and in being more agrees with the created essence than with the divine essence, it does not however more agree with the agreement of the proportion 'that is of representing to represented'.

338. To the third [n.310] I say that 'determination in an object' can be understood in two ways: in one way, determination to singularity, by the opposite to indetermination of the universal; in another way, determination to a definite participated degree, by the

¹²² The Vatican editors note that n.309 is not the second proof of the minor (n.308) but is the second argument by which is proved the assertion in n.307. They refer in support to *Lectura* II d.3 nn.272, 304.

opposite to illimitation of that which is participated. In the first way 'determination in an object' does not impede intellection of the supreme good, which God is, – rather it is the supreme good which of itself is a certain singularity; in the second way it does impede, because it is not good according to any determinate degree but absolutely good, participable by all degrees.

339. And although Augustine say about this good and that (perhaps about singular goods that occur for the soul) 'Take this and that away, and see the good itself, if you can etc.' [n.310], yet he does not understand this except because particular goods include limitation: but, with limitation taken away, there is a stand at the illimitation of the good in general, – and in this is God understood in general, as was said in *Ord*.I d.3 n.192; or further, there is a stand at the good most universal in perfection, – and then is God understood more in particular (and that good is neither this good nor that), by taking away the rank of limited good.

340. To the fourth [n.311] I say that 'image' is in one way taken for a likeness precisely imitating or representing, which does not represent because known, but precisely because idea of knowing, – in another way it is taken for what imitates that which is something other than itself, and it represents because known; in the first way the species of white in the eye is an image; in the second way a statue of Hercules is an image of him.

341. In the first way this species of God in an angel is more an image than the angel. In the second way is the angel image, and to this image pertains a likeness in some way natural in existing, and it consists somehow in the matter at hand in some way (in this, that the soul has trinity and unity in some way as the divine essence has), and this likeness concurs for idea of the beatifiable. Although, therefore, the divine species represents more distinctly the divine essence than the angel, yet the angel is more an image according as an image is called something more similar in nature, having acts similar to the acts that are posited in the Trinity – to which from this, that it has such acts, it belongs to be capable of that of which it is the image; and this, through these means (namely natural likeness in acts), belongs to the image of God according as Augustine speaks of it, that 'it can be capable of and participant in him' [n.311].

342. To the other [sc. a fifth, not posited above, n.311, and interpolated note there]¹²³ it could be said that although the species in the intellect of an angel is the idea of distinctly knowing the divine essence, it is yet not the idea of distinctly knowing the mode of that essence in the supposits [sc. the divine persons], – just as also in us can some created quiddity be distinctly known, although it not be known in which supposits it be or how it be in them.

343. And if it be objected against this that, when supposits are in a nature from intrinsic natural necessity, what is the idea of distinctly knowing the nature will be the idea of distinctly knowing the supposits in the nature, and then it seems that an angel could naturally know the divine essence in the three supposits (for the reason that he could naturally know that in the first supposit there is infinite memory productive of a supposit, and that in two there is infinite will productive of another supposit) – it could be

¹²³ This fifth argument reads as follows in *Lectura* 2 d.3 n.275: "Further, the species that would represent the divine essence can also represent the Trinity, because the Trinity is in the divine essence; therefore if an angel could through a species naturally know the divine essence distinctly, he will naturally be able to know the Trinity distinctly, which seems false." Also Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 4 q.7.

said that that knowledge would not be purely natural, because an angel could not naturally attain to it from his natural powers, nor from the necessary causes of anything acting naturally; so that, although an angel having a species of the divine essence could naturally use it, yet the species itself is from a cause supernatural and acting supernaturally.

344. But against this it is objected that he naturally knows anything else at all other than God, although he receive those other species from God imprinting them supernaturally. – It could be said that those others he could have from the objects in themselves, no agents other than them being required; but in no way could he have that distinct species in respect of the divine essence, if not from him [God] imprinting it, and this not naturally but supernaturally.

345. To the last [sc. the sixth, not posited above, n.311]¹²⁴ I say that if it be held that a blessed angel does not see through that species, then neither will another – seeing it in his [the first's] intellect – see supernatural things through it. But if it be posited that that [species] is the idea for the intellect 'as in what' of seeing the Trinity, it can be conceded that it be the idea also for another that sees, because the other too has in himself a like species of seeing: but then it is necessary to say that seeing is natural in one way and not in another way, – as was expounded in the preceding response [nn.343-344].

IV. To the Argument for the Second Opinion

346. To that for the second opinion [n.312], that the angel is an image, I say that 'image' is equivocal, because [an angel] is not such that it be precisely the idea of knowing as of what is known, but is an image having a natural likeness in some way in being [nn.337, 340-341], and in idea of knowing as what is known; and besides every such idea of knowing, which is the idea insofar as it is of the known, it is necessary to posit – presupposed to discursion [discursive knowing] – another than it [nn.315-316].

V. To the Principal Arguments

347. To the principal arguments [nn.303-304] it is plain how an angel can through a species distinctly know the divine essence [nn.324-325, 332-345]. And when it is objected that the essence itself 'is more intimate to the intellect than is the species' [n.303, also Henry of Ghent,*Quodlibet*3 q.1], I say that although because of thatintimacy it could immediately cause the act that the species causes, the act would yet notbe in the power of the angel, just as neither is the cause causing it; and if it weresometimes to cease from act, he [the angel] could not have that act again save with theessence causing the act, which would not be in the power of the angel. In order, then, thatthis act – not necessarily perpetual – be in the power of the one operating, it is necessaryto posit in him the sort of species through which he could perpetually distinctly knowGod.

¹²⁴ This sixth argument reads as follows in *Lectura* II d.3 n.276: "Again, if some species distinctly represented the divine essence and the Trinity of persons in the essence, then since another angel could see that species naturally in the intellect of a second angel, therefore he can naturally know what it represents, – and thus can an angel by natural knowledge know more about matters of belief than the faithful by faith, which is false." Also Henry of Ghent *Quodlibet* 4 q.7.

348. Hereby is it plain to the second [n.304], namely that not only because of this, that the object be present to the soul, is a species necessary, but also so that the act be in the power of the one operating.

Question Three

Whether for this, that an Angel Distinctly Know Created Quiddities, it be Required that he have Distinct Ideas of Knowing them

349. I ask third about the knowledge of an angel (and it is the second question in respect of things known other than himself [n.255, 302]), – whether for this, that an angel distinctly know created quiddities other than himself, it be necessarily required that he have proper and distinct reasons for knowing them.

350. That not:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b33-34, "Forms are disposed like numbers;" therefore the more perfect includes virtually the more imperfect, – and consequently it will be a sufficient reason for knowing it, just as a greater number is a reason for knowing a lesser number.

351. It is confirmed through the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.3.414b29-32, where he maintains that the sensitive [power] is in the intellective as a triangle in a quadrilateral, – and such seems to be the order of forms ordered in the universe; but a quadrilateral can be a sufficient reason for knowing a triangle; therefore etc.

352. Again, a material thing is more perfect than its species, because that has to the material thing the relation of measured to measure, but the measured is naturally posterior and more imperfect than its measure; but nothing more imperfect than a material thing seems to be the perfection of an immaterial thing; therefore no species of a material thing will be for the intellect of an angel a proper reason for knowing. But that which is for it the reason for understanding anything intelligible whatever is for it a natural perfection insofar as it is intelligible; therefore etc.

353. Again, he [an angel] understands himself through his own essence (from the first question [nn.269-271]), therefore also other things. The consequence is plain, because his quiddity is intelligible in the same way as other created quiddities are intelligible; therefore if for any intellect the essence of it is the immediate reason for knowing it, by parity of reason the quiddity of another will be the reason for knowing its, – and so there will not be proper reasons with respect to proper quiddities other than them.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, in the first proposition of *On Causes* prop.1: "Every first cause has more influence on the caused than a second cause;" if therefore an angel is a cause of an inferior thing, he will contain it perfectly.¹²⁵

354. To the contrary:

¹²⁵ Further words are added at the end of this interpolation that the Vatican editors have transposed to n.364 as its last sentence ('There is a confirmation of this...more things through one reason.'), where they think the words properly belong.

The divine intellect – according to many – understands many things distinctly through many distinct ideas (and on this account is the necessity for ideas posited by some [Bonaventure, Aquinas, Henry of Ghent]), and our intellect understands more things precisely through more ideas; therefore this which is 'having more ideas in respect of more intelligibles' is neither from imperfection of intellect (because it belongs to the supreme [intellect]), nor from perfection of intellect (because it belongs to the lowest [intellect]); therefore it is from the absolute perfection of intellect in itself.

I. The Opinion of Others A. First Opinion, which is of Henry of Ghent

355. Here [Henry of] Ghent says, *Quodlibet* 5 q.14, that an angel knows all quiddities through a one sciential habit. Now the way of positing it is this, because although the habit is in the intellect as a form in a subject (or by impression), yet the object that shines in the habit is [in it] only objectively.

356. And if it be asked how through a habit an object could be present as shining, – it is said that [Henry, *Quodl*. V q.14] sciential habits, "although they be qualities of the first species of quality, yet on it [sc. that first species of quality] is founded to the knowable a respect essential to it (which cannot be detached from it), as if to that on which in its essence and being it depends," "so that the intellect cannot grasp it without grasping the knowable with respect to which it is," because of "the natural connection of the correlation" that it has to it; and although it be "divinely bestowed, it no less has that essential respect to the knowable," so that "from the nature of the sciential habit always does that which is knowable by that of which it is shine in the intellect," "as much more naturally than would be able to be done through the species as science more essentially depends on the knowable than the species on the thing, by which it does not have to be caused."

357. And if it be asked how through one habit many objects can be present, – it is replied that "a single habit of science contains in virtue the many intelligibles about which the science is, and so much the more actually the more it is simpler," "so that, if there were infinite species of creatures, that single habit would suffice for understanding them all, – even proceeding to infinity, one after the other; and this by understanding singulars so much the more simply and clearly the more the habit will have been indeterminate and less determinate in its nature and essence, – according as the higher angels are posited to understand by more universal and simpler habits than the lower [angels]."

358. And if it be asked how this habit reduces the intellect of the angel from potency of understanding to act of understanding, it is said that the intellect of an angel "by this habit, co-created with it, is naturally inclined to understanding the quiddities of simple things (in the way 'a heavy object not impeded' tends by its heaviness at once downwards), and so much the more is it naturally inclined by this habit to understanding this than something else, the more is this habit essentially ordered to one than another (as to intellection of itself, or of a creature more abstract and more perfect that has more of intelligibility). And then, when the intellect has been put in first act for understanding the first thing, by a free choice of will it proceeds from habit discursively to knowing singulars, 'both propositions and terms' (by 'discursively' I mean by knowing this after this, not this from this);" "and according as it tends determinately to something by command of will, to that same thing the habit inclines determinately:" for the habit "determinately moves to something, according as it is impelled toward it by command of will."

359. Now for this opinion, from the statements of him who so opines, five reasons can be elicited, – of which the first is because, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.4.1105b19-21, there are in the soul only three things: power, habit, and passion. But the idea of understanding in an angel cannot be only his power (because thus something natural would be a sufficient principle of representing all knowables); nor a passion, it is certain; therefore it is a habit.

360. The second is of this sort: in an intellect not having a habit, a habit can be generated by frequent elicited acts; therefore if there were not generated with the angel a habit sciential for knowing, he could in himself generate such a habit, - and thus he would be in potency essential for act, not only second but also first (just as our intellect), which is unacceptable.

361. Third, because Dionysius says *Divine Names* ch.7 that 'the connection of the universe consists in this, that the highest of the lower is conjoined with the lowest of the higher'; but the highest in human knowledge is that it know promptly through a scientific habit; therefore this sort of knowledge is to be posited in an angel.

362. Fourth: if there were no other reason but that a species without a habit does not suffice for perfect knowledge, and a habit perfect without a species suffices, in vain is a species posited for act of understanding.

363. Fifth: in the will there are not posited some several things as principles for willing diverse objects; therefore neither in the intellect are there posited diverse principles of understanding, but one habit will suffice in a perfect intellect for representing whatever is naturally knowable to it.

B. Second Opinion, which is of Thomas Aquinas

364. Another opinion says [Aquinas *ST* Ia 1.55 a.3, *De Veritate* q.8 aa.10-11] that it is not necessary to posit in an angel proper ideas in respect of singular created quiddities, because a lower angel, although he know through many ideas many quiddities, yet a higher can know through some one idea, according to what is proved by [Ps.-]Dionysius *Celestial Hierarchy* ch.12, "Superior angels have a more universal science than inferior ones;" and by reason, because 'things prior are nearer to the first' just as in entity so also in intellectuality. Since therefore the first intellect understands everything through one idea, a higher intellect will understand through fewer ideas what a lower understands through more. – This is confirmed, because a more perspicacious human intellect understands more things in one idea of knowing than another less perspicacious; therefore it thus seems that an angelic intellect, because of the greater perfection of its intellectuality, can distinctly understand more things through one idea.

365. For this also is it argued, because the more some idea of knowing is in something more immaterial or in something more actual, the more is it a more universal idea of representing; this major is plain of the species in the senses, of the phantasm and the intellect, - and the reason is, because 'the received is in the receiver in the mode of

the receiver' [n.412]; therefore the idea that is in a more actual higher angel will be a reason for knowing more things in a superior than in an inferior.

C. Rejection of Each Opinion in General

366. Now this opinion [nn.364-365] seems to coincide with the preceding as to this, that just as the preceding posits that infinite quiddities could be known by that one habit (as far as is of itself [n.357]), so this has to posit that in some one angel there would be some one idea, which would be the idea of representing quiddities not so many that not more. For, by proceeding according to the multitude of quiddities in the universe, and of intelligible species in angels 'of which [species] there is always a smaller number in a higher [angel]' [nn.364-365], it will at length come down to some one species in some one angel which [species] could be the reason for knowing all inferior intelligibles – or at any rate to some few species, and so whatever inferior quiddities there could come to be could all be known through so many species; and thus, by attributing to one species some one certain multitude of knowable quiddities, it would not be on its part to find whence it was the idea of knowing so many and not more. And although this second opinion could in some way avoid this conclusion, yet although not be against it the first reason that I will posit [n.367], there will be another three against it, as also against the first opinion [nn.369, 371, 376].

367. I prove therefore first that one created idea cannot be the principle of knowing infinite quiddities, or not so many that not more, – because where a numerical more requires a greater perfection, there an infinite more or a numerical infinity requires an infinite perfection (an example: if 'being able to carry at the same time more weights' proves greater virtue, 'being able at the same time to carry infinite [weights] or not so many that not more' proves an intensive infinite virtue); but that something is the idea of distinctly knowing more quiddities proves a greater perfection in it than that it is the idea of knowing one only; if therefore something could be the idea of knowing infinites (or not so many that not more), it will be infinite, – which is impossible.

368. I prove^a the assumption [sc. the minor, 'that something is the idea of distinctly knowing more...idea of knowing one alone', n.367] because if the proper idea representative of this quiddity be taken, it includes some perfection (insofar as it is the representative idea of it), likewise the proper idea of that quiddity includes some perfection, – and these perfections in their proper representative ideas are of different idea; that one therefore which represents distinctly both these as objects includes in itself virtually more perfections of different idea, and so it is more perfect in itself than is only one of those [objects] alone. This is also confirmed from what is said in *Ord*.I d.2 nn.125-127, where it is proved that 'God is infinite' from the infinity of the things represented through his essence.

a. [Interpolation] Through this is proved not only the minor but also the major.

369. Second I prove that no one created idea can be the idea of distinctly knowing more quiddities:

First, because every idea, one idea, of knowing has one adequate object, in which object are included perfectly all things knowable through that idea, if there be many knowable through it;^a it is plain through a likeness about the divine essence, as idea and

as object: for therefore 'as idea' it is, in respect of infinite objects, distinctly representative, because it is of one first object which perfectly includes all those insofar as knowable. But this 'one idea' which is posited does not have any first object including virtually all other quiddities according to all their knowability; for it is posited precisely as having for object all created things, and no creature thus includes all [quiddities].

a. [*Interpolation*] Or in another way let this be the major: whatever is the idea of distinctly knowing more things has one object in which those more are perfectly contained.

370. Proof of the major [n.369] also through reason, because the unity 'of the posterior naturally' depends on the unity of the prior, because on a distinction in 'the prior naturally' follows a distinction in the posterior; but every idea of knowing that is in a created intellect (that is, which [idea of knowing] is not participated as is the divine essence) is disposed to the known as measured to measure, and so as 'the posterior naturally' to the prior; wherefore the unity of it necessarily depends on the unity of the object measuring.^a

a. [Interpolation] Therefore it is necessary that some one object is the measure of it. But the object that is the measure of it is adequate to it; therefore it is not the idea of knowing other things unless because they are contained virtually in the first object that is the measure of it. – Second the major is proved thus: nothing is the idea of knowing another perfectly unless it either be the proper idea of it or contain the proper idea of knowing it; but not in the first way, since it is the idea of knowing distinctly more other things; therefore it must be that it contain virtually the ideas of knowing of more things, if it be the distinct idea of knowing them. The minor is plain, because the quiddity of that object will be created, – and that cannot contain distinctly in knowability other quiddities, because some is an entity in an inferior which is not contained in a superior; therefore similarly, there is in knowability some idea in an inferior which is not contained in a superior knowability; therefore etc. [cf. *Rep.* II A d.3 p.2 q.1].

371. Again second: every idea of knowing, a single idea, can have some act of knowing adequate to it; but this which is posited to be the idea in respect of distinctly knowing several quiddities cannot have some one act of understanding adequate to it, because – according to them – this intellect cannot know distinctly and at the same time the several quiddities of which that idea is; therefore etc.

372. Proof of the major, because every perfect memory can have an intelligence adequate to it as to this, that 'according to its first and total act' it can produce an effect adequate to itself; this is apparent, because also can the infinite memory of the Father be the principle of producing actual infinite knowledge.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Proof of the minor: for it cannot have one act adequate to it intensively, because then the act would contain virtually the acts of understanding all other quiddities, – which it cannot do; nor extensively, because then it could at the same time actually and distinctly understand all those quiddities, – which is not true, nor do they themselves concede this [cf. *Rep.* II A d.3 p.2 q.1].

373. Against these two reasons [nn.369, 371] it is objected, because it is not necessary that a form productive of several things have one first object in which are contained all other objects virtually (as is apparent about the form of the sun in respect of

generable and corruptible forms), - nor even is it necessary that it can have one act adequate to itself, but several. So is it in the matter at hand.

374. I reply:

A productive power 'in some way unlimited as to its effects' is an equivocal one, and therefore simply superior and nobler than any effect at all; because of which, the unity of it does not depend on the unity of the effect, but the effect depends on this cause, – and the effects can be many, with this cause existing single, because in things posterior there can be plurality together with unity of the prior naturally. But in operations that are not productions, there the object has the idea of 'prior naturally' in respect of that which is the proximate idea of operating (speaking [of it] in creatures), and the unity of the posterior naturally depends on the unity of the prior.

375. Similarly too, it is not necessary that such productive form has a passive [object] adequate to it (both according to intensity and according to extension), so that it be able to act with adequate action; but the memory insofar as operative power, it has itself natural intelligence (in the same nature) as a passive or quasi-passive thing adequate to it, that namely it can receive an action or second act in every way adequate -- namely both intensively and extensively – to the first act of the memory: otherwise there would be in memory some idea of knowing that would altogether exceed the power of generating of the memory as it is parent, and so 'the parts of the image would not mutually possess themselves', which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* 10.11 n.18 (because for this reason are they equal, when comparing to the objects, because every object, in the way in which it can be in memory, can be in intelligence actually and in the will according to the act of it lovably or hatefully) – and the Master [Lombard] *Sentences* 1 d.3 ch.2 n.41 adduces authorities from Augustine for this, that "whatever I know I remember."

376. Third I argue thus: that intellect does not 'in the same way formally' know habitually many things that can without contradiction know this habitually and not know that (proof, because contradiction for the intellect is that it have the same thing formally and not have it, and that it have something by which it formally be such and not be such; therefore if it can be non-knowing *a* habitually and knowing *b* habitually, it does not by the same thing know habitually *a* and *b*); but every created intellect can know one object and not another; therefore none such knows by the same thing habitually several objects.

377. Proof of the minor, because if it could not know habitually *a* without the fact it knew *b*, without contradiction, either this would be on the part of such intellect, – which is false, because it can now know something habitually and not something else (otherwise it would at the same time be knowing many things); or on the part of the necessary binding together of objects – which is false, because one of them can be known by our intellect, with the other not known. If then not because of a necessary connection of objects, nor of object to power, – then in no way.

D. Rejection of the First Opinion in Particular

378. Further, especially against the first opinion 'about habit' I argue in four ways:

First against what it posits about essential respect [n.356]: it seems to contradict Augustine, who maintains *On the Trinity* 7.1 n.2 that "everything that is said relatively is something with the relative removed;" and it was proved, in *Ord*.II d.1 nn.260, 272, 243-252, 260-261, 266, 278, 284 (in the question 'On the relation of the creature to God'), that no relation is formally or essentially the same as the foundation, although by identity it be sometimes the same thing. If then this habit is a certain quality and absolute entity, it does not have a respect so essential that it cannot be understood without it.

379. Further, if the 'respect' be posited the same as something absolute, it is only so as to what is 'prior naturally', just as is plain from the question 'About the relation of creature to God' [*ibid.* nn.261, 263, 265]; but the relation of 'habit' in the angelic intellect to a stone is not to the prior naturally, because a stone in no genus of cause is disposed in respect of such a habit.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Or in this way: a respect is not posited as being the same as something save in respect to that on which it essentially depends; but on several things of the same order can something not essentially depend, because then, with one terminating the dependence of it, the other would not terminate it, – and so would it be although that other on which it essentially depends were not, which is unacceptable. But if such habit be posited, it will represent all quiddities under the same order so that [it represent] none by mediation of another but all immediately; therefore etc. [cf. *Rep.*II A d.3 p.2 q.1]

380. Secondly against this, that through the habit the object is present under the idea of the intelligible [n.355]:

First through his reason [Henry's]: for he proves that the intelligible species cannot be the idea of the presence of the object, because it perfects the intellect as a certain being, as form does matter, – and consequently it will not perfect the intellect as it is intellect [sc. as it is an intellective power], nor will the intelligible be per se present insofar as intelligible. Much more can this be argued about the habit, because a habit insofar as habit is the perfection of a power.

381. Further second: much more would it follow in our habit – which is caused by the object – that our sciential habit would be something by which the intelligible object would be present, and so, with the sciential habit acquired, a conversion to phantasms would not be required for actual intellection, which he denies.

382. It is replied that our intellection depends on sensibles, not so the intellection of an angel. – On the contrary: if the necessary binding together (or the essential respect in the habit) is the reason because of which the object is sufficiently present through the habit [n.356], and that respect is more essentially in our habit than in the habit of an angel (because ours is caused by the object but not that one), – therefore, because of this essential respect, our habit will be more the idea of such presence than the angelic habit.

383. Third, against this which he says, that every created intelligible object is present through this habit [n.355]: it seems unacceptable, because if an angel were created in his pure natural state without any such habit (which does not involve contradiction, because this habit differs – just like quality – from the angel's essence), then the angel would not be able to know, and thus the nature of an angel of itself would be more imperfect in intellectuality than the nature of a man; because the nature of a man, however nakedly made, has whereby it may acquire intellectual knowledge of certain

objects, – but an angel could not acquire this habit, nor be able without this to understand anything.

384. Further, a habit – according to him – does for this reason not represent the singular 'as a species would represent', because it is not of a nature to be generated immediately by the thing, but only through an act of intellect comparing simples; but he himself argues against a species, because when something 'generated by its natural cause' is of a nature thus to represent it under the idea under which it is generated by it, – it will, by whatever it be impressed, always thus represent; therefore the habit that thus would be generated by its natural cause, since it follows naturally the apprehension of simples (by whatever too it be impressed), it will follow that it would presuppose that apprehension of simples: therefore it cannot be the proper idea of apprehending simples.

385. Further, fourth: that he says that this habit is the principle for knowing any distinct objects whatever [n.357] – there seems to be against this the first reason 'against the first opinion' [n.367], because namely it would be naturally infinite.

386. That he also says that it determinately inclines to that to which the will by commanding determines [n.358] – it seems to be irrational, because there is of this habit 'as a natural form' a determinate natural inclination and, if there be many inclinations to diverse things, they are ordered, so that at least one is first; and consequently, to use it for that to which it is not inclined first, seems to be against its first natural inclination, and so it will not merely naturally be inclined to this. Nor does it seem rational to posit that one natural form – as far as concerns its natural inclination – is under a created will; for if the heavy, remaining actually heavy, were to be moved upwards by God, although the heavy be perfectly in obediential potency to divine power, yet it does not seem to be moved naturally passively, on its part [*Ord*.II d.2 nn.466-467]; and whatever may be [so] there, it does not seem that any natural form – in its natural inclination – is altogether in its act under the created will so that it be naturally inclined to this to which the created will wants it to be inclined

387. Further, in whatever way he will himself be able to say that by command of the will the habit represent determinately one thing and another, much more can it be posited that 'what has many intelligible species' could use now that species, now another: and there will be a naturality in any species, representing and inclining to its object, - and a liberty in it in using this species or that.

II. Scotus' own Opinion

388. To the question [n.349] therefore I concede the conclusions of the four first arguments [nn.367, 369, 371, 376], which prove that an angel has for knowing distinct quiddities distinct ideas of knowing.

389. And if it be asked what those ideas are of knowing, – I say that he has 'ideas of knowing', other than the essences known, representing them, which ideas both properly and truly are called 'intelligible species'; and if by some they be called 'habits' [e.g. Henry, who posits habit for species], they are thereby expressed actually as accidents of species, for the idea of habit is accident to a species according as a species in the intellect – from which it is not easily deleted – has the idea of habit (because the idea of permanent form), but this ['species'] is not said in the 'what' of this quality [sc. habit],

just as 'habit' is not said in the 'what' of a species (for the same absolute essence, in the genus of quality, can be a habit and a disposition).

390. Similarly: 'habit' is a universal for the intelligible species of this sort, fixed, because although every such 'strengthened' [species] be a habit, yet not conversely, – rather, not every intelligible habit of the same object, of which there is an intelligible species, is the same as it.

Which is plain. First because the species of the first object (which is not naturally present through the essence) precedes naturally the act of knowing it; and the habit, in respect of that object, follows naturally those from which it is generated [n.384]: but the same thing essentially does not follow naturally and precede naturally, because there is not a circle in things essentially ordered, neither in causes nor in things caused. Second because a habit can be more intense than something of which the intelligible species is more remiss (and conversely), - for he who has an imperfect intellect, in which an imperfect intelligible species is received, has an intelligible species more remiss than another who has a more perspicacious intellect (which is plain, because the natural causes in this one and in that are unequal, namely the agent intellect and the phantasm, - and natural causes act according to the ultimate of their power); therefore the intelligible species of the species in this more imperfect intellect are more remiss than in that more perfect one, - and yet the 'slower' can more frequently consider the intelligible thing (of which it has the species), and from this have a more intense habit in respect of this object, so that the habit be a quality facilitating it for consideration of this object.

391. Thus therefore per accidens and in general is this idea (namely the species) called an 'intelligible habit', – but per se and essentially is the 'intelligible species' called such, because in this is it most properly expressed, more properly even than in the idea of likeness.

392. And that an angel have such an idea of knowing, other than essence [known, n.389], in respect of other quiddities than himself, – is proved, because he knows through something through which he would know those quiddities even if those quiddities in themselves were not existent: for this is of perfection in our intellect, that we have actual knowledge of a thing with it not existing, – therefore much more does it belong to the angelic intellect; but such knowledge of a thing, which could be had of it with it not existing in itself, could only be had through the representing idea; therefore etc.

393. And from this follows further that also of his quiddity he [an angel] have an idea of knowing, – because no knowledge imperfect of its genus belongs to a higher angel without an inferior angel being able to have about the same thing a more imperfect [knowledge] in genus; but a superior angel can have knowledge of an inferior through a species (from what was already proved [n.392]), and knowledge through a species is more imperfect of its genus than knowledge through essence; therefore an inferior angel can have of himself knowledge through a species.

394. And if it is objected that this contradicts what was said in the first question, because there it is said that an angel knows himself through his essence [nn.269, 353], -I say that an angel can know any quiddity at all (other than himself and also his own) through the species and through the essence of them: through the essence indeed he can know when he knows it by intuitive knowledge (namely under the idea by which it is present in actual existence); he can also know through a species when he knows it with

III. To the Principal Arguments

395. To the principal arguments [350-353].

To the first [n.350] I say that the Philosopher's intention, *Metaphysics* 8, is about subaltern species; which appears from the first property of a number, where he maintains that just as a number stops at indivisible [units], so the resolution of definitions stops at indivisibles; therefore those quiddities are ordered in the universe, just as numbers are ordered, resolvable into unities. He is speaking therefore of subaltern species, and so it is not to the purpose speaking of the most specific species in the universe.

However if it be taken about them not from authority but as something in itself true, -I say that a higher angel has a more perfect entity than a lower; not however does he [the higher angel] include the whole entity of the lower, so that the lower not differ from him save by negation, for species in the universe are not distinguished by negations, but by their proper ideas. Nevertheless, the divine essence, which is infinite, does include eminently all perfections, - and therefore no higher [angel] is a sufficient reason for knowing a lower, but only the divine essence is.

396. To that from *On the Soul* 2 [n.351], I say that the Philosopher is speaking there specifically about the sensitive, vegetative, and intellective. Nor is it similar about species of numbers (or figures) and the most specific species in the universe, because greater numbers (and figures) include the lesser as parts and according to the whole entity of numbers, – and from this they are sufficient ideas of knowing them; not however in this way do the higher in the universe include the lower species.

397. To the second argument [n.352] I say by conceding that the species of a material thing is a perfection of an angel in intelligible being, but an accidental perfection (not substantial or essential), and such does not always exceed its perfectible simply; rather, every accident is simply less a being than substance (from *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a13-20).

398. And if you say, how can it be an 'accidental perfection' of a nature thus perfect if it [a species of a material thing] is inferior thus to the lowest nature (namely to corporeal substance), for what the idea is of understanding whiteness in a perfect intellect (as an angelic) seems to be more perfect than whiteness? – I say that it is not altogether lower than that nature, because it is not the effect of it as of total cause, but it is the effect of it and of the intellect of the angel as of certain things integrating one total cause. But it is possible that the effect of some partial cause exceeds its partial cause, because it can have something of perfection from the other partial cause, on account of which it can exceed that partial cause, – such that the species of white in the intellect of the angel is a perfection of his intellect: not indeed a more imperfect entity than that which is whiteness, rather it is more perfect. And this does not belong to it inasmuch as it is generated from whiteness, but because it is also generated from the intellect of the angel, as a vital perfection and in some way more perfect than the whiteness), but that excess of perfection is only 'in a certain respect'.

399. To the last [n.353], it is plain that they stand together – that he understand himself through the species and the essence, just as anything whatever 'other than himself' [n.394] – and this naturally, the divine essence alone excepted [nn.324-325].

IV. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

400. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.359-363].

To the first, from *Ethics* 2 [n.359], proceeding through the division of those that are in the soul, I concede that a species can truly be called a habit, and truly can a habit be predicated of the species as a universal predicate and per accidens; and if it have to be per se and in particular rightly expressed, it is called an intelligible species of that sort. But the Philosopher does not mean that nothing is in the soul save what is a 'habit per accidens', – rather that to which the idea of habit belongs is as if a universal predicate.

401. To the second [n.360] I say that an angel cannot in himself generate any habit from acts (a habit – I say – that is another thing than a species), because a habit is not generated in things naturally inclined or determined to one thing (as is not generated in a heavy thing, by descending however many times, the idea of descent); nor is there generated in things violently moved an inclination in conformity to the operator or the operation of a habit (as is plain if a heavy thing be however many times projected upwards),^a – but it is generated in powers in themselves indeterminate to an act frequently elicited. Now it is not a feature of imperfection that 'some created intellect' is supremely habilitated for intellection; but if any be such it will be the angelic, and so in that (as in the supremely habilitated for act) it will not be possible from any act at all for any [h]ability to be generated that may be called a habit in that way [sc. here *supra*: 'that is another thing than a species']; or if it lack such a habit (which was a certain [h]ability for considering this intelligible), and the intellect be capable of it, – then I say it is not unacceptable that it be able in itself to generate such a habit.

a. [*Interpolation:* in place of "an inclination generated...projected upwards")]: ... through however many times such a 'to be moved', any idea or habit facilitating and habituating to such violent motion, as is plain of a stone moved upwards.

402. And when you say

402. And when you say 'therefore it is potential, as our intellect is, not only to second act but also to first' [n.360], I deny the consequence; because the first act in an intellect is that which is presupposed to second act (which second act is intellection), but this habit (which is an aptitude for understanding and is distinguished from a species) does not naturally precede the act but follows it; therefore it is posterior to second act (and so it is not first act), and thereby the potency for it is not an essential potency (rather it is quasi posterior to accidental potency), because an essential potency is properly for a first act preceding second act; hence the science, for which the intellect, according to Aristotle, is said to be in essential potency, is not a scientific habit (which is generated from acts), but an intelligible species.

403. By this is it plain to the third argument, from Dionysius [n.361]. I say that 'the highest in an inferior is lowest in a superior' when that which is placed highest in an inferior is not repugnant to the superior. And here it is repugnant, because in us the habit

of science is a perfection supplying an imperfection of our intellect, to the extent it is not of itself supremely habilitated; even when a man has his reason active, whereby the object is sufficiently present, still is the sort of supreme inclination lacking that is required for the most perfect act.

404. This perfection, although in us it supply imperfection, is however repugnant to an angel, because there cannot be in him an imperfection that would be supplied by this perfection; so it could be said in many other things, because if the highest in an element is 'to generate something like itself', it is not necessary that it be lowest in any proximate mixed body whatever, because some mixed bodies do not generate something like themselves, because such a perfection supplying imperfection in an inferior is repugnant to them (so too can that be repugnant to an interior which is lowest in a superior, – and then the converse is not valid, namely that the lowest of the superior are the highest of the inferior). Hence that argument [taken from Dionysius, n.361] would entail many falsehoods: for it would follow that the sensitive soul (which is the supreme form in brutes) would be formally in the intellective soul.

405. To the fourth [n.362] I say that if there were no other reason save that a species – when it is perfect – suffices for perfect intellection without a habit (and in an angel perhaps it necessarily suffices without a habit, if a habit be impossible in him as it is distinguished from a species; or if it is possible there, it does not suffice without a species) – this alone suffices for denying a habit in an angel 'other than the species', as if a principle necessary for act of understanding.

406. To the fifth and last argument [n.363] I say that if 'the appetible object' were present to appetite by some proper presence other than is present to the 'cognitive' of that appetite, – there would be required in the appetite proper ideas proper whereby diverse objects were present; but this supposition is false, because an 'object' present to any cognitive power is by the same present to the appetitive corresponding to that cognitive.

407. And then if you argue 'the will does not require diverse ideas, so neither the intellect' [n.363], – I say that the antecedent is false if it is understood of the ideas by which an object is present to the intellect (for those are the ideas by which objects are present to the intellect which are diverse); but if you understand that ideas would not be required in the will by which objects are present, – I say that it is not valid, because the appetitive is not of a nature to have an object in itself in the way in which it is present to the cognitive power. Nor is it valid to object against this from ordered cognitive powers: for the order is not alike of those among themselves which are of the same genus as it is of the intellective and appetitive which are of other genus; and therefore do diverse ordered cognitive [powers] have diverse ideas (by which their objects may be present), just as does the cognitive to its appetitive [powers¹²⁶].

V. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

408. To the arguments of the second opinion [nn.364-365].

To Dionysius [n.364] it is plain through another translation that is adduced ('total' etc.) – look for Lincoln [Grosseteste: translation and commentary on *Celestial Hierarchy* ch.12]; for, as he himself expounds, by 'universality of species' is understood 'totality'.

¹²⁶ Scotus does not express the noun to go with 'appetitive' here, and it is conceivable that the noun to be supplied is not 'powers' but 'ideas'.

And this totality is of perfection (as of clearness and intensity), – and not that one idea be for any [angel] the idea of knowing more than for another, because this is equal in every finite intellect, that any at all in respect of knowing more things requires the proper ideas.

409. When it is argued second that 'things first are nearer the first' [n.364], I concede it; but it is not necessary in this they are nearer that 'through fewer', but because they can know more clearly; for in this is per se nearness of perfection, and not in the other, if it were [so]. For more perfect is the intellect simply which more clearly knows: but nothing is lost to it if it know through one thing and another, if yet it know more clearly; for if it were to know through the same thing and were not more clearly to know, it would not more perfectly know – which is false. For in this clearness is there per se nearness, and not in fewness of ideas of knowing, because – absolutely – this is not in the nature of any created idea, that it be one of many.

410. And by this is it plain to the argument that was made about the cleverer, that he knows through fewer etc. [n.364]; it is false, but he has as many species of knowables as the slower too has; yet more clearly thereby does he know objects and more quickly does he use them, combining this object with that and proceeding discursively from one known to another. But from greater clearness and speed it cannot be concluded that he understands through fewer ideas; so in the matter at hand.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] As to what was said there [interpolation to n.353], about the authority of the author of *On Causes*, it is not to be cared about; hence it should be said that the authority has to be understood of a cause simply first, not of any intermediate, because although it can do more than a second cause (because it includes it), yet because it does not include it eminently according to its whole entity (because thus does only God include all things), so neither according to its whole active virtue, because not according to the representative virtue by which it can represent the intelligible object, which cannot be a body/a body cannot [do].¹²⁷

411. To the last for this opinion [n.365], I say that there is not one species in sense, imagination, and intellect, but different ones; nor from this alone, that it is in a more immaterial subject, does it represent more universally, because if – *per impossibile* – the species that is in sense were in imagination (or that which is in the imagination were in the intellect), it would not more perfectly represent (neither according to quiddity, nor according to intensity) the fact, namely, that it was the proper idea of more. So not then from the sole immateriality or greater actuality of the receiver can a greater actuality be concluded of species received in the representing, but this will only be from the nature of the species in itself.

412. However these conditions of received species are proportionate to the receptives (according to the saying of Boethius [*Consolation of Philosophy* 5 prose 5], 'the received is in the receiver through the mode of the receiver etc.') – but absolutely, just as no 'receiving essence' is universal with respect to all essences (nor even perfectly containing every other essence than itself), so neither can anything 'received in it' be a universal idea of representing all else perfectly; but such 'universal representation' precisely can belong to the divine essence (infinitely and eminently), and to no other.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ The Latin is ambiguous.

¹²⁸ The Vatican Editors point out that the interpolated fourth question here (cf. interpolation to n.255), about whether angels can progress in receiving knowledge from things (interpolated in another manuscript after *Ord*.II d.12 q.1), is freely enough conflated from *Rep*. II B d.11 q.2 and *Additiones Magnae* 2 d.11 q.1 or d.10 q.1.