

THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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[Third Distinction not Translated Here. John Van der Bercken's Translation is due to be Published by Fordham Press in late 2015.

In its place is given in the Appendix, page 758, a translation of the treatment of this distinction by Antonius Andreas, one of Scotus' most faithful students.]

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B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father	
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2. Second Opinion	Num. 25
3. Scotus' own Opinion	Num. 27
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 29
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B. Rejection of the Opinion	Num. 44
C. To the Principal Arguments	Num. 48
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2. Second Opinion	Num. 61
3. Third Opinion	Num. 64
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Twenty Ninth Distinction (Page 650)

Single Question: *Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles*

Inwardly and Outwardly in God

I. To the Question

II. To the Arguments

Num. 1

Num. 3

Num. 5

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Question One: *Whether Some Relation is Said of God from Time*

Num. 1

Question Two: *Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures*

Num. 5

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A. First Opinion

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Num. 11

2. Rejection of the Opinion

Num. 15

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1. Exposition of the Opinion

Num. 24

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Num. 25

II. Scotus' own Response to the First Question

Num. 30

III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

Num. 46

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Num. 49

V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

Num. 59

Thirty First Distinction (Page 665)

Single Question: *Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God*

Num. 1

I. To the Question

Num. 6

A. As to the First Condition for Relation

1. Opinion of Others

Num. 7

2. Scotus' own Opinion

Num. 11

B. As to the Second Condition for Relation

Num. 12

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Num. 16

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Num. 19

III. To the Principal Arguments

Num. 23

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Question Two: <i>Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom</i>	Num. 6
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A. First Opinion	Num. 9
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C. Third Opinion	Num. 14
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2. Second Opinion	Num. 12
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D. Instances against Scotus' own Solution	Num. 35
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Thirty Sixth Distinction (Page 696)

Single Question: *Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect*

Num. 1

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

Num. 4

B. Scotus' own Response

Num. 26

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Num. 30

II. To the Principal Arguments

Num. 48

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Num. 54

Thirty Seventh Distinction (Page 705)

Single Question: *Whether God's Omnipotence necessarily entails his Greatness*

Num. 1

I. To the Question

Num. 3

II. To the Principal Argument

Num. 10

Thirty Eighth Distinction (Page 709)

Single Question: *Whether God's Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical*

Num. 1

I. To the Question

Num. 4

II. To the Principal Arguments

Num. 11

Appendix (Page 711)

[The second part of
Distinction 38
The Infallibility of Divine Knowledge
 and the whole of

Distinction 39

The Immutability of Divine Knowledge

are lacking in the *Ordinatio* and are supplied here by an interpolation from the *Lectura* and *Rep.* 1A.]

Questions One to Five: *On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

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 - A. First Opinion
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I. To the Question

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Prologue

First Part

Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be supernaturally inspired.

1. The question^a is whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the intellect, be supernaturally inspired.

a. [Interpolation] Desiring something etc. [quoting Peter Lombard *ad loc.*]. Concerning the prologue of the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is necessary for man in this present state that there be some supernaturally inspired doctrine for him. The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is practical; the fifth: whether a practical science is so called *per se* from order to praxis and end.

And that it was not necessary I argue thus:

Every¹ power having something common for its prime object is naturally capable of whatever is contained under that object just as it is capable of the *per se* natural object. This is proved by the example of the prime object of sight and of the other things contained under it, and thus by induction it is proved in the case of other prime objects and powers.

It is also proved by reason, because the prime object is said to be that which is commensurate with the power; but if its nature, that is, the nature of the prime object, were in something about which the power was unable to be active, the power would not be commensurate but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is plain. But the prime natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being; therefore our intellect is naturally able to be active about any being whatever, and thus about any intelligible non-being, because the negative term is known through the affirmative term. Therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is in Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6 (72rb): “Being and reality are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest by other things;” but if there were some prime object other than them, they could be made manifest by the idea of that prime object; but this is impossible.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] In this question note *a*, *b*, *c* for the principle; next, for the difficulties, *d*, *e*, *f*, *g*; they are done in the second question [n.95]. Note, *a* is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and *c* for question 1 [ibid., qq.1-2]; *b* and the following are common in supernatural matters; *d*, *e* for the question about the science of theology for us [n.124].

¹ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *a*.

2. In addition,² the senses do not need, for this present life, any supernatural cognition; therefore neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the consequence is: “Nature does not fail in things necessary,” *On the Soul*, 3.9.432b21-22; but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that are perfect; therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is necessary for the higher power to attain their act and end. Therefore etc.

3. In addition, if some such doctrine is necessary, it is because the power in its pure natural state is not commensurate with the knowable object as such; therefore it must be made commensurate by something other than itself. But this something other is either natural or supernatural; if it is natural then the whole thing is incommensurate with the prime object; if it is supernatural, then the power is incommensurate with that supernatural thing, and thus the power must be made commensurate to it by something else, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, since an infinite process is impossible, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first stage by saying that the intellective power is commensurate with everything knowable and in every way of its being knowable. Therefore, etc.

4. To the opposite:

2 *Timothy* 3.16: “All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof...”

In addition, in *Baruch* 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: “There is none who knows her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;” therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: “He handed it on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved,” as to the *Old Testament*; and then follows, v.38: “After this he is seen on earth and conversed with men,” as to the *New Testament*.

I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.^a

a. [Interpolation] and so they honor it more.

A. Opinion of the Philosophers

A philosopher might say, then, that no supernatural knowledge is necessary for man in this present life, but that he can acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the activity of natural causes. Adduced for this are both the authority and also the reasoning of the Philosopher in diverse places.

6. First, *On the Soul* 3.5.430a14-15, where he says that “the agent intellect is that whereby it makes all things and the possible intellect that whereby it becomes all things.”

² Text marked by Scotus with the sign *b*.

From this I thus argue:³ when that which is naturally active and that which is naturally passive are brought together and are not impeded, action necessarily follows, because action depends essentially on these alone as on prior causes; but the active element with respect to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and the passive element the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul and are not impeded. The thing is plain. Therefore, by the natural virtue of these two, the act of understanding can ensue with respect to any intelligible whatever.

7. There is a confirmation by reason: to every natural passive power there corresponds something naturally active, otherwise the passive power would in nature be in vain if it could be reduced to act by nothing in nature; but the possible intellect is the passive power with respect to any intelligible whatever; so to it there corresponds some natural active power. The proposed conclusion then follows. The minor premise is plain, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing whatever; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever; therefore it is naturally receptive of any understanding whatever.

8. In addition,⁴ in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18-19, there is a distinction of theoretical habits into the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical; and from the proof of this in the same place it does not seem possible for there to be more theoretical habits, because in those habits the whole of being, both in itself and in its parts, is considered. But just as there could not be any theoretical science other than these, so neither could there be any practical science other than the acquired active and productive sciences. Therefore the acquired practical sciences are sufficient for perfecting the practical intellect, and the acquired theoretical sciences sufficient for perfecting the theoretical intellect.

9. In addition,⁵ that which is naturally able to understand the principle can naturally know the conclusions contained in the principle. I prove this conclusion from the fact that the knowledge of the conclusions depends only on the understanding of the principle and on the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is plain from the definition of ‘know’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12; but a deduction is manifest of itself, as is plain from the definition of the perfect syllogism, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24, because “it is in need of nothing for being or appearing clearly necessary;” therefore if the principles are understood, there is possession of everything that is necessary for knowledge of the conclusion. And thus the major is plain.

10. But we naturally understand the first principles, and in these principles all the conclusions are contained; therefore we can naturally know all knowable conclusions.

Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common terms, therefore we can naturally understand them, because from *Physics* 1.1.184a21-22 the most common things are understood first;^a “but we know and understand the principles insofar as we know the terms,” *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25; therefore we can naturally know the first principles.

a. [Interpolation, in place of “therefore...understood first”] therefore we can naturally understand them, because, from *Physics* 1, the most common things are understood first by

³ Text marked by Scotus with the sign c.

⁴ Text marked by Scotus with the sign f.

⁵ Text marked by Scotus with the sign d.

us, and also because they are as it were the doorways in[to] the house, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5.

11. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common, therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all the subordinate concepts; now, such terms are taken universally in the first principles and thus they extend to all particular concepts, and so as a result to the extremes of all special conclusions.^a

a. [Interpolation] And thus is this second part of the minor proved.

B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

12. Against this position one can argue in three ways.⁶

Note: it cannot be shown by natural reason that something supernatural exists in the wayfarer, nor that it is required necessarily for his perfection. Therefore it is impossible to use natural reason here against Aristotle; if one argues from things believed, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence the reasons given against him here possess one or other premise as something believed, or as proved from something believed; therefore they are only persuasive theologically, from things believed to a thing believed.

13. [First principal reason] – First thus: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end. I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end; everything that per se acts, acts for an end; therefore everything that per se acts desires the end in its own particular way. Therefore, just as a natural agent needs desire of the end for which it must act, so a thing that acts by knowledge – which is also a per se agent, from *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22 – needs desire of the end for which it must act. The major then is plain.

But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore he needs some supernatural knowledge of it.

14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, lays down that happiness is perfected in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in the *Ethics* 1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32, or, if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, so that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either be in error or remain in doubt about the end in its particular nature;^a hence in the *Ethics* 1.10.1099b11-13 he says hesitatingly “if any gift is from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This is something believed.

15. Second, the same minor is proved through reason, because the proper end of any substance is not known to us save from the acts of it that are manifest to us, from which acts is shown that such an end is fitting for such a nature;^a in this present life we do

⁶ These arguments are derived variously from Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, though primarily from the latter.

not experience or know that any acts are present in our nature from which we might know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.

a. [Interpolation] This is plain from the descent of a heavy object downward, which descent is an act of the heavy object with respect to the center and end.

16. From this it is at least certain that some conditions of the end, on whose account it is more desirable and more fervently to be sought, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the end of man is the pure vision and enjoyment of God, yet the conclusion will not follow that these fittingly belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, the way it will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than it would if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end must be known, then, if the end is to be efficaciously sought, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

17. [Second Principal Reason] – Second, thus:^a every knower that acts for an end needs knowledge of how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and also he needs knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and, third, he needs knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first condition is plain, because if he does not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself so as to obtain it. The second condition is proved because if he does not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. Also, as to the third condition, if those necessary things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he is ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This proceeds of contingent things; therefore it does not proceed of knowable things.

18. But these three conditions cannot be known to the wayfarer by natural reason. The proof of the first is that beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and so as a result beatitude does not follow by natural necessity on any acts whatever of our own, but it is a contingent gift of God, who accepts some acts in their order to him as meritorious.^a This fact, as it seems, is not naturally knowable, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God proceeds from him by necessity. The other two conditions, at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptance by the divine will, insofar as it contingently accepts such and such things as worthy of eternal life, cannot be known by natural reason, nor too that these things are sufficient; it all depends on the divine will in respect of those things the divine will is in a contingent way related to; therefore, etc.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This is something believed.

19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons an instance is given. Against the first thus: every created nature depends essentially on any per se cause of it at all and, on account of such dependence, knowledge can be had from the thing caused by a ‘proof-that’,⁷ and any per se cause of it at all can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not incommensurate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that the end of the nature can be naturally known from knowledge of the nature.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] I concede that the end which is the final cause is known, and this in the respect in which it is final cause, and that it is known in like manner as the efficient cause is known in the respect in which it must necessarily be the first efficient cause [n.29].

20. Confirmation of the reason: for if the end of a lower nature is known from knowledge of that nature, no less is this possible in the proposed case, because there is in the proposed case no lesser dependence of a determinate thing on its end than in other cases.

21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’, which was assumed in the proof of the minor, is false, because the end of a nature can from the knowledge of that nature in itself be known by a ‘proof-that’.

22. But if it be said the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, *On Predestination Sanctorum* ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as belonging to such a nature, and consequently such a nature’s directability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it, are also naturally knowable to him.

23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore he is naturally directed to that end; therefore that end can be concluded from such directedness as from knowledge of the nature directed to it.

24. Again, that the prime object of the intellect is being is naturally knowable, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6 (72rb), and naturally knowable is that the nature of being is most perfectly realized in God; but the end of any power is the best of the things that are contained under its prime object, because in that alone is there perfect rest and delight, from the *Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable to man that he is in respect of his intellect directed to God as to his end.

25. The reason is confirmed, because what the prime object is of some power is naturally knowable to him to whom the power is naturally knowable, and, further, he can know what the nature of that prime object is realized in and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; but the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its prime object is known to it. Also known to it is that God is not transcended by the nature of that prime object, because then God would be in no way intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that

⁷ A proof from effects to cause, *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78a22-b34, as opposed to a ‘proof-why’, which is from causes to effects.

God is the best thing in which the nature of its object is realized, and so it knows that he is the end of the power.

26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, therefore the means in between are known; but the means between the nature and the end of it that is to be obtained are necessary for obtaining the end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that the means necessary for the end can in like manner be known.

27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of the things to the end is just as necessary in the proposed case as it is in other cases; but on account of this sort of connection in other cases other things are known from the end, as that from the nature of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.

28 [Response to the Instances] – To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although the process of reasoning is from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to the instance, and to the next one about Augustine, and to the third one about the power and the prime object, that all of these accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false in that proper and special respect under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end and is capable of complete grace and has God for its most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known to us in this present life under some general reason that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general reason it does not fittingly belong to our soul or nature to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that from a thing that exists for an end the end can be demonstrated by a ‘proof-that’, I say that it is not true unless the thing that exists for an end is known under the proper reason under which it has that end. Thus the minor is false. – And when proof is given by commensuration [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not in this present life capable of being commensurate as an object with itself save in accord with the general reasons that are abstractable from sensible things.

30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper reasons, unless some acts are manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

31. And from this the response to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor is clear, because the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not suppose that the end could not be known in some other way. For the truth very much is that if a substance were known under its proper nature, from this knowledge of it the per se cause of it might be known. But no substance is now thus known to us, and therefore we can conclude to no end proper to a substance save through an evident act of the substance as that substance is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, that about

ignorance of the act, and it supposes the other, namely that about the ignorance of the nature in itself.

32. To the second instance about Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition under the proper idea of love with respect to God in himself, is fitting to man's nature in accord with a special reason, not with a reason common to himself and to sensible things; therefore the potentiality is not naturally knowable about man in this present life, just as man too is not known under the reason in which this power belongs to him.^a Such is my reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposite to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about the supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as obtainable supernaturally and not naturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

a. [Interpolation] Or Augustine means that in nature it is a power for receiving. But it cannot be reduced to act by nature.

33. To the other argument [n.24], one must deny what it assumes, namely that it is naturally known that being is the prime object of our intellect, and that it is so in respect of the total indeterminacy of being to sensible and non-sensible things; and this is what Avicenna says is naturally known. For he has mixed his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – together with philosophical matters, and some things he has said that are philosophical and proved by reason, others that are in conformity with his sect; he expressly lays down in his *Metaphysics* 9.7 (107ra)⁸ that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore he had to lay down that immaterial substance was included under the prime object of the intellect. Not thus Aristotle [*On the Soul* 3.6.430b27-29], but according to him the prime object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.^a

a. [Interpolation] But if one opposes to this that, if material quiddity is the first and adequate object of the intellective power, then the intellect will not be able to understand anything about separate substance, because an adequate object includes virtually or formally everything that the power can be made to bear on – but material quiddity contains separate substances neither virtually nor formally, therefore etc. – I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, namely number, figure, etc., are sensed *per se* by the sense of sight, which sensibles are not included either virtually or formally under color or light; for it is enough that some things are contents of concomitance.

34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

⁸ Scotus left the space for '9.7' blank.

35. If it is objected to this that man in the state of nature, when that state was established, could, by the deduction of the first reason [n.19], know his nature and therefore the end of his nature; therefore that knowledge is not supernatural.

36. Again, if it is objected to the response to the final reason [n.33]: if what the prime object is of the intellect is for this reason not known that the intellect is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to the object, then it cannot be known about anything at all that it is intelligible, because the power is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to anything at all as to an intelligible object.

37. I reply: to the first objection [n.35] one would need to say of what sort the knowledge of man was when he was established, which may be put off to another occasion [4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present life the said knowledge is supernatural, because it exceeds his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of in accord with the state of fallen nature.

38. To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul now, or of any of its powers, is not had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object corresponds to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act have respect to the object as to the object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act which we experience. But we can have neither of these knowledges about a supernatural object; and for this reason both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

39. To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. – To the confirmation [n.27] for the reason I say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end; here, however, the attainment is not natural but is only an acceptance by the divine will that rewards the merits as worthy of such end.

40. [Third Principal Reason] – Again,⁹ there is a third principal argument against the opinion of the philosophers. *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate substances is the most noble because it is about the noblest kind of being; therefore knowledge of their characteristic properties is most noble and necessary, for those properties are more perfect knowables than are the ones they share with sensibles. But we cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if some science taught that it finds those properties in a way that is possible way, it would be the science of metaphysics; but a metaphysics about the characteristic features of those separate substances cannot be naturally had by us, as is plain. And this is what the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things somehow and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals somehow knows all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by a ‘knowledge-why’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include the proper ‘why’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc.

Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-that’ and from the effects. Here is the proof; for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to those properties,

⁹ Text marked by Scotus with the sign *g* [n.27].

or lead them away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three; but the effects do not show this property, because these do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument is made from the effects to the cause, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. It is also a property of that nature to be a contingent cause of things outside it; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers who posit that the first thing causes necessarily whatever it causes.^a About the properties of other substances too the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of those properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers also seem to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances accords with the number of the motions. Likewise, that those substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.^b

a. [Interpolation] A philosopher might say to this reason that what it is impossible for us to know it is not necessary for us to know; but it is impossible for us to have of the properties of separate substances any knowledge, whether by nature or infused, save as we now have it – and therefore it is not necessary that knowledge be infused for knowledge of the properties of separate substances.

b. [Interpolation] Again, from the motion of the heaven it turns out that the angels are always moving it, nor could the heaven be greater, on account of the labor of the angel doing the moving – so that if one star be added, the angel could not move it etc. [Aristotle *De Caelo* 2.1.284a14-18].

42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that any necessary property at all of separate substances that is now known to us by faith or common revelation could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows:¹⁰ those necessary properties of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but we naturally know the terms of all the necessary things that have been revealed; therefore etc.

43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, then when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with either extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if the premises are immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to things immediate. Therefore ultimately we will come down to immediate necessities that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessities follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know those mediates through the immediates.

44. Proof of the principal minor, because to have and not to have faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over ‘God is triune,’ where one of them denies and the other affirms not only the same name but the same concept; therefore every simple concept that the one has the other has.

¹⁰ Text marked by Scotus with the sign e.

45. [Response to the Instance] – To this instance I reply: There exist some immediate truths about separate substances. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be *a*. In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that in particular assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called *b*, *c*. Those true mediate assertions do not have their truth save from something immediate. Therefore they are not naturally known save from the understanding of that something immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in *b* and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in *a* nor consequently *a* itself, *b* will be indeterminate for his intellect, because it will not be known either from itself or from an immediate proposition, because this latter is, by supposition, not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each other; but the complexes we thus form are not evident save from the true immediate propositions that are about those essences in their proper and special idea; but we do not conceive those essences under this idea, and so we do not know those general truths about the general concepts.

46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its proper idea, although he could abstract and conceive the idea of the figure from a quadrilateral, it would also be impossible for him to conceive a triangle's primacy as this primacy is a proper quality of a triangle, because it is not in this way conceived except when it is abstracted from triangle; yet he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as for instance primacy in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite 'some figure is primary', because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed will be indeterminate for it, because it is a mediate one included in the immediate proposition 'the triangle is primary in this way'; and because he cannot understand this immediate proposition, because he cannot understand its terms either, therefore he cannot know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from the immediate one.

47. Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say 'therefore we can conceive the mean between the extremes', I deny the consequence, because the mean between the extremes is sometimes ordered essentially between them, for example the definition of one or other extreme, or a property that is prior in respect of a later property; and such is a mean for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I therefore concede that whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes, because the understanding of it is included in one or other extreme, or is the same as one or other extreme. But if the mean is a particular, contained under one or other extreme and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can understand the general extremes can conceive the mean that is particular to the extremes. Thus it is here. For a whatness that has in its proper and particular idea some property immediately inhering in it, is a mean inferior to the common concept about which the property in the common concept is asserted; and so it is not a mean for proving the property of the common term universally, but only particularly. This is plain in the example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is a mean contained under 'figure'; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of a figure in particular.

48. This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial substance, because knowledge of it as the beatific object is especially necessary. And then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely the supposition is that we do not now naturally conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles, which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. Even if that supposition is denied, one must still say that the concept which can be made about God by virtue of a creature is imperfect; but the concept that might be made by virtue of the very essence in itself would be perfect. So, just as we spoke about general and special concept [n.47], let us thus in another way speak about perfect and imperfect concept.

49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: a thing that is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be little by little moved to the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is not of himself disposed; therefore he needs to be disposed little by little for possessing that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort set down as necessary.

50. But if it be instanced that a perfect agent can remove an imperfection and act at once, I reply: although this might be possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate activity to the creature with respect to obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; but man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him. But this would not be possible without some imperfect knowledge preceding the perfect knowledge toward which it is finally directed.

51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has through that instrument no power for any action that exceeds the nature of the instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul now uses in its natural understanding; therefore it has through that light no power for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to acquiring knowledge in a sensitive way through means of the senses; therefore the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by means of sense. But knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present life; therefore etc.

52. This reason seems to produce a conclusion contrary to him who has made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such cannot be had by means of the senses without special illumination. And thus it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect does not in any way perform any action; but this seems problematic, because this action is more perfect than any understanding; and consequently that which is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to contribute in some way to the action.

53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem as effective as they could be. For the first would be effective if it had been proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which pertains to the question about beatitude, 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present life sufficiently dispose for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by means of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to knowables of that sort.

54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable.

However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:^{a b}

a. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] ‘Suppose there is someone non-baptized’ etc. see above at the sign o≠o.

b. [*Interpolation*] But against the principal conclusion, namely that supernatural knowledge is not necessary for man for salvation, one could argue thus.

Suppose there is someone who is not baptized; although he is an adult, has no one to teach him, he has the sort of good motions in conformity with right reason that he is capable of having, and he avoids the things that natural reason shows him to be bad.

Although God by common law would visit such a person and teach him through a man or an angel – in the way he visited Cornelius, *Acts* 10.1-48 – nevertheless suppose him not taught by anyone, he will be saved. Likewise, although he were taught later, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing the good things that precede teaching he merits the grace whereby he is just; and yet he does not have theological knowledge, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55. One could say that by meriting things good in their kind he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the gift of his liberality; therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith; therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, nevertheless just as in baptism the supposition is that these are infused simultaneously, so for the same reason simultaneity can be supposed in this case. For God is not less gracious to him whom without a sacrament he justifies because of his merit by congruity, than to him whom he justifies in the reception of the sacrament without any merit of his own. Therefore it is possible for God by his absolute power to save anyone he likes, and also to bring it about that the latter deserves glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, he gives the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to acquire in accord with natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking; although by his ordained power God does not give grace without the preceding habit of faith, because grace is supposed not to be infused without it; not because of any need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole man; also a man would, without infused faith, be less perfectly disposed as to assenting to certain truths.

56. And as in this case, so analogously about the habit of theology I say that the perfectly existing habit includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture, such that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this in general as far as concerns everyone; it is not so as far as concerns the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is by ordained power necessary in an adult who is able to have a teacher and can understand him, and can do so as far as concerns acquired faith of certain general things.

II. Solution of the Question

57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural.^a For a receptive power is compared with the act that it receives or with the agent from which it receives it. In the first way it is a natural power, or a violent one, or neither. It is called natural if it is naturally inclined to receive what it receives, violent if it does so against nature, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the form which it receives nor to the opposite form. But when the comparison is taken in this way there is nothing supernatural in it. But if the receiver is compared with the agent from which it receives the form, then the case is natural when the receiver is compared with such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a receiver, but supernatural when the receiver is compared with an agent that does not naturally impress the form on that receiver.

a. [*Interpolation, from Appendix A*] Against the things said, by responding to the question: for he seems to want the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' to be taken chiefly by comparing the receptive power with the act and the form and in no way by comparing it with the agent; he seems also second to want the distinction of natural and supernatural to be taken chiefly by comparing the passive power with the agent and not by comparing it with the act and the form.

Therefore, as to these points, I proceed thus against him: I will show first that the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' should be taken by comparison with the agent; second that it should not be taken chiefly by comparison with the act; third that the distinction of natural and supernatural should be taken by comparison with the act and the form and the second causes; fourth I will solve the reasons he has on his behalf.

The first is proved in this way, by the Commentator on *De Anima* 2 com.26: "Demonstrative definitions are naturally fitted to give causes for everything in the thing defined;" but the violent is defined by comparing the passive power with the agent; therefore the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' has its place by comparison with the agent. The minor is plain, because "the violent is that whose principle is extrinsic, with the thing suffering the violence contributing nothing" *Ethics* 3.3.1110b15-17; but the extrinsic principle is the agent; therefore etc.

Secondly, the same thing is argued thus: that by which certain things differ formally from each other seems to be the formal principle of the distinction between them; but the natural and the violent differ formally by having their principle within and without; therefore etc. The minor is proved by Aristotle, *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23 where, in expounding the definition of nature, he says about the same thing: 'in that in which it is'.

Before this distinction is applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple argument against it; both that the distinction of 'natural' and 'violent' is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the form, and that the distinction of 'natural' and 'supernatural' is taken from the comparison of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

59. However, a reasonable solution is apparent, because that thing is the per se cause of something on which, when it is posited, and when any other thing has been excluded or varied, the effect follows. But in the present case, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced except by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally except by

introducing a form, yet the per se idea of 'violent' is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form, and the per se idea of 'supernatural' is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent. The proof is that when the receiver and the form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not acting naturally changes the receiver ('only' I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver.

This is proved secondly in this way, that the form is supernatural not only in 'being introduced' but also in 'persisting'; in one way a form persists without extrinsic action in a receiver violently, although not for a long time, in another it persists naturally and for a long time; in one way it remains natural, in another supernatural, on account of the agent only, such that, by excluding the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; but it could be said to be natural, because the perfection, when the comparison is of the form to the receiver only, is natural.

60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that when comparing the possible intellect with the actual knowledge in itself there is no supernatural knowledge, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and it naturally inclines to any knowledge whatever. But speaking in the second way [n.57], it is supernatural in this sense, that it is generated by an agent that does not have the nature to move the possible intellect naturally to such knowledge.

61. Now for this present life, according to the Philosopher [*On the Soul* 3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect has the nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a sensible phantasm, therefore only that knowledge is natural to it which is impressed on it by those agents.

Now by virtue of those agents all knowledge that is had of a concept by a wayfarer in accord with ordinary law can be had, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation, cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural knowledge is not of ordinary law necessary.

63. But as to propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], after the whole action of the agent intellect and of sensible phantasms has been put in place, many propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us of which the knowledge is necessary for us. Therefore knowledge of these things must be delivered to us supernaturally, because no one can naturally discover the knowledge of them and deliver it to others by teaching, because since they were by natural powers neutral for one person so were they neutral for anyone else. But whether, after the first handing down of teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to the doctrine handed down, see 3. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing down of such doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, that it is from an agent which is, for this present life, not naturally a mover of the intellect.

63. In another way too an action or knowledge could be said to be supernatural because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object having the nature to cause knowledge of this truth 'God is triune', and of similar ones, is the divine essence known under its proper idea; it is, as knowable under this idea, a

supernatural object. Any agent, then, which causes some knowledge of the truths that have the nature to be evident through such an object thus known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of the object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect this knowledge is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object would be in itself the cause.

64. So it is in the proposed case. For he who reveals ‘God is triune’ causes in the mind some knowledge, though an obscure knowledge, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would naturally cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in the clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that same extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object which is the cause of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause about this object knowledge of such truths in the way it supplies the place of some lesser object which is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must, in causing even that obscure knowledge, supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, as suppose it were to infuse geometry into someone, it would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (I mean,^a in both ways, because the second involves the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it not be capable of being possessed naturally; where the second way is, the necessity is that it be possessed supernaturally, because it cannot be possessed naturally.

a. [Interpolation] but if there is any supernatural knowledge in the second way, it is supernatural, or: if it were to infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is Triune’ or the like, this knowledge would be supernatural.

III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine *City of God* XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine *City of God* XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the polities arranged by many others, *Politics* 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the *Politics*, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored

(“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “not to nourish anything defective”!

68. The third reason is confirmed by Augustine *City of God* XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution. For because the propositions about which our argument is [nn.40-41] are in themselves neutral, no one can believe them on his own testimony, but a supernatural testimony must be required of someone who is above the whole human race.

69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine could be done or was done is doubtful – whether, that is, it was by interior locution or exterior, along with the use of some signs sufficient to cause assent; but it suffices for the proposed case that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, although it could in neither way have been first handed down by a man without error.

70. Against these three reasons it is at once instanced that they destroy themselves, because a thing that is shown as requiring necessarily to be known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except truth; therefore whatever those reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown to be true. Either, then, those reasons only rest on faith, or from them is concluded the opposite of what they prove.

71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but by natural reason it is not shown that this part needs to be known necessarily. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one side of the contradiction, this or that; not about it determinately except only from things believed [cf. n.12].

IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus a blank tablet, as is said at *On the Soul* 3.4.429b30-30a2. The intellect then is an agent by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.

73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion and rest – as it is described in the *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is

distinguished from art or from choice on account of their opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of an agent that is natural in the second way. Thus it is in the proposed case.

74. When the major is proved [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot by a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being and beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it be objected that that cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from its natural powers, although nature fails less in nobler things, from *On the Heavens* 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness consisted in a supreme contemplation of the sort to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [*On the Soul* 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that happiness can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore nature is in this respect made more dignified than if that natural one were posited as the supreme one possible for it; nor is it to be wondered at that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the *On the Heavens* is not relevant to the case, because the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to the motive power if it is in the stars. And I concede that universally to a thing to which a power is given that is naturally organic, to it is by nature given an organ, I mean in non-defective things. But in the proposed case a power is given but it is not organic; yet not all the other things have been given that, besides the power, concur in an act. From the Philosopher, then, can be there had that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has a power for it, and an organ if the power is organic; but of the later things required for act it is not so.

77. It can be said otherwise to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural passive power as it is a passive power in contrast to an active one, but not as it is a passive power in contrast to a received act. The difference between these two is plain at the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. The minor [n.7] however is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It might also in a third way be easily replied to the minor by denying it, because although absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such understanding, not however for this present life. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16; q.3 n.2.

79. To the third reason [n.8] examine the response of Thomas in *ST* Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2, where he responds thus, that “the diverse nature of the knowable introduces a diversity of sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a mathematical middle term, that is, one abstracted from matter (to wit, the conclusion that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term that is considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical

sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.”

On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological science about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is clear in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. The said response, however, to the third argument is thus expounded, namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to the habit of science principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) no distinction is drawn through the objects, yet a distinction is drawn through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and thus there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habits; but it is impossible for anything to be distinct from other things under the idea of what is superior but not to be thus distinct under the idea of what is inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct under the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet not distinct under the idea of habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things under the idea of ‘animal’ and not distinct from them under the idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that the principles distinguish the habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if the principles possess some idea of cause that makes distinctions in respect of habits they possess only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that, however much one can posit distinct cognitive habits, yet one does not preserve the need for one of them, as though the knowledge would otherwise be impossible, when one posits the possibility of a second habit that is for any reason distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although all objects of speculation are treated of, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to their properties, in the way it was made clear in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion.

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and thus reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt in the case of immaterial things than in the case of material ones that contradictories are not both true. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being as divided into the ten categories, and that this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major premises alone but with the minor premises added; but the minors that should be added to them are not now naturally manifest.

On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make assertions about things assumed 'under' the terms that are the subjects of the first principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this, that in the first principles 'all knowable conclusions are virtually included' [n.10]. In proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms. When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is clear in the reason, because the middle term cannot be the 'why' in respect of any property save of one that is virtually included in the idea of the middle term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle the 'why' of any particular property is not included, but only of the most common property; therefore the subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing anything save under the most common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other knowable properties for which the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle terms, because they do not include them. Therefore there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles.

This is clear in the example, because the statement 'every whole is greater than its part', although it includes the statement 'four is greater than two', and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: 'four is double in respect of two', 'three is in the relation of one and a half to two', for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of the principles; therefore these predicates are not known of these subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: 'affirmation or negation about a thing are also both about the same not-thing'; the consequence follows, 'therefore about this white or non-white', in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject.

I reply that the principle 'affirmation or negative about a thing' etc. is equivalent to the principle 'one side of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false', where there are two distributed terms and it is licit to descend under either distributed term to 'therefore about this part of this contradiction' etc.; but under a predicate that only stands confusedly it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, 'one side of any contradiction about anything, therefore this side'. Thus it is in other principles; the predicate of a universal affirmative always only stands confusedly, whether there are two distributed terms there in the subject or one.

And in the proposed example the proposed case is also plain. Just because it is knowable about man that he is capable of laughter, never can more be inferred by the principle ‘one side of any contradiction’ etc. than that ‘therefore about man he is either capable or not capable of laughter’. One or other part, then, of the predicated disjunction will never be known of the subject by this principle, but some other special principle is required, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term and the reason for knowing ‘capable of laughter’ determinately of man.

V. To the Principal Arguments

90. To the principal arguments. – To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about the natural object. For ‘natural object’ can be taken either for that which can naturally or by the action of causes naturally active be attained, or for that to which the power is naturally inclined, whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, might be denied by denying ‘natural’ in the first way, because the first object is something adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power is able to operate on; however it is not necessary that the intellect, if it could naturally understand some such common thing, could naturally understand whatever is contained under it, because the understanding of something contained is much more excellent than a confused understanding of such a common thing; thus, although the minor is in each sense conceded, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely the conclusion about something naturally attainable, because the major in this way was false.

91. Against this response I reply that it destroys itself. For the first object is by itself something adequate to the power and is true, namely because the power has regard to nothing as object except what has in it the nature of the first object, and whatever has in it the nature of the first object the power has regard to it as to its object; therefore it is impossible for something to be naturally first without anything whatever that is contained in it being thus per se naturally the object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate, and thus is first.

Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is the fallacy of figure of speech. For although being, insofar as it is something intelligible in one act (as man is intelligible in one understanding), is naturally intelligible (for the one understanding of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited as the first object naturally attainable, because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such only whatever among them is naturally intelligible is naturally attainable. Therefore the phrase ‘this thing’ is altered to ‘this thing as qualified’ when it is argued ‘being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect is the adequate object and naturally attainable,’ for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, the way white is, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in all intelligibles, not as it is intelligible apart from them.

92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely because the minor is false about the natural object, that it is naturally attainable, – it is true in the other way, namely as that to which the power is naturally inclined or ordained [n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what should be set down as the first object naturally attainable, 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12 below is about it. The response is confirmed by Anselm *On Free Choice of the Will* ch.3, ‘We

have, as I think, no ability,' he says, 'that is sufficient of itself for act.' He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordained to an object which it cannot naturally attain by natural causes, after the manner of anything that is directed of itself alone to something and yet cannot on its own attain that something.

93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. – To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, that higher things are ordered to the passive reception of a higher perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently their perfection cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose final perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.

94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not commensurate with firm possession of every propositional truth, that is, it is not commensurate with being moved by the sort of agents that it cannot get to know from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect.

When you argue 'therefore it is made commensurate by something else' I concede the point – both as to 'by something else' in the sense of 'by a mover', because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to 'by something else' in the sense of 'by a form', because it assents by the assent that is made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it commensurate with the object.

When about that 'something else' you ask further 'whether it is natural or supernatural', I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form.

When you infer 'therefore the intellect is not commensurate with it, and is by something else made commensurate with it', I say that it is of itself in a state of obediential potency with respect to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is sufficiently commensurate with it for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made commensurate for receiving the very assent.

A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not commensurate and the recipient is not commensurate to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is commensurate with this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made commensurate to such an agent or to the form it impresses, as there is need that it be by something else made commensurate in the two aforesaid ways to such an object [n.94].

Prologue
Second Part
Sole Question

On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

95. The question is whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

That it is not:

Because necessary knowledge was never lacking to the human race; Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature, because the *Pentateuch* was first written by Moses, nor was the whole of Sacred Scripture in the Mosaic law, but only the *Old Testament*; therefore etc.

96. Again, the more acute in intellect any author of human sciences is, the more he avoids superfluity in handing them on; but in Sacred Scripture there seem to be many superfluous things contained, as the many ceremonies and histories, knowledge of which does not seem necessary for salvation; therefore etc.

97. Again, there are many things that one does not with certitude know from Scripture whether they are sins or not; however knowledge of these things is necessary for salvation, because he who does not know that something is a mortal sin will not avoid it sufficiently; therefore etc.

98. To the contrary:

Augustine in *City of God* XI ch.3 says, speaking of canonical Scripture: “We have faith in it for things that ignorance of is not expedient and that we are not fit to recognize by ourselves.”

I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

99. [Diverse Heresies] – There are on this question innumerable heresies that condemn Sacred Scripture, in whole or in part, as is clear from the books of Augustine and Damascene *On Heresies*. Some heretics accept nothing of Scripture. Some reject the *Old Testament* in particular, like the Manicheans, as is clear in Augustine’s book *On the Utility of Believing* ch.2 n.4, who say that the *Old Testament* is from the bad principle. Some accept only the *Old Testament*, like the Jews. Some, like the Saracens, accept something of both, into which impure Mohammed mixed innumerable other impurities. But some accept up to a point what is said in the *New Testament*, to wit the diverse heretics who, holding for their foundations diverse statements of Scripture badly understood, have neglected others; for example *Romans* 14.2: “He who is weak will eat herbs,” and the like. Again *James* 5.16: “Confess your sins one to another,” if from this the error about the sacrament of penance has arisen, that it can be dispensed by any non-priest, – relying on bad understandings of these sorts of authorities of Sacred Scripture.

100. [Various Ways of Convicting Heretics] – Against all these together there are eight ways of rationally convicting them, which are: prophetic foretelling, the agreement of the Scriptures, the authority of the writers, the carefulness of the recipients, the

rationality of the contents and the irrationality of the separate errors, the firmness of the Church, the clear evidence of miracles.

101. [On Prophetic Foretelling] – About the first the matter is clear. Since only God naturally and not from someone else foresees future contingents with certitude, therefore only he, or someone instructed by him, can predict them with certitude. Now many such things, foretold in Scripture, have been fulfilled (it is clear to anyone who considers the prophetic books), of which “the few that remain there is no doubt but that they will follow,” according to Gregory in a certain homily *On the Advent of the Lord*. [40 *Homilies on the Gospels* I hom.1 n.1]. The same way is touched on by Augustine *City of God* XII ch.10: “That what he said in the past is true he shows from the future things he foretold when these with so much truth are fulfilled.”

102. [On the Agreement of the Scriptures] – On the second, namely the agreement of the Scriptures, the matter is clear thus: in things that are not evident from the terms, nor have principles thus evident from the terms, there is no firm and infallible agreement among many persons diversely disposed unless they receive inclination to assent from a cause superior to their intellect itself; but the writers of the Sacred Canon, being variously disposed and existing at different times, were on such inevident things altogether in agreement. This way is dealt with by Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.42 n.1: “Our authors needed to be few lest, by their great numbers, they should be rendered cheap; and they are not so few that their agreement is not marvelous; for neither might one find in a great number of philosophers that all they thought was in agreement among them,” and Augustine proves the fact there by examples.

For the assumed major premise is not only proved by the example of the philosophers, as Augustine seems to prove it, but also by reason; because since the intellect is, as far as assent is concerned, naturally moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing else besides the object seems able to cause such assent unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object; for if nothing of this sort moves the intellect, theology will remain neutral for it. Now there is nothing of this sort in respect of things not evident from the terms save an intellect superior to our own; but nothing intelligent superior to man can effectively move man save God.

103. If it be said here that the later writers, although differently disposed than the earlier ones and existing at different times, did yet possess the doctrine of their predecessors in their writings and acquiesced in believing them, as disciples acquiesce in the teaching of their masters, and in this way wrote nothing that was discordant with the earlier writers, although God did not teach either the latter or the former, – Augustine in the earlier place seems to bring an objection against this when he says about the philosophers: “they left in their literary labor memorials of their doctrines,” which memorials their disciples read, and although in some things they, as disciples, assented to their predecessors, yet other things they rejected. The thing is clear in the same place [of Augustine] about Aristippus and Antisthenes, who were both Socratics, yet in some things they contradicted each other; and disciples have sometimes even contradicted their master, as Aristotle did Plato. How then did our later writers not contradict the earlier ones in some things if they had not had a common teacher inclining their intellect to the same inevident things?

104. Response: because the earlier writers handed on inevident things, therefore the later ones were not able to reject them by reason, and, if they were not able to get a

cogent reason for themselves, they did not wish to disbelieve them, reverencing them as truthful masters; but the philosopher disciples were able by reason to reject their masters, because the matter about which they were disputing was capable of receiving reasons taken from the terms. – An example: a disciple in historiography does not contradict his master in historiography in the way that a philosopher contradicts a philosopher, because histories are not capable of being evident about the past, enough to turn a disciple from the master, in the way that philosophical reasons can do.

Contrary to this is at least the fact of Ezekiel prophesying in Babylon at the time that Jeremiah prophesied in Judea.¹¹ Since they both said not only the things that they could have had from Moses, their common master as it were, but also many other things, they would have been able to disagree in these things, since these were not evident from the terms, unless they had had some common teacher superior to the human intellect.

105. [On the Authority of the Writers] – On the third, namely the authority of the writers, the thing is clear thus: the books of Scripture either belong or do not belong to the authors whose books they are said to be. If they do belong, since they condemn lying, especially in faith and morals, how is it likely that, if the Lord had not spoken, the authors lied and said ‘thus saith the Lord’? Or if you say they were deceived, and not lying or wanting to lie for the sake of gain, – to the contrary, and first against the first, namely that they were not deceived. For the Blessed Apostle Paul says, *2 Corinthians* 12.2: “I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago etc.,” and he adds there that he heard, v.4: “unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.” Which assertions do not seem to have been without lie if the assertor was not certain, because to assert a doubtful thing as if it were a certain truth is a lie, or not far from a lie. From this revelation of Paul, and from many others made to diverse saints, the conclusion is drawn that their intellect could not have been induced to assent, as firmly as they did assent, to things of which they could not by natural resources have had knowledge, save by a supernatural agent. – Against the second, namely that they lied for the sake of gain; the answer is that they endured on behalf of the things they wanted to induce men to believe the greatest tribulations.

106. If the books do not belong to them but to others, this seems an inconsistent thing to say, because in this way any book at all will be denied to belong to the author whose book it is said to be. For why have these books alone been falsely ascribed to authors whose books they were not? – Besides, those who ascribed the books to them either were or were not Christians. If they were not, it does not seem that their wish was to write down such books and ascribe them to others and magnify a sect whose contrary they maintained. If they were Christians, how then did those Christians deceitfully ascribe such books to them since their law condemns lying, as noted before [n.105]? And for the same reason, how do they assert that God said the many things that are there narrated, and this to the persons whose names the books bear, if such things did not happen to such persons? How too would these books in this way have become authentic and widely published as belonging to such authors if they were in fact not theirs and the authors not genuine? On this point Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* bk.1 ch.2: “By men of the greatest sanctity have they been delivered to us.” Again Augustine *City of God* XI ch.3, speaking of Christ says: “Having spoken first through the prophets, then

¹¹ They were prophesying simultaneously during the space of five years (592-587 AD) at the time of the Babylonian captivity.

through himself, afterwards through the apostles, as much as he judged sufficient, he established a Scripture, which is called canonical, of the most eminent authority.” This in that place. And in his first epistle to Jerome [*Epist.* 40 ch.3 n.3] (and it is contained in *On Consecration* [Gratian, *Decretum* p.1 d.9 ch.7]) he writes: “If even useful lies have been admitted into the Sacred Scriptures, what authority will remain to them?” And the same to the same in the same epistle [*Epist.* 82 ch.1 n.3]: “Only in those books of the Scriptures, etc.” (and Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.7 q.7 in corp.).

107. [The Carefulness of the Recipients] – On the fourth, namely the carefulness of the recipients, the thing is clear thus: either you do not believe anyone about a contingent thing you have not seen, and so you do not believe that the world was made before you, or that there is a place in the world where you have not been, or that he there is your father and she here your mother; and this refusal to believe destroys the whole of political life. If then you wish to believe someone about a contingent thing that is not and was not evident to you, you should most of all believe the community, or those things that the whole community approves, and especially the things that a noteworthy and reputable community has taught with the greatest care should be approved. Such is the Canon of Scripture. For so great was the care of the Jews for the books to be kept in the Canon, and so great was the care of the Christians for the books to be received as authentic, that so great care about any writing to be held as authentic has not been found, especially since very solemn communities have cared for those Scriptures as for things containing what is necessary for salvation. About this Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.38 says: “How is it that the writing of Enoch, of which Jude makes mention in his epistle, is not contained in the Canon, nor many other writings of which mention is made in the books of *Kings*?”, where he indicates that only the writing that the authors wrote, not as men, but as prophets, by divine inspiration, was received into the Canon. And in the same place ch.41 n.3 he says: “The Israelites to whom were entrusted the sayings of God did not in any way confound the false prophets with the true in equality of knowledge, but they are in agreement among themselves and dissent in nothing; they recognized and held the authors of the Sacred Letters to be truthful.”

108. [On the Rationality of the Contents] – On the fifth, namely the rationality of the contents, the thing is clear thus: what is more rational than that God as ultimate end “should be loved above all things, and one’s neighbor as oneself”? – that is, ‘as to what one wants for oneself’ according to Blessed Gregory [*40 Homilies on the Gospels*, 2 hom.27 n.1]; “on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,” *Matthew* 22.40. Again *Matthew* 7.12: “this do ye even so to others etc.” From these practical principles, as it were, follow other practical principles handed on in the Scriptures, principles honorable and consonant with reason, as can be seen as to their rationality by anybody who one by one examines the precepts, the counsels, and the sacraments; because in all of these there seems to be, as it were, a sort of explication of the law of nature, which “is written in our hearts” [*Romans* 2.15]. This about morals. On this point Augustine says, *City of God* II ch.28: “Nothing base or shameful is proposed for consideration and imitation when of the True God either precepts are insinuated or miracles narrated or gifts praised or benefits requested.”

About things for belief it is plain that we believe nothing about God which imports any imperfection; nay rather, if there is anything we believe to be true, it attests more to the divine perfection than to the opposite. The thing is plain about the Trinity of

persons, about the incarnation of the Word, and the like. For we believe nothing incredible, because then it would be incredible that the word believes them, as Augustine concludes in *City of God* XXII ch.5; yet that the world believes them is not incredible, because we see it.

This law and integrity of Christians are clear in Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.”¹²

109. [The Irrationality of Errors] – On the sixth, namely the irrationality of the separate errors, the thing is plain thus. What will the pagans introduce for their idolatry, worshipping as they do the works of their own hands, wherein there is nothing of the divine, as is shown sufficiently by philosophers [e.g. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.8.1084a38-b10]? What will the Saracens, disciples of that most worthless swine Mohammed, allege for their scriptures, expecting for beatitude, as they do, what befits swine and asses, namely sated gullet and coitus [e.g. *Koran*, sura 37 vv.42-50]? Which promise Avicenna, who was as though of that sect, despises in his *Metaphysics* IX ch.7 106vb, and he sets down another end as more perfect and more fitting to man when he says: “Our law, which Mohammed gave us, displays the disposition for a happiness and a misery that are in accord with the body, and there is another promise that is apprehended by the intellect.” And there follows there: “The eagerness of the wise was much more to obtain this felicity than that of bodies, which, although it were given them, yet did they not attend to it, nor did they value it in comparison with the felicity that is conjoined to the first truth.” What of the Jews who condemn the *New Testament*, which is promised in their *Old Testament* as the Apostle shows in his epistle to the *Hebrews*? And how tasteless are their ceremonies without Christ [*Hebrews* 9.1-28]! Again, that Christ has come and that thus the New Testament he promulgated as authentic would be something one should accept is shown by their prophecies: “The scepter,” says Jacob, “shall not depart from Judah...and for him shall the Gentiles wait” *Genesis* 49.10; likewise the verse of *Daniel* 9.24: “When the Holy of holies has come, your anointing will cease.”¹³ – What also of the asinine Manicheans who invent the fable of an ‘evil first principle’, although even they themselves, while not a ‘first’, were yet very evil! Surely they saw that every being, insofar as it is, is good? Surely too they could have seen in the *New Testament* that the *Old Testament* is authentic and approved?

110. What of the other individual heretics who have understood one word of Scripture badly, according to Augustine 38 *Questions* q.69 n.1: “An error cloaked under the Christian name cannot arise except from Scriptures badly understood;” and for this reason, that they did not collect the antecedents and the consequents. Hence in the same place [q.69 n.2] Augustine says: “The circumstance in the Scriptures is wont to throw light on the meaning.” Nor did they even collect the other places of Scripture. Hence things read on their own gave rise to heresies that when read together repulsed them, because those collecting the diverse statements brought together the things that were, by their mutual interconnection, able to disclose how those statements were to be understood.

¹² “Do you not judge too ill-advisedly of human affairs? The fact that nothing of earth, nothing of fire, nothing finally that reaches the senses of the body, is to be worshipped as God, but one must seek after him with the intellect alone, is not a thing of dispute for a few of the very learned, but is believed and preached even by an unskilled crowd of males and females in as many nations and as diverse.”

¹³ Actually a quote from Ps.-Augustine *Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* ch.12, which paraphrases the verse of *Daniel*.

Against them is the word of Augustine in his book *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel,” he says, “save because I believe the Catholic Church.” Therefore it is irrational to accept one part of the Canon and not another, since the Catholic Church, by belief in which I accept the Canon, accepts as certain the whole equally. – Again, the doctrines of the philosophers contain something irrational, as is proved by Aristotle in *Politics* bk. 2 about the diverse polities arranged by diverse philosophers. But even his own polity too is in certain things irrational, as is clear from the solution of the previous question [n.67].^a

a. [Interpolation] For when handing on his own polity he said: ‘It is expedient for temperance that the more aged have intercourse’ (*Politics* 7.16.1335a22-23). Again he says that nothing orphaned [deformed] should be nourished (*ibid.* 1335b20-21). Again he says that, if anyone has generated children beyond what wealth is sufficient for, abortion should be performed before life is perceived, etc. (*ibid.* 1335b22-25). Tully, *De Natura Deorum* 1.7.28.

111. [On the Firmness of the Church] – On the seventh, namely the firmness of the Church, the thing is clear as to the Head of it from the remark of Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “Will we doubt to trust to the bosom of the same Church which has, in the continuous confession of the human race, obtained by the Apostolic See the summit of authority through its succession of bishops, though the heretics bark around it in vain?” And a little later: “What else is displeasing to the face of God than to want to resist with so much effort his authority foretold?” Hence Gamaliel said, *Acts* 5.38-39: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.” And in *Luke* 22.32 the Lord says to Peter: “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou art converted, strengthen thy brethren.” – The firmness of the Church in its members is clear from the remark of Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.” [cf. n.108]. Augustine states a like opinion in *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.4 n.5.¹⁴ For what save God might induce so great a multitude, prone to sin, to keep a law contrary to flesh and blood?

112. There is confirmation in that the sect of the Jews does not remain in vigor, as Augustine objects against them in the sermon [Ps.-Augustine, *Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* ch.11]: “Against you, I say, O Jews, I bring my charge!”

If an objection be made about the permanence of the sect of Mohammed, I reply: that sect began more than six hundred years after the law of Christ, and in a short time, if the Lord will, it shall end, because it was much weakened in the 1300th year of Christ, and many of its worshippers are dead and very many put to flight; and a prophecy is said to exist among them that their sect must end.¹⁵

113. [On the clear Evidence of Miracles] – On the eighth, namely the clearness and evidence of miracles, the thing is plain thus: God cannot be a false witness; but God

¹⁴ “For in the Catholic Church, setting aside the purest wisdom to the knowledge of which a few spiritual people in this life attain ...the rest of the crowd, to be sure, is made most safe not by the vivacity of their understanding but by the simplicity of their belief; ...many other things there are that most justly hold me in her bosom; the agreement of peoples and nations holds me...”

¹⁵ Scotus may be thinking of the third battle of Homs that took place in 1299 between the Muslim Mamluks and the Mongols. The prophecy he mentions is also mentioned by others, as by Roger Bacon and William Vorillon.

himself, when invoked by a preacher of the Scripture to show that its doctrine was true, performed some work proper to himself, and thereby bore witness that what he preached was true. There is a confirmation from Richard [of St. Victor] in *On the Trinity* I ch.2: “Lord, if it is an error, we have been by you deceived, for your deeds have been confirmed by signs so great that they can only have been done by you.”

114. But if it be said that miracles have not been performed, or also that they do not testify to the truth, because even Antichrist will perform miracles, – against the first point can be stated the opinion of Augustine *City of God* XXII ch.5: “If they do not believe that these miracles were done, this one great miracle is sufficient for us, that now without any miracles the whole world believes.”

Note well the miracle and the chapter, because if what we believe is said to be incredible, no less incredible, he says, is that “men of low birth, weak, few in numbers, unskilled, were able so effectively to persuade the world, and even the learned in the world, of a thing so incredible,” such that the world does believe it, as now we see it has believed [cf. n.108], unless it was that some miracles were done by those men, whereby the world was induced to believe. Hence he there subjoins: “For this reason did the world believe a tiny number of low-born, weak, unskilled men, because more marvelously in such contemptible witnesses did divinity itself persuade them.” For what is more incredible than that a few teachers, poor and uneducated, should convert many powerful and wise men to a law opposed to flesh and blood? Which fact is especially clear in the case of the many very prudent men, first fighting against the faith, afterwards converts; as about Paul, first a persecutor, afterwards teacher of the Gentiles; about Augustine, first in some way seduced by the Manicheans, afterwards a Catholic doctor; of Dionysius, first a philosopher, afterwards a disciple of Paul; of Cyprian, first a magician, afterwards a most Christian bishop, and about many others.

Against the same can be said, second, the remark of Augustine *The City of God* X ch.18: “Or will someone say that these miracles were not done? He can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”¹⁶ And in the same place on the same point, “If they believe magical or theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which...?”¹⁷

Against the same, third, is that some of the things done cannot be denied save by the most shameless, as are the miracles performed by Sylvester in the presence of Constantine, both in curing his leprosy and afterwards in his disputation against the Jews, which deeds, being famous, have not been hid from the world.

115. Against the second point it can be said that if anyone, after being summoned as a witness, should permit some customary sign of bearing witness to be adduced and, although present, should not contradict it, such silence does not cohere with perfect truthfulness; but a miracle is such a sign of God as witness; therefore if he should permit miracles to be performed by demons and not contradict them, namely by declaring that they are not his testimonies, he does not seem to be perfectly truthful, which is

¹⁶ More fully: “Or will someone say that these miracles are false and were not done or were deceitfully written down? Whoever says this, if he denies that in these respects any writings are to be believed, he can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”

¹⁷ More fully: “Further if the worshippers of many gods believe magical books, or as they more honorably think, theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which books the more trust is due the more he is great above all to whom alone they command that sacrifice should be given?”

impossible. And hereby is the response to what is said of Antichrist, because God predicted that the miracles to be done were not testimonies of the truth, as is clear in *Matthew* 24.24 and *2 Thessalonians* 2.8-9.

Again, against the same point is the difference in the miracles performed by God and those performed by the devil, which difference Augustine treats of in his book *On the Utility of Believing* ch.16 n.34: “I call a marvel [miracle],” he says, “anything that appears difficult beyond the hope or capacity of the one who marvels; some marvels only cause admiration, others unite great grace and goodwill,” of which sort were the miracles of Christ; and he deals with the matter there extensively.

116. Again, against both points it can be said that there are some miracles, performed in the Christian law, wherein there can be no deceit whether they have been performed, nor that they are testimonies of truth, because they were performed by God; like the rapture of Paul and the revelation of future contingents.

The first claim is clear: because it is impossible for anyone to be deceived about his seeing the essence of God, therefore it was impossible for Paul to believe he saw the divine essence unless he did see it; but this he asserts of himself in *2 Corinthians* 12.2-4, according to the exposition of the saints;¹⁸ therefore it happened truly and not in appearance only.

The proof of the first antecedent is that no one can be deceived about some first principle – by believing he understands such a principle when he does not understand it – because it would not be clear from the apprehended terms what was a principle and what was not;^a therefore much more can one not be deceived about seeing God. The consequence is plain, because the vision of God is more distant from the understanding of any object at all, even as to the perception of the intellect of the wayfarer, than is the understanding of a propositional principle distant from the understanding of any non-principle. Again, how would the intellect believe it was at rest if it was not at rest [cf. 1 d.2 p.2 q.2 n.31]? Surely he would be able to recognize that he had an inclination toward a truth that he does not see? If he believes he sees God, he believes he is at rest in God; if he does not see, he is not at rest. “Nothing more stupid,” says Augustine, “can be said than that a soul with a false opinion might be blessed,” *City of God* XI ch.4 n.2. A second point, namely that this could only be done by God, is manifest, because no creature can beatify the soul, either simply or for a time [cf. 1 d. 35 q. un. n.13].

a. [Interpolation] provided it be clear from the terms that something such is principle.

The second claim [n.116, miracles as testimonies of truth, like the revelation of future contingents] is plain from many prophecies in both *Testaments*. Hence against the false miracles of Antichrist an objection, at least as to these two miracles, can be made to him in this way: if you are God, make me to see bare the divine essence, and to have, after the vision, a sure memory of the vision and a certitude that it was the vision bare of the divine essence, and then I will believe you; again, if you are God, tell me what I will do or what I will think or desire on such a day or at such an hour.

And the efficacy of this sort of way, the way of miracles, is indicated by the Savior in *John* 5. 36: “The works that I do bear witness of me,” 10.38: “if you do not wish to believe me, believe the works.”

¹⁸ As in particular St. Augustine, *Epistle to Paulina, On Seeing God*, bk.13 n.31.

118. [On the Testimony of Non-believers] – In ninth place too can be adduced the testimony of those who were without [sc. the Church]. Josephus, in *Antiquities of the Jews* XVIII ch.4 n.3,¹⁹ sets down a very beautiful testimony about Christ, where among other things written about Christ he says: “This man was Christ;” where he also confesses his true doctrine and resurrection from the dead.^a Again, about the prophecy of the Sibyl; it is noted in Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.23 n.1. Again, *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.4 n.5, note how individual heretics send inquirers about Catholics, not to their own people, but to true Catholics, as though they alone indeed are by everyone called Catholics, including by heretics.

a. [Interpolation. The passage from Josephus] But there was in those same times Jesus, a wise man, if however it is right to call him a man. For he was a worker of marvelous deeds, and a teacher of men, of those who gladly hear things that are true; and many indeed of the Jews, many also of the Gentiles, he joined to himself. This man was Christ. Who, although Pilate, on the accusation of the first men of our nation, decreed he should be crucified, was not deserted by those who from the beginning loved him. For he appeared to them on the third day alive again, in accord with what divinely inspired prophets had foretold, whether this miracle or other innumerable miracles about him. But even to the present day the name and race of Christians, who are named after him, perseveres.

119. [On the Efficacy of Promises] – Tenth and last can be added that God does not fail those who seek salvation with all their heart. For many most diligent inquirers after salvation have been converted to this sect [the Catholic]; and the more fervent they became in inquiry, the more confirmed they were in this sect, and the more suddenly therein have they been changed, in repenting of their malice, to goodness of life; third, too, many have in great exultation of spirit suffered sorrows on its behalf. Which things do not seem probable did not God especially approve this sect, resting as it does on Sacred Scripture, and ordain it for salvation.

II. Principal Response to the Question

120. Having established, then, against heretics that the doctrine of the Canon is true, one must see second whether it is necessary and sufficient to the wayfarer for attaining his end.

I say that the Canon hands on what is the end of man in particular, that it is the vision and enjoyment of God, and this as far as concerns the circumstances of its desirability; to wit, that it will be possessed after the resurrection by man immortal in soul as well as in body, endlessly. The Canon also determines the things necessary for the end, and that these are sufficient because commanded, “If thou wilt enter into life,” says our Lord, *Matthew* 19.17, “keep the commandments,” about which there is the statement in *Exodus* 20.1-17; explication is given also of these, as to what to believe and what to do, in diverse places of Scripture. The properties too of immaterial substances are handed on in the Canon, to the extent it is possible and useful for the wayfarer to know them.^a

¹⁹ The so called *Testimonium Flavianum*, whose authenticity has been much disputed, though it is attested in all mss. and is twice cited by Eusebius (AD 263-339); see the Loeb edition of the *Antiquities*, vol. IX p.49.

- a. [Interpolation] Comparing these with the three reasons on which the solution of the preceding question depends [nn.13-18, 40-41], it is plain that Scripture adequately contains the doctrine necessary for the wayfarer.

III. To the Principal Arguments

121. To the principal reasons. To the first reason [n.95]. To the minor I reply that the law of nature was content with fewer things, which were passed down by memory from fathers to sons. Those men were also more endowed in natural powers, and therefore a modicum of inspired doctrine was able to suffice them. Or it should otherwise be said to this instance, and to the one about the law of Moses, that the ordered progress of Scripture showed the fittingness of it. The thing is made plain by Augustine 83 *Questions* q.53 n.4.

122. To the second reason [n.96] I say that one grasps more delightfully a thing that lies hid under some literal statement than if it were said expressly; and for this reason the fact that what is express in the New *Testament* was veiled under figures in the *Old* contributes to devotion; and this as to the ceremonies; but as to the histories, both these and the ceremonies are examples declarative of the law. Likewise, from the whole progress of Scripture is made plain an ordered government with respect to man and the whole creation.

123. To the third reason [n.97], Origen in his homily *On Noah's Ark* [*Homilies on Genesis*, hom. 2 n.1]: "In Scripture silence seems to have been considered appropriate on this point, which would be sufficiently taught by the nature of the consequence itself."²⁰ Hence many necessary truths are not express in Sacred Scripture, although they are virtually contained there as conclusions in the principles; the labor of doctors and expositors has been useful for the investigation of these things.

If you object that about many things in human acts it is doubtful whether they are mortal sins or not, even after one supposes all the teachings of the doctors and expositors, – I reply: the way of salvation is not in doubt, because a man ought to guard himself from such doubtful things as from things dangerous, lest, while he is exposing himself to the danger, he fall into sin. But if someone wants to seek salvation yet carelessly^a exposes himself to the danger, although there would perhaps, by the nature of the act, be no mortal sin, nevertheless he will sin mortally by exposing himself to such danger, as will be touched on elsewhere [4 d.5 q.3 n.2; d.30 q.1 nn.4-5].

- a. [Interpolation] [without caring] even if [he exposes...]

²⁰ Origen's authentic text reads: "No science explains everything that needs to be known, but explains that from which the other things can be sufficiently drawn."

Prologue
Third Part
On the Object of Theology
Question 1

Whether theology is about God as about its first object.

124. The question is whether theology is about God as about its first object. And that it is not is argued in two ways:

[Argument in the First Way] – The first way is that something else is the subject of theology, therefore this is not.

The antecedent is proved in several ways:

125. First thus, from Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.2 n.2: “All Scripture is of things or of signs;” therefore things or signs are the subject.

126. Again, Scripture has four senses: the anagogical, the tropological, the allegorical, and the historical or literal; but to each of these senses there corresponds some first subject, just as to any other science having one sense there corresponds a subject in accord with that sense; therefore here there are four subjects.

127. Again, that man is the subject is proved by the authority of the Commentator on *Ethics* bk.1 in the prologue, because, according to him there, moral science is of man as to his soul, medical science is of man as to his body. From this is received the proposition: ‘every practical science has for first object that for which the end of the practical science is acquired and not the end itself’; but the end of this science is acquired for man, not God; therefore man is the subject of this science.

128. Again in another way, though it comes back to the same: the end of a science is to attain through its act the first object by introducing into the act the form principally intended by the science, to wit: as in the case of speculative science, to introduce into it ‘being known’, because knowledge is principally there intended; in the case of practical science, to introduce the form to which its action is ordered; but the end here intended is moral goodness, and the intention is not to introduce it in God but in man; therefore man is its first object.

129. [Argument in the Second Way] – The second way to the proposed conclusion is to show that God is not theology’s first object.

This is proved first by the authority of Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.2: “The form,” he says, “cannot be a simple subject.”

130. Again, the matter does not coincide with the other causes in the same thing, whether in number or in kind (*Physics* 2.7.198a24-27); but God is the end and efficient cause of this science; therefore he is not the matter of it.

131. Again, from *Posterior Analytics* 1.28.87a38-39, the subject of a science has parts: principles and properties. But God does not have integral parts, since he is altogether simple, nor subjective parts, since he is singular of himself; nor does he have principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because a property is present in a subject in such a way that it is outside the subject’s essence; nothing is present in God in this way.

132: To the Contrary:
Augustine *City of God* VIII ch.1: "Theology is discussion or reasoning about God."

Question 2

Whether Theology is about God under some special Idea

133. The question second is whether theology is about God under some special idea.

That it is so is argued thus:

Hugh [of St. Victor] in *On Sacraments* at the beginning wants the subject to be "the works of restoration;" therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some special idea of it, namely insofar as he is restorer.

134. Cassiodorus in *On the Psalter* pref. ch.13 wants the subject to be Christ, the head with his members; therefore he will be the subject specifically as incarnate or as head of the Church.

135. Again, God absolutely is the subject of metaphysics; therefore if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject in this case and in that is not taken under wholly the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23: "The most honorable science should be about the most honorable subject;" metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation for this indeed is that he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

136. Again, Averroes on *Physics* 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for laying down that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the class of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes' reason would not be valid unless he understood God there to be the first subject; therefore etc.

137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is in Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (95rb): "If the science is about causes, the one that is about the end would be noblest."²¹ From this the conclusion about the good follows, because – according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994b12-13 – he who posits an infinity in respect of ends destroys the idea of good, because he destroys the idea of end. From this is taken the conclusion that the idea of good is the idea of end.

138. On the contrary:

Knowledge with a restriction presupposes knowledge without a restriction, or absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore if this science is of God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; but no such science is posited; therefore etc.

²¹ More properly: "But if there is a science *per se* of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the nobler among them."

Question 3

Whether Theology is about Everything by Way of Attribution of them to its First Subject

139. The question is whether theology is about everything by way of attribution of them to its first subject.

That it is:

Metaphysics 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about the attributes of the thing is the same, as is shown there by the example of health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc.

140. [Augustine] *On the Trinity* 14 ch.1 n.3: "And must not be attributed to this science etc."²²

I. Preliminary Remarks

141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will designate the idea of its first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts.

[About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science taken in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science in accord with the way the object naturally manifests itself to an intellect commensurate with it; now doctrine for us is what is naturally had in our intellect about the object. Therefore theology in itself is the sort of knowledge that the object of theology naturally produces in an intellect commensurate with itself; but theology in us is the sort of knowledge that our intellect naturally has about the object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry naturally produces science of itself in an intellect commensurate with it.

142. [On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the nature of the first object is to be what first contains virtually in itself all the truths of the habit of the science. Which I prove thus: first, that the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate, and thus it contains the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science.

143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that 'firstness' is here taken from *Posterior Analytics* 1 ch.4 73b32-33, from the definition of 'universal' in the sense in which 'universal' indicates adequacy: the object^a would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything that such a habit inclines one to consider, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.

²² More fully: "Certainly I do not attribute to this science everything that can be known about man in human affairs, but only that whereby most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened."

a. [Note by Duns Scotus. Added before 'the object'] He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say...

144. By the phrase 'first...virtually' [n.142], I mean that it is first in the sense that it does not depend on another but other things depend on it; in this sense, then, 'first contains' means that, in its containing, it does not depend on other things but other things depend on it, that is, that if, *per impossibile*, all other things in the idea of the object were removed and only it remained understood, it would still objectively contain them. But it does not contain anything else save through its idea.

145. That its essence, once known with the habit of science, contains 'first virtually' the knowledge of all the truths of the habit:

The habit that is called science is an intelligible likeness (species) of the first object; it regards immediate truths and mediate ones, not formally, but by implication, and its formally adequate object is the quiddity of which it is the likeness. What wonder, then, if the first object, qua known, contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of *A* to contain virtually knowledge of *B*, and for the *A* itself, as known with the habit of science, to contain it, that is, that the intelligible species of the *A* itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of *B* in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object distinguishes, not them, but what proximately follows them, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of the two of them is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and to the habit of science of the proximate objects. In this way it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature, and also in time, the habit of intellect, because I never contemplate anything in scientific knowledge save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth. Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines me (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences),²³ or they are more than one habit – nay rather, any truth at all has its own habit, and, in addition to it, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible likeness, and it virtually includes all of the habits – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time be using all the prior ones.

Can it be, then, that a habit, when compared with many acts or with one act, has an act proper to both of what it is compared with? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with that chief act of discursive reasoning? – My own proper act is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two acts; look for the passage with the triangular mark below, against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

146. On the contrary, namely against the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145], there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the *per se* objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is

²³ This opinion of Henry's is discussed and rejected by Scotus in *Metaphysics* 6 q.1 nn.3-7.

something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line is in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.

148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the way the object is commensurate with the power is the way the mover is commensurate with the thing moved, or the way the active thing is commensurate with the passive; the way the object is commensurate with the habit is the way the cause is commensurate with the effect. Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same nature can act on any patient of the same nature. Therefore the first extremes of the commensurate relation of the active thing to the passive thing are common to all the per se extremes of that relation; for among those most common things is adequacy, because anything that the nature of one is in has regard to anything that the nature of the other is in. But the first extremes of the commensurate relation of cause to effect are not most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species, there can be some common object in the way that from their objects an object that is common can be extracted; and in this way there is a common object designated in the sciences that gives rise to a habit, not one in species, but only one in genus.

150. [On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things that are necessary but also things that are contingent. The matter is plain, because all the truths about God relating to what is extrinsic to him, whether they are about him as triune or about any of the divine persons, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no human science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and truths contingent.

II. About the Necessary Part of Theology

A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

151. On the basis of what has been said I give my reply to the first question. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove with three reasons.

The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of science of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains those truths as cause, or as that to which they are attributed, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect does by way of ‘proof that’, for no effect proves that God is triune [cf. n.41], which is the greatest theological truth, or the like truths; therefore etc.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This is valid against the opinion about Christ [n.134, 173]

152. Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known only to the divine intellect, therefore it is of an object naturally known only to God; but only God is naturally known to himself; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is about things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to these things, some other things naturally knowable only to the divine intellect, because the divine intellect is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known by some created intellect; therefore only an uncreated essence can be known only by the uncreated intellect.

153. Third thus: in no science is as distinct a cognition or knowledge handed down about any other thing that is not the first object of that science as would be handed down in the science that is about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed down about what is not its per se object as about what is its per se object; for then there would be no reason for that subject rather than something else to be its subject. Therefore if God is not here the subject, there is not handed down here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed down in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore the latter science would be prior to the former.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Note: valid against the opinion about Christ.

154. Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations.

The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13 ch.1 n.2 and 14 ch.1 n.3 is in one part of itself wisdom and in another part of itself science; but if it was formally about anything non-eternal, science would be formally about that thing, and wisdom would not in any way be about it, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.

155. The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as about its first object, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, the result is that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason.^a Therefore there would be some other intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part of reason, which is inappropriate.

a. [Interpolation] But if it is not about eternal things, it does not perfect the superior part of reason.

156. The third is that, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the object which is the same as the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

157. The fourth is that “the most noble science is about the most noble kind of thing,” from *Metaphysics* 61.1026a21-23 and *On the Soul* 1.1.402a1-4; but it is conceded

that this science is most noble; therefore it ought to be about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].

B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. To make it intelligible I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first sense he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in a general way, in the third *per accidens* in a property, in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot be in relation to something else, because knowledge of relation presupposes knowledge of what is non-relational or absolute; nor can the most perfect knowledge be about man under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of the subject; nor can it be about man in general or universally, because that is confused or unspecific knowledge. Therefore the noblest cognition of man is according to his quidditative idea. Thus one could posit some science of God under the idea of relation to something extrinsic, in the way that some posit knowledge of him under the idea of repairer [cf. n.133], or of glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or one could posit some science of God under the idea of some attribute, which is a sort of property, in the way that some posit that knowledge of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137] is this science; or one could posit some science of him under a general or universal idea [cf. n.146-147], as under that of being, or infinite being, or necessary being, or some such thing.

159. Argument against all these positions.

First against the one about general idea, for no general concept asserted of God contains virtually all the properly theological truths that pertain to the plurality of persons; for if it did, since those general concepts are naturally conceived by us, then the immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by us, and through those immediate propositions we would be able to know the conclusions, and so acquire naturally the whole of theology.

160. Second, because since general concepts are not naturally known only to God, then neither are the truths included in those general concepts naturally known only to God; therefore theology, if it was of God under such a general concept, would not be naturally known only to God, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].

161. Against the other position about the idea of attribute [n.158] one could argue through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through certain special reasons.

First, because cognition of a thing according to its essence is the most perfect cognition, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of God's essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributable property which is related to his nature as a characteristic of it, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.4.

162. Second, because if those properties differ really from God's essence, his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea from the essence, so the essence in its idea has the idea of being uncaused but these other

properties, although, because of their identity with the essence, they are uncaused, yet, in their formal idea, do not include as a primary datum their own being uncaused.

163. Third, because that thing, according to its own proper idea, seems to be more actual in itself which has a greater repugnance to being communicable with many things extrinsic to it; but communicability with many things extrinsic to it is repugnant to essence in itself and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as that essence as infinite.

If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: its infinity is because of an infinity and identity with the essence as with the root source and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.

164. Against the way also about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] one can make the same arguments as against the other two ways, but I have special reasons.

First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason; but a science that does not consider its subject under its idea as real is not a science of real things, just as neither is logic a science of real things, although it considers things as having second intentions attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science of real things, which is false.

165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form a concept that is per se one; therefore a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept that is per accidens one. But no primary science is of a concept that is per accidens one, because such a concept presupposes the sciences of both its parts; and therefore, if a subalternate science is about anything that is per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that separately treat of the parts of the whole. Therefore if theology were of such a per accidens unity, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept that is one per se.

166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God; therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to God as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: that which belongs to anything under a reason for inherence that is not necessary does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And thus no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question, namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only by God.

167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], that is, that theology is of God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him as he is man, but not if it were of him under some universal or accidental idea.

C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

168. To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in an intellect which gets evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but, as known to the intellect, it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in the intellect contains, as it is in the intellect, the evidence of the habit.^a But in a habit that does not get evidence from the object, but gets it caused in some other way, one must not

grant that its first object has the two conditions just stated; nay rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit that would in this respect be about things contingent, which contingent things do not have the first object in either way. To such a habit, then, which does not get evidence from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfectly first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. – Our theology is a habit which does not get evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters, as it exists in us, does not more get evidence from the known object than the theology that is about contingent theological matters does;^b therefore to our theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object that has first truths immediately known about it. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most perfect concept which we can have about what is in itself the first subject, which subject, however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our theology about necessary things is about the same as what theology in itself is about, therefore to it is assigned an object that is first to the extent of containing the truths in itself, and this object is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is not evident to us, therefore it does not contain those truths as it is known to us, indeed rather it is not known to us.

a. [*Interpolation*] because the intellect knowing such an object can draw out every conclusion or concept of that habit.

b. [*Interpolation*] to wit, the fact that God is three and One does not have evidence from the object known, because we do not know God under the idea of God, but from elsewhere; we believe it because we find it written. Therefore if you then find a written science of geometry, the object of geometry would not then contain the written properties as they are seen by my intellect, because it would not be known to me under the idea of first object; therefore a first object of such a sort should, with respect to such habit, be assigned as the intellect would assign first those truths to.

When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n.146], I reply: it is true that it is not a first object that gives evidence to us, but it is a first object that contains all the truths in itself, naturally fit or capable of sufficiently giving evidence, were it known.

These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].

III. On Contingent Theology

169. But now we must see in the case of contingent theological truths [n.150] what the prime subject is here. And as to these truths I say that no subject contains anything but necessary truths about itself, because, as to contingent truths about itself, it is of itself related to them and to their opposites equally. There is, however, an order in contingent truths, and some contingent truth is true first; and thus that can be posited as first subject of many contingent truths about which is stated first, that is immediately, the predicate of the first contingent truth (which truth is as it were the principle in the order of contingent truths), or the predicates of several first contingent truths, if several are first. But the first subject of the first contingent truth is said to be that which, when seen as

such, is naturally seen first to be conjoined with the predicate of that truth, because the first thing known in contingent truths is only known through intuition of the extremes; therefore the first thing one can intuit in which the predicate of the first contingent truth inheres, that is the first subject of all the contingent truths in order.

170. On the basis of these statements I say to the issue in question that the divine essence is the first subject of contingent theology and that, when taken in the very same way as was said before, it is the first subject of necessary theology [n.167]; – and this holds as much of contingent theology in itself the way it is in the divine intellect as it also does of it the way it is in the intellect of the blessed. Of the whole of theology in itself, then, both of God and of the blessed, the first subject is his essence as this essence, the vision of which by the blessed is like what the cognition of being is in metaphysics; and for that reason blissful vision is not theology but a sort of perfect simple apprehension of the subject, which apprehension naturally precedes the science.

171. Of our contingent theology the first subject seems to be the same as it is also of necessary theology, and in the way expounded above [n.168], because it is not the subject as containing – even if it is seen in intuition – but as knowable by us, proximate to that in which, when known in intuition, the predicate of the first evident contingent truth naturally inheres [n.169].

On the contrary: it seems that the Word is the adequate object of contingent theology, both of that theology as it is in itself and of it as it is in the divine intellect, because it is the first subject of all the articles about our reparation.

I reply: some other contingent thing can be first said of the Word, and some other contingent thing of the Holy Spirit, and some other contingent thing of the triune God, namely ‘to create’; therefore the persons will be as it were parts of the subject, just as some necessary things are also first true of the diverse persons.

IV. On Christ as First Object

172. [The Opinion of Bonaventure] From what has been said the refutation of the opinion that posits Christ as first subject²⁴ is plain, because then the necessary truths about the Father and the Holy Spirit – to wit, ‘the Father generates’, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds’ – would not be theological truths, nor would the contingent truths about them be, to wit ‘the Father creates through the Son’, ‘the Holy Spirit is sent in time visibly and invisibly’; nor the necessary truths about the triune God, as that he is omnipotent, boundless, nor the contingent truths, as that God creates, God governs the world, remits sins, punishes, rewards, and the like. – The proof of all these consequences is that no truth belongs per se to any science unless it be about its first subject, or about a part of it, whether integral or essential, or about something essentially attributed to the subject. It is plain that the Father or the Trinity is not Christ, nor part of him in any of the stated ways, nor anything essentially attributed to Christ; both because since Christ signifies two

²⁴ Bonaventure *On the Sentences* 1 prologue q.1 in corp. (1 7b): “The subject too, to which, as to ‘the integral whole’, all the things determined in this book are reduced is Christ, insofar as he embraces the divine and human nature, or the created and the uncreated, about which are the two first books; and as he is head and members, about which are the two following books. And I take ‘integral whole’ in a broad sense, because it embraces many things not only in composition but in union and in order.”

natures – and that insofar as he is subject, according to those who posit him as subject – it follows that, as having a created nature, he will be essentially prior to the Father and to the Trinity (because an essential attribution is only made to what is essentially prior), which is false; and because Christ even in his divinity does not have any such priority according to which the Father or the Trinity could be attributed to him.

173. Against this opinion too are the reasons placed last in the solution of the second question against the position about relation to what is extrinsic [nn.164-166]. – Against the same is the first reason set down for the solution of the first question [n.151], because the necessary truths about the Father, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Trinity cannot be virtually contained first in Christ, because if the Word had not been made incarnate, those truths would not have been necessary, which is false. The third reason too in the same place [n.153] is valid here, because no knowledge would have been handed down about God except as it is included in Christ; this knowledge is about the Word only and thus is not the most distinct knowledge that could be handed down; therefore some other knowledge prior to it would have to be required.

174. The same point is shown by some of the persuasive reasons there set down [nn.154-156], because the unity which belongs to Christ²⁵ as he is one supposit in two natures is not an eternal unity; but it would be necessary to assert that formal unity of the first subject; therefore the first subject as first is not something eternal only.

The persuasive reason about faith²⁶ seems also to be conclusive; for it is not a theological belief or truth that this man was crucified, as it does not in the subject term implicate the Word, because the Jews were able naturally to see this man on the cross. But it is a theological belief and truth that the Word was a man born of a Virgin, that the Word was a man crucified, that the Word was a man rising from the dead, and so on about the articles pertaining to his humanity; but as for those that pertain to his divinity, it is plain that they do not belong first to Christ as he is Christ, but some to the other persons, some to the Trinity.

Therefore the adequate object of theology is not Christ but something that is as it were common both to the Word, about whom primarily are believed the articles pertaining to reparation, and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, about whom are some other theological truths.

175. It seems then that one must say that things are like the way they are in medicine, on the supposition that the human body is the first subject about which health and sickness are there considered as the property: if the kinds of human body were body mixed thus and so, to wit blooded body, phlegmatic body, etc., this whole thing, healthy blooded body, would not there be the first subject, both because it is too particular and also because it includes the need to consider a property about the subject, and a property cannot be the nature of the subject, because a subject, as it is subject, is naturally prior to its property, and thus a property would be prior to itself. And in brief, whatever might be said about any medicine handed down that was about such a subject, although this subject was a particular and a per accidens being, it would at any rate be impossible for the first science of the body of man to be about a healthy blooded body. Nay rather, if there were a science about it, some other science would be prior: either about the body of man in general, because it has in its generality certain knowable properties that belong to it in its

²⁵ In the position of Bonaventure, see the previous footnote

²⁶ Again in the position of Bonaventure.

general nature, in the way it is prior to the things that come under it; or about blooded body, whose nature is naturally prior to healthy blooded body, and this prior nature virtually contains the other properties; or about the healthy body of man, because its nature precedes healthy blooded body. Thus also is it in the proposed case. Christ signifies the Word-man, according to Damascene [*De Fide Orthodoxa* 3 ch.4]; therefore before knowledge about Christ as about the first subject there would naturally be another prior knowledge about the Word, if there are things present in Christ by reason of the fact he is the Word, and there would, before that knowledge, be another knowledge about God as to what is present in him by reason of God as God is common to the three persons.

176. Therefore, if we hold theology to be in itself a first knowledge, it will not be first about Christ; and if it is equally about truths common and proper to the three persons, it would not be about any person as about some adequate subject, but about God as God is common to the three persons. And then the thesis will be saved that either every theological truth is about the first subject, to wit any truth that is in God by reason of God, or is about a subjective part, as it were, of the first subject, to wit any truth that is properly in one of the persons, or is about what is attributed to the first subject or to a part as it were of the subject, to wit about the creature as to the relation it has to God as he is God, and about the assumed nature as to the relation it has to the Word who sustains it [n.172].

177. [The Opinion of Lincoln]²⁷ – However Christ is in another way posited as the prime subject according to Lincoln in his *The Work of Six Days*, and this way is that in which Christ is one by a triple unity, of which the first is unity with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the second the unity of the Word with the assumed nature, the third the unity of Christ the head with his members.

And on behalf of this opinion about Christ seems to be the first reason and the second to last reason set down for the first question [nn.151, 156], because the seven articles of the faith that pertain to Christ's humanity²⁸ are not contained in God as subject, because they do not belong to him by nature of his divinity. However that subject does contain the property by whose form the property is present in him. But Christ does contain those articles, because they are present in him according to his humanity, and really so present; he also contains the other articles pertaining to his divinity,²⁹ because they are seen to be present in him according to his divinity.

178. A confirmation is that the subjects of the parts of the doctrine should be contained under the subject of the whole of it, either as subjective parts or as integral

²⁷ Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, *The Work of Six Days* ch.1: "...And this is the one subject of this wisdom [theology] which the Savior expresses in *John* when he says: 'And that they too may be one in us' ... Consider what is said, how the 'one' by which we are one with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit – which is also expressed in *John* when he says 'And that they too may be one in us' – seems to bind together in itself the 'one' of the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the 'one' of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, and the 'one' whereby we are one in Christ, and 'one' by the renewal of the Spirit of our mind with the Supreme Trinity!"

²⁸ These seven (from the Creed) are: conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, descended into hell, rose again from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven, will come again to judge the living and the dead.

²⁹ These seven articles are: I believe in one God, Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, I believe in the Holy Spirit, creator of heaven and earth, forgiveness of sins, resurrection of the body and life everlasting.

parts; the subjects of the parts of Scripture are not thus contained under God. The thing is proved by many glosses at the beginnings of books, assigning as their material causes certain things that are not anything in God, to wit, a gloss on Hosea says that the matter of Hosea is 'the ten tribes'.

179. Again, third: in some places of Scripture nothing proper to God is narrated, because no fact is there narrated where anything is required on the part of God save only his general influence; therefore such a book is not about God.

180. To the first argument [n.177] I say that the contingent truths asserted of Christ are not contained virtually in any subject in the way a subject is said to contain a property, because then those truths would be necessary; yet they do have a subject of which they are immediately and primarily said, and that subject is the Word, for the theological truths about the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc. are these: 'The Word became man', 'the Word was born a man', 'the Word suffered as man' etc.

When you say that 'the property is present according to his human nature', I reply that humanity is not the first idea in the subject wherein the resolution of the property rests, but is as it were a prior property, which mediates between the first subject of those truths, which is the Word, and the other later properties, as 'born' etc. It is plain that humanity cannot be the idea of the subject in its relation to the first property, which is 'was incarnate', because that property is said of the Word without humanity being pre-understood as present in it as in a subject; this is the first reason.

181. To the second [n.178] I say that it would be enough if the attribution of the parts of the science to the first subject is of the sort that the attribution to God can be saved in respect of any matter assigned by the glosses. Otherwise put: God is the matter of any book at all that narrates there about him how he governed the human race; the race or person governed, however, is the remote matter. The glosses are to be understood in this way.

182. Hereby is clear the response to the third [n.179], that although there be some book containing no miracle of God, yet any book contains God's providence and government of man in general or of a determinate race or person, so much so that if Moses writes about Pharaoh in *Exodus* the same history as some Egyptian writes in the Egyptian Chronicles, the subject of Moses' history is God, whose government of man is treated of there, in his merciful liberation of the oppressed Hebrews, in his just punishment of the Egyptian oppressors, in his wise ordering of an appropriate form of liberation, and in his performing, with a view to making the liberated people receive the law with joy, so many signs proper to himself. But the subject of the Egyptian historiographer's history would be the kingdom, or the king, or the Egyptian people, whose actions and the events that happen to them he intends to write, such that what God did is incidental to him, but what the race did or suffered is principal. For Moses the principal thing is what God did or permitted, and the matter in which it happened is for him as it were incidental. And granted that in some places no miracle is narrated, yet that which God permitted, by giving assistance through his ordinary influence and not preventing, is what is principally intended in that book insofar as it is part of Scripture; and the way this thing was fittingly ordered to some good, if it was capable of being so ordered, or the way it was punished, if it was made, is frequently added in the same or another book; or if the thing was permitted and not in this place punished, Scripture is not silent in other places about it in general that it will be punished somewhere else.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

183. [To the Arguments from the First Way] – To the first argument of the first question [n.125] I say that the authority states that the matter of this science, not the first and formal subject of it, is things and signs and the like.

184. To the second [n.126] I say that whatever sense is not literal in one part of Scripture, is literal in another part of Scripture; therefore, although any part of Scripture may have diverse senses, yet Scripture as a whole takes all those senses for the literal sense.

185. To the third [n.127] I say that the argument is to the opposite conclusion, in two ways. First, because in moral science and medical science man is posited as subject for that which contains virtually all the truths of the science. For the human body contains the idea of health virtually; for that is why the health of man is the sort it is, because the human body is the sort of complex it is. Likewise, the soul of man contains the idea of natural felicity virtually, as is clear in *Ethics* 1.9.1097b22-98a20, where the idea of the natural felicity of man is deduced from the soul, or from the idea of the soul. It is not in this way that man contains the idea of the end of this science (of theology), because supernatural felicity or the object of this science is not included in the idea of man; and therefore man cannot be the first object of this science; therefore etc.

186. Second thus: man is the final end of the sciences just mentioned, and to this end both health and natural felicity are ordered. The proof is that all love of concupiscence presupposes love of friendship [2 d.6 q.2 n.3]; but health and felicity are loved with love of concupiscence; therefore what is loved with love of friendship by him who has love of concupiscence is a further end beyond any of these ends. Such a further end is the body, on one side, and the soul, on the other. Therefore if man in his body or soul is the subject of this science, it follows that his end is the subject of this science.

187. To the fourth [n.128] I say that the first proposition is false, because the fact that nothing else is the end of a science except what, by its own act, attains the object of the science is not because it induces some form in the object by its act, for science is not a quality for making things.

188. [To the Arguments from the Second Way] – To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of subject in the sense of subject of an accident, not in the sense of subject of study.

To the text from the *Physics* [n.130] I say that it means matter in the sense of matter ‘from-which’, for this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means the matter ‘of-which’ or ‘about-which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science with respect to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; yet the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of the object ‘about-which’ comes together with the idea of the susceptible matter, because the act of making is a doing that passes over to something outside it. Things are not like this in the case of the proper act of a science; still, a science is understood to pass over, because it does not terminate in itself but in that about which it is, although it is not received in the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be the matter in relation to the science and to its act.^a

a. [Interpolation] because the artisan works on something, and in that same thing his making is received; by reason of the first is the object said to be the matter in a science, not by reason of the second, because the act of a science does not pass over [sc. into something else].

189. To the text of the *Posterior Analytics* [n.131] I say that the object of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science (of theology) the object is this essence here (sc. God) as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into subjective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are a sort of subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them the way it is in other and imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many parts.

190. As to the point that is added about properties [n.131], some say that the attributes are a sort of properties of the essence itself. But this does not hold, because any attribute as this can properly be known of God theologically, while any attribute as known confusedly is known of him metaphysically. For just as God taken in this way and in that, that is, as this and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian on the one hand and to the metaphysician on the other, so too does any attribute pertain to them when taken in this way and when taken in that. As to what is added about the property being outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really caused by the object; but in the deity that which has the nature of a property is not caused, because it passes over into essence by way of identity; yet, as far as its knowability is concerned, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.

191. As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of the subject as knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but what is necessary is that in the case of any subject whatever there are principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the means of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, such as are the self-evident principles. In this way there can be principles of any subject whatever, insofar as the subject is the principle-without-principle in relation to its properties.^a

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31; if therefore something has principles of knowing then it has principles of being. The principles of being are said not to be complex but in-complex, and from these are formed the propositions which are the principles of knowing; but the first cause lacks a principle of being, though not of knowing, because some things belong to it in a prior way and through these are posterior things known.

VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

192. To the first argument of the second question, when the argument through Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus is made [nn.133-134], the response is that they are speaking here, not of the formal object, but of the proximate matter, which is more extensively dealt with in Scripture, because of the more immediate order to the end they are holding to.

193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being are dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God there is, in addition to it, some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being.

But when it is proved through the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics* [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his argument thus concludes: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest class of things’, whether as first subject or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which, in any naturally acquired science, it can be considered.^a

a. [Interpolation] because the properties of being that are convertible with being are known supremely about any being, then knowledge of the more nobly distinct properties of a being, which knowledge divides them to the same supreme belonging, is the most noble that can naturally be had of God; but all this knowledge is metaphysics, because that which has the job of considering a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property supremely about the same subject in particular.

194. To the Commentator on the *Physics* [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, that if the existence of any separate substances were a presupposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which fact is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science of metaphysics. – Second, that a proof can be given about the existence of a cause through any condition of the effect that could not exist in the effect unless the cause existed; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that can only be present in beings from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is something that is simple in its actuality, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from the natural properties by which is shown that there is a first mover; also it is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

195. To the other citation [n.137] I say that relation to an end is not the noblest idea of knowledge but that which the end is – as being the idea of the foundation of that relation – is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end for

creatures; therefore the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And thus proceeds the argument to the opposite.

But when the proof from the *Metaphysics* about the good is given [n.137], I say that if the good, by a certain appropriateness, is foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However it is not necessary that goodness be the proper idea of end itself, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, in respect of the remark of Avicenna on the *Metaphysics* [n.137], that the remark must be understood, not of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.

VI. To the Third Question

A. Opinion of Others

196. To the third question [n.139] it seems that it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables,³⁰ because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first many truths virtually about themselves. The proof is that, after everything else per impossibile has been removed, these quiddities, if they were uncreated, would still contain such truths, as is clear of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, one could set down that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science,³¹ namely: theology would be the one that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, while geometry in his intellect would be the one that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by virtue of number, and so on about others.

197. Against this in three ways:

First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in which it understood line, it would still be in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the truths that exist in line – and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line – , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting the knowledge of those truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be the mover of the divine intellect.

198. Second thus: the first object of every power that is made actual by diverse objects through their per se proper virtue is something that is common to those objects; but if line, by virtue of itself, caused truth in the divine intellect, by equal reason other things too will cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be common being, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore it will be first by virtual-ness. But it would not be

³⁰ The opinion of Henry of Ghent.

³¹ Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent.

the first object virtually if anything else were to effect, in accord with its own virtue, a change in his intellect.

B. Scotus' own Response

200. [About divine theology] – Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God's theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first in his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, the order of the second to the third is not according to causality, as if those quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, that his own essence causes those quiddities to be known first in nature, as it were, before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19].

An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun was only capable, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part first illuminated, would illuminate that distant part; the order, however, between the near and distant part would be like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet it would not be an order of the cause to the effect, because the illuminated part performs no action on the dark distant part.

So it is in the proposal. The essence of God in his own intellect makes other quiddities to be actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them to be known to his intellect; yet those quiddities have no virtue in respect of effecting a change in God's intellect, because God's intellect is not of the nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.

201. In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge about all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and it is absolutely about anything about which there is any knowledge that does not of itself include some imperfection, because it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is limited by a cause, necessarily includes a limitation.

202. [On the theology of the blessed] – But as to the created intellects of the blessed things are otherwise, because their intellects are of the nature to be changed by the created quiddities so as to know the truths included in them; and therefore, in addition to the theological truth, which they have about those quiddities as displayed in the divine essence, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by the proper movement of those things. Therefore the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them which is possible for such intellects.

203. But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although they have some other knowledge about some of the knowables. Here a distinction must be drawn about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because these are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way I say that it is possible

for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite.^a De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about all the things that God voluntarily displays in his essence.

a. [*Interpolation*] because it alone does not include limitation about any object; but any other one, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.

204. [On our theology] – About our theology I say that is not about all things, because, just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit fixed by the divine will as to general revelation is the things that are in divine Scripture, because – as is contained in the last chapter of *Revelation* – “he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.

205. About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, – but revelation according to ordinary law is only of things whose terms can commonly be conceived by us naturally, – and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, in the opinion of some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.³²

206. [On theology taken all together] – However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and in this way the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this.

Thus, then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and it is all knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore to the intellect of God, who cannot have any imperfect knowledge, it is all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity that is moving the created intellect. Also it alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded in intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image of this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.³³

VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

³² Possibly a reference to the teaching of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time about the same thing, as say about the existence of God.

³³ The reference is to man as made in the image of God, as spoken of in particular by Augustine *On the Trinity* 14 ch.8 n.11, 15 ch.27 n.50.

207. To the first argument [n.140] I say that it concludes about theology not in itself but as it is handed down in Sacred Scripture.

Prologue
Fourth Part
On Theology as a Science
Questions 1 and 2

Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subaltern-ing or subaltern-ed

208. On this matter I examine whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of making it subaltern to itself or of being subaltern to it.

I. To the First Question

[On theology in itself and in God] – To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception or doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discursion.

These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection^a and also potentiality in the receiving intellect. Therefore theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect.

a. [Interpolation] on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect.

209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] – But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed is matter for doubt.

And it seems that it is not, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps there they will not be changeable,” etc., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have science as to that fourth condition of science.

But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that is passive in respect of such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make known to our intellect the truths included in itself, it will, by parity of reasoning, also do the same when seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused in it discursively, because discursion does not require succession of time or the order of time, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is naturally known first, and that in this way it is causative with respect to the second term of the discursion.^a

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence previously first known.

This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it.

The authority of Augustine in *On the Trinity* [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert that point, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect our word may also be. In like way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities that are in God.^a

a. [Interpolation] The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.

210. [On the science of contingents as a science] – But there is another doubt in that question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things [n.150]. The thing is clear about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem possible for there to be science about contingents, as is clear from the definition of science [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of theology, in the way it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not.

211. On this point I say that what belongs to perfection in science is that the knowledge is certain and evident;^a but as to its being about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of the knowledge, because science, to the extent it is of a necessary object, can be in itself contingent and can be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems that it is formally in itself more perfect than a science that requires necessity in its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally have a knowledge that is certain and evident and, on the part of the evidence, so far perpetual. The thing is clear, because all theological contingents are naturally seen in the first theological object, and the connection of those contingent truths in that object is naturally seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such an evident truth. As to what concerns also the part of the theological object which displays them, such truths are naturally seen in such a perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to be more perfectly known than an acquired science about necessary things.

a. [Interpolation] because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, *Metaphysics* 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of the necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore

absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit 'God is creative', 'God is capable of assuming our nature'; similarly in the case of practical things, 'God is to be believed', 'God is to be loved', 'God is to be worshipped'. But of these practical necessities – besides the third – the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as 'God is Triune', others are naturally known.

212. But can knowledge of them be a science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in the *Posterior Analytics* [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know it as contingent; yet, according to the way the Philosopher takes science in *Ethics* 6.3.1139b15-18, as divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because it also is a habit whereby we say something determinately true.

213. [On science as it is wisdom] – More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and its object is most perfect and highest and noblest. But, as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about the contingent things that are seen in themselves as they exist in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other things prior to them; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

II. To the Second Question

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject is in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any of its principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in metaphysics through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being.

Nor does this science make any other science subaltern to it, because no other science takes from it its principles, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles that are naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stop at knowables unless the knowable is the most perfect, nor does it stop there unless that knowable is most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than by way of its own movement; therefore the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles about it, as these are seen in the Word. But that resolution is had by seeing the Word. Therefore the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore that vision makes the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence, subaltern to itself.

216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of line or of whole may more perfectly know some immediate principle about line or about whole than a geometer does, who only knows line and whole confusedly, yet that immediate proposition is known per se to the geometer. Nor is his proof made through the metaphysician's proposition, provided that the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is from his confused concept evident; the only thing is that the

metaphysician has a more perfect knowledge of that same per se known truth; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line was known from diverse things and from the side of the object with equal distinctness albeit not with equal clarity.

So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect that is moved by line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself to be known in another way, but it is known ‘by itself’ in both ways, although more clearly thus or thus. But subalternation requires that the knowledge of the principles of the higher science be the cause of knowing the principles of the lower science, etc.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? – To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. – Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. – Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. – Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. – Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. – Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.

Prologue
Fifth Part
On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science
Question 1
Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

217. The question is whether theology is a practical or a speculative science.

Proof that it is not practical:

Because in *John* 20.23 it is said: "These things are written that you might believe;" to believe is something speculative, because on it vision follows; therefore etc.

218. Besides, practical science is set down as being about the contingent, *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 and *Ethics* 1.2.1094b7, 21-22; but the object of this science is not contingent, but necessary; therefore etc.

219. Again, Boethius *On the Trinity* ch. 2 assigns three parts to speculative science, one of which is theology according to him; and it seems he is speaking about theology in the present sense, because about its subject he there adds that its subject is the first substance, of which he says that "God's substance lacks matter."

220. Again, nobler than any practical science is some speculative science; but no science is nobler than this science [of theology]; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is both that speculative science is for its own sake while practical is for the sake of use, and that speculative science is more certain, from *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14-16, 25-28.

221. Again, after all necessary sciences were in existence, this science was invented for escaping ignorance, as is clear because concern with necessities is an impediment to the investigation of this doctrine; therefore it is a speculative science. For in this way does the Philosopher argue in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a19-25, that metaphysics is speculative.

222. On the contrary:

Romans 13.10: "The end of the law is love."

Again, *Matthew* 22.40: "On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets."

Again, Augustine *On the Praise of Charity*, *Sermon* 350 n.2: "He who keeps charity in morals possesses whatever is hidden and whatever is plain in the divine words."

But these authorities prove that this science is not precisely for speculation, but speculative science seeks nothing beyond speculation, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.1 (70ra) (examine him there).

Question 2

Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end

223. Second, the question is whether a science is called practical *per se* from order to action [praxis] as to its end.

I argue that it is:

In *On the Soul* 3.10 433a14-15 the Philosopher says: “The intellect becomes practical by extension, and differs from the speculative in its end.”

224. Again in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14-16 he says: “The practical is less noble than the speculative, because it is for the sake of use.” This argument would not hold unless use was the end *per se* of that habit.

225. Again in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 he says: “The end of the speculative is truth, but the end of the practical is work.”

226. On the contrary:

In *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b18-28 the Philosopher distinguishes practical sciences from speculative by their objects, as is plain; for he there distinguishes practical science, both active and productive, from speculative by its object and not by its end.

Again, in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a3-15 he distinguishes the calculative from the scientific by the necessary and contingent object; therefore science is practical *per se* from its object; therefore not from action as from its end.

Again, in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 he assigns good as the object of the practical, not any good but doable and contingent good; therefore science is practical *per se* from its object; not therefore from action as from its end.

227. To solve these questions I take one general thing that is conceded by everyone, namely that the practical habit is in some way extended to action. One must consider therefore in particular: first, what the action is to which practical knowledge is said to be extended; second, in what way practical knowledge is extended to that action; third, by what thing knowledge has such extension.

I. What Action [Praxis] is

228. I say first, then, that the action to which practical knowledge is extended is the act of some power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to the intellect, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right intellect so as to be right.

The first condition is clear, because when one stops precisely at acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not tend beyond itself unless its act has regard to the act of another power.

And if you say that one act of the intellect is extended to another, being directed by it, the second act is not for this reason action as we are now speaking of action, nor is the first knowledge practical, because then logic would be practical, because it directs in acts of discursive thought.

229. The second condition is plain, because acts not having an order to the intellect, of which sort are vegetative acts, and acts naturally preceding the intellect, as sense acts, are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge said to be extended to them in the way these are prior to understanding. Similarly, the act of the power of sense appetite, insofar as it precedes the act of the intellect, is not action; for it is in this way common to us and to the brutes. Nor is any knowledge practical in respect of these acts, unless it in some way moderates them and these acts follow the understanding moderating them *qua* being moderated by it.

230. From these two conditions follows a corollary, namely that the action to which the practical habit is extended is only an elicited or commanded act of the will, for

no other act coming from understanding or beside understanding is essentially posterior to understanding, for any other given act, which is of the same nature as it is, could be prior to it, as is plain by running through the acts of all the powers.

231. This fact is plain, second, in this way, that action is an act that is in the power of the knower. The proof is from *Ethics* 6.5.1140b22, that the artisan needs a virtue for acting rightly; but he does not need a virtue with respect to what is not in his power; therefore the artisan has the act of making in his power; much more does the prudent man have action in his power, because he is virtuous in his very form. From this follows further: if all action is in the power of the knower, and if nothing is in the power of the will save either an elicited or commanded act, the proposition intended follows as before [n.230].

232. Against this condition is that the consequence seems to be that then any intellection will be action, because any intellection can be an act commanded by the will the way the act of other powers is commanded by the will. And in that case it follows further that therefore the first condition is false, namely that action is the operation of a power other than the intellect. – I reply: although speculation is a certain operation and so, in an extended sense, is an action, yet, in the way action is said to be only the operation to which the intellect can be extended, no understanding is action; and this is the way action is taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When, therefore, it is argued that ‘understanding is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, the consequence does not hold, but what holds is ‘therefore it is action or practical’; for it has the nature to be denominated practical accidentally, as it were, because of the action to which it can be extended; but it cannot be the term of such extension. Yet, on the other hand, I do well concede that all action is an elicited or commanded act of the will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first condition is to commit the fallacy of the consequent, by asserting the consequent.^{34 a}

a. [Interpolation] Note, intellection is either commanded by the will or is directive or not; if it is not, then it is purely speculative; if it is, either it is directive as a logical intention directs an act of discoursing or of denominating (which is an act of the intellect following an act of simple intelligence and an act of forming complexes, which is to combine and divide), and such is still speculative; or it is directive of an act of will, and then it is practical; but it is not praxis in the way it is being taken here, namely not for any operation whatever but for such an operation as the intellect is of a nature to be extended to by taking extension properly.

233. Proof of the third condition. First from the remark of the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a22-25, that right choice necessarily requires right reason. This remark is not only true of choice taken strictly but, by parity of reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited; but all action either is volition or follows volition, from the preceding corollary [n.230]; therefore all action, for the purpose of being right, is naturally elicited in conformity with right reason. Second from the remark of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.10, ch.7 n.13, that the intellect performs acts of understanding for itself and for the other powers. Therefore, just as it can pass judgment on its own act, so it can on the acts of the others; therefore on an

³⁴ That is, from ‘if an act is action, then it is an elicited or commanded act of the will’ one asserts ‘understanding is a commanded act of the will’ and then concludes ‘therefore understanding is action’, which is the fallacy of the consequent.

act naturally posterior to its own act it can naturally pass judgment before that posterior act is elicited; and consequently, if the intellect judges rightly, that act, if it has to be right, must be elicited in conformity with that judgment.

From the two final conditions of action [nn.228, 229, 233] it follows that an act commanded by the will is not primarily but as it were *per accidens* action, because it is not primarily posterior to understanding nor is it primarily of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason. Some other act, then, must be primarily action; this act is nothing but volition, because through volition the commanded act has the said conditions; therefore the first idea of action is found in an elicited act of the will.

And then further: whenever something that is conjoined to another is primarily of a certain sort, it would still be of that sort if it could be separated from that other; therefore if the act of will can be separated from the act of the other power, it will be action when separated from that posterior act. But it is separate with respect to whatever can be the object of an act of will with respect to which there cannot be an act of another power, and of this sort are all immaterial things; therefore an act of will is about every such thing, and it alone is action.

235. Second, the same is proved from the intention of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.10.433a17-18, where, in his inquiry about the first mover, after he has concluded that there are two movers, namely will or appetite and reason, he subjoins: “The intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite.” And next he says that two appetites are sometimes contrary to each other; therefore he is positing as it were one species of mover, because common to the two appetites is the nature of the species that mediates between them, namely the nature of appetite. His meaning expressly, then, is that just as the sense appetite has the nature of a mover along with sense and imagination, so the will has the nature of a moving principle along with intellect and reason. Therefore, just as an act of sensitive appetite without any transition to what is extrinsic is truly action when it follows an act of intellect, so the act of will that is posited as equally a moving principle will truly be action, for it always follows an act of intellect; and it is action even if it is on its own without a commanded act, nay even if it is with an act in sense appetite opposed to the act which it commands, because, although it has that sometimes opposed appetite, it is itself a moving and operating principle, whose operation is action.

II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

236. From this article [nn.228-235] the second [n.227] is plain, for this extension consists in a double aptitudinal relation, namely of conformity and of natural priority; as to priority, it is plain from what has already been adduced from the *Ethics* [nn.231, 233]; about conformity there is what is contained in the same place, when he says: “truth in practical consideration is conformity to correct appetite.”

237. I said ‘aptitudinal’ because neither relation is required to be actual. For the fact that an action in conformity with consideration actually follows the consideration is altogether accidental to the consideration and is contingent;^a for if it were called action from actual extension, no action would necessarily be practical, but the same action would sometimes be practical, sometimes theoretical, which nothing is; therefore a double aptitudinal extension or aptitude for extension is enough.^b

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: of necessity an act of intellect is prior to an act of will actually, which you set down as the first action. – True, but it does not necessarily follow thereon about the act of will actually that is action.

b. [Interpolation] On the contrary: in that case any knowledge would be practical, because on any knowledge there is aptitudinally apt to follow in the will the right volition conform to them which you set down as first action. – One must say that it is not true of volition of a knowable, but of volition of knowledge, and this idea is action. – On the contrary: an aptitude that agrees with one nature and is repugnant to another is not seen save through something intrinsic to it; therefore it is necessary to explain why this conformity to action agrees with this habit and is repugnant to a second. – One must say that this is from its object [n.252].

A clarification of this is that practical knowledge is commonly conceded to be extended to action as director to directed or as regulator to regulated. But knowledge's being naturally prior to action and conformed to it is not its being conformed to action as to something prior but its making action to be conformed to it as something posterior, or its being what action is to be conformed to, which is what it is for knowledge to direct and rule in action. But as to whether directing and conforming action to itself like this is a certain efficacy in knowledge with respect to action, see 2 Suppl. 25 q. un.

238. From this second article it is plain that the practical and speculative are not essential differences of habit or science or knowledge in general, because 'practical' asserts a double aptitudinal respect of knowledge, which knowledge is as it were something absolute, being toward action as toward its term, and the speculative takes away this double respect; but neither the respect nor its privation are of the essence of what is absolute, but are as it were a division of the genus through the proper features of the species, as would be the case if number were divided into odd and even and line into curved and straight. For to one of the knowledges the practical *per se* belongs in the second mode of *per se*, from the predicate's intrinsic cause in the subject, and to the other knowledge the speculative so belongs.

III. From what Source Knowledge gets its Extension to Action

239. [First opinion] – About the third article [n.227] there exist opinions one of which is of this sort, that the intellect is called practical from one thing, and the act or habit is called practical from another. It is as follows: truth that is doable and that is not doable are specific objects, formally diverse, and so they distinguish *per se* the things that have a *per se* respect to them, namely act and habit, which are called practical because they concern something doable; but the intellect is only called practical if it is operative, and only the intellect that apprehends an order toward doing is of this sort. But it does not apprehend this order unless it is moved by appetite for the end, so that the practical intellect includes in its act, not formally by the essence of the act but by connotation, an order that is necessarily toward desire, a desire explicitly of the end and implicitly of the things for the end; wherefore, since the ordering of an object of speculation toward doing is accidental to that object (although the object's being capable of being so ordered is not accidental to it), the difference, which flows from this, between the speculative and the practical intellect will be accidental and in respect of something extrinsic to the intellect, although the difference of the habits and acts is formal in accord with the formal difference of doable and non-doable objects. Hence in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a14-15 it is

said that the speculative and practical intellect differ in their end, and in *Ethics* 6.3.1139a29-31 that: “The good of the practical intellect is truth in conformity with correct appetite.”

240. An example: the speculative intellect apprehends health as a fitting good, the appetite desires it, and there follows in another way the consideration of the practical intellect that health is to be acquired. With the desire for the end in place, then, the practical intellect proceeds discursively from the principle ‘that by which health can be better acquired is to be procured’, and its discursive process ends at the final conclusion of deliberation; and the whole discursive process, just as it takes its principle from apprehension of the desired end, which is the first object of the practical intellect, so it does what has been discovered in view of the end, and hence it presupposes will for the end and is ordered to the choice that follows deliberation.

241. Against this opinion – which, to speak briefly, consists in this that it puts the distinction of the practical and speculative intellect in an end that is accidental to the object, but the speculative and practical habit differ and are distinguished by the formal difference of their special objects – the argument is that it is said of the habits in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 that: “The end of speculative science is truth, but of the practical it is doing.”

242. Likewise, the practical habit will in that case be in the speculative intellect, and the intellect will not be called practical by that habit, which seems discordant, because every habit denominates its possessor according to the nature of the habit.

243. They reply to the first argument [n.241] that the end of practical science is work potentially and in aptitude, insofar as its object is *per se* doable; but the doable object is considered according to the habit in general, which consideration is not enough for it to be subject to operation in actuality and in particular; because in goods act is better than potency, and so such particular and actual consideration is required; now the consideration is by a habit different from practical science, and that habit alone is in the practical intellect.

To the second argument [n.242] the response is that the habit can be said to be by denomination practical, not simply, but by understanding the denomination to be made from the habit

244. To the contrary: therefore the practical habit and act can exist in the speculative intellect, because a habit and act that are of their nature practical can exist in the intellect without such reference to an act of will of the sort posited.

The consequent would be conceded, but another habit would be posited as capable of being possessed in the practical intellect, a habit generated not only by practical acts but also by acts of the practical intellect.

245. To the contrary: a practical habit generated from practical acts would be enough for the same things as the other habit would be enough for that is generated by acts of the practical intellect, because the will commanding consideration for the sake of such an end does not give any other reason for consideration in acts of directing, nor consequently for a habit generated by considerations.

246. Again, in that case many accidents of the same species will exist in the same thing. For one cannot, on account of order or non-order of the will, posit a specific distinction between this act and that, nor similarly between this habit and that.

247. Again, third, against the opinion in itself [nn.239-240] I argue thus: a subject is denominated more from a *per se* and essential condition of its accident than from an accidental condition of it; therefore, if the intellect can be called practical from an accidental condition of its habit, to wit from the order of the will ordering its act to something else, much more can it be called practical from the essential order of the act by which the act is said to be essentially practical. Therefore, the intellect seems to be called practical from the same thing as that from which the habit and act are called practical, although of the habit and act it is not said as accidentally as it is said of the intellect, where it has the respect of an accident *per accidens*.

248. [Second opinion] – Alternatively, it is said that the thing from which habit and act are said to be practical is the end and the extension of practical knowledge to action, which is extension to an end.

On behalf of this opinion are the authorities set down earlier [nn.223-225].

249. There is also argument by reason. First thus: that a habit is said to be practical either from the object or from the end. Not from the proper object because the intellect 'is made practical by extension',^a which is only true of the same speculative intellect that is also afterwards practical when extended to work; therefore there can be a speculative and a practical consideration of the same object.

a. [Interpolation] with respect to the same object.

250. Second thus: that medicine is divided into speculative and practical, and yet it is about some object that is the same, as about health or the body capable of health.

251. Again, an act is said to be practical because it is morally good or bad; goodness and badness in morals belongs to an act by its circumstances; but first and chief among the circumstances is the circumstance of the end; therefore etc.

252. Against this position I argue thus: I ask, are habit and act said to be practical because of actual extension to work or are they so only because of an aptitudinal or relational extension to work? Not because of actual extension (as is contained in the second article [nn.236-238] and as they concede), because in that case the workman who is not intending to work would not have practical knowledge; therefore because of aptitudinal extension. But an aptitude which is repugnant to one nature does not belong to another save because of something absolute in such nature; for because this nature is such, therefore such aptitude belongs to it; therefore in its very consideration it presupposes some intrinsic condition by which such aptitude belongs to it. This condition of consideration in itself is from another cause prior to it; but the prior causes of it are intellect and the object; therefore the condition belongs to it from the intellect or from some object.

253. If it be said that the end is the prior cause, or rather is the first among all causes, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (94va), and so from it can arise the consideration of such a nature so that such an aptitude befits it, on the contrary: the end is not a cause save insofar as, being loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to cause its effect. But the said aptitude belongs to such a consideration whether the end is loved or not. For the said knowledge can exist in the intellect however the will is disposed, even were the will not conjoined with the intellect. And so it is not from the end as from the final cause that the aptitude belongs to the knowledge; for no cause makes a thing to be present that is present when the cause is not causing.

If you say that the end is apt to be loved before the aptitude is present in knowledge, on the contrary: this does not save the intended proposition, because an effect does not get anything causally from a thing on the ground that the thing has the nature to cause if the thing is not actually causing; therefore knowledge does not get an aptitude, or the nature that such aptitude is consequent upon, from an end that is apt to cause if it is not actually causing; nor does it actually cause as a final cause unless, being actually loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to act; therefore etc

254. Besides, either the end as extrinsically elicited or possessed makes the habit to be practical, or it does so as considered and intended. Not as extrinsically elicited because in this way it is posterior to the habit and is in a way its effect; but an effect does not cause distinctions in a cause. If as considered, in this way it has the nature of the object; therefore the object causes the distinction. If as intended, this has already been refuted [n.253], because such knowledge exists before the end is naturally intended.

255. Besides, not every end of practical knowledge is action. For some practical understanding has regard to the action of a lower power, as for example the action of sensitive appetite or of the power of movement; but no act of a lower power is the end of an act of intellect, because nothing less noble is *per se* the end of something more noble; the act of understanding is nobler and more perfect than any act at all of any lower sensitive power at all.

256. It is said that, although understanding is nobler in its natural being than the operation of a lower power, yet it is not so in the genus of morals, because to act bravely is morally better than to think of acting bravely.

257. Against this there is a twofold objection. First, that it supposes something false, for the act of a lower power is not morally good unless it is conformed to right reason as to its rule; therefore rightness of reason is the cause of such goodness in that act and not conversely; but the act of reason being in this way right is for it to be morally good, just as understanding can be morally good. – The reasoning is confirmed because prudence is simply better than moral virtue as moral virtue exists in the sensitive appetite; therefore the act of the former as it is the former's act is better than the act of the latter as it is the latter's act; therefore the former as practical, in the way that understanding can be practical, is better than the latter as practical or as good morally. Hence it is plain that the proof about thinking is not valid; for when one is looking for the excellence of one thing over another, one should not compare the best to the worst, but one should compare the best to the best or the simply so to the simply so. Therefore, just as the best is taken there, namely to act bravely in fact, so one should take the best in the intellect, namely 'to command brave action in accordance with prudence'. This second is better even morally, because, as being the rule, it has formal goodness, which is rightness proper; the other is only good materially, because, when one removes from it its order to the rule and to the will as commanding, it is not of itself morally good.

258. Second, the first response [n.256] does not seem relevant to what is proposed: for one does not look for the source of understanding's being practical by supposing it to be practical, especially since one is not presupposing its first condition, namely the condition of the end, but one is inquiring into that condition [n.248]; therefore, since one is looking for practical understanding and for the first circumstance that will make it practical, one only takes understanding as to what it is in its natural being; therefore to distinguish it according to moral and natural goodness like this is nothing other than to

assume what is being sought for and to distinguish the thing as the thing is considered in its precision under one member of the distinction.

259. Therefore this opinion [n.248] is corrected by others and it is said that a habit is called practical from the end, which is practical consideration; for the proper end of any habit is its act. – But against this: If this consideration, which is the end of the habit, is practical, then it has a cause for being called practical; either then the cause it has is the end of that consideration, and this has already been refuted [nn.252-255]; or it is the object, and then it follows that the object is the cause, prior to the consideration itself, whereby the habit is said to be practical, and one has what is proposed, that it is from the object that both the habit, though mediately, and the act are said to be practical.

260. [Scotus' own opinion] – I concede, then, that the habit is not called practical from the act proper, because the act too is practical from a prior cause. Nor is any habitual or actual knowledge practical *per se* because it is ordered to action as to an end; yet it can sometimes get its first extension, namely conformity to action [n.236], from the very end of the action, not however from it insofar as it is end but insofar as it is object.

261. The first point here [about first extension] is plain. For sometimes the first practical principles are taken from the end of action, and so the end, as first cause of action, includes virtually all the knowledge in the genus, and so the knowledge itself gets from it its quiddity and aptitude.

262. The second point [about the end as object] is plain. For practice gives the aptitude, or the sort of nature possessing an aptitude, for this reason, that as the first object includes the principles and, by means of them, the conclusions, so it includes the whole of practical knowledge; but not insofar as it is end, first because no nature or natural aptitude is got from the end, unless the end is loved and desired and so is moving the efficient cause [n.253]; but before it is naturally loved it includes the said principles and conclusions; for the truth of a necessary practical principle does not depend more on the will than does the truth of a speculative principle, and neither do the conclusions necessarily inferred from such a principle; – second because anything else that may virtually include such knowledge would give such conformity to the knowledge in the same way, to wit if the action itself, or that which the operation is about, were first in the genus to include such knowledge, as sometimes happens and as was touched on in the response to the third argument in the first question about the subject of theology [n.185]; for man is perhaps the subject of both moral and medical science – but not happiness or health – because the idea of the end of each is included in the idea of what the action is about.

263. If it be said that the first practical principles are always taken from the end, therefore the end always first includes the knowledge of them virtually, – if this conclusion were conceded, it would hold nevertheless that the end did so, not insofar as it was end, but insofar as it was object, and it could then be said that man is the end both of health and of natural happiness, as was touched on in the preceding response [n.262]; but man is not at any rate the proximate end of the action, because, if the conclusion were denied, the antecedent taken universally would have to be denied, for taken particularly it is true, namely when the idea of the end is not deduced from anything pertaining to practical knowledge [n.314].

264. Or the antecedent could be expounded in another way thus: 'the first principles are always taken from the end' is true in the case of those principles that, once

an act good in its kind has been presupposed, are taken from the moral circumstances, because in this way the object is not a circumstance. In another way, when the act is taken bare, the object is also a circumstance; and by this the antecedent seems to be refuted; for that from which the first circumstance of the act considered bare is altogether taken seems to be prior to anything else, and so the object from which the act is first specified so as to be called good in kind of act, being qualifiable by the other circumstances so as to be fully moral, seems to be altogether first in practical knowledge. But it is not necessary now to pursue the question whether this conclusion holds or not, because its place is in the third book (3 Suppl. d.26 q. un. n.10; d.38 q. un. nn.4-5; also 2 d.7 q. un. nn.11-13, 24-28; d.40 q. un. n.3) [cf. n.362 below].

Briefly then to this article [nn.239, 227] I say that practical knowledge does not first get its appropriate extension from the end insofar as it is end, for the reasons adduced above [n.262].

IV. To the Second Question

265. From this the solution to the second question posed is plain [n.223]. I hold to the negative part of it [sc. science is *not* said to be practical from its order to the end], but the first relation, namely conformity [n.236], is had by practical science *per se* from the object, which is either rectitude of practice or something virtually including that rectitude, and therefore action is conformable to that knowledge so as to be right, because the knowledge is of such a known thing.

266. But as to the other relation, namely priority [n.236], it is doubtful whether it belongs to the knowledge. I say that necessarily some understanding naturally precedes action, as is plain from the first article [nn.229-233]; and in this respect posteriority belongs to action and priority to knowledge from the nature of the powers that are ordered naturally in acting, namely intellect and will. But that prior understanding is not always practical, but only when it is determinative of the rectitude or of the determinate rectitude of the action itself, and that either virtually or formally. But when there is in the preceding apprehension no virtual or formal determination of the rectitude of the action, although there is priority in it, yet conformity in it is lacking, because it is not the knowledge to which action should be conformed in order to be right, because it points out nothing determinate about the rectitude of the action.^a

a. [Interpolation] Now when in a previous apprehension there is determination about the rectitude of an action, but when the power of which it is the action is not in any way determinable from elsewhere, then the knowledge, although it is determinate, does not make conform.

It can be said then that, although absolutely from the nature of the intellect and of the will knowledge is prior, yet the fact that conform knowledge, namely knowledge that makes conform, is prior comes from the object and at the same time from the order of the powers and of the power of the actor, for although the object determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude naturally before the will wills, and although the will in some way receives its rule from something else, yet not apprehension alone but conform apprehension precedes action. But this happens whenever the determinate rectitude of action is a necessary knowable, either as a principle through the intellect or as a conclusion through science.

267. The things that have just been said, namely about the source from which the double relation, that is of conformity and of priority, belongs to practical knowledge, are to be understood in a general way, unless one should add something on behalf of the divine intellect, namely that the acting power, to whose action the conform knowledge is prior, is in some way determinable, or conformable to another as to a rule in its acting, from somewhere else; but whether this is required for knowledge or not will be touched on in response to the fourth objection that will be made against the principal solution to the question [nn.324-331].

268. But when determinate rectitude belongs contingently to action, then there is no object determining the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude before the will wills, and this when speaking of intellect and will in general, for the contingent thing is not determined to either part in advance of all acts of the will. But when making comparison specifically to this intellect and this will, the conform knowledge, which determinate knowledge of rectitude precedes, can precede the action, and the one which it does not precede cannot; but it can precede in all and only the intelligence whose will is not the first determinant of rectitude for the action.

269. An example of what has been said:

The rectitude of this act 'to love God' is necessary and is included virtually in the idea of God; this action is also not only naturally preceded in everyone by apprehension but also by conform apprehension, namely the apprehension to which the action must be conformed so as to be right; so it is from the object which of itself primarily determines the intellect to know the determinate rectitude of the action, and from the order of the intellect and the will in acting, that this knowledge is obtained which is prior to action and conform, and likewise in the case of any other action that determinate rectitude necessarily belongs to.

But the rectitude of this action 'to worship God in the sacrifice of the altar' is contingent; for sometimes the act is right, as it is now, and sometimes not, as it was in the Old Testament; and therefore there is not an object determinative of the intellect to knowledge of this rectitude in advance of every act of the will, and so the knowledge does not precede, as conform knowledge, every act of the will. Yet it does precede the act of some will, to wit of that will alone which does not first determine rectitude for this action, of which sort is the human will. For this rectitude is determined by the divine will, which accepts now this sort of cult or act and at other times some other one.

V. To the First Question

A. The Opinion of Others

270. Now that these points have been made visible, we must respond to the first question [n.217], where there are five ways of holding the negative side of the question [sc. that theology is *not* a practical science].

[First way] – One way speaks like this, declaring that there is a double act of the will, one perfecting the will, the other being perfected by it, as is maintained by Henry of Ghent in his *Summa* a.8 q.3 ad 3.^a

a. [Interpolation] 'First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will forms within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence a good action is that by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need a directive act but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply concerns speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs a directive act, and this pertains to practical knowledge, because there is in it speculation so as to direct action, which is proper to practical knowledge. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this knowledge (unless the end is under an end) but there is another act which perfects the will; and from this fact does this knowledge have its being most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended in this knowledge is the act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object. Therefore it is not practical knowledge, but only simply speculative knowledge, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.' So Henry of Ghent. 'For this way' etc. [n.271].

271. For this way there is the authority of Augustine in his sermon *On Jacob and Esau* (Sermon 88 ch.5 n.6): "All our works," he says, "are for the purpose of purifying the eye whereby God is seen."

272. Again, it can be argued thus: an act of direction is not required except where there can be error; practical science is directive, therefore the science of the blessed is not practical, because the blessed cannot err; therefore neither is our science practical, because it is the same as that of the blessed.

273. Again, it can be argued according to how the understanding of this science exists elsewhere: God does not have practical science; but he most of all or alone has this science; therefore etc.

274. I argue against it, and first I reduce the idea of these people's position to the opposite in four ways. First thus: although the will cannot err about the end displayed in a universal way, yet it can err about the end displayed in a particular way; therefore, in order for it to act rightly about the end displayed in a particular way, there is need of direction. The end is displayed in theology not in a universal but a particular way, because displaying it in a universal way belongs to metaphysics.

275. Further, a directive habit is not posited for the substance of an act but for its circumstance, as temperance is not posited for the substance of the act of eating, or of the other act of the sort, but for its circumstance; therefore, although the will is determined to the substance of an act that tends to the end in particular, direction would still be required as to the circumstances of the act, to which circumstances direction about the substance of the act does not extend. – From these two reasons the argument is taken that wherever it is possible to err or to act rightly in action, there practical knowledge is needed for giving direction; in the action that is love of the end, as it pertains to theology, error is possible in two ways, as the reasons show, both by reason of the object in particular and by reason of the circumstances of the act; therefore etc.

276. Further, third: where the love of something is what outside the genus of knowledge is principally intended, there the knowledge of that thing is what inside the genus of knowledge is principally intended; but love of the end, according to them, is what outside the genus of knowledge is principally intended, therefore knowledge of the end is what within the genus of knowledge is principally intended. But in any science what is principally intended is knowledge of the first subject, therefore the end is the

principal subject of this science. From the end practical principles are taken; but practical principles entail practical conclusions; therefore this science [of theology], which first intends love of the end outside the genus of knowledge, is practical.

277. Further, principles and conclusions belong to the same genus, whether as regard action or as regard speculation; for practical conclusions are resolved to practical principles, not speculative ones; therefore when knowledge of the end is directive in the case of acts that concern what is for the end, and when knowledge of what is for the end is a sort of conclusion included in knowledge of the end as a sort of principle, then if knowledge of what is for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions, the knowledge of the end will be practical knowledge because of a practical principle.

Thus the response to this position's first reason [n.270] is plain, because it assumes what is false, as if the will were determined from itself, the falsity of which is proved by the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. Likewise, if the will were determined, nevertheless the knowledge would still be practical, as the two final reasons prove [nn.276-277].

278. To the authority they appeal to [n.271] (it seems to conclude that the vision of God is the end of this science, which they do not concede) I reply that the authority is speaking of those external actions that are fastings, vigils, and prayers; yet any external act is of a nature to be conformed to any interior act from which it gets its goodness, and also of a nature to be ordered to some interior act, and ultimately to an act of willing.

279. To the third [n.272] I reply: an agent intends *per se* to introduce a form and does not intend the removal of the opposite except *per accidens*. Thus a habit *per se* directs, but it *per accidens* excludes error; and if the habit is perfect it is not compatible with error, nay if it is compatible it is not perfect. Therefore although the blessed cannot err, it does not follow that they do not have also a directive habit, because, if that were *per impossibile* removed, they could err, but, once it is posited, because of its perfection, all error is excluded.

280. Discussion of the fourth [n.273] will be given below, after the solution of this first question, by solving the fourth objection against it [nn.324-331].

281. [Second way (n.270)] – The second way, although it might be rightly and not rightly coaxed out, nevertheless denies that love of the end is action because it is not about a contingent object. For the Commentator says on the *Ethics* [Eustratius *Explanations of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* 1 ch.1 3E] that action is operation according to choice; choice is only about the contingent, *Ethics* 3.4.1111b29-30, because it is deliberative appetite; deliberation is only about the contingent (*Ethics* 3.5.1112a21-22, 30-31). From this too is proved that the description of action posited in the first article of the solution [n.228] is insufficient, because it omits the precise object. As a result this way asserts that no knowledge is practical that is extended to a willing of the final end alone, because this end is not a true contingent.

282. Against this way is the fourth reason set down against the preceding way [n.277].

Again, in truth action is that operation to which appetitive virtue inclines, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, from *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, and choice is action, as will be shown against the third way directly [nn.287-289]; but not only is charity inclined to love of the end but also acquired love, which is appetitive virtue, because the acquired habit or appetite is in agreement with right reason.

The motive for this way will be solved in the solution to the second principal reason for the first question [nn.346-351].

283. [Third way (n.270)] – The third way posits that either volition is not properly action but only the act posterior to it is, or, if it is action, it is not so save in order to some act of a lower power that it commands, to wit of the appetitive power or of the motive power or the like.

284. An argument for this way is that all action follows choice. The proof is from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a31-32: “The beginning of action is choice, not choice for the sake of which, but choice that is the source of motion,” that is, not the final cause but the efficient cause; the efficient cause naturally precedes the effect; therefore etc.

285. Further, a practical habit is generated from actions; but a practical habit is generated from acts that follow choice; therefore these are actions.

286. Again, the Commentator on the *Ethics* [Eustratius, *id.* 1 ch.1 3E] says: “Action is operation according to choice;” therefore action follows choice.

287. Against this is the proof that not only an act which follows choice is action, because in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a33-34 the Philosopher says that choice is not right without right reason and the habit of virtue; therefore virtue is *per se* required for right choice; but it would not be required if it were a habit generated from acts posterior to choice, because it would not then incline *per se* to any acts save those posterior to choice. For this reason the argument proceeds under another form, that a habit is generated by the same acts as those to which it inclines, from *Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-23; but moral virtue *per se* inclines to right choice, because, as is clear from its definition in *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, virtue is “a habit of choice” etc.; therefore moral virtue is *per se* generated by choices, and as a result it is not only acts which follow choice that are actions.

288. Further, not only is it false to deny that choice is action, as argued by the reason just given, but also, as was proved in the first article [nn.230, 234], an elicited act of the will is action first, and a commanded act is so only because of it; therefore if a choice exists on its own, without order to a commanded act, to wit because of lack of matter of the external act, it alone will be truly action. This is made clear thus: someone without money, to whom however money is presented in imagination, before the choice of any action becomes a principle moving to or commanding some action, if he chooses to distribute the money liberally should he have it, then, as far as the act and habit of virtue is concerned, no further prosecution of the act or distribution is required, because when some object has been presented in imagination about which an act of liberality can be done, the choice from which liberality is generated, or which is elicited from liberality, is possessed in its completeness; nor is there required any further prosecution of the act, or anything external, or any order to what is external, if the matter of the external act is lacking.

289. Further, this order can only be of a cause to a causing ‘that’ of the effect;³⁵ but that a cause in itself is not of itself such as to be prior to the effect, but is so only because it is actually ordered to bringing about the effect, seems discordant, since a cause gets nothing from the effect, nor from its order to the effect.

³⁵ Sc. as opposed to a causing ‘why’. A cause ‘that’ merely makes the effect to exist; a cause ‘why’ gives the effect the nature it has as well. The argument of this paragraph seems to be that since the third way supposes that choice is only action because the effect it causes is action, then the cause is getting its nature from the effect, which is contrary to the relation of cause and effect.

290. Then, as to the authority from the *Ethics* [n.284], I say that in the same place the Philosopher at once adds: “But of choice (supply: the principles are) appetite and reason for the sake of something” (that is, practical reason). Also, in order for choice to be right, virtue is required in the appetite; hence there follows: “Choice (namely right choice) is not without moral habit.” Therefore virtue has an elicited act more immediate to it than the act which choice is the principle of by commanding it; for the elicited act of the will, which is choice, is a good act before the external act, which is commanded by good choice, is good. The proof is given by the Philosopher; for he immediately adds (after the remark ‘nor is choice without habit’): “For a good action is not without custom.” But if this is the major premise to prove what he said just before about choice, this minor premise will be assumed under it, ‘good choice is good action’. I concede, therefore, the authority that affirms choice to be the principle of action in the sense of the source of action, because an act commanded by choice is also a moral act; but from this it does not follow that only this latter is an act or action, nay rather choice is a prior action, on account of which that act too is a good action.

291. To the second [n.285], if the major is true, I say that a practical habit is generated from the choices, as was said above about the person who frequently chooses to give liberally [n.288]; even without the commanded act, should the means not be available, liberality can be generated in him. But because, when the commanded acts are impossible, the will does not in general make frequent right choice about the matter of these acts – for what someone does not believe to be possible for him he either does not will or wills weakly, according to Augustine – therefore in general the practical habit which is virtue is not generated without the commanded actions that are subsequent to the choices; it is not, however, generated from these subsequent actions but from the choices, where moral goodness exists formally; in the commanded actions it only exists materially.

292. To the third [n.286], in response to the Commentator, it is necessary that the ‘according to’ there not be an indication of the efficient cause, if the description must be convertible with the thing described, as was already proved by Aristotle in the *Ethics* [n.290]; but the ‘according to’ must be understood effectively or formally, or let choice there be taken for liberality or for the controlling power, or let it be taken for the eliciting of an act of will which is not a choice or a volition. But all action is action in the genus of action in accord with that choice, as though in accord with its active principle, or let every action be choice or what follows choice, because action in the genus of action is reduced to the effective principle.

293. These three ways [nn.270, 281, 283] lay down that theology is purely speculative, notwithstanding the fact that it is extended to love of the end – whether the will is as it were naturally determined to the end previously shown to it, or whether the will is freely and contingently related to it, although the object the will concerns is not contingent and doable [n.281], or, third, whether the will is related in any way at all to any object at all, not however by doing it, that is, not however in its order to the commanded act, but by stopping at the first elicited act [n.283].

294. But that such extension does not include the practical is proved because then any knowledge would be practical, because some delight or love accompanies any knowledge at all.

295. Likewise in *Ethics* 10.9.1179a22-24 it is said that “the happy man is most dear to God,” and yet the Philosopher sets down this happiness as speculative and not practical.

296. Against this conclusion, common to these ways, is that it seems to follow that there is some operation in the power of man such that it is truly a human act and yet is not properly speculation or action, namely love of the end; the consequent seems discordant.

297. Further, that directive knowledge in any volition is not practical seems, since ‘truth is agreement with right appetite’, to be discordant, because such truth is the proper work of the practical mind, from *Ethics* 6.3.1139a29-31.

298. What is added about delight [n.294] is nothing to the purpose, because since delight is a passion naturally consequent to perfect activity, whether it be of speculation or of the thing speculated about, no practical knowledge is, because of extension to delight, posited from this fact, because neither is it action properly speaking; this will be touched on at 3 Suppl. d.15 q. un. But to love and desire a known object, and one with such or such circumstances, is truly action, nor does it follow apprehension naturally but is free – being rightly or not rightly elicited.

299. What is added about the happy contemplative, that he is most dear to God [n.295], is not the conclusion compelled by the authority, for it speaks passively, as though the happy man ‘is most loved by God’, not actively, as is clear in that place; for it adds: “if the gods have any care for human things, it is reasonable that they (that is, the gods) take joy in what is best and most like them; but this is the intellect,” and then: “to those therefore who love this (that is, the intellect) it will be reasonable for the gods to give reward, as to their friends,” etc.

300. But, setting that authority aside, is it the case that the happy contemplative is most dear according to Aristotle in the way that to love is distinguished from to be delighted, whether about the object speculated on or about the speculation? – I reply: in *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b3 he wants the first mover to move as being loved; therefore a lower intelligence loves the first mover, and yet he would place its happiness in speculation, as is clear from *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-32; therefore he himself includes under speculation not only delight but loving. Therefore neither will there be, according to him, practical knowledge because of extension to it, but speculative knowledge.

301. But why then is he not held to this result, since the idea of practical and of speculative science is adopted by him? – and so the first two ways, in rejecting that view [sc. that theology is practical], are, even according to the Philosopher, right to set down theology as speculative. – I reply: the ‘to love’ that he would posit in the intelligence he would posit to be in the will by natural necessity, so that it would not be a contingent matter there that it errs and acts rightly, so that, with respect to it, the knowledge is ostensive only, and not directive, whether as regards the object in particular or as regards any condition of it or any circumstance of the act of willing.

302. The theologians would not speak in this way about the loving of intelligible creatures with respect of God in the particular case and as regards the circumstances of the act, as was argued against the first way in the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. If therefore he [= the Philosopher] had agreed with us in positing that love of the end can freely and rightly and not rightly be elicited, and that it cannot be rightly elicited unless it is elicited in conformity with a right reason not only showing the object but also bidding

it to be thus elicited, perhaps he would have posited a practical knowledge with respect to such love that was in agreement with right appetite. Therefore it is better for the theologian, who must disagree with him in the minor premise, to say that he disagrees as a result in the conclusion than to agree in a conclusion he himself [= the Philosopher] would not posit if, with the theologian, he did not hold the minor.

When, therefore, you say that we get from him the idea of practical and speculative, it is true, and we agree in the major premise that it [= theology] is speculative, which although it is, as pointing out the object, extended to love, yet in no way is it directive in act of an object as subject to circumstances and as of this object in particular; but the minor which he himself assumes under the major we have to deny in the proposed case.

303. [Fourth way] – And therefore there is a fourth way, which says that theology is affective. Which can be understood in a good way if affective is set down as something practical; but if it is set down as a third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, it is in this way contrary to what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is truly action [nn.228-235], and also against many authorities that believe precisely that science is divided into the practical and the speculative, and there is no third member.

304. [Fifth way] – The fifth way says that theology is contemplative. For this way Augustine is adduced in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.14 n.22, where his meaning is that wisdom is in respect of contemplation, science in respect of action; since, therefore, theology is properly wisdom and not science, it will not be practical but contemplative.

I reply that Augustine in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.4 n.4 says that the two parts of the soul, the superior and the inferior, are only distinguished according to their functions; and in both there is a trinity (but in the superior the image of the Trinity), and yet only the superior is contemplative, because it has regard to things eternal. Therefore the contemplation of which he speaks is not distinguished from speculation within the genus of science; for the contemplative contains memory, intelligence, and will, and so in the contemplative there can be extension outside the genus of science, just as there can be in the active, that is, in the inferior part, which regards temporal things, and it too contains a trinity. If then it is contemplative as Augustine speaks there, it is not for this reason prevented from being practical if it is extended to practice in the superior part.

305. [Another opinion] There is another opinion, discordant from the preceding ones in its conclusion that science is speculative and practical. The proof for it is twofold. One way is as follows: just as a teaching in which there are some things written about law and other things about philosophy would be speculative and practical, whether they were written in separate books or intertwined and mixed, so too in this teaching [of theology] speculative and practical things are treated of together, not in separate books and chapters but intertwined and mixed; therefore it is speculative and practical.

306. Again it is proved in this way, that no speculative knowledge treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, nor does any practical science treat more distinctly of things to speculate than is required by the knowledge of them for the action it is extended to; this science treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, and more distinctly of things to speculate than is required for practical knowledge by the knowledge of them; therefore it is speculative and practical. – The major is plain, because

things to speculate are considered in a practical science only on account of practical consideration, and doable things are considered in speculative science only on account of speculative consideration. The minor is plain, because this science treats of doable things as distinctly as if it were precisely about them, and of things to speculate as distinctly as if it were precisely about them.

307. Against this it is argued thus: a habit that does not have evidence from its object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects (for then it would be necessary to posit two infused faiths); this habit [of theology] does not have evidence from its object, therefore it is not distinguished according to distinction of objects; therefore it is not two habits on account of the distinction between things to do and things to speculate.

308. Further, although the said opinion about two habits could have some probability about theology as it is handed down in Scripture, yet about theology in itself, whose subject is the divine essence as this essence (in the way said about the subject of theology [n.167]), it does not seem probable; for as to that object, since it is most truly a single knowable, some knowledge truly one is of a nature to be first had about it; if there were some other knowledge which was not about it but about some other first thing, that other knowledge will not be theology in itself. Therefore theology is a habit simply one, although perhaps there could along with it exist in Scripture some knowledge that was about some other subject.

309. Again, it is plain that the order of sciences with respect to eminence is in relation to one thing alone, because there cannot be two sciences simply first; that single and sole eminence I say is theology, which alone is first about the first subject of theology.

310. Further, I reduce the reason for it [n.306] to the opposite conclusion: that knowledge is practical in which the determination of things to speculate on is no greater than pertains, on the part of knowledge of them, to practice or practical knowledge; this knowledge [of theology] does not treat of things to speculate on more distinctly than knowledge of them requires for directing practical knowledge and practice; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: any knowledge at all of the conditions of the desirability of the end, and of the conditions of what is for the end insofar as it is for the end, and third of the conditions of anything of the sort or of other things, about which conditions the operative power can err unless it is directed, is necessary for practical knowledge; no knowledge here treats of the end or of what is for the end without being of this sort; therefore etc. Or at any rate it is possible for an ignorant will to err about them, as will be said in the solution of the third objection [n.322] against the principal solution of the question.

311. The assumption is plain, because any conditions handed down about the end are of a nature to show more the desirability of the end, and the conditions of the things that are for the end are of a nature to show more the things ordered to the end.

312. To the argument [n.306], it is plain that the minor is false. In proof I say that the end and the things for the end could not be treated so distinctly without the whole knowledge being practical for a created intellect, because the whole knowledge is of a nature to show the end under the idea of desirability and to show the things that are for the end under the idea of their order to the end, or in respect of whatever an undirected will could err about.

313. [Another opinion] – Another opinion holds the same conclusion, but posits along with this that theology is one habit simply.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] and this because of its one subject, which is God, in which come together all the things that are considered in this science. For all of them fall under the consideration of this science insofar as they participate in something divine, and therefore whether it consider them by comparison to work or not, as in the case of purely speculative science, but because of the formal unity of the subject this science is single. – Against this opinion thus: whenever something common is divided first through certain opposite differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found under some one thing contained under that common thing; but science in common is divided first into practical and speculative; therefore it is impossible for these differences to be found together in some one science. The major is manifest, because if differences that jointly divide some common thing could be compatible with each other in something contained in common, then the same body could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and non-sensible, and the same man rational and irrational, which is absurd. The minor is plain from Avicenna at the beginning of his *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70ra), and from the Commentator in his first comment on *Ethics* 1 [Eustratius, I preface (1A)]. Again, a contradiction about one and the same thing would follow, namely that it is extended and not extended, and many other disagreeable results follow. – An addition.

B. Scotus' own Opinion

314. [On the theology of necessary things] – To the question [n.217], therefore, I reply that since an elicited act of will is most truly action, even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is plain from the first article [nn.230, 232, 234-235]), and since extension of practical knowledge consists in conformity to action and in aptitudinal priority (this is plain from the second article [nn.236-237]), it follows that that knowledge is practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but the whole of theology necessary for a created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to it; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that the first object of theology is virtually conform to right volition, because from the idea of it are taken the principles of rectitude in the will; it also determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of action itself, with respect to all the necessary elements of theology, naturally before any created will wills them, otherwise they would not be necessary; therefore from the first object there follow both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus extension to action, from which extension knowledge itself must be called practical. A confirmation of this reason is that the first object of theology is the ultimate end, and the principles in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions too are practical.

315. If an objection be made against this from what was said in the preceding question, where it is said that God is not the first subject here as he is the end but as he is this essence [nn.167, 195]; but the principles taken from the end as it is end are practical; therefore etc.

316. Again, knowledge of the ultimate end is not immediately conform to, nor is it of a nature to be conform to, the eliciting of action; therefore it is not proximately practical.

317. Again, the first object virtually includes conformity to right action, but it does not include only the knowledge that is thus conform; otherwise there could not be

speculative science about it, which seems discordant. For how is this truth practical ‘God is triune’ or ‘the Father generates the Son’? Therefore the first object includes some speculative knowledge. Therefore from the virtual conformity of the first object to action it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths that are most theological insofar as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative.

318. Again, the science of God, which is about the same first subject, would in that case be practical, and it seems that the reason for the solution to the question [n.314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as to the created intellect.

319. To the first [n.315] I say that the respect of the end is not what the principles are taken from in any science, but the absolute subject is on which the respect is founded; that subject is ‘this essence’.

320. To the second [n.316] I say that what virtually contains conform knowledge is virtually conform, and thus is practical knowledge, because practical conclusions have practical principles; but the knowledge proximate to the one which is about the end is knowledge of enjoyment of the end, and it is of the nature to be formally conform to the action of enjoyment.

321. To the third [n.317] I say that the first object includes only knowledge that is conform to right volition, because by virtue of it nothing is known about the will that is not either rectitude of some will or virtually includes knowledge of such rectitude. And I concede what is inferred as a discordance in the consequent, that there can be about it no speculative science; for necessarily knowledge of it and of anything intrinsic known through it is aptitudinally conform to action and prior, if what is known is necessary.

322. When an instance is drawn from the truths, which seem to be most truly theological and not metaphysical, ‘God is triune’, ‘the Father generates the Son’ [n.317], I say that those truths are practical. The first indeed virtually includes knowledge of the rectitude of love tending toward the three persons, such that if the act were elicited about one of them alone by excluding another (as an unbeliever would elicit it), the act would not be right; the second includes knowledge of the rectitude of the act which is about two persons one of whom is thus from the other.

323. And if it be objected against this that only what is essential is the reason for terminating the act of love; but theology is more properly about the personals than about the essentials, because several essentials can be known by the metaphysician; therefore theology, as it is distinguished from metaphysics, is not practical as to what is most proper to it. The proof of the first proposition is that otherwise there would be some reason of lovability in one person that was not in another, which is false, because then no person would be blessed in itself.

I reply: an essential is absolutely a reason for terminating the act of love as the ‘that because of which’, but the persons terminate the act of loving as what are loved. For it is not sufficient for rectitude of the act that it have the formal reason that is fitting to the object, but there is also required that it have the fitting object in which such formal reason exists. So, over and above the knowledge of rectitude which the essential includes in the act of loving God, the personals include the further proper knowledge of the required rectitude.

324. To the fourth [n.318], one could concede that the theology of God about necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is of a nature to generate, as it were, the knowledge conform to right volition that is naturally

prior to the volition itself. That it is conform is plain. That it is also prior is proved because the intellect naturally understands the first object before the will wills it; therefore it can naturally have, prior to the will, all the knowledge sufficient for it virtually included in the understanding of the first object; of such sort is any necessary knowledge whatever of the first object. The assumed consequence is plain, both because, if all will were *per impossibile* excluded, the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in the understanding of the first object, since that understanding precedes volition; – also because the divine intellect is not discursive; therefore it does not naturally understand the first object before it understands anything as to knowledge that is virtually included in the object; therefore, if it understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything as to knowledge that is included in the first object before the will wills (this second proof of the consequence is less strong).

325. If it be objected that the divine will will not be the first rule of itself in its act if its act is preceded by the knowledge it should be conformed to so as to act rightly; the consequent seems discordant, because the supreme freedom of the divine will is taken away if this will is determined by another and not first by itself to its first act. But if all its acts are preceded by practical knowledge, it will be determined to its first act by the intellect, because it cannot dissent from it; for then it could commit sin.

326. Again, it was said above that the Philosopher consequently speaks well if intelligence naturally loves God when seen; therefore a knowledge that shows God is not practical. Let there be a like consequence about God naturally loving himself.

327. Again, something that directs is a cause in respect of something directed, so there is a real distinction between them; but there is no such distinction of God's intellection to his willing. A confirmation of the reason is that, if one understands an act of will to have already been elicited, the intellect is not directing, for its direction only concerns something to be elicited as being prior to it; but in God his willing does not follow the being of the will, so his willing there is never something to be elicited, as it were, but is always as it were elicited; therefore etc.

328. It seems here that, in consequence of what has been said [nn.274-277, 310-312, 314, 319-320, 322-323], one must say that, when one takes the rule for what gives right guidance in action, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually includes the knowledge of the rectitude necessary to any action, just as the first object of speculative science first includes knowledge of truths of speculation. But this first rule, which is the end, gives right guidance to the intellect and the will according to the order that those powers naturally have in acting, such that it generates knowledge conform to right action as it were before right action or before it makes action right; and in this way there will be another power that is right prior to the power that acts, so that it seems that the consequent deduced in the first reason [n.325] must be conceded. Although it is criticized [n.325], one could say that, just as freedom is universally consistent with previous apprehension, so supreme freedom is consistent with the most perfect previous apprehension; but the most perfect apprehension of action includes the knowledge of conformity when it necessarily agrees with action.

329. When it is further argued that it would then be determined by something else [n.325], one must deny this by speaking of the determination that is done by a sufficient agent. For although it could not disagree with knowledge that is right and prior to action, yet it is not as if the intellect is by its knowledge a sufficient cause actively determining

the will to act, but this is from the perfection of the will, which is of a nature only to act in conformity with the prior power in acting, when that prior power acts perfectly about its object, that is, when it knows in advance as much as it can know. But I say this about contingent things, of which the divine intellect does not have all the knowledge possible to it before any act of the will; therefore, as to those contingent things, I say that it is not necessary for it to act in conformity with the prior power, because it does not itself have in advance conform knowledge of such object. But it is otherwise as regards knowables that are of themselves necessary, because these contain the most perfect account of themselves without any act of will.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] To the second [n.326] it can be said that it is not similar, because there is there simple being pleased, but here there circumscribed efficacious willing. Likewise, the divine will is not merely ostensive, but it is at least equivalently directive, because it is an objectual, though not potential, regulation and determination, which the Philosopher did not posit. – To the third [n.327] I say that, if it was conclusive, it would follow that there was neither any intellection nor any volition in God, since the divine essence is the moving object for both, and thus, along with the concurring part, it is a vital power as joint cause; I say therefore that there is only an order of quasi-effects of the same quasi-cause in the proposed case, which order however is not distinct from the quasi-effects, because these effects are neither properly caused nor produced, nor do they have a principle, nor are they elicited, but they simply flow out; the causality therefore is metaphorical, as commonly happens in divine reality. Or in another way, when upholding that the intellect in some way or other directs, the assumption is denied when speaking properly of cause. To the confirmation [n.327] I say that the order of nature suffices, which order stands along with simultaneity in duration of the knowledge for action and of the will for willing, and thus the answer is plain to the arguments, when one upholds the first way.

330. Now although this response seems to avoid the argument [n.325], and although the subsequent arguments might be avoided [n.326-327], yet one must respond otherwise and say that necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because there is no natural priority of conformation or directive intellection to the will to make it conform or to direct anything; because once any knowledge whatever of the rectitude of action has been posited, although it could of itself conform a conformable or directable power from without, yet it could not conform the divine will with respect to its own first object, because the will is rectified by itself alone with respect to that object, for either it naturally tends toward it or, if it tends freely, it is not of itself in any way as it were indifferent to rectitude or in any way from without as it were possessed of that rectitude, and so determinate knowledge of rectitude is not necessarily prior to volition as though the will required it in order to be rightly elicited; but all that is required in advance is the showing of the object; and the knowledge that is of itself directive it does not require in advance as directive but only as ostensive, and so if the mere showing of the object could precede the will and if knowledge of the rectitude necessary for action could follow (in the way that will be said of action about contingent things [n.333]), volition would be rightly elicited equally in this case as in that. Therefore intellection is not now prior and conformation or regulative.

331. To the argument, therefore, that proves the priority of knowledge of rectitude to right action [n.324], one can reply that although there is some priority of intellection to volition, yet it is not prior such that it requires right cognition to be prior to action, because such priority is priority of the rule to the thing ruled, which is not the sort there can be when the will is in every way its own rule in acting.

The sum of this controversy about the science God has with respect to himself, whether it is practical or not, consists in this: whether the knowledge which of itself would be directive in action, if it were granted that the power in the knower which is right or is active were directable in its acting, is practical from the fact alone that it is directive, or is not practical from the fact that the power in the knower which is active is not directable. He who holds one side or the other will answer accordingly.

332. [About the theology of contingent things] – From this is introduced the second article of the question, namely about the theology of contingent things, whether it is practical or not [nn.314, 324, 330; 1 d.38 q. un. nn.1-4]. I say that the theology of contingent things can be practical only in that intellect which can have determinate knowledge of the rectitude of action prior to all volition of the one who has the intellect, or prior to the elicited action itself, because only there is this theology of contingent things able to be or is conform to action and prior to it. Of such sort is every created intellect, because in the case of no created intelligence does the will first determine the contingent rectitude that is fitting to its action.

333. But in the divine intellect contingent theology cannot be practical if one holds onto these two points, namely that practical knowledge and the action to which it is extended ought necessarily to belong to the same supposit,^a and that of God as an actor there is no action save volition (if one does not posit in him a third power other than intellect and will), for no knowledge conform to action or to a right contingent will precedes in the divine intellect its right action or God's volition itself, because such rectitude is first determined by the will for that action.

a. [*Interpolation*] and if of another supposit, then it would be practical, because it would be of the directible or determinable power of the other supposit, namely of the power of some created supposit or other.

334. The first point is true, for if any knowledge at all about someone else's action is practical, then my knowledge of the fact that God creates the world or that an intelligence moves the heavens, will be practical. This at least seems to be conclusive, because the practical knowledge cannot belong to a lower intelligence or understanding when something else is acting according to the action in question, nor, by parity of reasoning, to a higher or equal intelligence if it is contributing nothing to the action of the doer; but if it does contribute something, the higher intelligence does now have its own action with respect to which its knowledge would be practical.

335. Again, if practical knowledge has any causality with respect to the action to which it is extended, and if it only naturally has such causality in the first respect of action in the one who understands, the thing proposed [n.333] seems to follow.

336. To the contrary: therefore about the same thing one intellect would have practical knowledge and another speculative, if action were possible to one intellect and not to the other.

One can say that perfect rectitude of action includes the circumstance of the doer just as it does the other circumstances as well, so that without it there is no rectitude. For if one takes 'God is to be loved' and does not add by what, namely by the will, it is not a practical truth completely, because God is not to be loved by a brute; therefore this perfect truth 'God is to be loved by God' is practical in any intellect whatever; thus too this truth 'man should sometimes fast' is practical not only to the man who knows it but

also to an angel and to God; so also this truth is practical to man and to God ‘the heaven is to be moved by an angel’, – and I concede as something discordant what the first proof infers [n.334].

337. And if it be objected that the priority of practical knowledge to action is not preserved – for love with respect to himself is right before a man or an angel could understand ‘God is to be loved by God’ – I reply: this priority ought to be from the object and the intellect, that is, that it naturally determine the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude of action, namely as far as it is of itself in advance of action; in this way this object is of a nature to determine any intellect whatever to the knowledge ‘God is to be loved by God’ as far as it is of itself in advance of action, although some intellect, because of its own imperfection, is not determined before the acting power, because of its own perfection, acts.

338. To the other objection [n.336] I say that just as the will can be a superior cause with respect to the action of the moving power, not however any will at all with respect to any power at all, for example, not my will with respect to the moving power of an angel, but when it is in the same subject, so that if it is a practical cause with respect to action, this is in the same knower and the same doer; nor is it necessary that in someone else it be non-practical, unless one takes practical strictly for what is immediately applicable to a work to the extent it depends on the identity of subject in knower and doer, which immediacy is denoted [in Latin] by the infinitive that signifies the action when it is construed with the verb ‘to know’ – for in this way it is conceded that only God knows that he loves himself [Latin infinitive: ‘to love himself’] infinitely although an angel might know that he is to be infinitely loved by himself.

339. Someone who thus responds must from the beginning concede that every truth about the action of created agents is known by some acting intellect, because all these truths are of a nature to be conform to action, or to determine the rectitude of action (whether from the object if they are necessary, or from something else if they are contingent), before the action is elicited. But all truths about divine volition are practical if necessary but not practical if contingent, because these, in advance of the action’s being elicited to which they are extended, do not have conformity, for they do not have any determination of rectitude; for example, God knows practically that man should repent and that the angel should move, but not that God should wish a holy man to repent and an angel to move.

340. If you ask of what sort theology of contingents is in itself when not compared with this intellect or with that, one can say that it is in itself the sort it is from its object; but from its object it is not conform to action in advance of every action, because no determinate knowledge of contingent rectitude is of a nature to be had from the object; therefore from its object it is not practical, therefore it is speculative, if knowledge is sufficiently divided between these [n.303]. Congruent with this is that in the divine intellect it is denied to be practical [n.333]; for a thing seems to be such in itself as it is in a perfect instance in that genus and not as it is in an imperfect one.

341. If it be objected that then knowledge in itself speculative is for someone practical, to wit for a created intellect, therefore the practical is not repugnant to the speculative, I reply: to be speculative from the object is to be speculative *per se*; so, to be practical from an object that sufficiently determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude – and if sufficiently then prior to volition – is to be practical *per se*. It is in this

way that these two are opposed, as are also these ‘not-extendable to action’ and ‘extendable to action’. But to be practical from something other than the object, to wit from an extrinsic cause, as from the will determining the intellect to knowledge of action, is to be accidentally practical; thus I concede that the theology of contingent things is practical for us, though in itself it is speculative.

342. Against this: that to which one opposite *per se* belongs the other opposite belongs neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; therefore knowledge in itself speculative is not practical either *per se* or *per accidens*.

I reply: although the antecedent might be expounded of *per se* in the first or in the second way, not however in the third way, the way in which it signifies the same as the solitary [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a-34-b10], yet I concede that in no way of inhering does the opposite of this predicate inhere which is ‘*per se* practical’ or of this predicate ‘*per se* speculative’, because contingent theology *per se* in the second way is *per se* practical or speculative, so that the inherence is both *per se* and the predicate is determined by the ‘*per se*’. But to be *per accidens* practical is *per accidens* not opposed to that inherence, just as to be black simply and to be white in some respect are not opposed; for ‘in some respect’ and ‘simply’ determine predicates as they are denominative. If it is argued ‘it is *per se* to be *per se* speculative, therefore it is *per se* speculative’, I concede the point, but to this predicate the predicate ‘*per accidens* practical’ is not opposed.

343. But if the one of these two [n.333] that is held by that response is not held, then it can be conceded that contingent theology, although it is not in itself practical because not so from its object, yet in every intellect created and uncreated it would be practical *per accidens*, because in the divine intellect it can conform to action before the action is elicited by a created will; for the intellect of God knew that the adult sinner in the New Law should be punished before the sinner is punished. And by not holding to the first of the two above mentioned, the knowledge of God about the action of some other actor is practical; also by not holding to the second of them, to wit by positing the action of God extrinsically to be an action of his formally different from the will of God, although the divine intellect does not know by any ‘it must be created’ before his will wills it, yet he knows before he creates, and so conform knowledge precedes the extrinsic action, although it is not conform from the object but from something else.

344. This at any rate I hold to, that the theology of contingents is not practical *per se* or from its object; yet for a created intellect it can be practical *per accidens*, and that in the intelligence to whom it belongs to act according to the action for which rectitude is determined by the divine will. But as to whether it is practical to the divine will, by holding those two positions [n.333] or the opposites [n.343] it is plain what should be said as a consequence. These three things, however, seem to be probable: first, that the practical is regulative in the action of the contingent, and second that it is regulative of the power of the doer who is set right by something other than himself, and third that in God the only power that acts is will. From the first and third it follows that if divine knowledge is practical, it is rectificatory or regulative in divine volition; but this is false from the second of those things that were said [n.333], because the will of itself first rightly elicits willing with respect to the first object, but with respect to the second objects, which it is contingently related to, it is determined by itself alone, not by any preceding knowledge of rectitude.

VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

345. To the principal arguments of the first question. To the first [n.217] I say that faith is not a speculative habit and that to believe is not a speculative act, nor is the vision that follows believing speculative, but practical; for the vision is of a nature to be conform to enjoyment and it is first naturally had in the intellect so that right fruition may be elicited in conformity with it.

346. To the second [n.218] one must say that the contingent thing that practical science is about is the end or what is for the end; but in doable things action is the ultimate end according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139b3-4; therefore the contingency of action suffices for the object of practical science.

347. Against this is argued, first, that science is of necessary things; therefore there is no science about contingent things. The antecedent is plain from the definition of 'to know' in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b15-16.

348. Likewise from *Ethics* 6.2.1139a3-15, the scientific is distinguished from the calculative by reference to the necessary and the contingent [n.226], therefore all the habits of the scientific part are about the necessary; but science is a habit of that part; therefore etc.

349. Further, if theology is about the contingent doable, therefore it is a habit of action along with true reason; but, as is said in *Ethics* 6.5.1140b20-21, this is the definition of prudence; therefore theology is prudence, not science.

350. To the first [nn.347-348] I reply: there are many necessary truths about contingent things, because it is a necessary conclusion that an act that is contingently elicited should be such as to be right; about it, then, there is science as far as concerns the conclusion necessarily deduced, although it is in itself contingent as far as it is elicited by its proper power.

The response is then plain to the authority of the Philosopher in the *Posterior Analytics* [n.347]: science is of something necessary that is said about the contingent, and so necessary truths are included in the understanding of the contingent, or they are deduced about something that is contingent by reason of some prior necessary thing [*Posterior Analytics* 1.8.75b24-25, 33-36; n.212].

The same point provides the response to the authority of the Philosopher in the *Ethics* [n.348], that the habit of the calculative part is about the act insofar as it is contingently elicited; but the scientific habit or science is about the same thing insofar as something about it is necessarily deduced. If it be objected that there is not the same object for a scientific habit as for a calculative one, we will speak about this next [n.351], how there can be the same object for several habits, although not the same habit for several objects.

351. To the second [n.349] I say that it would prove that moral science is prudence, for moral science is a habit of action along with true reason. Therefore I say that the definition of prudence must be understood of the proximate habit of action, such as is the habit acquired from acts. Hence, just as art is related, in respect of things to be made, to the habit of the man of experience, so is moral science related, in respect of

things to be done, to the habit of prudence, because the habits of art and of moral science are as it were remote givers of direction, since they are universal; but the habits of prudence and of the man of experience, because they are generated from acts, are particular and proximate givers of direction. This exposition is necessary, otherwise there would be no practical science, because any practical science is a habit of doing or of making; but the conclusion is discordant and contrary to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b25, as it seems, and against Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70ra), and against other authors.

352. To the third reason [n.219] that Boethius understands by theology metaphysics. And as to what he says about the substance of God, I say that God is considered in that science insofar as it is possible in acquired sciences to consider him.

353. To the next [n.220] I say that it is a mark of nobility in an inferior that it reaches what is superior, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 7.14.1333a21-22. Hence the sensitive power in man is nobler than the sensitive power of a brute, because in man it is ordered to the intellective power. It is therefore a mark of nobility in science that it is ordered to the act of a nobler power. But the Philosopher does not posit any science to be conform to the action of the will about the end, because he did not posit the will to have action about the end but as it were a certain simple natural motion, and therefore he did not posit that there could be any nobler science through conformity to the end; if however he had posited some action about the end, he would not have denied, as it seems, that practical science in respect to that action was nobler than speculative science about the same thing, for example, if there were some speculative science about what moral science is about, he would not say that the speculative science was nobler than the moral science. But we do posit that there is true action about the end, to which knowledge is of a nature to be conform, and therefore that practical knowledge about the end is nobler than any speculative knowledge. Therefore the first proposition of the argument [n.220], which it seems could be taken from the *Metaphysics*, although the Philosopher does not expressly say it, is to be denied.

354. To the first proof of it [n.220] I say that what is for its own sake is nobler than what is for the sake of some act inferior to it; but whatever he posits as practical is for the sake of something lower than speculative consideration, because it is at any rate about some object inferior to what he posits as the object of speculative consideration; and therefore whatever he posits as practical is less noble than something speculative. Now what is for the sake of some other act, nobler than its own act, is not, because of such order, less noble; for then our sensitive power would be less noble than the sensitive power of the brute.

To the second proof of the denied proposition, when the discussion is about certitude [n.220], I say that any scientific knowledge with respect to its object is equally certain proportionally, because any science makes resolution to its immediate principles; but it is not equally certain in quantity, because these knowables are more certain than those. Thus everything that the Philosopher posits practical science about is a less certain and perfect knowable in itself than what he posits some speculative science about; therefore some speculative science according to him is set down as more certain in quantity than any practical science. But we posit the doable knowable, that is, what is attainable by doing, which is truly action, to be in itself most knowable, and therefore the

science of it is not exceeded by any other science either in quantity or in proportion of certitude.

355. To the other reason about necessary existents [n.221] I say that this science was not invented for the sake of extrinsic necessities but for intrinsic ones (as namely for the order and moderation of passions and actions), just as moral science, if it were invented after all extrinsic necessities had been possessed, would no less be practical. Now this science was not invented ‘for escaping ignorance’, because many more knowables could be handed down in so great a quantity of doctrine than have here been handed down; but here the same things are frequently repeated, so that the listener may more efficaciously be induced to the doing of the things that are here proved.

VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question.

356. To the arguments of the second question. To the authority of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* [n.223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as known; for the intellect that is calculating for the sake of something is calculating for the sake of the end as known and as principle of demonstration.

357. To the second authority from the *Metaphysics* [n.224] I say the practical is not for the sake of use as for its *per se* end; yet it does have some relation to use, such that use is its *per se* object, or something that virtually includes use, of which sort the only being the Philosopher posited was being for an end; and every such object is less noble than the object of speculation; and therefore such order to action proves the ignobility of the practical in respect of the speculative.

358. To the third authority from the *Metaphysics* [n.225] I say that the speculative and practical have diverse ends speaking of ends *per se* within the genus of knowledge, but those ends do not first distinguish them, but there is a prior distinction from the objects, as was said before [nn.252-255, 259, 265-266].

359. To the reasons for the opposite position when argument is given against making distinction by objects:

To the first [n.249] I say that a speculative habit and a practical habit cannot be about the same object. – But when the opposite is proved through the remark of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* that “the intellect is made practical by extension,” I say that the Philosopher does not say the following, namely that the speculative intellect is made practical by extension; but Aristotle, when he posits three grades of intellect, of which the first considers speculables only, the second considers doables, not by commanding to pursue or flee, he says that “by extending itself further it intends to pursue or flee,” so that this extension is of intellect imperfectly practical to consideration perfectly practical, for example from apprehension of things terrible to a complete command about them, prescribing flight or pursuit. A concession, however, that the speculative intellect is made practical is not to the purpose, because ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ are accidental differences of the intellect, although they are essential differences of habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.

360. To the other about medicine [n.250], some say that the universal habit is speculative but when from it the particular habit is acquired it becomes practical. – On the contrary: then from speculative principles a practical conclusion would follow, which is discordant.

361. Therefore one must speak otherwise and say that when there are extreme opposites, the more something departs from one of the opposites, so much the more does it approach the other; the consideration that most has the idea of the practical is the one that is of a nature to be immediately conform formally to the action to be elicited; therefore the more something departs from that, so much the more does it approach the speculative; therefore the universal habit, which is not of a nature to be immediately conform to action, can be said to be in a way speculative with respect to a habit that is immediately of a nature to be conform to the action to be elicited. In this way art could be set down as a speculative habit with respect to the habit of the man of experience, because art, as being a more universal habit, is not thus immediately directive, as appears from *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a14-24, “the one with the art will err, the one with experience will not err.” In this way medicine can be distinguished into the speculative, namely the one that is about universal causes and cures, which is a knowledge more remote from the action to be elicited, and into the practical, which is about particulars and things closer to action and more immediately conform to the action to be elicited. However, in truth that more universal knowledge, which is called speculative comparatively, is simply and most truly practical, because it virtually includes the particular knowledge that is formally conform to action.

362. To the next one about moral goodness and badness [n.251] I say that not every good act is good first from the circumstance of the end as end, nay some act is good from the circumstance of the object, to wit when the end is the object, and there the circumstance of the end as object first gives rectitude to the act [nn.263-264]; for the act is from the object alone simply good, as the act ‘to love God’ is simply good without any other circumstances. So it is false that the first goodness of the moral act is taken from the end as the end is contradistinguished from the object, nay it is false in a second way, because, although an act about what is for the end has the end for its first circumstance, yet there is from the object a prior goodness, the goodness by which an act is said to be good in its kind; the third response, directly to the purpose, is that although the circumstance formally circumstances the action so as to make it good, yet it does not formally circumstance practical understanding; for the intellect does not command an act moderately or in a middling way, such that it is circumstanced by this circumstance to command moderately, but the intellect commands the act according to the utmost of its power; but the ‘commanding’ is right from the principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.

363. Against this is that the distinction is not through the objects. The proof is that everything formally of a certain sort is of that sort by something intrinsic to it, therefore, if a habit is formally practical, this is by something intrinsic to it; but this is not the object; therefore etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot although it is virtually hot.

364. Further, the object only distinguishes the habit as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not distinguish the effect into species, because an effect the same in species can come from causes diverse in species, as a hot thing the same in species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and by the sun.

365. To the first [n.363] I say that being practical means intrinsic to knowledge just as aptitudinal respect means intrinsic to the foundation, and that some knowledge is naturally apt to be referred [sc. to something else], that is by a nature intrinsic to the knowledge, which nature it has from the object as from its extrinsic cause. I say then that

a habit is practical by what is intrinsic as by the formal cause, but by the object, which is extrinsic, as by the efficient cause.

366. To the second [n.364] I say that although from essentially ordered causes, one of which is univocal and the other equivocal, there can result, when each is causing, an effect one and the same in nature, as in the example of heat, however, when proximate causes of the same order to the effect cause something insofar as these causes are distinct, especially if each is univocal with the effect (whether the univocity is complete or diminished), there cannot result from such distinct causes an effect of the same nature. I say univocity is complete when there is likeness in form and in the mode of being of the form; I say univocity is diminished when there is likeness in form although the likeness has another mode of being, in the way that the real house outside comes from the house in the mind of the builder (hence the Philosopher calls this generation ‘in some way’ univocal, *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a21-25). Because therefore the object is the proximate cause with respect to knowledge and is univocal, although in a diminished way, it follows that the formal distinction of objects, since these cause knowledges insofar as they are distinct, necessarily includes a formal distinction of knowledges.

First Distinction

First Part

On the Object of Enjoyment

Question 1

Whether the object of enjoyment per se is the ultimate end

1. On the first distinction,³⁶ where the Master³⁷ treats of enjoying and using, I ask first about the object of enjoyment itself, and first whether the object of enjoyment *per se* is the ultimate end.

Argument that it is not:

First, by the authority of Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30: “Invisible goods are what is to be enjoyed;” but there are many invisible goods; therefore the ultimate end is not the only thing to be enjoyed.

2. Again, by reason: the capacity of the enjoyer is finite because the idea or nature of the subject is finite; therefore the capacity can be satisfied by something finite. But whatever satisfies the capacity of the enjoyer should be enjoyed; therefore etc.

3. Again, there is something greater than the capacity of the soul, as God, who is sufficient for himself, and something less than the capacity of it, as the body; therefore there is something in the middle, namely what is equal to the capacity of it; this thing is less than God; therefore I have the proposition intended, that not only God or the ultimate end is to be enjoyed.

4. Again, any form at all satisfies the capacity of matter; therefore any object at all satisfies the capacity of a power. The proof of the consequence is that a power relates to the object through the form received; and if one received form satisfies intrinsically, the result is that the object that the power relates to through the form satisfies extrinsically or terminatively. The proof of the antecedent is that if any form does not satisfy the matter, then the matter, while that form is persisting in it, would be naturally inclined to another form, and it would as a result be violently at rest under that first form, for whatever prohibits something from what it has a natural inclination to is violent for it, as is clear in the case of a heavy body at rest away from the center.

5. Again, the intellect assents more firmly to a truth other than the first truth; therefore, by similarity of reasoning, the will can assent more firmly to a good other than the first good.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, Ambrose [Ambrosiaster *On Galatians* ch.5, 22] on the verse of *Galatians* 5.22-23: ‘But the fruit of the Spirit is love, joy,’ etc., says that he here speaks, not of ‘works’, but of ‘fruits’, because they are to be sought for their own sake; but what is to be sought for its own sake is enjoyable; therefore it is fitting to enjoy virtues; but the virtues are not the ultimate end; therefore etc. And there is a confirmation of the reason, that the good is by its essence the due object of enjoyment; but the virtues are good by their essence.

³⁶ Rubric by Scotus: “On the object of enjoyment two questions are asked, on the act of enjoying itself two questions are asked, and on the one who enjoys five questions are asked.”

³⁷ Master Peter Lombard, the author of the *Sentences*, around which the *Ordinatio* is organized.

6. To the opposite is Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.5 n.5: “The things one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and these three are one thing,” therefore etc.

I. To the Question

7. In answer to this question I will first distinguish between enjoyment taken as ordered and taken in general, second I will speak of the first object of ordered enjoyment, third of the object of enjoyment in general, fourth of how one must understand enjoyment to be about the end – whether about the end truly ultimate, as in the second article, or about the end not truly ultimate, as in the third article.

8. [Article 1] – I say that enjoyment in general is more extensive than ordered enjoyment, because whenever some power is not of itself determined to ordered act, its act in general is more universal than its special ordered act; now the will is not of itself determined to ordered enjoyment, as is plain because supreme perversity can exist in it, as when things to be enjoyed are used and things to be used are enjoyed, according to Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30. Now ordered enjoyment is of the sort that is naturally right, namely when it is ordered according to the due circumstances, but enjoyment in general is whether it has those due circumstances or not.

9. [Article 2] – As to the second [n.7] it seems to be the opinion of Avicenna that ordered enjoyment can be about something other than the ultimate end. The proof is from his remarks in *Metaphysics* 9 ch.4 (104vb-105rb), where he wants the higher intelligence to cause through its act of understanding the lower intelligence; but it seems that the thing produced is then perfect when it attains its own productive principle, according to the proposition of Proclus *Theological Education* ch.34 that: “each thing naturally turns back to that from which it proceeds;” but in such a return there seems to be a complete circle and so perfection; therefore the intelligence produced comes to perfect rest in the intelligence producing it.

10. Argument against this is as follows: a power does not rest except where its object is found to exist most perfectly and at its highest; the object of the enjoying power is being in general, according to Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.6 (72rb); therefore the enjoying power does not rest except where being is most perfect. This being is only the supreme being.³⁸

11. There is a confirmation by a likeness from matter to form: matter only rests under a form that contains the others, yet something intrinsic does not satisfy as the object does.

12. Again, an inferior intelligence seeing the superior intelligence either sees it to be finite, or believes it to be infinite, or sees neither its finitude nor its infinity. If it believes it to be infinite then it is not beatified in it because “nothing more stupid can be asserted than that a soul might be blessed in false opinion,” according to Augustine *On*

³⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, a power that is inclined to many objects does not rest *per se* in any single one of them perfectly unless that one includes all the *per se* objects as far as they can be most perfectly included in any single object; but the enjoying power is inclined to all being as to its *per se* object; therefore it does not most perfectly rest in any single being unless that being includes all other beings as far as these can be included in any single being. But they can be most perfectly included in one infinite being; therefore the power can only rest there in the supreme being.”

the City of God XI ch.4 n.2. But if it sees neither the superior intelligence's finitude nor its infinity it does not see it perfectly and so is not blessed. But if it sees it finite, then it can understand that something else can exceed it; now we in this way experience in ourselves that we can desire a greater good beyond any finite good at all that is shown to us, or that we can desire beyond any good another good which is shown to be greater, and consequently the will can love the greater good, and so it does not rest in that intelligence.³⁹

13. Others⁴⁰ argue against this opinion as follows: the soul is the image of God, therefore it is capable of him and can participate him, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIV ch.8 n.11: "for this reason is the soul the image of God because it is capable of him and can participate him;" but whatever is capable of God can be satisfied by nothing less than God; therefore etc.

But this reason does not proceed against the philosophers, because the assumed premise about the image is only something believed and is not known by natural reason; therefore the idea of image which we conceive is only something believed, but is not naturally known by reason, because the idea of image that we conceive is founded in the soul in relation to God as Triune, and therefore is not naturally known, because neither is the extreme it is related to naturally known by us.

14. Others argue against his opinion [n.9] in the following way: the soul is created immediately by God, therefore it does and would rest immediately in him.

But the antecedent of this reason is only something believed, and it would be denied by them [sc. followers of Avicenna] because he himself [Avicenna] lays down that the soul is immediately created by the last and lowest intelligence. Likewise the consequence is not here valid, nor the like one either made [n.9] on behalf of the opinion of Avicenna; for it is an accident that the idea of first efficient and the idea of end are conjoined in the same thing, nor does the thing give rest as far as it is the first efficient but as far as it is the most perfect object, otherwise our sensitive power, which according to one opinion is created by God, could not perfectly rest save in God; in the proposed case, then, the same thing is efficient cause and end because there is in the efficient cause the fullness of perfection of the object, but in the efficient cause with respect to why it is efficient cause there is not included the idea of end and of cause of rest.

15. Therefore I hold with respect to this article the following conclusion, namely that ordered enjoyment has the ultimate end alone for object, because, just as one should by the intellect assent to the first truth alone for its own sake, so one should by the will assent to the first good alone for its own sake.

16. [Article 3] – About the third article [n.7] I say that the object of enjoyment in general, as it abstracts from ordered or disordered end, is the ultimate end: whether this be the true end, namely the end that from the nature of the thing is the ultimate end, or the apparent end, namely the ultimate end which is shown to be ultimate by an erring reason,

³⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: "Again, I reduce [Avicenna's] reason [n.9] to the opposite, because the second intelligence causes a third intelligence – supposing one concede to him that it does cause it – only in virtue of the first intelligence; therefore it does not complete it by its own virtue but by a foreign virtue. But what completes something by reason of another thing does not bring that something to rest, nor does that something rest save in that other thing; therefore etc."

⁴⁰ E.g. Bonaventure.

or the prescribed end, namely the end which the will of its own freedom wills as ultimate end.

The first two members are sufficiently plain. The proof of the third is that just as to will or not to will is in the power of the will, so the mode of willing is in its power, namely to refer or not to refer;^a therefore it is in its power to will some good for its own sake without referring it to some other good, and thus by prescribing the end for itself in that.

a. [*Interpolation*] because within the power of any agent whatever is acting and the mode of acting.

17. [Article 4] – About the fourth article [n.7] I say that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable object, neither in the case of ordered enjoyment nor in the case of enjoyment taken generally. That it is not so in the case of ordered enjoyment is plain; both because the respect [sc. of end] is not included in the beatific object *per se* as far as it is the beatific object; and because that respect is a respect of reason only, just as is any respect of God to creatures (but a respect of reason cannot be the *per se* object or the idea of the *per se* object of enjoyment); and because if *per impossibile* there were some supreme object to which the will was not ordered as to its end, the will would still rest in that object although there is, by supposition, no idea of the end in it. In respect therefore of ordered enjoyment the idea of end is not, in truth, the proper idea of the enjoyable object, but it is a concomitant of the enjoyable object; in disordered enjoyment of an apparent end the idea of end is a concomitant of the enjoyable object (perhaps in the apprehension it precedes the enjoyment that is to be elicited in some other way, as the enticing idea of the object), but in the case of enjoyment of a prefixed end the idea of end follows the act, because ‘prefixed end’ means either the mode of the act or the mode of the object in the way such a prefixed end actually terminates the act, because the will by willing it for its own sake attributes to it the idea of end.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘to enjoy’ is taken in an extended sense for a love of the honorable that is distinct from love of the useful or of the pleasant; or ‘things honorable’ [sc. invisible goods] are there spoken of in the plural, not because of a plurality of essences, but because of a plurality of enjoyable perfections in God.

19. To the second [n.2] I say that a relation to a term or object that is simply infinite is necessarily finite, because what is for an end is, insofar as it is such, finite, even when taken as altogether proximate to the end, namely when taken along with everything that suffices for immediately attaining the ultimate end, and yet the idea of end, to which it is immediately related, is based only on the infinite. And this often happens in the case of relations of proportions or of proportionalities, but not of likenesses, because the first extremes are there maximally dissimilar. Thus in the proposed case I say that the relation between the power and the object is not one of likeness but of proportion, and therefore a finite capacity can be finite in nature, in the way its nature is finite, and yet be related to a term or object, as to its correlative, that is simply infinite.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] just as any being whatever for an end, however finite it may, is yet never referred to the ultimate end unless that ultimate end is infinite. Or in another way, and it comes back to the same, one should say that although the appetite of a creature is, in its subject, finite, yet it is not so in its object, because it is for an infinite end. – And if an argument is made about adequacy, namely that an adequate object satisfies, one should say that adequacy is twofold, namely in entity, and this requires a likeness in the nature of the things that are made adequate, and there is no such adequacy between the created power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object; the other adequacy is according to proportion and correspondence, which necessarily requires a diversity in the natures that are made adequate, and such adequacy does exist between the power of enjoyment and the enjoyable object. An example about adequacy between matter and form [n.21].

On the contrary, an adequate object would satisfy. – I reply: not one that is adequate in reality, but one adequate in the idea of object; such adequacy accords with proportion and correspondence.

20. I use the same reply to the other argument [n.3], that nothing is greater in the idea of object than the object that is proportioned to the soul; yet there is something greater, namely something that is attainable in a greater or better way than can be attained by the soul, but this ‘greater’ is not in the object but in the act. I explain this by an example: if one posits some white object that has ten grades of visibility, and if one posits a sight that grasps that white thing and some whiteness according to one grade and another more perfect sight that grasps them according to the ten grades, the second sight will perfectly grasp that white thing as to all grades of its visibility, because it will see that object with as much whiteness as can on the part of the object be seen; and yet if there were a third sight, more perfect than the second and more acute, it will see that white thing more perfectly. Hence there will not in that case be an excess on the part of the visible thing and of the object in itself, or of the grades of the object, because simply and in its uniform disposition it is the same thing, but the excess will be on the part of the seers and the acts of seeing.

21. To the fourth [n.4] I say that not just any form satisfies the appetite of matter in its total extent, because there are as many appetites of matter to forms as there are forms that can be received in matter; therefore no one form can satisfy all matter’s appetites, but one form might satisfy it most perfectly, namely the most perfect form; but that form would not satisfy all the appetites of matter unless in that one form were included all the others. To the proposed case, then, I say that one object can include all objects in a way, and therefore only that object would make the power rest to the extent that the power can be made to rest.⁴¹ But things are not altogether alike as to internal and external rest, because anything that is receptive is at rest internally when some finite thing has been received; but externally or terminatively it ought not to rest in something finite, because it can be ordered to something more perfect than it can receive formally in itself; because a finite thing can only receive a finite form although it very well has an infinite object. – When it is proved that any form brings matter to rest, because otherwise it would be violently at rest under any form whatever [n.4], I say that violent rest never happens except when the thing at rest is determinately inclined to the opposite, as in the example of a heavy object with respect to descent downwards and its being at rest on a

⁴¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “as was argued in the second article against Avicenna [n.10: canceled text in footnote 3].”

beam [n.4]; but prime matter is inclined thus determinately to no form, and therefore it is at rest under any form at all; it is not violently at rest but naturally, because of its indeterminate inclination to any form.

22. To the fifth [n.5] I say that the intellect assents to any truth because of the evidence of that very truth – the evidence which the truth produces naturally of itself in the intellect – and therefore it is not in the power of the intellect to assent to a truth more or less firmly but only according to the proportion of the very truth that moves it; but it is in the power of the will to assent more intensely to the good, or not to assent, although less perfectly than when the good is seen, and therefore the consequence does not hold of the true with respect to the intellect as it does of the good with respect to the will.^a

a. [Interpolation] To the sixth [interpolation to n.5] one must say that ‘to seek for its own sake’ is double, either formally, and in this way the virtues of which Ambrose speaks are to be sought after, or finally, and in this way only God is to be sought after. And to the confirmation one should say that being by its essence, or being such by its essence, in one way is distinguished from ‘accidentally’, and in this way any thing is what it is by its essence; in another way existing by its essence is distinguished from that which exists by another, and thus only God exists by his essence; for he is not reduced to any other prior being that might be more perfect than he or be his measure, and thus too only God is good by his essence.

Question 2

Whether the ultimate end has only the one idea of enjoyability

23. Second I inquire whether the ultimate end has only one idea of enjoyability, or whether there is in it some distinction according to which the will could enjoy it in respect of one idea and not in respect of another.

And that there is in it such a distinction the proof is:

Because in *Ethics* 1.4.1096a23-27, in the paragraph, “But further, because the good...” the Philosopher says, and the Commentator [Eustratius *Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics* 1 ch.6 (17E)], that, just as being and one are in all the categories, so also is good, and he speaks there specifically of the category of relation; therefore just as relation has its own goodness, so also does it have its own enjoyability, and consequently, since there are different relations in God, there will be in him different ideas of being enjoyable.

24. Again, just as one is convertible with being, so also is good; therefore, when these are transferred to God, they are transferred equally. Therefore just as one is an essential and a personal feature in God, so also is good and goodness; therefore just as there are three unities in divine reality, so are there three goodnesses, and the intended proposition is as a result obtained.

25. Further, an act does not terminate in an object insofar as the object is numbered unless the object is numbered as it is the formal object; but the act of enjoying terminates in the three persons insofar as they are three; therefore the object of enjoyment is numbered insofar as it is the formal object.

26. Proof of the minor: we believe in God insofar as he is Triune; therefore we will see God insofar as he is Triune, because vision succeeds to faith according to the

complete perfection of faith [*Prologue* n.217]; therefore we will enjoy God insofar as he is Triune.

27. To the opposite:

In every essential order there is only one first, therefore in the order of ends there is only one end; but enjoyment is in respect of the end; therefore etc.

28. Again, to the first efficient cause the ultimate end corresponds; but there is only one first efficient cause, and one under a single idea; therefore there is only one end. – The reasons is confirmed too, because the unity of the efficient cause is so great that one person cannot so cause without the other person so causing; therefore likewise the unity of the end is so great that one person cannot be end without the other person being end, and the intended proposition follows. – This second reason is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “The Father,” he says, “and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit as they are one Creator with respect to the creature.”

29. Again, just as there is in God one majesty, so also there is one goodness; but there is owed to him because of his majesty only one adoration, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.8, such that it is not possible to adore one person without adoring the other;^a therefore it is not possible to enjoy one person without adoring the other.

a. [*Interpolation*] as it seems

I. To the Question

30. This question could have a fourfold difficulty according to the fourfold distinction in divine things, the first of which is the distinction of essence from person, the second the distinction of person from person, the third the distinction of essence from attributes, and the fourth the distinction of essence from ideas. About the third and fourth distinctions I will not now speak, because it has not been shown of what sort that distinction is nor whether the things distinguished pertain to enjoyment [cf. 1 d.8 p.1 q.4 nn.1-26; d.35 q.un nn.12-16]. Therefore we must only look now into the first two distinctions.

And as concerns those two distinctions one must first see about the enjoyment of the wayfarer as to its possibility, second one must see about the enjoyment of the comprehender and that when speaking of absolute divine power, third about the enjoyment of the comprehender speaking about the power of the creature, fourth when speaking of the enjoyment in fact of the wayfarer and of the comprehender.

A. On the Enjoyment of the Wayfarer as to its Possibility

31. About the first I say that it is possible for the wayfarer to enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person, and this is even possible in the case of ordered enjoyment. My proof for this is that according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: “if essence is said relatively it is not essence, because every essence which is said relatively is something after the relative has been removed;” from which he concludes: “wherefore, if the Father is not something for himself, he is not something which can be said relative to another.” The divine essence, then, is some conceivable object in whose concept relation is not included, therefore it can be thus conceived by the wayfarer; but

essence thus conceived has the idea of the supreme good, therefore it also has the perfect idea of enjoyability; therefore one can also enjoy it in an ordered way.

32. A confirmation of this reason is that one can deduce from purely natural facts that the supreme good is one, and yet from those natural facts we do not conceive God as he is Triune; therefore about the supreme good thus conceived one can have some act of the will, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore one will have an ordered act of enjoyment about the essence and not about the person as we now conceive the person. The converse, however, is not possible, namely that one might enjoy in an ordered way the person without enjoying the essence, because the person includes the essence in the idea of itself.

33. Second I say also that the wayfarer can enjoy in an ordered way one person without enjoying another. My proof is that with respect to the three persons there are three distinct articles of faith; therefore one person can be conceived to whom one article corresponds, and then in that person the idea of the supreme good is conceived; one can therefore enjoy the person thus conceived without enjoying another.

If you say the person is a relative notion, therefore it cannot be conceived unless its correlative is conceived, I reply: although the knowledge of a relative requires knowledge of its correlative, it is nevertheless not necessary that the knower and enjoyer of one relative know and enjoy the other relative, because it is possible to enjoy God insofar as he is Creator without enjoying the creature that is nevertheless the term of that relation. – Likewise, although the Father is said correlatively to the Son and therefore cannot be understood insofar as he is Father without the Son being understood, yet he is not said relatively to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Father; therefore it will be possible to conceive the Father as Father and to enjoy him without conceiving and enjoying the Holy Spirit.

B. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Absolute Power of God

34. About the second article [n.30] it is asserted that it is not possible, when speaking of the absolute power of God, that anyone who comprehends should enjoy the divine essence without enjoying the person.

The proof of this is first about vision [about enjoyment see nn. 40-41], namely that it is not possible absolutely for any intellect to see the divine essence without seeing the person:

The first proof is thus, that confused knowledge is imperfect knowledge; the vision of that essence cannot be imperfect; therefore the visual knowledge of it cannot be confused. But if it were knowledge alone or vision alone – about the essence and not about the person or of the essence and not of the person – it would be confused vision, because it would be of something common to the persons and would not be of the persons, which seems discordant.

35. The second is as follows: vision is of what is existent as it existent and as it is present to the seer according to its existence; and in this respect vision is distinguished from abstractive understanding, because the latter can be of what is not existent or of what is existent insofar as it is not present in itself; and this distinction in the intellect between intuitive and abstractive understanding is like the distinction in the sensitive part between act of vision and act of imagination. Intuitive knowledge of the divine essence,

then, is other than knowledge which is abstractive, because the former is vision of his existence as it is existent and as it is, according to its existence, present to the knowing power; but the divine essence only exists in the person; therefore there can only be vision of it in the person.

36. Again, something in which there are many things distinct on the part of the nature of the thing cannot be known by intuitive knowledge unless all those things are also distinctly and perfectly seen. An example: whiteness is not seen distinctly unless all the parts at the base of a pyramid are seen, which parts are distinct on the part of the nature of the thing. But the persons are in their essence also distinct on the part of the nature of the thing; therefore the essence is not distinctly seen unless the persons are seen.

37. From this there is an argument to the intended proposition [n.34] as concerns the second distinction, namely the distinction of the persons among themselves [n.30], because if the essence cannot be seen save in the person – and it is not seen more in one person than in another, because it is seen with equal immediacy to be related to any person whatever – therefore it cannot be seen unless it is seen in any person whatever, and so it is not seen in one person without being seen in another.

38. There is also an argument that goes further to the enjoying proposed [n.34], because the will cannot abstract its object beyond what the intellect can display of it; therefore if the intellect cannot distinctly display the essence without the person or the person without the person, then neither can the will distinctly enjoy them.

39. And there is a confirmation for this too, that the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of the object unless a distinction either real or in idea is posited on the part of the object; but if the intellect apprehends the essence and person indistinctly, there will not be on the part of the object a distinction either real or in idea; therefore the will cannot have a distinct act on the part of a distinction in the first object. That there is not a real distinction on the part of the object is plain; the proof that there is not a distinction in idea is that the intellect does not distinctively comprehend, or does not distinctly apprehend, this and that; therefore it does not distinguish this and that.

40. On the part of enjoyment the argument is as follows: enjoyment gives rest to the enjoyer; one person does not without another give rest perfectly to the enjoyment of the enjoyer, nor does the essence without the person, because then the power that is at rest therein could not be made to be at further rest; nor can it be made to be at rest in anything else, because what is at ultimate rest is not able to be made to be at further rest, and consequently that power could not be made to be at rest in another person or to enjoy it, which is false.

41. Again, if it were at rest in this person alone, and it is plain that it can enjoy another person, then either the enjoyment of the other person can exist with the enjoyment of this person, or these enjoyments will not be compossible, so that one of them will not exist with the other; if in the first way then two acts of the same species will exist at the same time in the same power, each of which acts is equal to the capacity of the power, which is impossible; if in the second way then neither act will be enjoyment, because neither act will be able to be perpetual.⁴²

⁴² Text cancelled by Scotus: "Again, in our soul there is by nature the image of the Trinity; therefore the soul cannot be made to rest except in the Trinity; therefore it cannot enjoy anything in an ordered way except the Triune God."

42. [Scotus' own opinion] – As to this article [n.34] I say that, speaking about the absolute power of God, there seems to be no contradiction in its being possible on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will that the act of each should be terminated in the essence and not in the person, or terminated in one person and not in another, to wit that the intellect should see the essence and not the person, or see one person and not the other, and that the will should enjoy the essence and not the person or enjoy one person and not the other.

43. Proof for this is as follows:⁴³ some act has a first object on which it essentially depends, and it has a second object on which it does not essentially depend but does tend

⁴³ Text cancelled by Scotus: "The Father is in origin perfectly blessed before he generates the Son, because he gets from the person produced no perfection intrinsic to himself. Blessedness is a perfection intrinsic to the blessed person. But if in the prior stage the Father is perfectly blessed, then in the prior stage he has the object as making perfectly blessed; but he does not seem in that prior stage to have an essence communicated as object to the three persons, but an essence absolutely, or an essence as it is in one person only; *per se* then it is not of the idea of the essence as it is the beatific object that it beatify insofar as it is communicated to the three persons, and so there seems to be no contradiction, either as to enjoyment or as to vision.

Response: the Father has the essence for object as it is in the three persons, and yet he has it first according to origin, because he has it of himself as an object for himself, and this is to be first in origin; but there is no other priority there according to which his essence, as it exists in one person and not as it exists in another, is an object for himself, just as neither in any prior stage of nature is it an object for one person and not for another, but it is an object only for one person from himself and an object for another person not from himself.

On the contrary: any of the persons whatever understands formally with the intellect as it exists in that person, not as it exists in another person, nor as it exists in all three, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore in this way it seems that each person understands by perfectly understanding the essence as it exists formally in that person; therefore perfect understanding, which is beatific understanding, does not necessarily of itself require that the essence is understood as it exists in the three persons.

Proof of the consequence: the intelligible thing is required for understanding no less than the intellect; therefore in one who understands perfectly of himself there is required no less that he have in himself the object as it is formally intelligible than that he have in himself the intellect whereby he understands.

The reason is confirmed because if the Father were by the beatific vision to understand the essence as it is in the Son, therefore he would as it were receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son. The consequence is proved by the argument of the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b28-35, where he proves that God does not understand something other than himself, because then his understanding would be cheapened since it would receive perfection from the intelligible thing; therefore it is so here, nay rather, what is more discordant, the Father would as it were receive perfection simply, which is the beatific vision, from the three persons as from three objects, or from something as it exists in the three. And then two absurdities seem to follow: first that the Father does not have all perfection from himself, because of the fact that the whole and essential perfection simply is not in any person prior to the properties, but some part of it is as it were posterior to the persons themselves, namely the part that is from the object as it exists in the three.

Again, if the intellect as it exists in something produced were the principle of the Father's beatitude, the Father would not be blessed of himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12; therefore if the essence as it exists in the thing produced were the *per se* object of beatitude, the Father will not be blessed of himself. The proof of the consequence is that the object as object is no less required for beatitude than is the intellect.

Response: it is required as present but not as existent within; the intellect is required as existent within, because by it one formally understands; not so by the object. An example: [the Archangel] Michael is not blessed except by his intellect existing within him; but he is blessed by an

toward it in virtue of the first object; although, therefore, the act could not stay the same in the same way unless it had a relation to the first object, yet it could stay the same without a relation to the second object, because it does not depend on the second object. An example: the act of seeing the divine essence is the same act as that of seeing other things in the divine essence, but the essence is the first object and the seen things are the secondary object; now the seeing could not stay the same unless it was of the same essence, but it could stay the same without being of the things seen in the essence. Just as God, then, could without contradiction cooperate with that act insofar as it tends to the first object and not insofar as it tends to the second object, and yet it will be the same act, so he can without contradiction cooperate with the seeing of the essence, because the essence has the idea of the first object, but not cooperate with the same act of seeing or of enjoying insofar as it tends to the person, and, by parity of reasoning, insofar as it tends to one person and not to another.

44. From this comes response to the arguments against this way [n.34]. As to what is said first about confused vision [n.34], I say that the universal in creatures is divided among its singular instances; but this 'to be divided' is a mark of imperfection and so it does not belong to what is common in God, nay the divine essence, which is common to the three persons, is of itself a 'this'. So that is why knowledge of some universal abstracted from singulars is confused and imperfect, because the object is confused, being divided among the things which are confusedly conceived in it. But the knowledge of the divine essence is distinct, because it is of an object that is of itself a 'this', and yet there is no need that in this distinctly conceived object the person be distinctly conceived or known, because the person is not the first term of enjoyment or of vision, as has been said [n.32].

45. To the second, when the argument is made about existent essence etc. [n.35], I say that it is necessary that the term of vision be existent as far as it is existent, but it is not necessary that subsistence, i.e. incommunicable essence, belong to the idea of the terminus of vision. But the divine essence is of itself a 'this' and actually existent,

object that does not exist within him, and he would be naturally blessed if he naturally had the object present to him although not existent in him; not so with the intellect.

On the contrary: of whatever sort something is of itself, it would be of that sort even if, *per impossibile*, any other thing whatever did not exist.

Again, the Father would receive something from the Son, or from something as it exists in the Son, as from the object of his beatitude; that which exists of itself does not necessarily require for its being anything which is not of itself, and this with a necessity as great as the necessity with which a dependent thing requires what it depends on.

This reason very well concludes that the Father has of himself, not only on the part of the intellect but also on the part of the object, the source whereby he is blessed, and consequently that he has of himself the essence as the essence is what makes him blessed; not, however, as it exists in the three, because in this way an object present of itself is required just as an intellect of itself is required, so that he might be blessed of himself. Here is a brief enthymeme: he is blessed of himself; therefore he has of himself the object as it is the beatific object; but he does not of himself have that object as beatific object as it exists in the three, because then as it exists in the Son it would *per se* as it were act on the beatitude of the Father.

Response: in comparison with the Father, the essence as essence is the first beatifying object, although it at the same time necessarily beatifies in the three; thus too does it necessarily understand creatures, although it does not expect understanding from them but from the essence which it has of itself; thus the first object can, in comparison with the created intellect, be posited without the second object. The manner of positing it is as follows: etc. [as in the body of the text].

although it does not of its idea include incommunicable subsistence, and therefore it can as a 'this' be the terminus of vision without the persons being seen. An example: a white thing is seen intuitively insofar as it is existent and is present to vision according to its existence; but it is not necessary that the white thing be seen as subsistent or insofar as it has the idea of a supposit, because it does not have the idea of a supposit, nor does it have the supposit in which it exists or is seen. As to the form of the argument, then, it is plain that although vision is of the existent insofar as it is existent, and although it is existent only in a person, yet the inference does not follow 'therefore it is of the existent insofar as it exists in a person', but what should be inferred is only that it is of what subsists or exists in the subsistent.

46. To the third [n.36] I say that the first proposition is false except when the first thing seen in those things that are distinct on the part of the nature of the thing is itself distinct, as is clear in your example about the base of the pyramid, for whiteness and a seen white thing are distinguished into the parts in which they are seen, and therefore the white thing is not distinctly seen unless the parts in which the seen white thing is distinguished are distinctly seen. But in the intended proposition, although the divine persons are distinguished on the part of the thing, yet the seen essence is not distinguished in them, because it is of itself a 'this'; therefore the essence can be distinctly seen without the persons that subsist in it being seen.

47. As to the further deduction about the will [n.38], although there is no need to reply to it, because the antecedent must be denied, yet one can reply that the consequence does not seem to be necessary. When it is said that 'the will does not abstract more than the intellect displays', I say that the intellect can show some first object to the will and in that first object something that is a *per se* object and not first (and here the whole of that in which the act of the power terminates is called 'first object', and what is included *per se* in the object that first terminates is called '*per se* object'). Now each idea there shown [the idea of first object and of *per se* object] suffices for the will to have its own act with respect to it; for there is no need that the will wills the whole of the first object shown, but it can will the first object shown and not will what is shown in that first object shown. Take the following sort of example: in bishop-hood is shown priesthood; such showing suffices for the will to have an act of willing or of not willing with respect to priesthood, so that it could from this showing have an act of willing with respect to bishop-hood and not with respect to priesthood; and yet there is only one showing, and a showing of one first object, in which first object however is included something as *per se* object. I say that the will does not abstract the universal from the singular, but there are many willed things shown by the understanding to the will, and this understanding is of several different things included in the first object, each of which, as thus shown, can be willed by the will.

48. To the confirmation, when it is said that 'the object differs either in reality or in idea' [n.39], I say that it differs in idea. And when the proof is given that it does not, 'because the intellect does not conceive this distinctly from that' [n.39], I say that a distinction of reason does not require that the intellect possess them as distinct objects, but it is enough that it conceive them in the first object.

49. To the point about rest [n.40] I say that the Father rests in his essence as it is in himself; nor does it follow that 'therefore he cannot rest in it as it is in the Son or the Holy Spirit', for rather he rests in the essence as communicated to them and does so with

the same rest with which he rests in the essence as it is in himself. For that which rests first in some object rests in it as to whatever it is according to that mode of it; so here, if the blessed were to enjoy the essence first and then the person, they would not rest with a further rest beyond what they were resting with before but with the same rest, because the object is complete in giving rest as it exists in any one of them and was not first complete as it existed in that one.

50. Using this in answer to the fifth argument [n.41] I say that there will not be two acts there, because whatever act there is of enjoyment or of vision there is of the first object under one formal idea; but that one act can be of everything or of the object *per se* by virtue of the first object, or it can be only of the first object itself; there will not then be two acts, at the same time or in succession, of the same species.⁴⁴

C. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender when Speaking of the Power of the Creature

51. As to the third article about the power of the creature [n.30] I say that the intellect cannot by its own natural power see the essence without seeing the person, because, since the intellect is of itself a natural and not a free power, when the object acts the intellect acts as much as it can; therefore if the object on its own part acts by manifesting the three persons to the intellect, it is not in the power of the intellect to see part of what is shown and not to see some other part of what is shown.

52. Likewise neither is it in the power of the will to have ordered enjoyment thus by not enjoying thus, because just as it is not in the power of the will not to enjoy in an ordered way (for if it was not enjoying, though unimpeded in this respect, it would be sinning and deserving not to enjoy), so it is not in the power of the will to enjoy something in an ordered way and not to enjoy whatever it can enjoy; and therefore it is not in its power, while remaining in an ordered state, not to have enjoyment under any idea under which it can have enjoyment.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: "To the other point about the image [in footnote 7 above] the response is clear from what has just been said."

⁴⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: "But about the absolute power of the will there is more doubt. However it can be said there that it is not in the power of the will to enjoy in this way and not to enjoy in this way, because although it is in the power of the will that some act be brought to be or not be brought to be, yet it is not in its power that the act once brought to be should or should not have the condition that naturally belongs to the act from the nature of its object. An example: although it is in the power of the will to elicit or not to elicit a sinful act, yet if the act, once brought to be, is disordered, it is not in the power of the will that the act so brought to be should or should not be disordered; now the act of enjoyment, as far as the nature of its first object is concerned, is naturally of the three persons in the essence, because on the part of the object – barring some miracle – it will of itself be of the three persons; therefore it does not seem to be in the power of the will that an act brought to be should or should not be of the essence as it exists in the three persons."

If you say that this reason concludes that it is not in the power of God that an act be of the essence and not of the three persons, I say that the conclusion does not follow, for the elicited act is in the power of God as to any condition that might naturally from the object be within his competence, and yet the act as to that condition is not within created power. An example: it is in the power of God that an act elicited by a sinful will be referred back to God because God refers it back to himself, but it is not in the power of the will, once the act has been brought to be, that the will *use* that act for God because the creature is *enjoying* the act; but it cannot at the same time *enjoy* a thing other than God and *use* that same thing for God. – The example does not, however, seem to be a good one, because that act of the sinner is referred back by one power and not by another. Let the example be dismissed

53. On the contrary: whatever is not necessarily concomitant to an act is within the power of the will that elicits the act; or in this way: whatever the act of will does not necessarily regard, the will itself, which elicits the act, also does not necessarily regard; or in this way: whatever can be separated as it is the terminus of the act of will can also be separated in respect of the power as eliciting the act.

D. On the Enjoyment of the Comprehender and of the Wayfarer when Speaking of the Fact of it

54. As to the article about the fact [n.30] I say that in fact there will be one vision and one enjoyment of the essence in three persons. And this is what Augustine says *On the Trinity* I ch.8 n.17: “Neither can be shown without the other,” and he is speaking of the Father and the Son; but the remark is to be understood of ordained power, of which Philip spoke when wanting the Father to be shown to him [*John* 14.8], as if he could in fact have seen the Son without the Father. And Augustine treats there of the words of Philip and Christ’s response. Augustine also means this in *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.26: “Perhaps we will see the whole of our knowledge in one view all at once.” And the fact that he says ‘perhaps’ does not refer to the beatific object but to the other things to be seen in it.

55. Likewise about the wayfarer I say that in fact necessarily the habitual, though not the actual, ordered enjoyment is of the three persons together; for no wayfarer or comprehender can have ordered enjoyment of one person without enjoying the other (that is, unless he habitually enjoys the other, namely that he is in proximate disposition to enjoying that other), if this person is conceived distinctly from that; and therefore enjoyment of one persons does not stand with hatred of a second person, because, as the Savior said, *John* 15.23: “he who hates me hates my Father also.”

II. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

56. To the principal arguments. To the first from the *Ethics* [n.23] I say that good is in one way convertible with being, and that in that way it can be placed in any category; but good in this sense does not have the idea of enjoyable object, and therefore it is not necessary that the idea of enjoyable object should exist wherever good taken in this way is found. For the idea of enjoyable object is not the idea of good in general but of perfect good, which is good without any defect, or is so at least in appearance or according to what has been prefixed by the will [n.16]; and the category of relation is not of this sort.

57. To the second [n.24] the reply is that the things that regard in a uniform way the essence and the person are only the essential features, if the ones that belong only to

then, and let the reason be held onto, because an accident necessarily consequent to an act once it has been brought to be cannot not be in the act as long as the act persists, and this accident is something subject to the divine will, though not to the created will which elicits it; so let it be said of a condition which, in respect of a secondary object, the act is of a nature necessarily, as far as depends on itself, to have, though not essentially to have; therefore that the condition not be present in the act is something subject to the divine will.”

the person are precisely the personal features; but things that under one idea regard the person and under another idea the essence are essential and personal features. 'Good' is related in the first way while 'one' is related in the second, namely 'indivision', which under one proper idea pertains to the essence and under another proper idea pertains to the person.

But on the contrary: the cause of this fact is what the argument [n.24] is looking for; for it runs: since these two things seem to be equally convertible with being and equally transferred to divine reality, therefore each of them will be equally essential features only, or each of them will be essential and personal features.^a

a. [No reply by Scotus to this argument is given in the *Ordinatio*. Replies are, however, given in the following interpolations] Therefore there is another response, that it is necessary for the object of enjoyment to be some quidditative good and not some perfection of a supposit, because the perfection of a supposit, as it is distinguished from quidditative perfection, is not the formal idea of acting, nor is it the formal idea of the term of any action; but quidditative perfection is only a perfection abstracted from a supposit, which of itself indifferently states or regards any supposit. And therefore it is necessary that goodness, as it terminates the act of enjoying, be only a quidditative perfection; but unity can be both the quidditative idea and the idea of the supposit, because it does not of itself state the idea of the principle of an act nor the formal idea of the term of any act. The good, then, is not the term of enjoyment when taken in any way at all but when taken quidditatively, because it is a quidditative perfection, which is an essential feature and not the idea of the supposit. But unity is in one way the essential idea and is in another way the idea of the supposit; in the second way it is not the formal idea nor the formal term of the act of enjoyment."

[Interpolation in place of this interpolation (from Appendix A)] But relation is not another thing or another goodness than the essence, therefore [the argument] is not valid. Therefore it can in another way be said that in the consequent of the first consequence only one sense can, by the force of the words, be held to, namely that this predicate, which is the being another thing than the essence, is present in the property; and thus the sense is false, because in this way a false thing, that which is inferred in the second consequence, well follows. And therefore I likewise deny the first consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are false and the consequent is false.

To the proof of the consequence I say that 'the same' and 'other' are not immediate in any predicate as said *per se* of a subject, nay not even contradictories are as it were immediates; for man is not *per se* white nor *per se* not-white. Yet between contradictories said absolutely of anything there is no middle; thus if a property is a thing, it is 'the same' or 'other', it is true that it is the same, but with '*per se*' it is not valid that it is '*per se* the same' or '*per se* other'.

[Two further interpolations follow on these interpolations (from Appendix A). The first interpolation] Therefore I say that being in its first division is divided into quidditative being and into being have quiddity, which is subsistent being. But now whatever is a formal perfection is quidditative being and quidditative entity; for formal perfection is what in any being is better existing than not existing. But nothing is such unless it is a quidditative entity insofar as it abstracts from subsistence. But subsistent being that possesses quiddity is what contracts that perfection, and it is not formally that quidditative perfection. But now it is such that one, which converts with being, is both quidditative being and subsistent being; and so it is both essential and notional. But good – as we are here speaking of it – in the way it states the formal idea of terminating an act of will, is quidditative essence; and therefore it is only essential. Etc.

[*Second interpolation*] To the third it can be said that, although necessarily an act of will follows an act of intellect, yet the mode of the will does not necessarily follow the mode of the intellect, because the intellect can make many formations about things that are not in the things, because it can divide what is united and unite what is divided, and thus it can form diverse ideas. But the will is borne toward the thing not according to the mode the thing has in the intellect but according to the mode of the thing. However, after a preceding showing by the intellect, only enjoyment states an act will that is terminated in some object, beyond which act it is not appropriate to proceed.

But in the terminating of something there are two things to consider, that which terminates and the idea of terminating, – just as light does not terminate but is the reason for terminating, while color terminates. In the same way the reason for terminating in respect of the act of enjoyment is the divine essence as it is a certain absolute form, on which the ideas of true and good follow, because on the idea by which it terminates the intellect the idea of truth follows, and on the idea by which it terminates the will the idea of good follows; but that which terminates is the essence existing in the three persons.

Then to the remark ‘we enjoy God under one idea’ [nn.34, 30]: that idea is the divine essence, what terminates is the essence existing in the three persons; one person cannot terminate without another – and he is speaking about ordered enjoyment.

Responses to the arguments are plain from what has been said.

The concept of essence is other than the concept of relation. The mode of the will does not follow the mode of the intellect, as has been said. Hence the intellect can form many ideas, and the will does not have to follow them. Hence the respect of an idea is a respect of reason, but it is not the object of enjoyment.

That ‘God can make a creature see the essence and not the person’ [nn.51, 30], the proof is that the vision of the essence and of the person, and of the attributes and of the creatures or the ideas, in the essence, whether they are two acts or one, come freely from God, and both, each, namely *per se*, are the same. Because, once the first has been produced, the other is producible freely and not by any necessity, therefore one is producible without the other. The consequence is plain.

The proof of the antecedent is that it is not repugnant by way of contradiction for the vision of the essence to be created and no vision with respect to the persons or with respect to the creatures in the essence to be created; the proof is that since the essence is an absolute and first and distinct object, different from creature or relation or person (*On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: ‘everything that is said relatively is something’, etc.), it can, as taken precisely and distinct from all the aforesaid objects, none of which it includes quidditatively as an essential or integral part, be the total object of an act of a created and limited intellect, whether intuitively or abstractly, although not of a created and unlimited intellect (but that is because of the infinity of the intellection, not because of the distinction of the object from other things). Thus it is plain that the intellect can distinguish this object from all others, and can therefore have an act only about it. Again, the intellect can abstractively understand it taken precisely, and therefore it can likewise do so intuitively. Again if, once the essence is seen, it cannot not see the attributes, then it cannot not see the infinite perfections glittering within it and so comprehend them, which is false.

Through this is made plain the solution to the argument ‘he who sees something white sees all the parts of it’ [n.36], because those parts are something in that white object, because they are integral parts, – just as, when seeing a man, perhaps animal that is included in him is seen, but not risibility.

On the contrary: the essence as distinct from the will presents itself to the blessed intellect, therefore it does so naturally; therefore as to the persons and the glittering creatables.

Again, to the same: the same principle has one mode of acting. But the divine essence presents itself naturally to the divine intellect, therefore to whomever it presents itself it presents itself naturally, and presents all the things that are in God.

58. To the third [n.25] I say that the ‘insofar as’ can denote only the fact that what follows is taken according to its formal idea or, in another, it can denote in addition that what follows is the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject. In the second way reduplication is taken most properly, because the reduplicated thing, whether it is taken for the whole of what it itself first is or for anything that is included in the understanding of it, taking reduplication formally to be always that for which it is taken, is marked out as being the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate in the subject.

To the proposed case, then, I say that if reduplication is taken in both ways in the major, the major is true and the minor is false; but if it is taken in the first way and not in the second, the minor is true and the major is false.

And when the proof of the minor is given [n.26], I say that in the first way of taking it [sc. ‘insofar as’] we will see the three insofar as they are three, that is, the formal idea of the Trinity will be seen, but the Trinity itself is not the formal idea of seeing or the formal cause of the inherence of the predicate, namely the predicate ‘enjoyment’ or ‘vision’, but the unity of the essence is. And when proof is given further through the act of faith [n.26], which is of the three insofar as they are three, or triune insofar as triune, I say that the case is not similar, because the divine essence does not cause in us immediately the act of belief as it will cause in us immediately the act of seeing, and that because of the imperfection of our understanding for the present state, because we understand the distinct persons from creatures and distinct acts. And therefore, as far as concerns our knowledge now, the Trinity can be the formal idea of knowing; but then the Trinity will be precisely known as it is and will not be the formal idea of knowing, because then it will be seen through the idea of the essence in itself precisely as through the idea of the first object.

B. To the Reasons for the Opposite

59. To the reasons for the opposite. To the first [n.27] I say that there is only one ultimate end in itself, although it has several distinct ideas which are not formally ideas of the ultimate end, and so one can enjoy it under the idea of the ultimate end without enjoying it under those ideas.

60. To the second [n.28] I say that, as was said in the preceding question [n.14], it is *per accidens* that the idea of efficient cause and the idea of end come together in the same thing, yet in fact there is one formal idea of the end itself just as there is one formal idea of the efficient cause itself, but in that one idea the power can be at rest although it is not at rest in the personal ideas that are in that end.

As to the confirmation when it is said that ‘one person cannot cause unless the other causes, therefore one person cannot terminate the act of enjoyment unless the other terminates it’ [n.28], I say that the conclusion does not follow; for while it does very well follow that one person from the nature of the thing is not the end unless the other person is the end, this conclusion does not follow about the end of the act as the act is elicited from the power, because the end of the act as elicited is that to which the power as eliciting orders the act and for the sake of which it elicits the act. But the end from the nature of the thing is the good, to which the act of its own nature is naturally ordered, not indeed by reason of the object which is attained by the act, but in the way that all created natures are in their degree ordered to the ultimate end.

To the authority from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.28], what is said there about the fact and the formal reason for the fact is plain.

61. To the final point about adoration [n.29] I say that there is one habitual adoration of the three persons, because whoever adores one of them habitually is subjecting himself to the whole Trinity; but this need not be the case actually; for he need not think actually of another person when he adores one of them, as is plain about someone praying to one of the persons by a prayer that is not directed actually to another person, as is clear in the case of the hymn ‘Come, Creator Spirit’, and in the case of many prayers established in the Church. Hence it is that the prayers of the Church are frequently directed to the Father and at the end the Son is brought in as mediator; therefore when someone actually directs his intention to adoring the Father, he need not then actually think of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, until after he introduces the Son in his adoration and thought, namely as mediator. And just as there is the same adoration in habit but not the same in act, so there is the same enjoyment in habit although not necessarily the same in act.

First Distinction

Second Part

On Enjoying in Itself

Question 1

Whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will

62. Next in order I ask about enjoying in itself, and first – on the supposition that it is something precisely of the will – I ask whether it is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight.

That it is delight my proof is:

Because the fruit is the final thing expected from a tree, and enjoying is said of fruit; but the ultimate fruit is not the eating itself but the delight is, because of which fruit is eaten and for which fruit is sought. Things are similar, then, in spiritual matters, namely that fruit is the final thing expected from the object; but delight is of this sort; because delight also follows the act, *Ethics* 10.4.1174b31-33, therefore it is the final thing; therefore etc.

63. Again, *Galatians* 5.22: “The fruits of the Spirit are peace, joy, etc.” All these things are passions – and especially joy, which is delight – or they are at least not acts but things consequent to act; but fruit is what we *per se* enjoy; therefore enjoying is something *per se* consequent to act, as it seems.^a

a. [Interpolation] Thirdly, Augustine *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13: ‘We enjoy things known, in which the very will in itself rests delighted’. So delight either is the same as enjoyment, and the proposition is gained, or it is something consequent and posterior (as a certain property), and thus the definition given of enjoying [n.62] is not appropriate, because the posterior is not put in the definition of the prior nor a property in the definition of the subject [n.72].

64. On the contrary:

The will loves God by an elicited act; either then it loves God for the sake of something else, and then it is using him and so is perverse, or it loves him for himself, and then it is enjoying him (from the definition of ‘enjoying’ [n.62]), and so enjoying is an act.

I. To the Question

65. In this question one must look first into the concepts themselves and second into the thing signified by the name.

66. As to the first I say that just as there are in the intellect two acts of assenting to some proposition – one by which it assents to something true on its own account, as to a principle, another by which it assents to some true proposition, not on its own account, but on account of something else true, as it assents to a conclusion – so there are in the will two acts of assenting to the good, one by which it assents to some good on its own account, another by which it assents to some good on account of something else to which it refers that good, just as the conclusion is assented to because of the principle, since the conclusion has its truth from the principle. This likeness can be got from the Philosopher

in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a21-22, where it is said that “in the mind there is affirmation and negation, but this in the appetite is pursuit and flight;” and so, further, just as in the mind there is a double affirmation, on its own account and on account of another, so there is in the appetite a double prosecution or adhering, on its own account and on account of another.

67. There is between these, however, a double difference. First, because the two assents of the intellect are distinguished by the nature of their objects; for they are different according to the different evidence of this and of that, and therefore they have distinct objects corresponding to them and causing them. But in the case of the will the assents are not from distinction of objects but from a distinct act of a free faculty accepting its object in this way or in that, because, as was said above [n.16], it is in its power to act in this way or in that, referring or not referring it [sc. to another]; and so there are no distinct proper objects corresponding to those acts, but any ‘will’-able good at all is had by the will for object according to this act or according to that.

The second difference is that the two assents of the intellect constitute a sufficient division of assent in general, nor is there any middle in between, because there is on the part of the object no evidence in between from which some other truth might be received than the truth of a principle or of a conclusion. But there is in addition to the two assents of the will some assent in between, because there can be shown to the will some good that is apprehended absolutely, not under the idea of something good for its own sake or good for the sake of something else. Now the will can have an act in respect of such a good thus shown, and not necessarily a disordered act; therefore it can have an act of willing that good absolutely, without any relation to anything else, or without any enjoyment of it for its own sake; and further, the will can command the intellect to inquire into what sort the good is and how it should be willed, and then it can in this way assent to it, – and the whole nature of the difference on this side and on that is freedom of the will and natural necessity on the part of the intellect.

68. From this one may say further: an act of an assent to a good for its own sake is a perfect act; but on a perfect act delight follows, from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore on an act of willing a good for its own sake some delight follows.

We have then in respect of the proposed intention four distinct things: an imperfect act of willing a good for the sake of something else, which is called use, and a perfect act of willing the good for its own sake, which is called enjoyment, and a neutral act, and a delight consequent to the act.

69. On the second principal point [n.65], namely to which of them the name ‘enjoying’ belongs, the answer can be collected from the authorities that speak about the word ‘enjoying’ [from Augustine nn.70-72]; it is plain that it is not the neutral act, nor is the act of use the act of enjoying, but the dispute concerns only the perfect act and the delight that follows it.

I reply: some authorities seem to say that enjoying is the perfect act alone, some that it is the delight alone; some that it includes both, and then it does not signify any being that is *per se* one, but one by aggregation from two beings, or a being *per accidens*: nor is it discordant that one name should signify many things, because the *Iliad*, according to the Philosopher at *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030a6-10, is able to signify the whole Trojan War.

70. That it is the act alone is seen from the authority of Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used.” Perversity exists formally in an elicited act of the will, not in delight, since delight is only depraved because the act is depraved, and delight is only in the power of the one delighted because the act is in his power; but sin insofar as it is sin is formally in the power of the sinner. This too Augustine seems manifestly to say *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.4 n.4: “To enjoy is to inhere by love to some thing for its own sake.” This inhering seems to be through the moving power of the inherer, just as in the case of bodies (from which the name ‘inhere’ is there metaphorically taken) inhesion is by virtue of the inherer.⁴⁶

71. But that enjoying is delight alone seems to be said by the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.8 n.18: “Full joy is to enjoy the Trinity;” but if the authority is not twisted toward causality or to some other understanding, which the words do not signify, joy is delight formally. Likewise too in the question alleged already from Augustine: “We enjoy the thing from which we receive pleasure;” if the phrase is meant as identity or as it were a definition, then ‘to receive pleasure’ is to enjoy essentially.

72. But that enjoying may be taken for both things, namely for the act and the delight together, is proved from the definition of ‘to enjoy’ in *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13: “We enjoy the things we know, wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests.” For to the act pertains what is said, that ‘we enjoy the things we know’, because to the act of will the object known is presupposed; but afterwards there is added ‘wherein the will delighted for its own sake rests’ etc., which, if delight were an accident of enjoyment, should not be placed in the definition of it.

Likewise, if it be posited that both the act and the ensuing delight essentially pertain to beatitude [cf. n.70 footnote], then all the authorities that say to enjoy is the highest reward or is our beatitude say that it includes each of them, both the act and the delight. The minor is said by the authority of Augustine in *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.22 n.35: “Supreme wages are to enjoy him himself.”⁴⁷

73. But one should not contend about the signification of the word, because according to Augustine *Retractions* I ch.15 n.4: “when the thing is clear, one should not force the words.” The thing is clear, because the will has a triple act, and a fourth, to wit the ensuing passion [n.68]; and to two of the acts this name in no way belongs [n.69];

⁴⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Likewise ‘inhesion in something for its own sake’ does not seem to be through delight, because the efficient cause of delight seems to be the delightful object and not the end, and thus the one who delights does not seem to tend to the object for its own sake. But this reason does not entail the conclusion – for it proceeds as if the object could not be the efficient and final cause of delight – and it must be solved by holding that delight is of the essence of beatitude, see 4 Suppl. d.49 p.1 q.7 nn.2-7.”

⁴⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: “But that it be the more proper signification of the word is difficult to prove, yet it can in some way be conjectured from the use of the word: for the word ‘to enjoy’ is construed with the ablative case to signify the object in transitive sense, such as is the construal appropriate to verbs signifying activity, but it is not construed with the object in the ablative case in causal sense, as is the construal due to passions signified by verbs that are primarily passive; for one does not say ‘I am joyed by God’ as one says ‘I am delighted by God’ or ‘God delights me’, but I am said ‘to enjoy God’ transitively in the way I am said ‘to love God’, and that seems to be the more proper signification of the word.” Scotus is here commenting on a peculiarity of Latin grammar, that the phrase ‘I enjoy God’ has a verb in passive form and an object in indirect or causal form (‘fruo Deo’), but in meaning it is active and the object is direct, as in ‘I love God’ (‘amo Deum’).

some people seem to use the word for either of the other two and for both together, and then it will be equivocal, – or if it is univocal some of the authorities [nn.70-72] must be expounded as speaking loosely or concomitantly.

II. To the Principal Arguments

74. To the first argument [n.62] I say that fruit is the final thing that is expected from a tree, not as something to be bodily possessed, but as something to be had by the act of the power that attains it as its object; for an apple is not the fruit insofar as it is expected as to be possessed but insofar as it is expected as to be tasted and to be attained by the act of tasting, which tasting is followed by delight; if therefore the fruit is said to be that which is to be enjoyed, delight is not the fruit, but that is which is to be expected last; but delight will not be the enjoying either if the first thing by which I attain the expected thing as expected is to enjoy it, – which seems probable, since fruit is what is expected under the first idea under which, as to be attained by the power, it is expected.

75. To the second [n.63] I say that the authority is to the opposite. For since the authority says that ‘acts are not fruits but passions are’, it follows that to enjoy is not to be delighted, because fruit is the object of enjoyment; but a passion cannot be the object first of itself as it can be the object of an act; therefore to enjoy, if it is of a passion as of its object, as the authority indicates, will not be a passion but an act, able to have for object those passions which are as it were proximate to its first object. – And when it is said that ‘we take joy in fruit *per se*’, this is not to be understood in the sense of formal principal, in the way ‘it is hot by heat’ is to be understood, but in the sense of object, as if one were to say that ‘we take love in the lovable’; now enjoyment is what, in the sense of formal cause, we enjoy by. But the authority does not say that enjoyment is something consequent to act but that fruit is, that is, the object of enjoyment.

76. The opinion that love and delight are the same is shown by four reasons: first, there is a single act of the same power about the same object; second, the same knowledge is followed immediately only by the same thing; third, things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same as well; fourth, things that have the same effects and the same consequences are the same. – Love and delight differ in idea just as from this to that and the reverse differ; also just as union and rest differ, or the privation of division and the privation of motion.

On the contrary: the definition of love in *Rhetoric* 2.4.1380b35-81a2 and the definition of delight in *Rhetoric* 1.11.1369b33-35 are different.

Response:

To the opposite about sadness, in four ways: not to want exists both in God and in the blessed; not to want does not require apprehension of the existence of a thing, or it is about that which neither exists in reality nor is apprehended as existing; not to want is most intense before the coming to be of the thing; I voluntarily do not want.

To the opposite about love: delight is the *per se* object of love, just as it is of the preceding desire, Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18: “The desire of him who yearns, etc.”

Again, Lucifer is able to love himself supremely, Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch. 28 and Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.4.

Again, the more intense the love the less the delight [cf. *Ethics* 3.12.1117b10-11, about the happier and more virtuous man being sadder at death].

Against the first distinction in idea, the agent is different [n.76, end of first paragraph]; against the second, union is a relation. The solution is in *Ethics* 10.2.1174a4-8.^a

a. [*Interpolation (from Appendix A)*] Now some say that love and delight are the same really but differ in reason.

The first point is proved in four ways. Firstly, because in the case of one power about one object there is one act. The proof is that the distinction of an act is only from the power or the object. – Secondly thus: on something the same there follows immediately only something the same; but, once the object possessed, love and delight immediately follow. – Again: things whose opposites are the same are themselves the same; but hatred and sadness are the same. The fact is plain because each introduces a certain inquietude. – Fourth thus: for they have the same effects and the same consequences. The fact is plain because each has to perfect an operation of the intellect.

The second is shown thus, that love is asserted on the basis of what comes from the power to the object, but delight on the basis of the reverse. Also, delight implies rest, which is the privation of motion; but love states union, which is the privation of division. Now these two privations differ only in reason.

But to the contrary. Firstly, that the opposites of them are not the same. The proof is that hatred is a certain refusal to will, but refusal to will does not require an existing object, while sadness does. – Secondly, that a very intense refusal to will precedes the event of a thing, but from the event such sadness arises. – Thirdly, because delight is *per se* the object of enjoyment, but love is not. – Fourthly, because a bad angel can love himself supremely. The thing is plain from Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch.28: “Two loves” etc. – Fifthly, because in *Ethics* 10 [no such reference is found, though there is something close in *Eudemian Ethics* 7.2.1237b35ff.] it is said that one loves old friends more, but finds more delight in new ones. – Again, the definition of love and that of delight differ. The thing is plain from *Rhetoric* 2.4.1380b35-81a2. – Again, where sometimes the love is more intense, there the delight is less. The thing is plain in the devoted.

To the first of these: the major is false. – To the second: the minor is false. – To the third: it has been shown that the minor is false. – To the fourth I say that they do not perfect in the same way, but delight is as it were an accidental perfection of it, as beauty in youth, from *Ethics* 10.4.1174b31-33, but love is as it were a commanded act or an act joining the parent with the offspring.

[*Interpolation*] Note the reasons that the same John [Duns Scotus], in d.1 q.3 in the Parisian *Lectura* [*Rep.* IA d.1 p.2 q.2], gives against this conclusion, that enjoyment and love and delight are the same really.

The first reason is founded on this that hatred and sadness, which are the opposites of love and delight, are really distinct.

His proof for this is that to hate something is not to want it; now not to want and to be sad are not the same thing, because the act of not wanting does not require an object apprehended under the idea of existing, which is what makes one sad, according to Augustine *On the City of God* XIV ch.6.

He also proves the same because it happens that the will changes from not being sad to being sad when there is a not wanting equally in place, because a thing intensely not wanted can precede the happening of that not wanted thing itself. Therefore, when the not wanted thing is posited as existing, the not wanting will not be more intense and it is then necessarily sad but before not.

Third, because the will freely elicits the act of not wanting as of wanting, but it is not voluntarily saddened; therefore not wanting is not being saddened. A confirmation is that when the will turns itself back on an act voluntarily elicited it has pleasure in itself, and so a

will willing itself freely not to want has pleasure in itself; but a will that turns itself back on being sad does not have pleasure in itself but is displeased; therefore etc.

The second reason: in God there is properly found the act of not wanting, but not the act of being sad. The assumption is plain, because just as God is by his willing the cause of things that come to be, so by his not willing he is a cause preventative of bad things.

The third reason: delight can be the *per se* object of some love of which love cannot be the *per se* object. The proof of this is that the will can choose to be delighted in the delightful thing itself when that delightful thing is absent, and of that choice delight is the *per se* object, but choice or love is not, because then the will would be turning itself back on its own act; but it is not necessary that the will turn itself back on its own act when it desires to be conjoined to its delightful object, or when it desires to be delighted in the delightful object when it will have become present; therefore when by an act of love it chooses the delightful thing or chooses to be delighted, it is not necessary that it be turned back, therefore delight can be the object of a love of which it is not the love.

Again, a bad angel can love itself supremely, and yet does not have delight. The thing is plain in Augustine *On the City of God* *ibid.* ch.28.

Again, a more intense love is compatible with a less intense delight, as in the case of the devoted/infatuated.

Question 2

Whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it

77. Second with respect to enjoying I inquire into the mode of eliciting the act, namely whether when the end has been apprehended by the intellect the will must necessarily enjoy it.

Argument that it must:

Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 8 ch.7 (101rb): “Delight is the conjunction of agreeable with agreeable;” the end necessarily agrees with the will; therefore from the conjunction of it with the will there is delight, therefore enjoyment.

78. Again, the end moves metaphorically as the efficient cause moves properly [cf. *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b9-11; 12.7.1072a26-27, 1076b3]; but an efficient cause proximate to the passive thing does, when not impeded, of necessity move properly; therefore the end that is proximate, namely present to the will, does, when not impeded, necessarily move metaphorically.

79. Again, everything changeable presupposes something unchangeable [*Physics* 8.5.256a13-b3]; therefore various and changeable acts of the will presuppose some unchangeable act; such an act is only about the end, therefore that act is necessarily unchangeable.

80. To the opposite:

Natural necessity does not stand with liberty. My proof for this is that nature and will are active principles possessing an opposite mode of acting as principles [*Physics* 2.5.196b17-22], therefore nature’s mode of acting as a principle does not stand along with the will’s mode of acting as a principle; but the will wills the end freely, therefore it cannot will the end by natural necessity, nor, as a result, in any necessary way.

Of the assumption, namely that the will wills the end freely, the proof is that the same power wills the end and what is for the end, therefore it has the same mode of acting, because diverse modes of working argue for diverse powers; but the will works freely in respect of what is for the end, therefore etc. – Now that there is the same power for both is plain,^a because otherwise there would, in the case of what is for the end, be no power willing it for the sake of the end; for the power must be one, having an act about both extremes, as the Philosopher proves about the knowing that belongs to the common sense in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b15-29.

a. [Interpolation] because the act of using is *per se* one act, therefore it is of one power, respecting *per se* each extreme.

81. Note, this reason [n.80] does not reject all necessity of unchangeableness but only natural necessity; therefore let there be a more general reason proving the opposite, – and then in the first article [n.83] what is set down is that there is natural necessity, but Henry sets down that the will tends freely to the end, others that it naturally does so: they agree in this common term ‘necessary’, therefore against them in general are the reasons given here against the opinion in the first article [nn.91-133], but against the mode ‘naturally’ in particular there is this reason [n.80], as well as Augustine in *Handbook on the Faith* ch.105 n.28 (Lombard, *Sentences* 2 d.25 chs.3-4; Scotus 1 d.10 q. un. n.10).

I. To the Question

82. This question can be understood either about the end obscurely apprehended in general, as we conceive beatitude in general, or about it obscurely apprehended in particular, as we conceive beatitude in the Triune God; or about the end clearly seen in one who has his will supernaturally elevated, as in the case of one who has a perfect will by supernatural habit, or fourth about the end clearly seen in one who does not have a supernatural habit in his will, and this on the supposition that God might, of his absolute will, show himself to an intellect without giving any supernatural habit to the will.

A. The Opinion of Others

83. [Article 1] – About these four articles [n.82] it is said first, as to the first, that the will of necessity enjoys the ultimate end thus apprehended obscurely and in general. There is a triple proof:

First by the remark at *Physics* 2.9.200a15-16: “As the principle is in speculative things, so the end is in doable things;” but the intellect of necessity assents to the first speculative principles; therefore the will of necessity assents to the ultimate end in doables.

84. There is a second proof for the same thing, that the will necessarily wills that by participation in which it wills whatever it wills; but by participation in the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that the will wills no other thing except insofar as that thing is a good; but every other good seems to be a participation in the ultimate end, which is the supreme good, as seems to be proved by Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3 n.4: “Take away this good and that good,” etc., “and see the good itself if you can, the good of every good.”

85. Third, the same thing is proved in this way: the will can only not will a thing that has in it some defect of good or some idea of evil; in the ultimate end apprehended in general there is no defect of good or any idea of evil; therefore etc.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.3 n.6, says that a certain mimic actor said that he knew what the many people present in the theatre wanted, meaning to understand this of happiness; but all those people would not want happiness or their ultimate end if they contingently wanted it; therefore they necessarily want it.

86. [Article 2] – As to the second article [n.82] it is said that when the end is thus obscurely apprehended in particular the will is able not to enjoy it; which can be proved because it can enjoy something which it knows to be impossible with such end, as is clear in a mortal sinner.

87. [Article 3] – As to the third article [n.82] it is said that the will necessarily enjoys the end thus seen because of the third reason to the first article [n.85], since no idea of evil is found in it, nor any defect of good discovered in it, – and this if it see the end with practical vision, whatever may be true of speculative vision; and there is added here that the connection, or the necessity of the connection, is so great that God by his absolute power cannot separate practical vision from the enjoyment of him.

88. [Article 4] – As to the fourth article [n.82] it is said that it is impossible for a will not elevated by charity to enjoy the end even when seen, because acting presupposes being; therefore supernatural acting presupposes supernatural being; but a will of this sort does not have supernatural being, therefore it cannot have a supernatural act.

89. Again, it would then be possible for such a will to be blessed. The consequent is false, because then charity would not be necessary for the beatitude of the will. The consequence is proved as follows, because to enjoy the end when seen in particular seems to be beatitude, or to include beatitude formally.

90. An argument is also given in another way thus: when vision is posited enjoyment is necessarily posited, when vision is not posited enjoyment is taken away; therefore vision is the total cause of enjoyment; therefore it is simply nobler. Proof of the first consequence: otherwise all knowledge is taken away of what the cause is whose ‘by’, or whose *sine qua non*, anything at all will act on itself.

B. Attack on the Opinion of Others

91. [Against article 1] – Against the first article I argue. First as follows: Augustine in *Retractions* 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4 says that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act.

92. From this come two conclusions: first, therefore the act of the will is more in the power of the will than any other act; second, therefore that act is in the power of the will not only mediately but also immediately.

From the first conclusion there comes further as follows: the act of the intellect about the end is in the power of the will; therefore the act of the will is too.

From the second conclusion there comes further as follows: therefore if the act of the will is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of some other power, much more is this act immediately in the power of the will; but to will or not to will the end is in the power of the will by the mediation of an act of the intellect; therefore this act is immediately in the power of the will. The minor is plain, because it is in the power of the will to turn the intellect away from consideration of the end, whereby the will will not will the end, because it cannot have an act about something unknown.

Response: it is supremely in its power because it is immediately in its freedom; everything else is in its power by the mediation of some other volition, including what is not free but not such that it cannot be contradicted.

93. There is a confirmation for this reason, namely the first against the opinion [nn.91-92], and it can count as the second reason, namely that what, when not impeded, is compelled to act, of necessity removes, if it can, what prohibits its action; therefore if the will when not impeded is compelled of its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes, if it can do so, everything prohibiting the volition; but what prohibits this volition is non-consideration of the end, and this the will can remove by making the intellect stand in consideration of the end; therefore the will of necessity will make the intellect stand in consideration of the end. – The major of this argument is plain, because that which of itself is necessitated to act will never be prohibited except by something opposing it that overcomes its active virtue, as is clear in the case of a heavy object; for a heavy object will be prevented from falling because of something opposing it that overcomes its downward inclination, and, by parity of reasoning, the heavy object will, if

it can, remove what is prohibiting it, and its fall is unimpeded once that thing is removed, because the heavy object removes what is opposing its effect as necessarily as it brings about the effect which that thing is opposing.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: "Confirmation for the reason [n.93]: wherever there is a necessary connection of extremes, there is also a necessary connection of the intermediates necessarily required for the union of the extremes, otherwise the necessary would depend on the contingent; but if the will necessarily enjoys an end shown to it, there will be a necessary connection of the terms among themselves and by the nature of those very extremes, therefore also of all the intermediates; but the one intermediate necessarily required for the union of those extremes is understanding of the end, therefore etc. Proof of the minor: if there is a necessary connection of the will to the end, it is a connection of the principal agent to the object about which it is acting; but necessity for acting can only exist in the principal agent through that by which it formally acts; but the will acts of its very self, therefore in itself will that necessity to the object exist. Therefore the first minor is plain. – The minor of the prosyllogism is proved in this way: a principal agent acts as a principal by no necessity save by that by which it acts as a principle, otherwise it would act by that necessity by which it is impossible for it to act; but it does not act as a principle save by that which is its formal idea of acting.

This confirmation seems to exclude a certain response that might be given to the principal reason, about necessity simply and conditioned necessity; for it proves that if the will also necessarily enjoys the end shown to it, then it does so on account of the proper reasons of those extremes, which reasons have of themselves a necessary connection; therefore the will does not depend on anything other than the extremes, and so it is absolute, although there will be a necessary connection of the extremes between themselves and therefore of all the intermediates in their order.

Response: the first minor is false unless it is understood of conditioned necessity, that is that, once understanding is presupposed, the necessity of enjoying which follows – which is a necessity in a certain respect, because it depends on the showing of the thing – that necessity, I say, is from the nature of the extremes; which is to say briefly: there is a necessary connection of the extremes if the showing precedes. But the minor is proved of absolute necessity by the nature of the extremes, therefore, in order to prove this, I reply to the minor and say that in a principal agent acting simply necessarily there is nothing by which it necessarily acts, and there is nothing required either for its acting necessarily, save only that by which it principally acts, because in a simply necessary agent the whole nature of its necessity is in it by that by which it is an agent. But in an something principally acting necessarily in a certain respect or conditionally the reason of its acting is not a sufficient reason for its acting necessarily but something else is required on which that necessity depends, because it is not from the idea of the agent alone. The second minor is therefore denied, because the conditioned necessity in something's acting is not from that alone by which it principally acts but from that along with the presupposition of something else. – To the proof of the second minor I say that in that 'act necessarily' two things are included, both that with respect to 'act' there exists one 'by which', namely the formal reason of acting in the principal agent, with respect to 'necessity' there does not exist that reason alone but along with it the presupposition of something else. To the form [sc. of the argument], therefore, I say that one should not concede that there is something by which it necessarily acts, but that for that necessity there is required both that by which it acts and something else by which it does not act. But because in the intended proposition that on which the necessity depends is the same as that on which the action also depends, and that by which it acts is that by which it acts with some mode of acting (either necessarily therefore or contingently), therefore in order to prove the second minor one can say in another way that that by which it is active is not that by which it itself acts except on the presupposition of something else, but when the other thing is presupposed then there exists that by which it necessarily acts. [The preceding paragraphs of this cancelled text are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.]

On the contrary: in the first instant of nature there is the preceding action, in the second the principal action. I ask how the principal acts in the second instant. If contingently, we have the intended proposition; if necessarily, then since it acts precisely through its proper form, both because it is acting principally and because what precedes is in no way its reason of acting, it follows that the form is then the reason for necessarily acting; but this is only possible from the determination of the

94. If an instance is made against this reason by saying that the will does not simply necessarily enjoy the end but with conditioned necessity, namely on the supposition that the end is shown to it, and if the major is said to be true of something acting simply necessarily, I reply: this is not a solution, because things that can be impeded do not act simply necessarily but with conditioned necessity, namely if they are not impeded, and of these things the major is true; therefore what is taken in the major is not ‘whatever necessarily acts necessarily removes, if it can, what removes it’ but: ‘whatever is not impeded necessarily acts’, etc. [n.93], where a specification is made in the major about conditioned necessity.

95. If an instance is made in another way that the major [n.93] is true of those things that have a necessity with respect to what is principally intended similar to the necessity they have with respect to things necessary for that thing, of which thing there are only natural agents, and these agents throughout the whole process up to the ultimate thing intended act merely of natural necessity – but the will in one way regards the end in which all goodness exists, and for that reason necessarily, and in another way regards any other being in which there is a defect of good, and therefore regards anything else contingently – on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme to regard with any necessity the other extreme without regarding with as much necessity any intermediate necessarily required between those extremes, otherwise a necessary thing would necessarily depend on a non-necessary thing; therefore the will tends to the end with the necessity with which it necessarily tends to the showing of the end, without which it is impossible for it to tend to the end.⁴⁹

96. If, thirdly, an instance is made to the minor [n.93], that non-consideration does not properly prohibit the will from enjoying, one might argue otherwise as follows: whatever necessarily rests in something present to itself, necessarily holds it present to itself if it has it and can have it; the will by you necessarily rests in the end presented to it; therefore it necessarily holds the end once presented to it so that it might always be present. – The major is proved by induction: if a heavy object necessarily rests at the center, it necessarily makes itself present to the center, if it can, and the center present to it, and necessarily holds onto that presence as much as it can. The thing is apparent in sensitive appetite; if this appetite necessarily rests in a present delightful thing, it

form to the object and to action on the object; therefore the extremes have of their nature a necessary connection, and so to the necessary intermediates. – Again, nothing makes one do that which is placed under a condition, therefore neither to make one do it necessarily; therefore if there is necessity from that condition, it will also equally be necessity simply.

Response to the first [objection on the contrary]: it acts in the second ‘now’ of nature necessarily, that is necessarily in a certain respect, because in the second ‘now’, namely as presupposing another ‘now’.

On the contrary: that which, when it acts, necessarily acts, simply necessarily acts, because ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’ determine action for the time when the cause acts; for the generator necessarily generates, although on the presupposition of alteration, as much as is in its active form. And then further: so it is determined simply necessarily, as much as in its form, to every necessary intermediate; it tends to this necessarily when it can, therefore it tends to every intermediate necessarily as much as or when it can.

Perhaps it is not in proximate potency save to operating about the object. – On the contrary: therefore it necessarily wills the understanding of the end if the end is presented to it as an understood object.

⁴⁹ The preceding paragraphs, nn.94-95, are marked by Scotus with the letters: a—a.

necessarily holds the sense as much as it can to that sensible object so that the object might be present to it to delight it. – The major is also proved by reason [mark k., see n.112] since⁵⁰ the fact that a thing necessarily rests in something present to it is on account of the perfect agreement of the latter to the former; on account of the same agreement it seems to desire equally necessarily the thing to be conjoined to itself as much as possible; but this conjunction takes place in the presence of the latter to the former.⁵¹

97. A response is made in another way to the major of the first reason [n.93], that it is true of what is said properly to be impeded, namely that it is prohibited from acting because of something else that overcomes its active virtue; it is not so here, but there is something else acting whose action is previous to the action of the will, and therefore the cessation of this something else is by extension said to prevent the will from willing, and about such the major is false. For although an agent that presupposes to its own action the action of another might move that other to act and, with that other acting first, would itself necessarily act by conditioned or concomitant necessity, yet it does not necessarily move that other to act first, because it does not simply necessarily act, just as that which is said properly to be impeded would simply necessarily act as much as depends on itself, although it only acts with conditioned necessity, namely on the supposition of the previous action; an example is about a power acting contingently, and yet once the act that generates the habit is in place it acts with the necessity of concomitance.⁵²

98. On the contrary: the necessity of acting only comes through something intrinsic to the active principle; the previous action is not something intrinsic to the active principle; therefore, once it has been removed, there is a necessity of acting, and so absolute necessity. – And then the reply is as before: if there is a simple necessity for acting, therefore there is a simple necessity for doing that without which it cannot act, provided however this is in its power; but here it is; therefore etc.

Confirmation: here the necessity is not of action to action, because one action is not the active reason with respect to the other; therefore the necessity is on account of the inclination of the power to the action; therefore the power is also necessarily inclined to the required intermediates, because there is no necessary connection between the extremes unless there is also a necessary connection of all the intermediates required for the connection of the extremes.

99. Response to these and to the principal argument [n.93]: here the necessity is conditioned, namely on the presupposition of something else; and I concede that the necessity is through something intrinsic to the principal agent and that it is a necessity in relation to the intermediates just as it is a necessity of the extremes to each other, but the whole is conditioned, namely by a presupposition of the showing of the object.

⁵⁰ Here Scotus gives as a superscript the letter: k.

⁵¹ The preceding paragraph, n.96, is marked by Scotus with the letters: e—e. Then there is some text cancelled by Scotus: “It is proved [note q. n.112] in another way, that what necessarily rests in a thing when present, necessarily as far as depends on itself moves toward it when absent, at any rate it is apt to do so, although it may be impeded by something; therefore just as it would by that necessity be actually moved if it were not impeded, so if it is a superior mover it moves anything inferior to itself by which it can take away the impediments; such a movable inferior to the will is in the present case an intellect movable to the consideration of the end” [this cancelled text is marked by Scotus with the letter: q].

⁵² This paragraph, n.97, is marked by Scotus with the letters: b—b.

On the contrary: an agent that can be impeded does not act simply necessarily but conditionally, ‘if it is not impeded’ [n.94], but yet it necessarily removes the impediment if it can; therefore so here. Nor is the first response valid, the one about what is properly impeded that ‘the will is not properly impeded by non-understanding’ [n.97].⁵³

100. [Again, propositions against article 1] g.^a Whatever^b power operates necessarily about the most perfect object and not about something else necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.133].

a. [Note by Duns Scotus, for the text from here to n.110] And they are against the first article of the opinion.

b. [*Interpolation in place of nn.100-114*] Against the first article [n.83] there is first the following argument: any power about a most perfect object presented to it, and it does not necessarily operate about anything else, necessarily continues its operation about that object as much as it can [n.100]; but the will necessarily operates about the ultimate end, which is the most perfect object, therefore it necessarily continues its operation as much as it can; the opposite of which we experience, because the will turns the intellect away from consideration of the ultimate end just as it turns it away from the consideration of other things. – There is proof of the major, and first in this way: the reason for necessarily operating is the same as for necessarily continuing the operation, if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can. Secondly, because if the power principally necessarily operates about the object when present, there is in the power itself a reason for always necessarily acting about it as far as depends on itself, or whenever it can if it can. Thirdly, because we see this in the sensitive appetite, and in the sense and the intellect. But it seems to be particularly true in the will, because the will does not cease to act of itself about any object save by turning itself away to some other object, whether a more agreeable or a more perfect one, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which prevents it operating at the same time about the first object; but the end is the most perfect and the most agreeable object; to it alone is it necessitated, to it most of all is it inclined, in it does it most rest, and in it is it most pleased; the willing of it is compatible with the willing of any other thing.

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to the supremely most perfect apprehended object alone, necessarily determines itself if it can to the continued apprehension of it once it is in place. The virtue of this argument depends immediately on the preceding reason. But will necessarily tends to the apprehended end that is the most perfect object, therefore etc.

Again, anything that necessarily acts once some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can; but once the previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will necessarily tends to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of it. The virtue of this reason is that necessity for an intermediate thing is the same as necessity for the extreme.

Again, anything that necessarily acts when some previous action is in place necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can [n.105]; but when a previous action of the intellect about the ultimate end is in place, the will tends necessarily to the ultimate end; therefore it necessarily determines itself to the action of the intellect as to the apprehension of the end. The power of this reason is that there is the same necessity for the end means as for the extremes.

Again, whatever acts necessarily about a present object necessarily determines itself to the presence of it if it can [n.107].

⁵³ The preceding paragraphs, nn.98-99, are marked by Scotus with the letters: c—c.

Again, any appetite that necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can [n.108].

To what is adduced against the first article, when it is said 'any power about, etc.' [at the beginning of this note], because the reason..." [continue as at n.114 below].

[*Interpolation to the interpolation for nn.100-110, from Appendix A*] a. Anything that, when not impeded, necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can.

b. Anything that necessarily acts when some previous action is in place, necessarily determines itself to that previous action if it can.

c. A principal agent that necessarily acts when anything is in place in a secondary agent, is necessitated by the principal active principle.

d. Anything that necessarily acts in the presence of the object necessarily determines itself, if it can, to the presence of it.

e. If a power necessarily principally operates in the presence of the object, there is in that power the idea, as far as depends on itself, of necessarily acting on the object always, or whenever it can if it can.

f. Any appetite that necessarily tends toward the object when it is known, necessarily determines itself to the knowledge of it if it can.

g. Any power that necessarily tends toward the sole supreme and most perfect object when it is apprehended, necessarily determines itself to the apprehension of it if it can.

h. Any power that necessarily operates in the presence to it of the most perfect object, necessarily continues the action as much as it can.

i. Any power that necessarily operates-rests in the presence of the object, is necessarily moved, as far as depends on itself, toward that object when it is absent; agreement is a common cause.

k. If there is a necessity in one extreme, simply or as far as depends on itself, to the other extreme, there will be a like necessity in it to any simply necessary intermediate between them.

101. n. Whatever power necessarily rests-operates about an object present to it, necessarily moves toward it when absent as much as it can; agreement is the common cause [n.96].

102. t. If a power principally necessarily acts-operates about an object present to it, that power has the nature to act, as much as depends on itself, always necessarily about it, either whenever it can or if it can [n.96].

103. m. If an extreme has a necessity simply or as much as depends on itself to the other extreme, it will have a like necessity to any simply necessary intermediate between them [n.95].

104. a. Whatever when not impeded necessarily acts, necessarily takes away the impediment if it can [n.93].

105. b. Whatever necessarily acts when the preceding action is in place, necessarily determines that preceding action to be if it can [nn.97, 98].

106. c. A principal agent that necessarily acts when anything is put in place secondarily, is necessitated by an active principal principle [n.98].

107. d. Whatever necessarily acts about an object present to it, necessarily determines that it be present if it can [n.96].

108. e. Whatever appetite necessarily tends to a known object, necessarily determines itself to knowledge of it if it can [n.96].

109. f. Whatever appetite necessarily tends only to the supremely most perfect object when the object has been apprehended, necessarily determines itself to apprehension of the object if it can [n.96].

110. g. Whatever power necessarily operates about only the most perfect object, necessarily continues its operation as much as it can [n.100].

111. Note,^a g. [nn.100, 110] appears to be truer among these: because there seems generally to be the same reason for necessarily acting or operating as for necessarily continuing – if simply, simply, if when it can, when it can; and because of t. above [n.102]; and because we see this by sense and understanding in sensitive appetite; and because it seems most true in the case of the will, since the will does not cease of itself to act about any object except by turning itself to some other object, either one more perfect or more agreeable, or one to which it is more determined or inclined, which object prevents it operating about the first one at the same time; but the end is the most perfect and most agreeable object: to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined and in it does it most delight; the volition of it stands with the volition of anything else.

a. [*Interpolation, from Appendix A*] From c, when the major is given, follows a, and follows b and d and f, each of which can be a major for the negative conclusion of the first article. – From i follows e. – g implies that the willing and understanding already in place are continued; the first from k, the second from i imply that things not in place necessarily must be put in place.

h appears truer among these, because universally there seems to be the same reason for necessarily operating and necessarily continuing, if simply simply, if when it can when it can. – g is plain because we see this in sensitive appetite, in sense and, in intellect. Yet it seems most true in the will, because the will does not cease of itself to act about any object save by turning itself to some other thing, whether to a thing more agreeable or more perfect or to which it is more determined or inclined, which thing prevents the will operating about something else at the same time; but the end is the most perfect and most agreeable object; to it alone is the will necessitated, to it is it most inclined, in it does it most rest and in it is it most delighted; volition of the end is compatible with volition of anything else whatever.

112. From the proof of g. there follows f. [n.109], at any rate if one understands the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ to mean that the apprehension already in place is to be continued. If the predicate ‘to apprehension of it’ is taken of an apprehension to be put in place if it has not been put in place, then in this way f. does not follow from g. but is proved by the reason given above [n.95] ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme...’; but there is a necessity that the appetite tend to the object when it can, because it cannot so tend except in its presence; therefore there is thus a necessity with respect to any intermediate when the proximate power is capable of it. – Not so now e. [n.108], which is more universal, because it does not specify the object as ‘most perfect’ nor as ‘only’ [n.109]; it is proved however as f. is, but above at the place marked [k. in n.96] it is not proved first except about an apprehension already in place. To be set down are k. [n.96] and q. [footnote to n.96]; they are as it were a single proof. – d. [n.107] and b. [n.105] are very universal, hence they are approved; a. [n.104] is sufficiently dealt with [nn.93-95, 97-99], and is improper; the proper form returns in b.; but b. and d. are proved from c. [n.106], along with the major ‘on the contrary: it is impossible for one extreme...’ [n.95]; the deduction is made here under ‘Confirmation for the reason...’ [footnote to n.93]. – Therefore g. stands; c. is disputed; k. and q. are probable.

113. Note the following four points as a gloss on the many things posited above [nn.94-112]: g. is well proved [n.111], and it is a more evident way to a negative conclusion in the case of the first article of the question [n.82]; g. can also be proved from c. here [n.106], and c is proved hereunder, namely on the other side of the page [n.98, first paragraph]. – From m. here [n.103] as major, and from c. here [n.106], made to be major [n.98, first clause], a. follows, b. follows, d. and e. and f. follow, each of which can serve as major for a negative conclusion to the first article. – From n. here [n.101] follows e., which is a more particular major than a. or b. or d. – g. entails that a willing and understanding already in place are necessarily continued, the two other reasons (the first from m. and c., the second from n. [n.112]) entail that when not in place they must necessarily be put in place; this second entailment is more discordant but it less manifestly follows, the first entailment contrariwise.

114. In response to the first way of g. [nn.100, 110, 111], for the negative conclusion to the first article [n.82], which is about the will necessarily continuing its willing as much as it can:

Let the conclusion be conceded, nor let the will ever stop unless the intellect first at least in nature stops considering the end, etc.

115. And if it be argued that the will necessarily will continue that understanding as much as it can, by commanding it [n.93], – response: the conclusion does not follow, because the will does not necessarily will the understanding as it does will the end [n.95].

116. It is argued in another way: at least the will would never turn away from this understanding, because the will, when necessarily continuing dependently, does not by commanding destroy that on which it depends.

Response: while the consideration of the end stands, and so as a result the willing of it, something else is confusedly offered to it the consideration of which is commanded by the will, and thus indirectly the will turns the intellect from consideration of the end; and for the ‘now’ for which it is averted the consideration first in nature ceases and next in nature the volition itself.

117. Against the first response [n.115]: the necessity that is of the extreme to the extreme is the same as is the necessity to any necessary intermediate [n.103].

But here there is the reply in the preceding page above [n.95] that there is not the like relationship to any intermediate as there is to the end, and then it might be conceded that I can will this and not will that without which I cannot will this [n.95].

118. Against the other response [n.116]: the fourth proof of g. [n.111], that there is no other object more perfect, or none to which it is equally or more inclined than it is to this; a more perfect and necessary volition of something both more perfect and more agreeable more impedes a volition that is less such than conversely.

119. Again, a superior power inclines an inferior in a concordant way; therefore where it is more superior it more inclines.

120. Again, if an object is necessarily willed, therefore the willing of it is a more determinate willing than any other willing whatever; therefore the understanding of it too is more determinate than any other understanding whatever. The proof of both consequences is that the will wills to will because of the object and wills to understand because of the willing.

121. Again, we experience that the will impels us to understand the object to which the will is more prone.

122. Therefore it is conceded that the will never turns away [n.116] but only an occurrent phantasm, which is not in the power of the will, Augustine *On Free Choice of the Will* 3 ch.25 n.74.

Here against the second response [n.116], and also against the first [n.115]; it always continues as much as it can, but it cannot continue when some other phantasm occurs whose movement is not subject to itself.

Confirmation: the separated intellect will always persist in consideration of the ultimate end and in the volition of it, although sometimes there is volition of another thing; these things do indeed stand well together [n.111].

123. On the contrary: we experience that the will as freely turns the understanding from consideration of the end to a different object as it does with other objects.

124. Again, the intellect would, as much as depends on it, always persist in consideration of the end, because the end is the maximally moving object; therefore if it sometimes ceases, this will be by the command of the will.

125. Response: if the end were the object that in itself or also in its proper species moves, it is true that it would maximally move. But now, according to some, it moves only in something else that is more of a nature to move toward itself in itself than to the end. Or, for you, many phantasms move it to conceive a description of it as taken from common notions; therefore less than to other objects, for two reasons: first, because it is difficult to persist in consideration of a transcendent universal [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 n.26], for a phantasm moves rather to the most specific species [1 d.3 p.3 q.1 n.9], Augustine *On the Trinity* 8 ch.2 n.3: “When you begin to think what truth is, at once phantasms will present themselves to you;” second, because it is difficult to use many common notions at the same time for a description than to use individual ones separately.

126. Against this response: at any rate the separated intellect always considers those common notions at the same time; likewise, according to Henry [of Ghent] it has a proper concept of God.

127. Again, to the principal, for a negative conclusion to the first article [n.82]:

The damned apprehend the ultimate end. If they necessarily will it, then they do so by the love and willing either of friendship or of concupiscence. Not in the first way, for that enjoyment is supremely right; nor in the second way, because they apprehend it as impossible for them.

128. Again, if loving the end is necessarily elicited once practical understanding is in place, and yet there is there the supreme idea of right and merit by congruity: then, because every other act of the will is acceptable and laudable only by virtue of that love, there would stand with any merit whatever the fact that the will would necessarily follow practical understanding, – against Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4.

129. Again, in something that is necessitated to acting of itself or to acting whenever it can act [n.102], there can be no habit; for thus there might be a habit in a stone, which is not simply necessitated to fall but as far as depends on itself [nn.93, and footnote thereto]. Therefore in the will with respect to the end there can be no habit. There is a confirmation about acquired habits: because these habits are only generated by acts, but now when the will acts it has a necessity *de re* [necessity in *sensu diviso*] to act.

The conclusion about acquired habits is conceded. – But this agrees with the Philosopher, because wisdom is a supreme habit [*Ethics* 6.7.1141a16-20, *Metaphysics* 1.2.983a6-7].

There is a proof that neither can there be a supernatural habit with respect to it, because it is not capable of another habit with respect to an act to which it is necessitated.

Response: it is not necessitated to love now of the end in particular, nor to love of it when seen in the fatherland, unless it is elevated. – The first is rejected as below against the second article [nn.134-135], the second as below against the third article [nn.136-140].

130. Against the reason [n.129] an instance is made, that it rejects habits in the intellect. It is conceded that the intellect as inclining has no habit but not the intellect as showing.^a

a. [Interpolation] if the reasoning is valid, no habit will be posited in the intellect. – I say that one should not posit an inclining habit but habit of showing is very well required, which habit should not be posited in the will but only the inclining one; therefore the reasoning is good about the will but not about the intellect. I hold therefore that the will is able not to will the end in whatever way it is apprehended, whether obscurely or clearly, whether universally or in particular.

131. Again, *a priori*, every single power, as it has one first object, so also one mode with respect to the first object; therefore it has the same mode with respect to anything whatever in which its first object is *per se* included.

Response: it has some one mode which is *per se*, but the ensuing modes can vary, which modes agree from the nature of special objects with the power in its acting; of this sort are ‘necessarily’ and ‘contingently’. – But the *per se* mode is ‘freely’ as this is contradistinguished from ‘naturally’; ‘freely’ however does not entail ‘contingently’.^a

a. [Interpolation] On the contrary: ‘naturally’ and ‘contingently’ do not imply ‘freely’ in the way inferiors imply their superior; therefore they are not special modes contained under the first mode which is ‘freely’. – It is said that they are so as compared with the will, although simply speaking ‘necessarily’ and ‘freely’ are related as things exceeding to things exceeded.

132. Again, *a priori*, whatever any will wills necessarily if shown to it, this it simply necessarily wills; the thing is clear about the will of God, where infinity is as much the reason for necessity simply as if the object were shown.

133. Again,⁵⁴ a power free by participation does not tend more to a perfect object than to any object; therefore neither a power free by essence; but there is no difference between the end that is willed and other things that are willed except on the part of the perfection of the object. The antecedent is plain, because sight, which is a free power by participation, namely insofar as its act is subject to the command of the will, does not more necessarily see a very beautiful thing than a less beautiful thing; therefore it is turned away from each equally and each it sees equally contingently.

The response is that the major is true of the cognitive power but is not true of the appetitive power tending to the object apprehended by its own cognitive power; for more necessarily does a very beautiful sight delight the seeing power than does a less beautiful one, and if the appetite could carry itself to that sight by an elicited act, it would more necessarily carry itself or be carried to a more beautiful sight than to a less beautiful one.

⁵⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, against the first article [n.83], every agent acting necessarily acts of necessity according to the ultimate of its power, because just as its action is not in its power, so neither its mode of acting, namely to act intensely or not intensely; therefore the will of necessity wills the end always very intensely and as much as it can, the opposite of which we experience. – The conclusion is conceded when the apprehension is equal and there is nothing to distract it.”

134. [Against article 2] – Against the second article [n.86].^a It seems that the first articles destroy the second article, because the reason, which is that in the ultimate end there is not any defect of good nor any malice [n.85], seems with equal efficacy to entail its conclusion about the ultimate end when apprehended in particular, or to entail it with more efficacy, because in the ultimate end in particular there is apprehended the whole idea of the end in general, nay there is also shown that the perfection of the end in general can exist in it alone, and so without any defect of good and without any malice either.

a. [*Interpolation*] which I concede to be true, but

135. Likewise the second reason for the first member about participation [n.83] concludes more about the end apprehended in particular, for created goods, if they are good by participation, are more truly goods by participation in the ultimate end in particular than by participation in it in general; for they do not participate in it in general except because they participate in it in particular, since the participator has the participated for the cause or measure on which it essentially depends, and the dependence of a real being is only on a real being, and so on something singular.

136. [Against article 3] – Against the third article [n.87]. When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, what possesses that principle does not necessarily act; nor does an elicitive principle, while being disposed in the same way, elicit necessarily now what before it was eliciting contingently, therefore neither will what possesses that principle necessarily act. But a will having the same charity that it has now was before eliciting the act of enjoying contingently, therefore it does not now necessarily elicit that act, since no change has been made on its part. This is plain in the rapture of Paul. If before he had a charity equal with that which he had during the rapture, there was no change on the part of his will nor on the part of the elicitive principle; therefore there was then no greater necessity for eliciting it than before.^a At any rate there could have been an equal charity during the rapture and prior to it.

a. [*Interpolation*] nor consequently for acting.

137. Or let the reason be formed in this way: the necessity of acting can only be through something intrinsic to the active principle; but, by the fact that the intellect now sees the object, there is no new thing intrinsic to the active principle in enjoying; therefore not a new necessity of acting either. – Proof of the major: otherwise the necessity of acting would not be by reason of the active principle, and so it would be by nothing or by something extrinsic; and if by something extrinsic, the acting would be through that, because the acting is through that through which is the necessity of acting. – The minor is plain: if vision in accord with this thing does not have the idea of active principle with respect to enjoyment, neither does the intellect nor anything in the intellect; also if vision in some other way has some nature of active principle, though not of the principal one but of the secondary one, then the major should be taken as determined in this way: ‘the necessity of acting is only through something intrinsic to the principal active principle’; for a secondary principle does not give necessity to a principal one, just as it does not determine it either to acting, but conversely the principal agent of itself uses in its own way the secondary one, so that if nothing in the principal one excludes

contingency, the whole action will be contingent. The minor is thus plain, because through enjoyment nothing is intrinsic to the principal active principle; therefore etc.

138. Again, either the end moves to the act or the power does. If the end, it is plain there is no necessity, because the end moves necessarily to no created act. If the will moves,⁵⁵ then I argue: the diverse proximity to the agent of the thing that undergoes the action does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain of the hot with respect to heatable things that are more and less proximate; but the diverse presence of the known object, to wit seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of what the act of will should be about; therefore it does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but only makes the act to be more or less intense.^a

a. [*Interpolation, from Appendix A*] Besides, diverse proximity of the passive thing to the agent does not cause necessity but only a more intense action, as is plain in the case of heat with respect to heatable things that are in greater or lesser proximity; but the diverse presence of the known object, namely seen and not seen, seems only to be as it were the diverse proximity to the will of that which the act of will should be about; therefore it does not diversify necessity and non-necessity, but will only make a more and a less intense act.

139. Again, what is said in that article, that the act of vision is altogether impossible without enjoyment [n.87], does not seem to be true, because any absolute distinct natures whatever are so disposed that a prior nature can essentially exist in the absence of a later one without contradiction; those acts 'vision' and 'enjoyment' are two absolute natures; therefore vision, which is naturally prior, can exist without contradiction in the absence of the later, namely enjoyment.

140. A response is that the major is true of absolutes neither of which depends on another nor both on a third; but in the proposed case both depend on a third, as on the object causing and moving.

On the contrary: if they depend on a third necessarily causing them both, and not necessarily causing one though it cause the other, the major will still be true, because the prior will be able without contradiction to exist in the absence of the later.^a But they do not depend on a third necessarily causing them both simply, as is clear; nor on a third necessarily causing the later if it causes the prior, because any absolute thing^b that is able non-necessarily to cause immediately is able non-necessarily to cause through an intermediate cause that is also caused, because that intermediate caused cause does not necessitate it to causing the absolute effect of the intermediate cause; therefore if it does not necessarily cause a later absolute, it does not necessarily cause it even when the prior cause is in place, if in any respect it is a cause.

a. [*Interpolation*] or the argument goes like this: whatever is essentially prior to another can be made to exist by that agent by which neither are both necessarily produced nor is the later necessarily produced if the prior is.

b. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] Note, 'absolute' excludes the following instance: 'God is able not to cause a white thing, and thus not to cause a similar thing, therefore he can cause a white thing without causing a similar thing'; and this instance: 'he is able not to cause a body, therefore to

⁵⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: "and it does not have a difference on the part of the object except that of greater or lesser proximity."

cause a body without a shape', if shape only means the many respects of lines bounding a surface or of surfaces bounding a body as health means many proportions.

141. [Against article 4] – Against the fourth article [n.88] the argument goes: that by which someone can simply act is the power; therefore if the will is not able from its natural properties to have an act about a seen end but it can have charity, charity is either simply a power of volition about that object or a part of the power of volition, both of which are false.

142. Again, if a willable object that is not sufficiently proximate or present to the will is sufficiently able to terminate an act of will, much more is the same object able to do so if it is more perfectly proximate or present to the will; therefore if some good obscurely apprehended can be willed by a will not elevated by a supernatural habit, much more can the same object clearly seen be in some way willed by such a will. I therefore concede the conclusions of these reasons [nn.141-142].

C. Scotus' own Opinion

143. As for the first article [n.82] I say that just as the will enjoys non-necessarily the things that are for the end, so also does it non-necessarily enjoy an end apprehended obscurely or in general.

144. As for the second article [n.82] I concede along with the first opinion [n.86] that the will does not necessarily enjoy an end obscurely seen and in particular; nor is there nor should there be an argument against the first opinion as to the conclusion, but argument that the reasons put in the first article conclude against the second article, if they are valid [nn.134-135]. But how will someone who relies on them in the first article solve them in the second? Nay even the reasoning of them in the second article [n.86] seems to contradict the first article [n.83].

145. As for the third article [n.82] I say that an elevated will does not necessarily enjoy, as far as depends on its own part, an end thus seen.

146. As for the fourth [n.82] I say that a will not supernaturally elevated can enjoy the end.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

147. To the arguments for the opinion [nn.83-90]. To the first [n.83] I say that the likeness would entail many false things, because it would entail that just as we assent necessarily to the conclusions because of the principles, so we would assent necessarily to the things for the end because of the end, which is false. Therefore I say that the likeness holds as to two things, namely as to the order of these things and of those by comparing them among themselves, and as to the order of them by comparing them to powers that tend toward them in ordered fashion; I understand it thus, that as there is an order between those true things in themselves, so also between these good things, and just as those true things in ordered fashion are thus known, so also these good things would be thus things in ordered fashion to be willed. But there is no likeness as to the order of necessity in one and in the other, by comparing them to powers absolutely. For it is not necessary that the will keep the sort of order in its own acts that willable things naturally have of their nature; nor is the assent alike on this side and on that, because necessity

exists in the intellect on account of the evidence of the object necessarily causing assent in the intellect: but there is not some goodness of the object that necessarily causes assent of the will, but the will freely assents to any good at all, and it freely assents to a greater good as it does to a lesser.

148. To the second, when the argument is about participation [n.84], I say that the major is false because the will wills nothing necessarily; and therefore it need not be that it necessarily will that thing by reason of which it wills everything else, if there were anything such. The minor is also false, because by virtue and by participation of the ultimate end it wills whatever it wills, because ‘by participation or by virtue of something the will wills other things’ can be understood in two ways: either by virtue or participation of it as of an efficient cause or as of something that contains it virtually, or by virtue of it as of a first object, because of which when willed it wills other things. If it is understood in the first way, the minor when assumed with the major is not to the purpose, because that by virtue of which as efficient cause something is willed need not itself be willed, just as that which is the efficient cause of something seen need not be seen; for it need not be that I first see God with my bodily eye if I see a color, which is a certain participation of God as efficient cause. If it be understood in the second way, namely of participation of it as first willed object, then the minor is false; for it is not by virtue of God willed that I will whatever is willed, because then every act of the will would be actual using, by referring it to the first willed object.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] When you prove ‘they are good by participation’, I say that there is equivocation over the term participation, namely effectively, and thus it is true, or formally, and thus it is not true.

149. To the third [n.85] it is in one way said that, although there is no defect there of any good nor any malice and therefore perhaps the will would not be able not to will it, because the object of not willing is the bad or the defective, yet it is able not to will that perfect good, because it is in the power of the will not only to will thus and thus but also to will and not to will, because its freedom is for acting and not acting. For if it can by commanding move other powers to act, not only thus and thus but also to determinately acting and not acting, it does not seem to have less freedom in respect of itself as to determination of act.^{a 56} And this seems capable of being shown through Augustine

⁵⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this response I prove that if the will is able not to will, it can refuse to will, because if it cannot refuse to will, this is because it necessarily has in itself something to which that refusing to will is opposed. But this something can only be actual willing; the proof is that no habitual or aptitudinal inclination to willing is opposed to a very refusing to will. Even if it be granted that it is a not-refusing to will, this does not avoid the problem, because a negation agrees necessarily to no positive thing save on account of some affirmation necessarily agreeing with that positive thing on which the negation follows; and then that affirmation in the proposed case cannot be an habitual or aptitudinal inclination, because not-refusing to will does not follow on it, just as neither is refusing to will opposed to it, because the affirmation necessarily agreeing with the will, on account of which refusing to will is opposed to it, will be actual willing. If therefore it cannot refuse to will, it necessarily wills. – And this reason generally shows that to nothing susceptible of contraries and of intermediates, if it has intermediates, is any form of that genus opposed, or it shows that it is impossible for a form to be present in it unless some form of that genus is necessarily present in the same thing, or something else is, to which that which cannot be present in it is virtually opposed.

Retractions 1 ch.9 n.3 and ch.22 n.4, where he intends that “nothing is so in the power of the will as is the will itself,” which is not understood save as to the elicited act [n.91].

a. [Interpolation] Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.3 n.6, everyone wants to be happy; therefore everyone necessarily wants the ultimate end wherein is beatitude.

150. It might, however, be said that the will itself through some elicited willing commands or prohibits the action of an inferior power. But it cannot thus suspend all willing, because then it would at the same time will nothing and will something. But however things may be with the suspension of all willing, the will can at least suspend every act about this object through some elicited willing, and in this way I refuse now to elicit anything about this object however more distinctly it may be shown to me. And thus refusing to will is a certain elicited act, one that as it were reflects back on willing the object, not an object that is present or was present, but one that could be present; which object, although it is not shown in itself, is nevertheless shown in its cause, namely in the object shown, which is of a nature to be, in some class of principle, the principle of an act.

151. It is in another way said to the third preceding reason [nn.149, 85] that it has not been proved that the will could not refuse to will the good in which there is found no idea of evil or of defect of good, just as it has not been proved that it could not will that in which is found no idea of good, and this either in reality or in apprehension before that thing is the term of the act of willing. About this perhaps there will be discussion elsewhere [2 d.6 q.2 n.13, d.43 q. un; 4 Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.2 nn.4-10].

152. To the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.84], that everyone wants to be blessed, therefore everyone necessarily wills the ultimate end in where there is beatitude, I say that he does not mean actual volition. For his intention is that the mimic actor, of whom he is speaking, would have spoken the truth about what everyone who was rushing together wanted had he said to them all: “You all want to be blessed.” But not everyone who was then rushing together to the spectacle had then actually the appetite for beatitude, because they did not all have actual thought about it. So he is speaking of habitual or aptitudinal volition, namely that whereby the will itself is ready for immediately inclining to an act of willing beatitude if beatitude is actually offered to it by the intellect.

153. Likewise, the authority is not to the purpose. Because if it is certain that everyone wills beatitude, this is not in an act of friendship, by willing for this beatific object well being for itself, but in an act of concupiscence, by willing that good as a

Such a positive that is virtually opposed to a very refusing to will cannot be found in the proposed case.

Response: the thing opposed to the refusing to will is the will, because the will only has a capacity for possible willing and refusing to will; but to refuse to will the end includes a contradiction, because it is not a possible object of this act. An example: to see a sound includes a contradiction by reason of the act and of the object, therefore the object is opposed to sight and sight is opposed to it and determines for itself not to see this, because sight is of a sight. So here. Nor is it discordant to deny that the end can be the object of hatred and beatitude of flight, but neither can misery be the object of concupiscence, because according to Augustine in *Handbook of the Faith* ch.105 n.28: “nor can we will to be wretched” [Lombard, *Sentences* 2 d.25 ch.3-5; Scotus 1 d.10 q. un n.10] [n.81].”

sufficient good for itself, because it is not certain that disordered wills have the ordered delight of the first good as such, but all wills, whether ordered or disordered, have the concupiscence of willing, or the will of concupiscence, for what is good for them. But an act of concupiscence cannot be an act of enjoyment, because everyone who desires with concupiscence desires for something else what he loves with the love of friendship, and so the act of concupiscence is not an act of enjoyment but only the act of friendship is. Therefore, although Augustine is speaking of the act of willing beatitude, he is however not speaking of an act of friendship but of an act of concupiscence, and so not of enjoyment, and thus it is not to the purpose.

154. To the argument for their fourth article, when they argue about doing and being [n.88], I say that the act would not be supernatural but natural, because the will can naturally will an act about an object in whatever way it is shown by the intellect; and because the act does not exceed the faculty of the power, so neither does the object as it is the term of the act of that power.

155. When it is said, second, that then such a will might be blessed [n.89], I say no, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.5 n.8: “The blessed have whatever they want and want nothing evil.” This definition must be understood in this way, that the blessed person is he who has whatever he can will in an ordered way, not merely whatever he now actually wills; for then some wayfarer could be blessed for the time when he is thinking about only one thing that he has in an ordered way. But the will could wish in an ordered way to have charity, because it can will not only to have the substance of the act of enjoying, but it can will to have an enjoyment accepted by God; if therefore it does not have it, it does not have whatever it can in an ordered way will. Also, the way charity is required, not for gratification of act but for some rank of perfection intrinsic to the act, will be discussed later [1 d.17 p.1 qq.1-2].

II. To the Principal Arguments

156. To the principal arguments. To the first [n.77] I say that a thing is agreeable aptitudinally or agreeable actually. A thing is agreeable aptitudinally that agrees to someone of itself and as much as depends on the nature of the thing, and such a thing agrees actually to everyone who does not have it in his power that a thing should actually agree or disagree with him; and for the reason that whatever agrees with someone naturally or aptitudinally, with his natural appetite or his sensitive appetite, agrees with him also actually. But it is in the power of the will that something actually agree or not agree with it; for nothing actually agrees with it save what actually pleases it. For this reason I deny the minor, when it is said that ‘the end necessarily agrees with the will’; for this is not true of actual agreement but of aptitudinal agreement.

Or in another way: if aptitudinal agreement alone is sufficient for delight, yet not for enjoyment; rather it is, by enjoyment, made to be actually agreeable whether it agrees aptitudinally or not. If the first thing supposed in this response is true, one must deny the consequence ‘delight, therefore enjoyment’.

To the second [n.78] I say that there is a different mode of acting in the action; ‘properly’ and ‘metaphorically’ destroy the likeness as far as necessity is concerned.

157. Or in another way: just as something properly acting necessarily moves something else contingently, thus something metaphorically acting necessarily moves

something contingently. For the end which necessarily moves the efficient cause, to wit the natural agent, moves necessarily in a metaphorical way, because it is necessarily loved or naturally desired; but the end which moves the efficient cause contingently, moves contingently in a metaphorical way. But this efficient cause causes contingently and the end moves contingently in a metaphorical way.

158. To the third [n.79] I say that the immovable thing does not have to be some elicited act. For several different and movable heatings do not presuppose some one immovable heating, but they presuppose a first act, namely heat, which is a sufficient principle for eliciting all the various acts. So here, the volitions do not presuppose some one immovable volition, because then the will when it wills something for the end would always be under two acts, or at any rate under one act that is referring this to that, but they presuppose a first act, to wit the will, which is a sufficient reason for eliciting the various volitions.

First Distinction

Third Part

On the Enjoyer

Question 1

Whether enjoying belongs to God

159. Lastly in regard to this first distinction I ask about the enjoyer, namely to whom as subject enjoyment belongs, and first whether enjoying belongs to God.

It seems that it does not:

Because enjoyment is with respect to the end; but God does not have an end; therefore enjoying does not belong to God.

160. On the contrary:

God loves himself; and he does not love himself because of something else, because then he would be using himself; therefore he enjoys himself. The consequence is plain, because if he loves himself, either by using or enjoying himself.

Question 2

Whether the wayfarer enjoys

161. Second I ask whether the wayfarer enjoys.

It seems that he does not:

Because the wayfarer has only an act of desire in respect of the absent good; but an act of desire is not an act of enjoyment. The proof of this is that desire is an act of concupiscence, but enjoyment is an act of friendship; therefore etc.

162. On the contrary:

“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake,” as Augustine says, and it is contained in the text [*On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.4 n.4; *Lombard Sentences* 1 d.1 ch.2]; but the wayfarer thus adheres to God; therefore he can enjoy God.

Question 3

Whether the sinner enjoys

163. Third the question is asked whether the sinner enjoys.

And it seems he does not:

Because what does not rely on something immovable does not enjoy nor rest; but the sinner does not rely on any immovable good; the proof is that he relies on a creature, which is not immovable, for “every creature is subject to vanity” [*Romans* 8.20, *Ecclesiastes* 3.19]; therefore he does not rest nor enjoy.

164. Again, he who wants another to use his act does not enjoy him; but the sinner wants God to use his act; therefore he does not enjoy him. The major is clear because he who wants another to use his act does not value him as the supreme good; therefore he

does not enjoy him. The minor is clear because the sinner wishes to be his own act; therefore he wishes it to be from God, since nothing can exist except from God; therefore he wishes God to use it, because God uses everything that is from him.

165. On the contrary:

Augustine 83 *Diverse Questions* q.30: “All perversity, which is named vice, is to use things which are to be enjoyed and to enjoy things which are to be used” [n.70]; therefore it is possible for the sinner to enjoy things he should use.

Question 4

Whether the brutes enjoy

166. Fourth the question is asked whether the brutes enjoy.

And it seems that they do, from Augustine, where as before, 83 *Diverse Questions* q.30, he says that: “to enjoy any corporal pleasure the beasts too are not absurdly judged to do.”

167. On the contrary:

“To enjoy is to adhere by love to something for its own sake” [nn.70, 162]; but the brutes do not have love, because neither do they have will nor do they adhere to anything for its own sake but for their own good; therefore they do not enjoy.

Question 5

Whether all things enjoy

168. Fifth the question is asked whether all things enjoy.

It seems that they do:

Because all things desire the good with natural love, *Ethics* 1.1.1094a2-3; and they desire some good not for the sake of something else [*Ethics* 1.4.1096b13-14]; therefore they enjoy.

169. On the contrary:

“We enjoy things known” [n72; Augustine *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13]; but not all things have cognition; therefore etc.

I. To all the Questions Together

170. To solve these questions I put first a certain example, namely about how bodies are made to rest in diverse ways [cf. Prol. nn.170-178]. For the ultimate terminus of rest for heavy bodies is the center. But to this center, as to the ultimate terminus, a heavy body adheres *per se* and first, for example earth, which does not by the nature of some other body adhere to that by which it participates in heaviness and in the adhering in question.

171. Now a body adheres to the center immovably and *per se*, but not first, because it adheres by the heaviness and the adhering that it has received from earth. However it does adhere *per se*, because it adheres by an intrinsic form and firmly and immovably, because it does so as it were through what is intrinsic to earth, which is what rests first, as stones and metals in the bosom of the earth; and such things, although they do not rest first, do yet perfectly rest, because they are perfectly conjoined to the center through the medium of the first rest, with which they are, as it were, perfectly united.

172. In a third way, a body adheres to the center through the medium of the earth with which it is united, but movably and not firmly, as a heavy object existing on the surface of the earth; and such a thing, although it truly rests for a time, is yet not as determined in rest as a body that is resting in the second way.

173. In a fourth way, a body can adhere uniformly to a body next to it and rest with respect to it, and not rest with respect to the universe if the body next to it, to which it adheres, is not uniformly adhering to the center, for example in the case of a man lying on a ship; although it would be in the power of a body to be itself at rest, that heavy body, which would be finally at rest itself in some such movable thing but not in the center, whether mediately or immediately, would be disorderedly at rest, because although, as far as depends on itself, it would be at rest because of its firm adhesion to such a movable body, yet it would not adhere to that to which it should, according to its own nature, adhere in order to be at rest.

174. Applying the example to the intended proposition, the will corresponds in spiritual things to weight in the body, because “as the body by weight, so the spirit by love is borne wherever it is borne,” according to Augustine *On the City of God* 11 ch.28. The center which of its own nature gives ultimate rest is the ultimate end; hence the wise man says that “God is the intellectual sphere, whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere” [Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus *Book of 24 Philosophers* prop.2] – it accords with truth. To this center the divine will first and *per se* immovably and necessarily adheres,^a because not by participation in anything other than itself, for this will, not by habit nor by a deferring act nor in virtue of any superior cause, most perfectly and necessarily loves the supreme good.

a. [Interpolation] Hence the Commentator *Physics* II com.88 says that the disposition of a simply necessary being is that it not exist because of its action but its action because of it, and this mode is found in simply eternal things.

175. In second rank is a blessed created will, which not first, but by participating in God, yet *per se*, because by its own intrinsic form, adheres firmly to this good, and that because it is made to be as it were intrinsic to the will that is first at rest, because it always abides in that will’s good pleasure.

176. In third rank is the will of a just wayfarer, who although it relies on the divine will and relies, by its mediation, on the supreme good in which the will itself rests, yet it does not firmly and immovably adhere to the good pleasure of that very will; hence now it adheres to that good and now it turns away from that good. – But here there is a certain unlikeness to the third member in the case of bodies [n.172]; because there the body is able not to be at rest while the form remains by which it rests, but here the form, by which the will rests, is posited to be destroyed at the same time along with aversion of the will from the center.

177. In the fourth rank is the mortal sinner, who although, as far as depends on the act of the will that is making itself rest, adheres vehemently to something other than God, so that neither by its mediation nor immediately is it adhering to God, yet on the part of the object it cannot be simply at rest; nay rather, just as someone at rest with respect to a ship, and not with respect to the center, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes ultimately to rest, so the will, which is making itself rest, as far as it can, in some object other than God, is not simply at rest, because not at rest with respect to what in the universe makes the will ultimately and most perfectly to rest. The fact is also plain, because the will is there never satisfied, however firmly it immerses itself in the thing by loving it for its own sake.

178. On the basis of these points I say to the questions posed that to enjoy either means delight or it means the act of adhering to the object for its own sake, to which act the rest of delight is concomitant, or which act is itself the delight or the rest, that is, the act that ultimately terminates the power to the extent that a power terminates itself in its act; so that about the idea of enjoyment, if it means the act, it does not seem to be the case that it itself makes the power to rest as far as depends on the part of the object, but as far as depends on the part of the power adhering to some object for its own sake; so that the divine will enjoys simply and necessarily and *per se* and first; but the blessed created will enjoys simply and perpetually and *per se* but not first; the just will of the wayfarer enjoys simply and *per se* but not immovably nor first. The will of the mortal sinner enjoys simply because, as far as depends on the part of the will, it would make itself to rest, and does rest, in the object which it loves for its own sake; but it does not simply rest as far as depends on the part of the object, nor does that object require enjoyment, but because the object does not make it to rest as a power makes itself, by its act, to rest in its act, therefore its enjoyment is disordered.

179. But in that case there is a doubt as to what object the mortal sinner enjoys, namely whether his own act or the object of his act.

My reply: I say that in general he enjoys himself, because he loves the object of his act with the love of concupiscence. Because all love of concupiscence is preceded by an act of love, and consequently he loves something else with the love of friendship, and that something else is himself, for whom, as loved with love of friendship, he loves the object with love of concupiscence. He does not then enjoy the object of his act, nor consequently the act itself, on which there is no need that he first reflect back. This opinion is that of Augustine *On the City of God* 14 ch.28: "The two loves have made two cities: the love of oneself to contempt of God has made the city of the devil, the love of God to contempt of oneself the city of God," and *On Genesis to the Letter* 11 ch.15 n.20. Therefore the first root is in this, that the sinner enjoys himself.

180. To the penultimate question [n.166] it can be said that although the sensitive appetite in some way adheres to something for its own sake, that is, not because of another negatively, because it does not have the feature of referring to another, nor yet by contrariety, because the object is not valued as not referable to another; therefore it is said in an abusive sense to enjoy, because of lack of relation, but not properly, because it does not adhere in a non-referring way. Likewise neither does it adhere with love, because it does not properly have the feature of loving. Likewise neither does it properly adhere, because it does not apply itself to the object but is as it were fixed by the force of the object, because it does not lead but is led, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox*

Faith 2 ch.22. And by following the said simile about the resting of bodies [n.173], one could say that the sensitive appetite is likened to iron that is fixed to adamant by the force of the attracting adamant, and thus is made to rest in the center neither mediately nor immediately, nor in anything else, by the force which would give it rest in the center, or by any intrinsic force making it rest in something as if in the center, but only by force of something extrinsic making it rest. So here, the force of the object makes it to rest, but not the intrinsic force of making to rest in the center or as if in the center, which force as freedom alone, and this does not belong to the sensitive appetite.

181. To the final question [n.168] the answer is clear from what has been said. Because, if enjoying proper by sensitive appetite be denied, which appetite however more agrees with the will, where enjoyment is, than natural appetite agrees with it, because the act of the sensitive appetite follows an act of knowing just as does the act of the will – not thus, however, the act of natural appetite, if it has any act – then the conclusion follows that enjoying proper does not belong to what has natural appetite alone, nay nor does it thus belong abusively either in the way it belongs to sensitive appetite.

II. To the Principal Arguments

182. To the arguments. To the argument of the first question [n.159] I say just as was said to the first question of this distinction in the fourth article [n.17], that the idea of end is not the proper idea of the enjoyable, but the idea of the absolute good is to which the idea of end belongs. Although, therefore, God is not the end of himself, yet with respect to his will he is that absolute object to whom naturally belongs the idea of end, because he is the supreme good; but the idea of end cannot belong to him with respect to himself (just as neither is he the end with respect to himself) but with respect to all enjoyable things, of which sort are all the goods that can be ordered to another.

If the objection is raised how God then is said to act for an end, and also that a superior agent has a superior end, I reply: with respect to nothing is there any final cause unless with respect to it there is an efficient cause, because the causality of the final cause is to move the efficient cause to act; God then, as not being something that can be effected, has no final cause. But the first common saying [God acts for an end] must be understood to mean that he acts for the end of the effect; but not for the end of himself, because he is not an agent of himself. Likewise the second common saying [a superior agent has a superior end] must be understood of the end of the effect, because a superior agent orders, not himself, but the effect to a more universal end; and so the superior end is the agent's, not as its end, but as that to which it orders what it does.

183. To the argument of the second question [n.161] I say that, besides the act of desire which is with respect to something not possessed, by which the just wayfarer desires God for himself with an act of concupiscence, the just wayfarer has another act, one of friendship, by wanting well being for God in himself, and this act of friendship is enjoyment, but not that act which is of desire; and this second act is properly the act of charity, but not the first, which is the act of one desiring, as will be said in 3 Suppl. d.26 q. un n.17. The major then is false.

184. To the first argument of the third question [n.163] an exposition of the minor can be given, that what adheres to a movable thing does not rest simply, although as far as depends on its own part it makes itself rest in it, and so the conclusion is to be

conceded, because the mortal sinner does not simply rest, although as far as depends on his own part, by his own act of ultimate rest, he makes himself rest in a movable thing. If it be added that nothing enjoys a thing unless it makes itself rest simply in that thing, this must be denied, but one must add: 'unless it makes itself rest as far as depends on the part of the act itself,' namely the act by which he adheres to the object; and also: 'as far as depends on the part of the object', in disordered enjoyment. Nor ought supreme rest to be what is understood here, because to all rest on the way there follows the greater rest of the fatherland, but because of an act accepting the object that cannot be referred to another.

185. As to the second [n.164], the major can be denied, because although by ordered love no one enjoys anything save what he does not wish anyone to use but to enjoy, yet with disordered love someone can very well enjoy what he does not wish another to enjoy but only to use, or not to love in any way, as is evident with disordered jealousy. – To the proof of the major one can say that although the enjoyer values the enjoyable as the supreme good, yet he does not wish it to be thus valued by everyone when he is enjoying it in disordered way; therefore the conclusion does not follow: 'he wishes it to be the supreme good or he loves it as the supreme good, therefore he wishes others thus to love it'.

One can reply in another way by denying the minor. – For the proof, when it is said 'he wishes the enjoyable to be, therefore he wishes it to be from God', the conclusion does not follow. Nor does this follow either: 'he wishes it to be from God, therefore he wishes God to use that act'. And the cause of the defect of each consequence is that he who wills the antecedent need not will the consequent when the consequent is not *per se* included in the antecedent but only follows through an extrinsic topic. So it is in the proposed case.

186. As to the authority of Augustine for the fourth question [n.166], it is clear that his authority is to be expounded of abusive enjoyment, or of the term 'enjoyment' in an extended sense, because the sensitive appetite does not refer by understanding negatively, nor by contrariety, because it does not adhere to the object as to something that cannot be referred, because, although the thing cannot be referred by it, this results from its natural impotency, not from the goodness in the object or in the acceptance of the power. About the difference between these, namely not being referred in negatively, by contrariety and by privation, there will be discussion at 2 d.41 q. un n.3.

187. As to the argument of the final question [n.168], it is plain that although the natural appetite adheres to something for its own sake negatively, not however by contrariety for the most part, and if it does do so by contrariety, yet it does not adhere by love; nor does it properly adhere either, but by itself giving the nature it is fixed as it were in the object itself, not indeed by an elicited act other than nature, as is the case with the sensitive appetite, but by nature's habitual inclination. Hence as was said [n.181], enjoyment belongs less to it than to the sensitive appetite which by an elicited act adheres as to an object already known, though not freely; but natural appetite is perpetually inclined without any cognition.

From what has been said about enjoying, and especially in the third question of this distinction (namely 'whether enjoying is an act elicited by the will or a passion received in the will, to wit delight' [nn.62-76]), one can be clear about use, which is a

more imperfect act of the will ordered to enjoying as to a more perfect act of the same power.

Book One
Second Distinction
First Part
On the Existence of God and his Unity
Question 1

Whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite

1. On the second distinction I inquire first about what pertains to the unity of God, and first^a whether among beings there is something existing actually infinite.^b

a. [Interpolation] This therefore is to be held by true and pious faith. About this second distinction, wherein the Master deals with the existence and unity of God and the plurality of the persons, there are seven questions [nn.1, 10, 157, 191, 197, 201, 212]; for there are three questions about the first part, two about God's essence and one about his unity. The first is.

b. [Interpolation] Whether there is some being simply first. That there is not: beings are related to themselves as numbers, and there is no number first in perfection because neither is there a greatest number. On the contrary: *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a11-19, there is a first efficient cause, therefore a first actuality; there is a first end, therefore a first good. – Second, whether priority could simply belong to essences of different nature. That it could: posteriority so belongs, and as one correlative is multiplied so is the other. On the contrary: every multitude is reduced to a unity. – Third, whether a being simply first is infinite in intensity. Here below [nn.1-9]. – Solution: first, as to what the order of questions is, because in a 'demonstration-that' existence is proved first of relatives; from the second will be got priority with respect to all causable things, from this the solution of the third, to the first as below [nn.41-73].

That there is not is argued as follows:

If one contrary were actually infinite, there would be nothing in nature contrary to it; therefore if there were some good actually infinite, there would be no evil in the universe.

2. The response is made that the major is true of contraries formally; but nothing evil is formally contrary to God.

3. On the contrary: whether it is formally or virtually contrary, if it is infinite, it suffers nothing contrary to its effect, because it will, on account of its infinite virtue, destroy everything impossible with its effect. The major is true, then, of the virtual contrary as of the formal contrary. An example: if the sun were infinitely hot virtually, it would leave nothing cold in the universe, just as if it were infinitely hot formally.

4. Again, an infinite body allows of no other body along with it, therefore neither does an infinite being allow of any other being along with it. Proof of the consequence is first because, just as dimension opposes dimension, so actuality seems to oppose actuality; and second because, just as a body different from the infinite would produce along with it something greater than the infinite, so a being other than the infinite seems to produce something greater than the infinite.

5. Further, what is here in such a way that it is not elsewhere is finite with respect to 'where', and what is now in such a way that it is not at another time, is finite with respect to 'when', and thus with each category. What does this particular thing in such a

way that it does not do something else is finite as to action, therefore what is a this something in such a way that it is not something else is finite in entity; God is supremely a this, because he is of himself singularity; therefore he is not infinite.

6. Again, from *Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6, if there were an infinite virtue, it would move in non-time; no virtue can move in non-time, because if it did motion would exist in an instant; therefore no virtue is infinite.

7. On the contrary:

In the same place of the *Physics* [266a10-24, b6-20, 7b17-26] the Philosopher proves that the first mover is of infinite power because it moves with an infinite motion. But this conclusion cannot be understood only of infinity of duration, because he proves, on account of its infinity of power, that it cannot exist in magnitude; but it is not repugnant to magnitude, in his view, that there is a power in it infinite in duration, the way he posited in the case of the heavens.

8. Again *Psalms* 47.2: "Great is the Lord and greatly to be praised."

9. Again Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.9: "He is a sea, etc."

Question 2

Whether something infinite is known self-evidently

10. Whether something infinite is known self-evidently, as that God exists.

It seems that this is so:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.1: "Knowledge of the fact that God exists is naturally implanted in everyone;" but that is self-evidently known the knowledge of which is implanted in everyone, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5, because the first principles, which are as it were the entrance doors, are self-evidently known; therefore etc.

11. Further, that than which nothing greater can be thought is self-evidently known to exist; God is of this sort, according to Anselm *Proslogion* ch.5; therefore etc. This thing is also not anything finite, therefore it is infinite. – The proof of the major is that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject: for if the subject does not exist, it is not that thing than which nothing greater can be thought, because, if it existed in reality, it would be greater than if it did not exist in reality but in the intellect.

12. Again, that truth exists is self-evidently known; God is truth; therefore that God exists is self-evidently known. The proof of the major is that it follows from its opposite: for if there were no truth, therefore it is true that there is no truth; therefore there is truth.

13. Again, propositions that have necessity in a certain respect from terms that have existence in a certain respect, namely from the fact that they are in the intellect, are self-evidently known, as first principles which are self-evidently known from terms that have existence in the intellect; therefore much more will that be self-evidently known which has necessity from terms simply necessary, of which sort is the proposition 'God exists'. The assumption is plain because the necessity of the first principles and their knowability is not because of the existence of the terms in reality but only because of the connection of the extremes as that connection exists in the conceiving intellect.

14. On the contrary:

What is self-evidently known cannot be denied by anyone's mind; but 'the fool has said in his heart, there is no God,' *Psalms* 13.1, 52.1; therefore etc.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70rb): 'That God exists is not known *per se*, nor is it beyond hope for him to be known.

I. To the Second Question

15. Because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2.3.995a13-14: "it is absurd to look for knowledge and the way of knowing at the same time," I reply first to the second question, which inquires about the way of knowing the proposition 'God exists'. And, as to its solution, I first set down the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, and I say thus:

When a proposition is said to be self-evidently known, the phrase 'self-evidently' does not exclude there being any cause, because it does not exclude the terms of the proposition; for no proposition is known when the knowledge of the terms is excluded, because we know the first principles to the extent we know the terms; but what is excluded is any cause and reason outside the *per se* conception of the terms of a self-evidently known proposition. A self-evidently known proposition, then, is said to be one that gets its evident truth from nothing outside the proper terms that are part of it.^a

a. [Interpolation] that is, from no other propositional truth but from itself alone does 'every whole is greater than its part' get its evidence.

16. Next, what are those proper terms from which its evidence should come? – I say that, in this regard, one term is the definition and the other the thing defined, whether the terms are taken for the words that signify or for the concepts signified.^a

a. [Interpolation] some are to be taken for the thing defined and others for the definition.

17. I prove this from the *Posterior Analytics* 1.6.75a25-27, because the 'what it is' or the definition of one of the extremes is the middle term in demonstration; therefore one of the premises does not differ from the conclusion save as the thing defined differs from the definition, and yet the premise is a self-evidently known principle; the conclusion, however, is not self-evidently known but is demonstrated. Therefore as to the idea of a self-evidently known proposition, the concept of the definition is different from the thing defined, because if the concept of the definition and of the thing defined were the same, there would, in the most potent demonstration, be a begging of the question; again, there would then only be two terms there, which is false.

18. This is proved in a second way as follows, through Aristotle *Physics* 1.1.184a26-b3, that names relate to the definition as the whole to the parts, that is, that a confused name is first known by the definition; but a name introduces confusedly what a definition introduces distinctly, because a definition divides a thing into its individual parts; therefore the concept of a quiddity, as it is introduced by the name confusedly, is naturally known before its concept, as introduced distinctly by the definition, is known,

and so it is another concept and another extreme term.^a – From this further: since a self-evidently known proposition is one which has evident truth from the proper terms, and since the other terms are, as introduced by the definition, concepts of the quiddity in a distinct way, and are, as introduced by the name, concepts of the quiddity in a confused way, the conclusion follows that a proposition about a quiddity taken in a confused way will not be self-evidently known when the same proposition is only known if it is conceived distinctly.

a. [Interpolation] A reason also of this sort can be formed: it is impossible for the same concept to be prior and posterior and to be had and not had about the same thing; but the same thing can be conceived, and is conceived, according to the name before it is so according to the definition, Averroes *Physics* 1 com.5; therefore the concepts introduced by the name and by the definition are not the same.

19. There is another proof of this conclusion, that otherwise any other proposition, which is necessary and *per se* in the first mode [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a34-37] (as this proposition: ‘man is an animal’ and ‘man is a body’, as far as substance), would be self-evidently known; for if the nature of each extreme is assigned by the natures of the extremes when distinctly conceived, it is plainly manifest that one extreme includes the other. Similarly, otherwise any proposition would be self-evidently known in the special sciences that the metaphysician might possess as self-evidently known from the definitions of the extremes, which is not true, because the geometer does not use any principles as self-evidently known save those that have evident truth from terms confusedly conceived, to wit by conceiving line confusedly; but it is evident that a line is length without breadth without yet any distinct conception, in the way considered by the metaphysician, of what genus line pertains to. But the other propositions that the metaphysician could conceive, to wit that line is a quantity and a quantity of this sort, these sort of propositions are not had by the geometer as self-evidently known.

20. This is clear thirdly because the demonstration of some predicate about a defined thing stands well with the predicate being self-evidently known about the definition.^a

a. [Interpolation] just as having three angles [equal to two right angles] is demonstrated of a triangle when there is knowledge of its definition, which is: ‘plain figure’ etc.

21. Therefore all and only those propositions are self-evidently known that, from terms conceived in the way in which they are the terms of the proposition, possess or naturally possess the evident truth of the combined proposition.^a

a. [Interpolation] That proposition is known *per se* which gets its evidence, not from another proposition whose truth is more known, but from its own intrinsic terms.

[Interpolation to the interpolation] ...as these terms are its own. And I say, as they are its own: either they are confused concepts as confused, or distinct concepts as distinct; for definition and thing defined are not the same terms, because the thing defined is known before the definition is, by the fact that the confused thing or things are known first, *Physics* 1.1.184a21-22; hence the name of the defined thing involves the intelligible thing in a confused way and in a confused concept, but by the definition is introduced a discrete

concept about the same thing; and therefore something can be known *per se* as to one term, namely the defined term, which is not known as to the definition.

Again, a definition is the middle term in demonstration, and the defined thing is the conclusion; and therefore did I say 'as the terms are its own', namely confusedly if they are confused and distinctly if the concepts are distinct. Hence the definition as it is the middle is not as it is declarative or more evident to us than the thing defined, but the major proposition or the minor is more evident than the conclusion.

22. From this it is plain that there is no distinction between a self-evidently known and a self-evidently knowable proposition, for they are the same; for a proposition is not called self-evidently known because it is self-evidently known by some intellect (for then, if no intellect actually knew it, no proposition would be self-evidently known), but a proposition is said to be self-evidently known because, as far as depends on the nature of the terms, it is of a nature to possess, even in any intellect that conceives the terms, the evident truth contained in the terms. But if some intellect does not conceive the terms, and so does not conceive the proposition, it is, as far as depends on itself, no less self-evidently known; and it is in this ways that we speak of self-evidently known.

23. From this is also plain that there is no distinction between the self-evidently known in itself to nature and the self-evidently known in itself to us, because whatever is in itself self-evidently known, even if not actually known, is evidently true from the terms and known to any intellect, provided the terms are known.^{a 57}

a. [Interpolation] as is plain in the case of the perfect syllogism, which needs nothing for its necessity to be evident, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24, and *Reportatio* IA d.3 n.62. But this evidence is from the relation of the principles or the suppositions to the conclusion, which is the relation of necessity.

24. Nor is there any validity to the distinction that some propositions are self-evidently known in the first order and some in the second, because any propositions self-evidently known, when the proper terms are conceived in the way they are the terms, possess evident truth in their own order.

25. From these points I say to the question that the proposition which conjoins these extremes: existence and the divine essence as a this or God and his proper existence, is self-evidently known in the way that God sees this essence and existence under the most proper idea that this existence has in God; and in this way neither existence nor essence are understood by us now, but by God himself and by the blessed, because the proposition has from its terms evident truth for the intellect, for the proposition is not *per se* in the second mode [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a37-b5], as when the predicate is outside the idea of the subject, but is *per se* in the first mode [n.19] and is immediately evident from the terms, for it is the most immediate proposition, to which are resolved all assertions about God however he is conceived. Therefore this proposition 'God exists' or

⁵⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: "For the same reason the distinction is not valid that something is self-evidently known to the wise and the unwise, because this only pertains to the conception of the terms, which are presupposed to the understanding of a self-evidently known proposition, although Boethius, *On the Seven Days* PL 64, 1311, does thus distinguish the common conception; but either the self-evidently known proposition and the common conception are not the same, or Boethius is understanding a proposition that is conceived, not a proposition that is conceivable, or he is understanding one distinctly conceived by reason of the terms."

‘this essence exists’ is self-evidently known, because the extremes naturally make the complex whole evident to anyone who perfectly apprehends the extremes of this complex whole, for existence belongs to nothing more perfectly than to this essence. In this way, therefore, understanding by the name ‘God’ something that we do not perfectly know or conceive as being this divine essence, thus is ‘God exists’ self-evidently known.

26. But if it be inquired whether existence is present in some concept which we conceive of God, so that the sort of proposition in which existence is asserted of such a concept is self-evidently known, for example as about a proposition whose extreme terms can be conceived by us, that is, whether existence can in our intellect be a concept said of God, though not one common to him and to creatures, namely necessary existence or infinite being or supreme good, and we can of such a concept predicate existence in the way it is conceived by us, – I say that no such proposition is self-evidently known, for three reasons:

27. First, because any such proposition is a demonstrable conclusion, and a ‘conclusion-why’. Proof: anything that first and immediately belongs to something can be demonstrated of whatever is in it^a by a ‘demonstration-why’ through what it first belongs to as through the middle term.^b An example: if the triangle is what first has three angles equal to two right angles, of whatever is contained in triangle there can be a demonstration that it has three angles by a ‘demonstration-why’ through the middle term which is triangle, to wit that some figure would have three [angles equal to...] etc., and also about any kind of triangle that it has three angles..., although not first. But existence belongs first to this essence as this essence, in the way it is seen by the blessed; therefore of anything in this essence that can be conceived by us, whether it be as something superior or as a property, existence can be demonstrated through this essence, as through the middle term, by a ‘demonstration-why’, just as by this proposition ‘a triangle has three...’ there is a demonstration that some figure has three...; and consequently it is not self-evidently known from the terms, because then there would be no ‘demonstration-why’.^c

a. [Interpolation] whether in a superior or inferior, or of a passion.

b. [Interpolation] about the superior particularly or about the particular universally.

c. [Interpolation] Or let the reason be given in briefer form thus: what belongs to something first does not belong to another save by the nature of what to which it belongs first; but existence belongs first to this divine essence, therefore it will not belong to any other property or any other thing save by the nature of the essence. Therefore no proposition in which existence is asserted of any property of this essence that we conceive about God is true first, but is true by something else, and consequently it is not first and not known *per se*.

28. Second in this way: a self-evidently known proposition is self-evidently known to any intellect from the terms. But this proposition ‘there is an infinite being’ is not evident to our intellect from the terms; proof: for we do not conceive the terms before we believe the proposition or know it by demonstration, and it is not known to us in that ‘before’; for we do not hold it with certitude from the terms save by faith or demonstration.

29. Third, because nothing about a concept that is not simply simple is self-evidently known unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of that concept are united; but no concept that we have of God which is proper to him and does not belong to creatures is simply simple, or at any rate no concept that we distinctly conceive to be proper to God is simply simple;^a therefore nothing is self-evidently known about such a concept unless it is self-evidently known that the parts of the concept are united; but this is not self-evidently known, because the union of these parts is something demonstrated, by the two reasons mentioned [nn.27-28].

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] This minor is set down on the basis of the opinion about the univocity of the concept that is common to God and creatures, but if this opinion is changed let this minor be taken: 'many concepts in which we conceive God are not simply simple', and a particular conclusion follows, not a universal one as from the two reasons [nn.27-28]. The minor might be taken in another way thus: 'no concept of ours that is proper to God and that we perceive to be proper to God is simply simple', because although the concept of being taken from creatures is simply simple and proper to God according to another opinion [sc. the opinion that being is analogical, not univocal, to God and creatures], yet it is not a proper percept, because according to Henry [of Ghent] it seems that in that concept, because of its likeness and simplicity, we do not distinguish God from other things, – understand: we do not distinguish in a perceptible way, because although the concept is distinct, yet it is not perceived by us as a distinct concept.

30. The major is manifest from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.29.1024b31-32, that an account in itself false is false about everything; therefore no account is true about anything unless it is in itself true. Therefore in order for something to be true about some account, or for the account to be true about anything, one must know that it is in itself true; but no account is in itself true unless the parts of the account are united. And just as one must know as regard quidditative predications that the parts of the account can be united quidditatively, to wit that one formally contains the other, so as regard the truth of a proposition asserting existence one must know that the parts of the account of the subject or of the predicate are actually united. An example: just as the proposition 'man is an irrational animal' is not self-evidently known when speaking of quidditative predication, because the subject includes something in itself false, for it includes a proposition that includes contradictories in itself, so the proposition 'a man is white' is not self-evidently known if it is not self-evidently known that man and white are actually *per se* conjoined; because if they are not conjoined in actual existence, this proposition is true 'nothing is a white man', and consequently its converse will be true 'no white man is'; therefore its contradictory is false 'a white man is'.

31. Proof of the minor: whatever concept we conceive, whether of good or of true, if it is not contracted by something so that it is not a concept simply simple, is not a proper concept of God. Now I call a concept simply simple which is not resolvable into other simple concepts any one of which might in a simple act be distinctly conceived.

32. From this final reason [sc. the third, nn.29-31] a response to the [following] instances is clear, when the argument is made 'this is self-evidently known, necessary existence exists' – proof, because the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject; for if the predicate is not, 'necessary existence' does not exist – 'this too is self-evidently known, God exists', because, according to all the expositions posited by Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.9, God is called so from actual operation, namely from warming

or burning or seeing,⁵⁸ therefore, according to all acceptations of the term, ‘God exists’ is the same as ‘God is actually operating’, which seems self-evidently known, because, as before, the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject.⁵⁹

33. For this reason I reply to these points [n.32] in another way, that neither of these propositions, ‘necessary existence exists’ or ‘the one actually operating exists’, is self-evidently known, because it is not self-evidently known that the parts that are in the subject are actually united. When it is said that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’ [n.32], I say that it does not follow from this that the proposition is self-evidently known unless the repugnance is self-evident, and unless it is evident also along with this that each extreme has a simply simple concept or that the concepts of the parts are simply united.⁶⁰

II. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

34. To the principal argument of Damascene [n.10]: it can be expounded of the cognitive power naturally given to us by which we can know from creatures that God

⁵⁸ Damascene derived the Greek for ‘God’ (*Theos*) from Greek words signifying these operations.

⁵⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “It is said that this proposition ‘the one who is actually operating is’ the ‘is’ can be predicated as an additional third thing, or as a second thing, and thus that the ‘is’ is predicated as present being or as habitual being [sc. the difference between ‘a just man is’ – where ‘is’ is second thing, namely a predicate of existence – and ‘a man is just’ – where ‘is’ is a third thing, namely the copula joining subject and predicate]; in the first way the proposition is not self-evidently known, in the second way it is self-evidently known. But this is not logically said, because according to the Philosopher *On Interpretation* 10.19b19-22, ‘is’ is not predicated as additional third except when the third is additional as a predicate; but, when no third is additional, it predicates existence proper, which is to be predicated as second thing; but here nothing is additional; therefore it predicates precisely what exists in itself, and so it is predicated as second thing.”

⁶⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Against this: if the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject, then the consequence is good of putting the subject in some antecedent and the predicate in some consequent, inferring the consequent from an antecedent of that kind, to wit ‘*a* is necessarily existent, therefore *a* exists’, because the opposite of the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent. But every necessary consequence holds by virtue of some necessary categorical proposition, and thus the categorical is what unites the extremes, by reason of which the consequence holds; therefore such a proposition is necessary, to wit this one ‘necessary existence exists’ and ‘the one who is actually operating exists’.

I reply: when in the antecedent are included two opposites and a consequent is inferred, it is not inferred by reason of the whole antecedent extreme, because the whole extreme does not make any single concept, but only by reason of one part of the extreme, to wit the inference ‘an irrational man exists, therefore an animal exists’. The reason for the consequence is not ‘irrational man’, because it does not make any concept, but ‘man’ in the antecedent and ‘animal’ in the consequent; and therefore a categorical proposition that is *per se* true must be formed from those extremes, namely these: ‘man’ is ‘animal’. So in the proposed case: if the proposition has an extreme that is not simply simple, whose parts are not self-evidently known to be united, and something is inferred by reason of such non-simply simple extreme, it is inferred by reason of a part of it which includes what is inferred in the consequent; and therefore it holds by virtue of a categorical proposition which conjoins these two things, namely one part of the antecedent extreme and one part of the consequent extreme. This categorical is ‘existence exists’, but not ‘necessary existence exists’. The same response is made to ‘if it does not actually exist, it is not operating,’ and to the reverse ‘if it is operating, it is a being in actuality’: for in the subject several things are included, one of which is precisely the reason for the consequence, but the whole subject is not; and therefore there is no necessary proposition uniting the whole extreme of the antecedent with the extreme of the consequent.”

exists, at rate in general ideas (he subjoins there how he is known from creatures! *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.3), or it can be expounded of the knowledge of God under common ideas that agree with himself and with creatures, which are known more perfectly and eminently in God than in other things. But that Damascene is not speaking of actual and distinct knowledge of God is clear from what he says there: “no one knows him save to the extent he himself has given revelation.”

35. To the second [n.11] I say that Anselm does not say that that proposition is self-evidently known, as is clear, because from his deduction it cannot be inferred that the proposition is true save through at least two syllogisms, one of which is this: ‘being is greater than any non-being, nothing is greater than the supreme thing, therefore the supreme being is not a non-being’, from oblique forms in the second mood of the second figure [of syllogism]; the other syllogism is this: ‘what is not a non-being is a being, the supreme thing is not a non-being, therefore etc.’ But how his reasoning is valid will be explained in the following question, in the sixth argument [n.137], about proving infinity.

36. As to the proof of the major [n.11] (I say the major is false when ‘it is self-evidently known’ is taken; however the major is true, though not self-evidently known), when it is proved that ‘the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject’, I say that it is neither self-evident that the opposite of the predicate is repugnant to the subject nor is it self-evident that the subject possesses a simply simple concept or that its parts are united in fact; and both these are required for that proposition to be self-evidently known.

37. To the third [n.12] I say that the inference ‘it is self-evidently known that truth in general exists, therefore it is self-evidently known that God exists’ does not follow but is the fallacy of the consequent;⁶¹ alternatively, the major can be denied. And when it is proved ‘if there is no truth, it is true that there is no truth’, the consequence is not valid, because truth is taken either for the foundation of truth in reality, or for truth in the act of the intellect combining and dividing; but if there is no truth, neither is it true that there is no truth, whether by the truth of reality, because there is nothing, or by the truth in the intellect combining and dividing, because there is no intellect. However the inference does indeed follow, ‘if there is no truth, therefore it is not true that there is any truth’, but the further inference does not follow, ‘therefore it is true that there is not any truth’; it is the fallacy of the consequent, from a negative having two causes of truth to an affirmative which is one of those causes.⁶²

38. To the last principal argument [n.13] I say that propositions are not said to be self-evidently known because the extremes have a greater necessity in themselves, or a greater necessity in reality outside the intellect, but because the extremes, as they are the extremes of such a proposition, show evidently that their combination is in conformity with the natures of the terms and with the relation of them, and this whatever being the terms have, whether in reality or in the intellect; for the evidence of this conformity is the evidence of the truth in the proposition, which is the proposition’s being self-evidently known. But, as it is, the proposition^a ‘every whole is greater than its part’, or anything

⁶¹ The argument in n.12 is of the form: it is self-evident that truth exists; this truth (namely God) exists; therefore this truth is self-evident. The argument commits the fallacy of the consequent because the premise proceeds from self-evidence to truth, and the conclusion does the reverse, proceeding from truth to self-evidence; cf. Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* 1.5.167b1-13.

⁶² The conditional ‘if there is no truth, it is not true that there is any truth’, is a double negative; the conclusion ‘it is true that there is no truth’ is an affirmation of the antecedent. But to conclude to the affirmation of the antecedent of a conditional is to commit the fallacy of the consequent.

similar, in any intellect that conceives the terms, naturally has such evidence from the terms, because from the terms it is evident that the combined proposition is in conformity with the relation and nature of the terms, whatever being the terms have; and therefore although there is less necessity in the terms, it does not follow that there is less evidence in the propositions.

- a. [*Interpolation*] in my intellect the proposition ‘infinite being is’ is of a nature to be evident from the terms, but...

III. To the First Question

39. To the first question [nn.1-9] I proceed as follows, that it cannot be demonstrated for us in this way by a ‘demonstration-why’ that an infinite being exists, although from the nature of the terms the proposition is demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-why’. But for us the proposition is indeed demonstrable by a ‘demonstration-that’ from creatures [*Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78a22-b34]. Now the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are related more immediately than are absolute terms to things that are the middles in a ‘demonstration-that’, so that it can more immediately about the relative properties than about the absolute properties be concluded that an infinite being exists through what are middle terms in such a demonstration, for from the existence of one relative the existence of its correlative immediately follows; therefore I will first make existence clear about the relative properties of an infinite being, and second I will make existence clear about the infinite being, because the relative properties belong only to an infinite being; and thus there will be two principal articles.

40. As to the first article I say: the properties of an infinite being that are relative to creatures are properties either of causality or of eminence; the causality is double, either efficient or final. As to what is added about the exemplar cause, it is not a genus of cause other than the efficient cause, because then there would be five genera of causes; hence the exemplar cause is a sort of efficient cause, because, in distinction from what operates through nature, it operates through the intellect, about which elsewhere [1 d.36 q. un n.5].

A. The Existence of the Relative Properties of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

41. In the first principal article I will principally show three things. First then I will show that there is something in effect among beings which is simply first^a in efficient causality, and that there is also something which is simply first in idea of end, and something which is simply first in eminence; second I show that that which is first in one idea of primacy is first also in the other primacies; and third I show that that triple primacy belongs to one nature only such that it does not belong to several natures differing in species or in quiddity. And so in the first principal article there will be three partial articles.

a. [Interpolation] with every primacy that does not include any imperfection. For the part is more imperfect than the whole and yet is prior; for a part shares in the entity of the whole and is not itself the whole. But there are other primacies that do not include any imperfection, as the primacy of eminence and of triple causal independence, namely, efficient cause, formal or exemplar cause, and final cause. But the primacy of eminence is not the primacy of causality; for one being is not the cause of another from the fact that it is preeminent over it, for the first and the supreme in any genus is preeminent over any other posterior in that genus and yet it is not the cause of it. Also exemplar primacy is not distinguished from the primacy of efficient causality, because a principle that is the exemplar of other things in intelligible being is only an efficient principle through the intellect; for just as a natural efficient cause does not distinguish efficient causality but is contained under it, so neither is the exemplar cause distinguished from the efficient cause. So there are two causalities, distinct from each other, namely of efficient causality and final causality. And all those primacies that we attribute to God do not include any imperfection. – Hence first I will show that there exists something in fact among beings that is simply first.

42. [First partial article] – The first article among them includes three principal conclusions, because of the triple primacy; but each of the three conclusions has three conclusions on which it depends: the first is that something is first, the second is that that thing cannot be caused, the third is that that thing actually exists in reality. And so in the first article there are nine conclusions, but three principal conclusions.

43. Now the first conclusion of these nine is as follows, that some efficient cause is simply first such that neither can it be an effect nor can it, by virtue of something other than itself, cause an effect. The proof is that some being can be an effect. An effect of itself, then, or of nothing, or of something else. Not of nothing, because that which is nothing is cause of nothing; nor of itself, because there is nothing that makes or generates itself, Augustine *On the Trinity* 1 ch.1 n.1; therefore of something else. Let this something else be *a*. If *a* is first in the way expounded [n.43 *init.*], I have the proposition intended; if it is not first, then it is effective derivatively, because it can be the effect of another or cause an effect by virtue of another, for if a negation is denied the affirmation is asserted.⁶³ Let that other be granted and let it be *b*, about which one argues as was argued about *a*, and thus either one proceeds *ad infinitum*, where each thing will be second in respect of a prior, or one stops at something that has no prior; but an infinity is impossible in ascending causes, therefore primacy is necessary, because what does not have a prior is posterior to nothing posterior to itself, for a circle in causes is discordant.^a

a. [Interpolation] because then the same thing would be prior and posterior to itself.

44. Against this reasoning there is a double instance: first,^a that according to philosophizers an infinity in ascending causes is possible, as in the example they posit about infinite generations,^b where none is first but each is second, and yet they posited this without circularity.

a. [Interpolation] because it seeks a stand in causes.

b. [Interpolation] none of which is first but each is second, because according to them an infinite process is not discordant in the case of productions of the same nature.

⁶³ To deny that a thing cannot be an effect or cause an effect by virtue of another is to assert that it can be an effect and cause an effect by virtue of another.

45. Second, it seems that the argument proceeds from contingents and so is not a demonstration. The proof of the antecedent is that the premises assume the existence of something that is caused; everything such exists contingently.^a

a. [Interpolation] likewise, it proceeds from contingents, because it proceeds from the ideas of producer and produced, which are only contingent terms.

46. To exclude the first instance [n.44] I say that the philosophers did not posit that an infinity was possible in essentially ordered causes but only in accidentally ordered ones, as is clear from Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 94rb-va, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

47. And, in order to show the proposed point better, one must know that there are causes essentially ordered and causes that are accidentally ordered. Here one must note that it is one thing to speak of causes *per se* and *per accidens*, and another to speak of causes *per se* that are essentially and accidentally ordered. For in the first case there is only comparison of one thing with another, namely of the cause with the thing caused; and a cause *per se* causes according to its proper nature and not according to something accidental to it^a and a cause *per accidens* is the reverse;^b in the second case the comparison is of two causes with each other, insofar as something is caused by them.

a. [Interpolation] as the subject is the *per se* cause with respect to its own property, even in other cases, as ‘the white disperses [sight]’ and ‘the builder builds’.

b. [Interpolation] as ‘Polycleitus builds’.

48. And causes that are *per se* or essentially ordered differ from causes that are *per accidens* or accidentally ordered in three ways.

49. The first difference is that in *per se* ordered causes the second depends for its causing on the first, but not in *per accidens* ordered causes, even though the second is dependent in existence or in something else.^a

a. [Interpolation] for although the son depends for his existence on his father, yet he does not so depend in causing, because he can act when his father is dead just as when his father is alive.

50. The second difference is that in *per se* ordered causes there is causality of a second nature and a second order, because the superior cause is more perfect, but this is not the case in accidentally ordered causes; and this difference follows from the first, for no cause essentially depends for its causing on a cause of the same nature, because in the causing of something one thing of one nature is enough.

51. The third difference is that all causes ordered essentially and *per se* are necessarily required simultaneously for the causing, otherwise some essential and *per se* causality would be lacking for the effect; but it is not so in the case of accidentally ordered causes, because the simultaneity of them in causing is not required.^a

a. [Interpolation] because any cause has its own perfect causality without any respect of its effect; for it is enough that one cause successively causes after the other.

[*Interpolation to the interpolation*]: “From the three differences come three reasons: from the first, that the totality of causes is dependent in causing, therefore dependent on something that is not part of the totality; from the second, that the infinitely superior will be infinitely more perfect; from the third, that infinite things are actual all at once. There is an additional fourth reason which proves that a possible thing which does not include imperfection is already shown to be in existence. – But if an essential order is denied, because an accidental order is sufficient for the sense, on the contrary I give this proof: *a* is being caused by something; a nature that can be produced in one supposit can be produced in any supposit; so the reason by which it is now in this supposit is reason that it was before in that supposit and in that other supposit. No succession of things goes on continually save by virtue of something permanent; that permanent thing is no part of the succession; therefore besides the individual in the species doing the generating there is some other superior agent. – From this result I infer that that agent is the surpassing first thing, because an equivocal agent is more actual and independent and that on which the other things depend. It is the first end, because there is some end on account of which it *per se* acts, *Physics* 25.196b17-22; not on account of any of the effects other than itself, because these are less good. Likewise, nothing else does it naturally or by reason most of all love. Fourth, it is the first exemplar thing because it is a *per se* agent; so either it acts for an end that it knows or for an end it is directed to by something that knows; also it knows everything that can be made, because it orders them to the end and wills them for the end.

Solution to the second question: there are not two supereminent things. – Again, there are always as many essential features, hence and thence and in different species, as there are coordinate orderings, because they do not have one idea here and there, nor here to one and there to two first totalities.

Note the process of this solution, which is as follows: the first conclusion is that there is some first efficient thing; this conclusion is first proved in a confused way [n.43], second in a distinct way (through the three propositions [nn.53-55], the first of which is proved after five manners [n.53]), and two instances against it are ruled out [nn.44-46, 56]. The second conclusion is that the first thing cannot be caused [n.57]. The third conclusion: thus the first thing is actually existent [n.58]. Hence follow three similar conclusions about the first end [nn.60-62]. Hence three similar ones about the first supreme thing [nn.64-66]. Hence, that the first efficient cause is first in two other ways; two conclusions follow [nn.68-69]. Hence, that thus the first thing is one nature; which is shown in four ways, namely because it necessarily exists, because it is highest, because it is ultimate end, because it is the termination of dependency [nn.70-73].

In the second principal article the preliminaries are first proved, and there are three conclusions [nn.75, 89, 98; a fourth conclusion in n.105]; hence, that the first thing has intelligence and will, by three reasons [nn.76-79]; hence that its understanding itself is the same as its essence [n.89]; hence, that no understanding is an accident of it, by four reasons [nn.98-101]. Hence is the principal intention proved, namely infinity; first, through efficient causality, by treatment of Aristotle’s reason in *Physics* 8.10.266a10-24, b6-20, 267b17-26 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-13, [nn.111-124]; second, through actual knowledge of infinities [nn.125-127] and, in line with this, by an argument about intuitive knowledge of effects [nn.128-129]; third, through the idea of the end [n.130]; fourth, through the idea of preeminence [nn.131-139].

52. These points make the proposed conclusion clear, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. Likewise second, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes; therefore in every way an infinity in essentially ordered causes is impossible. Even if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible; therefore in every way there is some first thing that is necessarily and simply efficient cause. – Of these three assumed propositions let the first for brevity’s sake be called *a*, the second *b*, and the third *c*.

53. Proof of the three propositions.

First *a*, namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible. The proof is first that^a the totality of essentially ordered causes is from some cause that is not any part of the totality, because then it would be cause of itself. For the whole totality of dependent things is dependent, and not on any part of the totality.^b Second that an infinite number of causes, namely of essentially ordered causes, would actually exist at once, from the third difference above [n.51],^c which no philosopher has posited. – Next, third, that the prior is what is nearer to the beginning, *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b9-11; therefore where there is no beginning, nothing is essentially prior. – Next, fourth, that the superior cause is more perfect in causing, from the second difference [n.50]; therefore what is infinitely superior is infinitely more perfect, and so possessed of infinite perfection in causing, and consequently it does not cause in virtue of another, because anything of this latter sort causes imperfectly, as being dependent in causing on another cause. – Next, fifth, that an effective thing does not necessarily posit any imperfection; therefore it can be in something without imperfection.^d But if no cause is without dependence on something prior, it will not be in anything without imperfection. Therefore independent effective causality can exist in some nature, and this nature is simply first; therefore effective causality simply first is possible. This is enough, because from this the conclusion is later [n.58] drawn that such a first effective cause, if it is possible, exists in reality. And thus by five reasons is *a* made plain.

a. [Interpolation] in essentially ordered causes, where the adversary posits an infinity of them, a second cause, insofar as it causes, depends on a first (from the first difference [n.49]). So if there were an infinity of causes, things are such that not only any later cause but any cause at all depends on its own immediate cause, therefore etc.

b. [Interpolation] and this thing I call the first efficient cause. So if there are infinite causes, they still depend on some other cause that is not part of the totality.

c. [Interpolation, replacing the second argument in the text] if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes were to come together in the production of some effect, and if, from the third difference [n.51], all essentially ordered causes exist together at once, it follows that an infinite number of things exist together at once in causing this effect.

d. [Interpolation] because what involves no imperfection can be supposed to exist without imperfection among things.

54. Proof of *b* [n.52], namely that an infinity in accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless a stand is posited in essentially ordered causes, because an accidental infinity, if posited, is not simultaneous, clearly, but only successive, as one after another, such that the second in a way flows from the prior. Yet it does not depend on the prior in causing; for it can cause when the prior does not exist just as when it does exist, as a son generates when his father is dead just as when he is alive. Such an infinity of succession is impossible save from some nature that endures permanently, on which the whole succession and any part of it depend. For no deform-ness is perpetuated save in virtue of some permanent thing that is no part of the succession, because all the successive members of the succession are of the same nature;^a but something is essentially prior, because any part of the succession depends on it, and that in another form of order than on the proximate cause which is some part of the succession.^b So *b* is plain.

a. [Interpolation] and because no part of a succession can persist along with the whole succession, for then it would not be part of the succession.

b. [Interpolation] Everything therefore that depends on a cause accidentally ordered depends more essentially on a cause *per se* and essentially ordered; nay rather, when an essential order is denied the accidental order will be denied, because accidents do not have an order save by means of something fixed and permanent, nor consequently are they multiplied to infinity.⁶⁴

55. There is proof too of *c* [n.52], that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible. The proof is that since, from the first reason here adduced, namely that nothing can be from nothing [n.43], it follows that some nature is effective, if an essential order of active causes is denied then this nature causes in virtue of nothing else; and although it be in some individual posited as caused yet in another it is not caused, which is the proposed conclusion about nature; or, if it be in anything posited as caused, at once a contradiction is implied if one denies an essential order, because no nature can be in anything posited as caused such that there be an accidental order under it without an essential order to some other nature.

56. To the second instance posited above, which says that the reasoning proceeds of contingents and so is not a demonstration [n.43],^a I respond that one might argue thus: some nature is effected because some subject is changed, and so the term of the change begins to be in the subject, and so that term or composite is produced or effected; therefore there is some efficient thing, by the nature of correlatives, and then the first reason [n.43] can in truth be contingent, but it is manifest. – However, one can argue thus, by proving the first conclusion [n.43] in this way: this reasoning is true, ‘some nature is effectible, therefore some nature is effective’. The proof of the antecedent is that some subject is changeable, because some being is possible, by distinguishing the possible from the necessary [*Prior Analytics* 1.13.32a18-20: ‘the contingent is that which, whether it exists or not, nothing impossible follows’], and by proceeding in this way from necessities. And then the proof of the first conclusion is about quidditative being or about possible being, but not about actual existence. But actual existence will be proved further in the third conclusion of that of which possibility is being proved now [n.58].

a. [Interpolation] when I say ‘some nature has been truly brought about, therefore something is the efficient cause of it’.

57. The second conclusion about the first effective thing is this, that the simply first effective thing cannot be caused [n.42]. The proof is that it is an in-effectible independent effective thing. This is clear first [n.43] because, if it is causative by virtue of another or is effectible by another, then either there is a process to infinity, or a circle, or a stand at some in-effectible independent effective thing; that thing I say is first, and anything else is plainly not first, from the things you have granted. Therefore there is also this further conclusion: if that first thing is in-effectible then it is un-causable, because it is not causable by an end, or by matter, or by form. The proof of the first consequence, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by an end, is that the final cause

⁶⁴ Tr. In other words, an infinite series of accidentally ordered causes must at least have an abiding matter underlying it, and this matter will underlie it as a *per se* and essentially ordered cause.

only causes because the final cause moves metaphorically the efficient cause to bringing about its effect, for the entity of a thing with an end does not in any other way depend on the end as on something prior; but nothing is a cause *per se* unless the caused thing essentially depends on it as on something prior. – Now the two other consequences, namely that if it is in-effectible then it is not causable by matter or by form, are proved together because what does not have an extrinsic cause does not have an intrinsic cause either, because the causality of an extrinsic cause implies perfection without any imperfection, but the causality of an intrinsic cause necessarily implies some imperfection annexed to it, because an intrinsic cause is part of the caused thing; therefore the nature of an extrinsic cause is naturally prior to the nature of an intrinsic cause. So once the prior is denied so is the posterior. – The same consequences are also proved by the fact that intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic ones, whether in their existence, or insofar as they cause the composite, or in both ways, because intrinsic causes do not cause the composite by themselves without an agent. – From these statements the second conclusion is plain.

58. The third conclusion about the first effective thing is this: the first effective thing is actually existing and some nature is truly actually existent in the way it is effective [n.42]. Its proof: if that to whose nature it is repugnant to be from another can exist, it can exist from itself; but it is repugnant to the nature of the simply first effective thing to be from another, as is plain from the second conclusion [n.57]; likewise too it can exist, as is plain from the first conclusion where the fifth proof for *a* was set down [n.53], which proof seems to establish too little and yet it establishes this. But the other proofs for that very *a* [n.53] can be brought to bear on the existence which this third conclusion proposes, and they are about contingents, though manifest ones; or let them be taken of the nature and quiddity and possibility of *a*, and they proceed from necessities. Therefore a simply first effective thing can be from itself. But what is not from itself cannot be from itself, because then a non-being would bring something into being, which is impossible, and further it would then cause itself and so would not be altogether un-causable. – This last point, namely about the existence of the first effective, is made clear in another way, because for the universe to lack a possible supreme grade in its being is discordant.

59. In accord with the three conclusions shown about the first effective thing, note a certain corollary, that it contains as it were the three proved conclusions, namely that the first effective thing is not only prior to other things but, because a contradiction is involved in something else's being prior, thus, to the extent it is first, it exists. The proof is as in the preceding [n.58]; for un-causability is most included in the idea of such a first, as is proved from the second [n.57]; for if it can be (because this does not contradict its being, as proved from the first [nn.53, 56]), it follows that it can be of itself, and so it is of itself.

60. In accord with the first three conclusions about the efficient cause I propose three similar conclusions about the final cause.

Some final cause is simply first, that is, it is neither orderable to another nor is it naturally end of other things in virtue of something else. And it is proved by five reasons similar to those set down for the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.53].

61. The second conclusion is that the first final cause is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, otherwise it would not be first; and, further, therefore it is in-effectible. The proof of this consequence is that every *per se* agent acts for an end,

from *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22, where the Philosopher intends this to hold also of nature, about which it is less evident than about an agent that acts from deliberate choice. But that of which there is no *per se* efficient cause is not effectible, because in no genus can the *per accidens* be first, as is plain in the proposed case, especially about causes acting *per accidens*, which are chance and fortune, that according to Aristotle, *Physics* 2.6.196a5-13, are necessarily reduced to causes acting *per se* as to things prior, namely to nature and intellect and deliberate choice. Of that therefore of which there is no *per se* agent there will be no agent; but of that of which there is no end there is no *per se* agent; therefore it will be in-effectible, for what is causable by an end is excelled in goodness by the end and consequently in perfection, – and so on, as was proved of the first effective cause [n.57].

62. The third conclusion is that the first final cause is actually existent and that to some actually existing nature that primacy belongs. The proof is from the first way about efficient causality [n.58].

63. A corollary: it follows that the first is so first that a prior being is impossible, and this is proved like the corollary in the prior way [n.59].

64. To the three conclusions about both orders of extrinsic causality I propose three similar conclusions about the order of eminence.

Some eminent nature is simply first in perfection. This is plain because an order among essences is essential, for according to Aristotle forms are related like numbers, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b33; in this order there is a stand, which is proved by the five ways above about a stand in effective causes [n.53].

65. The second conclusion is that a supreme nature is un-causable. The proof is that it is not causable by an end, from the points preceding [nn.57, 62]; therefore it is in-effectible and, further, therefore un-causable. These two consequences were proved in the second conclusion about efficient causes [n.57]. Again, that the supreme nature is in-effectible is proved because every effectible has some essentially ordered cause, as is plain from the proof of *b* itself in the first conclusion about the first effective thing [n.54]; but an essentially ordered cause excels its effect.

66. The third conclusion is that a supreme nature is something actually existing, and it is proved from the preceding [nn.58, 62].

67. Corollary: that there be some nature more eminent or superior to it involves a contradiction; the proof is like the corollary about the effective thing and the end [nn.59, 63].

68. [Second partial article] – As to the second article [n.41] I say that the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.⁶⁵ The proof is that every efficient cause *per se* acts for an end, and a prior efficient cause for a prior end; therefore the first efficient cause for the ultimate end. But it acts principally and ultimately for nothing other than itself; therefore it acts for itself as for an end. Therefore the first efficient cause is the first end.^a

a. [Interpolation] For if it were to act *per se* for an end other than itself, then there would be something more noble than the first efficient cause, because an end which is something separate from the agent intending the end is more noble than the agent.

⁶⁵ Cf. Averroes *Metaphysics* 10 com.7, 12 com.6: “the formal, final, and moving principles are not three in number, but one in subject and three in idea.”

69. Likewise, the first efficient cause is the first eminent cause. The proof is that the first efficient cause is not univocal with other effective natures, but is equivocal; therefore it is more eminent and more noble than they. Therefore the first efficient cause is most eminent.

70. [Third partial article] – As to the third article [n.41] I say that since that in which there is the triple primacy is the same thing, for that in which one primacy is the others are too, there is also in it a triple identity such that the first efficient cause is only one in quiddity and in nature. To show this I show first a certain preliminary conclusion, and second the principal conclusion.

Now the preliminary conclusion is that the efficient cause that is first by this triple primacy is necessarily existent of itself. The proof is that it is through and through un-causable, for there is a contradiction involved in something's being prior to it in the genus of efficient or final cause and consequently in the genus of any cause at all; therefore it is altogether un-causable. From this I argue: a thing cannot not be unless there is something positively or privatively impossible with it that can be; but in the case of that which is from itself and is through and through un-causable there cannot be anything which is positively or privatively impossible with it; therefore etc. The major is plain, because no being can be destroyed save by what is positively or privatively impossible with it. The proof of the minor is that that impossible thing can either be from itself or from another; if it can be from itself and it is from itself, then two impossible things will be at the same time, or neither of them exists, because each destroys the being of the other; if it can be from another, then to the contrary: no cause can destroy some being on account of the repugnance of its effect to that being unless it give to its effect a more perfect and intense being than is the being of the other destructible thing; of no being from another is its being from its cause nobler than is the being of something necessary of itself, because every caused thing has dependent being, but what is from itself has independent being.

71. Further, to the intended proposition, there is proof from this of the unity of the first nature, which is the thing principally intended in this third article. This is shown by three reasons.

First in this way, that if two natures are necessarily existent they are distinguished by some real proper reasons, and let them be called *a* and *b*. The reasons are either formally necessary or not. If they are,^a then each nature will be necessarily existent by two formal reasons, which is impossible, because since neither of the reasons *per se* includes the other, each of the natures, when taken separately, would be necessarily existent.^b But if by the reasons by which they are distinguished neither one of them is formally necessarily existent, then the reasons are not reasons for necessarily existing, and so neither of them is included in necessary existence, because whatever is not necessarily existent is of itself possible, but nothing possible is included in necessary existence.^c

a. [Interpolation] and, beside this, those two natures are formally necessary through that in which they agree.

b. [Interpolation] through the other nature, and so there would be something necessarily existent that is no less necessarily existent when the thing through which it is so has been taken away [n.177].

c. [Interpolation] because necessary existence includes nothing that is not necessarily existent or the reason for necessarily existing [n.177].

72. The second proof is that there cannot be two most eminent natures in the universe; therefore neither can there be two first effective things. The proof of the antecedent is that species are related as numbers, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b33, and consequently there cannot be two in the same order; therefore much less can there be two first or two most eminent natures.

73. This is also plain, third, by reasoning about the idea of end, because if there were two ultimate ends, they would have two coordinate orders of beings related to them such that these beings here would have no order to those beings there, because they would have no order to the end of those beings either, for things that are ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another end, because there cannot be two total and perfect causes in the same order of the same caused thing; for then something would be in some order a *per se* cause such that, when it was not posited, the caused thing would nevertheless be. Therefore things ordered to one end are in no way ordered to another end, nor consequently ordered to things that are ordered to the other end, and so from them no universe would come to be. – There is also a general confirmation of this, that there cannot be two things that are the total term of the dependence of some one and the same thing, because then a thing would be the term of a dependence such that, when it was removed, the dependence would no less have a term, and so it would not be a dependence on that thing. But other things are essentially dependent on the efficient and eminent and final cause. Therefore there cannot be two natures that are the first terms of other things according to that triple dependence. There is therefore precisely some one nature which is the term of beings in accord with that triple dependence, and so which has that triple primacy.

B. The Existence of an Infinite Being is Made Clear

74. Having shown the relative properties of the first being, I proceed further as follows to show the infinity of the first being and consequently the existence of an infinite being: first I show that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will such that its intelligence is of infinities distinctly and that its essence is representative of infinities (which essence indeed is its intelligence), and from this will be shown, secondly, its infinity. And thus, along with the triple primacy already shown, there will be a fourfold means for showing its infinity. But yet as to the fourth means, namely that the first efficient cause has intelligence and will, from which, as from a means added to the other three, its infinity is proved, I make a certain assumption with respect to it until distinction 35 [*Ordinatio* I d.35 q. un. n.2].

1. Conclusions preliminary to infinity are proposed and demonstrated

75. Now, that the first being has intelligence and will I argue thus: some agent is a *per se* first agent, because to every cause *per accidens* some cause *per se* is prior, *Physics* 2.6.198a8-9, where Aristotle intends this of nature, about which it is less evident; but every agent *per se* acts for an end.

76. And from this there is a twofold argument.

First thus: every natural agent, precisely considered, would act of necessity and just as much if it were not to act for any other end but was acting independently; therefore if it does not act save for an end, this is because it depends on an agent that loves the end; of such a sort is the first efficient cause, therefore etc.

77. Again, if the first agent acts for an end, then that end moves the first efficient cause either as loved by an act of will or as only naturally loved. If as loved by an act of will, the intended conclusion is gained. If only naturally loved, this is false, because it does not naturally love an end other than itself in the way the heavy loves the center and matter loves form; for then it would in some way be in relation to an end because inclined to an end. But if it only naturally loves the end which is itself, this is nothing save itself being itself, for this does not preserve the doubleness of idea in itself.⁶⁶

78. Another argument, by as it were bringing together the reason already made, is as follows: the first efficient cause itself directs its effect to an end; therefore it directs either naturally or by knowing and loving the end. Not naturally, because a non-knower directs nothing save in virtue of a knower; for it belongs first to the wise to order things, *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a17-18; but the first efficient cause directs in virtue of nothing else, just as neither does it cause in virtue of anything else, – for then it would not be first; therefore etc.

79. Again, something is contingently caused; therefore the first cause causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly.

80. Proof of the first consequence: any second cause causes insofar as it is moved by the first cause; therefore if the first cause moves necessarily, any other cause is moved necessarily and anything else is caused necessarily; therefore if some second cause moves contingently, the first cause too will move contingently, because the second cause, to the extent it is moved by the first cause, does not cause save in virtue of the first cause.

81. Proof of the second consequence: there is no principle of contingent operation save the will or something concomitant to will, because any other thing acts from the necessity of nature, and so not contingently; therefore etc.

82. There is an instance against this reason, and first against the first consequence the argument is as follows, that our own willing could yet cause something contingently, and so there is no requirement that the first cause contingently cause it.

83. Again, the Philosopher conceded the antecedent, namely that something is contingently caused, and he denied the consequent in the sense of understanding it of will, namely that the first cause causes contingently, by positing contingency in inferior things, not because God wills contingently, but as a result of motion, which causes necessarily insofar as it is uniform but has deformity, and so contingency, following from its parts.

84. Against the second consequence, ‘if it causes contingently, therefore it causes willingly’: this does not seem to hold, because some of the things that are moved

⁶⁶ The point seems to be that if the first being’s love of the end is natural then, first, this end cannot be something other than itself (as it is in the case of other things that naturally tend to an end, as a heavy thing tending downwards), and, second, if therefore this end is just the first being itself and the first being naturally loves it, then there is in the first being no doubleness of end and natural love of the end (as in the case of a heavy thing tending downwards), so that its being is its very self-loving, which is a knowing and willing itself.

naturally can be impeded, and so the opposite can – contingently and violently – come about.

85. To the first [n.82] one must say that if God is the first moving or efficient cause with respect to our will, the same follows about it as about other things, because he necessarily either moves the will immediately or he moves another thing and this other thing, having been necessarily moved, would necessarily move the will, because this other thing only moves from the fact that it is moved. The ultimate result is that what is proximate to the will would necessarily move the will, even if what is proximate to the will is the will itself; and so it will necessarily will, and it will be necessarily willing. And further the impossibility follows that he necessarily causes whatever is caused.

86. To the second [n.83] I say that I do not here call contingent what is non-necessary or non-eternal, but something whose opposite might happen when that something happens; therefore I said ‘something is contingently caused’ [n.79], and not ‘something is contingent’. Now I say that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent by saving the antecedent through recourse to motion [n.83], because if that whole motion is from its cause necessarily, any part of it is necessarily caused when it is caused, that is, it is caused inevitably, so that the opposite cannot then be caused; and further, what is caused by any part of the motion is caused necessarily and unavoidably. Either therefore nothing happens contingently, that is avoidably, or the first thing causes immediately in such a way that it might also not cause.

87. To the third [n.84] I say that if some cause can impede it, this is only in virtue of a superior cause, and so on right up to the first cause, and if the first cause necessarily moves the cause immediate to itself, there will be necessity right up to the end; therefore it will impede necessarily, and consequently no other cause can naturally exercise its causality.^a

a. [Interpolation] and because just as the first cause does everything by necessity of causality (as everyone supposes, for otherwise it would be a changeable cause), so also do all other causes. – These things that he [i.e. Scotus] says do not seem to be true, one could use the same reasoning to argue that nothing exists by chance or fortune in caused things unless the first cause acts by chance or fortune, and that as everything happens determinately in respect of the first cause so also in respect of other causes. Therefore one could reply to what he says that causes moved by the first mover do not so receive motion in a uniform way that of necessity they secondarily move in like manner as they are moved by the first cause, such that the ‘in like manner’ states the manner of moving on the part of God who makes them move; for they are indeed moved in like manner as they are moved by the first cause if the ‘in like manner’ states the manner of moving on the part of the causes that are moved. For the manner of the moving cause is not always being received in the moved cause, but the motion in the latter is received according to the mode of the receiver; therefore motion exists in it in a way other than it does in the first cause.

88. Thus therefore it seems to have been shown in a triple way that the first agent has intelligence and will, the first of which ways is that nature acts for an end and only because it is dependent and directed to the end by a knower [n.76]; the second is that the first agent itself acts for an end [nn.77-78], and the third that some effect is, when caused, contingently caused [nn.79-87].

89. Further, as to the question preliminary to infinity, I prove second that the first agent’s understanding and will are the same as its essence, and first of the volition of

itself as of an object such that the act of love of the first cause is essentially the same as the nature of that cause and as the nature of every act of its will.

Proof. The causality and causing of the final cause is simply first, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (95rb), who says that “if there is knowledge about any cause whatever, knowledge about the final cause would be noblest;” for this cause, as concerns its causality, precedes the efficient cause, because it moves the efficient cause to act, – and therefore the causality of the first cause and of its causing is, according to any causation in any genus of cause, through and through un-causable. But the causality of the first end is to move the efficient cause as a thing loved; but it is the same thing for the first end to move the first efficient cause as a thing loved by it and for the first efficient cause to love the first end, because for an object to be loved by the will is nothing other than for the will to love the object. Therefore that the first efficient cause loves the first end is through and through un-causable, and so is necessary of itself, and so it will be the same as the first nature. And there is as it were a reversal of the reasoning from the opposite of the conclusion, because if the first loving is other than the first nature, then it is causable, and consequently effectible; therefore it is from some *per se* efficient cause which loves the end. Therefore the first loving would be caused by some love of the end prior to that caused first loving, which is impossible.

90. Aristotle shows this fact about intelligence, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-21, because otherwise the first thing will not be the best substance, for it is through understanding that it is honorable.

91. Second, because otherwise the continuance of its activity will be laborious for it. Again, if it is not that [sc. the same as its essence], it will be in potency to its contradictory; on that potency labor follows, according to him.⁶⁷

92. These reasons can be made clear by reason.

The first [n.90] thus: since the ultimate perfection of every being in first act exists in the second act whereby it is conjoined to what is best, especially if the best acts and does not merely make (for every intelligible is active, and the first nature is intelligible, from the previous conclusion [nn.75-88]), the consequence is that its ultimate perfection will be in second act; therefore if this act is not the substance of it, its substance will not be best, because its best is some other thing.

93. The second reason [n.91] can be made clear thus: a potency merely receptive is a potency for the contradictory; therefore since it is not of this sort [sc. in potency to the contradictory], therefore etc. – But because according to Aristotle this reason is not demonstrative but only probable, let the intended proposition be shown in another way, from the identity of the power and of the object in itself; therefore they will have the same act. But the consequence, plainly, is not valid; an instance is that an angel understands itself and loves itself and yet an angel’s act of loving and of understanding are not the same as its substance.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b28-29: “If [the first mover] is not intelligence but potentiality, the continuing of its understanding will reasonably be laborious for it.”

⁶⁸ That is, an angel’s power of knowing and loving and what it knows and loves are the same, namely itself; but its act of knowing and loving is not itself or its substance but an accident of its substance. One cannot therefore argue from identity of power and object to identity of *act* of power and object. One cannot therefore use this argument to prove that the first being’s knowing and loving itself is identical with its substance. Scotus seems here to be criticizing an argument found in St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a q.14 a.2 and ad 2; a.4.

94. This conclusion, namely that the divine essence is the same as its willing itself, is true from corollaries: for it follows first that that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing exists only in the will; therefore the will whose willing is un-causable is also un-causable;⁶⁹ therefore etc. And likewise, willing is understood to be as it were posterior to the will; yet willing is the same as the first nature; therefore the will more so.

95. Again, second, it follows that understanding itself is the same as the first nature, because nothing is loved unless it is known; therefore if loving itself is necessarily existent from itself, the consequence is that understanding itself is necessarily existent from itself.

96. And if understanding is closer to the first nature than willing, then the consequence further is that the intellect is the same as the first nature, as was just argued about the will from willing [n.94].

97. There is a fourth consequence too, that the idea of understanding itself is the same as itself, because the idea necessarily exists of itself if understanding necessarily exist of itself, and if the idea of understanding itself is as it were pre-understood in the intellect itself.

98. Having shown of self-understanding and self-willing that they are the same as the essence of the first being, I show from other things the proposition intended, namely about all its understanding and willing.

And let the third conclusion be this: no understanding can be an accident of the first nature. The proof is that it has been shown of the first nature that it is in itself the first effective thing [nn.43-56]; therefore it has from itself the resources whence, after everything else has been removed, it can cause anything causable, at least as first cause of the causable. But with its knowledge removed it does not have the resources whence it might cause the causable; therefore knowledge of anything else whatever is not other than its nature. – The proof of the assumption is that nothing can cause except from love of the end, by loving it, because it cannot otherwise be a *per se* agent, because neither can it act, for an end; as it is, however, there is pre-understood in its willing of anything for the end its understanding of it; therefore before the first moment in which it is understood to be causing or willing *a*, necessarily it is pre-understood to be understanding *a*; so without this it cannot *per se* bring *a* about, and so in the case of other things.

99. Again, the same thing is proved because all understandings of the same intellect have a like relation to the intellect, according to their essential identity or accidental identity with it (as is clear of every created intellect and its understandings), because they seem to be perfections of the same genus; therefore if some of them have a subject that receives them, then all of them do, and if one of them is an accident each of them is. But it cannot be that any of them is an accident in the first thing, from the preceding conclusion [n.89], because an accident would be a non-understanding of itself; therefore none of them will there be an accident.

100. Again, understanding, if it is what can be an accident, will be received in the intellect as in a subject; therefore received also in the understanding which is the same as the intellect, and thus a more perfect understanding will be in the receptive power in respect of a more imperfect understanding.

⁶⁹ That is, if the will were caused, its act of willing would be caused, because that act would exist in something caused.

101. Again, the same understanding can be about setting several objects in order, therefore the more perfect it is the more the objects; therefore the most perfect understanding, with which a more perfect degree of being understood is impossible, will be the same as the understanding of all objects. The understanding of the first thing is most perfect in this way; therefore it is the same as the understanding of all objects, and the understanding which is of itself is the same as itself, from what has just preceded [n.89]; therefore the understanding of all things is the same as itself. And I intend the same conclusion to be understood about willing.

102. Again, the intellect is nothing but a certain understanding; but this intellect is the same for all things, and so is something that cannot be for any other object; therefore neither can it understand any other thing. Therefore the intellect is the same as the understanding of all things. – It is the fallacy of the accident to conclude from the identity of certain things among themselves to their identity with respect to a third thing with respect to which they are extraneous;⁷⁰ and it is plain from a similitude: to understand is the same as to will; ‘if therefore to understand itself belongs to something, then to will itself too belongs to the same thing’, does not follow, but it only follows that to will belongs to it; which willing indeed is something that belongs to the same thing, because one must so understand ‘same thing’ that the inference can be drawn in a divided, not a conjoined, manner, because of being an accident.⁷¹

103. Again, the intellect of the first thing has one act that is adequate to itself and coeternal, because understanding itself is the same as itself; therefore it cannot have any other understanding. – The consequence is not valid. An example about the blessed who at the same time see God and something else even if they see God according to the utmost of their capacity, as is posited about the soul of Christ, and still he can see something else.

104. Again an argument: this intellect has in itself through identity the greatest perfection of understanding; therefore it has every other understanding. – Response: this does not follow, because an understanding that is lesser can be causable and therefore can differ from the un-causable, but the greatest understanding cannot.

105. The fourth principal conclusion about the intellect and the will of God is this: the intellect of the first thing understands always and with a distinct and necessary act any intelligible thing naturally before that thing exists in itself.

106. The proof of the first part is that the first thing can know what is thus intelligible; for this belongs to perfection in the intellect, to be able distinctly and actually to know any intelligible thing, nay to posit this is necessary for the idea of intellect, because every intellect is of the whole of being taken in the most common way, as will be determined later [I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.3, 8-12, 24]. But the intellect of the first thing can only have an understanding the same as itself, from what was just said [n.98]; therefore it has actual and distinct understanding of any intelligible whatever, and this the same as itself and so always and necessarily.

⁷⁰ The point seems to be that one cannot conclude from identity of intellect in respect of all things to its identity with its act of understanding all things.

⁷¹ The point seems to be that one cannot infer from identity of understanding and will to identity of objects understood and willed, for objects are logically extraneous to acts, and so to infer identity of the first from an identity of the second is to commit the fallacy of the accident.

107. The second part, about priority, is proved thus, that whatever is the same as itself is necessarily existent, as was plain above [n.106]; but the being of things other than itself is not necessarily existent. Necessary existence is of itself prior in nature to everything non-necessary.

108. It is proved in another way, that the existence of anything else depends on the first thing as on a cause and, as a cause is of something causable, knowledge of the causable on the part of the cause is necessarily included; therefore the knowledge will be naturally prior to the very existence of the known thing.

109. The first part of the conclusion is also proved in another way, that a perfect artisan distinctly knows everything to be done before it is done, otherwise he would not operate perfectly, because knowledge is the measure by which he operates; therefore God is in possession of distinct and actual knowledge, or at any rate habitual knowledge, of all things producible by him prior to those things.

110. Against this: there is an instance about art, that universal art suffices for producing universal things [Scotus, *Metaphysics* I q.5 nn.3-4, VII p.2 q.15 n.1] – Look there for a response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9]. response [ibid. VII p.2 q.15 n.9].

2. The infinity of God is proved directly

111. Having shown these preliminaries I argue for infinity in four ways.

[First way] – First by way of efficacy, where the intended proposition will be shown in a twofold way: first because it is the first efficient cause of all things, second because the efficient cause, plainly, knows distinctly all make-able things; third, infinity will be shown by way of the end, and fourth by way of eminence.

The first way, on the part of the cause, is touched on by the Philosopher, *Physics* 8.10.266a10-24, 266b6-20, 267b17-26 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-13, because it moves with an infinite motion; therefore it has an infinite power.

112. This way is confirmed as to the antecedent as follows: the intended proposition is proved just as much whether it can move through an infinity as whether it does move through an infinity, because the existence of it must be actual just as much as the power of it is; the thing is clear of the first thing to the extent it exists of itself [n.58]. Although therefore it may not move with an infinite motion in the way Aristotle understands, yet if that antecedent is taken to be what, for its part, can move, the antecedent is held to be true and equally sufficient for inferring the intended proposition.

113. The consequence [n.111] is proved thus, that if it exists of itself, it does not move with an infinite motion by virtue of another; therefore it does not receive its thus moving from another, but it has in its own active virtue its whole effect all at once, because it has it independently. But what has in its virtue an infinite effect all at once is infinite; therefore etc.

114. The first consequence [n.111] is confirmed in another way thus: the first mover has all at once in its virtue all the effects that can be produced by motion; but those effects are infinite if the motion is infinite; therefore etc.

115. Against these clarifications of Aristotle, whatever may be true of the antecedent, yet the first consequence does not seem well proved.

Not in the first way [n.113], because a greater duration does not add any perfection, for a whiteness that persists for one year is not more perfect than if it

persisted for only one day; therefore a motion of however long a duration is not a more perfect effect than the motion of one day. Therefore from the fact that the agent has all at once in its active virtue a moving with an infinite motion, the perfection is not proved to be greater in this case than in that, save that the agent moves for a longer time, and of itself; and so one would need to show that the eternity of the agent would prove its infinity, otherwise it could not be proved from the infinity of its motion. – Then as to the form of the argument: the final proposition of the confirmation [n.113] is denied, save of infinity of duration.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Let us inquire, therefore, how the aforesaid reasoning of the Philosopher [n.111] is conclusive! If the way of efficient causality is preferable to the other ways (the point is plain above where the ways are compared, because this way entails the others [n.111]), and if infinity is not proved by this way, how will it be proved by the others?

116. The second confirmation [n.114] of the consequence is also refuted, because a greater intensive perfection is not proved by the fact that any agent of the same species can go on successively producing as much and as long as it lasts, because what has power for one such thing in one stretch of time has power by the same virtue for a thousand such things if it last a thousand stretches of time. And, among philosophers, an infinity is not possible except a numerical one of effects producible by motion (namely of effects that can come to be and pass away), because in species they posited a finitude. Therefore an intensive infinity in an agent no more follows from the fact that it has power for an infinite number of things in succession than if it has power for two things only; for only a numerical infinity is possible according to philosophers. – But if someone prove an infinity of species to be possible, by proving some of the heavenly motions to be incommensurable and so never able to return to the same form, even if they endure an infinite time and even if conjunctions infinite in species cause generable things infinite in species, whatever may in itself be true about this, yet it is nothing to the intention of the philosopher, who denied an infinity of species.

117. The ultimate probability that occurs for making clear the consequence of the Philosopher is as follows: whatever has power for many things at once, each of which requires some perfection proper to itself, is shown by the plurality of such things to be more perfect. Thus it seems one should conclude about the first agent that if it can cause infinite things all at once then its virtue must be infinite, and consequently that if the first agent has all at once the virtue to cause infinite things, then, as far as depends on itself, it can produce them all at once; even if the nature of the effect does not permit of this, yet the infinity of the thing's virtue follows. The proof of this ultimate consequence is that what cannot cause a white and a black thing is not thereby less perfect, because these things are not simultaneously causable; for this non-simultaneity comes from a repugnance in them and not from a defect in the agent.

118. And from this I prove infinity as follows:^a if the first thing had all causality formally at the same time, although the causable things might not be able to be put into being all at once, it would be infinite, because, as far as depends on itself, it could produce infinite things all at once; and having power for several things at once proves a greater power intensively; therefore if it has this power more perfectly than if it had all causality formally, its intensive infinity would follow all the more. But all the causality

for anything whatever as to the whole of what exists in reality itself is had by it more eminently than if it was had by it formally.

a. [Interpolation] ...because the agent has virtue with respect to both at the same time, provided both are of themselves compatible. Let this be the major then: whatever agent has a virtue whereby, as far as depends on itself, it has power for infinite effects at the same time, even if the impossibility of the effects prevents them being in place at the same time, that agent possesses infinite virtue [n.117]. The first agent is of this sort; therefore etc. The major was already made clear before [n.117], because a plurality of effects demonstrates a greater perfection in a cause which, as far as depends on itself, has power for that plurality at the same time; therefore an infinity of the things that it has power for at the same time, as far as depends on itself, proves the infinity of its power. Proof of the minor, because...

119. Although, therefore, I believe that omnipotence properly speaking, according to the intention of theologians, is a matter of belief only and cannot be proved by natural reason, as will be said later [I d.42 q. un. nn.2-3; below n.178], nevertheless an infinite potency can be naturally proved that, as far as depends on itself, has all at once of itself all the causality able to produce infinite things, provided these infinite things are capable of being made to be all at once.

120. If you object that the first thing does not of itself have power for infinite things all at once, because it has not been proved to be the total cause of infinite things,^a this objection poses no obstacle, because if it had all at once the source whence it was the total cause, it would be in nothing more perfect than it is now when it has the source whence it is first cause. – Also because the second causes are not required for its perfection in causing, because then a thing more removed from the first cause would be more perfect because it would require a more perfect cause. But if second causes are, according to the philosophers, required together with the first cause, this is because of the imperfection of the effect, so that the first thing along with some imperfect cause might cause an imperfect thing, because according to them it could not cause it immediately. – Also because, according to Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 5.16.1021b31-32, 12.7.1072b28-34], the totality of perfections is more eminent in the first thing than if their formalities themselves were present in it, supposing they could be present in it; the proof of which is that a second cause proximate to the first cause has the whole of its causative perfection from the first cause alone; therefore the first cause has that whole perfection more eminently than the second cause, which has it formally. The consequence is plain, because the first cause is the total and equivocal cause with respect to the second cause [n.69]. One may ask a similar question of the third cause with respect to the second cause or with respect to the first; if the answer is with respect to the first [sc. that the third has its whole causative perfection from the first cause], the proposition intended is gained; if with respect to the second, it follows that the second contains eminently the total perfection which is formally in the third. But the second has from the first that it thus contains the perfection of the third, from what has just been shown above [n.120]; therefore the first has to contain more eminently the perfection of the third than the second does, and so on in all other cases right up to the last cause. Wherefore that the first cause possesses eminently the whole causative perfection of all the causes, and possesses it more perfectly than if it had the causality of all of them formally, were that possible, seems in my judgment capable of being proved by the argument of Aristotle posited

above [n.111]^b about the infinite substance, which is taken from the *Physics* and *Metaphysics*.

a. [Interpolation] although it has all the causality of the second cause more eminently than this causality exists in the second cause, yet it does not, of itself, have power for the effects of all the second causes, because this more eminent way of possessing causality does not show that without the second causes it can be the total and immediate cause of all the effects, and so the minor premise is not gained, that the first cause has of itself power for infinite effects.

b. [Interpolation] In addition to the proof just stated, which deduces the infinite virtue of the first thing from the infinite number of effects that that first thing, as far as depends on itself, is at the same time capable of, one can take a similar proof from the infinite number of causes as follows: if the first thing were able to possess formally in itself all the secondary causalities along with the first causality, it would, as far as depends on itself, be of infinite virtue in some way; therefore much more will it be infinite if it has more eminently than formally all those secondary causalities.

But a reply can be made to these two proofs of the consequence given by Aristotle:

As to the first of them I concede that when any one of several things requires some proper formal or at least virtual perfection in its cause, a cause that is capable of more things is more perfect than what is capable of fewer [n.117], because at the very least the several formal perfections that would be proper to those several things would be contained virtually in such a cause; only what possesses several formal perfections virtually is infinite in perfection. But whether the cause is at once or successively capable of several things none of which requires a proper formal or virtual perfection in that cause, one cannot from those several things deduce a greater perfection in the cause. Such is what the philosophers would say in the proposed case, because the infinite number of things that the first thing is capable of, as far as concerns itself, would only posit an infinity of things in number but a finitude of things in specific natures [n.116]; as it is, however, only a distinction of specific nature in the effect, and not a distinction of number, requires some other formal or virtual perfection in the cause.

From this there is a response to the second proof, that second causes are not infinite in species according to Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-2; therefore what has virtue for all those causes is not proved by this alone to be infinite in intensity.

Against the first response: what is capable at the same time of more things is more powerful than what is capable of fewer things, whether these things are of different species or of the same species; therefore what is of itself capable at the same time of an infinity of things is infinite and possessed of infinite power.

Against the second response: if all the secondary causalities existed formally in the first cause, there would be some virtual infinity, at least in extent, in that first cause; therefore if they exist in it more eminently, it will have some infinity in it. But not an infinity in extent, because eminence, on account of which the secondary causalities are unitive, takes away extensive infinity; therefore there will be some infinity there other than extensive; therefore an intensive infinity.

To the first counter-argument [sc. against the first response]: one should deny the antecedent and say that simultaneity does nothing to prove a greater power; the case is like this fire which, if there were an infinite number of bodies in due proportion spherically surrounding it, would act on them all at the same time just as it acts now on the finite number of parts of the body spherically surrounding it.

To the second counter-argument [sc. against the second response]: it would follow from this that the sun, nay that any perpetual cause capable of an infinite number of effects in succession, would be infinite. Therefore the reasoning, although it seem probable, is nevertheless sophistical, because the proposition on which the reasoning rests seems false in itself, namely that 'all things that posit in themselves an extensive infinity posit, so as to be possessed more eminently, some virtual infinity'. This proposition is false, because they can

be possessed more eminently in a finite equivocal cause; nor is it proved by this other proposition, that when things are lacking in infinity they are lacking in eminence with respect to their infinite effects; for this proposition is false, because eminence produces unity and so takes away the material extensive infinity that was there before; yet neither does it posit an intensive formal infinity, because a finite formality sufficiently contains eminently a material and extensive infinity.

121. According to this way of efficacy there is an argument⁷² that it has infinite power because it creates, for^a between the extremes in the case of creation [sc. the extremes of creator and created] there is an infinite distance.^b But this antecedent is set down only as something believed [n.119], and it is true that^c not-being would in duration as it were precede being,^d not however in nature as it were, after the way of Avicenna.⁷³ – The antecedent is shown^e by the fact that at least the first nature after God is from him and not from itself, nor does it receive being on the presupposition of anything else; therefore it is created.^f But if one takes being and not-being as in this way prior in nature, then they are in that case not extremes of a change which that virtue would cause, nor does the causing of the effect require a changing.

a. [Interpolation] a virtue that has power over extremes infinitely distant is infinite; but divine virtue is of this sort in the case of creation.

b. [Interpolation] just as there is between something and nothing.

c. [Interpolation] [it is true] about creation in the real order, namely such that...

d. [Interpolation] the real being of the creature's existence

e. [Interpolation, after 'not however']: it is [not however] less believed about creation in the order in which being follows not-being, the way Avicenna speaks of creation in *Metaphysics* 6 [quoted in previous footnote], but it has been sufficiently demonstrated [*Reportatio* 1A d.2 n.59].

f. [Interpolation] For if it is the first efficient cause, then anything else other than it has its whole being from it, because otherwise that other thing would, in respect of some part of itself, not depend on it, and then it would not be the first efficient cause; but what thus takes its whole being from something, such that it receives by its nature being after not-being, is created; therefore etc.

But whatever may be true of the antecedent, the consequence is not proved, because when there is no distance intermediate between the extremes^a but the extremes are said to be distant precisely by reason of being extremes between each other, then there is as much distance as there is an extreme that is greater. An example: God is infinitely distant from the creature, even than the highest possible creature, not because of any distance between the extremes but because of the infinity of one extreme.

⁷² The argument is found in St. Thomas Aquinas, *ST* 1a q.45 a.5 ad 3, and also in Henry of Ghent.

⁷³ *Metaphysics* 6 ch.2 (92ra): "Creation...is the giving of being to a thing after its absolute non-being; for a caused thing as far as concerns itself is that it not exist, but as far as concerns its cause it is that it should exist. But what belongs to a thing of itself in the intellect is prior in essence, not in time, because it belongs to it from something other than itself; therefore every created thing is a being after non-being by posterity of essence."

a. [Interpolation] as in the case of the continuous, whose extremes are two points [n.60].

122. It is in this way, then, that contradictories are not distant by anything intermediate, because contradictories are immediate [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a12-13] – such that however little anything recedes from one extreme it is at once under the other extreme – but they are distant because of the extremes in themselves. Therefore the distance is as great as the extreme which is more perfect; that extreme is infinite; therefore etc.

123. There is a confirmation, that the total power over the positive term of a distance of this sort is power over the distance or the transition from extreme to extreme; therefore, from power over that transition infinity does not follow unless it follows from total power over its positive term. That term is finite.^a

a. [Interpolation] Therefore power over transition to that term does not demonstratively prove an active infinite virtue.

124. Now as for what is commonly said, that contradictories are infinitely distant, it can be understood thus, that is, indeterminately, because just as there is no distance so small that it does not suffice for contradictories, so there is no distance so great that, even if it were greater than the greatest possible, it would not stretch itself to the contradictories. Their distance then is infinite, that is, indeterminate to any magnitude, great or small; and therefore from such an infinity of distance the consequent about an infinite power intensively does not follow, just as neither does it follow on the smallest distance in which an infinite distance is thus preserved; and what does not follow on the antecedent does not follow on the consequent either.^a

a. [Interpolation] Contradiction therefore is the greatest distance and opposition, but by way of privation and indeterminately; contrariety however is the greatest distance positively, as is plain from *Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a9-10, 38-b4.

125. [The second way] – Having shown the intended proposition by way of the first efficient power, because the first efficient power involves infinity, the second way follows, from the fact that it distinctly understands all make-able things. Here I argue as follows: the intelligibles are infinite, and that actually, in an intellect that understands everything; therefore the intellect that understands them actually all at once is infinite. Of this sort is the first intellect.

126. Of such an enthymeme I prove the antecedent and the consequent.

As to all things that are infinite in potency, such that in taking one after another no end can be reached, if all these things are actual at once, they are actually infinite; intelligibles are of this sort with respect to a created intellect, as is plain, and in the divine intellect all things are at once understood actually that are understood successively by a created intellect; therefore an infinity of things is in the divine intellect actually understood. Of this sort of syllogism I prove the major (although it seems sufficiently evident), because all such things that can be taken one after another are, when they are simultaneously existent, either actually finite or actually infinite; if they are actually finite, then by taking one after another one can in the end actually take them all; therefore if

they cannot all be actually taken, then if such things are actually simultaneous, they are actually infinite.

127. The consequence of the first enthymeme [n.125] I prove thus, that where a plurality requires or involves a greater perfection than a fewness does, there numerical infinity involves infinite perfection. An example: being able to carry ten things requires a greater perfection of virtue than being able to carry five; therefore being able to carry an infinite number of things involves an infinite moving virtue. Therefore, in the proposed case, since to understand *a* is a perfection and to understand *b* is similarly a perfection, there is never one and the same understanding of *a* and *b*, and with as much distinctness as two understandings would have, unless the perfections of the two understandings are included eminently in that one understanding; and thus about three understandings, and so on about an infinite number.^a Likewise one might also argue about the very idea of understanding what has been argued about intellect and about act, that a greater perfection in an act of understanding is implied from a plurality of things where there is the idea of distinctly understanding them, because this act must include the perfections eminently of all understanding's proper operations, each of which, according to its proper idea, posits some perfection; therefore infinite operations involve infinite perfection.

a. [Interpolation] Response: numerical difference does not imply any other perfection.

128. Second, following on this way about the understanding of the first thing I show the intended proposition thus: a first cause to which, in accord with the utmost of its causality, a second cause adds some perfection in causing, does not seem able on its own to cause as perfect an effect as it can cause along with the second, because the causality of the first cause alone is diminished in respect of the causality of both; therefore if that which is naturally from the second cause and from the first simultaneously is much more perfectly from the first alone, the second cause adds no perfection to the first; but every finite thing adds some perfection to a finite thing; therefore such a first cause is infinite.

129. To the proposed case: the knowledge of a thing is naturally generated by that thing as from the proximate cause, and especially the knowledge which is vision or intuitive understanding; therefore if that knowledge is, without all action of such an object, in any intellect merely by virtue of another prior object which is naturally a superior cause with respect to such knowledge, the result is that that superior object is infinite in knowability, because the inferior object adds nothing in knowability to it; such a superior object is the first nature, because from the mere presence of it in the intellect of the first thing, without any other objection accompanying it, there is in the intellect of the first thing knowledge of any object whatever. Therefore no other intelligible adds anything to it in knowability; therefore it is infinite in knowability. Therefore it is such in its reality, because each thing is related to existence as it is to knowability, from *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31.

130. [Third way] – Again in the third way, namely on the part of the end [n.111], the argument is as follows: our will can desire and love, as the intellect can understand, some other thing greater than any finite thing; and it seems that the inclination to loving an infinite good supremely is more natural, for a natural inclination in the will to something is argued from this, that free will of itself, without a habit, promptly and with delight wants it; thus it seems that we experience an infinite good in an act of loving it, nay it seems that the will does not perfectly rest in some other thing. And how would it

not naturally hate that other thing if it were the opposite of its object, just as it hates not-being (according to Augustine *On Free Choice of the Will* 3 ch.6 n.18, ch.8 n.23)? It also seems that, if the infinite were repugnant to good, the will would, under the idea of the infinite, in no way rest in good, nor would it easily tend to good, just as neither to what is repugnant to its object. This reason will be confirmed in the next way [n.136], about the intellect.

131. [The fourth way] – Again, fourth, the intended proposition is shown by way of eminence [n.111], and I argue thus: it is impossible with the most eminent thing that something else be more perfect, as was plain before [n.67]; but with a finite thing it is not impossible that there be something more perfect; wherefore etc.

132. The proof of the minor is that an infinite thing is not repugnant to real being; but the infinite is greater than everything finite. There is another way of arguing for this and it is the same: that to which it is not repugnant to be intensively infinite is not supremely perfect unless it is infinite, because if it is finite it can be exceeded or excelled, because to be infinite is not repugnant to it; to real being infinity is not repugnant; therefore the most perfect real being is infinite. The minor here, which is taken up in the preceding argument, does not seem capable of being shown a priori, because as contradictories contradict by their proper ideas and as this fact cannot be proved by anything more manifest, so non-repugnant things are non-repugnant by their proper ideas and it does not seem possible for this to be shown save by explaining their ideas. Real being is not explained by anything more known, the infinite we understand through the finite (I explain this vulgarly thus: the infinite is that which no given finite thing exceeds precisely by any finite relation, but beyond any such assignable relation there is still excess).

133. Thus, however, may the intended proposition be proved: just as anything whose impossibility is not apparent is to be set down as possible, so also is that whose impossibility is not apparent to be set down as compossible; here no impossibility is apparent, because finitude is not in the idea of real being, nor does it appear from the idea of real being that finitude is a property convertible with real being. One or other of these is required for the aforesaid repugnance; for the properties that belong to the first real being, and are convertible with it, seem to be sufficiently known to be present in it.

134. Again there is proof thus: the infinite is not in its mode repugnant to quantity, that is, by taking part after part; therefore neither is the infinite in its mode repugnant to real being, that is, by being in perfection all at once.

135. Again, if quantity of virtue is simply more perfect than quantity of bulk, why will an infinite be possible in bulk and not in virtue? But if it is possible it is actual, as is plain from the third conclusion above, about effective primacy [n.58], and it will also be proved below [n.138].

136. Again, because the intellect, whose object is real being, finds no repugnance in understanding something infinite, nay rather the infinite seems to be the most perfect intelligible. Now it is remarkable if to no intellect a contradiction of this sort about its first object is made plain although discord in sound so easily offends the hearing; for if the discordant offends as soon as it is perceived, why does no intellect naturally flee from an intelligible infinite as from something not concordant that thus destroys its first object?

137. Hereby can be colored the reasoning of Anselm about the highest thinkable good in the *Proslogion*, [nn.11, 35] and his description must be understood in this way:^a

God is that than which, when known without contradiction, a greater cannot be thought without contradiction. And the fact that ‘without contradiction’ must be added is plain, for a thing in the knowing or thinking of which contradiction is included is said not to be thinkable, because in that case there are two opposed thinkables with no way of producing a single thinkable thing, because neither determines the other.^b

a. [*Interpolation, in place of what follows*] There is a supreme thinkable; the supreme thinkable is infinite; therefore there is an infinite. Proof of the major: a supreme thinkable can be thought of as existing in reality, and it cannot be thought to exist from another; therefore from itself; therefore it is from itself. Therefore that a greater than what exists only in the intellect can be thought that exists in reality must not be understood to be about the same thing [n.138]; but because the merely thinkable is merely possible, something of itself necessary is greater than any possible. – Alternatively, the highest thinkable is intuitable; not in another; therefore in itself [n.139].

b. [*Interpolation*] hence, that man is irrational is unthinkable. Hence, just as in reality nothing exists save it be simple or composed of potency and act, so in concepts; but contradictories make nothing that is one, whether simple or complex.

138. The aforesaid highest thinkable without contradiction can exist in reality. This is proved first about quidditative being, because in such a thinkable the intellect supremely rests; therefore in that thinkable is the idea of the first object of the intellect, namely the idea of real being, and this in the highest degree. – And then the argument further is made that it exists, speaking of the being of existence: the supremely thinkable is not in the thinking intellect only, because then it would both be able to exist, because it is a possible thinkable, and not be able to exist, because existing by some cause is repugnant to its idea,⁷⁴ as was clear before in the second conclusion [n.57] about the way of efficacy; therefore what exists in reality is a greater thinkable than what exists in the intellect only. But this is not to be so understood that the same thing, if it is thought on, is thereby a greater thinkable if it exists, but rather that something which exists is greater than anything which is in the intellect only.

139. Or it [Anselm’s reasoning] is colored in another way thus: what exists is a greater thinkable; that is, it is more perfectly thinkable because visible or intelligible to intuitive intellection; when it does not exist, whether in itself or in something nobler to which it adds nothing, it is not visible. But what is visible is more perfectly thinkable than what is not visible but intelligible only in the abstract; therefore the most perfect thinkable exists. – The difference between intuitive and abstract intellection, and how the intuitive is more perfect, will be touched on later [I d.3 p.1 q.1-2 nn.29, 11, 18-19; q.3 nn.24, 10, 28], and elsewhere when there will be place for it [e.g. n.394 below, d.1 n.35 above].

⁷⁴ Tr. A fallacy of equivocation over the term ‘possible’ seems to lurk in Scotus’ reasoning here. The existence of an infinite being is possible intrinsically because its idea involves no contradiction (unlike, say, a round square, which does involve contradiction); but if it does not in fact exist its existence is not possible extrinsically, because nothing extrinsic could make it to exist. Yet such a non-existent infinite being, although it could never in fact exist, would still, in its idea, contain no contradiction (unlike square circle). So there is no problem in supposing that an infinite being is both able and not able to exist since the ‘able’ in each case is different.

140. Finally the intended proposition is shown from negation of an extrinsic cause, because^a form is limited, or made finite, through matter;^b therefore what is not of a nature to be in matter is infinite.^c ⁷⁵

a. [*Interpolation*] matter is terminated by form as potency by act and perfection and the formal existence of it, and conversely.

b. [*Interpolation*] as act by potency; form

c. [*Interpolation*] of which sort is God.

141. This reasoning is not valid, because according to them an angel is immaterial; therefore it is in nature infinite. – Nor can they say that the existence of an angel limits its essence, because according to them existence is an accident of essence and naturally posterior; and thus in the first moment of nature the essence in itself, as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite, and consequently it will, in the second moment of nature, not be limitable by existence.

142. I respond briefly to the argument, for any real being has intrinsic to it its own grade of perfection, in which grade it is finite if it is finite and infinite if it can be infinite, and not by anything accidental to it.

143. There is also an argument ‘if form is limited in relation to matter, then if it is not in relation to matter it is not limited’; it is the fallacy of the consequent,⁷⁶ just like ‘body is limited in relation to body, therefore if it is not in relation to body it will be infinite’; ‘therefore the furthest heaven will be actually infinite’. The sophism is the one in *Physics* 3.4.203b20-22, that just as body is limited first in itself,^a so a finite form is finite first in itself before it is limited in relation to matter, because of such a sort is nature in real beings, that it is limited, that is, before it is united to matter, for a second finitude presupposes a first and does not cause it. Therefore in some moment of nature it will be finite in essence, therefore not made finite by existence; therefore it is not, in a second moment, made finite by existence.

a. [*Interpolation*] by its proper terms before it is limited in reference to something else, as in the case of the heavens, therefore.

144. I assert briefly one proposition, that any absolute essence finite in itself is finite as pre-understood to every comparison of itself to another essence.

145. [*Epilogue*] – From what has been said the solution to the question is plain. For from the first article [nn.41-73] one gets that some existent real being is simply first with a triple primacy, namely of efficacy, of end, and of eminence [nn.42-58, 60-61, 64-66], and so it is simply that which is impossible with something else being first [nn.59, 63, 67]. And in this article existence is proved of God as to the properties of God in respect of creatures, or insofar as he determines the dependence of respect of creatures on himself [n.39].

⁷⁵ This reasoning seems to be taken from St. Thomas Aquinas.

⁷⁶ The phrase ‘form is limited in relation to matter’ is really equivalent to ‘if form is in relation to matter it is limited’, so to argue ‘but some form is not in relation to matter, therefore it is not limited’ is to argue from the denial of the antecedent to the denial of the consequent, which is a fallacy.

146. From the second article [nn.74-144] one gets in a fourfold way that the first thing is infinite: namely first because it is the first efficient thing [nn.111-120], second because it is the first knower of all make-able things (the second way [nn.125-127] contains^a four conclusions about the intelligibility of the first thing [nn.75-110]), third because it is the ultimate end [n.130], fourth because it is eminent [n.131-136]. By occasion of the first way there is excluded a certain useless way about creation [nn.121-124], by occasion of the second another way is touched on about the perfection and intelligibility of the first object [nn.128-129], by occasion of the fourth exposition is given of the argument of Anselm in *Proslogion*, ‘God is that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [nn.137-139, 11, 35]; lastly there is excluded a useless way inferring infinity from immateriality [nn.140-144].

a. [Interpolation] and on account of the second way there were prefaced there [four conclusions etc.].

147. From the premised conclusions, proved and shown, the argument to the question^a goes as follows: some real being triply first among beings actually exists [nn.41-73, 145]; and that triply first thing is infinite [nn.111-141, 146]; therefore some infinite real being actually exists [n.1]. And it is the most perfect conceivable, and the most perfect, absolute conceived, that we can naturally have about God, that he is infinite, as will be said later [I d.3 p.1 qq.1-2 n.17].

a. [Interpolation] Therefore join the conclusions of the first two articles with the conclusion of the third as follows:

And thus it has been proved that God exists as to his concept or existence, the most perfect conceivable or possible to be had by us of God.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

148. To the arguments of this question.

To the first [n.1] I say that an infinite cause, active by the necessity of its nature, does not allow of anything contrary to it, whether something be contrary to it formally, that is, according as something agrees with it essentially, or virtually, that is, according to the idea of its effect which it virtually includes. For in each way it would impede whatever was impossible with its effect, as was argued before [n.3].^a

a. [Interpolation] God acts freely and voluntarily with respect to everything that is extrinsic to himself.

149. On the contrary: is it really the case that the philosophers, when positing that God acts from the necessity of his nature, did not posit that there was anything bad in the universe?

150. I reply: as was made evident in the proof that God is an agent through knowledge [n.86], the philosophers could not save the idea that something evil can happen contingently in the universe, but only that one order of courses would produce something that was receptive of a perfection, while another order would of necessity

produce the opposite of that perfection; such that this perfection would not then be produced when all the causes came together, although absolutely a thing produced by some of the causes, when considered according to the idea of its species, would be receptive of the perfection whose opposite necessarily comes about.^a But what the philosophers can say about our free choice and about badness of morals must be discussed elsewhere.

a. [Interpolation] Therefore, according to them, just as efficient causes in one and the same order act necessarily, so impeding efficient causes in another order act necessarily in impeding; hence the sun acts to dissipate things with the same necessity as Saturn acts to condense them. Since therefore every defect of matter is reduced to efficient causes that are defective in virtue, then, if any efficient cause whatever acts necessarily, no defect whether of monstrosity or of malice will exist in the universe without happening necessarily.

150. To the second [n.4] I say that the consequence is not valid. For proof of the consequence I say that there is not a similar impossibility of dimensions in filling up a place and of essences in existing simultaneously. For a single entity does not so fill up the whole nature of real being that no other entity can stand along with it (but this must not be understood of spatial filling up but of, as it were, essential commensuration), but one dimension fills up the same place according to the utmost of its capacity. Therefore one entity can exist at the same time along with another, just as, in respect of place, there could exist along with a body filling the place another body not filling the place. Likewise the other consequence [n.4] is not valid, because an infinite body, if it existed along with another body, would become a greater whole than either by reason of dimensions, because the dimensions of the second body would be different from the dimensions of the infinite body, and of the same nature as them; and therefore the whole would be greater because of the diversity of dimensions, and also the whole would not be greater because an infinite dimension cannot be exceeded. Here, however, the whole quantity of infinite perfection receives, in the idea of such quantity, no addition from the coexistence of another thing infinite in such quantity.

151. To the third [n.5] I say that the consequence is not valid unless that which is pointed to in the antecedent, from which other things are separate, is infinite. An example: if there were, *per impossibile*, some infinite 'where', and an infinite body were to fill up that 'where', it would not follow that 'this body is here such that it is not elsewhere, therefore it is finite according to where', because the 'here' only points to something infinite; so, according to the Philosopher, if motion were infinite and time were infinite, it does not follow that 'this motion is in this time and not in another time, therefore it is finite according to time'. So, in relation to the intended proposition, it would be necessary to prove that what is pointed to by the 'here' is finite; but if it is assumed, then the conclusion is being begged in the premises.

152. To the final one [n.6] I say that the Philosopher infers that 'it is moved in non-time' from this antecedent, that 'infinite power exists in a magnitude', and he understands 'it is moved' properly in the consequent, in the way motion is distinguished from mutation; and in this way the consequent involves a contradiction, and the antecedent too, according to him.^a But how the consequence might hold I make clear in this way: if a power is infinite and acts from the necessity of its nature, therefore it acts in non-time. For, if it acts in time, let that time be *a*. And let some other virtue be taken, a

finite one, which acts in a finite time; let it be *b*. And let the finite virtue which is *b* be increased according to the proportion which *b* has to *a*, to wit, if *b* is a hundred or a thousand times *a*, let a hundred or a thousand times virtue be assumed for that given finite virtue. Therefore the virtue so increased will move in the time *a*, and so this virtue and the infinite one will move in an equal time, which is impossible if an infinite virtue moves according to the utmost of its power and necessarily so.

a. [Interpolation] The Philosopher argues: 'God is possessed of infinite power; therefore he moves in non-time.' Declaration of the consequence:

153. From the fact, then, that the virtue is infinite it follows that, if it act of necessity, it acts in non-time; but from the fact that it is posited in the antecedent as existing in a magnitude [n.152], it follows that, if it act about a body, it would properly move that body, which he says of extensive virtue^a *per accidens*. But such virtue, if it acted about a body, would have the parts of such a body at different distances with respect to it, to wit, one part of the body closer and another part further away; it also has some resistance in the body about which it acts; which two causes, namely resistance and the diverse approximation of the parts of the moveable thing to the mover, make there to be succession in the motion and make the body to be properly moved. Therefore from the fact that in the antecedent the virtue is posited as existing in a magnitude, it follows that it will properly move. And so by joining the two things together at once, namely that it is infinite and that it is in a magnitude, it follows that it will move properly in non-time, which is a contradiction.

a. [Interpolation] because the Philosopher calls virtue in a magnitude extensive virtue [n.6].

154. But this does not follow in the case of an infinite virtue which does not exist in a magnitude; for although it act in a non-time if it acts necessarily, because this is consequent to infinity, yet it will not properly move, because it will not have in the thing it acts on those two ideas of succession [n.153]. The Philosopher, therefore, does not intend that an infinite power properly move in non-time, in the way the argument proceeds [n.6], but that an infinite power in a magnitude would properly move and in non-time [n.152], which are contradictories; and from this it follows that such an antecedent involves contradictories, namely that an infinite virtue exist in a magnitude.

155. But in that case there is a doubt. Since he posits a motive power that is infinite and naturally active, it seems to follow that it would necessarily act in non-time although it would not move in non-time, nay it will in that case not move any other thing, properly speaking; and that this follows is plain, because the thing was proved before through the reason of an infinite power acting necessarily [nn.152-153].

156. Averroes replies, *Metaphysics* 12 com.41, that in addition to the first mover which is of infinite power there is required a conjoint mover of finite power, such that from the first mover there is infinite motion and from the second there is succession, because there could not otherwise be succession unless the finite thing acted along with it, because if the infinite thing alone acted it would act in non-time. This is refuted later [I d.8 p.2 q. un nn.3, 8-20], where an argument on this point is directed against the philosophers who posit that the first thing does of necessity whatever it does immediately. But the argument is not difficult for Christians, who say that God acts contingently; for

these can easily reply that, although an infinite power acting necessarily do according to the utmost of itself, and so in non-time, whatever it immediately does, yet an infinite virtue acting contingently and freely does not; for just as it is in its power to act or not to act, so it is in its power to act in time or to act in non-time; and so it is easy to save the fact that the first thing moves a body in time although it is of infinite power, because it does not act necessarily, nor according to the utmost of its power, namely as much as it can act, nor in as brief a time as it can act.

Question 3

Whether there is only one God

157. I ask whether there is only one God.

Argument that there is not:

I *Corinthians* 8.5: "As there be gods many and lords many."

158. Again thus: God is; therefore Gods are.

The proof of the consequence is that singular and plural indicate the same thing although they differ in mode of signification; therefore they include the same predicate taken proportionally. Therefore as the singular includes the singular predicate so the plural includes the plural.⁷⁷

Proof in a second way is that just as God is that than which a greater cannot be thought [n.11], so Gods are that than which greater cannot be thought; but things than which greater cannot be thought exist in fact, as it seems, because if they did not exist in fact greater than them could be thought; therefore etc.

159. In addition, every real being by participation is reduced to something such by essence; created individuals in any species are real by participation, otherwise they would not be many; therefore they are reduced to something such by essence; therefore there is some man, some ox by essence, etc. But whatever is by essence and not by participation is God; therefore etc.

160. Again, more goods are better than fewer; but whatever is better should be posited in the universe; therefore etc.

161. Again, anything that, if it is, is a necessary being is simply a necessary being; but if there is another God it is a necessary being; therefore etc. Proof of the major: grant the opposite of the predicate, 'it is not simply a necessary being', and the opposite of the subject follows, namely that, if it is, it is a possible being and not a necessary being.

Response: the opposite of the subject should be inferred in this way, 'it is not a necessary being if it exists', where the relation of antecedent and consequent is denied.

162. To the contrary:

⁷⁷ The point seems to be that if 'God' includes the predicate 'is' then 'Gods' must include the predicate 'are' because the difference between singular and plural is in mode and not in thing signified. A parallel would be 'God is masculine' ('Deus' is a masculine word in Latin] therefore 'Gods are masculine' (i.e. each occurrence of 'Deus' is an occurrence of a masculine). The error here is exposed below n.185.

Deuteronomy 6.4: “Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one God;” and *Isaiah* 45.5: “Beside me there is no God.”^a

a. [Interpolation] The argument for this is by means of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074a31-37: if there are two [gods], one of them would have matter. And (ibid. 1076a4): a plurality of principles is not good; therefore there is one ruler. And Damascene *De Fide Orthodoxa* 1.5 sets down three reasons: this god would lack that one, that one differs from this; second, neither would be everywhere; third, they would regenerate things badly – and this agrees with the second reason. The Master [Lombard, I d.3 ch.3]: one of them would be superfluous. – Again, by reason, because as he [Aristotle] says above, unity is the principle of duality and of every multitude; Proclus *Institutio Theologica* ch.21. – Again, how would they come together under a genus or a species? Composition follows either way. This agrees with the first reason of the Philosopher.

I. To the Question

163. [The opinion of others] – In^a this question the conclusion is certain. But some say that this conclusion is not demonstrable but only accepted on faith; and for this there follows the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides], *Guide of the Perplexed* I ch.75: “the unity of God is received from the Law.”

a. [Interpolation] When setting down this concept of God in this question, that he necessarily exists of himself, or is independent in existence, or is an uncreated being, or the unmovable first mover, one will be able to make use of the opinion of Aristotle about the intelligences [*Metaphysics* 12.8.1073a14-74b14], if they are thus Gods, which is dealt with in I d.8 p.2 q. un. nn.3-11. – As to the fourth concept, there is no demonstration of the affirmative if, according to Aristotle [*ibid.* 12.6-7.1072a9-23], one of them moves with a diurnal motion and the other moves the zodiac and each exists of itself. But this concept is saved by setting down this concept or description of God: a being of infinite intellectuality, will, goodness, power; a necessary being, existing of itself. Hence, in advance of this question, one must prove all the following things of God: thus, that some being is altogether first with a triple primacy was proved in the preceding question [nn.42-67], and that it necessarily exists [n.70], and is infinite [nn.111-136]; and the same about the intellect, will, and power, in the same place [nn.75-100]. Thus the question is not being begged here.

164. This is also argued by reason, that if it could be known by natural reason that God is one, therefore it could naturally be known that God is naturally a singular; therefore the singularity of God and his essence as singular could be known, which is false, and the contrary was said above in the question about the object of theology [*Prol.* nn.167-168].

165 [Scotus’ own opinion] – However it seems that the unity might be shown by natural reason, and that by taking a way, first, from infinite intellect, second from infinite will, third from infinite goodness, fourth from the idea of infinite power, fifth from the idea of an infinite absolutely, sixth from the idea of necessary being, seventh from the idea of omnipotence.

166. [First way, from infinite intellect] – On the part of infinite intellect the argument is first as follows: an infinite intellect knows most perfectly any intelligible whatever insofar as it is intelligible in itself;^a therefore, if there are Gods – let them be *a* and *b* – *a* knows *b* most perfectly, namely insofar as *b* is knowable. But this is impossible.

The proof is that either it knows *b* through the essence of *b* or it does not. If it does not and *b* is knowable through its essence, then *a* does not know *b* most perfectly and insofar, that is, as it is knowable. For nothing knowable through its essence is most perfectly known unless it is known through its essence, or through something more perfect which includes the essence which it is in itself; but the essence of *b* is included in nothing more perfectly than in *b*, because then *b* would not be God. But if *a* knows *b* through the essence of *b* itself, then the act of *a* itself is naturally posterior to the essence of *b* itself, and so *a* will not be God. Now the proof that the act of *a* itself is posterior to *b* itself is that every act of knowing which is not the same as the object is posterior to the object; for an act is neither prior to nor simultaneous in nature with anything other than the act, because then the act might be understood without the object, just as conversely.

a. [Interpolation] because it is the whole of being, for a finite intellect has this power, although not most perfectly nor all at once.

167. If it be said that *a* understands *b* by the essence of *a* itself, which is most similar to *b* itself, namely in this way, that *a* understands *b* in the idea of a species common to *a* itself and to *b* itself, on the contrary: neither response saves the fact *a* understand *b* most perfectly, and consequently *a* is not God, because the knowledge of a thing in a similar and a universal only is not a knowledge most perfect and intuitive of that thing, and so *a* would not know *b* intuitively nor most perfectly, which is the conclusion intended.

168. The argument second on the part of the intellect is as follows: one and the same act cannot have two adequate objects; *a* is the adequate object of its own intellection, and *b* would be the adequate object of the same intellection if *a* could understand *b*; therefore it is impossible that *a* understand in a single intellection perfectly all at once both *a* and *b*. If *a* have intellections that are really distinct then it is not God.^a The major is plain, because otherwise the act would be adequated to an object which, when removed, the act would no less be at rest in and adequated to, and so such an object would be in vain.

a. [Interpolation] because *a* has its own essence as adequate object; therefore it does not have essence *b* as adequate object. But *b* would be the adequate object for intellection *a* if that intellection could understand *a* and *b* perfectly all at once.

169. [The second way, from infinite will] – As to the second way the argument is as follows: an infinite will is correct, therefore it loves whatever is lovable insofar as it is lovable; if *b* is another God it is to be loved infinitely (since^a it is an infinite good) and to be loved infinitely by a will that is able thus to love it; therefore the will of *a* loves *b* infinitely. But this is impossible because *a* naturally loves itself more than *b*. Proof: for anything whatever naturally loves its own being more than the being of something else of which it is not a part or an effect; but *a* is nothing of *b* whether as a part or as an effect; therefore *a* naturally loves itself more than it loves *b*. But a free will, when it is correct, is in conformity with the natural will, otherwise the natural will would not always be correct; therefore if *a* has this correct will it loves itself with an elicited act more than it loves *b*; therefore it does not love *b* infinitely.

a. [Interpolation, in place of 'if *b* is another...since'] and with as much love as it can if it is infinite; but *b* is to be loved to infinity when it is set down as being another God, and consequently.

170. A second argument about will is as follows: *a* either enjoys *b* or uses it; if it uses it then *a* has a disordered will; if it enjoys *b* and enjoys *a* then *a* is blessed in two objects neither of which depends on the other, because just as *a* is blessed in itself so it is blessed in *b*. But the consequent is impossible, because nothing can be actually blessed in two total beatifying objects; the proof is that when either object is destroyed it would nevertheless be blessed; therefore it is blessed in neither.^a

a. [Interpolation] Also it seems plausible that what is completely at rest in one adequate object could not be at rest in another object.

171. [Third way, from infinite goodness] – About the third way, namely about the idea of infinite good, the argument is as follows: the will can in an ordered way desire a greater good and love more a greater good; but several infinite goods, if they were possible, include more goodness than one infinite good; therefore the will could in an ordered way love several infinities more than one infinite, and consequently it would not rest in any single infinite good. But this is contrary to the idea of good – that it be infinite and not give rest to any will whatever.

172. [The fourth way, from infinite power] – As to the fourth way, about infinite power, I argue thus: there cannot be two total causes of the same effect in the same order of cause [n.73]; but infinite power is the total cause in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, therefore there can be no other power in idea of first cause with respect to any effect, and so there is no other cause infinite in power.

173. The proof of the first proposition is that then it would be possible for something to be the cause of something on which that something did not depend. Proof: nothing essentially depends on a thing such that, when that thing does not exist, it would no less exist; but if *c* has two total causes, *a* and *b*, and in the same order, then when either of them does not exist, *c* would no less exist on the other of them, because when *a* does not exist *c* would no less exist on *b*, and when *b* does not exist *c* exists no less on *a*.

174. Next to this is an argument about the unity of any first thing in any of the aforesaid primacies [n.41]; for nothing is exceeded by two first exceeding things, or no finite thing is essentially ordered to two first ends; for there would be something in relation to an end such that, when the end did not exist, it would no less have an end, as was argued before [nn.173, 73], and it would be essentially exceeded by something such that, when that thing did not exist, it would no less have an essential exceder by which it was essentially measured, and from which it would essentially receive its perfection, which is impossible; therefore it is impossible for there to be two first ends of any two finite things, or two first eminents of two exceeded things.

175. [The fifth way, from the infinite absolutely] – About the fifth way I say that an infinite cannot be exceeded, and I argue thus: whatever perfection can be numerically in diverse things has more perfection in several of them than in one, as is said in *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2; therefore the infinite cannot at all numerically be in many things.

176. [The sixth way, from necessary being] – About the sixth way I argue first thus: a species that can be multiplied, namely in individuals, is not of itself determined to a definite number of individuals, but as far as concerns itself it allows of an infinity of

individuals, as is plain in all corruptible species; therefore if the idea of ‘necessary existence’ is multipliable in individuals, it does not determine itself to a definite number, but, as far as concerns itself, allows of an infinity. But if there could be infinite necessary beings, there are in fact infinite necessary beings; therefore etc. The consequent is false, therefore so too is the antecedent from which it follows.^a

a. [Interpolation] Let this reason be stated under another form from the idea of primacy as follows: one thing of one idea that is disposed to many things of one idea is not determinate with respect to that plurality, or to a definite determination of them; there is no instance in nature with respect to supposits nor in cause with respect to things caused, unless you make an instance in the proposed case. But deity will be one thing of one idea, and according to you it is related to many things of one idea; therefore of itself it is not determinate to a definite plurality of singulars, nor can it be made determinate from elsewhere, because that is repugnant to the first thing; therefore deity exists in infinite supposits. This reasoning seems to be founded on the fact that primacy is indeterminate of itself.

177. Secondly I argue thus, and next to this way: if there are several infinite beings they are distinguished by some real perfections [n.71]; let those perfections be *a* and *b*. Then as follows: either those two things distinct by *a* and *b* are formally necessary beings by *a* and *b* or they are not. If they are not then *a* is not the formal idea of necessarily existing, and consequently not *b* either; therefore also what includes them is not a first necessary, because it includes some reality which is not formally the necessity of existing, nor necessary of itself. But if the two things are formally necessary beings by *a* and *b*, and if in addition to this each of them is a necessary being by that in which one of them agrees with the other, then each of them has in itself two reasons each of which is formally necessary being, but this is impossible, because neither includes the other; therefore when either reason is removed each would be this sort of necessary being by the other reason, and so something would be formally a necessary being by a reason such that, when the reason was removed, it would nevertheless be a necessary being, which is impossible [n.71].

178. [The seventh way, from omnipotence] – About the seventh way, namely omnipotence, it seems that it is not demonstrable by natural reason, because omnipotence – as will be plain elsewhere [n.119] – cannot be proved by natural reason in the way Catholics understand omnipotence, nor can it be proved by reason of infinite power.

179. Yet from omnipotence as believed the intended proposition may be argued for in this way: if *a* is omnipotent then it can cause being and not being in the case of anything else, and so it could destroy *b*, and so might make *b* impotent of everything, and the consequence is thus that *b* is not God.

180. This reasoning is not valid, just as some reply to it, because *b* is not an object of omnipotence since omnipotence has regard to the possible for its object; but *b* was posited as necessary [n.177] just like *a*. Therefore one argues in another way by declaring thus the reason of Richard [of St. Victor] in *On the Trinity* I ch.25:^a just as the omnipotent by its willing can produce whatever is possible, so by its not willing it can impede or destroy anything possible; but if *a* is omnipotent it can will everything other than itself to exist, and so by its willing them to bring them into existence. But it is not necessary that *b* will all the things that *a* wills, because the will of *b* is contingently related to them, just as the will of *a* is to the things that *b* wills, if it is God [n.156]. But if *b* does not will them to be, then none of them exists. Therefore if there are two omnipotents, each of them would

make the other impotent, not by destroying it, but by preventing by its non-willing the existence of the things willed by the other.

a. [Interpolation] where he speaks thus: ‘Any omnipotent that was such that everything else could do nothing will be able easily to effect things’.

181. But if you say, by playing the sophist as it were, that they may agree in their will, although there is no necessity [n.180], but they would as it were make a pact, still I argue that neither of them will be omnipotent; for if *a* is omnipotent it can produce by its willing any willed possible other than itself; from this it follows that *b* could produce nothing by its own willing, and so it is not omnipotent. Now that this follows is plain from the fourth way [n.172], because it is impossible for there to be two total causes of one effect, because from the fact that the effect is totally caused by one, it is impossible that it be caused by the other.^a

a. [Interpolation] I do not wish to adduce here certain arguments of some people relative to the question, on which one should rely because they are answerable and perhaps prove just as much that there is a single angel in a single species, if an angel is simple in its essence [an implicit reference to *St. Thomas Aquinas*]; or if they are proofs yet they do not proceed from what is naturally known to us. Nor should they be adduced as in need of being answered, because they are not opposed to the conclusion that I maintain.

II. To the Arguments

A. To the Arguments for the Other Opinion

182. To the arguments [nn.163-164, 157-160] – For first to those that are for the other opinion. I reply to the authority of Rabbi Moses [n.163] and I say that God’s being one is handed down in the Law; for because the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry therefore they needed to be instructed by the Law about the unity of God, although it could by natural reason be demonstrated. For it is thus received by the Law that God exists (*Exodus* 3.14: “I am who am”, and the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 11.6: that “he who comes to God must believe that he is”), and yet it is not denied that God is demonstrable; therefore by parity of reasoning it should not be denied either that it could be demonstrated by reason that God is one, although it be ‘received’ from the Law. Also, it is useful for things which can be demonstrated to be handed down to the community also by way of authority – both because of the negligence of the community in inquiring into truth, and also because of the impotence of the intellect and the errors of those who make inquiry by demonstration, because they mix many false things in with their truths, as Augustine says in *The City of God* XVIII ch.41 n.2. And therefore, because the simple who follow such demonstrators could be in doubt as to what to assent to, so an authority is a safe and stable and common way about the things it can neither deceive nor be deceived about.

183. To the second reason about the singular [n.164] I say that it is one thing for singularity to be conceived either as an object or as part of an object, and another thing for singularity to be precisely the mode of conceiving or that under which the object is conceived. An example: when I say ‘universal’, the object conceived is a plurality, but

the mode of conceiving, that is, the mode under which it is conceived, is singularity; thus in the case of logical intentions, when I say ‘singular’, what is conceived is singularity, but the mode under which it is conceived is universality, because what is conceived, in the way it is conceived, is indifferent to many things. Thus I say in the proposed case that the divine essence can be conceived as singular such that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object; yet it does not follow that the essence can be conceived as it is singular, such that singularity be the mode of the concept; for thus to know something as singular is to know it as this, as a white thing is seen as this, and in this way it was said before [n.164] that the divine essence is not known under the idea of singularity; and therefore there is in the argument a fallacy of figure of speech [Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.166b10-14], by changing thing to mode.

B. To the Principal Arguments

184. To the principal reasons [nn.157-160]. – I say that the Apostle [n.157] is speaking of idols, and so of ‘gods’ in name only; and he adds there: “but for us there is one God,” because “all the gods of the Gentiles are demons.”

185. I say to the second [n.158] that the consequence is not valid, because number is not a grammatical mode of signifying as are other grammatical modes that mean precisely a mode of conceiving a thing without any reality corresponding to such a mode of conceiving; hence they mean precisely some aspect in a thing by which the intellect can be moved to conceive such a thing.^a But number truly includes a subsumed thing; hence the inference follows ‘men are running, therefore several men are running’. But it is not like this in the case of the other co-signified things in a noun or a verb, because this inference does not follow ‘God exists, therefore God is masculine’^b [in Latin the word for ‘God’ is a masculine noun, ‘Deus’], because it suffices for masculinity that there is something in the thing from which the mode of conceiving might be taken, such as activity. I say therefore that only the term ‘Gods’ conceived in the plural mode includes a contradiction, because the mode of conceiving is repugnant to that which is conceived in that mode. – When therefore the consequence is proved that the same thing includes the singular and plural [n.158], I say that it includes the singular under a mode of conceiving fitting to the concept but it includes the plural in a mode impossible to that concept; and therefore the singular, insofar as it includes the concept and the mode of conceiving, includes an idea that is as it were in itself true, but the plural, insofar as it includes those two things, includes an idea that is as it were in itself false. And so it does not follow that the plural is true of the plural as the singular is of the singular, because about that whose idea is in itself false nothing is true [n.30].

a. [Interpolation] although that which moves [the intellect] is not anything in reality; for masculinity does not require anything masculine in reality but something corresponding to masculinity, namely active power or something of the sort.

b. [Interpolation] the inference ‘there are several men, therefore that are several rational animals’ holds, but the inference ‘God is a generator, therefore God is of the masculine gender’ does not hold.

186. Through this is plain the response to the other proof ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [n.158] because Gods are not thinkable without contradiction,

because the mode is repugnant to the thing conceived; and therefore the major is to be glossed as was said before in the preceding question [n.137]. Now for sense and truth it is required that the idea of the subject not include a contradiction, as was said in the second question of this distinction [n.30].

187. To the third [n.159] I say that the major proposition is not first but is reduced to this ‘every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect thing’; and because every being by participation is imperfect, and only that being is perfect which is a being by essence, therefore does the proposition follow.^a But this major about ‘imperfect’ has to be distinguished in this way: a thing is imperfect according to a perfection simply when the perfection does not necessarily have an accompanying imperfection, because it does not include in itself a limitation, as ‘this good’, ‘this true’, ‘this being’; and an imperfect of this sort is reduced to a perfect of the same nature, namely ‘good’, ‘being’, and ‘true’, which indicate perfections simply. But a thing is imperfect according to a perfection non-simply when the perfection includes a limitation in its idea, and so it necessarily has an annexed imperfection, as ‘this man’, ‘this ass’; and imperfects of this sort are not reduced to a perfect by essence absolutely of the same idea as to their specific idea, because they still include imperfection, because they include a limitation, but they are reduced to a first perfect that contains them super-eminently and equivocally. What is imperfect then in the first way is reduced to a perfect simply according to a perfection of the same nature, because something can according to that nature be simply perfect. But what is imperfect in the second way is not reduced to something perfect according to a perfection of the same nature; for because that nature includes imperfection, therefore it cannot be a perfect thing simply, because of the limitation, but it is reduced to some simply perfect equivocal that eminently includes that perfection. And for this reason an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but a stone, which is imperfect, is not reduced to a simply perfect stone, but to supreme being and to supreme good, which include that perfection virtually [n.69].

a. [*Interpolation*] namely that ‘every being by participation is reduced to a being by essence’ which being is perfect. So that the conclusion, then, might truly follow...

188. To the final one [160] the response is that many finite goods are better than fewer finite goods, but not many infinite goods.

189. But this does not seem to respond to the argument, because it seems that all things that would be better if they existed should be posited within beings, and most of all within the supreme being, which is a ‘necessary being’, because there whatever could exist is good and must necessarily be there; but many infinite goods, if they existed, would be better; therefore it seems that many infinite goods should be posited in the nature of the supreme good.

190. To this I reply that when it is said in the major ‘things which would be better if they existed should be posited there’, I say that by the ‘if’ either a possible positing is implied or a positing of impossibles is. If in the first way I say that the major is true and the minor false, because the implication in the minor is not possible but is of impossibles. But if the ‘if’ implies a positing of impossibles then the minor is true and the major false; for things that would only be better from a positing of impossibles would not be better, nor are they even good, just as that which only exists

from the positing of impossibles altogether does not exist, just as neither does the posited thing on which it depends.

Book One
 Second Distinction
 Second Part
 On the Persons and Productions in God
 Question 1

Whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons

191. About the second part of this distinction a question is raised first whether there can be along with the unity of the divine essence a plurality of persons.

That there cannot be:

Because all things that are simply with one and the same thing simply the same are altogether the same with each other. And ‘simply’ is added because if they are not the same as the same simply but in a certain respect, or if they are simply the same as the same only in a certain respect, they should not be simply the same as each other. But the divine persons are simply and altogether the same as the divine essence, which essence is in itself altogether and simply the same; therefore etc. The major is plain because every syllogistic form, and this the form of the perfect syllogism [Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.25b32-35], holds on the basis of it; it is of itself evident, because in the premises the extreme terms are known to be conjoined in the middle term, and from this alone is concluded the identity of the extremes with each other in the conclusion; also because the opposite of the predicate destroys the subject, because if they are not the same as each other they are not simply the same as a third. The minor too is plain, because the essence itself is simply the same, for it is whatever it has, because of its supreme simplicity, according to the Master of the *Sentences* I d.8 ch.8, and Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1.

192. Again, essential and accidental divide the whole of being. So whatever is in something is the same as it either essentially or accidentally. But what distinguishes persons is not an accident of the essence (because nothing is an accident of itself), therefore it is essential; therefore it is the same as it essentially. But when what is essentially the same as the essence is multiplied the essence is multiplied; therefore if there are several persons there are several essences.

193. Again, nothing is to be posited in beings – and especially not in the highest good – such that when it is not posited nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; but if some divine person does not exist in the divine essence, nothing of perfection is lacking to the universe; therefore a plurality of such things is not to be posited in God. Proof of the minor: if the second person did not exist, whatever perfection is posited in it would exist in the first person; also, no perfection would be lacking to the universe if the second person did not exist, because whatever of perfection exists simply in one person exists also in another. Therefore when one person is removed and another remains, nothing of perfection is taken from the universe.

194. You say it is not the case under every mode that ‘whatever of perfection is in one is also in another’.

On the contrary, that mode of having or of being is either a perfection or not a perfection. If it is it will exist in God, and consequently the first person, which will not have that mode, will not be simply perfect. If it is not then the argument stands that, when

the second person does not exist, the whole of its perfection exists in the first; therefore nothing of perfection will perish from the universe when the second person is removed.

195. Again, that there be several necessary beings includes a contradiction, because if there are several necessary beings I ask by what are they formally distinguished? Let these be *a* and *b*. Either then those reasons by which they are distinguished are necessary beings and necessities of being, and then there will be two necessary beings; also they agree in necessary being and consequently they are not distinguished by necessary being. Or if those reasons are possible, then the things distinguished by them are not necessary beings [n.177].

196. To the opposite:

That is possible which does not include a contradiction. But there is no contradiction included in there being one essence in three persons, because contradiction is in the same respect. But here there is no contradiction in the same respect, because here there is unity of essence and plurality of relative supposits, therefore etc.

Question 2

Whether there are only three persons in the divine essence

197. Next I ask whether there are only three persons in the divine essence.

I argue that there are not:

Opposite relations are of equal dignity; therefore if the relation of the first producer constitutes only one person, there will correspond to it another relation constituting only one produced person, and so there will be only one produced person.

198. Further, to two relations of things produced there correspond two relations of thing producing and these latter extremes are distinguished as equally among themselves as the former are; therefore if those two relations of produced things constitute two persons, the other two will also constitute two persons, and so there will be four divine persons.

199. Further, a finite power lasting for an infinite time could have successively infinite effects, as is plain about the sun according to the way of the Philosopher *On Generation and Corruption* 2.10.336a23-337a33, 11.337b25-338b19; therefore an infinite power can have infinite produced things all at once. The proof of the consequence is that the fact a finite power is not able to do all at once as many things as it can do successively is because of the finitude because of which this effect here is for the present enough for it; therefore an infinite power can do all at once all the things it can do successively; it can do infinite things successively, as is plain, because a finite power can thus do infinite things.

200. The opposite is shown in the last chapter of *Matthew* 28.19: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit;" and in *I John* 5.7: "There are three that give testimony in heaven etc.;" and Augustine [in fact Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.5, and it is in the text [sc. of the *Sentences*].

Question 3

Whether the being of being produced can stand in something along with the divine essence

201. And, because a plurality of divine persons is made clear from production, I therefore ask about production in the divine nature, and first in general, whether the being of being produced can stand in something along with the divine essence; and in the *Lectura* [*Reportatio* I A d.2 n.107] in this way: whether any intrinsic real production whatever is repugnant to the divine essence.

I argue no according to the first form of the question, and this is to argue yes according to the second form, because nothing produced is of itself necessary; but whatever subsists in the divine essence is of itself necessary; therefore etc.

202. The major is plain in five ways:

First, because nothing is at the same time necessary of itself and by another; but what is produced, if it is necessary, is necessary from another; therefore it is not necessary of itself. The proof of the major of this syllogism is that if it is necessary of itself then it is necessary when everything else is removed; but if it is necessary from another it is not necessary when that other is removed.

203. Second, a proof of the first major [n.201] is that everything produced was capable of being produced, otherwise a thing incapable of being produced was produced; therefore everything produced includes in it some possibility; also that every possibility is repugnant to what is necessary of itself; therefore etc.

204. Again, third, the produced terminus is posterior in some way to the thing producing, because production cannot be understood without some order; in that prior moment in which the producer is understood the thing produced is not understood, because then the producer would not be first; therefore in that prior moment the thing produced is understood not to exist, and in the next moment it is understood to exist; therefore there is a change from not-being to being.

205. There is a proof, fourth, that the divine essence, when all production is removed, does not have the thing produced; but it has the thing produced by production; therefore by production the divine essence becomes from not having the thing produced to having it, and so there is change.

206. Fifth, because generation seems to be essentially a change, in the way a species essentially includes the genus; but production into being by way of nature is generation; therefore production cannot be understood without change.

207. Again on the principal point, second, in this way: if it is produced therefore it is dependent; the consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. The proof of the consequence is that if the produced depends in no way on the producer, then each would have its nature on an equal basis; and from this further, that the produced would first require for its production and existence that the producer first have its nature would not be more the case than the reverse, which is contrary to the nature of production.

208. Again third on the principal point, because other changes, which do not involve in their idea as much imperfection as generation involves, could not exist in divine reality; therefore not generation either.

The consequence is plain, because we remove from God whatever there is of imperfection. The proof of the antecedent is that local motion and alteration according to Aristotle, *Physics* 8.7.260a26-261a20, do not involve as much imperfection as generation,

and that is why many perfect beings can be altered and locally moved that cannot be generated [to wit the heavenly bodies]; but no change of place or alteration is conceded to exist in God; therefore etc.

209. To the opposite is Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” only by production.

210. Again *Psalms* 2.7: “The Lord said to me: Thou art my son, today have I begotten thee.”

211. Look for other authorities in the text [*Sentences* I d.2 ch.4-5].

Question 4

Whether in the divine essence there are only two intrinsic productions

212. Next I ask in particular whether there are only there two intrinsic productions.

That there are not two I argue thus, that of one nature there seems to be one mode of communicating according to Averroes, *Physics* VIII com.46.

213. This is proved by his own reasons in the same place:

First, because of a second matter there is a second form, otherwise there would not be a proper form for this matter;^a but matters corresponding to diverse agents and productions belong to diverse ideas, which is plain in generation by propagation and putrefaction, because the thing propagated is generated from semen, while the other is not but from some putrefied body; therefore etc.

a. [*Interpolation*] and anything might be generated from anything, and then matters would universally be otiose.

214. Second he argues in this way, by inferring from that supposition [n.213] that the same species would be then both from nature and from chance; from which he infers that a man could be generated from the seed of an ass and from an infinite number of matters. Now he proves the first consequence to be discordant because what happens by chance is opposed to what happens by nature, and for that reason no species is by chance, because things found to exist by chance are monstrous. All of this is manifest of itself. But if a nature had diverse modes of communicating, then according to one mode of communicating a species can be by nature and according to another mode of communicating it can be by chance or by fortune.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] as follows: this generable thing is generated equivocally, not from seed; either therefore of necessity, or for the most part, or rarely. If it is equivocally generated of necessity then it is never generated from seed, which is false. But if it is generated for the most part, it is equivocally generated from putrefaction; but things that happen for the most part happen naturally; therefore it is naturally generated equivocally, and further it follows that they are rarely propagated from seed, which seems false. But if it is generated rarely, it is generated equivocally; but what happens rarely happens by chance and fortuitously, and because they are fortuitous they are monstrous. And things that are of this sort, this thing and that thing, are not of the same species; therefore nature is communicable in only one way.

215. Again, an argument for the conclusion of the Commentator [n.212] is as follows, that of changes diverse in species there are terms diverse in species; therefore if

there are communications or productions of another nature there are also terms of another nature.

216. Again that there are not two productions I prove because the Philosopher, *Physics* 5.1.224b7-8, distinguishes nature and intellect as diverse active principles; the idea of both is truly found in God, because neither includes imperfection, and internally, because neither is productive externally; therefore besides the production of will there will be another two productions internally.

217. This is also proved by the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b1-11, where he expressly seems to say that a rational potency is capable of opposites, because science is of opposites. If then the intellect of its nature is indeterminate as to opposites, and nature is determined to one thing, then the intellect will have a different way of being a principle than nature; therefore etc.

218. Further, the power of the will is free, therefore its producing too is free; therefore it is not determined to one thing, but from its liberty it can be to opposites or of opposites; but only the creature is able to be and not be, not however a divine person; therefore the will is only a principle of producing creatures, but not a divine person.

219. To the opposite:

If there are not two produced persons only, then there will either be more persons than three or fewer persons than three, which is false. Therefore those authorities by which it is shown that there are only three persons in divine reality show that there are only two produced persons.

I. To the Third Question

220. Because, as I said [n.201], plurality is made clear from production, therefore I respond first to the question about production, which is the third in order [nn.191, 201], and I say that in divine reality there is and can be production.

A. Scotus' own Proofs

221. I prove this as follows:

[The first principal reason] – Whatever is of its own formal nature a productive principle, is a productive principle in whatever it is without imperfection; but perfect memory, or, what is the same, the whole ‘intellect having the intelligible object present to itself’, is of its own formal nature a productive principle of generated knowledge [n.310], and it is plain that such memory is in some divine person and is so of itself, because some divine person is not produced; therefore that person will be able through such a perfect principle to produce perfectly.^a

a. [*Text cancelled by Scotus with an interpolation following*] therefore in whatever there is this ‘intellect having an actually intelligible object present to itself’, in that there will be a productive principle of generated knowledge, and this according to the proportion of its own perfection. But in God this exists according to the true nature of itself; therefore in God there is production of generated knowledge. [*Interpolation*] Or one can argue in this way: any supposit that has of itself a sufficient and formal principle of producing can produce a supposit or product adequate to that principle, namely, the most perfect supposit that can be produced for such a principle; but not a product adequate in nature, because this would be a begging of the question, but a product adequate to the active virtue of the producer, just as

the sun, when it produces a most perfect effect, is said to produce an effect most perfect not in nature but in its active virtue. The following is the minor: some divine supposit has of itself a principle of producing, which principle is perfect memory; therefore etc. The major and minor are made plain in what follows.

222. I argue further: no production through perfect memory is perfect unless it be of knowledge adequate to that memory or that intellect with respect to such object; but to the memory or intellect of a divine person no knowledge is with respect to the divine essence adequated as intelligible save an infinite one; because that intellect comprehends the infinite object, therefore some divine person can through memory produce infinite knowledge. Further, but the knowledge will exist only in the divine nature, because no other thing is infinite; therefore in divine reality there can through memory be an internal production. But, further, if it can be then it is; both because there ‘possible being’ is ‘necessary being’, and because the principle is productive by way of nature; therefore necessarily. The consequence is plain, because it cannot be impeded, nor does it depend on another in acting; but everything acting from necessity of nature necessarily acts, unless it is impeded or depends on another in acting.

223. The major of the first syllogism [n.221]⁷⁸ is clear, because what does not of itself agree with a productive principle which is productive in it can exist only for one of two reasons: either because of the principle’s imperfection in it,^a or because the principle exists, as received in it, by a production adequate to it, as is true of the generative power if it exist in the Son, and of the inspiriting power if it exist in the Holy Spirit; but each of these reasons is excluded by the ‘of itself’ [‘of its own formal nature’] which is said in the major,^b because nothing has of itself a productive principle unless it have it without imperfection and as also not communicated by a production fitting such a principle.

a. [Interpolation] as an imperfect hot thing that imperfectly possesses heat is, according to him, not sufficient to cause heat.

b. [Interpolated note to interpolation n.221] the major of the second syllogism which was... [as in the interpolation to the cancelled text after n.221].

224. The proof of the minor of the first syllogism [n.221]^{a 79} is that this belongs to every created memory; not however insofar it is created or imperfect, because imperfection is never the idea of producing or communicating existence, because this belongs to it from perfection, not from imperfection.^{b 80}

⁷⁸ The reference may, however, be to part of the interpolated text following on from the cancelled text in the previous note.

⁷⁹ Or the reference may again be to interpolated text, where the minor is stated thus: “some divine supposit has of itself a principle of producing, which principle is perfect memory; therefore etc.”

⁸⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The conclusion absolutely inferred, namely that memory in the first divine person is a principle for itself of producing or simply communicating, proves the intended proposition [n.220], because it is only a productive principle by way of nature; but such a production is only internal [n.222]. It proves the intended proposition more in another way, that it is a productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore internally [n.224]. And then the major [n.221] ought to be taken in this way: ‘Whatever of its own formal nature is a productive principle of something according to this something’s formal nature, is a productive principle, in whatever it is of itself in, of such a thing’. In a third way it proves most of all the intended proposition thus:” Here

a. [*Interpolation*] the thing is plain as to the first part, because unless some person in divine reality had of itself perfect memory there would be a process to infinity; the other part of the minor, namely that perfect memory in a supposit possessing of itself that memory is a principle of producing generated knowledge...

b. [*Interpolation*] every created memory, not because it is created nor because it is limited or imperfect, is a principle of producing generated knowledge, because imperfection is never a reason for producing or communicating existence; and therefore the fact that it is a perfect principle of producing a generated knowledge corresponding to itself, this belongs to it not from imperfection but from its own natural perfection." A further interpolation follows: "Therefore this too belongs to it most perfectly where memory is most perfect and exists most perfectly; so it is in the uncreated supposit of the Father; therefore etc.

225. The major of the second syllogism [n.222] is made clear thus: for just as there is no perfect memory with respect to any intelligible object unless the object is present to it in its idea of being actually intelligible, insofar as it can be present to it as an intelligible, so there is no perfect offspring of such memory unless there is as much actual knowledge of the object as can belong to such an intellect with respect to such an object; and I call that knowledge adequate to such an intellect with respect to such an object.

226. This [n.221] can be argued of the will, because the will that has an actually known object present to it is of its own nature productive of love of such a produced object.

227. [Response to the first principal reason] – On the contrary I bring an instance against this reason [n.221] so as to make it clearer. And the major indeed of the reason I concede. But to the minor let it be said that the whole thing is not of itself a productive principle, but only when the intellect can have of itself a produced knowledge; but this happens when it can have a knowledge other than that by which it is perfected; but an infinite intellect cannot have a knowledge distinct from itself by which it is perfected, and so it does not seem that a productive principle should be there posited.

228. And this reason [n.227] is confirmed, first because a generated knowledge would be posited in vain, second because it is impossible to posit it.

229. Proof of the first point [n.228]: in us there is a necessary generated knowledge, because by it the intellect is perfected, and it would without it be imperfect; but an infinite intellect, although it have an object present to itself, is however not formally perfected by generated knowledge but by the ungenerated knowledge, really the same as itself, by which it formally understands.

230. The second point, namely impossibility [n.228], I prove^a because a productive thing that has an adequate product cannot produce another one; therefore since that whole 'an intellect having an object actually present to itself', or a memory, has in the paternal intellect an ungenerated knowledge adequate to itself that is quasi-produced from itself (because posterior in some way in idea of understanding to such memory or to such presence of an object), it seems that it has no further virtue for producing a distinct knowledge, different from this one.⁸¹

Scotus breaks off and cancels the note, because he has not yet made clear (he does it next in n.225) the major of the second syllogism [n.222].

⁸¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: "It is proved secondly because the intellect is a power of acting, not of making, as is said in *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a21-b2; therefore if it can produce a product it can produce

a. [In place of “I prove” Scotus wrote “I prove in two ways, first...” on which then follows this interpolation] ...thus: the memory in anything is either really productive of generated knowledge, as it is in us, or quasi-productive, as it is in God, because in God his accidental intellection is understood as generated quasi-knowledge. Next I argue...

231. By excluding these reasons I confirm the argument [n.221]. And to exclude the response to the minor [n.227] in itself, I say that our intellect has with respect to generated knowledge a receptive power; and this power is one of imperfection, because it is a passive power; but nothing is active through itself on the idea of a productive principle, because there is no imperfection formally in the idea of a productive principle, and especially when the productive principle can in itself be perfect. Our intellect also has the idea of productive principle with respect to generated knowledge; and this comes from its perfection, insofar as a first act virtually contains the second act.

232. The first of these, namely to receive intellection, clearly belongs to the possible intellect. About the second it is not as certain whether it belongs to the possible or to the agent intellect; let there be inquiry about this elsewhere [Scotus, *Quodlibet* q.15 nn.13-20, 24]. But as for now, taking this point about the intellect indistinctly, that it is a productive principle of knowledge, I suppose it to be sufficiently true, and it will be made clear later [I d.3 p.3 q.2]; and intellect in this sense exists in God, because he has intellect in every idea of intellect that does not posit imperfection.

233. Then I argue thus: whenever two things *per accidens* come together in something,^a namely the idea of doing and of suffering, then, when that which is the idea of acting exists *per se*, the idea of acting no less exists; the point is plain from *Physics* 2.1.192b23-27 about a doctor healing himself; if the medical art is separated from the illness the idea of healing will exist no less. Therefore if these two are separated in the intellect from each other, then, when that remains which was the *per se* idea of active principle, the idea of producing will still exist, however much the passive power of receiving is not there. There might be a manifest example of this: if knowledge of itself were co-created or consubstantial with our intellect, as some understand Augustine about hidden knowledge, *On the Trinity* XIV ch.7 n.9, then the intellect, although it could not receive the generated knowledge by which it knows itself formally,^b yet in another intellect, to wit in an angel or a blessed man in the fatherland, it could generate knowledge of itself in idea of object, because thus to generate belongs to itself in the way it is in act, although it is not receptive of it.⁸²

a. [Interpolation] one *per se* and another

it in itself and not outside itself, otherwise it would not have the idea of acting as this is distinguished from the idea of making. This intellect, therefore, which cannot produce knowledge in itself, cannot produce another knowledge, as it seems.”

⁸² Text cancelled by Scotus: “if however it could have another object actually intelligible present to itself, it can generate another knowledge in a nearby receptive thing, if there is something such [or an interpolation: ‘if any such knowledge is something that is received in another’], or it can generate a self-standing knowledge if it have the virtue of generating something self-standing; therefore, when the idea of being receptive of knowledge is removed, though the idea of being productive of knowledge remains and this a self-standing knowledge, knowledge will be able to be generated by the intellect, although it would not be received in the intellect which is the principle of the generating.”

b. [Interpolation] because it knows itself by co-created knowledge according to them.

From this is plain that the gloss [n.231] on that first minor [n.221] is in itself nothing.

234. To confirm the gloss about the ‘in vain’ [n.228], I say that in every order of agents, especially where a principle active of itself is not imperfect, there is a stand at some active principle that is simply perfect – namely because the agent acts from the fullness of its perfection and is called an agent from liberality, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6. ch.5 (95ra). But no agent acts liberally which expects to be perfected by its action. For, just as in human acts he is liberal who acts or gives expecting no return, so, similarly, that agent is called liberal which is in no way perfected by its production or product.

235. From this an argument is made as follows: in every genus of productive principle that does not include imperfection, it is possible to stand at some principle simply perfect; but the intellect is such a principle, and the will similarly; therefore in that genus it is possible to stand at something simply perfect. But no agent is simply perfect which does not act liberally, in the way stated [n.234].⁸³ Therefore in the genus of that productive genus there is some such principle that is in no way perfected by its production; such an intellect, thus having an object actually intelligible to itself, is only that which does not receive nor is perfected by the intellection which it generates or which is by its virtue generated. Therefore it is not necessary that every intellect produces a knowledge so as to be perfected by it, but it is necessary that there is some prior producing intellect that is not perfectible by its product.

236. And when one says ‘then it will be in vain’ n.228, this does not follow, for it will be the supreme good; but it is not produced by the producer so that the producer be perfected by it, but it comes from the fullness of perfection of that producer.^a

a. [Interpolation] the product is the supreme good, abiding *per se*, produced from the fullness of the perfection of the producer itself; but it is not produced so that the producer may be perfected through it.

237. But when the argument about impossibility is made afterwards [n.230], I reduce it to the opposite, because if some actually intelligible object present to the intelligence or memory of the Father have actual quasi-produced knowledge there of the Father, yet it does not have actual knowledge produced in the Father. Now from no principle productive of itself is producing as it exists in something taken away, unless that principle be understood to have produced, or to produce, by some production adequate to the virtue of such productive principle; therefore to whatever extent memory, as it is in the Father, has a quasi-product, it can still truly produce a product. But it is true that when it truly have a really produced product adequate to itself, it will not be able to produce another.⁸⁴

⁸³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “therefore this is something acting freely, in the way stated before.”

⁸⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “When it is further argued about what acts and what makes [footnote to n.230], I say that these are different accidental productive powers, namely the power that acts and the power that makes. For universally every power of itself productive of something receivable in something, produces or can produce that producible in any proportionate or nearby receptive thing;

238. [Second principal reason] – Second principally [n221] to the principal conclusion [n.220] I argue thus: the object as it is in the memory produces or is a reason for producing itself as it is in the intelligence; but that the object has ‘existence’ in both places in a certain respect is a matter of imperfection, because if the memory were perfect and the intelligence perfect, the object would be simply the same as both; therefore when all imperfection has been taken away, but preserving that which is simply a matter of perfection, the object simply the same as the memory will generate or will be the reason for generating something in the intelligence to which it is simply the same, which is the intended proposition.

239. [The third principal reason] – Further, third in this way: in any condition of being which is not in its idea imperfect, there is a necessity simply for perfection; therefore in the production too, because it does not of itself signify imperfection.⁸⁵ The proof of the antecedent is that, just as the necessary is a condition of perfection in being insofar as it is being, so also it is a condition of perfection in anything that divides being which is not necessarily of itself imperfect and limited. For just as when being is divided through opposites, one of the dividing things is a matter of perfection in being and the other of imperfection, so in anything at all which is a matter of perfection one member of any division is possible and is a matter of imperfection, and the other is necessary and is a matter of perfection. But the producer insofar as it is such does not include imperfection, therefore it is not a perfect producer in idea of producer unless it is necessarily a producer. But the first producer cannot be necessarily a producer of something other than itself and externally, as is said later [I d.8 p.2 q. un nn.12-14]; therefore internally. A similar argument is made about natural production, because natural production is primary production; therefore it belongs to the first producer; but it does not belong to the first producer externally, as will be clear elsewhere [*ibid.*], therefore internally.⁸⁶

240. [Fourth principal reason] – In addition, opposite relations in the second mode of relatives can belong to the same limited nature, just as to the same will can belong the

but if the producible is not of a nature to be received in anything, the productive power will produce it and not in anything but as per se subsistent, if however the productive power is sufficient for producing it without anything else presupposed. So it is in the intended proposition, that the Father has generated knowledge not by acting, that is, not by producing something in himself, nor by making, that is, not by producing something essentially distinct outside himself; but because the product is not of a nature to be received in anything, and the intellect is a sufficient productive principle, because it is infinite, therefore it produces a generated knowledge that is in itself subsistent, and that is a person.*

And thus the responses to the instances [nn.231-237] are clarifications of the first reason [n.221], and consequently of the principal proposition [n.220].”

*Note added here by Scotus: “Note, why is my agent intellect not able to cause in you an intelligible species, at least in the fatherland?”

Another response to the instance [footnote to n.230] is that the Word is generated in the same intellect according to substance [n.232]. This, without simple identity [n.238], suffices for action distinct from making; an example: if intellection in us is consubstantial, it produces a generated knowledge, etc. [n.233].”

⁸⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “I reply that it is not imperfect, nor does it signify a respect to something imperfect, because necessity in such a relative requires a necessity in the imperfect thing for what it is.”

⁸⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is denied as the natural is distinguished from the artificial, or as nature is from the intended proposition. It is conceded by philosophers as the natural is concomitant to the intellectual and the volitional; thus it is posited externally.”

idea of motive and movable when the will moves itself; but the relations of produced and produced, although they are more repugnant than the relations of mover and moved, are relations of this sort according to the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-32, 1021a14-25; for in that place he sets down, for example, the heater and heated as relations of the first kind [mover and moved], and father and son, or generated and him whom he generates, as relations of the second [producer and produced].⁸⁷

241. The reason is confirmed, and then I argue thus, that just as will is in a way unlimited insofar as it founds some opposed relations of the second mode, namely from the fact it virtually contains that which it is in potency for formally possessing, therefore much more can an essence simply unlimited simply found relations of the same mode that are more opposed, such as are the relations of producer and produced. For the infinity of the divine essence more exceeds any lack of limitation of anything created than the repugnance of any relations of the second mode exceeds the repugnance of any others of the same mode.⁸⁸

242. According to the Canterbury articles⁸⁹ the reasons [nn.221, 238-241] for solving this question should not be demonstrations.

243. So, the minor of the first reason [n.221] is not manifest according to natural reason. When it is proved [n.224] I reply: to be a principle of producing really belongs to the memory not whence it is memory, insofar as memory has a unity of analogy to an infinite and finite memory, but to the finite memory only, not however that finitude is the formal reason of producing, but the nature is, which we specifically gesture to by 'finite memory'. I concede therefore that imperfection is not the idea of producing but perfection is [n.224], yet not a perfection common to finite and infinite perfection, but such perfection as is necessarily accompanied by some imperfection; the reason is that to have the relation of naturally productive cause according to natural reason belongs only to such a perfect thing as is imperfect, because the imperfect is not naturally immediately producible save by the imperfect, and it is not plain that every producible is imperfect.

244. Therefore the instance against the gloss of the minor [n.233] is to be conceded because it is not for the reason that it is non-receptive that it is not-active.

245. But to the second instance about a liberal agent [n.235] I reply: here it is not plain that the productive principle is necessarily imperfect and perfectible by the product, although that perfectibility is not the idea of acting.

246. To the third instance about the product and quasi-product [n.237] I reply: it is not plain that perfect memory is a principle of producing.

247. To the fourth about acting and making [footnote to n.237]: the response to the major by the gloss is not valid, that 'it is understood of a principle of producing in which it is univocally, not equivocally', because – against this – where the principle is analogical, there will be there a greater principle of producing; an example is about heat in the sun with respect to heat in fire.

⁸⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: "Therefore the relations of producer and produced are compossible in the same nature"

⁸⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: "The reason [n.240] is also confirmed because all relative opposites equally involve contradiction; therefore if some of the second mode do not involve it then neither do others."

⁸⁹ Which these articles are is obscure. The articles must at any rate have said that the Trinity is not a matter of demonstration but of faith.

B. Proofs of Others

248. A certain doctor⁹⁰ argues otherwise in this way: the first person is constituted by relation to the second, and only by relation of origin; therefore one should posit in divine reality diverse suppositis of which one is from another, etc. Proof of the first proposition: for the first person is relative to the second; and if it were not constituted by that relation then that relation would either be accidental to it or would be adventitious to the person^a constituted, which is discordant.

a. [Interpolation] and it would be as it were adventitious to the person already [constituted...].

249. Secondly he argues thus: a virtue supremely active diffuses itself supremely; but it would not diffuse itself supremely if it did not produce something supreme,^a or unless it communicated a supreme nature to something; therefore etc.

a. [Interpolation] and this thing a second person.

250. Others⁹¹ argue through the idea of good, that the good is of itself communicative; therefore the supremely good is supremely communicative; only internally because nothing 'other' can be supreme.

251. There is a similar argument about the idea of the perfect, that the perfect is what can produce something like itself, from *Metaphysics* 1.1.981b7 and *Meteorology* 4.3.380a12-15; therefore the first agent, which is most perfect, can produce something like itself. But the more perfect is what can produce something univocally like itself than equivocally so, because an equivocal production is imperfect; therefore etc.

252. These reasons do not make the intended proposition [n.220] clear through what is more manifest, whether to the faithful or to the infidel.

The first [n.248], when it accepts that the first person is constituted by relation, is, if it intends to persuade the infidel, accepting something less known than the principal proposition; for it is less known to such a person that a *per se* subsistent thing is constituted by relation than that there is production in divine reality.^a If the reason intends to persuade the faithful it still proceeds from that is less known, because that there is production in divine reality is an evident article of faith; but it is not so primarily evident that it is an article of faith that the first person is constituted by relation.^b

a. [Interpolation] because if some *per se* subsistent person is known to have been produced, yet he would not seem to himself to be so through a relation but through an absolute.

b. [Interpolation] Nor is the consequence valid, because common inspiring is a relation and not constitutive.

253. And when it is argued further that the distinction there is only by relations of origin [n.248], this not as immediately manifest from faith as is the conclusion which it is intending to show.^{a 92}

⁹⁰ A reference to Henry of Ghent.

⁹¹ A reference to Bonaventure and Richard of Middleton.

a. [*Interpolation*] nor is this consequence valid that ‘the distinction is through relation, therefore through a relation of origin’ because not all relations are relations of origin.

254. When he proves that otherwise the relation would be adventitious to the constituted person and so would be an accident [n.248], this proof does not seem to be valid, because it could be argued in a similar way about active inspiriting, about which all hold that it does not constitute a person, nor yet is it an accident, because it is perfectly the same as the foundation that is the essence in the person.

255. And when it is argued secondly that something supremely active is supremely diffusive of itself, the response would be that this is true to the extent that it is possible for something to be diffused, but it would be necessary to prove that it would be possible for something to be diffused or communicated in unity of nature.

256. The same to the third about the idea of good [n.250], because it would be necessary to prove that the communication of the same thing or nature would be possible, because there is no power or communication of goodness^a for an impossible that involves a contradiction.

a. [*Interpolation*] and consequently neither is the communication of goodness supreme.

257. Likewise to the fourth ‘the perfect is of a nature to produce something supreme like itself’ [n.251], this is true as to something that is a supreme as similar to itself as can be produced;^a therefore one ought to prove that a like univocal supreme would be producible.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] but it is not a supreme that is univocally similar, because then it could produce another God.

b. [*Interpolation*] but this is impossible, because there cannot be several Gods, as was shown in the question about the unity of God [nn.165-181].

II. To the Principal Arguments of the Third Question

258. By holding onto the four reasons [nn.221, 238, 239, 240-241] and especially the first two [nn.221, 238] for the affirmative conclusion to the question, I respond to the arguments for the opposite conclusion [nn.201-208].

To the first [nn.201-206] by denying the major.

259. When it is proved first through the necessary of itself and the necessary from another [n.202], I say that if the same genus of cause is meant by these two, ‘of itself’ and ‘from another’, it is true that in this way nothing is necessary of itself and from another; but if another genus of cause is meant, to wit through the ‘of itself’ the formal cause and through the ‘from another’ the effective or productive cause, it is not discordant for the same thing to be necessary of itself in one way and from another in another way.

⁹² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Also it is not necessary for the intended proposition, because even if the distinction there were in another way, origin could still be preserved.”

260. When the major of the prosyllogism [n.202] is proved, I say that what is necessary of itself formally cannot not exist when any other thing is removed whose removal does not include impossibility with the positing of something else existing; but 'necessary of itself formally' follows 'being able not to be' when any other thing is removed through impossibility, just as from the positing of one impossible another impossible follows.

261. But then there is a doubt what the difference is between necessary of itself as applied to the Son according to the theologians and as applied to the necessarily produced creature according to philosophers.

I respond: the philosophers, when positing that creatures are necessarily produced, had to say that creatures had an entity whereby they were formally necessary, although in that entity they depended on a cause that necessarily produced; but the Son has a formally necessary entity and the same entity as the producer. A creature, then, if it was necessary of itself, could not fail to be when everything else was removed whose removal does not involve a contradiction, although, when the cause other than itself was removed through impossibility, it could fail to be; but the Son could not fail to be when everything else as to entity was removed, because it could only fail to be when the person producing was removed, and the producer is not other as to entity than the produced. Hence if the Father produced a creature naturally and necessarily, he would produce it to be formally necessary, and yet it would not then be necessary with as much necessity as the Son now is necessary.⁹³

262. To the second proof of the major [n.203] I say that logical possibility differs from real possibility, as is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b28-30. Logical possibility is a mode of composition formed by the intellect whose terms do not involve contradiction, and so this proposition is possible: 'God exists', 'God can be produced', and 'God is God'; but real possibility is what is received from some real power as from a power inhering in something or determined to something as to its term. But the Son is not possible with real possibility or with a possibility inhering in something or determined to him, because possibility, whether active or passive, is to another thing in nature, as is plain from the definition of active and passive power at *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-20, because it is a principle of changing another either from another insofar as it is other, or from another or insofar as it is other. But the Son is the term of productive power, which abstracts from the idea of effective power, and if that power be called simply power, the term of that power can be called simply possible; but that possibility is not repugnant to being formally necessary, although perhaps the possibility of which the philosophers speak, of active and passive power, is properly repugnant to necessity of itself; but this doubt concerns active power, if they posited that something necessary has a productive principle.

263. To the third proof, when it is said 'there is order then, so the first person is understood when the second person is not understood' [n.204], I reply that in the first understanding the second person is not necessarily understood along with the first person if that first person is absolute; but it does not follow from this that, if the first person is

⁹³ Text cancelled by Scotus: "A stand therefore is made in the Son that he is formally necessary of himself, and yet from another producing him by efficacy [interpolation: or originally], together with whom he has the same necessary entity [interpolation: for necessary formally and non-necessary in origin are not contradictory]."

understood with the second not understood, therefore the second person is understood not to exist,^a just as it does not follow ‘the animal which is in man is understood when rational is not understood, therefore man is understood not to be rational’.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] for here the intellect, by abstracting in this way, does not merely abstract but also divides what exists in reality.

b. [*Interpolation*] For it is not the same thing to understand animal without rational when understanding by way of a proposition that it is not rational, and not to understand animal to be rational by way of abstraction. Hence this is the order in the intellect: first not to be understood to be, second to be understood to be; but in real existence there is no order.

But on the contrary: in the first stage one must understand that the thing is not, because in that first stage it does not have being, otherwise it would have a priority of being along with that first stage.

To this objection, which is set down in [*Reportatio* IA d.2 n.142], I reply as follows: it is not understood in that prior stage not to be absolutely but not to be in prior stage of origin, that is, not to be of itself, and it is in this way understood to exist in that prior stage, and absolutely, because that is prior; but in the later stage of origin it is understood to have been produced, because it is from another.

264. When, however, you infer change from the opposed terms [n.204], you take it as if the produced was understood not to be when the producer is, which is false; you are changing abstraction without falsehood, which is by not considering the thing from which the abstraction is made, into false abstraction, which is by considering the thing not to exist from which abstraction is made.

265. To the fourth proof [n.205] I say that the person would not be in essence without production; for it has essence through production. The consequence is not: ‘therefore the essence becomes from not having the person to having it’, but the consequence is: ‘therefore the essence, which of its idea does not include person’ (which is true if person is relative, first because then there is something when the relative is taken away, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, and second because a respect is not of the idea of an absolute) – the essence, I say – has ‘that production, or through production it has the person in which it subsists’, which person or production, however, is not of the idea of essence. But change does not follow from the fact that something is in something which is not of the idea of it, but change requires that something be in something in which the opposite of it first was, which does not hold in this case.

266. To the fifth proof [n.206] I say that also in generation in creatures two ideas come together, namely that generation is a change and that it is a production; but as it is a change it is the form of the changed subject, and as it is a production it is as the process of the produced term. These ideas do not include each other essentially even in creatures, because they have a regard first to diverse things. Therefore without contradiction the idea of production can be understood without the idea of change, and so generation is transferred to divine reality under the idea of production, although not under the idea of change.

267. To the second principal argument [n.207] I say that this does not follow ‘it is from another therefore it is dependent’. When it is proved I concede that nature exists equally independently in producer and produced.^a When it is argued from independence that there will not be a pre-requirement, I deny the consequence, because dependence follows the formal entity of what depends on that on which it depends; when therefore it

has the same entity, there is not in that case dependence, although there can be a pre-requirement if one supposit has it from another.

a. [*Interpolation*] and they have essence first equally by the primacy that is opposed to dependence.

268. To the final argument [n.208] I say that changes other than generation are in their formal idea more imperfect than generation, because⁹⁴ the terms introduced are more imperfect than the terms of generation; yet the other changes do not require, as to what they presuppose, as much imperfection in the subject as generation requires, and this in the way generation is a change, because generation requires in the subject a being in potency, and potency to existence simply, but the other changes do not.

269. Applying this to the intended proposition, I say that generation is not transferred to divine reality as to what generation presupposes, to wit a changeable subject, which is a matter of imperfection, because in the way it is a change it is not in divine reality, – but it is transferred to divine reality insofar as it is a production, under the idea in which production is of a term, which term is more perfect than the terms of other changes; and thus can essence well be taken through generation as the most perfect term in divine reality, although there could not be taken through some other change some other term of other changes, because this other term would include composition and imperfection, because the term of any other change would be an accident combinable with a subject.

III. To the Fourth Question

270. To the fourth question, about the number of productions [n.212], the truth is plain that there are only two productions.

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Expounded.

271. But this is explained by some [Henry of Ghent] in the following way: notional acts are founded on immanent essential acts; but there are only two essential acts abiding internally, and these are understanding and willing; therefore there are only two notional acts that are productive internally, founded on the same essential acts.

272. A confirmation of the reason is that notional acts founded on essential acts are adequated to them, and so there cannot be a multiplication of notional acts founded on the same essential act.

273. The mode^a of their founding is the following, as collected from the many things that he opined scattered about in many places:^b “Both the intellect and the will, whatever they have being in, because of their separation from matter, after they have being in their own first act of simple intelligence or volition, can turn themselves back on themselves and on their simple acts and on their objects through acts of turning back or through converse acts of understanding and willing.

⁹⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “by reason of the more imperfect forms introduced they have greater imperfections, or because...”

a. [*Interpolation, from Appendix A*]: This mode is set down, and it is gathered from the many statements of that doctor, scattered about in several places. For, according to him, the word is formed in us in this way, that 'when first known it impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to it as to what is purely passive and to it as under the idea in which it is intellect. But the intellect when perfected with simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressively in itself, is made fecund and an active principle as nature – in itself being as intellect merely and as a passive principle – for forming a declarative knowledge in itself from the simple knowledge. And in this respect, when it is said that 'the word is formed through the intellect' and that 'the intellect is active in the formation of the word', this is understood of the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge; for by this simple knowledge, as by a formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle, and necessarily the idea of it, as intellect is passive, though passive with respect to the simple knowledge which it receives from the object, is prior to the idea of it according to which it is nature and active through the simple knowledge inhering in it; and therefore, in the order of reason, it has being first as intellect before it has it as nature, and before the notional act is founded that it performs as nature over and above the essential act which it undergoes as intellect' [Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.54 q.10 ad 2], namely over and above the simple knowledge of the object which it receives as it is bare.

But as to how the intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to the intellect as purely for producing he makes clear in this way, that 'Both the intellect and the will, whatever they have being in, because of their separation from matter, after they have being in their own first act of simple intelligence or volition, can turn themselves back on themselves and on their simple acts and on their objects through acts of turning back or through converse acts of understanding and willing.

For the intellect not only understands truth by simple intelligence but also by converse intelligence, by understanding that it understands, by turning itself back on the understood object and on the simple act of understanding and on itself understanding through a converse act, because the second knowledge which is in the word not only knows and understand the thing but knows and understands it in such a way that it knows that it knows and understands that thing. Likewise the will not only wills the good with simple volition, but also with converse volition, by willing that it will, by turning itself back on the willed object and on the simple act of willing and on itself willing through its converse act.

But this turning back agrees with the intellect and the will partly in one and the same way and partly in different ways. For the fact that both turn themselves back as they exist as bare, pure, and mere powers, this happens in one and the same way as far as concerns their turning themselves back; for both turn only themselves back by their own active force, which force agrees equally with both; but it happens in different ways as concerns the objects to which they turn themselves.

For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it has been turned back, possesses itself as a certain potential and pure possible, and this in the way the bare and pure intellect is of a nature to receive something from those things, as a proper passive thing receives from its proper natural active thing, which active thing indeed is the intellect informed with simple knowledge, and this in respect of the formation of declarative knowledge. But the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, is related as a certain active thing, and this in the way the bare and pure will is of a nature to express a certain incentive love about those things, as a proper active thing about its proper passive thing (of which sort is the same will when informed by simple love)' [*ibid.* a.60 q.1 in corp.]. Applying this to the proposed case in divine reality he says, 'the intellect as notional essence existing in the Father, or, which is the same thing, existing in an act of understanding its own essence, which act the essence itself as it were brings about in its own intellect as intellect is in potency, as it were, to essential knowledge according to the idea of understanding – this intellect is fertile with natural fertility for producing from itself something like itself, to which it is as it were in potency through the fact that it is in act under that essential knowledge. For the intellect, as it is a certain essential knowledge in act,

is the nature and as if the active principle by which the Father, as he is pure intellect and only intellect, forms from the same intellect, as from a passive principle, the knowledge which is the Word, which in reality is the same knowledge as that from which it is formed, differing from it only insofar as it proceeds from it as making it manifest and declaring it' [*ibid.* a.54 q.10 ad 2].

'Therefore on the part of the intellect an act of saying is caused by simple knowledge in the bare intellect when it is turned back on itself and on its simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed with simple knowledge is an active and eliciting principle of the notional act of the intellect. But the bare converted intellect itself is only a passive principle, about which, as if about some material, the Word is produced as though by impression. Now, on the part of the will, a notional act is caused by the bare will itself when turned back on itself and on its simple love and on its will informed with simple love, such that the bare converted will is an active and elicitive principle of the notional act of the will. But the will itself, informed with simple love, is a quasi-passive principle, from which, as from some material, the Holy Spirit is produced according to a certain expressing' [*ibid.* a.60 q.4 ad 1], 'not by an informing of that about which he is subjectively, nor through any impression made on the same according to the manner in which the Word or the Son proceeds from the Father by a certain quasi-informing or impressing made on the intellect by the paternal turning back,¹ but by a certain quasi-striking or pushing out or progress or – speaking more properly – by a certain expressing of what is produced by that about which it is subjectively produced' [*ibid.* q.1 in corp.].

In this way, then, the mode is plain in which, according to this opinion, the notional act is founded on the essential act, and how it is founded in diverse ways in the intellect and the will.

b. [*Interpolation*] For the word is formed in us, according to him, in this way, that 'when first known it impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to it as to what is purely passive and to it as under the idea in which it is intellect. But the intellect when perfected with simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressively in itself, is made fecund and an active principle as nature – in itself being as intellect merely and as a passive principle – for forming a declarative knowledge in itself from the simple knowledge. And in this respect, when it is said that 'the word is formed through the intellect' and that 'the intellect is active in the formation of the word', this is understood of the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge; for by this simple knowledge, as by a formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle, and necessarily the idea of it, as intellect is passive, though passive with respect to the simple knowledge which it receives from the object, is prior to the idea of it according to which it is nature and active through the simple knowledge inhering in it; and therefore, in the order of reason, it has being first as intellect before it has it as nature'. But how intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to the intellect as bare for producing the word, it is made clear thus, that... [*as in nn.276-277 below*].

274. For the intellect not only understands truth by simple intelligence but also by converse intelligence, by understanding that it understands, by turning itself back on the understood object and on the simple act of understanding and on itself understanding through a converse act, because the second knowledge which is in the word not only knows and understand the thing but knows and understands it in such a way that it knows that it knows and understands that thing. Likewise the will not only wills the good with simple volition, but also with converse volition, by willing that it will, by turning itself back on the willed object and on the simple act of willing and on itself willing through its converse act.

275. But this turning back agrees with the intellect and the will partly in one and the same way and partly in different ways. For the fact that both turn themselves back as they exist as bare, pure, and mere powers, this happens in one and the same way as far as

concerns their turning themselves back; for both turn only themselves back by their own active force, which force agrees equally with both; but it happens in different ways as concerns the objects to which they turn themselves.

276. For the intellect, after it has turned itself back to the things to which it has been turned back, possesses itself as a certain potential and pure possible, and this in the way the bare and pure intellect is of a nature to receive something from those things, as a proper passive thing receives from its proper natural active thing, which active thing indeed is the intellect informed with simple knowledge, and this in respect of the formation of declarative knowledge. But the will, after it has turned itself back to what it has turned itself back to, is related as a certain active thing, and this in the way the bare and pure will is of a nature to express something about those things, as a proper active thing about its proper passive thing; this passive thing is the very same will, informed by simple love, about which – when thus informed – the same will as bare naturally expresses incentive love, who is in the divine reality the Holy Spirit, and he has being from the persons producing him, not by an informing of that about which he is subjectively, nor through any impression made on the same according to the manner in which the Word or the Son proceeds from the Father by a certain quasi-informing or impressing made on the intellect by the paternal turning back,⁹⁵ but by a certain quasi-striking or pushing out or progress or – speaking more properly – by a certain expressing of what is produced by that about which it is subjectively produced.

277. On the part of the intellect an act of saying is caused by simple knowledge in the bare intellect when it is turned back on itself and on its simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed with simple knowledge is an active and eliciting principle of the notional act of the intellect. But the bare converted intellect itself is only a passive principle, about which, as if about some material, the Word is produced as though by impression. Now, on the part of the will, a notional act is caused by the bare will itself when turned back on itself and on its simple love and on its will informed with simple love, such that the bare converted will is an active and elicitive principle of the notional act of the will. But the will itself, informed with simple love, is a quasi-passive principle, from which, as from some material, the Holy Spirit is produced according to a certain expressing.”

278. But how the intellect as nature is an active principle with respect to intellect as pure for producing the Word, this is made clear in this way,⁹⁶ because [point f] “the intellect as notional essence existing in the Father, or, which is the same thing, existing in an act of understanding its own essence, which act the essence itself as it were brings about in its own intellect as intellect is in potency, as it were, to essential knowledge according to the idea of understanding – this intellect is fertile with natural fertility for producing from itself something like itself.”⁹⁷

279. Now the intellect, as it is a certain essential knowledge in act, is the nature and as if the active principle by which the Father, as he is pure intellect and only intellect, forms from the same intellect, as from a passive principle, the knowledge which is the

⁹⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “as it is declarative knowledge about simple knowledge.”

⁹⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “And hence is apparent the difference between intellect as intellect and intellect as nature.”

⁹⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: “to which it is as intellect in potency as it were through the fact that it is in act under that essential knowledge.”

Word, which in reality is the same knowledge as that from which it is formed, differing from it only insofar as it proceeds from it as making it manifest and declaring it.

280. And in the whole same way we must thus understand the word to be formed in us. For a thing when first known impresses a simple knowledge of itself on our intellect by representing itself to the intellect as to something purely passive and as under the idea in which it is intellect. But the intellect thus perfected by simple knowledge through the object known, which it contains expressed in itself, is made to be fertile and an active principle by way of nature, making impress on itself as it is merely intellect, as on a passive principle, so as to form in itself a declarative knowledge about the simple knowledge, so that – according to this – when it is said ‘a word is formed by the intellect’ and that ‘the intellect is active also in the formation of it’, this is understood about the intellect actually informed with simple knowledge, by which, as by the formal idea of acting, the intellect is an active principle; for by this it is a principle, and its idea as it is intellect and passive with respect to the simple knowledge, which it receives from the object, is necessarily prior to its idea according to which it is nature and active by the inhering simple knowledge; and therefore, in order of idea, it has being as it is intellect before it has being as it is nature.”

281. Thus then the mode is plain in which, according to this opinion, the notional act is founded on the essential act, and how it is so in diverse ways in the intellect and in the will [nn.273-280].

B. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent is Rejected.

282. This opinion posits four articles which I do not believe to be true.

The first is that the divine Word is generated by impression [nn.273-280]; the second is that this is by impression on the intellect as it is turned back on itself; the third is that essential knowledge is the formal idea of generating declarative knowledge; the fourth is that it is generated by impression on the intellect as bare.

283. [Article one] – I dismiss the rejection of the first article until distinction 5 [I d.5 q.2 nn.2-10], where it properly has place.

284. [Article two] – Against the second article I argue in a threefold way: first that on the intellect thus converted the Word is not impressed, the second that such conversion is not necessary for generating the Word, the third that there is no such conversion.

285. I argue for the first as follows, namely⁹⁸ that the intellect is not turned back save as it is in some supposit, because turning back is posited as an action, and actions are of supposits. Then I ask, to which supposit or to which person does it belong as turned back on the formed intellect? If as so converted it belongs to the person of the Son, and according to you this conversion precedes the generation of the Word, then before the generation of the Word there are two persons, which is heretical. But if, as it is turned back on the formed intellect, it belongs to the Father himself, and if to that to which it belongs as converted it belongs as it is formed by generated knowledge, as I will prove, then the intellect as it belongs to the Father is formed by generated knowledge; therefore generated knowledge belongs formally to the person of the Father himself, because to

⁹⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The first is that in the intellect as bare, turned back on the intellect formed by simple knowledge, generated knowledge is formed; this I refute as follows...”

what person the intellect belongs as formed, to that same person belongs the knowledge by which it is formed. The assumption that needs to be proved I prove thus: to what person the intellect belongs as it is turned back on the formed intellect, to that person it belongs as it possesses the intellect formed for the object actually present; therefore it belongs to that person as it is formed by the object. The proof of this consequence is that a passive thing proportioned, disposed, and approximated to a sufficient proportioned active thing is of a nature to be immediately perfected by that active thing, from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a5-7; for, according to the Philosopher, something is in proximate potency when nothing needs to be added, subtracted, or lessened so that act might be present in it. But the intellect bare, as converted and having the intellect formed as present object, is a passive thing disposed, proportioned, and approximate to the intellect formed as a sufficiently active object; therefore the bare intellect as converted – with no variation made with respect to it, in subsistence or any entity as such – is formed by generated knowledge. And thus is the first consequence proved.⁹⁹

286. Here a response could be made that the intellect bare, through the fact that from it the knowledge is actually formed, or by the fact it is a quasi-matter informed by generated knowledge, has ‘existence’ in the generated person [I d.5 q.2 n.8]. But against this response are the two first arguments set down later [*ibid.* nn.5-8] against the opinion about quasi-matter, which is there specifically refuted.^a

a. [*Interpolation, replacing what follows after ‘intellect bare’*] from which generated knowledge is formed, and is communicated to the Son by an act of producing generated knowledge, – about which we will speak in distinction 5, and so I pass over it here.

287. I argue for the second [n.284] thus,¹⁰⁰ that the intellect of the Father, when it has the object present to itself, is a natural principle, not only operative with respect to the intellection of the Father but also productive with respect to generated knowledge; therefore, when the reflexion is removed, it would still be a productive principle.

288. Again I prove the third [n.284] thus: if by conversion nothing is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood to be there when no conversion is understood, then conversion is nothing there; if something is understood to be in the intellect which would not be understood without the conversion, what, I ask, is it? – not the presence of the object, not the perfection of the power, not finally the determination of the power to act or to the exercise of act. As to the way in which some posit that the will in us converts the intelligence to memory, it is plain that the will does not convert it to generation of the divine Word.

289. Again, this conversion is not an action which is an operation, because it is not intellection nor volition, nor is it an action productive of which.

⁹⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Again, that the Word be formed about the intellect as bare, and yet that it be impressed on the intellect as having essential knowledge [the matter of the fourth article], do not seem to stand together, because under what reason the intellect is the proximate about-which, under that it is also the proximate in-which; but at point f [n.278] he says that it is in quasi-potency to the Word through the fact that it is in act under essential knowledge.”

¹⁰⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The third article is that the turning back of the bare intellect on the formed intellect is necessary for the bare intellect to be formed by the formed intellect [n.277]. This I do not see.”

290. [Article three] – The third article [n.282] is that the intellect informed by actual essential knowledge is a principle active and elicitive of generated knowledge.

291. This I refute^a as follows: the Word is not generated by intelligence but by memory,^b according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.24;^c therefore, although in the Father memory, intelligence, and will go together,^d the Father does not generate the Son formally by intelligence as ‘by which’ but as it is memory. But as it has actual knowledge quasi-elicited and as second act, it is in act of intelligence, to which belongs all actual understanding; therefore as such it does not generate the Word, but as it is in act of memory, that is, as it has the intelligible object present to its intellect; for here first act is understood as if preceding second act, and second act is actual understanding.

a. [Interpolation] But that intelligence or essential knowledge in the Father is not the formal idea of acting or generating the Word, I prove...

b. [Interpolation] through an act of intelligence but through an act of memory.

c. [Interpolation] at the end: ‘the way,’ he says, ‘that the Word of the Father is knowledge from knowledge, etc.’; knowledge according to him is only ever in the memory.

d. [Interpolation] according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 15 ch.7 n.12, however...

292. Second thus: production more agrees with first act as active principle than with second act, because perfect operations are ends in their idea, and so they are not for the sake of other ends; therefore intellection as it is the operation of the Father is not the formal productive reason of any term, but only first act – by whose virtue the operation is elicited – will be productive principle.

293. Third thus: if the actual intellection of the Father is the formal idea of producing the Word, still the object as present to the Father’s intellect, as the intellect possesses the idea of memory, will be the prior productive principle of generated knowledge, because it is apparent in us that it is of a nature to generate more immediately than the act of understanding is; therefore some Word will be generated by the Father as he is memory itself before being generated by him as he is knowing intelligence itself.¹⁰¹

294. Further, all intellection, since its existence is in becoming, has a principle or quasi-principle whose existence is not in becoming, because otherwise there will be a process to infinity; therefore of some understanding of the object *a*, to wit the first understanding, only the memory must be the principle or quasi-existence such that it is not the whole complex ‘intellect understanding’ [n.221], otherwise there would not be a first intellection. But all understandings of *a*, and in an intellect of the same nature, are of the same nature. But whatever is the first principle of the first thing in a species can be the principle of anything else and immediately; therefore perfect memory of *a* can be the immediate principle or quasi-principle of every understanding of *a*. Therefore the

¹⁰¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “There is a confirmation, that for you essence quasi-operates the essential act of understanding in the paternal intellect [n.278]; the essence then as present to the intellect is a sufficient principle ‘by which’ with respect to actual intellection; but the fact that it is only a quasi-principle with respect to it as it is in the Father is because the intellection of the Father is not producible; therefore with respect to actual producible knowledge it will be simply the principle ‘by which’, and so the first Word will not be produced by the actual intellection of the Father as by the formal productive idea.”

memory of the Father can be the immediate principle of the Word; therefore necessarily it is.

On the contrary: therefore the memory of the Son to the intelligence of the Son is not as the memory of the Father to the intelligence of the Father.

295. Further, the Word is most immediately declarative of that by which it is most immediately expressed; therefore if the elicitive nature of the Word is the actual knowledge in the formed intellect of the Father, it follows that the Word is more immediately Word, or declarative, of the intellection of the Father than of the essence of the Father, which seems discordant, because then there would be some prior Word that would be immediately declarative of the essence of the Father, or one should say that the essence could not immediately be declared by some Word, which seems discordant, since according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.10 n.19: “knowledge formed by the thing which we contain in memory” is the word; the first object of the divine memory is essence as essence.

296. Further, if the actual intellection of the Father were generated or produced, it would be produced by virtue of the essence not as already known but as prior to all knowledge; this is plain also according to truth, because otherwise there would be a process to infinity in acts of understanding, namely act before act, and also according to them, because he said above [Henry of Ghent, n.278] that in the Father the essence itself in the Father’s intellect operates the act of understanding the essence. From this I argue as follows: actual knowledge of the essence cannot formally be of another idea in the persons by the fact that it is communicated by another or not communicated by another, because then deity would formally be of a different idea in the persons;^a therefore actual knowledge of the essence belongs to the same idea in the Father and in the Son. Therefore, that which is of a nature to be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to one of them if it were principal, will be the same principle with respect to the other if it is what follows a principle.^b

a. [Interpolation] because one person and not another has it from himself.

b.[Interpolation] But it has been made clear [in the note to n.293] that actual knowledge in the Father, if it were generated, would have the essence as formal principle; therefore in the Son, where it is generated and is of the same idea, it will have the essence as formal principle and not the intellect or simple knowledge.

297. I pass over the fourth article [n.282], except for the fact that by thinking in this way here he seems to contradict himself, as was argued before [footnote to n.285].

298. The second article [n.282] is also false in us, because the most perfect word will exist in the fatherland, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 nn.20-21, and yet it will not be a word generated by a turning back on first act, so that the word, because of this, is a reflex act in the way he says that by the second knowledge which is in the word the intellect knows that it know and understands [n.274]. But the proof that the word is not reflex knowledge [n.257] is that the most perfect created word does not have for its first object something created but something uncreated.

299. The third article too [nn.282, 290] is false in us; both because confused knowledge cannot be the elicitive principle of distinct knowledge, just as neither can an imperfect thing be the elicitive principle of some perfect production; and also because the

actual confused knowledge would exist at the same time with actual distinct knowledge, and so there would be two elicited acts at the same time, or a confused act would, when it did not exist, generate a distinct act; and also because every second act of understanding is generated by memory as memory exists in a first act proportional to itself, to wit perfect act by perfect memory, imperfect by imperfect, as will be clear later [I d.3 p.3 q.2 nn.12-13].

C. Scotus' Own Opinion

300. I say then to the question that there are only two productions distinct according to formal ideas of productions, and this because there are only two productive principles that have distinct formal ideas of production.

Of this causal statement I prove the antecedent and the consequence.

The antecedent I prove as follows: every plurality is reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to; therefore the plurality of active principles will be reduced to as much unity, or as much fewness, as it can be reduced to. But it cannot be reduced to some single productive principle. The proof is that¹⁰² the principle would determinately have one mode of being principle, or the mode of being principle of one of them: for either it would be of itself determinately productive by way of nature, or not of itself determinately but freely productive, and so by way of will; therefore these cannot be reduced to some as it were third principle among them that would have, that is in producing, the idea of neither of them. Nor is one reduced to the other because then one would in its whole genus be imperfect, which is false, because since it belongs to both from the same perfection to be an operative and productive principle (which was proved in the preceding solution, in the proof of the minor of the first syllogism there given [[nn.224, 226]], and since neither is in itself imperfect insofar as it is operative, for then it would not exist formally in God, therefore neither is imperfect either as it is productive.

302. The productive principles, therefore, cannot be reduced to a lesser fewness than to a duality of principle, namely a duality of a principle productive by way of nature and of a principle productive by way of will. Now these two principles, according to their reasons of being principle, should be placed in the first thing, because in it there is every idea of principle that is not reduced to another prior principle. Therefore there are only two productive principles of different idea in the first productive thing, namely a single one productive by way of nature and a single one productive freely. But these productive principles are inward, because any productive principle which is not reduced to another prior principle is of a nature to have a production adequate and a product adequate to itself; therefore the productive principle which is will is of a nature to have a product adequate to it, and the productive principle which is nature is of a nature to have a product adequate to it. These productive principles are infinite, therefore the products adequate to them can only be infinite. Also omnipotence in the first thing cannot have a

¹⁰² Text cancelled by Scotus: "the productive principles which are nature and will have opposite modes of being a principle, because one is of itself inclined to acting naturally, the other has the producing freely in its own power, such that it is not of itself naturally inclined to this; but if they were reduced to some single productive principle..."

possible infinite object, because then the creature could be infinite;¹⁰³ but nothing is formally infinite except God, from the question ‘Whether God Exists’ [nn.39, 74-147]. Therefore these principles are productive of some things in the divine nature.

303. Further it follows: if there are only two productive principles of different nature, then there are only two productions numerically. The proof is that each productive principle has a production adequate to itself and co-eternal; therefore while that production stands it cannot have another.¹⁰⁴

D. Instances against the Solution

304. An objection is raised against this deduction as follows: nature of itself is a principle determined to action; but in divine reality intellect whereby it is intellect not only seems to be a principle determined to action but also by nature an essence as essence is in some way prior to intellect, being its root as it were and foundation, in the way that any essence seems to be the foundation of the power; therefore not only the intellect but also the essence itself as essence should be set down as having the idea of being principle of the principle which is nature as distinguished from will.

305. Second, there is a doubt about these productive acts, how they belong to those productive principles whose the essential acts are; for since acts distinguish powers,

¹⁰³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “I prove that perfect memory is productive inwardly by way of nature, from the preceding solution [nn.225-226], because perfect intellect, insofar as it is an operative power, is of a nature to understand an object insofar as the object is knowable, and thus, insofar as it is a productive power of generated knowledge, it is of a nature to be a principle of as much knowledge as there can be of the object; but the intellect in the first thing too, as it is a productive principle, is simply perfect, as is plain, because it is not reduced to another prior principle, and everything imperfect is reduced to a perfect thing prior to itself. This first object too of the intellect is an infinite intelligible; therefore the intellect, as it is a productive principle, is of a nature to be a principle of producing an infinite knowledge. A similar argument holds of the will with respect to infinite love.”

¹⁰⁴ Note cancelled by Scotus: “One must keep in mind that the whole matter of distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un.] turns about the antecedent of this causal argument [n.300], therefore either the dispute about the antecedent should be deferred to that point, or here the whole of it should be touched on.

Second, it would be done better if this question is moved, ‘Whether productions are precisely distinguished according to the distinction of formal principles of producing’. The solution of this question depends on these questions: ‘Whether essence as essence is formal principle of communicating essence’ (and as to the former ‘That thus’ in the Collations [16], and as to the latter ‘It is objected to the contrary’ etc. [n.304]); again, ‘Whether there can be the same formal principle of producing with respect to distinct products’ (as here at ‘Fourth, whence’ etc. [n.307]); again third, ‘Of what nature is the distinction of principles of producing’, but this pertains to the question about the distinction of attributes [I d.8 p.1 q.4].

Note, for the solution of the question [‘Whether productions are precisely distinguished...’] let there be the proposition: ‘Everything that, while being of the same idea, extends itself to many things of the same idea, is not determined of itself to as many such things as it extends itself’. The proof is found in the relation of what is common to the supposits and in the relation of the cause to its effect. From the proposition it follows that neither does the divine nature, insofar as it is common, determine for itself a number of supposits, nor insofar as it is a principle of producing – if it is such a principle – will it determine for itself a number of things from a principle; therefore if there is a definite number of persons, it will be because the productive principle is distinguished. Thus are [the first] two ‘Whether...’ questions solved; the third requires a proof through the adequation of one or a single principle to the principle of one idea.’

On the Soul 2.4.415a16-20, it seems that to the powers to which the essential acts [understanding, willing] belong, the notional acts [generating, inspiring, n.271] do not belong.

306. Third, the proof does not seem to be valid which is adduced for showing that the duality in productive principles cannot be reduced to unity [n.301], for to be principle necessarily and to be principle contingently are opposite modes of being a principle and yet this duality is reduced to unity. And I concede that the ‘one thing’ has determinately one of these two modes, the mode namely that is more perfect and prior. So it should be said, in the proposed case, that to the principle which is nature – because it is prior in idea of being principle – the will is reduced, although it have the opposite mode of being a principle.

307. Fourth,^a whence is proved the proposition ‘when one act adequate to the power stands, the power cannot have another act’ [n.303]? If it understand adequation according to extension, the question is begged; if according to intension, it seems to be false. For although the vision of the Word is adequate to the intellective power of the soul of Christ, yet it can also know by an elicited act some other intelligible; it is plain too that God knows himself by a knowledge adequate to his intellect according to intension, and yet he knows things other than himself. If this is how it is about an act adequate to the operative power, which allows of another, much more does it seem to be so of the productive power, because its product is not in the productive power as operation is in the operative power.

a. [Interpolation] I argue against the ultimate proposition of the aforesaid deduction; for I ask...

308. Again, a principle is not a principle insofar as the thing that has a principle is already understood to be posited in existence, but insofar as it is prior to that thing; but as it is prior it is not differently disposed by the fact that what has it as a principle is posited to be in existence. Therefore if, when this thing is not posited, it could be the principle of another thing, it seems by parity of reason that, when this thing is posited, it could at the same time be the principle of another thing, because when the first thing is posited the principle, insofar as it is principle, that is, insofar as it is prior to what has it as a principle, is in no way differently disposed.

309. The solution of these two ultimate questions [nn.307-308], and the clarification of the reason against which they are made, and the proof of the conclusion for which the reason is adduced, namely that there are only two productions – let them be dismissed to distinction 7 [n.358], in the question ‘Whether there could be several Sons in divine reality’ [I d.7 q.2].¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Note: the instances against the antecedent are about the matter of distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un], however some are touched on here, at least the first one [n.304]; the second [n.305] can be against the preceding solution [nn.221-241, 258] rather than here, and the argument about the distinction, in idea of principle, of intellect from nature [nn.216-217] is proper here.

The instances against the consequence [nn.307-308] pertain to the question ‘Whether two Sons’, in distinction 7 [n.309].

See in the other part of the folio the four instances [nn.316-319] against the rejection of the second article of the opinion [nn.290-296]: of which two are put first for confirming the opinion [nn.316-317], the other two are against the reasons against the second article of the opinion [nn.318-319].”

310. [Response to the instances] – To the first [n.304] I reply that this whole ‘the intellect having an object actually intelligible present to itself’ [n.211] has the idea of perfect memory in first act, namely the idea that is the immediate principle of second act and of generated knowledge; but in this principle that is memory two things come together which constitute one total principle, namely essence in the idea of object and intellect, each of which is *per se* a partial principle as it were with respect to a production adequate to this total principle. When therefore it is argued that the idea of nature belongs not only to intellect but to essence [n.304], I reply that the total principle, including the essence as object and the intellect as a power having the object present to itself, is the productive principle which is nature and is the complete principle of producing by way of nature.^a For if essence as object did not have the idea of principle in the production of the Word, why would the Word be said more of essence than of stone, if from the sole infinity of intellect as productive principle an infinite Word could, when any other object whatever was present, be produced?

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Note how in the production there is a double principle ‘by which’, how the essence alone is not a ‘by which’ sufficient for communicating existence, how something quasi-posterior can be a principle ‘by which’ for communicating which is quasi-prior in perfection, how essence is not as it were the root of everything equally in anything whatever [n.304] (but the Son is first knowledge and the Holy Spirit first love, and as it were concomitantly with essence; distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un. nn.11-25]).

311. To the second doubt [n.305] I say that memory in the Father is the operative principle of the Father, by which, namely, as by first act, the Father formally understands as in second act; the same memory of the Father is also the productive principle by which the Father, existing in first act, produces, as he is in second act, generated knowledge. The productive act, therefore, is not founded on the essential act which consists in second act, that is, which is a quasi-operating on the formal reason of eliciting the second productive act, but in a certain way pre-requires that second act, because the first act which is operative and productive is the idea of perfecting a supposit in second act, in which it exists first by a certain order before that which is produced is understood to be produced or perfected. For what operates and produces through that principle is operating before it is producing.

312. An example. If ‘to shine’ were set down as some operation in a luminous thing, and ‘to illuminate’ were set down as production of light by the luminous thing, light in the luminous thing would be the principle ‘by which’ both with respect to the operation which is ‘to shine’ and with respect to the production which is ‘to illuminate’; yet ‘to shine’, which is an operation, would not be the formal idea of the illumination, which is production, but would there be the order, as it were, of the effects ordered to the same common cause of both, from which one of the effects proceeds more immediately than the other. So it is in the proposed case. A certain order to the same first act, which is the memory of the Father, is understood to be possessed by the ‘to understand’, which is an operation of the Father, and by the ‘to say’, which is the ‘to produce’ of the Father with respect to generated knowledge; not such an order that the ‘to produce’ of the Father is the cause or elicitive principle of the ‘to say’ of the word, but that the ‘to understand’ is more immediately quasi-produced by the memory of the Father than the ‘to say’ or the Word is produced by the same memory. So there is not such an order there as is posited

by the first opinion [of Henry of Ghent, 280] in the idea of a presupposed object or in the idea of the formal principle of acting, but only the prior ordering, with respect to the same principle, of a quasi-product to a product, a principle common to quasi-product and product.

313. And then to the passage of *On the Soul*, about the distinction of powers to acts [n.305], one could say that ‘to quasi-produce’ and ‘to produce’ are acts of the same idea; for if that which is not produced but quasi-produced were really distinct from the producer, it would truly be a product; therefore what is only present without production, though by virtue of a principle which would be productive of it were the thing able to be made distinct – and to this extent one may call it a quasi-product – does not vary the act formally from the act by which it would be produced were it producible.

314. Another response would be about the agent and possible intellect, but I pass it over now; I have not yet said to which intellect, as to partial principle, it belongs to produce knowledge (this will be spoken of below), but I have now spoken about the intellect indistinctly [n.232].

315. To the third [n.306] I say that when two principles have opposite modes of being principle, neither of which requires any imperfection, neither is reduced to the other as to a prior in nature, although there could there be some priority of origin, as it were, or something of the sort. But now neither of these principles includes any imperfection, no more insofar as it is productive than insofar as it is operative; therefore one of them will not be reduced to the other as to a prior in nature, nor both to a third, for the same reason, because neither is imperfect, and also because the third thing would be a principle according to the idea of one or other of them, because there is between them no middle in being principle, and so, if both were reduced to a third, one would be reduced to the other and the same to itself.

316. Against these [nn.310-315] an instance is made, and first in this way: intelligence is in the Father under the proper idea of intelligence, and the Word is the proper perfection of intelligence as intelligence; therefore the Word belongs to the intelligence of the Father [n.290], which was before denied [nn.291-296].

317. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.12 n.22: “The Word is vision of vision;” therefore actual knowledge is the idea of generating the Word [n.290].

318. Further, there does not seem to be a difference between memory and intelligence in the Father, therefore to reject the Father as he is intelligence from being the principle of the Word does not seem to be other than rejecting the Father as he is memory from being so; therefore you approve and reject it as one and the same thing [nn.310, 291].

319. The fourth instance is: there seems to be no reason for the Father to produce generated knowledge in this act and not in that, since each is second act and is a principle by virtue of the same first act [nn.311, 292].

320. To the first [n.316] I say that the Father is formally memory, intelligence, and will, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12: “In the Trinity who would say that the Father only through the Son understands himself and the Son and the Holy Spirit, but of himself only remembers either the Son or the Holy Spirit?” – conclusion – “who would presume to opine or affirm this in the Trinity? But if there only the Son understands and neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit understand, one is reduced to the absurdity that the Father is not wise about himself but about the Son.” So St. Augustine.

He understands, therefore, that the Father is formally memory for himself, intelligence for himself, and will for himself; and in this respect there is a dissimilarity between the persons and the parts of the image in us, according to him.

When therefore it is said that ‘the proper act of intelligence is the Word’ [n.316], I deny it; rather it belongs to the idea of the Son that he is generated knowledge.

312. You say that it suffices that the knowledge be declarative.

I deny it, understanding by ‘declarative’ a relation of reason, as of the intelligible to the intellect; for such is the relation of the actual declarative knowledge of the Father, by which the Father formally understands, to the habitual knowledge of the Father as he is memory, such that the object present to the Father’s intellect is made clear as equally by the actual knowledge of the Father as by the actual knowledge of the Son, – and yet the actual knowledge of the Father is not the Word, because nothing can exist formally in the Father save what is non-generated.

322. When it is said, second, that there is ‘knowledge of knowledge’ [n.317] I reply that the self-same Augustine expounds himself *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 n.20: “the vision of thinking is most similar to the vision of science;” and *ibid.* ch.12 n.22: “In this case is the word most similar to the thing to be known from which it is generated, and the image of it: vision of thinking from vision of science.” – These phrases are intransitive. For as ‘vision of thinking’ is nothing other than thinking, so ‘vision of science’ is nothing than science. It is the same thing then to say that from the vision of science the vision of thinking is born as to say that from science thinking is born. But ‘science’ is habitual science, which perfects memory, according to the same Augustine *ibid.* ch.15 n.25, where he says: “If there can be in the soul some eternal science, there cannot be eternal thinking of the same science.” The ‘eternal’ according to him pertains to memory, ‘non-eternal’ to intelligence. He does not then intend the phrases ‘vision of vision’, ‘knowledge of knowledge’ to mean anything other than that second act, which is vision or thinking in intelligence, is born of first act, which is habitual vision or science, according to him.

323. To the third instance, when an argument is made about the difference between memory and intelligence [n.318], I say that those adversaries do not posit a real difference between the intellect and the will of the Father, and yet these have so much difference that one can be the elicitive principle of some production of which the other is not the formal elicitive principle; for the Son is not formally produced by way of will. Therefore although the memory and intelligence of the Father do not differ really, there is yet as much difference between them that one of them could be posited as the elicitive principle of some production of which the remaining one is not posited as the formal elicitive principle. Such difference is plain according to Augustine *ibid.* ch.7 n.12 and before [n.291]. For the difference is such that if the Father by way of memory were knowing but not understanding, he would not be perfect, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.9.1074b17-18, notwithstanding the identity of memory with intelligence or recollection with understanding.

324. To the fourth instance [n.319] I say that this is an immediate contingent proposition, ‘heat is heating’ and this an immediate necessary one, ‘heat is able to heat’, because there is no middle found between the extremes of either of these. So I say that this proposition is *per se*, ‘operation insofar as it is operation is not productive’, because operations as operations are the ends and perfections of the operator [n.292]; but production as production is not the perfection of the producer but contains the term

produced outside the essence of the producer, or at any rate this term is not formally in the person of the producer.

325. Why then does the first act by which the Father understands or formally operates not produce?

I reply that the ‘to understand’ is the ‘to operate’ of the Father from his own idea, and is not the ‘to produce’; but by production or by speaking he produces in the way that something heats by heating, of which there is not formally some other prior cause.

326. But as to your statement that the principle of these two acts is the same [n.319], without interchange of mode of agent and possible intellect [nn.314, 232], it can be conceded that, from the fullness of perfection, there can belong to something that it operate and that it produce something other than itself. This, however, will be plainer when it is stated that ‘to say’ is not formally an act of understanding [I d.6 q. un. nn.2-4]; it is however an act of intellect. But no act of understanding is formally productive, but some other natural act, preceding or following, can be productive – of which sort is the act of saying.

IV. To the Principal Arguments of the Fourth Question

327. To the principal reasons [nn.212-218]. – To the first [n.212] I say that Averroes in comment 49 on the *Physics* 8, whose text begins “Whether each of the moving things,” is only speaking expressly of man, and on this point he is contradicting Avicenna (*On the Nature of Animals*, XV ch.1 59rb-va), as he himself says in the same place. He imputes to Avicenna, then, that he posited that man could be generated equivocally, – and in that case the conclusion of Averroes [n.212] is true, because nothing univocally generable can be generated equivocally unless it is so imperfect that an equivocal or a univocal cause is sufficient for its generation; and therefore imperfect beings can be generated univocally and equivocally but not perfect ones. However, the reasons of Averroes [nn.213-214] seem to prove the conclusion not only about man but about any species of natural generable things; and if he does not intend this, his conclusion is false and his reasons not conclusive.

328. That his conclusion [n.212] is false is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* III ch.8 n.13. And the reason of Augustine, in the same place, is that a generated thing propagates other things through putrefaction; but the propagators are univocal with the things generated by them; therefore things propagated and generated by putrefaction are univocal.

329. But if Averroes deny the assumption of bees and of animals, he cannot deny it of plants, because plants equivocally generated, that is, not generated from seed, do afterwards produce semen univocally, from which are generated other plants of the same species.

330. Augustine also contradicts him in *Letter to Deogratias* q.1 n.4,^a and so does Ambrose *On the Incarnation* at the end, ch.9 nn.101-102.

a. [Interpolation] where he says: ‘Many kinds of animals are procreated from earth without parents, and yet they produce their like among themselves something; nor is there because of the diversity of their birth any difference in the nature of those which are procreated from earth and those which come from their coition; for the live and die in similar way despite have a dissimilar birth’.

331. But Averroes himself also contradicts himself in other places about this conclusion. For about the equivocal generation of accidents he himself makes it plain in *On the Heavens* 2 com.42, where he himself concedes that in accidents there is not always generation by a univocal cause; and he sets down an example about heat and fire; for he posits that heat is generated equivocally from the motion and the concourse of rays, and also univocally from heat. – In substances too it is plain that fire is generated univocally and equivocally. That it is generated equivocally is plain from *On the Heavens* com.56: “The proceeding of fire from a stone is not in the chapter on transfer but in the chapter on alteration,” that is, it is not generated by transference but by alteration; it is also generated by local motion, *Metaphysics* 12 com.19, and *Meteorology* 1 summa II ch.1, about the generation of ignition by striking.^a – The same is plain about animals, that many are generated equivocally, *Metaphysics* 12 com.19: “For wasps seem to come to be from the bodies of dead horses, and bees from the bodies of dead cows, etc.”

a. [Interpolation] Fire, then, that is generated from a stone by the motion of striking it and that is generated from the reflection of the rays of the sun is generated equivocally, and the fire thus generated univocally generates fire.

332. But that all the aforesaid generated things are of the same species with things generated univocally is proved by the fact they have the same operations, and operations about the same objects; they are preserved by the same things and are corrupted by the same things. They have the same motions, either as to going up or down, or as to progress forward and as to the same organs of progress forward; but from the unity of motion Aristotle concludes, in *On the Heavens* 1.2.269a2-7, to the unity of nature, and the Commentator in com.8 at the same place says: “unity of motion only comes from unity of nature.” These – the former and the latter generated things – also have limbs of the same species, and “the limbs of a lion do not differ from those of a deer save because soul differs from soul,” Averroes *On the Soul* 1 com.53. And generally all the middle terms that prove unity of species, whether these terms are taken from acts or from operations, prove the intended proposition about the univocity of things generated in this way and in that.

333. Averroes’ conclusion is also contradicted by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a9-14, 30-b7, where his intention is that, just as some of the same things come to be by nature and by chance, namely when the principle is in a matter similar to what would be the principle of the motion of making if the same thing were to come to be by art, so his intention is that some of the natural things come to be by nature and by chance, and some do not; and in the same place Averroes’ intention – and the text beings “Therefore just as in syllogisms” [*Metaphysics* 7 com.31] – is that those things can be generated without semen, and consequently, according to him, equivocally, in whose matter some virtue, similar to the virtue of semen in propagated things, can be introduced by the virtue of the heavens.

334. Therefore the opposite of the conclusion of Averroes is plain, if he be understood generally and universally.

335. His arguments too are not conclusive. – To the first [n.213] I reply: matter according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013a24-25 is that “from which, when present within, a thing comes to be;” “when present within” is added to differentiate the

opposite case, when a thing comes to be from something that is transmuted and corrupted but that is not present within the thing made. – But if he take the phrase ‘a form of the same nature belongs to matter of the same nature’, speaking properly of matter as it is a part of a thing which exists within that thing, I concede the point; but if he take matter for the opposite, for that from which, when corrupted, the composite is generated, I deny it; for fire of the same species is generated either from corrupted wood or from corrupted air. In propagated things, however, and things putrefied, the matter is of the same nature in the first way but not in the second way.

336. To the second [n.214] I say that something is not said to happen rarely or for the most part because it is in itself a frequent or rare contingency; for a falling stone breaks someone’s head more frequently than the moon is eclipsed. But the difference should be understood by comparison of a thing to its cause; and that effect is said to come about for the most part which has, ordered to the effect, a cause which produces the effect for the most part; that is said to come about rarely which does not have a cause ordered to its coming about but arises only from some cause that is ordered to another effect but that has been prevented from the effect it is ordered to, and from this preventing the thing comes about rarely. – The rare or for the most part are also taken as they distinguish between contradictory opposites, not as they distinguish between disparate things.^a

a. [Interpolation] Between contradictories, because for the most part and more often than not a mouse will be generated if the sun approaches such and such matter.

337. So when he [Averroes, *Physics* 8 com.46] argues that if this generable thing is generated equivocally, or not from semen, ‘then either it is from necessity’, and this I concede it is not, ‘or it is for the most part or rare’, and this I concede it is for the most part, by comparison to determinate cause and also as distinction between contradictories,^a although it happen more rarely that this generable thing is generated not from semen than that it is generated from semen, namely as two things disparate among themselves are compared.

a. [Interpolation] namely by comparing an equivocal effect with an equivocal cause under disjunction to contradictories.

338. Now, the proof that in the first way a thing happens for the most part is: for thus is the sun *per se* a cause ordered to generating not from semen, just as a propagating cause is ordered to generating it from semen. If he infers that if in the second way something happens rarely then it happens ‘by chance’, the consequence does not follow, – and he argues further in this way about causality insofar as those things are said to be by chance that happen only from an impeded cause of another thing; and therefore, as he says, chance things are monstrous and not perfect in any species [n.214].¹⁰⁶

339. When the argument is made, third, about motion and its term [n.215], I reply that this proposition ‘of motions different in species the terms are different in species’ is not an immediate one, but it depends on these two: the first is ‘in motions differing in species, the transient forms, or forms according to which there is transience, are different

¹⁰⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: “which chance things – in the proper sense of chance – do not come about from a cause ordered to producing them, but what produces chance things is an impeded cause ordered to producing something else.”

in species'; the second is, 'a transient form, or a form according to which there is transience, is of the same nature as the terminating form'. When one of these two is false, the assumed proposition is false. So it is in the proposed case, because the form introduced by the production is not of the same nature as the form which is quasi-transient or according to which there is quasi-transience.¹⁰⁷

340. But the difficulty of Averroes' arguments still seems to remain. For although the same nature might be communicated equivocally and univocally, yet not by something of the same species, but it is only univocally caused by an individual of one species and equivocally by a superior cause; but divine nature is not communicated by any superior cause, but only by something in the same nature; therefore it seems that the nature would not have a communication save in one idea.

341. I reply that created nature cannot be communicated save by a communication in one idea from a supposit of that nature; the reason is that the effect does not exceed the cause. But the communicated effect from such a supposit is nature; therefore the principle of communicating should be nature, because nothing more perfect than nature, nor anything equally perfect with nature, exists in such a communicating supposit. But nature is a communicative principle in one idea; therefore to a supposit acting by virtue of nature there belongs a communication only in one idea.

342. The opposite exists in the proposed case [sc. of the divine nature], because a supposit of that nature can have principles of a different idea in producing, each of which is equally perfect with nature, and therefore each can be a principle for communicating nature; and so here there can be a twofold communication by supposits which are of this nature.¹⁰⁸

343. If an instance be made that the twofold principle of operating in us, namely intellect and will, is equally perfect with the nature, because it is equally perfect with the form, according to one opinion about the powers of the soul, – I reply¹⁰⁹ that although in us there is a twofold operative principle, will and intellect, and both are perfect principles of operating and can have perfect operations adequate to themselves in idea of perfection

¹⁰⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: "But that the assumed proposition is false when one of those two propositions is false is plain, because the same 'where' can be acquired by circular and by direct motion, which are also motions of a different species and incomparable, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.248a10-b6; but this is because the form which is the term of the transience does not have a specific distinction, just like the form which is transient or according to which there is transience.

However it may be with the example, one must perhaps expound the Philosopher there and hold that the 'where', which is transient in a circular or straight line, is of the same species insofar as the 'transient wheres', whether straight or circular, which are accidents of the line or magnitude over which the motion is, are not of the same nature; and therefore in this respect they are incomparable, but not in respect of the 'where' or the 'transient where' *per se*; and therefore not in respect of the motion *per se*. At least this is true as to the example here adduced, because when the transient form is of a different nature from the terminating form, one should not conclude from a distinction of motions to a distinction of terms.

But in the proposed case production is of a different nature from the terminating essence, as from the terminating form taken from it, because production is relation but essence is for itself; therefore a plurality of productions does not prove a formal distinction of their terms."

¹⁰⁸ Note by Scotus: "This response [nn.241-242] is valid in responding to the first instance brought against the solution of this question [n.304]."

¹⁰⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: "A further reason for what is here [nn.241-242] supposed, namely about the twofold principle of communicating nature in divine reality, but not in creatures, can be set down as follows:..."

of operation, yet they do not have operations adequate to themselves in being, that is, although by our intellect we can have an intellection as perfect as any that can belong to our nature, yet this intellection will not be as perfect a being as nature, because an intellection adequate to the intellect, as to a power or object, in idea of operation, is not adequate to the object or intellect in being. The intellect therefore and will, namely in the creature, although they are principles of producing adequate to themselves in idea of operation, are yet not so in being, and consequently much more are they not really adequate to the nature of which they are the intellect and will.

Thus can one argue about any productive principles in creatures, the distinction between which principles stands in the same supposit of some nature.

344. But in divine reality the operative principle is not only equal with the nature in idea of operative principle but also in being; the operation is also equal with the operative principle, and that in being, and consequently it is equal with nature. Likewise the productive principle is equal with nature in being.¹¹⁰

345. To the arguments which prove that there are not just two productive principles in God [nn.216-218]. – First, when it is argued about nature and intellect that they are two distinct productive principles, from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22, I reply that the Philosopher spoke little about the will as it is distinguished from the intellect, but he commonly conjoined intellect with will in idea of active principle; and therefore in the *Physics* passage, where he distinguished these active principles, namely nature and intellect, the intellect should not be understood there as it is distinguished from the will but as it goes along with the will, by constituting one and the same principle in respect of artifacts.

346. This will be plain from the response to the instance of the Philosopher [n.217], to which instance I say that the intellect is contrasted with its own nature and with its own proper operation, of which it is in some sense the elicitive and productive principle; and it is contrasted also with the operations of the other powers, with respect to which it is the directive and regulative power. If it is taken in the first way, I say that it is merely nature, both in eliciting and in producing; for whatever act of understanding it produces when the object is present in memory, it produces merely naturally, and whatever operation it operates, it operates merely naturally.

347. Now the will as productive with respect to its proper operation has an opposite mode of producing, and this is sufficiently clear from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a8-11, where he treats of how a rational or irrational power is reduced to act; and he argues that a rational power, which of itself is related to opposites, cannot of itself proceed to act; for then it would proceed to opposites at the same time, because it is of opposites at the same time; and from this he concludes that one must posit, in addition to that rational power, another rational power, a determinative one, by which it is determined, and, when determined, it can proceed to act.

348. And from this it follows that the intellect, if it is of opposites, is of opposites in this way, namely by way of nature, because, as far as concerns itself, it is necessarily of opposites; nor can it determine itself to one or other of them, but requires something else as determinant which can freely proceed to act on one or other of the opposites; but this is appetite, according to him, or choice.

¹¹⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “and so by it can be communicated a formal term of production adequate in being to itself and to nature.”

349. An example. The sun has the virtue of producing opposites, namely liquefaction and constriction. If there were two things nearby, one of which was liquefiable and the other constrainable, the sun would, by necessity of nature, have to elicit those two acts on them, and if some one and the same thing were nearby that was of a nature to receive opposites at the same time, the sun would, by the necessity of nature, at the same time produce the opposites, or neither of them.

350. The power of the sun, therefore, is merely natural, although it is of opposites, because merely by itself it is of them in such a way that it cannot determine itself to one or other of them. Such a power is intellect, as it is precisely intellect, with respect to understood opposites; and there is no determination there to one of them and not to the other save to the extent the will concurs.

351. But the Philosopher commonly speaks of intellect according to how it constitutes along with the will one principle with respect to artifacts, and not as it is naturally elicitive of its own operation; and therefore as to the fact he sometimes distinguishes intellect against nature, and sometimes art against it, and sometimes the thing intended, it is the same intellect in the case of all of them.

352. When, finally, the statement is made about the will, that it is the principle in respect of creatures [n.218], I say that the will of God is naturally the productive principle of some product adequate to itself before it is the productive principle of something non-adequate; what is adequate to the infinite is infinite, and so the creature is willed secondarily, and produced by the will of God secondarily.

IV. To the Second Question

353. To the second question, when the question is asked about the trinity of persons in divine reality [n.197], I reply that there are only three persons in the divine essence.

The proof is as follows: there are only two produced persons and only one un-produced person; therefore there are only three.

A. About the Produced Persons in Divine Reality

354. About the first proposition I first prove that there are two produced persons [nn.355-357], second that there are not more [358].

355. To prove that there are two produced persons I prove first that there is one produced person, and this as follows: the intellect as it is perfect memory, that is 'having an object actually intelligible present to itself' [n.221], is through some act of itself productive of an adequate term, namely an infinite one, from the preceding question [nn.302, 222]; but nothing produces itself, *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore what is produced by the act of the intellect is in some way distinguished from the producer. It is not distinguished in essence, because the divine essence, and any essential perfection intrinsic to it, is not distinguishable, from the question about the unity of God [nn.89-104], therefore the thing produced is distinguished in person from the thing producing; therefore there is some person produced by the act of intellect.

356. There is a similar argument about the act of will [footnote to n.302, nn.222, 226].^a

a. [Interpolation] But you will say that one and the same person can be produced by either production. On the contrary.

357. Now that the person produced by this act and by that are different the one from the other is proved because the same person cannot be produced by two sufficient and total productions; but this production is different from that one, from the preceding question [n.303]; therefore by this and that production not the same person but two are produced. Proof of the major: if the same thing were produced by two total productions, it would receive being sufficiently from each; but if it receives being sufficiently from the producer by this production, it would perfectly have its being by no other posited production;^a therefore it cannot receive being through another production, because then it would not exist without it.

a. [Interpolation] nay, when everything else is removed.

358. Further, that there cannot be more produced persons than these two I thus prove: there can only be two productions inwardly. This was in some way proved in the preceding question [n.303], but the final declaration of it was deferred to distinction 7 [n.309], so let this now be certain, that there are only two productions inwardly. But neither of these can be terminated save in one person, because the produced person is the term adequate to the production; therefore etc.

B. About the Sole Non-produced Person in Divine Reality

359. It now remains to prove that one person is non-produced.^a

a. [Interpolation] the non-produced person is one only.

Here one doctor says [Henry of Ghent] that this is shown the way the unity of God is shown. The thing is also clear from Hilary *On Synods* n.26, where his meaning is that someone who says there are two unborn is confessing two gods.^a

a. [Interpolation] See the authority in the text [*Reportatio* IA d.2 n.205].

360. Again Henry [of Ghent] *Summa* a.54 q.2, where he argues in the opposite way: “two cases of being unborn would be of the same idea, and thus there would be several properties of the same idea in the same singular nature, namely deity, which is impossible, whether these properties be absolute or relative; the thing is clear in the case of creatures.”

361. Again he there argues: “the un-produced person is the first principle; therefore there would be several first principles.”

362. Again, in the solution: “Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* V ch.4: ‘the person not from another has power through the essence; wherefore he has in himself all power’.”

363. To the first [n.360]: there are in this as many negations of the same idea as there are other possibilities of the same idea; being unborn is a negation. – In another way: several relations exist in the same thing, III d.8 q. un.

364. To the second [n.361]: as things are now, the three persons are one principle of everything else.

365. To the third [n.362]: all power is in respect of any possible whatever. Nor can the reason be colored as the reason is colored about omnipotence in the question of the unity of God [n.180]; it is plain why not.

363. Further he argues in this way: several absolute supposits cannot exist in this nature, because nature does not exist in several absolute supposits without division of nature; there will then be several relative supposits. Either therefore by mutual relation among themselves, or in relation to some other things. But if there were several unproduced supposits, they would not be distinguished by relation to other supposits, because not by relation to producing supposits, because *ex hypothesi* there are none; nor by relation to produced supposits, because they would have to them the same relation, as now the Father and the Son have the same relation of active inspiring to the Holy Spirit. Therefore they would be distinguished by relations among themselves, and this by relations of origin, which is the intended proposition.

367. These proofs do not seem sufficient. The first [n.359] is not, because the unity of God is proved from the fact that divine infinity is not divided into several essences; but it is not thus manifest that the idea of ‘ungenerated’, or of ‘unborn’, is not in several supposits, – both because the idea of ‘unborn’ does not indicate simply a perfection from which the unity of being unborn could be simply concluded in the way that from infinite perfection the unity of the divine essence is concluded; and also because indivisibility does not prove incommunicability. – Likewise, the authority of Hilary which he adduces [n.359] asserts that it is so but does not prove that it is so.

368. And when he assumes in his argument that several absolute persons cannot exist in the same nature [n.366], how is this more known than the conclusion? For he who would posit several ungenerated persons would not say that they are formally constituted by any relations; therefore, contrary to him, to assume that there cannot be several absolute persons seems to be to assume what is more immanifest than concluding to it.

369. When he says further that they are not distinguished by relations among themselves, because this would only be by relations of origin [nn.366, 253, 248], he should prove this consequence.¹¹¹

370. So I prove the intended conclusion in another way thus: whatever can be in several supposits and is not determined to a definite number by something other than itself, can, as far as concerns itself, exist in infinite supposits; and if it is a necessary being, it does exist in infinite supposits, because whatever can exist there does exist there. But if what is ungenerated can exist in several supposits, it is not determined by another as to how many supposits it is in, because to be determined by another to existence in a supposit or in several supposits is contrary to the idea of the ungenerated; therefore of its own idea it can exist in infinite supposits; and if it can exist, it does exist, because

¹¹¹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “For when it has been conceded that the distinction is only by relations of origin, the intended proposition would be quickly obtained.”

everything ungenerated is of itself a necessary being. The consequent is impossible, therefor also that from which it follows.¹¹²

VI. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

371. To the arguments. – When it is argued ‘they are equally noble, therefore they are equally many [n.197]’, there is figure of speech, by change of ‘what’ or ‘what sort’ to ‘how many’. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is: for it is not because of nobility or ignobility of the relation of principle or of what is from a principle that it is multiplied or not multiplied, but unity is of the idea of principle, although in things from a principle there can be plurality, because there is always reduction of plurality to unity. And so, with equal nobility standing, there can be multiplication in the relations of the produced though not in the relations of the producers.

372. Another response is that any relation there of one idea is of itself a this, although from the several relations of the producers there can perhaps be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘productive’, and so from the several relations of the produced there can be abstracted one common thing, to wit ‘produced’. Although therefore there is one relation in common – if there is a common abstractable – which is called in common ‘relation of producer’, yet there are two relations of the producer, in this way and in that, just as there are two relations corresponding to them.

373. To the second reason [n.198] I concede that to relations on the part of the produced there correspond relations on the part of the productive, and as many relations, but it does not follow ‘if the relations of the produced are distinguished personally, therefore so are the relations of the producer’; the reason for which is assigned as that on the part of the producer another idea of producing is sufficient,¹¹³ just as artificial and natural production are thus distinguished through productive principles, namely art and nature, although they come together in the same supposit. But the relations of the produced cannot so come together in the same supposit and in one person, but they are personally distinct, because the produced is *per se* subsistent and supposit.

374. Another response is plain from the solution of the question [nn.357, 172-173], because the same thing cannot be produced by two total productions, although the same thing can produce by two total productions; and so the relations of the produced are not multiplied in the same thing, although the relations of the producer can be multiplied.

375. To the third [n.199]: a finite power cannot have at the same time two adequate terms in being produced, although it can have one in being produced and another in having been produced; but an infinite power has its term always within in being produced, and this term is adequate, and therefore it cannot have several terms.

¹¹² Text cancelled by Scotus: “Second thus: plurality should never be posited without necessity; there is no necessity, whether in relation to itself or outwardly, for the contingency that there are several unborns; therefore there is only one. – Third, because one essence actually existing does not seem of itself to have very immediately several modes of existing. The opposite would follow if there were several ungenerated supposits. But it does not follow now, because the divine essence does not have very immediately several modes of existing without production, but only one of existing without production and another two by intermediates that are also productions.”

¹¹³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “because the relations of the produced can be distinguished by the distinct ideas of producing in the producer, although there is the same supposit producing.”

VII. To the First Question

376. To the first question [n.191] I say that the unity of essence and plurality of persons do stand together, as appears from the solution of the preceding question [nn.353-370], because this plurality exists there at the same time along with this unity.

A. Declaration of Scotus' Own Solution

377. Now to make this in some way clear one must note that, just as repugnant things are repugnant by their own proper reasons, so non-repugnant things, or compossibility, are so by the proper reasons of the compossible things.

378. But to see this compossibility one must look at the reasons of the extremes, namely of nature and of the supposit.

Here one should note that nature is not related to the supposit as a universal to a singular, because in accidents too singularity is found without the idea of supposit, and an individual nature was assumed in our substance by the Word, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* III ch.3, but not a supposit of our nature. Nor is the nature related to the supposit as the 'in which' to the 'what', for to the 'in which' of anything there corresponds a proper 'what' or 'who', and so, as nature is the 'in what', so it has a proper 'what' or 'who' which it does not contract to the supposit, and as the supposit is the 'what' or the 'who', so it has a proper 'in what' in which it subsists, and yet the supposit concomitantly is of necessity a singular, – and also, the nature cannot be an 'in what' with respect to something else, because it is subsistent, incapable of being the act of another subsistent thing; these two indicate a twofold incommunicability.¹¹⁴

379. Here one needs to know that something is said to be communicable either by identity, such that what it is communicated to is 'it', or by informing, such that what it is communicated to is 'in it', not 'it'.

380. In the first way a universal is communicated to a singular, and in the second way a form to matter.^a Any nature, therefore, insofar as concerns itself and the idea of nature, is communicable in both ways, namely to several supposits, each of which is 'it', – and also as 'in which', by way of form, in which the singular or the supposit is a quidditative being, or in possession of a nature; but the supposit is incommunicable by the opposed twofold incommunicability.

a. [Interpolation] such that matter is actually a being through form.

381. On this basis the intended proposition is made clear.

And first in this way: any nature is communicable to several things by identity, therefore the divine nature too is communicable (for this is plain from the question set down before [nn.353-370]); but the nature is not divisible, from the question about the unity of God [nn.157-190]; therefore it is communicable without division.

382. Again I argue thus: 'perfection simply' as far as concerns itself, whatever may be impossible with it, is better than any supposit absolutely taken according to idea of supposit; the divine nature is not thus better, *ex hypothesi*; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: divine nature determines for itself a single subsistence, therefore it is of itself

¹¹⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: "The idea of the supposit then exists in a double incommunicability."

impossible with any other subsistence, even precisely taken as it is another subsistence, namely without considering that it may be in another nature; and so, further, it is of itself not better than any other thing as this other thing is another subsistence.

383. The proof of the first consequence is that, just as anything of itself determines for itself a single supposit, so anything else impossible with that is repugnant to it; *ex hypothesi* divine nature of itself determines for itself not only a subsistence which is in one nature (a trinity would stand along with this), but a single subsistence – this subsistence as it is a this – in idea of subsistence, without considering only the fact that it is in this nature.

384. The proof of the second consequence is that, just as divine nature is impossible with this other thing, so it is no better than this other thing than is anything else impossible with itself.¹¹⁵

385. There is a clarification from the infinity which is a condition of nature, and that as follows: form, which is in some way unlimited in perfecting matter, can, without distinction in itself, perfect several parts of matter.

386. An example. The intellective soul, which is not limited to perfecting this part of an organic body, can, without any distinction or extension of itself, whether *per se* or *per accidens*, perfect another part of an organic body. But this property, namely that the form is not distinguished and yet it perfects several parts of body or matter, does not belong to the soul by reason of imperfection, because the soul is posited as the most perfect form among all natural forms, and all other more imperfect forms lack this grade in perfecting; for all are limited to perfecting one thing, nor do they perfect several parts of matter without *per accidens* extension.

387. From this I argue as follows: if such a oneness may stand with plurality, and not from the imperfection of that which is ‘one’, then, when everything of imperfection is removed from each part, perfect oneness can stand with plurality. But the fact that the soul perfects matter belongs to imperfection in it; the fact too that the several perfected things are parts of the same whole belongs to imperfection. If, therefore, the ‘perfecting matter’ is taken from the soul, and from the many distinct things the ‘being parts of one whole’, there will remain a form that has perfect unity, but does not perfect matter, but does give total being, and that to several distinct things, which distinct things will not be parts of one whole but *per se* subsistent; and then there will be one nature giving total

¹¹⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued as follows: divine nature, and whatever belongs to this nature as it is nature, is ‘perfection simply’; every ‘perfection simply’ is communicable to several things; therefore etc. Proof of the minor: ‘perfection simply’ is that which in anything whatever “is better existing than not existing,” *Monologion* ch.15; which fact is understood in this way, that ‘perfection simply’ is better than whatever may be impossible with it, whatever supposit absolutely considered it may be in, that is, not determining what nature it is subsistent in. But if the divine nature determined itself to incommunicable subsistence, it would in no other subsistence be better than anything impossible with it save in that subsistence to which it determined itself, because it would be impossible with any other subsistence; therefore it would not be ‘perfection simply’.”

Text following on from this also cancelled by Scotus: “This is also argued on the part of the idea of supposit; for because a supposit is of its idea incommunicable simply, that idea should not include any idea of existing through identity, and thus another distinct idea of supposit can stand, and therefore the idea of supposit is not ‘perfection simply’ in the aforesaid way [in the previous paragraph of this footnote]; but if two distinct ideas of supposit can stand, then so can two distinct supposits, and without division of nature; therefore etc. – This fourth...”

being to several distinct supposits. Therefore the divine essence, which is wholly unlimited, which has everything of imperfection taken away from it, can give total being to several distinct supposits.

B. On the Formal Distinction or Non-Identity

388. But there still remains a further difficulty. For it does not seem intelligible that the essence is not multiplied and that the supposits are several unless a distinction is posited between the idea of essence and the idea of supposit. And therefore, to preserve the aforesaid compossibility [nn.376-387], one must look into this distinction.

389. And I say, without assertion and without prejudice of a better opinion, that the idea by which the supposit is formally incommunicable (let it be *a*) and the idea of essence as essence (let it be *b*) have a distinction that precedes every act of created and uncreated intellect.

390. I prove this as follows: the first supposit formally or really has a communicable being, otherwise it could not communicate it; also it really has an incommunicable being, otherwise it could not be a positive supposit in real being. And I understand 'really' thus, that which is in no way by an act of an intellect considering it, nay that which would be a being of this sort there if no intellect were considering it; and to be in this way there if no intellect were considering it I call 'existing before every act of intellect'. – But it is not the case that some entity before every act of intellect, such that it is not by an act of intellect, is communicable and that another entity is of itself incommunicable, unless there is before every act of intellect, that is, not precisely through an act of understanding, some distinction between this entity and that; therefore etc.

391. If you say that before every act of intellect of the Father there is not there any distinction but an entity of altogether one idea,¹¹⁶ and thus the Father has no positive entity in himself which he does not communicate to the Son; therefore he communicates to him paternity just as he does essence!

392. There is an argument, second, as follows: one distinction exists in the intellect in virtue of a diverse mode of taking the same formal object, and this either by taking it grammatically, as 'man', 'of man', or logically, as 'man' and 'this man'; another distinction, a greater one, exists in the intellect by conceiving two formal objects in two acts, and this whether diverse things correspond to them, as when understanding man and ass, or whether one thing corresponds, as when understanding color and that which diffuses [sc. sight].

393. From this I argue: the Father, when understanding himself in the first moment of origin, either understands the essence and property *a* [n.389] as diverse formal objects, or he understands them as precisely the same object under this and that mode of conceiving. But not in the second way, because then there would be no greater difference than when conceiving God and deity, and so one would not conceive the property *a* as more incommunicable than deity is, for man is not incommunicable if humanity is communicable, nor conversely; so it is in the intended proposition. And then too the intellect of the Father would not be more blessed in the divine essence than in *a*, which is

¹¹⁶ Text cancelled by Scotus: "on the contrary: therefore the Father communicates that whole entity of one idea."

said to be a property of the Father, nor more in *a* than in a property of the Son, and thus in two objects, as in the property of the Father and of the Son, he would first be blessed.

394. And if the first mode be given, that the paternal intellect has the essence and *a* as two formal objects [n.393], then I argue: that intellect understands nothing save intuitively, because – as will be plain from I d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24, 28 [above n.139] – every abstractive and non-intuitive intellect is in some way imperfect. But intuitive knowledge is of an object as the object is present in actual existence, and this either in itself or in another containing eminently its whole being; therefore, as to the things that are known intuitively as formal distinct objects, either one is contained eminently in another, or each according to its own existence terminates the act as the act is of it. But nothing intrinsic to a divine person is properly contained in something eminently, because then it would not be a being save by participation in the thing containing it; therefore all intrinsic things that are diverse formal objects, according to their proper actual existence, terminate intuition as objects, and so they have some distinction before the act of understanding.

395. If you say that the essence makes of itself one concept in the intellect of the Father but that concerning it the paternal intellect can make diverse ideas, and that it is precisely in the second mode that essence and *a* in the paternal intellect are distinguished, but not in the first mode [n.393], – on the contrary: whatever the intellect, without the action of the object, causes concerning the object precisely by the proper virtue of the intellect, and this when speaking of the object as it has known being in the intellect precisely and from the intellect as considering it, that thing is precisely a relation of reason. But now the idea which the essence makes of itself is plainly absolute, otherwise it would not beatify the intellect of the Father; beyond this absolute idea there is no other in reality before the act of the intellect, or the intended proposition is attained [n.389]; also there is for you no other idea in the intellect of the Father save by an act of intellect being busy about it and not through an impression made by the object, which, for you, only imprints one concept; therefore any idea other than the absolute idea of the essence would be precisely a relation of reason, and thus the property of the Father by which he is incommunicable will be a relation of reason, which seems discordant.

396. Second, it is necessary to see [n.388] of what sort the difference is that is posited to precede every act of intellect.

I say that both in things and in the intellect a major difference is manifest, and that from it a minor difference is frequently inferred that is not manifest, just as from the difference of creatures a difference of ideas is inferred in the divine intellect, as is plain from Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.46 n.2. In reality, however, a distinction of things is manifest, and this a twofold one, namely of supposits and of natures; in the intellect there is manifest a twofold difference, namely of modes of conceiving and of formal objects [n.392].

397. From what has been said is inferred the difference here intended, which is not manifest, namely because it is least in its order, that is, among all those that precede the intellect.

398. Now the inference is made from the difference in reality in this way: the distinction of divine supposits is real; therefore since with the same one formally, which is something of itself, the same one cannot agree in reality to such an extent that it cannot be distinguished from it, and since it cannot differ from it in reality to such an extent that it cannot agree with it (because if it is altogether the same in reality, why is this one so

great a principle of identity and non-distinction and the same one so great a principle of distinction and non-identity?), there is inferred some difference or distinction of the essence in which the supposits agree from the ideas in which the supposits are distinguished.

399. Likewise in the second way [n.396]: from the difference of formal objects, neither of which is contained eminently in something, and this in an intellect considering intuitively, there is inferred in the things known intuitively some difference prior to an act of intellect [n.394].

400. But is this distinction to be called real?

I reply that it is not an actual real, understanding this in the way ‘actual real difference’ is commonly said to be that which is a difference of things and actually so, because there is not in one person any difference of things, on account of the divine simplicity; and just as the distinction is not an actual real so it is not a potential real, because nothing is in potency there that is not actual.

401. But it can be called ‘a difference of reason’, as a certain doctor said [Bonaventure]; – not as ‘reason’ is taken for a difference formed by the intellect, but as ‘reason’ is taken for the quiddity of a thing as quiddity is an object of the intellect.

402. Or, in another way, it can be called ‘virtual difference’, because what has such a distinction in itself does not have thing and thing, but it is one thing having virtually and pre-eminently two realities as it were, because to each reality, as it is in one thing, there belongs, as if it were a distinct thing, that which is a proper principle for such reality; for in this way this reality distinguishes and that one does not distinguish, as if the former were one thing and the latter another.

403. Or, most properly in a way, let it be said: just as we can find in unity many grades – first, there is the least degree of aggregation; in the second grade there is unity of order, which adds something more to aggregation; in the third there is unity *per accidens*, where beyond order there is an informing, although an accidental informing, of one thing by another of those that are in this way one; in the fourth there is a *per se* unity of a thing composed of essential principles that are *per se* in act and *per se* in potency; in the fifth there is the unity of simplicity, which is truly identity (for each of what exists there is really the same as any other, and is not just one with the unity of union, as in other modes) – thus, further still, not every identity is formal. But I call it formal identity when that which is called thus the same includes that with which it is thus the same in its own formal quidditative reason and *per se* in the first mode of *per se*. Now in the proposed case essence does not include in its formal quidditative reason the property of supposit, nor conversely. And therefore it can be conceded that before every act of intellect there is a reality of essence by which the essence is communicable and a reality of supposit by which the supposit is incommunicable; and before every act of intellect this reality is formally not that one, or it is not formally the same as that one in the way that what ‘formally’ is was previously expounded [n.390].

404. But should some ‘distinction’ then be conceded?

It is better to use the negative ‘this is not formally the same’ than to say this is ‘distinct’ thus and so.

405. But surely this follows, *a* and *b* are not the same formally, therefore they are formally distinct?

I reply that it need not follow, because formality is denied in the antecedent and affirmed in the consequent.

406. Briefly then I say¹¹⁷ that there is in the divine essence before an act of intellect entity *a* and entity *b*, and this one is not formally that one, such that the paternal intellect when considering *a* and considering *b* has, from the nature of the thing, that which makes this composite true '*a* is not formally *b*', but not precisely from any act of intellect about *a* and *b* [n.389].

407. This difference is made clear by an example: if whiteness be set down as a simple species not having in itself two natures, yet there is something really in whiteness whereby it has the idea of color, and something whereby it has the idea of difference; and this reality is not formally that reality, nor formally the reverse, nay one is outside the reality of the other – speaking formally – just as if they were two things, although now by identity those two realities are one thing.

408. But this example, although it is in a way similar to the proposed case (namely as to the fact that real identity does not necessarily entail the formal identity of anything in something that is thus the same with whatever is in it), is yet not altogether alike, because there is some composition in whiteness, although not of thing and thing, yet such is not conceded in God, because of formal non-identity. But where formal non-identity of certain things in the same thing requires some composition, and where it does not, will be stated in distinction 8 in the question about attributes and in the question 'Whether God is in a genus' [I d.8 p.1 q.4.3].¹¹⁸

409. This formal distinction or non-identity, which was proved before by three reasons [nn.390, 394, 398], can also be proved by two or three authorities of Augustine:

On the Trinity VII ch.1 n.2 'about big things' or 'about little things': "Every essence which is said relatively is something when the relative is removed;" and: "If the Father is not something in himself he is altogether not someone who may be spoken of relatively." In reality therefore he is essence in itself and not in relation to another, and in reality the Father, insofar as he is Father, is said relatively, or he is in relation to another thing or another person; but he is not formally the same entity in himself and not in himself; therefore etc.

410. Again in the same place ch.2 n.3: "He is not Word by the fact he is wisdom, because Word is not said by itself but only relatively, in relation to him of whom he is the Word, as Son is in relation to Father; but he is wisdom by the fact he is essence."¹¹⁹ And from this he concludes: "Wherefore not because the Father is not the Son...is there for that reason not one essence, because by these names of theirs relatives are indicated; but both are together one wisdom, one essence." There is, therefore, according to him such a

¹¹⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: "omitting the words about distinction of reason and virtual distinction [nn.401-402]; not because they are badly said but because it is not necessary to use them; I say..."

¹¹⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: "An example could be posited about a quantitative whole, by subtracting what belongs to imperfection and positing what belongs to perfection [nn.386-387]; but it would be unlike in more things than like [n.408], so let it be omitted." [It is stated in *Lectura* I d.2 n.273: "a quantitative whole is taken possessing parts, and we imagine that the extension of the parts is taken away and that the parts remain and that one part is another by identity, the formal idea of the one part will still exist outside the formal idea of the other part."]

¹¹⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: "Augustine therefore understands that in the mode that the Father is in the same way wisdom and essence, in that same mode the Father is not in the same way Father and God" [cf. *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9]

non-identity of relation with absolute in divine reality, because if one is the ‘by which’ with respect to another, the other will not be the ‘by which’ with respect to the same; but to be the ‘by which’ belongs to one according to its formal idea; therefore one of them is not of the formal idea of the other but is outside it, and consequently it is not formally the same as the other, just as the idea of that which is ‘not to be the same’ was expounded above [n.403].¹²⁰ And yet from this does not simply follow a real diversity or non-identity of substance and relation. For that by which the Father is Father is not other than the essence but the same, according to Augustine himself¹²¹ *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is called simple because he is what he has, except that each person is said relatively to the other;” nor is essence “as the Father has a Son but is not the Son,” but “whatever the Father has in himself, to which he is” as a consequence “not said relatively, that he himself is” by true identity, although not by formal identity.

VII. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

411. [To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.191] I say that the major is to be understood in this way: ‘all things that are by some identity the same as another, they are by such identity the same thus among themselves’, because an identity of extremes with each other cannot be concluded unless they are according to that identity the same as the middle and the middle is in itself the same in this way; and by this proposition so understood ‘every syllogistic form holds’. For when one or other condition is omitted, whether of the unity of the middle in itself or of the extremes to the middle, there is no syllogism, but the parallogism of the accident.

412. Another response is where the unity of the middle is unlimited with respect to the unity of the extremes. An example of limited where-ness and limited when-ness: things that are together according to ‘where’ or ‘when’ without limitation, either in this way or in that, are nevertheless not the same thus among themselves. Another example, more familiar, is about the intellective soul and about this and that part of flesh [nn.386-387]. – This response succeeds when the same unlimited thing is the ‘with which’ or the ‘in which’, not when it is the ‘this’, unless the requisite unity is lacking to the middle in itself, as the logical response contained here just above says.

413. When it is taken in the minor that ‘whatever is in the divine essence is the same as it’ [n.191], this is not true of formal identity, and therefore the formal identity of the extremes among themselves cannot be inferred; but as long as the formal distinction of the relations of the supposit stands, the distinction of the supposits stands.

414. And if you say that at least from the real identity of them with the essence the identity of them among themselves is inferred, I say that the essence does not have such unique identity of subsistence to the extent the persons or the personal features as extremes are united in the essence, and therefore one cannot infer identity of subsistences or of subsistence by reason of their identity in the essence as in a middle term.

¹²⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Augustine in the same place: ‘Now substance will not be substance, because it will be relative’; and there follows: ‘It is absurd for substance to be said relatively’ (deduce: ‘therefore the converse is absurd’).”

¹²¹ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Let here be introduced the saying of the doctor [Augustine] about double predication in divine reality, namely by identity and formally, which he well explains in this one way...”

415. From this the response is plain to such sophisms as ‘this God is the Father, the Son is this God, therefore the Son is the Father’, which sophism has a confirmation in that, when ‘this something’ exists as middle term, the extremes must necessarily be conjoined.

My reply. Just as in creatures the common is related as ‘qualified what’, the singular as ‘this something’, so here the essence common to the persons has the idea of ‘qualified what’, and the person has the idea of ‘this something’. The middle term here, then, is ‘qualified what’ and not ‘this someone’. But the identity of the extremes in the conclusion is inferred as if the middle term was ‘this something’; likewise there [in the above sophism] it seems there is a fallacy of the accident and of the consequent, because ‘this God’ is taken in the premises for different suppositis, and likewise a fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this something’.

416. But if you argue ‘the deity is the Father, the Son is deity, therefore etc.’, although deity does not stand for any supposit in the major or in the minor, yet there is a figure of speech there, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this someone’. For to make a change like this is nothing other than from the force of the inference to interpret that which has the idea of ‘qualified what’ to have the idea of ‘this someone’; so to infer the supposition about the supposit in this way is to interpret the middle as being the same according to idea of existence or of subsistence, which is false.

417. But if at any rate you argue that ‘the extremes are really the same among themselves because they are the same also in the middle term’, I concede that essential identity can be inferred but not formal identity or identity of supposit. And therefore one should not infer ‘the Son is the Father’, because in this case formal or hypostatic identity is denoted by the form of the words, but one should infer ‘the Son is the same with that which the Father is’ or ‘the Son is that which the Father is’.

418. But if there is still a confirmation of the major of the principal argument [n.191] through the fact that, by denying it, one seems to destroy a first principle, namely by positing affirmation and negation to be true of the same thing, I reply: about something that has true identity, but not so much unique or formal identity, the same thing must, by reason of one ‘reality’, be formally predicated of it and not be formally predicated of the other ‘reality formally’. Just as whiteness by reason of some reality which it has in itself agrees with blackness, and by reason of another reality does not really agree with it but differs, and the affirmation and negation are not said of the same thing by reason of the same thing – namely ‘of reality formally’ –, so here, the Father by reason of essence is the same quidditatively, and by reason of property is not the same formally or hypostatically, and the affirmation and negation are not said of the same identity about the same thing nor by reason of the same thing; and although the affirmation and negation be said of the same identity about the same thing, not however by reason of the same thing, to wit if it were said that by reason of paternity the Father is not the same quidditatively with the Son but by reason of essence.

419. If on the contrary you say that affirmation differs from affirmation where the negation of one is said about something else or stands with something else, because the other is not true of the affirmation which contradicts the negation, therefore if deity stands with non-paternity (to wit in some other person), deity itself would differ from paternity, which never stands along with non-paternity in the same thing, I reply: the major may be conceded of formal, or not adequate, non-identity, because one of them is

not determined to the other, wherefore it stands with the opposite of the other, – or in other words the major may be conceded of convertible and precise non-identity. But if the major takes real distinction simply, it is to be denied; the thing is plain in whiteness; by taking the proper reality from which the genus is taken, with that reality the opposite of the difference of blackness is not of itself repugnant; yet with the reality from which is taken the specific difference of whiteness, the difference of blackness is repugnant.

420. And this response should be understood as to the second part of the major, which says that one or other affirmation ‘stands’ with the negation. But as to the first part of the major, which takes the negation ‘to be said’ of the affirmation, the major could, as to that part, be conceded if ‘to be said’ is understood ‘necessarily and universally and through the proper reason of that of which it is said’, and this when the contradiction which the words concern is real or is of thing to non-thing, but not of reason to non-reason, for then there only follows a distinction of reason of affirmation from affirmation.

421. By applying the first part of the major – in the way it is true – to the proposed case, it follows that the Son is really distinguished from the Father, but not that God or deity is, because not-Father is not said of God necessarily and universally, nor by reason of the subject, although according to some [Henry of Ghent] it be said particularly by reason of the supposit of the subject.

422. But if you argue, let that by which the Father is distinguished from the Son be *a*, then *a*, insofar as it is *a*, is either the same as the essence or different – if it is different, this is discordant; if insofar as *a* is the same, then, insofar as it distinguishes, it is the same as the essence, and consequently the essence distinguishes – I reply: I say that it is neither true that *a* insofar as it is *a* is the same as the essence nor that *a* insofar as it is *a* is different from the essence, and this by understanding that which follows the reduplication to be taken according to its formal reason, and that along with this it has to be the formal reason for the inherence of the predicate, just as I distinguished above in the case of unity of enjoyable object in response to the third argument [I d.1 n.58]. There is an example for this: for man and non-man are immediate opposites, and yet neither is said formally about anything along with reduplication; just as a white thing is not man insofar as it is white nor is it non-man insofar as it is white.

423. And if you say ‘the same’ and ‘other’ are immediate opposites in the case of being, I say that it does not follow “they are immediate opposites, therefore one or other is said of anything along with ‘insofar as’” such that the idea of the subject is the formal reason for the inherence of the other contradictory, but it suffices that one or other of the contradictories truly exists in any subject, although not *per se* by reason of the subject. But if the ‘insofar as’ is taken in the first way, so that it only indicates that the *a* is taken according to its formal reason [n.422], I say that *a*, when in any way formally taken, is the same as the essence, although it is not formally the same as the essence; but in that case this inference does not follow “‘*a* formally’ is the same as the essence, ‘*a* formally’ distinguishes, therefore the essence distinguishes,” but there is a figure of speech, by change of ‘this someone’ to ‘qualified what’.

424. If still you insist that *a* insofar as it is *a* is a being or a thing, so which thing or which being? – if the essence then the proposition [n.191] is obtained, if a thing and not the essence, then some other thing – I reply: I concede that it is a being and a thing, and this by taking ‘insofar as’ in both ways, because if some predicate *per se* in the first mode is present in something, then it will be present in the same mode *per se* whether the

subject is a thing distinct from whatever is outside the idea of it or is contained by identity in something which is outside the idea of it; for such containing does not take away the formal reason nor what is present *per se* in the first mode.

425. But when you ask, which being? [n.424], – I say the being which *a* is; just as if a substance is a *per se* being, that being, by descending under being, is *per se* substance, and not anything else. If you ask further whether it is *per se* essence, it has been said [n.423] that it is not. If you infer ‘therefore it is another *per se* thing’, it is the fallacy of the consequent to say ‘it is not *per se* this thing, and it is a thing, therefore it is another thing’ [n.424], because in the antecedent ‘*per se* identity’ is denied, in the consequent ‘identity’, and so the antecedent is destroyed.¹²²

426. Suppose you object: ‘it is *per se* a thing, and it is not *per se* essence’, ‘therefore it is *per se* another thing’, and further, ‘therefore it is another thing’.

427. The proof of the first consequence is that in the case of a being ‘same’ and ‘different’ are immediate opposites; therefore if it is *per se* a thing, it is *per se* the same thing as the essence (and so it is *per se* essence), or it is *per se* some other thing. The proof of the second consequence is that ‘*per se*’ is not a determination that divides, as is plain.

428. Further, the first consequence is proved, and it is to the principal point, because if it is *per se* a thing, it is either a thing which is the essence or a thing which is not the essence. If it is *per se* a thing which is the essence, therefore it is *per se* the essence; if it is *per se* a thing which is not the essence, then it is a thing other than the essence.

429. Further, third: essence is *per se* a thing, and a property is *per se* a thing, and they are not *per se* the same thing; therefore they are *per se* two things, and so each is *per se* a different thing from the other.

430. To the first [n.426]. Although the conclusion of the first argument could be distinguished, because there would be there a difference of *per se-ity* or a *per se-ity* of difference, and in the first way the ‘*per se*’ would be denied by the negation included in the difference, in the second way it would be affirmed, because it would precede the way of negation, and consequently in the first way the consequent of the first consequence would be conceded – but then the second consequence would offend according to the consequent by destroying the antecedent [n.425], in the second way the first consequence would offend according to the consequent – however, because it does not seem logically well said that negation, if it is in any way included in the difference, could attain something other than the term of the respect and than the form in which, or according to which, the difference is noted to exist, nor does it seem logically well said that the ‘*per se*’, which indicates the mode of inherence and consequently determines the composite, could be denied by some denial in the predicate, therefore one should say in another way that, in the consequent of the first consequence, there can be obtained, by force of the words, only one sense, namely that this predicate, to be a thing other than the essence, is ‘*per se*’ present in the property; and this sense is false, because thus the false thing that is inferred in the second consequence very well follows. Therefore I simply deny the first

¹²² Tr. The point seems to be that the argument is of this form: ‘if it is not *per se* this thing, then it is some other thing; but it is a thing; therefore it is some other thing’, which amounts to denying (‘destroying’) the antecedent, and asserting the consequent, which move is fallacious.

consequence, since the two propositions in the antecedent are true and the consequent false.

431. To the proof of the consequence [n.427] I say that ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are not immediate about any predicate as said *per se* of a subject, nay rather contradictories are not thus immediate; for man is not *per se* white nor *per se* not-white. Yet between contradictories absolutely taken or absolutely said of something, there is no middle; so if a property is a thing, it is true it is the ‘same’ or ‘other’, but with a ‘*per se*’ it is not valid that it be ‘*per se* the same’ or ‘*per se* other’.

432. To the second [n.428]. The antecedent can be distinguished according to composition and division. In sense of composition neither [part of the antecedent] is to be granted; for just as one must not grant that it is *per se* essence or *per se* non-essence [n.431], so neither must one grant the other member of this disjunctive, with ‘which is’, in sense of composition. Nor are by this both contradictories denied, because if you are speaking of the terms, it is given that neither of them is said *per se* of the subject; this I concede. If you wish to hold to the contradictory propositions, I say that they will be these: ‘either the property is *per se* a thing which is essence, or it is not *per se* a thing which is essence’; and the negative here is true, but it does not entail ‘therefore it is *per se* a thing which is not essence’, just as it does not follow ‘a man is not *per se* white’, ‘therefore he is *per se* non-white’. – In sense of division the affirmative part of the disjunctive must be granted; but it does not further follow ‘therefore it is *per se* essence’, because formal identity is being inferred from real identity, for the antecedent in sense of division only indicates real identity by the ‘which is’.

433. In another way could the aforesaid antecedent [n.432] be distinguished, so that by the implication ‘which is’ be understood formal inherence or only identical inherence. In the first way neither part is to be granted, because neither of the opposites is *per se* in the thing which is said *per se* of the property. In the second way the affirmative part is to be granted, but the intended proposition [n.191] does not in addition follow, because of the positing of the consequent [n.428].

434. This second distinction [n.433] does not hold by force of the words, because the implicated composite [‘which is’] is not determined to something which indicates that it means formal inherence, but only identical inherence; the first distinction [n.432] does hold by force of the words, and although ‘which is’ there does not indicate formal inherence in sense of composition, yet from the unity of the extreme, as it is a quasi specific or determinative construction, the essence has to be denominated ‘*per se* present in’ the subject.^a

a. [Interpolation, giving a response to the third objection, n.429] The answer to the third is plain. It is said that neither are they *per se* the same thing nor are they *per se* two things; but it is well said that when the syncategorematic term is removed, namely the ‘*per se*’, the affirmative is true, namely that ‘they are the same thing’.

435. [To the second] – To the second [n.192] I say that what is accidental is either taken for something extraneous or is taken properly, for that which as it were perfects something accidentally which in itself pre-exists as perfect. If in the second way, I say that not every being is essential or accidental to every being that it is in; for there is a middle between the accidental and the essential, as in the case of that which contracts, as difference contracts a genus, because such a thing is neither substantial nor accidental,

taking it in this way. And thus in divine reality nothing is accidental, but there is beside the essence something non-essential. – But if the accidental is taken in the first way, anything that is not of the formal idea of it but extraneous, although it not properly be called accidental, would thus be an accidental difference with respect to the genus; and in this way the Philosopher takes the accidental for the extraneous in the fallacy of the accident [*Sophistical Refutations* 1.5.166b28-30]. Thus can anything be called accidental to something which is extraneous to it as it is compared to some third predicate.

436. [To the third] – To the third [n.193] I say that if in the major by the ‘if’ is understood a possible condition, the major is true and the minor false; for, when a possible is posited, by no positing can the second person in divine reality be lacking without the supreme good and supreme perfection being lacking. And if you prove that, if the second person were lacking, supreme perfection would exist in the Father, I say that if that person were lacking, supreme perfection would be lacking; and if the second person were lacking and the Father was not lacking, supreme perfection would be present; and so for supreme perfection to be lacking and for the Father to be present includes a contradiction. – But if in the major by the ‘if’ is posited an impossible positing, I say that the major is false; for in the supreme good must be posited that which cannot be posited not to be without the positing of impossibles.

437. [To the fourth] – To the final one [n.195] I say that the reason about ‘necessary being’ must be thus understood: whatever is of itself a necessary being has of itself the most actual existence, such that it does not by anything – in any way other than itself – expect any actuality of existing. And therefore it is of itself indivisible, because if it could be divided, then from the things by which it might be divided it would expect some actuality of existing that it would have in the divided parts; and then it would be necessary that the things distinguishing that necessary being would formally be necessities of existing, because they would be ultimate actualities of necessity in those diverse necessary beings, without which they would not have the most actual being, because the divisible does not have the most actual being or the most actual existence. On this basis, then, the reason holds that was above posited [n.177] in the question about the unity of God, from the reason about ‘necessary being’, which was also touched on in the first question of the second distinction [n.71], that necessary being is not divided among several things. Because if *a* and *b* were not formally necessities of existing, even before they were understood in any of the things among which necessary being is divided, then, since they are ultimate actualities without which that common actuality would not exist, that common actuality would not be necessary being, because it would in some way require something other than itself by which it would be. But this does not hold of diverse persons in the same necessary entity; for that entity, which is of itself necessary, does not expect any actuality from the things that distinguish the persons, because it is not divided by the things that distinguish the persons, and the things that distinguish the persons are not as it were ultimate actualities by which such beings exist.

438. When therefore it is argued ‘*a* and *b* (understanding by these here two personal properties) are either formally necessities of existing or they are not’ [n.195], one can concede that they are not formally necessities of existing; and it does not follow ‘therefore they are possibilities’, because they are by identity that one necessity of existence. But if *a* and *b* were in diverse things, one would have to say that they were formally necessities or possible entities, because they could not be the same as some

entity that was of itself necessary; for that common entity, to which they were the same, would be as it were a potential for existing, in the way this common entity is understood before the idea that contracts or divides it.

439. Against this [nn.438, 437]: being able to be lacking is either repugnant to the *a*, insofar as it is *a*, or is not repugnant. If it is, *a* insofar as it is *a* is necessary, and so it is the reason for necessarily existing for that for which it is the form. If not, then by nothing can something else be repugnant to *a* precisely insofar as it is *a*, therefore by nothing is there taken away from *a*, precisely insofar as it is *a*, its being able ‘to be lacking’; therefore, as precisely taken, it is always ‘able to be lacking’; therefore it is repugnant to ‘necessarily of itself’. – To this...^a

a. [Interpolation] The response will be that, with the ‘insofar as’, it is neither repugnant nor not repugnant. But, without the ‘insofar as’, I say that the relations are not possibles but exist necessarily, and that by identity; but they are not possibles either formally or non-formally.

[Third Distinction not Translated Here. John Van der Bercken’s Translation has been Published by Fordham Press, 2015.

In its place is given in the Appendix, page 758, a translation of the treatment of this distinction by Antonius Andreas, one of Scotus’ most faithful students.]

Fourth Distinction

First Part

On the Predication of Otherness in Divine Generation

Single Question

Whether this proposition is true ‘God generates another God’

1. There is another question, about ‘other’ [*Parisian Reportatio* IA d.4 n.1] – It is contained in the Cambridge question [*Reportatio* IC], but in this way [sc. as opposed to the way it is contained in *Reportatio* IA]: as it is in the case of all concrete terms, whether substantives or adjectives – wherefore they are not numbered the way something having a

form is.¹²³ Another question, the common one, ‘whether God generates God’, of which the Cambridge question can be the article.¹²⁴

2. For the arguments ‘pro’ and ‘con’ see the *Parisian [Reportatio]* IA d.4 nn.2-5].

3. Solution. There is, corresponding to any entity, some thing or someone, as its ‘in which’; deity is of itself a ‘this’, therefore God is of himself a ‘this’; therefore non-identity is in itself repugnant to him; ‘other’ posits non-identity about him, because it is a determinable of him [IA d.4 n.6].

4. These three phrases are distinguished – other than God, other by deity, other in deity: the locution ‘another God’ does not posit the first two but the third. [IA d.4 nn.7-10].

5. On the contrary: ‘other’ connotes that the same extremes are in a determinable form. – Response: they are the same in one way in that form, different in another [IA d.4 n.10].

6. Another doubt, same God and other God: the term ‘God’, as it is compared to subject and determination, is understood in the same way in both cases, otherwise in one proposition the term would be understood under opposite modes of understanding; therefore if it has a personal and not a simple distinction with respect to the subject, it has the same distinction with respect to the term ‘other’ [IA d.4 n.13].

¹²³ *Reportatio* IC d.4 p.1 q. un: “...but in a thing which is a ‘this’ no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say ‘another entity’ or ‘another deity’, one could not there say ‘another God’, for ‘God’ in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity... Hence when it is said ‘Socrates is other than Plato in humanity’, there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposits, therefore this proposition is false ‘the Father is other than the Son in deity’.”

¹²⁴ See appendix point A. The Vatican editors opine that Scotus intended the lacunas in the *Ordinatio* to be supplied from materials in the two *Reportationes*. Hence they include the relevant sections of the Cambridge *Reportatio* in an appendix (the *Parisian Reportatio* is already in the process of being edited and published in separate volumes by the same Vatican editors).

Fourth Distinction
Second Part
On the Predication of the Name of God in the Divine Persons
Single Question

Whether this proposition is true 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'

7. About the second part of the fourth distinction I ask about the truth of this proposition 'God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'.

It seems that it is not true, because its contradictory seems to be true 'no God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit', because each singular is true – because God is not Father and not Son and not Holy Spirit.

8. On the contrary:

Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God – this proposition is true, therefore also its converse. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity*, in many places.

I. To the Question

9. I reply that the proposition is true, because the term puts first in the sentence what it first signifies, and if one or other extreme is the same as it, the affirmative proposition denoting such identity is true: but 'God' signifies the divine nature as it is naturally predicated of a supposit, and the thing signified is the same for the three persons; therefore the proposition signifying this is true.¹²⁵

10. But is it the case that it has the same truth as this one 'deity is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit'?

I reply. Just as predication in divine reality is distinguished into formally true and true by identity,¹²⁶ so this proposition 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are God' is true formally, and this proposition is true by identity 'Father and Son and Holy Spirit are deity', but not formally; therefore this proposition too 'God is Father' etc. has some truth – speaking of formal predication – which this other one 'deity is Father' etc. does not have.

11. But for what does 'God' supposit, understanding that truth ['God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit'] to be quasi-formal predication?

I reply. To each 'in which' there corresponds a proper 'what' or 'who', and therefore to deity as deity there responds a 'what' or a 'who'. First 'God' by deity is a being as deity is, and just as deity is of itself a 'this', so God – who is God by deity – is of himself a 'this' [n.3], and in this concept there is not included incommunicability or idea of person, because deity is communicable, – and therefore God as 'by deity God is' does not include anything formally incommunicable. To this concept then as so understood, without conception of persons or of personal features, some real predicates can belong, namely those which do not belong to the nature as existing in idea of supposit, but to this nature as existing in this nature, insofar as it exists in it; in this way perhaps this

¹²⁵ See appendix point B.

¹²⁶ An interpolated text is worth noting here: "namely, that formal predication is when the predicate agrees formally with the subject, – predication by identity when, because of the divine simplicity, the predicate is the same as the subject though not formally."

proposition is true ‘God creates’, and the like, understanding the subject to be ‘this God’ existing in divine nature, and not understanding any supposit, nor anything incommunicable in the nature, because incommunicability is not the idea of such acts; and thus one can posit that this proposition ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’ is true, insofar as ‘God’ stands for ‘this God’ – insofar as he is by deity a *per se* being – but not for any supposit properly said, in which the divine nature exists, because when there is truth in the things first signified by the terms, one should not look for truth in others in which those things first signified are included, – just as when the consequent has its own truth, one should not look for its truth precisely in any antecedent.

12. An example of this: ‘this’ color, an existing singular, does not determine for itself the idea of supposit (because the proper idea of supposit is not in accidents), and although it exists in a supposit of substance, yet insofar as it is understood without the substance in the supposit – as ‘this existing color’ – it can be the principle of a real operation, just as, if the same whiteness were in three surfaces, it would have one real act, namely the one idea of diffusing sight. And if, about the truth of this proposition ‘this color diffuses sight’, you ask me for what the term ‘color’ supposits, – I say that it supposits for its first signified thing, namely for ‘this existing color’, but not for any color inferior to this color, namely for ‘this color’ in this surface or in that, because the things that contract color are not the causes of the truth of this proposition, but it is true because of the first extreme terms.

13. Much more would this be true if this color as ‘this’ were a *per se* being. But deity is *per se* existence, and so God insofar as he is God by deity is a *per se* being, because *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: ‘the Father is by the same thing by which he is God, although it is not that he is and that he is Father by the same thing’; and so to ‘this God’, without understanding any idea of supposit or person – nay, by understanding the idea of ‘this God’ – can be attributed ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit’.

II. To the Principal Argument

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.7] I say that that proposition is not the contradictory if the distribution be taken precisely for the persons, because then what is first affirmed in the affirmation is not denied [n.9]; but if it negate the predicate from the first thing of God signified, namely from this God [n.11], it is false. – And this is what is usually said, because ‘such a universal negative does not contradict the term having simple supposition, although it do contradict the term having personal supposition’; but this [contradicting the term having simple supposition] seems probable if the maxim of the sophists is true – ‘when two things are included in any well-formed phrase, one of them is not referred to anything that the other is not referred to’;¹²⁷ but in this quantifier ‘no’ there is included negation and distribution, therefore when the distribution has

¹²⁷ Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.12 n.32: “Hence the ancients say that the premises are double but the conclusion is not, because of a certain reason of this sort that they give: ‘whenever negation and distribution are included in the same phrase or single term, to whatever one of them is referred the other is too.’ Hence when a distribution, set down obliquely, does not reach the verb, neither does the negation, as in this case: ‘no thing seen is something seen.’” This sentence trades on a sophism, as if to see a no thing were like seeing a blue thing, so that to see nothing is really to see something. But ‘no’ is a negation and it is negating the word ‘seen’, not qualifying the word ‘thing’, so that ‘no thing seen’ means ‘not seeing’. In any event the sentence is false.

regard precisely to the supposits of such a nature, the negation too will have regard to the same, – and then the universal negation is true; but it would not be the contradictory of the first proposition, but this would be ‘God is not Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, where the same thing is denied as was first affirmed, – and this negation is false of the same thing, in the subject, of which the affirmation is true.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ See appendix point C.

Appendix
[*Reportatio* IC d.4 q.1]
Book One
Fourth Distinction
First Part. Single Question

[Point A]

2, 16 – About the fourth distinction I ask whether this proposition is true ‘God generates another God’.

It seems that it is:

God generates God; either himself God or another God; not himself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore another God.

Second thus: the one generating is distinguished from the one generated; but God generates God; therefore God generated is distinguished from God generating, and consequently God generates another one.

Third thus: God generates another; either then another God, and thus the proposition is obtained, – or another non-God, which is false, because thus the one generated would not be God.

Fourth thus: God generates another possessing deity, therefore he generates another God. The consequence is plain from Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.55: “‘God’ means one having divine nature, ‘man’ human nature.

On the contrary:

“There is no other God” [*Tobit* 13.4.]

“Hear, O Israel, the Lord thy God is one” [*Deuteronomy* 6.4]

One must say that this proposition is not true. The reason for which is that there adequately responds to any entity some thing or someone; but divine essence is a singular entity and in no way multipliable, as is plain from what is said below [IC d.4 q.2]; therefore there determinately responds to it some thing or someone. But in a thing which is a ‘this’ no otherness falls as such; therefore since one cannot there say ‘another entity’ or ‘another deity’, one could not there say ‘another God’, for ‘God’ in the manner of a concrete term responds adequately to deity.

One must understand, then, that just as in creatures there is a difference between ‘Socrates is other than humanity’, and ‘he is other by humanity’, or ‘he is other in humanity’, so also, with respect to deity or God, ‘other’ implies negation of identity. Hence ‘other’ means non-same.

When therefore ‘other’ is placed first, negation is posited universally with respect to the predicate, which is understood to be universally negated from the subject; and so this proposition is false ‘Socrates is a thing other than man’, but this is true ‘Brownie (or a donkey) is a thing other than man’. And therefore this proposition is simply false of the person of the Father ‘the Father is other than God’ or ‘he is another God’. I say the same of the other divine persons. – But when in the second way there is taken ‘Socrates is other by humanity’, there is likewise universal denial with respect to anything not participating humanity, and it constitutes a true proposition: as ‘Socrates is other than a stone by humanity’, likewise ‘God the Father is other than a stone by deity’; but it makes a false proposition with respect to those things that do participate it; hence this proposition is

false ‘Socrates is other than Plato by humanity’, and likewise ‘the Father is other than the Son by deity’. But in the third way, when it is said ‘Socrates is other in humanity’, one must understand that in this manner of locution ‘other’ implies two things, namely distinction between the things that are compared together and community of that in which they are compared, along with distinction and enumeration of it in them; hence when it is said ‘Socrates is other than Plato in humanity’, there is introduced a distinction between Socrates and Plato and an agreement of both in humanity, and the phrase introduces a distinction and a numbering of humanity in them. So since deity in divine reality is not numbered in the supposit, therefore this proposition is false ‘the Father is other than the Son in deity’.”

To the first argument one must say that this proposition is true ‘God generates God’; for terms taken concretely supposit for supposits. And when it is said ‘either himself God, or another God’ [n.2], I grant neither, but I say that neither himself, nor another. But if you argue ‘either he generates the same God or another God’ (for, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b17-23, ‘same’ and ‘diverse’ are said of everything, and are reduced to contradictories), one must say that he generates the same God, – not however himself, because it is the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘qualified what’ to ‘this something’; for when I say ‘he generates the same God’, there is no reciprocation, which however there is when ‘himself God’ is said.

To the second one must say that in that argument and like ones – where the relation of the middle term varies – there is the fallacy of accident. For when it is said ‘the one generating is distinguished from the one generated’, the otherness is taken with respect to the supposit, along with opposite relation, but when it is said ‘God becomes other than God’, it is taken absolutely, not along with relation.

To the third one must say that God generates ‘another’. But one must not concede the other proposition, that ‘another God, or another non-God’; for ‘other God’ and ‘other non-God’ are not contradictories, but these are ‘other God’ and ‘non-other God’; – and so one must grant this proposition ‘he generates a non-other God’.

But if you say ‘on a negative about the finite predicate – with constancy of subject – there follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate, and so if he generates a non-other God, therefore he generates another non-God’, one must say that this rule does not whole of complex predicates, as the Philosopher says in *Prior Analytics* 1.46.52a18-21; hence those two propositions about a stone are false ‘a stone is white wood’ and ‘a stone is non-white wood’, just as also these two ‘God generates another God’ and ‘God generates another non-God’.

To the fourth one must say that when it is said ‘God generates another possessing deity’ only in the supposit is otherness implied, but not in deity, – and so when otherness is included in deity, more is concluded than was in the premises, and so there is the fallacy of the consequent. For the conclusion can only be thus: ‘what possesses deity is God, God generates another possessing deity, therefore God generates another who is God’, not ‘another God’. Or one could say that there is there the fallacy of figure of speech, by change of ‘this something’ to ‘qualified what’.

Second Part. Single Question

[Point B]

4, 13 – Hence God, in subject position, indicates the divine nature in agreement with the supposit, – Father and Son and Holy Spirit, on the part of the predicate, indicate the same nature by indifference and they state supposits; from which it follows that the proposition is true. However it is true that in its converse there is rather formal predication, because there the superior or common thing is understood to be predicated of its *per se* supposits; but predication is always more formal when the common thing is predicated of the less or quasi-common than conversely.

[Point C]

8, 6 – To make evident the second argument, one must know that, as was said in the preceding question, to any unique nature there adequately corresponds one singular, because the singular is either incommunicable, as it is in creatures, – or it is communicable, as it is in God. But the divine nature is altogether unique, un-multipliable and un-numerable, therefore to it there adequately corresponds one singular, which is expressed by the name of God, because this is understood by natural intelligence before any property of persons is. And that singular is considered to be some being for itself, with which agree all the properties, essential and perfective, before any property of persons; but that indeed which is a being for itself and of itself is in no way multipliable or numerable, although it is communicable to several supposits, which communication is understood through the notional properties. And just as this proposition is true ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is this one ‘this God is Father’ etc. An example of this has been touched on, that if there were one color in three surfaces, that color – suppose it whiteness – would diffuse sight and would have all the perfections belonging to whiteness, but not as it is first in this surface or that, but by itself, although it have them as a universal existing in those surfaces, yet not first. Now it is the same way here.

Book One
Fifth Distinction
First Part
On the Generation of the Divine Essence
Single Question
Whether the divine essence generates or is generated

1. About the fifth distinction I ask first whether the divine essence generates or is generated.

That it does:

From Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “Let us accept that when the Word is spoken of, it is just as if ‘Wisdom born’ were spoken of, so that in one of these, namely ‘born’, both Word and Son are taken, and so that in all these words there is not shown the divine essence, which is said in reference to itself, – but so that in the other term, namely ‘Wisdom’, the essence is shown, and in this respect it is said in reference to itself.” Therefore he expressly intends that Wisdom, as it is Wisdom and said in reference to itself, is called born as ‘born’ is proper to the Son.

2. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.22 seems expressly to speak against the Master of the *Sentences* [I d.5 ch.1]. “Many,” he says, “have arisen in our times who do not dare to speak of generated substance, but always rather (which is more dangerous and against the authorities of the saints) dare to deny and in every way to disprove that substance generates substance. They stubbornly deny what all the saints affirm. For that which they themselves affirm they can find no authority, – for that which we say, even they themselves adduce many authorities, in the manner of Goliath [*1 Kings [Samuel]* 17.45-51]” etc. And because the Master expounds the authorities which he adduces against himself [those of Augustine and Hilary, I d.5 ch.1 nn.57-64], Richard subjoins about him: “They say [sc. the Master and his followers], ‘The Fathers do well say that substance generates substance; our exposition contends that we believe substance does not generate substance’: – a faithful ‘exposition’, and worthy of all praise, because that which the Fathers proclaim they contend to be false, and what none of the saints asserts they contend to be true.” Thus Richard. – He seems to mock the Master in expounding as it were against the intention of the Fathers the authorities which he adduces against himself, and asserts – as it seems – the opposite of what the Master holds to be true and to be of the intention of the Fathers.

3. Again, by reason: essence is communicated, therefore it is produced. The antecedent is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “generation without beginning bestows essence on the Son.” The proof of the consequence is both that to communicate and to be communicated are relational opposites, and only state a relation of origin (for they do not assert common relations, as is plain; therefore they assert opposite relations of origin; therefore they are the same as to produce and to be produced), and also that if there are two correlations, and if one extreme of one of them is the same as one extreme of the other, then the remaining extreme is the same as the remaining extreme. Example: if *a* and *b* were correlative and *c* and *d* correlative, then if *a* and *c* are the same, then *b* and *d* are the same, – the proof is that otherwise the same thing would be said with reference to several correlatives, as *a*, which is the same as *c*, would be said

correlatively to *b* and *d*, which for you are diverse; and here is one combination of relatives of this sort, ‘producing’ and ‘produced’, and another ‘communicating’ and ‘communicated’; but ‘producing’ and ‘communicating’ are the same, therefore the extremes corresponding to them are also the same.

4. Again, by logical arguments:

When a predicate is predicated *per se* of a subject, it can supposit for it, – the thing is plain in superiors and inferiors; essence is predicated *per se* of the Father, ‘the Father is essence’; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor, because it is not *per accidens*, because one is not an accident of the other, nor both of a third; and these are the two modes of unity *per accidens* that are posited in *Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b16-36, the chapter on ‘one’.

5. Again, essence is father of the Son, therefore the essence generates. Proof of the antecedent, by conversion: father of the Son is essence; therefore essence is father of the Son. Proof of the consequence: essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence; proof of this consequence, because in relatives the consequence is mutual: *a* is father of *b*, therefore *b* is son of *a*; therefore if essence is father of someone, this someone is son of essence.

6. Again, the generated insofar as it is generated is something, because it is not nothing, and between nothing and something there is no middle; but nothing in divine reality is something unless it is essence, therefore the Son insofar as he is generated is essence; therefore essence is generated.

7. To the contrary is the Master in the text.

I. To the Question

A. Opinion of Abbot Joachim against Peter Lombard

8. On this question Abbott Joachim was in error, whose argument is reported in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.2, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “We condemn” etc. For he said that Master Peter [Lombard] was a heretic, because he said there was a thing in divine reality that neither produces nor is produced [I d.5 ch.1 n.54]. For Joachim made his inference from this, insinuating that Peter posited a quaternity in divine reality; for he posited three things in divine reality, a generating thing and a thing generated and a thing inspirited, – and he posited a thing neither generating nor generated nor inspirited [*ibid.* n.58]; therefore he posited four things.

9. Joachim, avoiding this discordant result that seemed to follow, posited that no one thing is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, but he only said that the persons were one thing in the way that many faithful are said to be ‘one Church’, because of one faith and one charity; and this he proved by the saying of the Savior (*John* 10.30) when praying for his faithful: “that they might be one,” he says, “as we are one.” Joachim therefore inferred: since the faithful are not one by unity of nature, therefore neither is the Son one thing with the Father.

B. Against the Opinion of Abbott Joachim

10. This second thing in the opinion of Joachim is heretical, namely that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are not some one thing, because as is argued in the afore cited

chapter [of the *Decretals*, n.8], ‘The Father by generating gave his essence to the Son’ (for he could give nothing else by which the Son would be God), and for a like reason both gave their essence to the Holy Spirit; ‘for the communication was not of part of the essence, because the essence is simple and indivisible, – therefore of the whole essence; therefore the whole same essence, which is in the Father, is in the Son and in the Holy Spirit, and, because of the divine simplicity, each person is that thing, and all three persons are that thing’.

11. Now as to what Joachim argued from the Gospel [n.9], it is there solved, for ‘the Savior understands in his prayer that his faithful are one in a unity proportional to themselves, just as the Father and Son are one in a unity proportional to themselves, – that is, just as the Father and Son are one in the unity of charity which is their nature, so the faithful are one in participated charity’. And this exposition is there proved by the like saying of the Savior (*Matthew* 5.48) saying to his disciples: “Be ye perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect,” namely with essential goodness; where he did not admonish that we be perfect of ourselves naturally, as the heavenly Father is perfect of himself naturally, with a perfection essentially belonging to himself, but that we be perfect with the perfection belonging to us, namely of grace and the virtues.

C. For the Opinion of Peter Lombard

12. [As to the reality of the question] – However as to the first article [n.9], in which Joachim said that Master Peter was heretical, the Pope contradicts him [Innocent III, 4th Lateran Council, 1215AD]: “But we, with the approval of the sacred Council, believe and confess with Peter [Lombard], namely that one supreme thing is essence or divine nature, which neither generates nor is generated; yet it does not follow that there is a quaternity, because those three things – Father and Son and Holy Spirit – are that one thing.” But there cannot be a quaternity unless there is a fourth, really distinct from the first three.

13. For this opinion, then, thus solemnly approved, there is adduced this sort of reason: a generating thing generates something, and generates a really distinct thing, because “nothing generates itself so as to exist,” *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; but essence in divine reality is altogether indistinct; therefore it is neither generating nor generated, because there is a generating by the same reason that there is a generated.

14. To this are reduced the reasons of the Master in the text, that essence ‘would be referred to itself’ and ‘would be distinguished from itself’ [I d.5 ch.1 n.55]; but a third reason is that the Father would exist formally by that by which he generates, because he is formally the very essence that is in the Son, because of the lack of distinction of the essence, – and if he were to generate it, he would not formally be it, because it would be distinct from him and posterior in origin.

15. There is added too another reason, that in creatures form does not generate nor is generated, but the composite is; now deity is disposed as form in a person; therefore it neither generates nor is generated.

This reason has less evidence here than in creatures, because in creatures form is not something *per se* existing so that it could be operator; but here deity, without co-understanding the personal properties, is of itself a being in act [d.4 n.11].

16. The reason is however confirmed, because operation, which belongs necessarily to a distinct operator, cannot belong to that which here exists as form, because form is *per se* indistinct in the three; but such operation is personal, as to generate is.

Let this be said as to the reality of this question.

17. [As to the logic of the question] – But speaking of the logic, why cannot this proposition ‘essence generates’ be true as essence supposits there for a person, just as this proposition is true ‘God generates’ because God supposits for the Father, – and yet God is not distinguished from himself, nor is God formally he who is generated although God does generate God?

18. I reply and give the following reason for the intended proposition: whenever a subject is abstracted with ultimate abstraction¹²⁹ and the predicate of its idea cannot be predicated save formally, the proposition cannot be true of such terms save *per se* in the first mode; the subject here, namely deity or the divine essence, is abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and the predicate of its idea, namely generating, cannot be predicated save formally; therefore the proposition could not be true save *per se* in the first mode; but in this way it is not true, because the predicate is not *per se* in the understanding of the subject – “for everything that is said in relation to something is something beside the relation” (*On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2), such that the relation is not within the concept of the absolute thing.

19. The major of this syllogism I declare in this way:

In the case of substances, although there can be in the same one really – even if it is simple – many substantial perfections formally distinct, and although there one formal idea could be abstracted from another, while the concretion of each formality with their own proper supposits still remains (for example, although this proposition is true ‘the intellective substance is volitional’ – where there is a concrete predication of the perfection of one substantial feature about another – yet this proposition is denied ‘the intellect is will’, because these terms signify the perfections as abstract from each other, and that according to their proper formalities; however these thus abstract terms still concern the proper supposits, because here ‘intellect’ is an intellect), yet, by taking the substance, whether simple or composite, precisely according to one formal quidditative idea, there is only abstraction from the supposit of the proper nature in common, because the substances do not naturally concern anything of another nature; therefore this first abstraction [n.20 for the second abstraction] is the greatest. For by abstracting human nature from the supposits that truly are of that nature – as humanity is abstracted when it is conceived – there does not remain any further abstraction; and this thing as thus conceived is precisely its very self, because extraneous to anything else, – as Avicenna says *Metaphysics* 5 ch.1 that ‘equinity is only equinity’ and nothing else.

20. But in the case of accidents, as many abstractions can be made as there can be many things they concern. Accidents indeed concern supposits of another nature, and although they are abstracted from them, yet they concern individuals of the proper nature, – just as white concerns wood, and although whiteness is abstracted from this, yet it still concerns this whiteness and that, which are its individuals. – But further, there is

¹²⁹ The following interpolated note [*Reportatio* IA d.5 nn.19, 21] may be helpful here: “Note, ultimate abstraction is when the formal idea of something is considered according to itself, apart from anything not included *per se* in it; if the idea of something is taken most precisely, nothing formally agrees with it save what is *per se* included in that idea.”

abstraction of quiddity from the supposit, which is the sort of abstraction said to happen in the case of substances [n.19], and we have a circumlocution for this by the fact we speak of the quiddity of whiteness¹³⁰ – and this does not concern any subject whether of the same or different nature.

21. In relations too, that concern many things, there can still be many abstractions; for a relation concerns its proper individual, both foundation and subject, – and although it is abstracted from the latter yet it is not abstracted from the former.

An example. This concrete term which is ‘cause’ is said of fire, which generates heat in wood. – But, abstracting from the subject, there still remains concretion with a foundation, to wit if one say ‘the power of causing’; for heat is a power of causing heat, yet fire is not a power of causing it. – There can be still a further abstraction to the proper genus, to wit if one say ‘causality’, and then neither fire nor heat receives the predication of it; yet this causality is ‘causality which is the ultimate abstraction of the sort that is in substances’ [n.19] through the fact that we speak of ‘quiddity of causality’, and this is predicated of nothing else.

22. And, from the things thus shown or narrated, it is apparent what ultimate abstraction is, that it is ‘of the most absolute quiddity, taken from everything that is in any way outside the idea of the quiddity’,¹³¹ – and from this is apparent the first term of the major.

23. About the other term of the major, namely that the predicate ‘is of necessity formally predicated about whatever it is predicated,’ [n.18], one must note that substantives can be doubly predicated in divine reality, sometimes formally and sometimes by identity; but adjectives, if they are predicated, are of necessity formally predicated, and this because they are adjectives, – for, from the fact they are adjectives, they signify form by way of what informs; and so they are said denominatively of the subject, and consequently by way of what informs the subject, and thus they are said formally of it; of such sort are not only adjectival nouns but all participles and verbs.

24. With these things understood, the assumed major is plain, that ‘when something is abstracted with ultimate abstraction – such that it is abstracted from

¹³⁰ The term for the quiddity of whiteness would be something like ‘whiteness-eity’, which is as barbarous as Scotus’ *albedineitas*, but it serves its purpose.

¹³¹ Note of Scotus: “This point ‘about multiple abstraction’ what is its validity? ‘This humanity’ is humanity, and ‘this whiteness-eity’ is whiteness-eity, – and universally, there can be no abstraction, however ultimate (provided, however, that the concept be common, as it always should be), without the abstracted thing being said of its singular ‘*per se*’; but this singular is not the supposit when the quiddity is abstracted from what has the quiddity; thus in the case of accidents the abstracted thing never has a supposit for singular.

Therefore in the case of accidents a multiple abstraction is posited, from a more remote and from a nearer subject [n.20], – as relation from its supposit (or subject) and from its foundation [n.21] – in the case of substance a single abstraction, from its supposit, but not from the singular [n.19]; nor is it thus posited that in some abstraction ‘the abstracted thing’ is not predicated of something nor something of it, because this is impossible [as stated in the previous paragraph of this note], but it is enough for the intended proposition here [n.18] that the ultimately abstracted thing – that is abstracted from everything of a different nature and from the proper supposit, but not from the singular [n.22] – that about it nothing is formally predicated unless it is predicated ‘*per se* in the first mode’.

So is it the case then that ‘humanity’ is animality? – No. Humanity is not the singular of animality but this animality is; but man is as it were the supposit of animal.”

everything which is outside its idea – and the predicate is not predicated of it save formally, there is no true union of such extremes unless it be formal and *per se* in the first mode'. Because this predicate is precisely of a nature to be predicated formally, therefore truth cannot be saved by identity alone, – and because the subject is abstracted with the highest abstraction, it cannot stand for anything in any way that is other than itself but precisely for itself formally, and so it would be necessary [for truth to be saved] that its idea were precisely formally the same as the predicate, which could not be unless the idea precisely included the predicate. – The minor too [n.18] is plain, because the extreme terms 'essence generates' or 'deity generates' [n.17] are not of such a sort, because 'deity' is something abstracted with highest abstraction; but 'generates' is a verb, therefore it cannot be predicated save formally.¹³²

II. To the Principal Arguments

25. To the arguments for the opposite. – To the first authority of Augustine [n.1] – *Sentences* I d.21 ch.2 'the words of the authority occur...' – the Master [Peter Lombard] responds in d.28 ch.6, that Wisdom stands for the hypostasis; "the essence is shown" [n.1], namely it is shown that the Son is essence," because the essential name stands for the person. The reason for this is stated: although wisdom is abstracted from the wise man, because he is the one operating, yet it still signifies the operative power or the operative principle, and therefore it is not abstracted with highest abstraction, because the operative power in some way concerns something; and, because of such sort of concretion, it is some way conceded that Wisdom is born, but not in any way that the essence is born. But as to Augustine sometimes saying that the Son is essence of essence, this is expounded in the following question 'because this does not prove that the essence is generated or generating, but that it is something from which the Son is generated' [nn.98, 101].

26. To the statement of Richard [n.2]. If he intends to blame the Master there, as appears from his words, – since the doctrine of the Master, and this one especially, is confirmed by a General Council in the chapter cited above [n.12], I deny Richard¹³³ by holding to the Master. And as to his saying that the Master adduces many authorities against himself, the Master well expounds them, as will be plain in the following question [n.100]; not, however, that he has no authority for himself, but he does have the authority of the Universal Church, which is the greatest, because Augustine says *Letter against Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: "I would not believe the Gospel if I did not believe the Church," – which Church, just as it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the canon of the *Bible*, so too it has decreed which books are to be held as authentic in the books of the doctors, as is plain in the canon, and after the authority of the canon there is not found in the *Corpus Iuris* any writing as authentic as that of Master Peter in the chapter cited before.

¹³² An interpolated text is usefully noted here: "This name 'God' is not thus abstracted with ultimate abstraction, and therefore it can supposit for a person, as when it is said 'God creates', 'God generates' [d.4 n.11]."

¹³³ Note by Scotus: "The assertion [Richard *On the Trinity* VI ch.22] 'In himself the person of the Father is nothing other than ungenerated substance, and the Son nothing than generated substance' could be expounded the way the Greeks take it [sc. understanding substance as hypostasis]."

27. To the reason about ‘communicating’ [n.3] I say that production has the thing produced for its first term, and I say that this ‘first term’ is the adequate term; and in this way the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 7.8.1033b16-18 that the composite is first generated, because it is what first has being through production, that is, adequate being.

28. However, in the composite the form is the formal term of generation, but it is not the term *per accidens*, – as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.193b12-18, where he proves that form is nature by the fact that ‘generation is natural because it is the way to nature, but it is the way to form, therefore etc.’, – which reason would be nothing if form were only the term *per accidens* of generation. And in the same way he intends that form and end coincide in the same thing, which is not true of the end of the thing generated, but is true of the end of generation. Therefore form is truly the end of generation.

29. The thing, then, that generates has one relation to the first term – which term is called the thing produced or generated – and it has another relation to the formal term. And in creatures each relation is real, because each relation has terms really distinct, and there is a real dependence of each produced thing on what produces it. But in the proposed case [sc. of God] the producer has to the thing first produced a real relation, because it has a real distinction and a real origin, but to the formal term in the thing produced it does not have a real relation, because it does not have a real distinction, without which distinction there is no real relation. ‘To produce’ then in divine reality states a real relation, but ‘to communicate’ states a relation of origin, and as it were of idea, concomitant with that real relation; there is an example of this about the principle ‘in which’; in creatures this principle is really referred to the product, just as the ‘what’ principle is (for the art and the builder are referred to the same genus of cause, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33), but here [sc. the case of God] the ‘in which’, because it is not distinct, does not have a real relation to the thing produced (I d.7 n.13), – so not conversely either, the formal term not having a real relation to the producer.

30. When it is said, therefore, that these relations are opposite, namely to communicate and to be communicated [n.3], – I say that they are relations of reason, opposite according to their proper ideas, although they are necessarily concomitant with some real opposed relations, namely to produce and to be produced; but yet the latter and the former relations are not formally of the same relative things.

31. By this same fact is given an answer to the second [n.3], that no extreme of one correlation is formally the same as some extreme of another. For the communicator and the producer, although they come together in the same supposit (because the nature is said properly to be communicating itself just as it is said to be properly communicated¹³⁴), yet the communicating does not state formally the same relation as producing qua producing does, – for to be communicated and to be produced do not state the same either, nor do they first denominate the same.

32. To the logical arguments [nn.4-6].

When it is first argued about predication ‘*per se*’ [n.4], I say that essence is not predicated ‘in the first mode *per se*’ of the Father, nor is it predicated formally. – When

¹³⁴ Note by Scotus: “Whether essence is communicating or communicated? – That it is not: then the things produced are [n.3]; it is proved in two ways, as above [n.3]. – On the contrary: *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 and *John* 10.29, “My Father who gave them to me.” – Solution: about the double term, first and formal [nn.27-29]; likewise about the double term, first and formal. – To the arguments...”

you prove it ‘because not *per accidens*’ [n.4], I say that, as in creatures, not every predication is either ‘*per se*’ or ‘*per accidens*’, taking accident properly, as when an accident is predicated of a subject; for the genus is not predicated *per se* of the difference, nor is it predicated *per accidens*, – because neither of them is accident of the other of them, but the difference is there a middle that is extraneous or inferior to the genus, and contracts it, which inferior can be called ‘accidental’ to the superior, that is, extraneous, but it is not properly an ‘accident’; but in divine reality not everything is ‘*per se*’ the same, that is, formally,¹³⁵ nor yet is anything of another ‘*per accidens*’ properly,¹³⁶ but something is the same as something by absolute identity, without formal identity, – and thus it is in the intended proposition.

33. To the other I say that this proposition ‘father is essence’¹³⁷ can be distinguished, because ‘father’ can be taken adjectivally or substantively. In the second way it signifies the person to whom belongs paternity, and I concede that the proposition is true by identity, because a substantive can be predicated of anything by identity. In the first way it signifies the very property denominatively, and in this way the Master expounds [I d.27 ch.1 n.237] that to be father is the same as to have generated;¹³⁸ in this way this proposition ‘essence is father’ is false, because it signifies that father is formally predicated of the subject.

34. When therefore you argue about subject and property, I say that when the property can be predicated by a predication of the same idea as that by which the subject is predicated, the property can be inferred from the subject when it has the same mode of predicating [n.24], – but when not, not. Here the subject – if it is subject – can be predicated by identity, the property – if it is property – cannot be, but only formally, because it is an adjective [n.23].

35. To the other, ‘essence is father of the Son’ [n.5]:

A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] repeats the opinions of others, the first of Master Alexander [of Hales, *ST* Ia d.20 ad 5], who distinguished this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ in the way the preceding one, namely ‘essence is father’, was already distinguished [n.33], – because ‘father’ can be taken adjectivally and substantively, and in the first way he says it is false and the consequence [‘therefore father of the Son is essence’] not valid, – in the second way he says it is true. Another opinion he repeats from Master Praepositinus, who says that it is simply true, for which Praepositinus has two reasons, – one by conversion (because if the converting proposition is true, the converted proposition will be simply true): “this proposition is true ‘father of the Son is essence’, therefore essence is father of the Son;” the other reason is that “this proposition is simply true ‘essence is father’: either then it is father of someone or of no one; if of no one, then there is altogether no father, – if of someone, and if of none but the Son, then essence is father of the Son.”

36. Against Master Alexander – nay against both masters – he argues thus and proves “the term ‘father’ is only held adjectivally, since names that are imposed from an

¹³⁵ Note by Scotus: “‘Predications *per se*’ are formal, Aristotle did not hand it down in ‘on identicals’ [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a21-73b26].”

¹³⁶ Note by Scotus: “On the Trinity V ch.5 n.6: in God there is a middle between ‘according to substance’ and ‘according to accident’ [to wit: ‘according to relative’].”

¹³⁷ Note by Scotus: “father generates; father is essence; therefore [essence generates; IA d.5 n.36]. – Response: the predication varies.”

¹³⁸ Note by Scotus: “The master in I d.27 ch.2 takes father only substantively.”

active and passive power (as are master and disciple, father and son, builder, etc.) are only significative adjectivally, and this from the respect that they have to something else, which is what the power from which they are imposed has regard to. But whenever something has the idea of adjective, or of adjacent, from a respect to something else, the more determinate its respect the more it has the idea of adjacent or of adjective, and the less it has this idea the more indeterminate it is, – as is plain about the respect of the infinitive mode, which grammarians say has or says an infinite inclination to the supposit and can supposit more than other modes can [Priscian, *Institutiones Grammaticae* VIII ch.12 n.63, ch.13 n.69], because the others also have a finite inclination to the supposit, but the former has an infinite one; but an infinitive and an adjective in the neuter gender are more substantive than in the masculine or feminine. Therefore since ‘father of the Son’ has a finite and express relation – but it is not so when the term ‘father’ is posited *per se* – therefore, although it could be held substantively when saying ‘essence is father’, yet it is only held adjectively when saying ‘essence is father of the Son’, and thus this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false.”¹³⁹

37. “It is also plain that the first argument of Praepositinus is not valid, ‘father of the Son is essence, therefore essence is father of the Son’, by conversion [n.35], because it should be converted in this way: ‘therefore something that is essence is father of the Son’; just as this proposition ‘an individual is man’ is not converted in this way ‘therefore man is an individual’, but it in this other way ‘therefore something that is a man is an individual’. – Likewise the second reason [n.35] is not valid. When it is argued ‘essence is father, therefore father either of someone or no one’, – one must say that it does not follow, because of the fallacy of figure of speech (because as soon as ‘of someone or of no one’ is added the combination is otherwise than was first being supposed), and one must say that it is father of no one, that is, it is not father of anyone; and it does not follow from this that it is not father, because of the fallacy of figure of speech, but there only follows ‘therefore the property of paternity does not belong to it’.”

38. So he responds in a third way, that this proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’ is simply false, because of the aforesaid reason [n.36], because the term ‘father’ here is only held adjectivally.¹⁴⁰

39. Against his way of speaking [n.38] I argue thus:

What is included essentially in the concept of something as a part of the concept cannot be excluded from it under whatever mode it is conceived, because if it is conceived under some mode and that part is not included, then the mode is repugnant to the idea of the concept which is conceived. When, therefore, in the concept of a relative [sc. father], from the fact that the concept is relative – not as conceived relatively – its correlative is necessarily included as its term (because it can neither be nor be understood without it, just as not without the term either), then in whatever way it is conceived,

¹³⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus [quoting Henry]: “And if it is objected ‘essence is father, but it is not father except of the Son, therefore it is father of the Son or it is altogether not father’,” – response: “it is plain that there is a fallacy of figure of speech, because in the first proposition the term ‘father’ *per se* supposits for the whole person; but in the second proposition, when it is said that it is ‘father of the Son’, it combines only a property with the subject.”

¹⁴⁰ There are thus three ways of dealing with the proposition ‘essence is father of the Son’. First Alexander’s: true substantively, false adjectivally [n.35]; second Praepositini’s: simply true, because substantive only [n.35]; third Henry’s: simply false, because adjectival only [n.38]. Scotus also cancelled here a less full repetition of Henry’s remarks quoted in n.36.

whether adjectivally or substantively, the correlative is always included as term, and so in no way can it be understood as absolute; the point is confirmed about filiation [sc. filiation is correlative in the same way].

40. Again, then [sc. if Henry's position is correct] this proposition 'father of the Son is essence' would be incongruous, and a non-substantive adjective does not supposit incongruously. Indeed in this case in the subject ['father of the Son'] father is determined by the Son, to whom it has a determinate respect [n.36].

41. Therefore I hold the opinion of Alexander, distinguishing as he does, that the substantive is true and the adjectival is false.

42. To the reasons of Praepositinus: I say that the converse ['essence is father of the Son'; n.35] is true substantively, – adjectivally it is incongruous, because the masculine [sc. 'father' in the converting proposition] cannot be made substantive; to his second reason [n.35] I say that essence is father, and of someone, – and I concede too that it is father of the Son.

43. But when it is argued in the principal reason 'if essence is father of the Son, therefore the Son is son of essence' [n.5], I deny the consequence.

When it is proved through that 'mutual consequence' in relatives, I say that the mutual consequence holds in those relatives that are first relatives [father-son]; it holds also of those that are referred through relations [paternity-filiation] – if they are said formally as relations of them, – just as if formally Socrates is father of Plato, then conversely, formally Plato is son of Socrates. But in those relatives that are not referred first nor are denominated formally from those relations, but the relation is predicated of one of them by identity, that [mutual] consequence is not valid, because in that case more is indicated in the consequent than in the antecedent; for in the antecedent is noted the identity of the relation with that of which it is said, but in the consequent is indicated that the other thing is formally referred to it: for since it is said 'the Son is son of essence', from the force of the construction there is indicated that the essence is the proper correlative of that which is the Son, and so the Son is formally son of essence; but the antecedent does not indicate that the relation of paternity agrees with the essence formally, but only by identity.

44. To the final one [n.6] I say: when you take 'the generated insofar as it is generated is something', I deny it. And when you say 'it is not nothing', I say (as has often been said before, I d.1 n.58, d.2 nn.422-423, 431, d.3 n.326), that between contradictories there is a middle with 'insofar as', such that neither is present with 'insofar as', just as man 'insofar as he is man' is neither white nor 'insofar as he is man' is he non-white; but these two contradictory propositions are false together; for the true contradictory is 'man not insofar as he is man is white'; so here 'the generated not insofar as it is generated is something', because the idea of being generated is not the formal idea of the inherence of the predicate, although the generated – taken formally in itself – is essence by identity.

45. What then should be said of 'generated insofar as generated'? – One can concede that 'generated insofar as generated' is the person, or subsisting, but it does not further follow 'therefore insofar as generated it is something', taking something for essence, – because of the formal non-identity of the idea of person with essence, etc. [I d.2 nn.388-410].

Fifth Distinction
Second Part
On the Generation of the Son
Single Question

Whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father

46. Second a question is raised about the second part of the fifth distinction, whether the Son is generated from the substance of the Father.

That he is not:

Because *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11: “We do not say three persons out of the same substance;” but substance seems to be disposed uniformly to any of the persons; therefore no person is from the substance.

47. Again, the construal of something with the genitive does not indicate a greater distinction of construable parts than does a preposition with its own case when it is added to the same construable; therefore no greater distinction is indicated in ‘the Son is of the essence of the Father’ than in ‘the Son is from the essence of the Father’; but it is not conceded that ‘the Son is of the essence of the Father’ [n.43], because then the essence of the Father would generate the Son.

48. Again, when the Son is said to be from the substance of the Father, either the ‘from’ indicates a distinction or it does not; if it does the proposition is false, because essence is not really distinguished from the Son; if it does not, then this proposition is true ‘the Father is from the essence of the Son or from the essence of the Father’, which is not conceded.

49. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37 treating the saying in *Colossians* 1.13 ‘he has translated us to the kingdom of the Son of his charity’ says: “what is called ‘Son of his charity’ is nothing other than Son of his substance;” therefore the Son is from the substance of the Father.

50. Further, there is for this the authority of Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 n.2, and it is in the text: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father.”

51. Again, a son in creatures is only he who is generated from the substance of the father; for that is why there is in inanimate things no paternity and no filiation, because they generate from foreign matter, – just as fire generates fire from the matter of air; therefore there is no true filiation save where the substance of the father, or something of the substance of the father, is the matter with respect to the son.

I. The Opinion of Others¹⁴¹

52. On this question it is said that, just as in created generable substance there is something potential, presupposed to generation, as matter, – and something introduced by generation, as form, – and something from these the product, which is generated, so proportionally in divine reality there correspond as it were three similar things; the person to be sure is the quasi-composite, and relation the quasi-form, and essence the quasi-

¹⁴¹ Henry of Ghent.

matter. Therefore the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter.

53. This is proved by the reason of Augustine *Against Maximinus*, which is placed in the text [of Lombard I d.5 ch.1 n.63: “but it is none of these; therefore it is born either from nothing or from some substance”]. For the Son is in no way from nothing, whether negatively, as when someone says he is speaking ‘of nothing’ when he is not speaking, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ so as to make it a mark of materiality or quasi-materiality, because nothing cannot be the matter of anything, or whether by affirming the ‘from’ by way of origin or order, that is in the sense of after nothing. Which three ways of understanding ‘something is from nothing’ are put down by Anselm *Monologion* ch.8. If the Son is in no way from nothing, therefore from something; therefore since not from anything other than the substance of the Father, then plainly he is from the substance of the Father.

54. And if one respond as the Master seems to respond in the text, that he is from the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is substance, – the argument is that this response is not sufficient, because it only expounds the ‘from’ as it indicates the idea of originating or efficient principle; and once posited that he is in this way from the Father, the question still remains whether he is from something or from nothing as from matter or quasi-matter, and since he is not from nothing (because in this way the creature is from nothing), therefore from something, and the argument [n.53] stands.

55. For this [n.52] there is also adduced the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, that the Son is ‘born Wisdom’.

56. If one argue against this opinion [n.52] that ‘pure act cannot be quasi-matter in respect of generation, because it is in no way in potency’, and further, by the reason of the Master, ‘since there is one essence of three persons, the Son is generated from the essence of the three’, – the response to the first is by saying that¹⁴² “something is in potency to something which is absolute, and it differs from it in reality or in intention, and it goes from potency to act by a change and transmutation of the thing or the idea; in another way something is in potency to something which is a respect only, and it differs from it only in idea, never going through any transmutation from potency to act, and always naturally conjoined with act. In the first way, in creatures, matter is in potency to form as to something differing really from it, and it passes from potency to act by a real transmutation in the matter, – and likewise, the form of the genus is in potency to the form of the difference as to something different in intention from it, and it passes from potency to act by change of idea; in no such way [the first] is the divine essence in potency to anything, and it is about potency in this sense that the middle term in the argument is true, because this potency is repugnant to pure act. Things are not like this of potency in the second way, because it is from the nature of the divine form insofar as it is pure act; it is also the case that – in the second way – it is in potency to several respects.”

57. “Divine production, therefore, differs supremely from natural production, because in the latter there is a going through transmutation to perfection and the potency stands apart from act, but in the former not at all so. But the former differs specifically from the natural production which is generation, because the latter is from what is imperfect in substance, but the former is from perfect substance, wherein there is more

¹⁴² Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a.54 q.3 arg.7 of the third principle and response to arg.3.

agreement with the production that is alteration, because in this the subject – which is in potency ‘in a certain respect’ – is something existing in act; but it differs in this respect that the subject in the case of alteration is in potency to something absolute, really differing from it, but in divine production not at all so, – and in this regard divine production agrees more with the production of the species from the genus (but it differs), because in the case of this production the genus is as the subject and matter and it is in potency to something absolute, as to the difference, which however differs from it only in intention; but in divine production the subject is in potency to something respective, which differs from it only in idea; and so, although the production of the species from the genus is more like divine production than any other one is, yet it differs in many respects, because the production of the species from the genus proceeds from incomplete being to complete being, taking up the determination of the complement through the difference, so that according to this and that really different thing it descend to this and that different species and is in idea only one common thing. But in divine production the subject is not something incomplete, determined by the assumption of a property, but one and the same singular being has being totally – through production – in diverse relative properties, which is something common not in idea but in communication.”

58. To the second [n.56] it is said that the Son is not from the substance insofar as it is the substance of the three, but as it is the substance of the Father.

59. To this opinion [n.52] there is added by others [following Henry] that the divine essence is said to be generated subjectively. For what is subjected to generation can be said to be subjectively generated, from the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.225a25-27, where he argues that generation is not motion through this argument: ‘what is moved is; what is generated is not; therefore what is generated is not moved’. He takes ‘what is moved’ for the subject of motion, not for the term, because while it is motion it is not the term. But if he were to take ‘what is generated’ for the term of generation, not for the subject, the argument would not be valid, because the term is not motion; therefore he must be taking ‘what is generated’ there for that which is subject to generation. This is also proved by the Commentator, at the same place, com.8-9.

60. For this opinion these sort of reasons are adduced:

That is said to be truly subjectively generated, or to be the subject of generation, which remains the same under each term of the generation; but the divine essence remains the same in the Father and the Son; therefore it will truly be the subject of generation.

61. A confirmation of the reason is that transmutation and the term are in the same thing as the disposition and the form to which the disposition disposes; therefore since in the essence there is relation, which is the quasi-term of generation, there will be in it generation itself.

62. Further, to every active power there corresponds some passive power; therefore to the fecundity of the quasi-active Father there will correspond some quasi-passive power, from which it can produce.

63. Finally there is an argument like this: if fire were to generate fire from its own substance, the substance of the fire generating would still thus be in potency to the form of the fire to be generated, just as now there is foreign matter from which it generates. So it is in the proposed case, the essence of the Father – from which the Father generates – will be the quasi-matter with respect to generation.

64. [Rejection of the opinion] – I argue against this opinion [n.52].

First in this way: essence is the formal term of the production and of the generation of the Son, therefore it is not quasi-matter.

Proof of the antecedent:

65. *John* 10.29: “What the Father gave me is greater than all things;” something ‘greater than all things’ is only something infinite; this is only essence, – so he gave essence.

66. This is also the intention of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “Just as generation bestows nature on the Son without beginning, so procession from both also bestows essence on the Holy Spirit without beginning.” But it is not conceded that any form was given or communicated by production or bestowed by generation unless the communicated form is the formal term of the production.

67. The antecedent is also proved in another way [n.64]:

First, because no formally univocal entity, being simply more perfect than the formal term, is attained through production; the essence is formally infinite, the relation is not; therefore if the relation were the formal term of production, the person would not have the essence by production.

68. Second, because in creatures nature is the formal term of production, but the individual or hypostatic property is not, – as is plain in *Physics* 2.1.193b12-13, where it is held that generation is natural, or is called nature, because it is “the way to nature” [n.28].¹⁴³

69. Similarly: otherwise [sc. if essence were not the formal term] this production would not be generation, but rather it would be a change to relation, because production is put in a genus or species from its formal term, as is plain from the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b6-8, – as alteration is put in the genus of quality, because quality is there the form which is the formal term of alteration; therefore if the formal term of this sort of production were relation, this production would be put in the genus of relation, and it would not be generation.

70. Proof of the consequence of the first enthymeme [n.64]:

First, because that which is matter in generation is in potency to the formal term, – and what is quasi-matter is quasi in potency; essence is neither truly nor quasi in potency to itself; therefore etc.

71. Likewise, the same consequence is proved because one person has essence in only one mode of having, or at any rate does not have it in these two modes – as formal term of production and, along with this, as quasi-matter and subject of generation. The proof of this is that, if by force of production, it had essence as formal term, it would have it when everything else is removed; therefore it would not have it as quasi-matter subject to generation; for it does not have essence in any way such that, with that way removed, it would have it perfectly and would be true God. The consequence also seems to be that it would have essence twice, and it would naturally have it before it has it, if the idea of quasi-matter in some way precedes the formal idea of the term of generation.

¹⁴³ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The antecedent is also proved because otherwise this generation would not be univocal, because the formal idea of its term would not be the idea of the agreement of the generator with the generated; the consequent is discordant, as will be touched on in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.43].”

72. Again, second to the principal [n.52]:¹⁴⁴ to the essence, as from it the Son is generated, some being must be assigned, because to be principle of some true being – in whatever genus of principle – does not belong to anything save to a real being.

73. I ask therefore what being belongs to the essence as it is that from which the Son by impression is generated; either it is precisely being for itself, which is of essence as essence, – and then the Son is from the essence as essence, and essence in this way is of the three persons; or being in some subsistence belongs to it. And then I ask, in which? Either in ungenerated subsistence, – and if so, since in the understanding of that which is ‘being from which something is produced’ there is included that which is ‘being that in which form is introduced’, and in the understanding of that which is ‘being in which’ is included ‘having that which is in it’ and consequently ‘being formally through it’, – therefore if the essence as it is in the Father is that from which the Son is generated (and by impression, according to them) it follows that essence as it is in the Father will be that in which generated knowledge is imprinted, and so essence as it is in the Father will be formally the Word or generated knowledge knowing, which is discordant [sc. for the Word would not then be of the Father; I d.2 nn.273-280]; but if essence, as it is a subsistence other than the Father, is that from which the Son is generated and in some way precedes, ‘insofar as it is that from which’, the term of generation, then before the term of generation there are two subsistences, which is discordant.

74. If essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ has no existence in a person, just as matter too ‘insofar as it is that from which the generated is generated’ does not have being in any supposit but only has being in potency in the supposit to be generated, – this is worthless, because, as was said, to what is really principle of some being, in whatever genus of principle, there must be attributed some real being [n.72]; and so to matter as it is principle of the composite, although there does not belong to it the being of the composite that exists by participating it, yet there does belong to it its own proper being, which naturally is before it is part of the composite. So here, then, there must be given to the essence ‘insofar as it is that from which the Son is generated’ either being in a supposit or the being of essence in itself, and the argument stands [n.73].

75 If it be said in another way that ‘insofar as it is of the Father’ it is that from which the Son is generated, and yet by generation, namely insofar as generated knowledge is actually formed, it is actually of another supposit, – this has been rejected in the argument, because in the understanding of that which is ‘to be from which’ by impression there is included ‘to be in which’, and so to be formally such according to the thing impressed; likewise, in that case the communication of essence to another supposit would, in understanding, precede the production, such that the communication would not happen by production but would as it were happen before the term of production, – just as that which is the quasi-matter of generation is pre-understood in some way to its term; likewise, although something which is from itself not of some supposit in act may come by generation to be actually of some supposit, – just as matter which is not of some supposit may come to be of some supposit, – yet that that which is of one supposit should

¹⁴⁴ Text cancelled by Scotus: “Let the reason that is put fifth below be the second, and let the third be third, and let what is here second be the fourth, and let what is fourth be fifth.” Hence the paragraphs would have had to be renumbered thus: 64(71), 80(82), 76(79), 83(85), 72(75).

come to be of another supposit precisely by that which is matter seems impossible without any action which is directed to the matter.

76. Further, third: when the active and passive element come together in the production of an effect, the respect of the active to the passive is naturally prior to the respect of either to the product.

77. Proof, because diverse causes of the same thing must be naturally brought into proximity with each other before they produce the effect, – and it is plain from the example of heating fire and heatable wood and generated heat.

78. Again, these respects, namely of the active to the passive and of the active to the product, do not belong altogether equally to the active element, – and the respect to the product is not prior; therefore it is posterior. The antecedent of this enthymeme, as to each part, is proved thus, – because the active acts on the passive by itself alone by reason of cause; and if you altogether deny the priority of respect to respect, you cannot deny that necessarily the respect of the active to the passive is not posterior to the respect of each to the product.

79. Therefore if in the Father there is active fecundity and some quasi-matter that come together for the product, the respect of the Father as productive for that quasi-matter is prior to the respect of each of them to the Son, or at any rate it will be necessarily concomitant; and from this further: since the thing does not naturally pre-require – nor does it necessarily require at the same time – that which is precisely a being of reason, it follows that the naturally pre-required relation of the quasi-active element to the passive be real, and so in the Father there will be a real relation to something in himself, prior to his relation to the Son, or at least different from it, which seems discordant.

80. Again, fourth: the first power that is effectively causative causes by itself alone, excluding every other cause – both of the same genus and of a different genus – in idea of material cause.

81. And the reason is that material causality does not state perfection simply; and therefore, although a reduction be made to something first in that genus, yet that something is not simply first, but the whole genus is reduced to something first in another genus, which something does not include imperfection, – to wit to something first in the genus of efficient cause. This antecedent [n.80] is also plain by the fact that creative power *per se*, without any material principle as the ‘in which’, produces the product.

82. From this is inferred by similarity that the first productive power produces by itself alone, and without any other productive principle concurring, and without any quasi-matter; for the reason seems similar about the productive and causative principle, that if some quasi-material principle were posited, it would not be – insofar as it is such – of supreme perfection, and so it would seem to be needing to be reduced, in idea of principle, to an actively productive principle.

83. Again, fifth, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 says: “the Holy Spirit is not from any matter, nor from nothing, but he is thence whence he proceeds;” so Augustine concedes, therefore, that the Holy Spirit is not from nothing but from the substance of the Father and the Son, just as he concedes that the Son is from the substance of the Father.

84. And this is proved by reason, that in a similar way the relation of the Holy Spirit is in deity as is the relation of the Son; but the essence is not disposed in respect of

the Holy Spirit as matter receptive of him according to that opinion – as it seems –, because it posits that the Word is generated by impression on that from which it is generated, but that the Holy Spirit is produced as by expression, or exhalation of itself, from the formed will from which it is produced. But what is produced by expulsion or expression from some ‘from which’ does not have that ‘from which’ as the matter in its production, because all matter – of the production and of the product – is that in which the form of the product is received, which is not by expulsion from it. The Holy Spirit therefore is not from nothing, nor yet from the quasi-matter of its production.

85. Therefore, because of the fact that the Son is not from nothing, or that his relation is founded in the essence, – the essence as ‘that from which the Son is generated’ should not be matter with respect to the generation of the Son [nn.52-53].

86. Again, to the same [i.e. the principal issue, Henry’s opinion, n.52]:

That the Son is from the substance of the Father is necessarily required for this generation, as to the real existence of generation; but for that existence it is not necessarily required that the substance of the Father be quasi-matter; therefore etc.

87. The major is plain from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [*ibid.*]: “In no way are you thinking of the true Son of God if you deny that he is from the substance of the Father [n.50].” The minor is plain, – no being of reason is precisely, necessarily required for this generation as it is existent [n.79]; that the substance of the Father is matter states precisely a being of reason about the substance, otherwise, with the activity of our intellect removed, he will be of himself quasi-matter, or matter really, or a real likeness to matter.

88. Again, to the [divine] essence belongs nothing in which matter is distinguished from form, but whatever belongs to it is either proper to the form or common [sc. to both matter and form]; therefore it is in no respect quasi-matter in the way it is quasi-form.

89. The antecedent is plain, because to be the same thing in generator and generated is not proper to matter; nay rather the soul [sc. which is form of the body] is the same in the heart generating as in a part generated [n.135], – matter never, in the case of the creature, because it is sufficiently actuated by the single form; in propagation, the matter of the generated was something, but it was not the matter under the form of the propagator; there is a deception here in the remark [from Henry] ‘because there is the same matter of the thing corrupted and the thing generated’ – as if therefore it was the same in the generator and the generated.

90. Again, things simply impossible cannot be the act of something simply the same; however the ‘same’ can well be the act of impossibles, as the soul is of the organic parts [n.133].

91. Again, the composite is constituted by the fact that the potential is actuated and determined by the act of the composite; therefore the essence will be referred and determined [sc. to and by something else]. There is a confirmation: just as quality is not act save as the thing actuated is qualified, so the relation of anything is not actuated save as it is referred [to something]. Essence is not referred [to something].

92. Again, another reason – which is in the third doubt at the end [n.137] – that the supposit would be said to be a related thing according to its foundation. – An instance [of Henry against this]: ‘the Father is like the Son in deity’. However, this relation is not

the act of the foundation as the relation is formally distinct from the foundation, according to you [sc. Henry].

II. Scotus' own Response to the Question

A. The Son is not Generated from the Substance of the Father as from Matter or Quasi-matter

93. Therefore by holding with the ancient doctors – because they all from the time of Augustine up to the present did not dare to speak of matter or quasi-matter in divine reality, although all said in agreement with Augustine that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father – I say that the Son is not generated from the substance of the Father as from matter or quasi-matter.

94. And this can be made clear as follows:

Generation in the creature states two things, change and production; the formal ideas of these are different and separable from each other without contradiction.

95. For production is formally of the product itself, and it is accidental to it that it is done with change of some composite part, as is plain in creation [sc. where there is production but not change]; change is formally the act of 'the changeable', which passes from privation. But change accompanies production in creatures because of the imperfection of the productive power, which cannot give total being to the term of the production, but something of it that is presupposed is changed to another part of it and thus it produces the composite. Therefore they can without contradiction be separated, and they really are separated in comparison to a perfect productive power.

96. This is also plain in creation, where, because of the perfection of the productive power setting it first in total being, there is truly the idea of production, insofar as through it the produced term receives being, – but there is not there the idea of change, insofar as change states that some substrate 'is otherwise disposed than it was before', *Physics* 6.3-4.234b5-7, 10-13. For in creation there is no substrate.

97. To the proposed case. Since in divine reality nothing of imperfection is to be posited but the whole of perfection, and since change in its idea states imperfection, because it states potentiality, and that in a changeable thing, – and concomitantly too it states imperfection of the active power in the changer, because such a changer necessarily requires a cause causing along with it so that it may produce (but no imperfection happens in divine reality, neither of the sort that is in the passive power nor any imperfection either of the active power, but supreme perfection), – in no way would generation be posited there under the idea of change or of quasi-change, but in divine reality would be posited only generation as it is production, namely insofar as something by it gets being. And therefore generation as it is in divine reality is without matter, – and therefore to generation as it is in divine reality there is not assigned matter or quasi-matter, but only the term; and this either total as first term, that is the adequate term – namely which is first produced in being [n.27] – or formal term, according to which the first term formally receives being [n.28].

B. The Son is truly from the Substance of the Father

98. Second I say [n.93] that when all materiality and quasi-materiality have been denied, the Son is yet truly ‘from the substance of the Father’, as the authorities [Augustine, Hilary] adduced in the text [of Lombard] say.

99. Here by the ‘from’ is not indicated only efficient causality or origination [n.54], because if it were efficient causality alone then creatures would be from the substance of God, – nor is indicated by the ‘from’ only consubstantiality, because then the Father would be from the substance of the Son, – but there is indicated origination and consubstantiality at the same time; namely so that in the [ablative] case, governed by the preposition ‘from’, consubstantiality is indicated, so that the Son has the same substance and quasi-form together with the Father, from whom he is by way of origin, – and by what is construed in the genitive case [‘of the Father’] with this prepositional clause the originating principle is indicated; so that the total understanding of this phrase ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ is this: the Son is originated by the Father as consubstantial with him.

100. And in this way the Master [Lombard] expounds the authorities adduced in the text, – not precisely by consubstantiality, nor precisely by origination, but by both, as is generally apparent. “From the substance of the Father, that is, from the Father, who is the same substance [n.54]” – by the first point origination is held to, by the second consubstantiality.

101. And that this is the intention of Augustine in his authorities *Against Maximinus* [n.53] that are put in the text, is apparent from the point of the authorities, – for in one authority Augustine sets down: “If you do not find another substance, recognize the substance of the Father, and confess the Son is *homoousion* (Greek: ‘of the same substance’) with the Father;” from this then he understood by ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ that the Son is so from the Father that he is *homoousion* with the Father. Again, in the other authority he says: “But if he is from the substance of the Father, then there is the same substance of Father and Son.”

102. But to understand this affirmative proposition by which it is said that ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’ [n.98], according to the aforesaid understanding [n.101], I say that that understanding truly saves the fact that the Son is not from nothing, – it also truly saves the fact that the Son is ‘from’ in the way required for filiation.

103. I clarify the first point, because a ‘generated creature’ is not from nothing, because something of it pre-existed as matter. Therefore since the form is something of the composite, and something of it more perfect than matter, if the form of something pre-existed and matter came to it *de novo* and was informed by the already pre-existing form, the product itself would not be from nothing, because something of it would have pre-existed, nay something of it more perfect than the matter which commonly pre-exists. Therefore if the Son would not be said to be from nothing ‘because his essence according to order of origin pre-existed in the Father’, and this too if the essence were the quasi-matter of the generation of the Son, much more will the Son not be from nothing if the essence ‘existing in the Father first by origin’ is the quasi-form communicated to the Son.

104. I clarify the second point [n.102] in this way, namely that the ‘from’ suffices for the idea of filiation, because in animate things, where paternity and filiation exist, we may see what the act is by which the generator is said to be formally ‘father’. It is namely the act of depositing semen, and if it were a perfect agent, so that now, when it deposits semen, it could immediately deposit the offspring, it would be truly father and much

more perfectly than is now the case when so many intermediate changes are required; but now, in the act of depositing semen, that which was the substance of it, or in some way something of it, is not matter, but is as it were the formal term, communicated or produced through the act, just as the offspring would be if it were immediately deposited by the father; therefore because something of the substance of the generator is the term of its act, by which it is father, this truly saves the fact that a product alike in nature 'is from the substance of it', so that the 'from' truly suffices for the idea of father and son, – and as to the thing 'deposited as term' being the matter of subsequent changes, this happens to the 'from' as it belongs to father and son.

105. Therefore the eternal Father, not depositing some part of himself but communicating his whole essence, and this as formal term of the production, most truly produces the Son from himself, in the way in which 'from' pertains to father and son; and although the essence be there the 'from which' as from quasi-matter, the 'from' would not do anything for the idea of father, – just as neither in creatures, if the generator had its semen both for the formal term and for the matter of its action, the father would not be 'father' insofar as his semen was the matter subject to his action, but insofar as it was the term of the action, in the way too that, if the created father deposited a son from himself, he would be truly father, because that which would be from him would be the term of the action, but in no way the matter.

C. How Relation and Essence can exist in the Same Person

106. Third principally, to the solution of the difficulty of this question, one must see how relation and essence can exist in the same person without the essence being material with respect to the relation, since no relation is material with respect to it.

107. And there are four difficulties.

[Difficulty 1] – First, in what way the divine person is one without the former [relation] being act and the latter [essence] potency.

108. To this I say as follows:

First, created quiddity is that in which something is a being quidditatively, and this is not a mark of imperfection; for it belongs to quiddity from the idea of quiddity.

109. Created quiddity, however, for example humanity, because it is of imperfect actuality, is therefore divisible by that which contracts it to an individual, namely by the individual property – whatever it be, let it be *a* – and it receives from *a* some actuality (whether also unity or also individuality), which it has in the individual and does not have from itself, so that the contracting thing (as *a*) is in Socrates not only that 'by which Socrates is formally Socrates', but is formal in some way with respect to the nature, and the nature is in some way potency with respect to it; hence, secondly, the nature is contracted and determined by that very *a*.

110. And third; but humanity in Socrates is some act, and precisely by taking humanity and by distinguishing *a* from it, humanity is a more perfect act than is *a* itself, although *a* is a more proper act and in some way the act of nature insofar as it determines nature.

111. When applying these three things [nn.108-110] to divine reality, let that be left behind which belongs to imperfection.

112. As to the first point [n.108]. Deity is of itself that by which God is God, and also that by which the subsistent thing ‘whose property is *a*’ is formally God, because to be ‘by this’ in this way is not a feature of imperfection in the creature, but belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity.

113. As to the second point [n.109]. There is a dissimilarity, because deity itself is not determined or contracted by the personal property, nor in any way actuated by it, because this was a feature of imperfection and of potentiality in created nature; likewise, deity is of itself a ‘this’, and thus, just as it has ultimate unity of itself, so it has actuality too. The personal property therefore is the proper act of the person such that it is yet not an act of the divine nature itself in any way perfecting or informing it.

114. As to the third point [n.110]. There is in some way a similarity, because although relation is the proper act of the person, and essence is not the proper act but an act of the person, yet the essence is formally infinite act; but the relation is not of its formal idea infinite act.

115. But how can these two acts come together to constitute one thing, if neither is the act of the other? For one must be in the other, because if not then each is *per se* subsistent, and thus they will not be in the same *per se* subsistent thing; likewise, the unity of things distinct in any way at all does not seem, according to Aristotle [*Metaphysics* 8.6.1045a7-10, 23-25], to exist except by reason of act and potency.

116. I reply. The unity of the composite is necessarily by reason of act and potency, as is assigned by the Philosopher, *ibid.* and 7.13.1039a4-5. But the person in divine reality is not composite, nor quasi-composite, but simple, – and as truly simple as the essence itself considered in itself, having no composition nor quasi-composition in reality; and yet the formal idea of the divine essence is not the formal idea of relation, nor conversely, as was said above [I d.2 nn.388-395, 403-406].

117. But how it stands that the idea of relation in the thing is not formally the same as the idea of the essence and yet, when they come together in the same thing, they do not constitute a composite, – the reason for this is that the former idea is perfectly the same as the latter; for because of the infinity of the one idea [sc. of the essence, nn.67, 114, 127], whatever can exist along with it is perfectly the same as it. Therefore the perfection of identity excludes all composition and quasi-composition, which identity exists because of the infinity, – and yet infinity does not take away from the formal ideas that the one is not formally the other.

118. So there is no quasi-composite made from them. And therefore nothing from them is as composite of act and potency, but there is from them one most simple thing, because one idea is perfectly – nay most perfectly – the same as the other, and yet is not formally the same; for this does not follow ‘they are perfectly the same even by identity of simplicity, therefore they are formally the same’, as was touched on about identity in the pre-cited question [in n.116], and as will be touched on below in distinction 8 [nn.209, 217]. And the same perfect identity excludes all aggregation, because the same thing is not aggregated with itself.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The conclusion [nn.116-118] of the first difficulty [n.107] here [sc. in the *Ordinatio*] is argued against in the *Oxford Collations* question 1 and question 14, where is contained the first part of it [the conclusion], afterwards this part [here nn.117-118], – and there [question 14] the idea of act and potency is treated of; however the major can be denied, – it suffices that there be respect and foundation, – and it is precisely false about respect, because it is of itself

119. And as to what is added that ‘one must be in the other’ [n.115], I concede that the relation is in the foundation or the root, but this is not as act is in potency but as identically contained in the infinite sea [sc. the divine essence, n.131].

120. In another way [sc. to the issue in n.119] it can be said that all these propositions are true, ‘deity is in the Father, paternity is in the Father’, ‘the Father is in deity or in the divine nature, paternity is in deity’, and yet no ‘in’ there is as act in potency.

121. For the first proposition is true as nature is in the supposit, having quidditative ‘being’ by it (because this belongs to quiddity whence it is quiddity [n.112]), but not for this reason is it a form informing the supposit, even in the case of creatures [nn.132, 138].

122. The second [n.120] is true as the hypostatic form is in the hypostasis, – but it does not inform it; for as well the quiddity as the hypostatic form, even in the case of creatures, although it is the form of the supposit, yet is not an informing form, but is there [in creatures] as a part [sc. as Socrateity-humanity is in Socrates], while here it is as one formal idea concurring with another [sc. as paternity-deity], formally, to the same simple thing that yet has in it several formal ideas.

123. The third [n.120] is true as the supposit in the nature, – plainly not as informing it [n.147].

124. The fourth [n.120] is true in the same way of ‘in’ [sc. the same as in n.123], because in the way a whole is first in something, in the same way the part is *per se* but not first in the same thing, – it is plain about being in place; therefore if the Father is first in nature, as the supposit of nature, paternity ‘will be *per se* in the same nature’ in the same way of being ‘in’, although not first.

125. In addition to this, the prior response [n.119] gives the manner of ‘in’ – which is that of relation in the foundation – which is not reduced to the being of form in matter save where the foundation is limited, in that it does not have the relation perfectly identically in itself.

126. [Difficulty 2] – The second difficulty is how relation can distinguish the person and not distinguish the essence without the relation having the idea of act, – because it belongs to act to distinguish, *Metaphysics* 7.13.1039a7.

127. I reply. I concede that relation is a personal act, not a quidditative act, – because it distinguishes personally and not quidditatively. But the essence is quidditative act and distinguishes quidditatively; but the quidditative act is simply perfect, because infinite, – but the personal act is not thus of itself formally infinite.

128. And if you say that ‘the distinguishing act is an act of what does not distinguish’, it is false, unless what does not distinguish is distinguished by a distinguishing act, as it is in creatures; humanity is distinguished in Socrates and Plato by *a* and *b*, and therefore the distinguishing act there – even distinguishing individually – is an act of what does not distinguish, because the distinguishing act distinguishes the nature itself, which does not distinguish. It is not so here [sc. in divine reality], because the personal property does not distinguish the essence, nor does it contract or determine it.

129. [Difficulty 3] – The third difficulty is how a relation can exist without requiring the proper idea of foundation. For the foundation seems to be prior to the

related to the foundation. When there [in the *Collations*] the minor is denied, – on the contrary: ‘the person is *per se* one formally’ etc.”

relation and is as it were perfectible by it, and not conversely; for a relation does not seem to be perfected by its foundation, because then it would be presupposed to its foundation. Therefore since the essence is the foundation of these relations, it seems to be quasi-matter.

130. I reply. In the case of creatures the order of generation and the order of perfection are contraries, as is clear from *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a4-5, because “things that are prior in generation are posterior in perfection;” and the reason is that creatures proceed from potency to act, and so from the imperfect to the perfect, – and therefore by way of generation the imperfect is reached before the perfect is. But, when going to what is simply first, it must be the case that the ‘same thing’ is simply first both in origin and in perfection (even according to the Philosopher, *ibid.*), because the whole order of generation is reduced to some first thing of perfection, as to the first thing of the whole origin. In divine reality, therefore, the order of generation and the order of perfection must be understood together.

131. Just as in creatures, then, if those two orders were always uniformly to come together, we would not seek first for the matter which underlies the form and then, second, for the form, but we would seek first for the form which would be of a nature to give act to the matter, and second we would seek for the matter which would be of a nature to receive being through that form, or the supposit which is of a nature to subsist through that form, – so it is in divine reality. Beginning from the first moment of nature, altogether first arises divine nature as it is being through itself and from itself, which does not belong to any created nature, because no created nature has being naturally before it is in a supposit. But this essence – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 – is that by which the Father is and that by which the Son is, although it is not that by which the Father is Father and the Son is Son. To this essence, then, considered in the most abstract way, as prior to all the personal features, there belongs being through itself, and in this first moment it arises not as something receptive of some perfection, but as infinite perfection, able indeed in the second moment of nature to be communicated to another; not communicated to matter as an informing form, but to supposit as quiddity, as to what exists formally through it. And thus do the relations – as some say – ‘sprout up’ from it and the persons ‘sprout up’ in it; not as certain quasi-forms, giving being to it, or as certain quasi-supposits, in which it receives the being which simply belongs to it, but as supposits to which it gives ‘being’ as that by which they are formally supposits, and by which they are God; and so the sprouting relation – if it is *per se* subsistent – sprouts up, not as form of the essence, but as naturally being God by the very deity formally, although not by deity as informing, but as existing the same with it, in the most perfect identity; but, conversely, in no way is the relation of the essence as being that by which essence is formally determined or contracted or in any way actuated by it, because all these things are repugnant to the infinity of essence as it first occurs under the idea of infinite act.

132. I concede then that essence is the foundation of these relations [n.129], but not a foundation quasi-potential receiving them, but foundation as by way of form, in which those forms are born and are to subsist, – not indeed by informing, as likeness does in whiteness, – but as the subsistent is said to exist in the nature, as Socrates is said to subsist in humanity, because ‘Socrates is a man by humanity’. You will not then have from the idea of foundation the idea of potency or quasi-potentiality in the divine essence,

but you will have precisely the idea of form – as that by which the relation founded in it simply is God.

133. An example of this can be taken in the case of creatures by positing there a certain '*per impossibile*'. Increase happens now by the fact that food coming to the body is corrupted, and its matter receives the form of flesh, and is thus informed by the soul. Let it be posited that, while the same matter remains, it is of a nature to receive some part of the form [sc. of flesh] (as is posited in the case of rarefaction); the matter remains one, which was formed before and now is formed with a new form, – it itself however is formally truly changed, because it passes from privation to form. – Let us posit, on the other side, that the same soul would perfect first one part of the body (as the heart), but after another part of the organic body arrives, perfectible by the soul, the soul would perfect the part that *de novo* arrives, – and the soul itself would yet not be changed, because there would not be in it first privation and later form. For privation is a lack in that which is naturally apt to receive [what is lacked]; but the soul, first non-informing and later informing, is not of a nature to receive anything but to give something.

134. In each of these extremes there is truly production of some product, but in the first there is change and not in the second.

135. The example will seem more apt if we posit that the matter of the animated heart is able to be communicated the same to diverse forms – as of the hand and foot – and this by the active virtue of the animated heart producing those composites from its own communicated matter and from those forms; this would truly be production of all the things having the same matter, and it would go along with change of that matter; but if, on the other side, we posit that the soul – because of its lack of limitation in idea of act and form – can be communicated to many things and, by virtue of the soul in the heart, is communicated to hand and foot, produced by the animated heart, this would truly be production of many things consubstantial in form, without change of that form.

136. In each example [nn.133, 135] let the products be posited to be *per se* subsistents, not parts of the same thing, because to be a part belongs to imperfection. With this posited, the second mode in each example, which is about the communication of form to the product, perfectly represents production in God, but not the first, which is about the communication of matter, – and this while still adding to the position that the soul in the heart and hand and foot is not the informing form, because being composable involves imperfection, but is the total form by which they are subsistent and are animated; so that deity is not understood to be communicated to quasi-matter; rather, to subsistent relations – if the persons are posited relatively – deity is communicated by way of form, not informing form, but form by which the relation or the subsisting relative is God.

137. And the essence does not therefore inform the relation, nor conversely, but there is perfect identity. – But essence has the mode of form with respect to relation, just like nature with respect to the supposit, insofar as it is that by which the subsisting relation is God. Conversely, however, in no way is the relation an act of the essence, because just as relation (says Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50) 'does not determine the nature but the hypostasis', so it is not an act of nature but of the hypostasis; likewise, when relation informs the foundation, the supposit is said to be related *per se* in the second mode according to that foundation, just as Socrates is alike in whiteness or by whiteness; but the Father is not Father by deity, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, – therefore there is not here such a mode of relation to the foundation as

there is in other things, because here the foundation is not actuated through the relation, but the relation is only the act of the supposit or is the supposit.

138. I say briefly that relation and essence are in the person such that neither of them is form informing the other, but they are perfectly the same, although not formally. But as they are not formally the same, the relation in no way perfects the essence, nor is it the formal term received in the essence, but the essence in this way is the form of the relation, because it is that by which the relation is and is likewise God, – and also, the essence is the formal term of generation [n.64], just as in creatures nature is the formal term of generation but not an individual act.

139. [Difficulty 4] – Against this it is objected that ‘the formal term of generation is communicated, therefore it presupposes that to which it is communicated; but the essence does not presuppose relation but conversely, therefore essence is not communicated to relation [from Henry]’, – and it can be the fourth difficulty; because something is communicated there, and it will be the formal term, and it will presuppose that to which it is communicated; but essence cannot presuppose the relation to which it is communicated but conversely, – therefore conversely, – and so relation is communicated to essence, and then relation will be the formal term of production and essence the quasi-matter.

140. I respond. Because production is of some first term – that is of an adequate term – which includes in it something in the idea of formal term of the very production and something in idea of subsistence in such term [nn.27-28, 97], therefore it is a contradiction for these to be separated in respect of production, namely the formal term and the idea of subsistence, namely insofar as they have being by production, although absolutely there would be a priority of one to the other (even to the ‘separated without contradiction’), considering them absolutely, not insofar as they have being through production, – although there would there too be a priority of perfection, because one would be more perfect than the other, – because nature is more perfect by reason of subsistence (even in creatures), and from this it follows that nature is the formal term of production, because no simple entity more perfect than the formal term of production has being through production [n.67].

141. Then to the form of the argument I say that the thing communicated ‘insofar as it is communicated by production’ does not presuppose that to which it is communicated, nor conversely, because the communication is not to something already existing, as it is in the case of alteration, – but it is to something so that it simply exist; therefore neither is nature communicated before the production of the supposit (because then it would be communicated also to something non-produced), nor conversely, although absolutely it is communicated first in the proper idea of supposit – in priority of perfection and in priority of being without each other – in the case of creatures; to the first priority in the case of creatures there corresponds here in God that the essence is formally infinite, the relation however is not.

III. To the Arguments of the Opinion of Others

142. To the arguments for the opinion. To the first, from Augustine *Against Maximinus* [n.53]: it is plain how the Son is in no way from nothing, but is truly from the substance of the Father [nn.98-103].

143. But if you ask, once origination and consubstantiality have been posited, there is still the question: is it as from matter or from quasi-matter that the Son is from? – I reply that there is no matter or quasi-matter there, and so let him not be from anything.

And you ask further – therefore from nothing? – It does not follow; but what follows is that therefore he is not from any matter.

But you will say, then he is a creature. – I say it is false, because a creature exists after nothing, that is, after the non-being of itself and of whatever is in it; not so the Son, – not only because his being is eternal, but also because, as he is the second person, so his formal being is prior in origin in the first person.

144. To the other, from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.55]: it is of no value for the proposed position [n.46], as was expounded in the preceding question [n.25].

145. As for the argument of others that ‘essence is subjectively generated’ [n.59], from the false is inferred the false.¹⁴⁶

146. To the arguments they give [n.145]:

To the first [n.60] I say that here there are not any terms corresponding to generation as it is change, because there is nothing here that is as it were in any way first under privation and later under form. But the terms of generation as generation is change are privation and form, but generation as production has as term the product itself [n.95]; now generation does not thus have a term ‘from which’ except by speaking of the productive principle, and thus the terms of generation are producer and product; and from this it does not follow that something is a quasi-subject, but there follows from it – if generation is univocal – that something is common to the generating and the generated, and this I concede, but it is not common as matter but as form or act, in both of them.

147. When the argument is next put ‘about generation and term’ [n.61], the response is plain, that relation is not in substance as form in matter, but if the person there is relative, then relation is in essence as the property of the supposit is in nature [sc. as Socrateity is in Socrates, nn.109, 113, 124];¹⁴⁷ but to be in something as a supposit or idea of supposit in nature entails nothing about being ‘in’ as form is in matter, although, when nature is imperfect, the individual property in some way informs nature, as was said in the third article of the solution, in the first difficulty [n.109].

148. When it is argued third that ‘to every active potency there corresponds a passive potency’ etc. [n.62], I reply: to the first active power there does not correspond any passive power, as is plain about the power of creating, – and this speaking properly of passive power as that in which, or from which, something is produced; however to the

¹⁴⁶ From Henry’s [false] opinion that the Son is generated from the substance of the Father as from quasi-matter [n.52] is inferred the [false] conclusion that essence is subjectively generated.

¹⁴⁷ Note of Scotus: “But it is objected: in the way in which generation precedes the Son – according to way of understanding – in what is it? Not in essence as essence is in the Father, because as it is in him it is not had by generation, – nor as it is in the Son, because it precedes him; and it is in something because it is not *per se* subsistent (because then it would be a person; not the first person, – therefore the second person would precede the Son) [sc. so it must be in ‘essence after the Father’ and so essence will be the subject of generation].

Response: in what is generation-passion? – it is the same question, nay a more difficult one because here can be given what is ‘in essence’ in a double way, both as in a foundation and as property of a person in the nature – in which the person is – and both without potentiality of essence; nor is the second way [sc. as property of a person in the nature] more difficult than about relation, because passive generation is the same property as filiation – only conceived in a different way.”

active power there corresponds some passive power which they [followers of Henry] call ‘objective power’, – which is producible power, – and in this way I concede that if the Father is actively fecund, that the Son is producible, but from this does not follow some power of quasi-matter, just as it does not follow in the case of creation.

149. When finally it is argued ‘about fire’ [n.62], I say that if fire were to generate from itself, it would communicate to the thing generated its form as formal term of the generation; but its substance would not be in potency to the form of generating, if fire itself were perfectly something productive, – for then there would not be required another co-causing cause. So it is in the proposed case: the first principle – and not another principle (in the same not another genus of principle) – does not require something else concurring with it to be principle.

IV. To the Arguments

150. [To the Principal Arguments] – When it is argued to the principal from Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.46] I reply: Augustine subjoins in the same place: “as if one thing there were substance and another were person.”

Likewise, I concede that a person is not properly said to be from the essence absolutely, but when adding along with the substance some originating person it is well said that some originated person is of the substance of that person, such that this proposition ‘the Son is from the divine essence’ is not to be conceded in the way that this proposition is ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’, because by the second is expressed consubstantiality and origination, on account of the genitive [‘of the Father’] construed with the causal case of the preposition [‘from the substance’], – but by the first nothing originating is indicated.

151. To the other [n.47] one must say that although Augustine says the Son is ‘Son of the substance of the Father’ (*On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37, n.49), and a certain doctor [Henry] says this proposition is a proper one, – yet it seems more probable that whenever a relative [‘Son’] is construed with something [‘substance’] in that sort of causal relationship [‘of’] in which something naturally terminates the relative as its correlative, then it is construed with it [‘Son of the substance’] precisely as with its correlative [‘Son of the Father’]. – An example. ‘Father’ is construed with the relative in the genitive case [‘of the father’], ‘similar’ in the dative case [‘similar to...’], ‘greater’ in the ablative case [‘greater than...’]. According to common speech, it seems that with whatever ‘such a [determinate] relative’ is construed in ‘such a causal [genitive] case’, it is indicated to be the correlative of the relative [sc. ‘son of the father/of man/of substance’]; for we do not say ‘this dog is the son of a man’ because it is a son and is of a man as of the dog’s master, such that ‘of a man’ is construed with ‘dog’ by force of possession or possessor, but ‘of a man’ seems to indicate that it is construed with ‘dog’ in the idea of relation, as with ‘of the father’.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ In other words [to quote the note of the editors of the Vatican edition], although we can say that a dog is a son [of some dog] and is of a man [as of its master], common speech does not allow us to go

152. Thus therefore in the phrase ‘the Son of the essence’, it seems that essence is taken as the correlative of the relative with which it is construed. – And then the authority of Augustine [n.151] ought to be expounded as he himself expounds it [sc. and not as Henry does, n.49]: “‘of the Son of his charity,’ – that is ‘of the Son of his delight’.”

153. And then to this argument [n.151]: when it is argued that on the phrase ‘from the essence’ follows the phrase that he is ‘of the essence’, – I deny the consequence, because the consequent indicates that the relation between the Son and the essence is like that of a correlative; and this the antecedent does not indicate, but it only indicates consubstantiality in the essence, along with origination, indicated in the thing that is construed with essence.

154. To the final one [n.48] I say that ‘from’ [as in ‘the Son is from the substance of the Father’] does not indicate only identity, but it indicates identity of the noun it governs [‘substance’] (and this in the idea of form) and distinction of that which is added to that noun [‘of the Father’] as originating principle, in the way said before [n.99].

155. [To the arguments for the opposite] – To the arguments for the opposite:

To that from *On the Trinity* XV [n.49] the response has been given [n.152].

156. To the one from *Against Maximinus* [n.50] the response is plain too from what has been said [nn.98-101].

157. To the final one [n.51], about ‘son’ in the case of creatures, – the response is plain from what was said in the solution of the question, because the ‘from’, which pertains to the idea of filiation, does not state the idea of material cause [n.104], but rather it is enough if that from which the son is be a form common to father and son and be, not the subject of generation, but the formal term of it [n.105].

on to say ‘the dog is a son of a man’ because here ‘of a man’ indicates paternity and not, as it did originally, mastership.

Book One

Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God the Father generated God the Son by Will

1. Concerning the sixth distinction I ask whether God the Father generated God the Son by will.

That he did:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17, after the other treatments of the production of the persons, says: “Do you wish to hear a brief word about what he have said? The fact that the ungenerated wishes to have from himself someone who is of the same form and dignity seems to me to be the same as that he generates a Son; and the fact that both generated and ungenerated wish to have someone of the same love seems to be the same as that they produce the Holy Spirit.” Thus, that the Father wants to have someone of the same form is to generate; therefore just as he wants by will to have someone of the same form, so he generated by will.

2. From the same authority there is the following argument: in the same manner Richard concedes that ‘willing as it is of the Father’ is related to generating in the way that ‘willing as it is of the Father and Son’ is related to inspiring; but now the Holy Spirit is inspired formally by the will ‘as it is of the Father and Son’; therefore etc.

3. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.7 (and the quote is placed in [Lombard’s] *Sentences* I d.20 ch.3 n.189) says: “If the Father did not generate the Son equal to himself, either he did not want to or he was not able to; if he did not want to, then he was envious.” – From this as follows: for envy only pertains to those things that are taken away by will and can be communicated by will, just as I am not envious if I do not make you wise because I cannot make science to be in your soul; therefore the Father generated an equal Son by will, because according to the aforesaid authority he would be envious if he did not generate an equal Son.

4. Again, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a26-30: “Everything involuntary is painful;” there is nothing painful in divine reality, therefore there is nothing involuntary there; therefore the son is generated by will.

5. Again, the Word is love, as is plain, – and it is produced, because according to Hilary *On the Trinity* IV ch.10: “the Son has nothing save what is born;” the principle of produced love is the will; therefore etc.

If it be said that it is love concomitantly, because first it is produced knowledge; – there is the same principle with respect to the first formal term as to anything concomitant with that term.

6. To the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8: “Generation is a work of nature;” and the Master [Lombard] in the text [I d.6 ch. un. n.69], and it is a quote from Augustine [Ps.-Augustine *Dialogue on 65 Questions* q.7]: “The will cannot precede knowledge.”

I. To the Question

7. In this question there seem to be two difficulties: one, in what way the Father generates the Son willingly, – the other how the fact may be saved that the Father does not generate the Son by the will as by productive principle.

A. How the Father generates the Son willingly

8. [The opinion of others] – As to the first article [n.7] the argument is given [from Godfrey of Fontaines] that the Father does not generate the Son ‘willingly’ but only by natural necessity (the way fire heats), although once the act of generating has been as it were posited the will of the Father is as it were much pleased.

9. The argument is as follows: the intellection of the Father precedes the will in some way; but the intellection of the Father as it is of the Father seems to be the generation of the Word as it is of the Son; therefore the generation of the Son as it is of the Son precedes any volition of the Father.

The first proposition [the major] is evident from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. – I prove the second [the minor], because there are not two acts of the same power, for powers are distinguished by acts, *On the Soul* 2.4.415a18-20; but to generate the Son or to speak the Word – which is the same thing in God – belongs to the intellective power, and so similarly does to understand; therefore to speak is formally to understand something, and it only belongs to the Father as to the Father generating; therefore etc.

10. [Against the opinion] – This reasoning rests on a false minor, namely on the identity of to understand and to speak, – and from it there follows a false conclusion, namely that the Father does not properly speak willingly. First then [nn.11-12] I show the falsity of the minor, second [n.13] that the ‘false consequent [conclusion]’ follows, third [n.14] I reply to the proof of the false minor, fourth [n.15] I show how the false consequent should be avoided and the opposite held, which is the principal point in this article [n.7].

11. On the first point [the falsity of the minor, n.10], I argue against the identity of these two, to understand and to speak, as follows:

First: to understand is a perfection simply; to speak is not; therefore they are not formally the same. Proof of the first proposition [the major]: the Father, as to intellect, is formally blessed by intellection, – and, as to will, by volition; but he is only blessed by perfection simply; therefore, etc. – Proof of the second proposition [the minor]: in that case [sc. if to speak were a perfection simply] the Son and the Holy Spirit would not be simply perfect, because they do not speak – taking to speak in this way – because they do not express word.

12. Second thus: because just as in creatures the idea of action and of making are formally distinguished (because action is ultimate term, – but of making the term is other, the thing produced by the making), so in divine reality the operation by which the Father formally operates seems to be distinguished from the production by which he formally produces; and this seems so because operation has an object as it were presupposed, but production has a term that is produced by it. Therefore to understand – which is the

operation of the Father – is not formally to speak, which is the production of the Son by the Father.¹⁴⁹

13. To the second point [that the false consequent follows, n.10], which is also a confirmation of the first point, I argue thus:¹⁵⁰ just as in the case of our intellect, when it naturally has its first intellection – which is not in our power –, the will is able to be much pleased in the intellection already posited, but properly speaking we do not elicit the act willingly but we will it to be, when it has been elicited, thus it would follow that, if to understand were formally to speak, the Father would not formally generate willingly, although the generating would later in some way much please the Father.

14. About the third point [the proof of the false minor, n.10], to the proposition ‘powers are distinguished by acts’, – I respond thus, that action in creatures is taken in one way for action in the genus of action, in another way for second act, which is an absolute quality, as was expounded before [I d.3 nn.601-604]. Of one power, then, there is only one act when speaking of the latter act only or of the former act only – but of one power there can very well be a double act, one of which acts is an action and the other is in the genus of quality; just as our intellect, which is of the sort that ‘to generate a word’ is action in the genus of action, yet it has another act in the genus of quality, namely the generated knowledge. So in the proposed case: the divine intellect has one act corresponding to our intellection, which is a quality, namely the act by which the intellect of the Father formally understands, – it also has an act corresponding to act in the genus of action, by which it expresses the Word. – A certain doctor [Henry of Ghent] says otherwise, that the intellect as it is intellect has the act which is to understand, – but that it also has the act which is to speak, according to the fact it has already been made to be in act by understanding; but this was rejected in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.273-280, 290-296], where it was argued that the first act – which is to understand – is not the formal idea of generating the Word.

15. I say then about the fourth point [avoiding the false consequent, n.10] that the Father does in this way willingly generate, – because in the first moment of origin the Father understands formally, and then also he can have the act of willing¹⁵¹ formally; in the second moment of origin he generates the Son; and he does not will the generating by a volition that follows the generating, but by a volition possessed in the first moment of origin, by which the Father formally wills, presupposing already in some way the intellection by which the Father understands, but not presupposing already the generating of the Word.

B. How the Father does not Generate the Son by Will as by Productive Principle

¹⁴⁹ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This conclusion I concede.”

¹⁵⁰ Text cancelled by Scotus: “because otherwise [sc. if to understand and to speak were formally the same], how it is that the Father generates the Son willingly would not be saved well, as was argued in the first argument [nn.11-12] – unless because he naturally generates so as later to will the generation already posited.”

¹⁵¹ Note by Scotus: “‘of willing’: – true, as to whatever is then known; the generating of the Son is not pre-known to its existence in itself. – Response: the essence is known, it can be willed not only in itself but as to be communicated; therefore, willing the essence to be communicated, he generates the Son, and thus he is willing, not to generate as it is to generate, but as it is a sort of to communicate.”

16. As to the second article [n.7], it seems that the Father does not produce the Son by will as by productive principle, because a productive principle of one idea in divine reality cannot have two productions; for there is no production of one idea there save a single production, because it is an adequate production; since therefore the Holy Spirit is produced by way of will as of productive principle, the Son will not be thus produced.

17. But in this article there is a difficulty, on account of the word of Augustine, because he seems to attribute generation to will in us as to productive principle, *On the Trinity* IX ch.7 n.13: “the word is conceived in us by love;” and by the same, ch.11 n.16, ch.3 n.6: “The will itself, in the way it was moving the sense to be formed by the object and, when it was formed, uniting it, so in this way it was converting the mental vision of the remembering soul to memory;” and in the same, ch.4 n.7: “The will, which brings hither and thither and brings back the mental vision that is to be formed and conjoins it when it is formed.” There are also many similar passages. – Therefore he intends that will have the idea of turning back mental vision before generation, and of retaining it in act.

18. Thus then it seems that in the Trinity – whose image is in the soul – the will has there some idea of principle with respect to production and generating, or has the idea of some superior applying a proximate principle to its act, just as it does in us.

The consequence is confirmed, because thus to conjoin belongs to the will from its perfection, insofar namely as it is first in the kingdom of the soul; therefore it belongs most of all to the most noble will.

19. The fact is also argued for in us, because if our generating were merely natural, it would in no way be in the power of the will, – and so we would always have the same word, about the same object, which is more strongly moving the intellect.

20. As to this article, although some [Henry] make a distinction that the ‘by will’ can be held adverbially, so that the sense is ‘he generated by will’, that is ‘he generated willingly’, – or it can be held ablatively, and then it indicates the cause and elicitive principle with respect to generating, and then the proposition is false, – but however it may be with this distinction, it does not seem that one should concede that the Father has produced the Son by will such that the will is the proximate or remote principle. That it is not the proximate principle has been proved [n.16], because a principle of one idea is only principle of one production; but that it is also not the remote principle is plain, because just as the will, as it is the operative principle in some way, operates posteriorly to the intellect, – so, as it is in some way the productive principle, it produces posteriorly to the intellect, and thus it will be a superior or prior cause in a production that belongs properly to the intellect.

21. However, because of the authorities of Augustine [n.17], one must understand that in us there is not only a single act of understanding (taking ‘act’ in the genus of quality), nor only a single act of generating (taking ‘act’ for action in the genus of action), because if there were only the single latter act and only the single former act, and the latter and the former act were the same, – our will would have no causality, either with respect to the act of understanding which is of the genus of quality, or with respect to the act of generating which is of the genus of action. In divine reality, therefore, since there is in the Father only a single act of understanding, with respect to that act the will of the Father will not have any idea of principle or cause, – since too there is only one act of speaking, the will with respect to it will not have the idea of principle, because the will –

being principle in the way it is operator – in some way follows the intellect; therefore the act of speaking precedes every way of the will's being a principle. But the will can have, as being well pleased – not as being principle –, an act with respect to the generating, from the fact that the will, as operating in the Father, does not presuppose the generating but only the intellection by which the Father formally understands.

22. But in us the authorities of Augustine are true, because the will moves mental vision to the act of knowing and holds it in knowing [n.17], – because once our first act has been posited, whether of the genus of quality or of the genus of action, we can have other later acts from the command of the will; but in the Father the will does not move the intelligence of the Father as needing to be formed by the memory of the Father, because there is in the Father only a single intellection formally, which precedes in some way the production of the Word, – nor does it move the memory with the object itself, so that the Word may be generated.

23. Against this [nn.21-22] there is an argument that Augustine understands it not only in us but also in God, because Augustine never seems to assign an act to the will as it is the third part of the image [of God], save that which is conjoining the parent with the offspring, and in this way it has some causality with respect to the generating of the offspring; therefore this part, as it is part of the image, will represent nothing in the prototype unless the divine will in some way has to conjoin in this way.

24. I reply. Although he frequently assigns that act to the will – as it is part of the image – yet sometimes he assigns another one to it, namely 'love of the same object' (which is the 'object' of the memory and intelligence), as is apparent in *On the Trinity* XV ch.20 n.39: "Hence it is possible," he says, "for eternal and immutable nature to be recollected, considered, and desired" (which authority is set down at distinction 3 of the last question, I d.3 n.591); for there he expressly posits a trinity "in memory, intelligence, and will" as they have an act about the same object, namely uncreated truth. Likewise in XIV ch.8 n.11 he posits a trinity in the mind insofar as "it remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself." He also touches on both acts in XV ch.3 n.5: "The mind and the knowledge, by which it knows itself, – and the love by which it loves itself and its knowledge."

25. And these two acts come well together in our will, because in loving the object the will also loves the knowledge of the same object, and from love of the object it moves the intelligence to understanding it, uniting it to memory (from which it is formed), and holding it in such uniting, and by this in actual understanding of one object.

26. Now of these two acts of the will, the more principal one in us is that which is 'love of the object', because it is sometimes cause of love, – but the other act, namely 'love of the act', is more universal, because even in respect of a bad object we love the act of knowing, although not the object, as Augustine says IX ch.10 n.15: "I define intemperance, and this is the word for it; I enjoy defining, although I do not enjoy incontinence."

27. The will then in us, as it is part of the image, represents will in God, not as to the act of uniting, which belongs to our will, but as to the other act, namely insofar as our will is the principle of producing an act about the same object as belonged to our memory and intelligence; for will in divine reality is a principle of producing love adequate to the divine essence, which is the first object of the divine memory and intelligence and will, – and the love produced is the Holy Spirit, to whom corresponds in us the love produced,

and this love is frequently called will by Augustine; but will properly in us – which is a power – does not correspond to the Holy Spirit but to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son, and this according to the act by which the will in us has to produce love of the object understood, though not primarily, to the extent it has to produce love of generated knowledge, and in no way, moreover, to the extent it is a superior cause of generated knowledge; if indeed the inspiriting force is the principle of producing the Holy Spirit in divine reality, who is love of the divine essence and also love of generated knowledge, – although perhaps according to a certain order, – yet the inspiriting force is in no way the productive principle of generated knowledge, because although the Father in the first moment of origin is willing and in the second moment generates, yet the will of the Father does not have the idea of principle with respect to the generating of the Word. – Thus then is it plain how the Father willingly generates and yet not by will as formal elicitive principle of generation.

28. However, as to Augustine's intention 'about the intention of uniting the parent with the offspring' [n.23], a certain doctor [Henry] says that the uniting intention – speaking in respect of the act of sensing – is 'inclination', made in the power by the sensible species. Hence the five things that that doctor posits (namely sensible object, species, and made intention, and power of sensing, and act of sensing), he proves by one authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XI ch.2 n.2, – and when Augustine enumerates 'intention', saying that "'the intention of the spirit' detains the sense of the eyes;" "behold the third," says that doctor [Henry], "for what 'detains' the sense is not other than the excitation by the said inclination; but Augustine calls it" (according to him) "intention of the spirit causally, because by it the sense of the spirit becomes intent on perceiving the object."

29. But this is not to the intention of Augustine there, because in the same place – distinguishing these things from each other – he says of intention that "it is the third of the soul alone;" therefore, according to him, the intention which was 'the third' is not the excitation or inclination through the species; likewise, the 'third' is attributed to the will of which he says later that "the will carries the mental vision hither and thither" etc., – which is not true of inclination but only of will and the power of the soul.

II. To the Principal Arguments

30. To the principal arguments. – To the first, when Richard says "this seems to me" etc. [n.1], – this does not 'seem' to Augustine, that the to will of the Father is formally to generate, because he says *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15 that the Holy Spirit proceeds "in some way given, not in some way born," – that is, by way of will, freely, and not by way of nature; and therefore one should expound Richard to mean 'concomitantly'.

31. To the second [n.3] I say that 'envy' exists in taking away not only goods that can be communicated by an act of will, immediately, but also anything that 'willing' can communicate; but the Father willing generates, as was said [n.15], and therefore the argument of Augustine about 'envy' holds.

32. To the third [n.4] I say that nothing is involuntary there, and therefore the generation of the Son is not involuntary (which I concede), – but it does not follow further 'therefore it is by will as by elicitive principle': for we make many things –

whether with will preceding or with it being concomitant – of which the immediate principle is not will, but nature is in the case of some, necessity in the case of others, and others things of the sort in the case of others, etc.

Book One

Seventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Power of Generating in the Father is something Absolute or a Property of the Father

1. Concerning the seventh distinction I ask whether the power of generating in the Father is something absolute or a property of the Father.

That it is a property of the Father, – proof:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.5 n.6: “He is Father by the fact he has a Son,” therefore he is Father by the fact he generates; the proof of the consequence is that he has a Son by generation. But he is Father by paternity; therefore he generates by paternity.

2. Or thus: ‘he is Father by paternity, therefore he generates by paternity’; or thus: ‘he generates by deity, therefore he is Father by deity’. – Response: neither consequence is valid, because the ablative when along with a verb [‘he generates by paternity/deity’] signifies the principle of acting, when along with an adjectival or concrete name [‘he is Father by paternity/deity’] signifies the formal concerning principal [e.g. as a white thing is white by whiteness]. But as it is, to be ‘that by which he is formally such’ should not be the same as to be ‘that by which he elicitively acts’, although to be such and to act are convertible with respect to the acting supposit; nor is the added phrase the same, because the ablative cannot be construed uniformly with the latter and the former statements, but there is a figure of speech in the first mode [‘similar termination’, Peter of Spain *Logical Summaries* tr.7 n.35, Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.166b10-14], because ‘similar termination’ indicates identity of concept – with the latter and with the former – although the concept is different.¹⁵²

3. Again, by reason:

The act proper is from the proper form of the agent; but to generate is the act proper of the Father; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: both because the proper form gives being, therefore it also gives acting, – and also because, if the form is common, the effect is common too, because cause and effect correspond to each other, universal to universal and particular to particular, *Physics* 2.3.195b25-27 and *Metaphysics* 5.2.1014a10-13.

4. Again, the middle term belongs to the same genus as the extremes; but the supposit, which are the extremes, are relatives; therefore that by which the supposit acts – which is the middle between them – is a relative.

5. Again, potency belongs to the same genus as act, nay in divine reality they are the same thing; but the act of generating is a relation; therefore the principle too will be a relation, or a relative.

6. To the contrary:

¹⁵² The point seems to be that though ‘by paternity/deity’ are the same in verbal form (having in Latin a similar ablative termination) as to each statement, ‘he is Father by paternity/deity’ and ‘he generates by paternity/deity’, yet they are different in concept, because in the first statement they indicate the formal principle and in the second the acting principle.

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.8 says: “Generation is the work of nature” [I d.6 n.6]; but it is not of the nature as of the one generating, because the nature does not generate; therefore it is the work of the nature as of the principle of generating.

7. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* V ch.37: “From the virtue of the nature the Son by nativity subsists in the same nature.”

8. Again, the Master [Lombard] in the text: “the Father is not powerful save by nature,” – and he is speaking of the power of generating; therefore etc.

I. The Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

9. There is here an opinion [Aquinas *ST* Ia q.41 a.5] of this sort, that that by which the Father generates is essence, – for the following reason, that the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts; but the Son is assimilated to the Father in essence, not in property; therefore etc.

10. And there is a clarification of the reason, that just as in creatures the individual property is not the idea of the acting but the nature is, in which the individuals agree, so in divine reality the personal property – which corresponds to the individual property in creatures – will not be the idea of the acting or generating.

11. Against this [n.9] there are multiple arguments. – First thus: every form sufficiently elicitive of some action, if it exists *per se*, acts *per se* with that action (example: if heat is a sufficiently heating power, separated heat heats); therefore if deity is the generative power, and it is agreed that it is sufficient, – it follows that if deity exists *per se* then it will *per se* generate. But deity exists in itself – in some way – before it is understood to exist in a person, because deity as deity is *per se* being, such that the three persons exist *per se* by deity itself and not conversely (Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9, ch.5 n.10: “God subsists for himself;” and later: “for God to exist is this, to subsist”); therefore in the first moment of nature in which deity is understood, before it is understood in a person, it will generate, – and thus deity considered as such is distinguished from the generated.

12. If it be said that deity does not have ‘*per se* being’ save in a person, and therefore it does not *per se* act but the person *per se* acts, – on the contrary: the argument proves the opposite, that if heat, having *per se* participated being, were, by a miracle, to exist *per se*, it could *per se* operate with the operation of which it is the principle; therefore the essence itself, which is ‘*per se* being’ of itself (it does not, however, participate ‘*per se* being’), will be able *per se* to be an agent with the action of which it is the elicitive principle in the supposit, and so the argument [n.11] stands.

13. Second thus: the producer and the form by which it produces have the same relation to the product. This is taken from the Philosopher *Physics* 2.3.195b21-25, *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b30-33, where he means that art and the builder pertain to the same genus of cause. Therefore the producer and that by which the producer produces pertain to the same genus of principle, and so, if the essence is that by which the Father generates, the essence will have a real relation to the one generated; this is false, therefore etc.

14. Again, third: the form, insofar as it is that in which the generator and the generated are assimilated, only has the unity of idea, therefore it only has the being of idea; therefore, according to this, it is not the elicitive principle of real action.

15. Again, fourth: the form is only the principle of acting insofar as the agent is in act by it, but the agent is not in act by it save insofar as it is in the agent; but as it is in the agent it is a 'this'; therefore it is principle as a 'this'.

16. Again, production distinguishes before it assimilates – as is plain (for every production distinguishes but not every production assimilates) – therefore the form which is the principle of production is first a principle of it insofar as form distinguishes before it is a principle of it insofar as form assimilates; the form distinguishes insofar as it is a 'this', and it assimilates insofar as it is a 'form'; therefore it is a productive principle insofar as it is a 'this' before it is so insofar as it is a 'form'.

17. Again, there is an instance against the proof of the argument for the position [n.9]: both because when a brute generates a brute it is assimilated to it in species, and yet the specific form of the brute is not the principle of generating, but the vegetative power is, – therefore the major ['the one generating assimilates to himself the thing generated in the form by which he acts', n.9] seems to be false; and also because in the increase of flesh heat is the active principle (according to the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.4.416a13-14), and yet animated flesh is generated, being similar to the generator in form of vegetative [soul].

B. Second Opinion

18. In another way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that for generation in divine reality one must give some positive principle, because action is positive; but the only positive principles in the divine persons are essence and relation, – but relation cannot be a principle of the production, because relation is not a principle or a term of motion, *Physics* 5.2.225v11-13; therefore essence is. But essence, considered in itself, is indeterminate to several persons and to the actions of several persons, therefore, in order for it to be principle of determinate action, it must be determined; but it is determined by relation, – and therefore relation is posited as a principle, not an elicitive principle but a determinative one.

19. To this there is adduced a confirmation from creatures, where the same form gives the first and the second act [sc. being and action, n.3]; but it is determined to the former and the latter by diverse respects, because to the first it is determined by respect to the subject, and to the second by respect to the object.

20. To the contrary. Of indetermination one sort is of a 'passive power' and another is of an 'active power' unlimited to several effects (an example: as the sun is indeterminate to producing many generable things, not because it receives some form so as to act, but because it has an unlimited productive virtue). What is indeterminate by 'indetermination of matter' [sc. the first sort of indetermination] must receive a form so that it may act, because it is not in act sufficient for acting, but what is indeterminate 'by indetermination of active power' is of itself sufficiently determinate for producing any of the effects; and it is so if the passive disposed thing, when something passive is required, is close by, or of itself when something passive is not required; proof: if such an active thing was of itself determinate to one effect, it could of itself sufficiently produce it, – but

if it is indeterminate to this and to that, the perfection of its causality with respect to such an effect is not taken away by such lack of limitation, but there is only added causality with respect to one or other of them; it can then produce it just as if it were of it alone, and so there is not required anything to determine it.

21. To the intended proposition [n.18]. The divine essence is not a principle that is indeterminate by ‘indetermination of matter’; therefore if it is indeterminate by the indetermination of something else as an active principle, it will be simply determined by the determination that is required for acting, and thus nothing else is required. A confirmation is that such indetermination of an active principle, although it is to disparate things, is yet not to contradictories, but it is determinately to one or other part of the contradiction with respect to any of the disparate things; but no indetermination prevents a thing acting determinately of itself save an indetermination that is in some way to contradictories, as to acting and not-acting; therefore etc.

22. Again second thus: when some active principle is indeterminate to two effects, not equally so but according to a natural order, – it is sufficiently of itself determined to the first of them, and, once the first is in place, to the second;¹⁵³ but the divine essence is not indeterminate equally to those two productions [sc. generation and inspiring], but is related first to generation; therefore it is of itself sufficiently determined to both, because it is of itself determined first to the first – in order of origin – and, with that in place, it is determined to the second, – and so in no moment of origin is it indeterminate to each as each is then to be elicited.

23. Again third: relation is the idea of the acting supposit. Therefore if the relation is determinative of the principle ‘in which’, it will have a double idea of principle with respect to generation: one insofar as it is the idea of the agent, and another insofar as it is the determinative idea of the acting principle, – and so it will mediate between itself and the action.

24. Fourth thus: nature as nature is posited as the elicitive principle of the action. But nature ‘as nature’ is not determinable, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.50: “The properties determine the hypostases, not the nature” ‘as nature’. Therefore nothing is determinative of the principle ‘in which’ as it is the principle ‘in which’, but only of the acting principle.

25. Again, relation according to you differs only in idea from the foundation; therefore it cannot be a determinative principle, in some way distinct from the essence, for a real act, because only something real concurs with the idea of some principle in respect of a real action.

26. Again, what is said of determinative relation in creatures [n.19] seems to be false, because heat of itself – not by some intermediate respect – is the foundation with respect to this heating power; also, it is not necessary that the determination to the first and the second act be done through respects, because the same absolute form gives a first

¹⁵³ Note by Scotus: “Note here that the indeterminate thing is determined by itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity, because it would be determined to those effects because it was determined to others, and to those others because it was determined by yet others. – On the contrary: what is determined of itself to one opposite is impossible with the other; again [what is determined of itself to one opposite] is therefore determined to it in anything at all. – Response: this holds of contradictories; to the second, – in anything at all it has been determined, etc. [sc. determined first to the first effect, second to the second etc.]”

absolute and not respective act, and the principle of acting too is absolute and not respective.

II. To the Question

A. On the Distinction of Powers

27. I respond to the question, then, by first making a distinction about ‘power’.

For in one way there is said to be ‘logical power [possibility]’, which states the mode of composition made by the intellect, – and this indicates the non-repugnance of the terms; about which the Philosopher says *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b30-32: “That is possible whose contrary is not by necessity true.” – And if in this way one asks about ‘power’ in divine reality I say that it exists by comparing generation to any act non-repugnant to generation; and then power, or possibility, is of the Father or of God to the predicate that is ‘to generate’, because these terms are not repugnant; but there is an impossibility that the Son or Holy Spirit generate, because these terms are repugnant. And if one ask what is the power of generating in divine reality, there is in this way [sc. of logical possibility] no need to give some principle by which someone is able to generate, – for the sole non-repugnance of the terms suffices; just as if, before the creation of the world, the world not only was not but, *per impossibile*, God was not but began of himself to be, and then was able to create the world, – if there had been an intellect before the world combining the proposition ‘the world will exist’, this proposition would have been possible because the terms were not repugnant, not however because of any principle in possible reality, or any active principle, corresponding to it; nor even so was this proposition ‘the world will be’ possible – formally speaking – by the power of God, but by the possibility that was the non-repugnance of the terms, because the terms would be non-repugnant, although the non-repugnance would be concomitant with the power that is active in respect of this possibility.

28. In another way there is said to be ‘power as divided against act’ [*Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a15-16], – and this power is not in God.

29. So there is left ‘real power’ – which is said to be ‘principle of doing or suffering’ [*ibid.* 5.12.1019a15-20; I d.2 n.262] – as the proximate foundation of relations, because this noun ‘power’ is not abstract with ultimate abstraction, but is concrete with concretion in a foundation (although not with concretion in a subject), – which multiple abstraction in relatives was spoken of above in distinction 5 [I d.5 n.21]. Here however the question is only about the power of acting.

30. And then I draw a distinction, because this noun ‘power’ can be taken for that which it *per se* signifies, or for that which it denominates – which is ‘proximate foundation of such relation’.

31. Power taken in the first way [n.30] I say signifies relation, just as does potentiality or being a principle, – and in this way the question has no difficulty, because ‘the power of generating in divine reality’ essentially states a relation.

32. In the second way [n.30] the question does have a difficulty when one inquires what that ‘absolute’ is which is the proximate foundation of this relation. And then (speaking always precisely of active or productive power, which is what the discussion is now about [n.29]) I draw a further distinction that ‘power denominatively taken’ is sometimes taken for the foundation precisely, but sometimes for the foundation along

with all the other things that come together so that it can elicit the act, namely the things that are required for the idea of proximate power – of which sort in creatures are the coming near of the passive thing and the removal of an impediment.

33. This last distinction of power, of power taken for the foundation precisely or for the foundation along with the other concurring things, is taken from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16 and 9.1.1046a10-11. For the definition of power that he there sets down is of power taken in the first way. But power taken in the second way he himself manifestly expresses in *Metaphysics* 9.5.1047b35-8a2, 5-7, 16-21: “Since,” he says, “the possible is something possible, and when, and how, and anything else that must be present in the definition;” and he subjoins: “in the case of such powers” (namely the irrational powers) “it must be that, when they approach each other so that they can be active and passive, the former must act and the latter must undergo.” And if it be objected against Aristotle that these irrational powers can be impeded, he says excluding this: “When no outside thing impedes, there is no need to add anything further, – for it has power as it is a power of making; now it is not present absolutely but in things that are disposed in some way, where what hinders from outside is excluded; for these – some of the things placed in the definition – remove it” (he means to say that ‘some of the things’ pertaining to the definition of active and possible power exclude impediment, but ‘active power’ here – according to him – is taken ‘along with all the things that come together for proximate possibility of acting’).

34. Again, third, ‘power of generating’ signifies the principle of eliciting the act by the supposit that has the principle. Therefore it connotes a double relation, one the relation of principle to act, and another the relation of act to supposit, – which is to say: it notes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the act and it connotes the relation of the act to the principle ‘which’; and perhaps, third, it connotes the relation of the principle ‘in which’ to the principle ‘which’. Whether there are two relations or three, they are only relations of reason, because of the lack of distinction of the extremes (the first [sc. the relation of principle to act] belongs to paternity as to proximate foundation). – What Boethius¹⁵⁴ says, then, that the idea of original principle is directed ‘within’, is true in respect of the person originated, but not in respect of the origin or act of originating, save according to reason only.

B. The Father’s Power of Generating is Something Absolute

35. Speaking then of power, that is, of the proximate foundation precisely taken of this relation, – I say the Father’s power of generating is not a relation but something absolute.

36. [Proof] – The negative part I prove:

First, because every relation seems to regard equally naturally its proper correlative, therefore the relation of inspiring will equally naturally regard its correlative just as the relation of generating will regards its own; but in divine reality productions are not distinguished by way of nature and will, except because the principle ‘by which the producer produces’ is disposed differently to the production and to the product, because it is of this one naturally and of that one

¹⁵⁴ What text of Boethius is here referred to is unclear. The name ‘Boethius’ may possibly be an error and perhaps a reference to an ‘argument’ is meant, as to that in n.22 [Vatican editors].

freely; therefore they would not then be two productions formally distinct by way of nature and of will.

37. Second, because then [sc. if the Father's power were a relation] the same relation would be the principle of itself, because there is in the Father only a single relation to the Son, and it is the principle 'by which' with respect to generation, – which is the same relation, although differently named; therefore etc.

38. Third, because then paternity would be simply more perfect than filiation. Proof of the consequence, in two ways. First, because that by which the producer produces, if it is not of the same idea as the form of the product, contains the form virtually and is more perfect than it; therefore if paternity is that by which the Father acts, and it is not of the same idea as filiation, it contains filiation virtually and is more perfect than it. Second, because filiation does not give to the Son what it does; therefore if the Father acts by paternity formally, paternity will be something more perfect than filiation.

39. The affirmative part of the solution [that the Father's power is something absolute, n.35] I prove thus:

What is of perfection in the productive principle does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything; but to communicate itself in numerical identity, and with a communication adequate to itself, posits a perfection in the productive principle; therefore this does not take the idea of productive principle away from anything. But if God, *per impossibile*, were to generate another God, and that other a third, deity would be posited as the productive principle of the other [sc. the third] and not as a relation of it; and then deity would not communicate itself in numerical identity, nor would it communicate itself with a communication adequate to itself in idea of productive principle, because deity would be able to be the principle of another communication, namely the one done – *per impossibile* – by the second god. Therefore since, as things are now, deity is communicated in numerical identity and with a communication adequate to itself, such that by deity there cannot be a numerically further communication of the same idea as the first, – it follows that the productive principle should now much more be posited as absolute than it would then be posited as being.

40. In brief: if a form were communicated that was not the same in number, nor communicated adequately, it would be posited as the principle of communicating; therefore if now it is more perfectly communicated, it – or something more perfect – will be the principle of communicating in this more perfect way.

41. An example of this is if heat in fire were to communicate itself the same in number to a piece of wood, and with an adequate communication, such that the heat could not be the principle of another heating, one would not deny that the heat of the fire was the productive principle of heat in the wood, since now in fact the heat is posited as the principle of it, and this with a double imperfection, opposed to the double perfection here supposed (because now there is here a diversity of communicated heat and the communication is not adequate, but then there would be an identity of communicated heat and the communication would be adequate); and yet – on the basis of this hypothesis – the wood would not be able to heat by heat; for it would not be able to heat itself, because it receives heat from the heating

which comes from the heat in question, and so it would have heat before it had heat, – nor would it be able to heat something else, because the heating of the wood is posited as adequate, in idea of active principle, to the heat. – Thus must one understand things in the intended proposal, because that which would be posited as the principle of another heating, if the communication were made with numerical diversity and not adequately, this same thing should now be posited as the principle when a communication is made of the same thing and a communication adequate to the productive principle.

42. Second I prove the same: something absolute is the formal term of generation, therefore something absolute is the formal idea by which the agent acts. – The antecedent was proved in distinction 5 question 2, in the first reason against the first opinion [I d.5 nn.64-69]. – I prove the consequence by the fact that it is impossible for an ‘agent’ to communicate the formal term of production unless it act, if it acts univocally, by an equally perfect form, – or, if it acts equivocally, by a more perfect form; but in divine reality nothing is more perfect than the absolute, because the ‘absolute’ is formally infinite, but the relation is not; therefore etc.

43. [Instance] – Against this reason [n.42] it is instanced that the consequence is only valid in univocal generation. But this generation [sc. the one in divine reality] is proved to be equivocal, first on the part of the persons, second from the productions, and third from the idea of specific difference.

44. The first way is as follows: paternity and filiation differ in species, therefore the persons constituted by them differ in species. – The proof of the antecedent is that they differ in their quiddities, and such difference is specific; and also that they are pure acts, but the difference of act and form is specific. – The proof of the consequence is, first, that there is no greater distinction in the principles than in the things they are principles of; second, the difference is the same for that in accord with which certain things are precisely different as it is for the differing things themselves; third, that the relations are the same for the divine essence as for the person, – therefore a specific difference will not by this be denied for the persons just as it is not denied for the relations either; fourth, that there is the same difference for the formal constituents as for the things constituted.

45. In the second way (about productions) the argument is: in divine reality the productions differ in genus, therefore so do the products. – The antecedent is plain, because in divine reality there is no production of a single idea save a single one. – The proof of the consequence is, first, that otherwise there would not be a proportion of the productions to the products; also, second, that productions are of the same idea as the products; and, third, that powers of a different idea require objects of a different idea, – therefore, if they were to produce their own products, they would produce products of a different idea; therefore, just as will and intellect presuppose that ‘good’ and ‘true’ are formally distinct, so they will produce formally distinct termini, or they will be that by which such distinct termini are produced.

46. In the third way (about specific difference) the argument is as follows: specific difference seems to be more perfect than numerical difference, – the proof of which is that the distinction of species belongs to the *per se* perfection of the universe, but the distinction of individuals does not; therefore specific difference, in the way it is more perfect, seems it should be posited in divine reality.

47. [Against the instance] – To these arguments I reply that, whether generation is set down as equivocal or univocal, the argument is not affected, because in equivocal generation the productive principle must be more perfect than the terminating form; but nothing is more perfect than the absolute, and specifically no relation is more perfect; for it seems most absurd to say that relation virtually contains the divine essence.

48. The conclusion, however, to which these reasonings [n.43] lead, namely about equivocal generation, seems to be false, because since in the first term of generation – namely in the product itself – two things come together, namely nature and the relation proper of the product itself by which it is a ‘this’, – generation is called equivocal or univocal either by some formal term of generation, or by some formal term proper to the produced supposit itself. If in the first way, since nature – which is the formal term of this production – is the same in producer and produced, univocity follows, because the likeness is most perfect. If in the second way, then no generation is univocal, because nothing generated is assimilated in its own individual form to the one generating. – That is, and it is to argue in another and almost the same way, that generation both assimilates and distinguishes, – as is plain, because thus is generation from the form under the idea of form and not under the idea by which it is a ‘this’, and the idea of form is more perfect in the supposit than this individual difference is. If in the case of generation its being assimilative is more perfect, then it will according to this be called univocal or equivocal. For if it were said to be of the former or latter sort insofar as it distinguishes, any generation at all would be called equivocal, because any generation at all distinguishes, – and this idea of distinguishing is in generation more imperfect, because it belongs to the most imperfect generation. Therefore not by this is univocal generation distinguished from equivocal.

49. Therefore to the intended proposal. Since generation assimilates insofar as the same nature is communicated, and distinguishes insofar as it is of a generated thing distinct from a generator that is distinct, it follows that univocity is located in the nature of the thing coming to be and come to be, and not in the distinction of generator and generated.

50. Second, one applies this to the intended proposal, that if the individual differences – which are diverse first – constitute products not diverse first but between which there is univocal generation (because of their likeness in nature), if these individual differences were species of a different genus, they would still not constitute things distinct with as much distinction as they would have in their own genus, because then the individual differences would constitute things diverse first. But that the things ‘constituted’ now are not diverse first is because of the nature, in which nature the individuals agree; so they would also then agree in the same nature, although the constituting differences would be species of a different genus. Therefore the constituted things would then be of the same species, as they now are.

51. So to the arguments for the opposite [sc. for the opposite conclusion, that the generation is equivocal, nn.43-46]:

To the first [n.44] one must say that there is properly neither genus nor species there, nor specific difference. But I do well concede that paternity and filiation are relations of a different species and of a different idea, because they are opposites and are

not founded on unity – even immediately – as are likeness and equality; there is also a greater distinction between paternity and filiation than between paternity and paternity. But when you infer that ‘therefore the things constituted too are of a different idea quasi-specifically’, I deny the consequence.

52. And, on account of the proof of the consequence, one must understand that some things are sometimes said to be more distinguished because of a greater repugnance or impossibility between them, as contraries are said to be more distinguished, like white and black, than disparate things are, like man and white, – and in this way it is not said properly that ‘some things are more distinguished’; for those things are more ‘properly distinguished’ which agree less in some respect; and thus things distinct in the most general genus are more distinguished than contraries which are of the same species, even though contraries are more repugnant.

53. Hence universally: the distinction of distinct things is as great as is the distinction, that is, the repugnance, of what constitutes or formally distinguishes them, because if white and black are impossible, the things constituted by them are also impossible. And so it is in the intended proposal: the impossibility of Father and Son, such that the Father is not the Son, is as great as is the impossibility of paternity and filiation – because of which paternity is not filiation.

54. But in the second way of taking it [sc. ‘more distinguished’, n.52], never do the distinguishing things agree as much as do the things distinguished by them, as is plain by running through all the things that distinguish. For specific differences do not include the genus in which they agree, but the species distinguished by them do include the genus in which they agree; and the reason is that the distinguishing things presuppose something in the distinct things that the distinguishing things do not include in their understanding, but the things distinguished by them do include it; therefore the distinguished things agree in it, but the distinguishing things do not agree in it.

55. From this [n.54] the response is plain to the arguments and the proofs [n.44]. – When you speak of ‘the principles and the things they are principles of’, I say that there can be a greater distinction – that is, a greater non-agreement (that is, an agreement in fewer things) – between principles than between the things they are principles of, just as specific differences, which are the principles of species, do not agree in the genus in which the species themselves agree; and so is it also in the case of individual differences and individuals in respect of the specific nature.

56. From this [n.54] the answer is plain to what is said about ‘formal constitutives and things precisely distinct’ [n.44]; for, in the case of all of them, it is false that the difference of the things constituted is as great as the distinction or difference of the formal constituents.

57. But I consider the argument further: because these relations – those in the intended proposal – are subsistent, therefore they have as much difference insofar as they are subsistent as they have in their proper ideas; but the subsistent relations are persons, therefore the persons have as much difference as the relations have. – And in addition to this: the persons differ by some formal difference, and by none save by the difference that the relations have, because they have no other; but the difference the relations have is specific, – therefore the difference of the persons will be in species or in nothing.

58. To these arguments I reply. – To the first [n.57], that although the relations are subsistent, yet the persons do not only include the relations but also the very nature in

which they subsist, – but the relations do not formally include the nature. The persons then formally agree in something in which the relations formally do not agree, and so there is not as great a distinction in the former as in the latter.

59. To the second [n.57] I say that this consequence does not follow: ‘by these relations precisely are they distinguished, and the relations are distinguished in species, therefore the persons are distinguished in species’, – just as neither does it follow about individual differences with respect to individuals. And when you say ‘then there will be no difference between the distinct things, since what belongs to the distinguishing things does not belong to the distinct things, nor anything else that comes through them’ [n.57], I say that through them there can be some distinction of the distinct things, different from the distinction of the distinguishing things, – and a lesser one, just as by the individual differences there is some distinction between individuals, different from the distinction of those individual differences, because the differences are diverse first; but the ‘distinct things’ are not diverse first, but they are only distinct in number within the same species. So here, in the intended proposal, by relations distinct in species, or in quasi-genus (to which, however, insofar as they are distinct, distinction in species is an accident), some things can be distinguished only in person within the same species or within the same nature.

60. As to the second way, about productions [n.45], I deny the consequence, because in divine reality there can, from the perfection of the divine nature, be some principles of a different idea yet communicative of the essence itself, – which does not happen in any imperfect nature. And because of the distinction of these formal principles, there can be productions of a different idea and yet products of the same idea, because of the unity of the formal term, namely of the nature which is communicated.

61. When the consequence is proved first, through proportion [n.45], – I say that the proportion ‘of the production to the formal term’ is that by it the formal term is communicated. But such proportion is not required for the production to be of one idea, provided the formal term is of one idea, because productions can be distinguished by their ideas otherwise than they are by the formal terms, as they are here [sc. in divine reality], by their formal principles. An example of this is whenever the same form can be acquired by changes of a different idea, just as the same ‘where’ can be acquired by straight or circular local motion over an extended magnitude, which motions are so of different idea that they are not comparable, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 7.4.248a10-b6, 5.4.228b19-21; so would it be if the same health could be induced immediately by art and immediately by nature.

62. When this consequence is proved, second, by the fact that ‘productions are of the same idea as their products’ [n.45], – I say that to this extent are they of the same idea, that just as productions are relations so products are relatives; but because the products are subsistent in the same nature, and the productions are not formally supposita subsistent in that nature, therefore the products can have some unity formally in the nature – communicated to them by the productions – which the productions do not formally have.

63. When it is argued, third, about the distinction of powers and distinct objects, that the distinction of the objects is similar to that of the powers [n.45], – the response was plain from distinctio 2 question 4, ‘Whether there are in divine reality only two productions’ [I d.2 nn.342-344].

64. About the third way, namely ‘about the perfection of the specific difference’ [n.46], – I say that specific difference is not more perfect than is specific identity in divine reality. But in creatures it is a mark of perfection. – For once limitation in creatures is posited, there cannot be a total perfection in creatures without specific distinction, but if in some one nature there were an infinite perfection, specific distinction would not be there required for perfection simply. Therefore in creatures specific difference is a perfection supplying for an imperfection, but in divine reality – where nature is simply perfect – there is no need to posit such ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’, because there is no imperfection there for which it might supply. An example: generation in creatures is ‘a perfection supplying for an imperfection’ in corruptible things, which without generation could not be conserved either the same numerically or of the same species, – but in divine reality there is no need to posit such ‘a perfection supplying for some imperfection’ which may exist there, or exist in any eternal thing.

C. To the Form of the Question

65. Now as to the form of the question, by which the question asked about the power of generating is ‘whether it is something absolute’ [n.1], – I reply that the gerundive construction [in Latin] with ‘power’ [sc. ‘power of acting’] indicates the act as coming from the same supposit as the power is attributed to. The like is true of science and will when these are construed with the gerundive; for then they indicate the act as coming from the supposit that the science or will is attributed to. For which reason one does not allow the proposition ‘the Son has the science or the will of generating’ in the way one allows that ‘the Son knows the generation of the Father and wills it’. – Nay, the first one seems it should be denied, just as also these, ‘he knows how to generate’ and ‘he wills to generate’, – because ‘to will to act’ seems to be the same thing as ‘to have the will of acting’; but ‘to will action’ does not seem to be the same as these, because it does not include willing the action as action belongs to the one willing, which the other [‘to will to act’] does seem to map out.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Arguments

66. To the arguments. First to the principal ones [nn.1-5]. – First, as to Augustine [n.1], I say that he understands the ‘by the fact that’ formally, not foundationally or causally; an example: we say that Socrates is similar by similarity formally, but he is said to be similar by whiteness foundationally or causally. So in the proposal, the Father generates by generation formally, but we are not asking in this way by what he generates, but we are asking by what the generation is elicited as by formal elicitive principle, namely what is the proximate foundation of this relation. Therefore Augustine intends that ‘he is Father by the fact he has a Son’, that is, by that notion, – this is to say that the

Father is not called Father in relation to himself but in relation to the Son; but Augustine does not there understand that by which the Father is Father – or that by which he generates – as the elicitive principle of generation, as is plain there from his text.

67. To the second [n.3] I say that from a form common in the first mode¹⁵⁵ there is a common operation, because if some form taken universally is followed by some operation taken universally, any singular form under it will be followed by a singular operation of the same idea, unless some singular form is imperfect. But if we are speaking of the second kind of community, which is of the form with respect to what participates it, I say that it is not necessary that the common form be the principle of a common operation, and especially when it is possessed by many suppositis in order, such that it is communicated to one by another, and this by adequate communication, as was made clear in the example adduced in the first reason to the affirmative part of the solution [n.41].

68. To the proposal I say that the major ‘the operation proper is from the proper form’ [n.3] is false, when speaking of appropriation in the second mode [n.67], which is the sort of appropriation – or at least no other one – that can be understood in the proposal.

69. And when the first proposition is proved, first because “it is the proper form, therefore, because it gives being, it gives acting” [n.3], – I deny the consequence; for there are many forms giving being which yet are not active and which in no way give second act; the such is paternity, just as also filiation.

70. But what is the reason for some forms being active and others not?

It is difficult to assign a common reason, because some substantial forms are active, and some qualities are active, but some substantial forms and some qualities are not active, – and yet qualities and qualities agree more in some common concept than do qualities and substances. Likewise, some of the more imperfect substantial forms are active, such as the elementary ones, and some of the more perfect ones are not active, as the forms of mixed things, as of stone and other inanimate objects, – some forms too of the mixed and perfect things are active, as the forms of animate things; however some of the more perfect forms are not communicative of themselves, as the forms of celestial bodies and angelic forms. There does not then seem to be a reason why some forms in general are active and some not – just as, in a specific case, there does not seem to be any reason why heat heats save that heat is heat; and thus it seems that this proposition is immediate ‘heat is effective of heat’. Thus too it seems that all forms of the genus of quantity, and all relations (about which the discussion now is), are not active, and about such it is not valid that ‘if they give first act therefore they give second act’.

71. When the second consequence is proved through the Philosopher in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* [n.3], – I say that he is speaking of universal and particular speaking in the first mode of ‘common’, but not taking it in the second mode, namely insofar as the same form in number is common to the things that participate it; for this

¹⁵⁵ An interpolated text is here worth quoting: “community of form can be understood in a double way: one is the universal, which is by identity to many particulars under it, each of which is ‘it’ (in the way a universal is communicated to singulars), the other is by relation to many things each of which is ‘by it’ (in the way a form is communicated to matter) but is not ‘it’, – as was said above [I d.2 nn.379-380].” See also below, n.71, where it is pointed out that the second mode does not exist in creatures without the first mode.

commonness is not in creatures, nor a 'universal' commonness to the things that participate without a 'universal' commonness said in the first way [n.67].

72. When the argument is given, third, about potency and act [n.5], I say that there is an equivocation about potency. For the major is true as potency is a difference of being, dividing it jointly against act, because thus not only is being in general divided into act and potency, but also thus divided is any genus of being and any species and any individual, because thus is the same whiteness first in potency and later in act, – and in this way act and potency belong to the same genus; and in this way, properly speaking, there is no potency of generating in divine reality, namely a potency which may be opposed to act, because that generation is simply necessary and in act, and therefore it is not in potency as potency is repugnant to act. But here the discussion is about potency or power as it is a principle, and in this way the proposition is false which says that 'power is of the same genus as act'; for a substantial form can be a principle of action in the genus of action and of action in the genus of quality – as was touched on above in distinction 3 question on 'generated knowledge' [I d.3 n.518], and this subject [sc. substantial form] is the *per se* cause of its proper passion.

73. When the argument is made 'about the middle and the extremes' [n.4], I say that there is a thing which is a middle by participation in each extreme, as grey is a middle between white and black, which middle is from the nature of the thing, and of such a middle it is true that it is in the same genus as the extremes, as the Philosopher proves *Metaphysics* 10.7.1057a18-26. Another middle is in a way taken accidentally, as is operation between the operator and the term; this middle need not be of the same genus as the extremes because, when the soul understands itself, its understanding is a quality, and yet the operator and the object are substances; such a middle is what is taken – namely in the intended proposition – as the 'by which' between the generating supposit and the generated supposit. Or one can in another way say that the 'by which' is not properly a middle but keeps itself to the side of one of the extremes, namely of the generator; but the proper middle, if it be granted, can be said to be generation, and about this it is true that is of the same idea as the extremes, because it is a relation, just as the extremes are relatives.

B. To the Arguments against the First Opinion

74. Now because some of the arguments 'against the first opinion' are against me, I respond to them.

To the first [n.11] I reply that the major proposition has a greater probability in divine reality than in creatures, because the form in question is *per se* such that there corresponds to it its proper 'what', and this has the power to act, – to wit 'this God', who in some way precedes the relations and so acts; the thing is plain because he thus first understands and wills; therefore it seems he would have power for every action of which his 'in what' is the proper formal principle, and so 'this God' generates first.

75. But about the elicitive principle the major is false, since the elicitive principle – if it exists *per se* – cannot be the proper power for operation. An example: the visible species – if one posits an elicitive principle for the operation of seeing in the eye – could not, if it *per se* existed, be the principle of that operation, and the reason would be that it could not be in proximate potency to acting because it could not have the thing that

undergoes the act near to it, for coming near to – as was said before [n.32] – is required for the idea of proximate power. But just as there is required in creatures a coming near and a removal of impediments, so has it been said that in the intended proposition there is required a supposit suited to acting [n.32]. Therefore the form, which would be the principle of action in a distinct supposit, if it was *per se* existent, would not be a supposit or a distinct principle, nor would it be in a distinct supposit suited to generation, and, from the fact that that supposit is required for proximate potency to act, such a form could not act *per se*. But something ‘essential’, if it were to exist *per se* in some instant of nature before it was understood to exist in a supposit or a person, it is not in that prior instant an acting supposit in proximate potency to acting; for the act requires a distinction of certain things in the nature, which distinction can only be of supposits. Therefore a supposit suited to this action is a distinct supposit, existing in this nature; in no such thing does nature exist insofar as nature is understood to be *per se*, although it would in some way be *per se* before it was in a person – and therefore it will not be able ‘to act *per se*’ by this action.

76. Note that ‘a form existing *per se*’ can be understood in three ways: in one way such that ‘*per se*’ excludes ‘the being in of a form’ in matter, whether the being in is of an accidental or a substantial form; in another way ‘the being in of a quiddity or a nature’ in the supposit itself, and this actually so; in a third way ‘aptitudinal’ or ‘potential’ – each a case of being in.

77. The third way sets down what is to be thus *per se* a complete supposit, and therefore to take it like this in the major [nn.74-75] is to take contradictories, because the form, which is, for the thing that has the form, the principle by which it acts, cannot thus be *per se*. Therefore *per se* in the major is understood in the first two ways, – and thus do I prove the major, because there is only required for ‘acting’ actuality and ‘*per se* existence’; the first is possessed equally in an inherent form and in a *per se* being, the second is possessed sufficiently if it is *per se* in the first two ways (otherwise the separated soul would not be an agent).

78. There is also a confirmation, because if the nature assumed by the Word were let go without any positive action concerning it, it would not be *per se* in the third way (because then it would be un-assumable, as such), and yet ‘this man’ could do every act which the Word now possesses by means of this nature, – nay if, according to the article of the first distinction in book 3 (III d.1 q.1 nn.6,9), nothing positive constitutes the created supposit, it is certain that the idea of the supposit gives nothing positive to anything for acting; but neither does it give order in relation to other passive things, as Averroes imagines in *Metaphysics* VII com.31, that a [Platonic] idea cannot move a body or matter because of lack of order.

79. Against this [sc. what Averroes says, n.78], that it is accidental that the order of agent to patient insofar as it is consequent to ‘this existent’ exists ‘incommunicably’.

Therefore one can reply in another way, that the major [nn.74-75] is true, because the form is active with respect to a term distinct of itself (but not when it is with respect to a term not distinct, because then, although it could be that by which the supposit produces, it cannot however be the producer, because it is not distinct from the term, which is required for it to be producer; but this is not required for it to be that ‘by which’).

80. More plainly said, the major is true of immanent acting and making, and universally of the production of a term distinct from the productive form. Here the term is not distinct from the form by which it produces [sc. therefore the major is not true here].

81. On the contrary. If deity or 'this God' creates, therefore it acts by the action that necessarily precedes creating,¹⁵⁶ of this sort is generating.

Proof of the first consequence: what is simply first does not require any 'acting later' for it to have power for an action proper to itself; 'this God' is in some way prior to the relative person; therefore etc.

82. This argument requires one to posit an order by which 'this God' is in the persons before there can be a power proximate for creating; not because of impotence in 'this God' for creating (even if, as the gentiles imagine, he did not exist in persons), but because of a greater closeness of the persons than of creation to the essence, according to that ancient rule: 'about any two things, compared according to an order to some same first thing, the power is not proximate to the second unless the first has already been posited' [Aristotle *Metaphysics* 5.11.1018b9-12, 22-23; Averroes *ad loc.*; also n.22 above].

83. Therefore 'this God' understands too not precisely as he is in the persons, because essential action is as it were prior to relation, and so is more immediate, – nay altogether first; second, 'this God' is *per se* unlimited existence, and in the [second] moment of nature [n.82] is first in the three persons (that moment does however have the signs of origin); in the third moment of nature 'this God' has power proximate for action outwardly.

84. Therefore let the minor [n.81] be denied, because deity never exists *per se* in such a way that it is not in a supposit, except in the intellect.

85. On the contrary. What belongs to something first of itself formally is in some way prior outside the intellect to that which does not belong to it from itself formally; (a) deity is altogether first, because it is a 'sea' [I d.8 n.200], and (b) to it belongs of itself formally *per se* existence; (c) but it is not of itself formally in this relative supposit, therefore it is first *per se* before it is in this supposit.

The proof of (b) is that the same thing is the *per se* existence of the three persons, – *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.7-8; there is also the proof that otherwise it would have that relation in anything, because it has everywhere what belongs to it from its own formal idea.

86. To the other, about 'what' and 'by which' [n.13], I say that the saying of the Philosopher is true of the cause and the thing caused, because there is a real distinction there of the cause, and of the principle by which it causes, from the thing caused; there is also essential dependence there of the caused thing on the causative thing just as also on the cause, and the reason there is that the causative principle is only single, in one supposit. In the proposed case, however, things are the opposite, because the producing supposit is distinct, but that by which it produces is not distinct, – and so the product is not referred really to the principle 'by which' as it is referred to the principle 'which' produces, and therefore in the proposed case there is no real relation of the productive principle to the product; but of the producer there is a real relation, while of the productive principle a relation of reason, as was said before about the communicated and the communicating in distinction 5 question 1 [I d.5 n.29].

¹⁵⁶ Note by Scotus: "Note this for the order of production inwardly and outwardly."

87. To the third [n.14] I say that the form ‘according to its being that in which the generator is assimilated to the generated’ is not only a being of reason but also has some unity preceding every act of intellect, because in no existing act of intellect would fire generate fire and corrupt water, and this on account of the natural likeness here [sc. in the intellect] and the contrariety there [sc. in reality]. This will be plainer in the question about individuation [II d.3 q.1 nn.3-7]. – To Damascene [n.14] I say that he understands commonness of something one in nature and in number (just as divine essence is common to the three persons), but there is now no such commonness in the creature. There is however a commonness of something one by a unity less than numerical unity [II d.3 q.1 nn.8-9].

88. To the remark ‘the form is the principle of acting insofar as it is a this’ [n.15] – the conclusion is on my side, because the absolute thing that is the Father’s power of generating is not a power of generating for the Son.

89. And when it is argued that generation distinguishes before it assimilates, and that, from this, the form is elicitive first as a ‘this’ prior to being so as form [n.16], – I respond that ‘prior’ in consequence is not always ‘prior’ in causality. An example: this conclusion follows, ‘fire, therefore hot’, and not conversely; therefore hot is prior in consequence and yet fire is prior in causality to the heat. And thus I concede that to distinguish is prior to assimilate, that is, it is more common, because many things distinguish that do not assimilate, – but to distinguish is not more perfect in generation than to assimilate, because to distinguish belongs to generation (even the most imperfect) insofar as it is from a form as a ‘this’, and to assimilate belongs to it insofar as it is from a form absolutely, and the idea of form is more perfect than the idea of singularity.

90. I concede the argument ‘against the opinion positing only a distinction of reason’, because it does not conclude against me, as will be clear in distinction 8 [I d.8 n.169, 185].¹⁵⁷

91. The instance ‘about heat and the vegetative soul’ [n.17] is not valid, because there each form is communicated – both the principal active form [sc. the vegetative soul] and the immediate form [sc. heat]; for the generated flesh is animated, and it has some natural generated heat; also each form is a principle of generation, although one is mediate and the other immediate. But the other instance ‘about the generation of the

¹⁵⁷ [From the Vatican editors:] The text of n.90 is a response to an argument that is lacking in this question of the *Ordinatio*, but it is found in the *Lectura* I d.7 n.21: “Further, against the one who has this opinion [cf. *Ordinatio* I d.7 nn.9-10], there is the following argument from his own words: for he himself posits that nature and will and everything essential in divine reality are only distinguished by reason, through an operation of intellect. If therefore – according to him – the principle of the generation of the Son is essential and, for the same reason, the principle of the inspiring of the Holy Spirit is essential, then the principle of each production in divine reality will be essential, and consequently – according to him – the principles of each production are distinguished by reason. But that two real productions ‘of different reason’ are from the same principle simply – differing only in reason –, when the thing from the principle is adequate to the principle, is altogether impossible; therefore it is impossible that the essence be the formal production of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. It will not then be the case that the essence alone is the principle of producing.” The remark ‘from his own words’ points to Aquinas *Sentences* I d.13 q.1 a.2 and d.2 q.1 aa.2-3.

brute' seems more difficult, if the sensitive soul does not there have any operation but only the vegetative soul.¹⁵⁸

Question 2

Whether there can be several Sons in Divine Reality

92. Whether there can be several Sons in divine reality.
Arguments.¹⁵⁹

I. The Opinions of Others

93. It is posited [by Henry of Ghent] that there cannot be, because all the fecundity is used up in one act; therefore there is no fecundity for another one.

On the contrary. To be used up signifies in bodily things that the source does not there remain which was used up; it cannot be thus understood here, but that the source does not remain for another act. Therefore the premise is improper, – and in the way it is true it is the same as the conclusion.

94. Therefore it is said in another way – more properly – that a 'single generation' is an act adequate to the generative power and always stays in place, and that the single Son is a term adequate to the power and is always being produced; therefore there cannot be another one.

95. On the contrary. Is the adequacy understood as intensive or extensive? If in the second way there is a begging of the question. If in the first way, the proposed conclusion does not follow from the adequacy of the act, because fire generating a fire as equally perfect as itself – and so adequate – can still generate another fire elsewhere; therefore the consequent is inferred 'that the adequate act always stays in place', and consequently the power is not of itself determined to this act but absolutely it would have power for another act, – just as if the sun were always staying in place and so were with a single adequate illumination to illuminate the medium present to it, it would not have power for another illumination, because that single illumination always stays in place; but from this it follows that of itself it would have power for another – and suppose that the first one does not stay in place, it will proceed to another.

96. Thus therefore the generative power of the Father can absolutely be the principle of another generation; therefore another is absolutely possible, therefore another one actually is – and so the staying in place of this 'adequate' act will not here prevent another act from being, because whatever is here possible from the nature of the thing necessarily is; it is not thus in the case of the sun, where the medium is in potency to an illumination other than the adequate one that stays in place, but if that other illumination is possible it does not follow that it is necessary.

¹⁵⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: "and about this in book 2 [II d.18 q. un n.10 – although this reference corresponds not to the words here in n.91 but to the text of the *Lectura* I d.7 n.95], where there will be a discussion about seminal reasons, 'how there can be univocal generation in animals'."

¹⁵⁹ For the arguments pro and con Scotus refers, by a symbol, to the Parisian *Reportatio*, IA d.2 nn.183-184.

97. Again another argument. – ‘A principle produces insofar as it is prior’ [I d.2 n.308-309]; therefore the staying in place of the posited effect takes nothing away from the principle as it is a principle; therefore if, when the effect is not posited or not staying in place, the principle would have power for another, it will also have power for another when the effect is staying in place. – But although the argument [n.95] appears sound, it would conclude against the sun having an adequate illumination.¹⁶⁰ Hence one should solve the argument by asking whence it is that the actual positing of the adequate effect limits the virtue of the cause to the ‘then’ (although absolutely it extends to other occasions), and to the ‘then’ in the sense of division and to the ‘at another time’ in the sense of composition.

98. I concede, however, that adequacy, whether absolute or with a staying in place, does not sufficiently entail the unity of divine generation, because it does not entail that to be the principle of another generation is repugnant to the generative power absolutely of itself, nor consequently does it entail the absolute impossibility of another generation, – nay it entails the absolute possibility, if this [sc. the adequacy of the one generation] were the precise reason for the impossibility – because where there is an impossibility for this reason, there is there an absolute possibility (the result is plain from induction).

99. One must then look for another reason so as to show that the generative power is determined of itself to this generation, such that if *per impossibile* it would not proceed to this generation, or if this generation were not adequate or were not always staying in place, it would altogether have power for no other, just as sight cannot hear, – in the way that, if the Father did not here exist in the divine nature, altogether no person could there be what the Father was; because if for this reason precisely there could not be another Father, namely because in the essence – although indifferent to several ungenerated persons – this person would as it were subsist by itself and adequately to the essence, then absolutely there could be another Father, and if there could be there would be.

100. Not only does this argument [n.99] refute the reason ‘about adequacy’ [n.94], but also, if this Father or this generation were not by itself, but the essence were as it were indifferent to several Fathers and the generative power were indifferent to several generations, one would not be able to give more a reason for this generation existing in divine reality than for that one, because that one too would be adequate, and so for the case where this one prevents that one, which is altogether impossible; nay for what reason the one is posited, any at all might be posited, and for what reason the other is not posited, any other might not be posited.

II. To the Question

101. I say therefore.¹⁶¹

¹⁶⁰ Presumably because, if the sun can have another illumination, the one it has cannot be adequate after all.

¹⁶¹ Scotus gives no solution to this question here in the *Ordinatio*. One must presumably look in the *Reportatio* instead.

Book One
Eighth Distinction
First Part
On the Simplicity of God
Question One
Whether God is supremely Simple

1. Concerning the eighth distinction I ask whether God is supremely simple, and perfectly so.

That he is not:

Because simplicity is not a mark of perfection simply, therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential. – Proof of the antecedent: if it were a mark of perfection simply then anything having it simply would be more perfect than anything not having it, and so prime matter would be more perfect than man, which is false, – nay, generally, in corruptible or generable creatures the more composite things are more perfect.

2. Again, it is a mark perfection in a form to be able to give being, although it is a mark of imperfection to depend on matter; therefore if the first idea were separated from the second, because there does not seem to be a contradiction in such a separation, deity can be a form giving being, although it does not depend on that to which it gives being, and so it can be posited without imperfection to be a composition of matter and form, or a combinability at least of matter and of deity as form.

3. Again, what is a non-substance for one thing is not a substance for anything, from *Physics* 1.3.186b4-5; but wisdom in us is an accident; therefore in nothing is it a substance or a non-accident. But wisdom is in God according to the same idea as it is in us; so there is an accident in God and thus a composition of subject and accident.

4. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.7 n.8: ‘God is truly and supremely simple’.¹⁶²

I. To the Question

5. I reply to the question, and first I prove the divine simplicity through certain particular middle terms, and second from common middle terms, namely infinity and necessity of existence.

A. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Particular Middle Terms

6. Proceeding in the first way, I show that [divine] simplicity is opposed to composition from essential parts, second that it is opposed to composition from quantitative parts, and third opposed to composition from subject and accident.

7. [God is not from essential parts] – The first thus: the causality of matter and form is not simply first, but necessarily presupposes a prior efficient causality, – therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form it would presuppose the causality of an efficient cause; but not the causality of this First thing, because it does not, by joining

¹⁶² These words are in fact not Augustine’s but a prefatory comment by Lombard [*Sentences* I d.8 ch.4 n.85].

its matter with a form, cause itself – therefore of a different efficient cause, a prior one; therefore God would not be the first efficient cause, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 2 question 1 [I d.2 nn.43-59]. Proof of the first proposition: the causality of matter and form involves imperfection, but the causality of the efficient and the final cause do not involve imperfection but perfection; every imperfect thing is reduced to a perfect one as to what is essentially prior to it; therefore etc.

8. I prove the same thus: matter is of itself in potency to form, and this in a potency that is passive and open to contradictories, as far as concerns itself, – therefore it is not under a form of itself but through some other cause, reducing the matter to the act of the form; but this cause reducing it cannot be called form only as it is form, because thus it does not reduce matter save by formally actualizing the matter itself; therefore one must posit something effectively reducing the matter to that actuality. Therefore if the First thing were composed of matter and form, there would be some efficient cause through whose effecting act its matter would be under the form, and so it would not be the first efficient cause, as before [n.7].

9. Third in this way: every single caused entity has some one cause from which comes its unity, because there cannot be unity in the caused without unity in the cause. The unity therefore of a composite, since it is caused, requires some one cause from which comes this caused entity. The causality in question is not of matter or form, because each of these is a diminished entity in respect of the composite entity; therefore besides these two causalities, namely of matter and form, some other one must be posited – it will be the efficient cause, and so the same result returns as before [n.8].

10. [God is not from quantitative parts] – The second, namely the lack of quantitative composition, seems to be proved by the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.10.226a24-b6 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-11, because the First thing is of infinite power; but infinite power cannot exist in a magnitude; and the proof of this is that in a greater magnitude there is a greater power, and so an infinite power cannot exist in a finite magnitude; but no magnitude is infinite; therefore neither does any infinite power exist in a magnitude.

11. But this argument seems deficient, because one who would posit that an infinite power exists in a finite magnitude would say that the power is of the same nature in a part of the magnitude as in the whole magnitude, and so of the same nature in a greater as in a lesser magnitude; just as the intellective soul is whole in the whole of the body and whole in any part of it, and is not greater in a greater body, nor greater in the whole body than in a part; and if an infinite power of understanding were consequent on this soul, this infinite power would exist in a finite magnitude, and in a part just as in the whole and in a little part just as in a big one. So should it be said in the proposed case, because an infinite power in a magnitude would be of the same nature in the whole as in the part.

12. Making clear, then, the reasoning of Aristotle [n.10], I say that his conclusion is this, that an infinite power, extended *per accidens* to the extension of the magnitude, ‘does not exist in a finite magnitude’. His reasoning proves this in the following way: any power that is extended *per accidens* is, *ceteris paribus*, greater – that is more efficacious – in a greater magnitude, and it is not greater as follows, namely that it is more intense formally, because a small fire can have more heat than a big one if the big one is very diffuse and the small one concentrated (and therefore one must add the

‘ceteris paribus’ clause in the major); the example too is about heat in the same fire, which although it is of equal intensity in the part as in the whole, yet a greater fire is ‘of a greater power’, that is, more efficacious.

13. And from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, can be understood to grow in efficacy by increase of magnitude – but as long as it is understood to be able to grow in efficacy it is not infinite in efficacy; and from this it follows that every such power ‘extended *per accidens*’, as long as it exists in a finite magnitude, is finite, because an intensive infinity cannot exist without infinity in efficacy; and from this it follows that a power infinite in efficacy cannot exist in a finite magnitude, – nor therefore can a power infinite in intensity so exist; and then further: since there is no infinite magnitude, it is plain that there is no such infinite power in a magnitude.

14. But how does this result, that every such power would not exist in a magnitude, relate to the intended proposition [nn.5-6],?

I reply. By joining with this result the conclusion proved earlier by the Philosopher [*Metaphysics* 12.6.1071b19-22], – that such a ‘potent thing’ is without matter – the intended proposition follows. For, because it is by extension that a thing is extended, or, if extension were to be *per se* existent, there would be something that was the form informing the extension, and the form would be extended *per accidens*, – therefore if the infinite power were to be posited in a magnitude, I ask what thing is this extension of magnitude? Not the infinite power itself, as was proved [n.13], – nor does the infinite power perfect the magnitude as form does matter, because the power is not in matter, from the conclusion shown before [sc. by the Philosopher *ibid.*]; therefore one would have to posit that the matter is what is extended with this magnitude, which matter would be perfected by infinite power, just as our matter or our body is extended in magnitude and is perfected by a non-extended intellective soul; but there is no matter in a possessor of such [infinite] power, from the conclusion shown before by the Philosopher [*ibid.*]. From this immateriality then – shown before by the Philosopher and just shown in this conclusion [n.13] – the reasoning in question [that God is not a quantity, n.10] gets its efficacy.

15. [God is not from subject and accident] – The third conclusion is proved specifically from these [first two conclusions, nn.7, 10]: for because God is not material or a quantity, therefore he is not capable of any material accident fitting a material thing in the way a quality fits a material thing; therefore he is only capable of those accidents that fit spirits – to wit intellection and will and the corresponding habits – but such things cannot be accidents of such a nature, as was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.89-110], because its understanding and its willing, and its habit and power etc., are its substance.

B. Proof of the Simplicity of God through Common Middle Terms

16. Second I prove the intended proposition [n.5] generally.

[From necessary existence] – First from the idea of necessary existence, – because if the First thing is composite, let the components be *a* and *b*; I ask about *a*, whether it is of itself formally necessary existence, or is not but is possible existence (one of these two must be given in each thing, or in the whole nature, from which something is composed). But if it is of itself possible existence, then necessary existence of itself is composed of

possible existence, and so it will not be necessary existence; if *a* is of itself necessary existence, then it is of itself in ultimate actuality, and so with nothing can it make itself to be *per se* one thing. Likewise, if the composite is of itself necessary existence, it will be necessary existence through *a*, and by parity of reasoning it will be necessary existence through *b*, and so it will be twice necessary existence; it will also be a composite necessary existence through something which, when taken away, will leave it to be no less necessary existence¹⁶³, which is impossible.

17. [From infinity] – Second I show the intended proposition from the idea of infinity, – and first that God is not combinable; for this reason, that everything combinable can be part of some composite whole which is combinable from itself and from something else; but every part can be exceeded; but to be able to be exceeded is contrary to the idea of infinity; therefore etc.

18. And there is a confirmation of the reason, and it is almost the same, – because everything combinable lacks the perfection of that with which it is combined, such that the combinable does not have in itself complete identity, and identity in every way, with that with which it is combined, because then it could not be combined with it; nothing infinite lacks that with which it can in some way be the same, nay everything such has all that in itself according to perfect identity; because otherwise it could be understood to be more perfect, for example if it had all that in itself as a ‘composite’ has it and if the ‘infinite’ does not have it;¹⁶⁴ but it is contrary to the idea of infinity simply that it could be understood to be more perfect, or that something could be understood to be more perfect than it.

19. From this follows further that it is altogether incomposite, – because if it is composite, then composed either of finite things or of infinite things; if of infinite things, nothing such is combinable, from what has been proved [nn.17-18]; if of finite things, then it will not be infinite, because finite things do not render anything infinite in the perfection that we are now speaking of.

II. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the first argument [n.1] I say that simplicity is simply a mark of perfection according as it excludes combinability and composition of act and potency or of perfection and imperfection, as will be said in the following question [nn.32-34].

21. Nor, however, does it follow that every simple creature is a more perfect creature than a non-simple one [n.1], because something that is simply a mark of perfection can be repugnant to any limited nature, and so it would not simply be such a nature if it had that which is repugnant to it; so a dog would not be a simply perfect dog if it were wise, because wisdom is repugnant to it. Likewise, to any limited nature one perfection simply can be repugnant and another one not be, – and then it does not follow that that nature is more perfect to which such a perfection as is repugnant to it belongs, especially when there belongs to that to which this perfection is repugnant another

¹⁶³ I.e., if it is necessary existence through *a* and through *b*, then, if *b* is taken away, it will still be necessary existence through *a*; therefore it will not really be necessary existence through *b*, and so it will not be a necessary existence composed of *a* and *b*.

¹⁶⁴ Sc. suppose the infinite combined with something, then by itself, or uncombined, it does not have it; therefore, when combined with it, it is more perfect.

perfection simply, which latter perfection is perhaps simply more perfect than the former, the repugnant one. An example: ‘actuality’ is a perfection simply and ‘simplicity’ is a perfection simply; but to a composite there belongs greater actuality though not greater simplicity, – while to matter, although there belongs simplicity, there does not however belong as much actuality as belongs to the composite; simply, however, actuality is more perfect than simplicity, – and so, simply, that to which actuality without simplicity belongs can be more perfect than that to which simplicity without actuality belongs.

22. But there seem to be doubts here: one, how a perfection simply is something that is not a perfection everywhere, although it is of the idea simply of perfection that ‘it be simply better, in each thing, than not-it’, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15; the second doubt is how one perfection simply is more perfect than another absolutely.

23. To the first I say that this description [from Anselm’s *Monologion*] ought to be thus understood, that perfection simply is not only better than its contradictory (for thus anything positive is better and more perfect simply than its negation, nay no negation is a perfection formally), but this is how is understood the remark ‘it is better than not-it’ – that is, than ‘anything impossible with it’ – and then should the remark which is ‘in anything it is better’ be understood by considering the ‘anything’ precisely insofar as it is a supposit, without determining in what nature the supposit subsists [cf. I d.2 n.384]. For, by considering something insofar as it subsists in a nature, some perfection simply is able to be not better for it, because it is impossible with it as it is in such nature, because it is repugnant to such nature; yet it is not repugnant to it insofar precisely as it is subsistent, but it will be a simply more perfect being if it is in this way considered to have it than if it had whatever [sc. perfection simply] is impossible with it.

24. To the second doubt [n.22] I say that clarification is required of ‘what is the order of perfections simply’. And now, briefly, let it be supposed that there is some order of perfection among them such that one is of its idea more perfect than another precisely taken, although when any of them exists in supreme degree then all are equally perfect, because infinite – and then any of them is infinite. About this elsewhere.¹⁶⁵

25. To the second principal argument [n.2] I say that ‘to give something being formally’ necessarily posits a limitation, because what thus gives being does not include by identity that to which it gives being; nor can imperfection be separated from thus giving being, because neither can limitation, or even every sort of dependence, be separated from it; for although dependence on matter be separated from it, yet there always remains dependence on the efficient cause by virtue of which the form informs the matter. And if an instance be made about the Word, that it gives being to human nature, – this is not to give being formally, as will be clear in book 3 distinction 1 [III d.1 qq.1-5]

26. To the third [n.3] I say that wisdom, according to the idea by which it is a species of quality and an accident in us, is not of the same idea in God, as will be clear in this distinction better at the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ [nn.112-113].

¹⁶⁵ No such ‘elsewhere’ is to be found in the *Ordinatio*.

Question Two

Whether any Creature is Simple

27. Following on from this I ask whether any creature is simple.

And I argue yes as follows: the composite is composed from parts, and these not from other parts, therefore these other parts are in themselves simple.

28. The opposite of this is in *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, where Augustine says that no creature is in itself simple.

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others¹⁶⁶

29. There is said here that ‘any creature at all is composed of act and potency’; that no creature is pure potency, because then it would not exist, – nor is any creature pure act, because then it would God.

30. Further, that ‘any creature at all is a being through participation’, – therefore it is composed of participant and participated.

31. Against this conclusion I argue that if in anything at all there is composition of thing and thing, I take the thing that does the composing and I ask if it is simple or composite; if it is simple, the proposition is gained [sc. that some creature is simple], – if it is composite, there will be a process in ‘things’ to infinity.

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

32. I concede then that some creature is simple, that is, not composed from things. However no creature is perfectly simple, because it is in some way composite and combinable.

How it is composite I clarify thus, that it has entity along with privation of some grade of entity. For no creature has entity according to the total perfection that is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and therefore it lacks some perfection which is of a nature to belong to entity in itself, and so it is ‘deprived’, – just as a mole is said to be blind ‘because it is of a nature to have sight according to the idea of animal, but not according to the idea of mole’ according to the Philosopher at *Metaphysics* 5.22.1022b24-27. Therefore any creature is composed, not from positive thing and thing, but from positive thing and privation, namely from some entity, which it has, and from lack of some grade of perfection of entity – of which perfection it is itself not capable, though being itself is capable of it; just as a mole is, according to itself, not of a nature to see but is, according to that which is animal, of a nature to see. Nor yet is this composition ‘from positive and privative’ in the essence of the thing, because privation is not of the essence of anything positive.

33. On this composition there also follows composition of potency and act objectively; for anything that is a being and that lacks some perfection of being is

¹⁶⁶ Aquinas *Contra Gentes* II chs.53-54, I ch.22; *ST* Ia q.50 a.2 ad 3.

simply possible and is the term of potency simply, whose term cannot be infinite being, which being is necessary existence.

34. It is also the case that any creature at all is combinable:

This is plain about accident, which is combinable with a subject. In the case of substance too it is plain, about form as well matter. Also plain about substance *per se* generable and corruptible, because it is receptive of accident; no substance then would be non-receptive of accident save on account of its perfection. – But the most perfect intelligence [sc. creaturely intelligence] is receptive of accident, because it is capable of its own intellection and volition, which are not its substance; first, because then it would be formally blessed in itself, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 1 [I d.1 n.175]. Second, because any intelligence can understand infinite things, because these are all intelligible; therefore, if its own intellection were its essence, it could have an infinite essence, because it would have one intellection of infinite things. Third, because its own intellection would not depend on any object save that on which its own ‘existence’ would depend, and so it could understand nothing inferior to itself – not even itself – in its proper genus, but only in the superior object moving it; nay no intelligence could understand anything save in God, because its own existence is not caused by any other intelligence – therefore not its intellection either. Fourth, because the word of an angel would be personally distinct from it and essentially the same as it, as was proved in distinction 2 about the divine Word [I. d.2 n.355].

II. To the Arguments

35. [To the principal argument] – To the principal argument of Augustine [n.28] I concede that no creature is truly simple, because it is composite – in the aforesaid way – from positivity and privation [n.32], act and potency objectively [n.33], and combinable with some other creature [n.34].

36. [To the argument of the opinion of others] – And from this is plain the response to the argument about the first opinion [n.29]; for no act is pure that lacks a grade of actuality, just as no light is pure that lacks a grade of light, even if there is not mixed with that impure light any positive entity but only a lack of a more perfect grade of light.

37. To the second [n.30] I say that ‘to participate’ is in some way the same as ‘to take part in’, so that it involves a double relation – both of part to whole and of taker to taken.

The first relation is real. Nor yet is part understood to be that which is something of the thing, but it is taken extensively, insofar as every less is said to be part of a more; but everything that is a ‘finite such’ is simply a ‘less such’, if anything such is of a nature to be infinite; but any perfection simply is of a nature to be infinite – therefore wherever there is a finite perfection it is less than some similar perfection, and so it is a part extensively.

38. But the second relation – namely of taker to taken – is a relation of reason, as in the case of creatures between the giver and the given. However a thing is taken in three ways; either such that the ‘whole’ taken is part of the taker, as the species participates the genus (as far as the essential parts of the genus are

concerned, not the subjective ones),¹⁶⁷ or ‘part’ of the taken is part of the taker, or – in the third way – ‘part’ of the taken is the whole taker itself. In the first two ways the relation of taker and taken can be conceded to be real, but not in the third way; this third way is the one in the intended proposition, because every limited perfection (which perfection is of itself, however, not determined to limitation, and it is the part taken) is the limited whole itself,¹⁶⁸ except that a distinction can be made here between the supposit taking and the nature taken – but there is not thus a real distinction.

Question Three

Whether along with the Divine Simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus

39. Third I ask whether along with the divine simplicity stands the fact that God, or anything formally said of God, is in a Genus.

That it does:

Because God is formally being, but being states a concept said of God in the ‘what’ – and this concept is not proper to God but is common to him and creatures, as was said in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.26-45]; therefore, in order that this might become proper, it must be determined by some determining concept; that ‘determining’ concept is related to the concept of being as the concept of ‘what sort’ to the concept of ‘what’, and consequently as the concept of difference to the concept of genus.

40. Further, Avicenna *Metaphysics* II ch.1 (74vb): between ‘a being in a subject’ and ‘a being not in a subject’ there is no middle – and he seems to be speaking according to the fact that ‘a being not in a subject’ is the idea of substance and ‘a being in a subject’ is the idea of accident. Therefore God, since he is being formally and is not ‘a being in a subject’, therefore he is ‘a being in a non-subject’ – therefore he is substance; but substance as substance is a genus.

41. Further, where there is species there is genus – according to Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3] – because these are relatives; the divine nature is a species with respect to the persons, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48; therefore etc.

42. Again, wisdom is formally said of God, and this according to the same idea by which it is said of us, because the reasons that were set down in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 nn.27, 35, 39] about the univocity of being conclude the same about the univocity of wisdom; therefore wisdom, according to the idea in which it is said of God, is a species of a genus [n.153]; and this is proved by the saying of the ancient doctors [Alexander of Hales, Bonaventure, Aquinas], who say that species is transferred to divine reality,

¹⁶⁷ The essential parts of something are what define it; the subjective parts are the kinds it divides into. So ‘animal’, which is by definition ‘animate sensing body’, is taken wholly by the species ‘man’ (for man is a rational animate sensing body), but the subjective parts of animal are all the kinds of animals (horses, dogs, giraffes), and of course none of these is taken into the definition of man.

¹⁶⁸ I.e. no perfection is of itself limited, but in creatures every perfection is limited, being a partaking of the perfection that is of itself unlimited [n.37]. Thus a limited perfection is a part of unlimited perfection, but in creatures this limited perfection is the whole creaturely perfection itself.

because it states a perfection, although not the genus, because it states an imperfection – as ‘science’ is transferred but not ‘quality’.

43. To the contrary is the Master [Lombard] in the text, and he adduces Augustine [*On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2] – and shows through him that ‘from God are removed the categories of the art of dialectic.’

I. First Opinion

A. Exposition of the Opinion

44. Here there are two opinions, at either extreme. – One [Henry of Ghent] is negative, which says that with the divine simplicity does not stand the fact that there is some concept common to God and creatures, and it was touched on above in distinction 3 question 1 [I d.3 n.20].

45. For proof of this certain reasons are set down which were not touched on before [sc. not touched on by Scotus in I d.3 qq.1-3].

The first is this: there is for things that are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction no common univocal term; God and creatures are totally and immediately under the extremes of a contradiction – to depend and not to depend, caused and not caused, to be from another and not to be from another; therefore there is for them no common univocal term.

46. Again second thus, and it is a confirmation of the previous reason: every common concept is neutral with respect to the things to which it is common; no concept is neutral with respect to contradictories, because it is one or other of them; therefore etc.

47. Again third thus: things primarily diverse agree in nothing; God is primarily diverse from any creature, otherwise he would have that in which he would agree and that in which he would differ, and so he would not be simply simple; therefore God agrees in nothing with the creature, and so neither in any common concept.

48. Again, where there is only the unity of attribution there cannot be the unity of univocity; but it is necessary to posit unity of attribution of the creature with respect to God in the idea of being; therefore there is in this no univocity.

49. For this opinion [n.44] is adduced the intention of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], who posits three grades of knowing God – by eminence, causality, and negation – and he posits that the knowledge by negation is the ultimate, when from God are removed all the things that are common to creatures; therefore he himself does not understand that any concept abstracted from creatures remains in God according to the respect in which it was common to creatures.

50 For this opinion there is also Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3 n.5 (in the middle of the chapter): “When you hear of this good and of that good (which could elsewhere also be said to be not good), if you could without the things that are good by participation perceive the good itself, by participation in which they are good (for you also at the same time understand the good itself when you hear of this good and that good), but if you could, with these things taken away, perceive the good in itself, you would perceive God, and if you cleaved to him with love, you will at once be blessed.” Therefore he intends that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good by participation in which they are good, and this is ‘the infinite good’; therefore I

do not have there only a concept of God in general [I d.3 n.192], but also a concept of the good through its essence.

B. Reasons against the Opinion

51. Against this position [n.44] there are two reasons,¹⁶⁹ which were touched on above in distinction 3 in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27].

[First reason] – One reason is ‘that this concept proper to God could not naturally be caused in our intellect’; for whatever is naturally a mover of our intellect for the present state, whether the agent intellect or a phantasm or an intelligible species of the thing, has for adequate effect causing in us a concept of the quiddity and of what is contained essentially or virtually in such quiddity; but that proper concept is contained in neither way in the quiddity, neither essentially nor virtually (that it is not essentially is plain, because it denies univocity, – that not virtually because the more perfect is never contained in the less perfect); therefore etc.¹⁷⁰

52. The response of some people¹⁷¹ is that the being which is thought on causes knowledge of itself insofar as it is a being which is thought on (that is, insofar as it is a being related to the first being), and so to conceive it under that idea is not to conceive it under an absolute idea, but under an idea related to the first being; but the relation has to cause in the intellect a correlative concept, or a concept of the corresponding relation – and although the corresponding relation is not conceived of ‘as subsisting in itself’, yet it will be conceived in some way by virtue of the foundation of that relation.¹⁷²

53. Against this argument [n.51] the fact seems to stand that, if there is anything adequate to the object, the one naturally knowable and intelligible to us (whatever way it is present to our intellect), it can cause a concept of itself and of the things that it essentially or virtually includes, and, according to what was already said [n.51], it in no way includes the absolute that is the foundation of the relation in God, as I will prove [nn.54-55]; therefore it follows that in no way is a concept of that absolute caused in us, and so we will not naturally be able to have any concept of anything absolute about God.

54. Proof of the assumption [n.53], – because although the said response [n.52] supposes that a relation in creatures is naturally first conceived before the relation corresponding to it, or before the foundation of the corresponding relation (which I

¹⁶⁹ Note by Scotus: “For the commonness of being, besides the two argument of distinction 3 and their confirmations [I d.3 nn.27, 30, 35], there are these: comparison in being [n.83] (a); number of any beings whatever, and that the determinable of that which is ‘other’ is common to both the others [n.84] (b); Aristotle *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29 [n.79] (c); Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6 [n.71] (d); the confirmation that God is not called a stone [n.74] (e); Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 [n.72] (f); Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7 [n.73] (g); the masters [n.72] (k); against the one holding this opinion [sc. Henry of Ghent, nn.44, 53-54] (h).”

¹⁷⁰ That is, since we could never naturally get this concept proper to God, we do not now have it, and so we do not now have a concept of God that is proper to God and not univocal with creatures; therefore any concept of God we do now have cannot be proper but must be univocal with creatures.

¹⁷¹ Probably Richard of Conington, according to the Vatican Editors, who give references to Robert of Walsingham, John Baconthorp, Giles of Nottingham, and Giles of Alnwick.

¹⁷² The relation corresponding to the relation of the thought-on being to the first being will, of course, be the relation of the first being to the thought-on being. Hence (or so goes the theory) to think this correlative relation is to think the first being as in some way the foundation of the relation, and so to have a non-univocal concept of this first being.

believe to be dubious, because the term of a relation is naturally pre-understood to the relation, just as the foundation is too), – although it supposes too that a created thought-on thing is not understood by us save insofar as it is related (which was refuted in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Footprint’ [I d.3 nn.310-323] and seems to be against Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9: “Each thing subsists to itself, – how much more God?” – and Augustine is speaking about subsistence as about that by which a created thing naturally is not, and which naturally subsists in itself, otherwise the remark, ‘if each thing subsists to itself, how much more God’, would, if the same thing were taken in the premises as in the conclusion, not be an argument), – omitting these things, I say, which perhaps would be denied by the adversary, I argue as follows: although relation in a creature is able, by its virtue, to cause a concept of the relation corresponding to itself, yet that corresponding relation does not include in itself some absolute concept on which it is founded, because the relation of a creature – conversely – to God, which is only one of reason, does not include the divine essence or any perfection absolute in God (which perfection it naturally is), which essence, however, or perfection must be set down as the foundation of the relation of God to creatures; and so there could not, by these relations, be caused in us any concept of absolute perfection unless another relation possessed in itself virtually that absolute which is the proper perfection of God, and that is impossible.

55. This point [sc. that nothing absolute is included in the concept we have of God] is also proved by the fact that, according to them [sc. those holding the opinion in n.53], the divine essence is of a nature only to cause, about itself, a single concept in the intellect, – therefore only a single real concept about it is of a nature to be possessed. The proof of this consequence is that the divine nature itself is of a nature to cause in the intellect every real concept that is, as to its simple understanding, of a nature to be possessed about it (and more imperfect objects are not capable of this). I infer further: therefore any object that is of a nature to cause, about itself, some real concept, is of a nature to cause that single concept which is itself of a nature to be possessed about it – and, if it does not cause that concept, then it causes no concept about it; but no creature can cause that single concept, because then the concept could, under the idea in which it is a singular essence, be understood from creatures; therefore through no creature – according to this position [n.53] – can any singular concept be possessed about the divine essence.

56. [Second reason] – The second reason, touched on in the aforesaid question [I d.3 n.35, 27], was about one certain concept and two doubtful ones, where the certain concept is common to them.¹⁷³

57. To this there is a threefold response.¹⁷⁴ – First, that there is some concept one and the same that is ‘certain’ and ‘doubtful’; as the concept of Socrates and Plato is

¹⁷³ A reference to an argument from I d.3 n.27: “Every intellect which is certain about one concept, and doubtful about diverse ones, has a concept about what it is certain of that is different from the concepts about what it is doubtful of; the subject includes the predicate. But the intellect of the wayfarer can be certain about God that he is a being, while doubting about finite or infinite being, created or uncreated being; therefore the concept of the being of God is different from this concept and from that; and so neither term [finite or infinite, created or uncreated] is, in itself and in each of those concepts, included in it [sc. included in the concept of the being of God]; therefore [the concept of the being of God] is univocal [sc. of the same meaning whether it is a concept of something finite or something infinite, of something created or something uncreated].”

¹⁷⁴ Presumably from Richard of Conington et al.; see footnote to n.52 above.

doubtful while the concept of some man is certain, – and yet both this and that concept are the same.

58. This is nothing, because although the same concept might be diversified in grammatical and logical modes (grammatical ones as in any modes of signifying; logical ones as in any diverse modes of conceiving, as universal and singular, or explicitly or implicitly: explicitly, as definition expresses it – implicitly as the defined thing expresses it), and not only could one posit certitude and incertitude by these differences, but also truth and falsehood, congruity and incongruity, – yet the fact that the same concept, conceived or taken in the same way, may be certain and doubtful according to, or as to, the modes mentioned, is altogether the same as to affirm and deny. Therefore if the concept of being is certain and the concept of created and uncreated being is doubtful (and this is not because of grammatical modes of signifying, nor is it in logical modes of conceiving), then either the concepts will be simply other, which is the intended proposition – or there will be a concept diversified in mode of conceiving universal and particular, which is also the intended proposition.

59. In a second way it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that they are two concepts close to each other, but that also, because of their closeness, they seem to be one concept – and the concept about the ‘one’ seems to be certain, that is, about these two concepts when doubtfully conceived, while doubtful about the two concepts when distinctly conceived.

60. On the contrary. When there are concepts that cannot be conceived under any unity unless they are at the same time, or beforehand, conceived under a distinction proper to them, which distinction is presupposed to the unity, the intellect cannot be certain about them insofar as they have that unity and doubtful about them insofar as they are distinct; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about the unity of them and doubtful about their distinction; or thus: the intellect cannot be certain about them under the idea of the unity and doubtful about them under the idea of some proper distinction. But the intellect conceiving the being that is said of God and creatures – if they be two concepts, it cannot have those concepts according to any unity unless it naturally have them first, or at the same time, under their idea as distinct; therefore it cannot be certain about them under the idea of them as one and doubtful about them under the idea of them as many.

61. Proof of the major [n.60], that if there was certitude about any concept (or about all concepts whatever) while there was a doubting about *a* and *b* (or along with doubt about *a* and *b*), then this one concept or these two concepts [sc. which seem to be one] are conceived first naturally – under the idea under which there is certitude about it or about them – before *a* and *b* are conceived [sc. but this is false].¹⁷⁵

62. However it is conceded that concepts that have a relation are pre-conceived. – On the contrary. Either conceived as altogether disparate, – therefore they do not ‘seem’ one; or conceived as having some unity, or any unity, of order or distinction among themselves, – and then comes the proof of the minor [n.60]: being in God and being in creatures, if they are two concepts having attribution, cannot be conceived insofar as they have unity of attribution unless this concept and that are first – or at least at the same time – naturally conceived insofar as they are distinct, to wit this concept under its own proper

¹⁷⁵ The point seems to be that one cannot be certain about a given concept and doubtful about whether it does or does not include some other concepts unless one first conceives those other concepts (for otherwise what is one doubting about?).

idea and that one under its own proper idea, because these concepts under their own proper ideas are the foundations of the unity of ‘order’ or of ‘attribution’.

63. This is confirmed by an argument of the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.2.426b8-15 about the common sense, which sense he concludes is common through its knowledge of the difference between white and black, from the knowledge of which difference he concludes that it knows the extremes. For if it could know them under the idea of this respect which is ‘difference’, without knowing them under their proper idea, then his argument would not be valid. Therefore likewise in the intended proposition, *a* and *b* cannot be known at the same time under the idea of this relation – namely of the unity of order – unless *a* is known under its own proper idea and *b* under its own proper idea (since for you there is nothing common between them), and so any intellect that conceives these two under the unity of order conceives them as in themselves distinct.

64. A better argument is as follows, against the claim ‘they seem to be one concept’ [n.59]:

Two simply simple concepts are not in the intellect unless each is there distinctly, because such a simply simple concept is either altogether unknown or totally attained (*Metaphysics* 9.10.1051b17-26); therefore no intellect is certain about it in some respect and doubtful or deceived about it in another. Form, then, a reasoning as follows: an intellect has two concepts; therefore, if ‘they seem’ to be one, something is plain to the intellect about each concept, and something else is not plain – clearly – otherwise they would always seem ‘one’; therefore neither concept is simply simple, therefore they are not first diverse or most abstract.

65. Again, an intellect in possession of a distinct concept can distinguish by it ‘a known object’ from the concept which it has; here [n.59] it cannot distinguish because it does not have a distinct concept, – therefore neither does it have a proper concept, because a proper concept is a concept that is repugnant to another one; therefore the intellect conceiving this proper concept conceives a something that is repugnant to another concept; for example, sight does not see something repugnant to black without thereby distinguishing it from black. I call concepts formal objects. – For because two objects under their proper ideas (one of which is diverse first from the other) are understood by me, and yet I cannot distinguish what this one is, then I do not understand their proper ideas; therefore I understand nothing or I understand something common.

66. Again, when it is known ‘if a thing exists’, the question ‘what it is’ remains, *Posterior Analytics* 2.1.89b34.¹⁷⁶

67. Again there is a more brief argument thus: when the intellect is certain, either it is certain about a concept simply one, or it is not but about a concept one ‘by unity of analogy’. If in the first way, and the intellect is not certain about this concept or about that one (because it is in doubt about each in particular), then it is certain about some third concept that is simply one, which is the intended proposition. If in the second way, it is true, insofar as it is thus one concept, – but about that which is thus one I argue: the intellect cannot be certain about something one ‘by unity of analogy’ unless it is certain

¹⁷⁶ Therefore, presumably, while one can know that something is, one does not know what it is, or does not have a concept of it (as opposed to a name for referring to it), until one asks what it is, and asking what it is will force one to come to a concept which, if not entirely adequate to the object, will be sufficiently adequate to itself that it is known to be the concept that it is and not, say, two concepts seeming to be one [cf. n.69].

about the two as they are two; therefore those two do not seem to the intellect to be 'one', because they are at once conceived as distinct concepts.

68. The response in the third way [nn.57, 59] is that there is not certitude about some one concept and doubt about two, but certitude about two concepts and doubt about one or other of them; as for example, 'I am certain that this is a being, that is, that it is a substance or an accident, but I doubt whether it is determinately this being, as substance, or that being, which is accident.'

69. On the contrary. The certitude precedes all apprehension of anything whatever that divides being itself, therefore it precedes certitude 'about the whole disjunct'. – The proof of the antecedent is that in the first apprehension by which 'this' is known to be something, or a being, there is no need to apprehend it from itself or from another, in itself or in another, and so on about other disjuncts.

70. [Third reason, nn.51, 56] – Against this opinion [n.44] there is also a confirmation for the fourth argument stated above [point (d) in footnote to n.51], which was about the inquiry of the intellect, which inquiry we make by natural investigation about God [I d.3 n.39]; here the ideas of creatures that state imperfection of themselves are separated by us from the imperfection with which they exist in creatures, and we consider them, taken in themselves, as indifferent, and we attribute to them supreme perfection; and, when thus taken as supreme, we attribute them to the Creator as proper to him.

71. Thus does Augustine argue *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: "Since we put the Creator without any doubt before created things, he must both supremely live, and perceive and understand all things." This he himself proves from the fact that "we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living ones, things endowed with sense to non-sentient ones, intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, immortal things to mortal ones," – which argument does not seem valid if such things, as they are displayed in creatures, were not of the same idea as those which, when such in supreme degree, we attribute to God.

72. The like arguments [sc. taking creaturely imperfection away and attributing supreme perfection to God, n.71] are frequently made or held by the doctors and saints.

For thus are intellect and will posited formally in God, and not only absolutely but along with infinity, – thus too power and wisdom; thus is free choice posited in him; and Anselm *On Free Choice* ch.1 blames the definition that says free choice 'is the power of sinning', because according to him free choice would then – according to this definition – not exist in God, which is false; and this refutation would be no refutation if free choice were said of God and creatures according to a wholly different idea.

73. This is also the way of Dionysius [*On the Divine Names* ch.7 sect.3, ch.2 sect.7], because when by the third way, or on the third level, he has come to the 'knowledge by remotion' [n.49], I ask whether the negation is understood there precisely, – and then God is not more known than a chimaera is, because the negation is common to being and non-being; or whether something positive is known there to which the negation is attributed, – and then about that positive thing I ask how the concept of it is possessed in the intellect; if no concept by way of causality and eminence is possessed, previously caused in the intellect, nothing positive at all will be known to which the negation may be attributed.

74. There is a conformation for this reason [n.70], that we do not say that God is formally a stone but we do say that he is formally wise; and yet if the attribution of concept to concept is precisely considered, stone could be formally attributed to something in God – as to his idea – just like wisdom is.

75. The response is that God is not called wise because the idea of wisdom is in him, but because such a perfection simply is in him, although of a different idea from created wisdom.

On the contrary:

76. Our wisdom is a certain participation in the ‘wisdom in God’, and likewise also in the idea; but only some single same perfection participates essentially.

77. Again, the relation of what participates the idea to the idea is the relation of measured to measure; but a single measured is referred only to a single measure, – the idea is its measure; therefore since the wisdom by which God is wise is the measure of the same, it is not distinguished from the idea (response: the idea is the proper measure and the proper participated, or rather, is the relation of measure and participated, – wisdom is not thus but is the foundation of the relation of measure and participated, and is common, not proper, because one creature participates the perfection in just the way another does).

78. And similarly, if you say that we conclude something about God by reason of effects, where proportion alone and not likeness is sufficient – this does not reply to, but confirms, the argument [n.70], because, by considering God under the idea of cause, he is from creatures known proportionally well enough, but in this way there is not known about God any perfect thing’s perfection that is in creatures formally, but only causally, namely that God is cause of such perfection. But attributes are perfections stated simply of God formally – therefore such attributes are known about God not only by way of proportion but also by way of likeness, such that it is necessary to posit some concept in such attributes common to God and creatures, and the common concept in the first way, knowing God by way of causality, is not of this sort.

79. For this argument [n.70] there is the authority of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b23-29, who, when arguing that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’, proves it through this major, that ‘that thing is in each case maximally such whereby univocity is predicated in other things’, and he exemplifies it about fire; and from this he concludes that ‘the principles of eternal things must be most true’. This consequence is not valid save in virtue of the following minor, that the eternal principles ‘are the univocal cause of truth in other things’. For if in the minor the proposition is taken that the principles are equivocal or analogical, there will be four terms in the Philosopher’s syllogism, which is not likely.

C. To the Arguments for the Opinion

80. To the arguments for the opposite opinion [n.44].

To the first [n.45]. Either one understands in the minor the ‘they are totally under the extremes of a contradiction’, that is, that they are precisely under the extremes of a contradiction, – and thus the minor is false; for God is not precisely the extreme ‘not from another’, because this negation is said of a chimaera, nor is a creature precisely the

negation ‘not a necessary being’, because this belongs to a chimaera, – but both God and a creature are something to which one or other side of a contradiction belongs. Take the major then to mean that whatever things are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction belong to them, that ‘these things are not univocally spoken of in anything’; this major is false, for all things that per se divide something common are of the sort that the extremes of a contradiction are said of them, and yet they are univocally spoken of in that division. So in the intended proposition: these things can all receive, according to themselves, the predication of a contradiction, and yet they can have something abstract – or some substrate of the extremes of the contradiction – which is common to both [sc. extremes].

81. As to the confirmation about the ‘neutral’ [n.46], I say that even a concept common to two things is neutral formally, and so I concede the conclusion that the concept of being is not formally the concept of something created or of something uncreated [I d.3 n.27]; but if the understanding be that this concept is neutral such that neither of the contradictories is said of it, it is false. For thus it is about rational and irrational, that the concept animal is formally neutral with respect to them, and yet that which is conceived is not neutral but is truly one or other of them. For one or other of the contradictories is said of any animal whatever, and yet it is not necessary that any concept whatever is formally one or other of the contradictories.

82. As to the third [n.47] the answer will be plain in the third article ‘that God and creatures are not diverse first in their concepts’ [nn.95-127]; they are, however, diverse first in reality, because they agree in no reality – and how there can be a common concept without agreement in thing or in reality will be said in what follows [nn.137-150].

83. To the next one, about attribution [n.48], I say that attribution by itself does not posit unity, because the unity of attribution is less than the unity of univocity, and the lesser does not include the greater; yet a lesser unity can stand along with a greater unity, just as things that are one in genus are one in species, although the unity of a genus is less than the unity of a species. So here, I concede that the unity of attribution does not posit unity of univocity, and yet this unity of attribution stands along with unity of univocity, although this unity is not formally that unity, example: the species of the same genus have an essential attribution to the first thing of that genus (*Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18), and yet there stands along with this the unity of univocity of idea in those species. Thus – and much more so – must it be in the proposed case, that the attributes may have in idea of being, in which there is unity of attribution, a unity of univocity, because never are things compared as measured to measure, or as exceeded to exceeding, unless they agree in some one thing. But just as comparison simply is in the univocal simply (*Physics* 7.4.248b6-7), so any comparison is in what is somehow or other univocal. For when it is said ‘this is more perfect than that’, if it is asked ‘a more perfect what?’, one must assign something common to both, so that the determinable of every comparative is common to each extreme of the comparison; for a man is not a more perfect man than an ass, but is a more perfect animal. And so, if certain things are compared in being, where there is attribution of one to the other (‘this is more perfect than that; a more perfect what? – a more perfect being’), there must be a unity in some way common to each extreme.

84. Thus may it also be argued about number or about distinction, because all distinct or numbered things have something common, as Augustine means in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: “If three persons are spoken of, common to them is what a person

is,” – so that the determinable of a numerable term is always something common (according to Augustine) to all the numbered things. – And if it be instanced that there is properly no number of God and creatures, I argue about the diverse or the distinct or the other, thus: God and a creature are diverse or distinct, or God is something, or someone, other than a creature. In all these cases the determinable of the distinction, or of the stated singularity or plurality, must be common to each extreme – the point is plain in all examples, because a man is not ‘another man than an ass’ but ‘another animal’. This is proved by reason, because in relations of equal comparison the extremes are of the same idea; otherness is such a relation; therefore in all things ‘other’ there is an otherness of the same idea, and consequently the determinable of otherness will be of one idea. Do not rely on this, because it would conclude that the foundation is of the same idea, hence the minor [‘otherness is such a relation’] is contrary to the article about ‘other’.¹⁷⁷

85. As for the argument from Dionysius [n.49], it is clear rather in the third argument [n.73] that the intention of Dionysius is to the opposite, because at the third level a stand is not made at negation alone, but at some concept taken from creatures, to which that negation is attributed.

86. To Augustine [n.50] I reply that ‘the good by participation in which other things are good’ (which good is understood by understanding this good and that) can either be posited as a universal to all goods, and then ‘the other goods’ are by participation in it (the way a species participates the genus, or as any inferior participates the superior), or it can be understood as the good in essence, by participation in which, as in their cause, the other goods are, and then it is true that, by understanding this good and that good, I understand the good in essence, but in the case of the universal I understand good the way that, when understanding this being, I understand being as part of its concept, and that in being I understand any being whatever universally. And when Augustine adds ‘if you can know it in itself’ [n.50], I say that if the ‘in itself’ is referred, not to the act of knowing, but to the object [sc. if ‘in itself’ goes with ‘it’ not with ‘know’], – to wit, that I know the good, which I know universally, with the determination ‘in itself’, namely that I conceive the good with the sort of determination that it is a non-dependent good and good in essence – then I understand God not only in a common concept but in a proper concept, and then, by the phrase ‘in itself’, the good that was common is contracted and becomes proper to God; and beatitude lies in cleaving to this good by enjoyment (speaking of the beatitude of the way [sc. as opposed to the beatitude of the heavenly fatherland]), because this concept is the most perfect we can have in conceiving God naturally.

87. And this appears to be the intention of Augustine in *On Free Choice of the Will* II chs.8-14 nn.23-28 – or elsewhere in the same book [*On the Trinity* VIII, n.50], where he says: “do not look for what truth is, because at once phantasms will present themselves, etc.,” which would not be true if there was a concept of being or of good in God altogether different from the concept of them in creatures. For then one well ought to look for ‘what truth is’, because then a truth would be looked for that is proper to God, nor would phantasms there present themselves to disturb the concept of truth as it is

¹⁷⁷ An article that Scotus apparently intended to put together from the Cambridge and Parisian Reportations: “otherness connotes some agreement of the extremes in their determinable, and also notes some non-identity corresponding to the same” [Rep. IA d.4 q.1 n.9], which non-identity would here be lacking [n.54].

proper to God, because this concept does not have concepts corresponding to it. But they do disturb the concept of truth as it belongs to God when speaking of truth universally, as has been expounded elsewhere [I d.3 n.193].

But there are some who shamelessly insist that there is one concept of being and yet none that is univocal to this thing and that, – this is not to the intention of this question, because, whatever it is that is conceived according to attribution or order in diverse things, yet if there is a concept of itself one, such that it does not have a different idea according as it is said of this and of that, that concept is univocal.

89. Also if anyone in any way shamelessly insists that a denominative concept is not univocal, because the idea of the subject is not of the idea of the predicate, – this instance seems puerile, because in one way a denominative predicate is a middle between a univocal and an equivocal predicate, in another an equivocal and a univocal predicate are, in logic, immediate [extremes]. The first is true when taking a univocal predicate which is univocally predicated, that is because, namely, its idea is the idea of the subject, and in this way a denominative predicate is not univocal. The second is true when understanding it of the unity of the idea which is predicated; thus a univocal concept is that whose idea is in itself one, or the idea is the idea of the subject, whether it denominates the subject or is said *per accidens* of the subject, but an equivocal concept is that whose idea is different, however that idea is disposed to the subject. An example: animal is univocal, not only as said of its species but also as determined by its differences, because it has one concept determinable by them, and yet it is not said univocally of the differences, such that it is predicated in their ‘what’ – such that its idea is the idea of the differences, the way it is said of the species. Also, this dispute is nothing to the purpose, because if being is said about God and creatures according to a single concept of itself, one must say that the idea of being is the idea of the subject; for it will be said of both in the ‘what’, and so it will be univocal in both ways.

II. Second Opinion

90. The other opinion is affirmative, at the other extreme [n.44], which posits that God is in a genus – and they [sc. those who hold this opinion]¹⁷⁸ have also on their behalf the authority of Damascene *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.7: “Incorporeal substance etc.”¹⁷⁹

91. Again Boethius in his little book *On the Trinity* ch.4, where he seems to say that two genera¹⁸⁰ remain in divine reality. This cannot be understood only according to some similar mode of predication, because Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.8 speaks thus: “If God be called good, just, spirit” etc., “only the last one I mentioned seems to signify substance, and the rest qualities;” and *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 he seems to say that action most properly agrees with God. Therefore it is not merely the modes of predication similar to those genera that remain, and in this way does it seem one should understand Boethius ‘about those two genera’ that in themselves remain.

¹⁷⁸ Who these people are is unknown, but their arguments given here [nn.90-93] are reported by Thomas of Sutton.

¹⁷⁹ Damascene *ibid.*: “Incorporeal substance embraces God, angel, soul, demon,” cf. also: “The most general genus is substance, for it has no genus above it.”

¹⁸⁰ The two genera are substance and relation, n.130.

92. Third for this opinion seems to be the authority of Averroes *Metaphysics X* com.7 (and the text begins “And being is said”),¹⁸¹ where the Philosopher says that “there is some one first substance,” which is the measure of the others [*Metaphysics* 10.2.1054a8-9, 11-13]. The Commentator wants this first substance to be the prime mover. Therefore, just as in the case of other genera the ‘first’ is something of that genus, so the first mover is something of the genus of substance.

93. A first reason set down for this opinion is of the following sort, that created substance can be conceived from uncreated substance, and that neither concept is simply simple. Therefore, by resolution, the idea of substance will remain, indifferent to each contracting instance – and the idea of genus seems to be thus indifferently taken.¹⁸²

94. A second reason is that many simple entities are placed in a genus, such as angels, according to those who posit them to be immaterial – accidents too, according to those who posit them to be simple. Therefore the simplicity of God does not exclude from him the idea of genus.

III. Scotus’ own Opinion

95. I hold a middle opinion, that along with the simplicity of God stands the fact that some concept is common to him and to creatures – not however some common concept as of a genus, because the concept is not said of God in the ‘what’, nor is it, by whatever formal predication said of him, *per se* in any genus.

A. Proof of the First Part of the Opinion

96. The first part was proved when arguing against the first opinion [nn.44, 51-79].

B. Proof of the Second Part of the Opinion

I. By the Reasons of Augustine and Avicenna

97. The second part I prove by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.5 n.10: “It is manifest that God is improperly called a ‘substance’.” – His reason there is that substance is said to be that which stands under the accidents; but it is absurd to say that God stands under any accident; therefore etc. This reason holds in this way: Augustine does not understand that the idea of substance is ‘to stand under accidents as substance is a genus’, because he has given there as premise that “it is absurd that substance be said relatively.” But substance, as it is a genus, is limited, as will be immediately proved next [nn.101-107]; but every limited substance is able to receive an accident; therefore any substance that is in a genus can stand under some accident, – God does not so stand, therefore etc.

98. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb) argues that God is not in a genus, because a genus is a ‘part’; but God is simple, not possessing part and part; therefore God is not in a genus.

99. These two reasons [nn.97-98] are true by authority and reason together.

¹⁸¹ Cf. Scotus’ *Lectura* I d.8 n.92.

¹⁸² The Vatican editors refer this argument to David of Dinant and Albert the Great.

2. By what is Proper to God

100. I now show the intended proposition [n.95] by two middle terms (and they are made clear from things proper to God): first from the idea of infinity, – second from the idea of necessary existence.

101. [From the idea of infinity] – From the first I argue in two ways.

First as follows: a concept having an indifference to certain things to which the concept of a genus cannot be indifferent cannot be the concept of a genus; but something commonly said of God and creatures is indifferent to the finite and infinite, speaking of essential features, – or at any rate indifferent to the finite and non-finite, speaking of any feature whatever, because divine relation is not finite; no genus can be indifferent to the finite and infinite, therefore etc.¹⁸³

102. The first part of the minor is plain, because whatever is an essential perfection in God is formally infinite, – in creatures it is finite.

103. I prove the second part of the minor by the fact that a genus is taken from some reality which, in itself, is potential to the reality from which the difference is taken; nothing infinite is potential to anything, as is plain from what was said in the preceding question.¹⁸⁴ This proof stands on the composition of species and the potentiality of genus, but both these are removed from God, because of infinity.

104. This assumption [n.103] is plain from the authority of Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b25-26: “The term” (that is, the definition) “must be an extended proposition,” “because of the fact that it signifies something of something, so that the latter is matter and the former is form.”¹⁸⁵

105. The same assumption is also apparent by reason, because if the reality from which the genus is taken were truly the whole quiddity of the thing, the genus alone would completely define it, – also genus and difference would not define it, because the account composed of them would not indicate what is first the same as the thing defined; for each thing is itself once, and therefore an account that would express it twice would not indicate what is first the same as the quiddity of the thing.

106. Treating further in some way of this reasoning [n.105], I understand it thus, that genus and difference are, in the case of some creatures, taken from one and another reality (as, by positing there to be several forms in man, animal is taken from the sensitive form and rational from the intellective form), and then the thing from which the genus is taken is truly potential and perfectible by the thing from which the difference is taken. Sometimes, when there is not there thing and thing (as in the case of accidents), at any rate there is in the one thing some reality from which the genus is taken and another reality from which the difference is taken; let the first be called *a* and the second *b*; *a* is in itself potential to *b*, so that, by understanding *a* precisely and *b* precisely, in the way *a* is understood in the first instant of nature – the instant in which it is precisely itself – it is perfectible by *b* (as if it were another thing), but the fact that it is not perfected really by *b* is because of the identity of *a* and *b* with some whole with which they are first really the same, and this whole is indeed what is first produced and in this very whole both those

¹⁸³ This paragraph is marked as ‘p’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

¹⁸⁴ The Vatican editors refer to nn.7-19, but the reference might be as well or better to nn.36-38.

¹⁸⁵ See Appendix to this question point D.

realities are produced; but if either of them were produced without the other, it would be truly potential to it and truly imperfect without it.

107. This composition of realities – of potential and actual – is the least that is sufficient for the idea of genus and difference, and it does not stand along with the fact that some reality is infinite in something; for if the reality were of itself infinite, however much it is precisely taken, it would not be in potency to any reality; therefore since in God any essential reality is formally infinite, there is none from which the idea of genus can formally be taken.

108. [Again from the idea of infinity] – Second, from the same middle [n.100], I argue as follows: the concept of a species is not only the concept of a reality and of a mode intrinsic to the same reality, because then whiteness would be a genus and the degrees of intrinsic whiteness could be the specific differences;¹⁸⁶ but those things by which something common is contracted to God and creatures are the finite and infinite, which state intrinsic degrees of it;¹⁸⁷ therefore the contracting things cannot be the differences, nor do they constitute with the contracted thing a composite composed in the way the concept of a species should be composed, nay the concept from such a contracted and contracting thing is simpler than the concept of a species could be.¹⁸⁸

109. From these middles about infinity, the reasoning of Augustine stated above about ‘standing under the accidents’ [n.97] gets its evidence. Thence too does Avicenna’s reasoning get its evidence, in *Metaphysics* VIII ‘about the partial nature of genus’ touched on above [n.98], because a genus is never without some partial reality in the species, which reality cannot be in something really simple.

110. [From the idea of necessary existence] – I argue, third, from the second middle, namely from the idea of necessary existence [n.100], – and it is the argument of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb): if necessary existence has a genus, then the intention of the genus will either be from necessary existence or not. If in the first way, “then it will only cease at the difference;” I understand this as follows: the genus will in that case include the difference, because without it the genus is not in ultimate act and ‘necessary existence of itself’ is in ultimate act (but if the genus includes the difference, then it is not the genus). If the second way be granted, then it follows that “necessary existence will be constituted by that which is not necessary existence.”¹⁸⁹

111. But this reasoning [n.110] proves that necessary existence has nothing common with anything, because the common intention is ‘non-necessary existence’; hence I respond: the intention as understood includes neither necessity nor possibility, but is indifferent; but as to that in the thing which corresponds to the intention, it is in ‘this thing’ necessary existence, and in ‘that thing’ it is possible existence (this is rejected if to

¹⁸⁶ Note by Scotus: “‘An intrinsic mode is not a difference, in any degree of form at all’; therefore there is no difference involved in this case. – On the contrary, ‘about infinite line’ [below n.117].”

¹⁸⁷ Note by Scotus: “‘but those things...’, – response: not those only, just as neither does color descend to whiteness only through the primacy and perfection of whiteness to the other colors, but also through the specific difference. – To the contrary. Nothing else contracts anything indifferent to God save the infinite, – because if something other than the infinite contracts it, what is the order of that other thing to infinity? Either the intrinsic mode will be posterior ‘to the quasi-extrinsic contracting mode’ just as the difference is, or the infinite understood as ‘infinite’ will be further contractible and potential.”

¹⁸⁸ This paragraph is marked as ‘q’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112

¹⁸⁹ This paragraph is marked as ‘s’ by Scotus. See footnote below to n.112.

the intention of the genus a proper reality corresponds, and if it does not thus correspond to the common intention, – as is said [later, n.139].

112. [As to ‘whatever is said formally of God’] – As to that which is added in the question ‘about whatever is formally said of God’ [n.39], I say nothing such is in a genus,¹⁹⁰ for the same reason [nn.95-111], that nothing which is limited is said formally of God; whatever is of some genus, in whatever way it is of that genus, is necessarily limited.

113. But then there is a doubt, as to what sort the predicates are which are said of God, such as wise, good, etc.

I reply. Being is divided first into finite and infinite before it is divided into the ten categories, because one of them, namely ‘finite’, is common to these ten genera; therefore anything that agrees with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite, or as proper to infinite being, agrees with being, not as it is determined to a genus, but as prior, and consequently as it is transcendent and outside every genus. Anything that is common to God and creatures is such as to agree with being as indifferent to the finite and infinite; for as it agrees with God it is infinite, – as it agrees with creatures, it is finite; therefore it agrees with being before being is divided into the ten genera, and consequently whatever is such is transcendent.

114. But then there is another doubt, as to how ‘wisdom’ is set down as transcendent although it is not common to all beings.

I reply. Just as the idea of ‘most general’ is not the having of several species under it but the not having any genus above it (just as this category ‘when’ – because it does not have a genus above it – is most general, although it has few or no species), so the transcendent is whatever has no genus under which it is contained. Hence it is of the idea of the transcendent to have no predicate above it save being; but the fact it is common to many inferiors is accidental to it.

115. This is plain from another fact, that being not only has simple properties convertible with it, – as one, true, good – but also it has some properties where there are opposites distinguished against each other, as necessary existence or possible existence, act or potency, and the like. But just as the convertible properties are transcendent, because they follow being insofar as it is not determined to any genus, so the disjunct properties are transcendent, and each member of the disjunct is transcendent because neither determines its determinable to a definite genus; and yet one member of the disjunct is formally specific, agreeing with only one being, – as necessary existence in this division ‘necessary existence or possible existence’, and as infinite in this division ‘finite or infinite’, and so on in other cases. Thus too can wisdom be transcendent, and anything else that is common to God and creatures, although some such be said of God

¹⁹⁰ Note of Scotus: “The negative [side of the question] – ‘nothing said of God is in a genus’: for this there are three reasons, two of which, p [n.101] and q [n.108], are from infinity (the instance r against them, through infinite line [n.117], and there two things: the intention of Aristotle and what is true in the thing); the third reason s [n.110] is about necessary existence – the fourth t from others [nn.118-119] (it will be refuted).

The affirmative [side of the question] – ‘anything said of God is transcendent’: where the first argument is v, about transcendents “But then there is a doubt” [n.113]; next x ‘to the contrary’, the one about the four predicates [n.120], – and y the other ‘to the contrary’, about the reality corresponding to the common concept [n.137] (a difficulty is at o [see footnote to n.136]), – the solution to them [sc. x and y, nn.212-127, 138-150].”

only, and some other such be said of God and a creature. But it is not necessary that a transcendent, as transcendent, be said only of whatever being is convertible with the first transcendent, namely with being.¹⁹¹

3. Statement and Refutation of Some People's Proof

116. [Some people's proof] – Some people¹⁹² prove it in a fourth way [nn.101, 108, 110], that God is not a genus because “he contains in himself the perfections of all genera.”¹⁹³

[Refutation of the proof] – But this argument is not valid, because what contains something contains it in its own way. Substance too, which is now the most general genus, contains, as it is taken for all inferior species, all the accidents virtually; so that, if God were to cause only the individuals of substances, they would have in themselves the wherewithal to cause all accidents, and yet created substances would not be denied, because of this, to be in a genus, because they contain accidents virtually in their own way and not in the way of accidents. So, therefore, from the fact alone that God contains the perfections of all genera, it does not follow that he is not in a genus, because containing them in this way does not exclude finitude (for this ‘to contain virtually’ is not ‘to be infinite’), but from God's absolute infinity this does follow, as was deduced before [nn.101-109].

117. [Instances from infinite line] – But against this [sc. the last clause of n.118] an instance is made that infinity simply does not prove the intended proposition [sc. that God is not in a genus], because the Philosopher *Topics* 6.11.148b23-32 takes exception to the definition of straight line (namely this definition, ‘a straight line is that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes’), for this reason, that if there were an infinite line it could be straight, – but then it would not have a middle, nor extremes or ends; but a definition is not to be taken exception to because it does not agree with that to which being in a genus is impossible; therefore it is not impossible for an infinite line to be in a genus, and consequently infinity does not necessarily prohibit being in a genus.¹⁹⁴

118. I reply, first to the intention of the authority [sc. of Aristotle, n.117], – because a straight line is a whole *per accidens*, and, if this whole be defined, it will be assigned one definition corresponding to line and another corresponding to straight. That which corresponds to ‘straight’ in the place in the definition does not formally contradict the infinite (because straight does not formally contradict the infinite), and what a definition is formally repugnant to, the thing defined will also be repugnant to; but that there is assigned in the definition, which the Philosopher takes exception to, a definition as it were of straight (that is, to have a mean within the extremes), this is formally repugnant to the infinite; therefore, if this definition were good, it has to be that straight would be formally repugnant to the infinite, – but this is false, although straight is, as to its subject, formally repugnant to the infinite. The Philosopher, then, does not intend to say that an infinite line can be in a genus, but that infinity is not formally repugnant to the idea of straight, – and therefore the definition to which infinity is formally repugnant is

¹⁹¹ This paragraph is marked as ‘v’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112

¹⁹² Aquinas *On Power* q.7 a.3.

¹⁹³ This paragraph is marked as ‘t’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

¹⁹⁴ This paragraph is marked as ‘r’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112. See also appendix point E.

not a definition ‘of straight insofar as it is straight’; for he would not have taken exception to this definition ‘a straight line is length without breadth, whose extremes are two points equally extended’, because here something would be repugnant to infinity, but it would be assigned as the idea of line, not as the idea of straight, – and then it would be well assigned because infinity is repugnant to that line.

119. But there is another doubt, concerning the thing, whether an infinite straight line could be in the genus of quantity, – and if it could, then the two reasons taken from infinity [nn.101, 108] do not seem to be valid.

I reply. Never does the supreme in a superior follow on the supreme in an inferior unless the inferior is the most noble thing contained under the superior, just as ‘the most perfect ass, therefore the most perfect animal’ does not follow, but ‘the most perfect man, therefore the most perfect animal’ does, thanks to the matter, follow, because man is the most perfect of animals; therefore the best or most perfect being does not follow on the most perfect of the things that are contained under being unless it is the simply most perfect thing contained under being; but quantity is not such, nor anything in that genus – because anything in it is limited – nay, nothing is such save what is perfection simply, which can of itself be infinite; and so ‘the most perfect quantity, therefore the most perfect being’ does not follow, nor does it thus follow about anything in any genus, but only this follows, ‘the most perfect truth or goodness, therefore the most perfect being’. So it is, then, with the infinite, that because it does not assert only supreme perfection but also a perfection that cannot be exceeded, infinite being does not follow save on such an infinite as is the most perfect thing in which there is the idea of being, namely which asserts perfection simply. And therefore, although there were a quantity infinite in idea of quantity, yet, since quantity is not a perfection simply, it would not follow that it was an infinite being, because it would not follow that it was a being which could not be exceeded in perfection. There might, then, be an infinite line in the genus of quantity, because it would be a simply limited being and exceeded simply by a simply more perfect being, but ‘an infinite being simply’ cannot exist in a genus; and the reason is that the first infinite [sc. that of a line] does not take away all the potentiality that the idea of genus requires, but it only posits an infinity in a certain respect of some imperfect entity (in which, as it is that thing, there can well be composition, in whatever degree it be put – as long as it is that thing), but the second infinity necessarily takes away [that potentiality], as was made clear before [nn.106-107, 103].

120. [Instance from the insufficiency of the categories of Aristotle] – Against this [n.119] it is opposed that then contradictories would be posited, by conceding a common concept said in the ‘what’ about God and creatures and denying that God is in a genus; for every concept said in the ‘what’, if it is a common concept, is either the concept of a genus or the concept of a definition, otherwise there will be more predicates than Aristotle taught in *Topics* 1.4.101b15-28.¹⁹⁵

121. To this I say that they are not contradictories. The thing is plain from the authorities of Augustine given above [n.97], – where he denies that God is a substance and concedes that properly and even truly he is essence. But if there were a different, an equivocal, concept for essence as essence belongs to God and creatures, then there could thus be an equivocal concept of substance, – and so God could then be called substance just as he is called essence.

¹⁹⁵ This paragraph is marked as ‘x’ by Scotus. See footnote above to n.112.

122. Likewise Avicenna in *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 (99rb), where he denies that God is in a genus, concedes there that he is substance and being not in another. And that he is taking 'being' non-equivocally from the concept according to which it is said of creatures appears from himself in *Metaphysics* I ch.2 (71ra), where he says that "being in itself does not have principles, which is why science does not look for the principles of being absolutely, but of some being." But if being had a different concept in God and in creatures, there could well be a principle in itself of being, because of being according to one concept being itself according to another concept would be the principle.

123. When you argue 'it is said in the 'what', then it is genus or definition' [n.120], – I reply: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b23-32 teaches what sort of 'predicate said in the what' is a definition. For he introduces there, against the 'ideas' of Plato the sayings of the followers of Antisthenes, – whom to this extent he approves when they say, "a long account is a term." And afterwards he adds that "it is a feature of substance that of it there can be a term (to wit of composite substance, whether sensible or intelligible), but of the first elements from which these are, there is not" (supply, a definition), – and he adds the reason: "since a definition signifies something of something" (this needs to be understood virtually, not formally, – as was said elsewhere [I d.3 n.147]); and he adds: "this indeed must be as matter, but that as form." From which he seems there to be arguing that the [Platonic] 'idea', if it were posited, would not be definable, and so if, because of the simplicity of the 'idea', his own reasoning has validity in any way, he himself would much more deny a definition of God, whose simplicity is supreme. Therefore it follows from his authority that nothing is said of God in the 'what' as a definition.

124. From the same it follows that nothing is said in the 'what' of God as a genus. For whatever has a genus can have a difference and a definition, because (*Metaphysics* 7.12.1038a5-6) genus 'either is nothing besides the species, or if it is, it is so indeed as matter', and then that of which there is a genus should be set down as being able to have a difference as form. If, therefore, something is said of God in the 'what', it follows, arguing constructively from Aristotle's authority not destructively, that that something is not a genus or definition; but when you infer 'it is a genus or definition, because Aristotle did not say that there were other predicates asserted in the 'what', therefore there are no other predicates' [n.120] – you are arguing from the authority destructively, and there is a fallacy of the consequent.¹⁹⁶

125. But you will say: then Aristotle did not sufficiently hand on all the predicates said in the 'what'.

I reply. The Philosopher in the *Topics* [n.120] distinguished predicates because of the distinction of problems, because diverse problems have, from the diversity of

¹⁹⁶ Those whom Scotus is criticizing are arguing that if a genus or definition is predicated in the 'what', then something predicated of God in the 'what' must be a genus or definition, and they are arguing thus on Aristotle's authority. But, first, this argument is the fallacy of the consequent (for even if genus and definition are predicated only in the 'what' it does not follow that anything predicated in the 'what' is only a genus or definition, for perhaps something else might be so predicated), and, second, they are arguing destructively from Aristotle and saying that if Aristotle spoke of nothing else as predicated in the 'what' then he denied that anything else could be predicated in the 'what'. Scotus is arguing constructively, that since Aristotle denied definition of simples he would admit that anything predicated of a simple in the 'what', as in the case of God, could not be a definition or a genus.

predicates, a diverse way of terminating. So he does not there number all the predicates, because he does not number specific difference (although he did include general difference under genus); and yet specific difference has the proper idea of a predicate; now species too has the proper idea of a predicate, different from definition, otherwise Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.1] would have been wrong to posit five universals. For that reason, therefore, Aristotle did sufficiently there distinguish the predicates, because he distinguished all those about which puzzling problems require a special way of terminating, which is what he was there intending to hand on. – But the transcendent ones are not such predicates, because there are no special problems about them; for a problem supposes something certain and inquires into what is doubtful (*Metaphysics* 7.17.1041b4-11), but being and thing “are impressed on the soul in first impression” (Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.6 (72rb)), and therefore about these most common concepts there are no *per se* terminable problems. It was not necessary, then, to number them among the predicates of problems.

126. But is it really the case that Aristotle never taught those general predicates [sc. the transcendent ones]?

I reply. In *Metaphysics* 8 [n.123] he taught that nothing was said of God as genus (from the afore-mentioned authority [n.123]), and yet he did teach that ‘truth’ is said univocally of God and creatures in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b30-31, as was mentioned above (where he says that ‘the principles of eternal things are most true’ [n.79]); and by this he taught that entity is said univocally of God and creatures, because he adds there (sc. *Metaphysics* 2, *ibid.*) that “as each thing is related to being, so is it related to truth;” it is also plain – according to him¹⁹⁷ – that if being is said of God, it will be said in the ‘what’. Therefore in these passages he implicitly taught that some transcendent predicate is said in the ‘what’, and that it is not genus or definition, – and that other transcendent predicates are said in the ‘what sort’ (like true), and yet that they are not properties or accidents in accord with the fact that these universals (sc. property and accident) belong to the species of some of the genera, because nothing which is a species of some genus belongs to God in any way.

127. He also in some way taught the same in *Topics* 4.6.128a38-39: “If something,” – he says – “always follows and does not convert, it is difficult to separate it from being a genus.” And he afterwards adds: “To use it as a genus by the fact that it always follows, although it does not convert,” – as if he were saying that this is expedient for the opponent; and he adds: “when the other grants one of the two sides, one should not obey him in everything,”¹⁹⁸ – as if he were to say that this is expedient to the respondent, not to concede that every non-convertible consequent is a predicate as a genus; and, if he were not speaking of a predicate said in the ‘what’, there would be no plausibility to what he teaches, that the opponent is using such as a genus. Therefore he insinuates there that something is a common predicate said in a ‘what’ which is not a genus. – And that he is speaking of predication in the ‘what’ is seen from his examples,

¹⁹⁷ Because (Vatican editors) he posited that God was substance (first, eternal, and immutable), and that being is said of substance in the first mode of saying *per se*, etc.

¹⁹⁸ But (Vatican editors) one should in some things respond with an instance, that is, by using that objection, *Topics* 4.6.128b6-9: “Non-being follows everything that comes to be (for what comes to be is not), but it does not convert (for not everything which is not comes to be); but non-being is not the genus of what comes to be; for, simply, there are no species of non-being.”

‘tranquility is quiet’. For predication in abstract things is not predication in the ‘what sort’ or a denominative predication.

IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

128. To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.90-94]. I respond to Damascene [n.90]. Although he says many words, in diverse places, which seem to say that God is in a genus, yet one word – which he says in *Elementary Instruction on Dogmas* ch.8 – solves everything. For there he says that “Substance, which contains the uncreated deity super-substantially, but the whole creation cognitively and content-fully, is the most general genus.” Therefore he does not say that the substance which is the most general genus contains the deity as it contains the creature, but contains it ‘super-substantially’, that is, by taking that which is a matter of perfection in substance, as it is a genus, and leaving out that which is a matter of imperfection – in the way Avicenna says in *Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 [n.122] that God is ‘being in itself’.

129. As to Boethius [n.91] I say that nowhere in that little book is he found to say that ‘two genera remain in divine reality’. In brief, neither genera, nor modes or genera, nor their ideas remain there, – because, just as genera and the things in them are limited, so also are their modes and ideas (speaking of ideas of first intention, which are founded on these), because nothing can be founded on a limited thing save a limited thing.

130. Yet Boethius does – in his little book *On the Trinity* chs.4, 6 – say, after enumerating the categories, that “if anyone turns these toward divine predication, all that can be changed are changed; but a something is not at all predicated as ‘a relation to something’,” – and later, “essence contains the unity, relation multiplies the trinity;” and from these is taken the thought that he indicates substance and relation remain in divine reality. But he expressly says there that neither substance, which is a genus, nor anything of it, remains there; for he says “When we speak of God, we seem to signify substance, but a substance that is beyond substance,” in the way Damascene spoke of substance ‘super-substantially’ [n.128]. Boethius intends, then, that there are two modes of predicating in divine reality, namely of relative predicate and essential predicate, which modes Augustine expresses rather as ‘to itself’ and ‘to another’ – *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – , and all the predicates said formally of God are contained under one or other of these two members; but under the first member [sc. ‘to itself’] are contained many predicates that have a mode of predicating like quality and quantity (and not only those that have a mode of predicating similar to the ones which are of the category of substance), and under the second member [sc. ‘to another’] are contained all that have a mode of predicating similar to relatives, whether they are properly relatives or not.

131. And as to why all essential predicates are said to be predicated according to substance, and why against them are distinguished the predicates said ‘in relation to something’, although however the predicates said ‘in relation to something’ pass over, by identity, into substance, just as the other predicates also do, – the reason for this will be assigned in the following question ‘About attributes’, in the second doubt against the principal solution [nn.215-216, 222].

132. As to Averroes [n.92] I say that he does not seem to have the intention of the master, because Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* 10.1.1052b18-1053b3, 2.1053b9-1054a19, asks whether in substances there is something one that is the measure of the others, and

whether this is the one itself. And he proves – from his intention against Plato – that it is not the one itself, but something to which one itself belongs, just as with all other genera when speaking of one and of the other common things measured in the genera. And he concludes at the end: “Wherefore indeed, in properties and qualities and quantities one itself is something one but not the substance of it; and in substances things must be similarly disposed – for things are similar in everything” (about which text the Commentator set down the words afore mentioned [n.92]). But if the first mover is posited as the measure of the genus itself of substance, this one thing would itself be posited as the measure, because the first mover – on account of its simplicity – would much more truly be this one thing itself than the idea of Plato.

133. What then is the first measure of the genus?

I reply: some substance in that genus, to which unity belongs, is first. – But the first mover is not the intrinsic measure of that genus, just as not of the other genera either. Yet insofar as it is, in some way, the extrinsic measure of everything, it is more immediately the measure of substances, which are more perfect beings, than of accidents, which are more remote from it. It is, however, the intrinsic measure of no genus.

134. To the first reason [n.93] I say that if you contract substance with the difference of created and uncreated, then substance is not taken there as it is the concept of the most general genus (for uncreated is repugnant to substance in this way, because substance in this way involves limitation), but substance is taken there for ‘being in itself’ and not ‘being in another’, whose concept is prior and more common than the concept of substance as it is a genus, – as was plain from Avicenna above [n.122].

135. To the other reason [n.94] I concede that the composition of thing and thing is not required for a being ‘in a genus’, but there is required composition of reality and reality, one of which – precisely taken in the first moment of nature – is in potency to the other and perfectible by the other; but such composition cannot be of infinite reality to infinite reality; but all reality in God is infinite formally, as was made clear above [n.107], – therefore etc.

V. To the Principal Arguments

136. [To the first] – To the first principal argument [n.39] I concede that this concept said of God and creatures in the ‘what’ is contracted by some contracting concepts that assert a ‘what sort’, but it is not the case either that this concept said in the ‘what’ is the concept of a genus, or that those concepts asserting a ‘what sort’ are concepts of differences, because this ‘quidditative’ concept is common to the finite and infinite, which community cannot be in the concept of a genus, – and those contracting concepts assert an intrinsic mode of the contracted thing itself, and not some reality perfecting it; but differences do not assert an intrinsic mode of reality of some genus, because, in whatever grade animality is understood, rationality or irrationality is not on this account an intrinsic mode of animality, but animality is in that grade still understood as perfectible by rationality or irrationality.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Note by Scotus: “Note how some intention is first about *a* and *b* indifferently, and nothing of one idea corresponds to it in reality, but the formal objects first diverse are understood, in one first intention, although both imperfectly.” This note is marked as ‘o’ by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

137. But there is a doubt how a concept common to God and creatures can be taken as 'real' save from some reality of the same genus, – and then it seems that it is potential to the reality from which the distinguishing concept is taken, as was argued before 'about the concept of genus and difference' [n.39], and then the argument made above for the first opinion stands, that, if there were some reality in the thing that distinguishes and another reality in it that is distinguished, it seems that the thing is composite, because it has something by which it agrees and something by which it differs [n.47].²⁰⁰

138. I reply that when some reality is understood along with its intrinsic mode, the concept is not so simply simple that the reality cannot be conceived without the mode, but it is then an imperfect concept of the thing; the concept can also be conceived under that mode, and it is then a perfect concept of the thing. An example: if there were a whiteness in the tenth grade of perfection, however much it was in every way simple in the thing, it could yet be conceived under the idea of such an amount of whiteness, and then it would be perfectly conceived with a concept adequate to the thing itself, – or it could be conceived precisely under the idea of whiteness, and then it would be conceived with an imperfect concept and one that failed of the perfection of the thing; but an imperfect concept could be common to the whiteness and to some other one, and a perfect concept could be proper.

139. A distinction, then, is required between that from which a common concept is taken and that from which a proper concept is taken, not as a distinction of reality and reality but as a distinction of reality and proper and intrinsic mode of the same, – which distinction suffices for having a perfect or imperfect concept of the same thing, of which concepts the imperfect is common and the perfect is proper. But the concepts of genus and difference require a difference of realities, not just of the same reality perfectly and imperfectly conceived.

140. This point [n.139] can be clarified. If we posit that some intellect is perfectly moved by color to understand the reality of the color and the reality of the difference, however much the intellect may have a perfect concept adequate to the concept of the first reality, it does not have in this concept a concept of the reality from which the difference is taken, nor conversely, – but it has there two formal objects which are of a nature to terminate distinct proper concepts. But if the distinction in the thing were only as of reality and its intrinsic mode, the intellect could not both have a proper concept of the reality and not have a concept of the intrinsic mode of the thing (at any rate as of the mode under which it would be conceived, although this mode itself would not be conceived, just as is elsewhere said 'about conceived singularity and the mode under which it is conceived' [I d.2 n.183]), but in the perfect concept it would have one object adequate to it, namely the thing under the mode.²⁰¹

141. And if you say 'at any rate the common concept is indeterminate and potential with respect to the special concept, therefore the reality too is indeterminate and potential with respect to the reality, or at any rate the concept will not be infinite, because nothing infinite is potential with respect to anything', – I concede that the concept common to God and creatures is finite, that is, it is not of itself infinite, because, if it were

²⁰⁰ This paragraph is marked as 'y' by Scotus, see above footnote to n.112.

²⁰¹ This and the previous two paragraphs [nn.138-140] are marked by Scotus with a reference back to n.111.

infinite, it would not of itself be common to the finite and infinite; nor is it of itself positively finite, such that it of itself include finitude, because then it would not belong to the infinite, – but it is of itself indifferent to the finite and the infinite; and so it is finite negatively, that is, it does not posit infinity, and in such negative finitude it is determinable through some concept.

142. But if you argue ‘therefore the reality from which it [sc. the above concept] is taken is finite’, – it does not follow; for it is not taken from any reality as a concept adequate to that reality, or as a perfect concept adequate to that reality, but it is diminished and imperfect, to such an extent even that if the reality from which it is taken were to be seen perfectly and intuitively, he who intuitus it would not there have distinct formal objects, namely the reality and the mode, but one and the same formal object [n.140], – yet he who understands it with abstractive intellection can, because of the imperfection of the intellection, have it for formal object although he not have the other one.

143. As to the ‘I concede...’ [n.141 near the middle]: the concept is not the finite act [sc. whereby we conceive] but is the formal object [n.65]. If it is determinable [n.141], then it is formally finite and potential, and then not common to an infinite thing.

The final consequence [sc. the clause immediately preceding] is to be denied, because the infinite thing is in the formal finite object understood imperfectly to the extent that the infinite object would be of a nature to cause in the intellect such a formal object if it were to be moving it in diminished fashion [n.142], just as also a created object moving in diminished fashion is of a nature to do the same; and therefore it is common to both, as a sort of common and imperfect likeness.

144. To the contrary: an infinite thing is not anything finite; God is the object in question, if the object is predicated of God in the ‘what’, in the way ‘man is an animal’ – similarly, God is not anything potential.

Response. Although there is in the intellect a composition of concepts, yet the conception is on behalf of the external thing. Just as signs are taken for the things signified, and just as several concepts can be the signs of the same thing (although one is common, another proper), so the composition of the concepts is a sign of the identity of the things signified by those concepts. Because, therefore, the thing signified by the finite concept, as by the common sign, is the very thing which is signified by the concept of God, therefore, by compounding the finite concept in the intellect with the concept of God, this proposition is true ‘God is a being’; but the composition is not on behalf of the finite thus signified, but on behalf of the infinite signified in common.

145. Then to the proposition ‘God is the object in question, a being’ [n.144, *init.*], I reply: God is that which in reality is signified by being as by a common sign, and therefore in the intellect this composition is true ‘God is a being’, which composition is a sign of that identity.

146. When you say ‘God is not anything finite’ [n.144, *init.*], the statement is true, when speaking of identity in the thing, namely the identity which is signified and belongs to the signified things; but, when speaking of being as it is a composition in the intellect, the statement that nothing which in the intellect is a finite sign can be predicated of God in a composition is false. An example of this: ‘a man is an animal’, – in the intellect ‘animal’, as it is there the formal object, is a diminished being. But no diminished being is true of [the man] Socrates existing in reality.

147. So this is false, then, ‘Socrates existing is an animal’? – I reply: a composition is always made of concepts, and it is a sign and of things signified; but it is on behalf of material objects, which are signified by the concepts, and of identity, which is signified by the composition, such that if there is an identity of the things signified, namely of the material objects, the composition of the concepts, which are the formal objects, is true.

148. The point [n.139, 140] can also be further clarified. If there is posited for any universal a proper individual (to wit in reality, a proper individual for substance, a proper individual for animal, a proper individual for man, etc.), then not only is the concept of genus potential to the concept of difference, but the proper individual of the genus is potential to the proper individual of the difference. But if we take the proper individual of this concept ‘being’ which is individual in God, and if we take the proper individual of this which is ‘infinite’, it is the same individual, and it is not potential to itself.

149. But you ask at any rate: why does entity not have a proper individual in reality, which individual would be in potency to the individual of the determining feature, so that ‘this’ being is first understood before ‘infinite’ being is?

I reply, because when something is existent of itself, and is not merely capable of very existence, it has of itself whatever condition is necessarily required for existence; but being as it belongs to God – namely being through essence – is infinite existence itself and not something to which existence itself merely belongs (God is of himself ‘this’ and of himself ‘infinite’), so that infinity is in some way as it were first understood to be a mode of being through essence before it is understood to be ‘this’; and therefore one should not ask why ‘this’ being is infinite, as if singularity first belonged to it before infinity. And so is it universally in the case of things that can be beings through essence. Nothing such by participation is first of itself determined so as to be such by essence, both so as to be an infinite such and so as to be of itself ‘this’.

150. And if you argue that individual includes individual, therefore common includes common, therefore if ‘this’ being includes ‘this’ infinity, and if being in common includes infinity in common, – I reply that the consequence is not valid, because individual includes some perfection which common does not include, and on account of this perfection it can formally include the infinite, and yet the common – by reason of the common concept – does not include it as an included concept, but is in some way determinable by it.

151. [To the second] – As to Avicenna *Metaphysics* II [n.40], the answer is plain from himself in *Metaphysics* VIII, as was said [n.122].

152. [To the third] – As to Damascene [n.41], the answer is plain from the Master [Lombard] in distinction 19 [*Sentences* I d.19 ch.9 n.182], because he puts species there ‘for some likeness of species to individuals’; there is however a greater unlikeness, according to Augustine, and therefore Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11 denies species there as he also denies genus. Hence the definition of Porphyry [*Book of Predicables* ch.3] ‘species is said to be that which is predicated of many things in the what’ should be understood as meaning that the species in those many is multiplied as to its nature, but in the divine persons the divine nature is not multiplied; the species too has in itself a reality corresponding to it, potential to the proper reality of the individual, but the divine essence is in no way potential to the relation, as was said in distinction 5 question 2 [I d.5 nn.70, 113, 118-119, 132, 138].

153. [To the fourth] – To the final one, about wisdom [n.42], I say that wisdom is not a species of a genus as it is transferred to divine reality, nor is it transferred according to that idea, but according to the idea of wisdom as it is transcendent. But how such a thing can be transcendent was said in the principal solution, the third article [nn.114-115].

154. There is, however, a doubt about the wisdom which is in us, whether it is an individual of transcendent wisdom and of quality, or whether only of something else.

And it seems not to be an individual of either.

Because nothing contains the same thing under diverse predicates which are said in the ‘what’ about the same thing and are not subalternate; but transcendent wisdom and quality are not subalternate; therefore etc.

155. Again, transcendent wisdom is a property of being, – therefore being is not said of it in the ‘what’, nor conversely, from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.131, 134-136]; therefore neither does anything in which transcendent wisdom is included include a being in ‘what’, because then it would be a being *per accidens*; for it would essentially include the idea of subject and property, and these do not make anything one *per se* but only *per accidens*.

156. If these arguments [nn.154-155] are valid, and the wisdom in us is only an individual of transcendent wisdom or only an individual of the genus of quality – the second of these does not seem it should be granted, because then wisdom would not be in us a perfection simply, which seems to be contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: ‘Every creature around us cries out’ etc. [n.71]; if the first of them is granted, then not every habit is formally in the genus of quality, but all that indicate perfection simply are transcendent.²⁰²

Question Four

Whether along with the Divine Simplicity can stand a Distinction of Essential Perfections preceding the Act of the Intellect

157. I ask whether along with the divine simplicity there can in any way stand a distinction of essential perfections preceding every act of the intellect.

I argue that there cannot:

Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.7: “Wisdom and justice are not two qualities in God as they are in creatures, but that which is justice is itself also goodness.” From this I argue: predication in the case of something abstract is only true if it is ‘*per se* in the first mode’; therefore this proposition ‘wisdom is truth’ is *per se* in the first mode, and so there is in no way a distinction between the subject and the predicate, but the subject *per se* includes the predicate, because this is what belongs to *per se* in the first mode [Posterior Analytics 1.4.73a34-37]; therefore etc.

158. On the contrary:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* I ch.4: “If you say just or good or anything of the like, – you are not stating the nature of God but something in respect of the nature.”

²⁰² The Vatican editors remark that nn.154-156 have the nature of notes (not of finished discussion).

But you are stating something that precedes the act of the intellect; therefore, before every work and act of the intellect, there is something in God which is not the nature formally.

I. The Opinions of Others

159. On this question there are many opinions, all of which I do not intend to recite. But there are two holding to the negative conclusion that nevertheless contradict each other; each posits that along with the simplicity of God no distinction of attributes stands save only a distinction of reason, but the first [from Thomas of Sutton] posits that it cannot be had save through an act of the intellect ‘understanding God himself in an outward respect’, – the second [from Henry of Ghent] posits that this distinction of reason can be had ‘without any outward respect’.

A. First Opinion

160. [Exposition of the opinion] – The first rests on this reasoning:²⁰³ “whenever there is in one extreme a difference of reason to which a real difference corresponds in the other extreme, the distinction or difference of reason is taken by comparison with things really distinct (an example of a distinction according to reason is of the right and left side of a column, which is taken by respect to the real distinction of these in an animal, – likewise, an example of a distinction of reason is in a point as it is the beginning and end, which distinction is taken by respect to lines really diverse); but the divine attributes have in creatures certain things really distinct corresponding to them, as goodness to goodness and wisdom to wisdom, and other things that are really called attributes (by which are excluded certain divine properties, as everlastingness and eternity, which are not properly attributes); therefore etc.”

161. “The adherents of this reasoning say that the attributes are distinguished with respect to our intellect in that, once the corresponding attributes have been removed, only

²⁰³ Scotus seems to be following, somewhat freely, Henry’s report of this opinion (with which opinion Henry himself did not agree), and the Vatican editors suggest that Henry’s report is not fully accurate to, e.g., Sutton’s own view. They quote the following from Sutton [*Quodlibet* II q.2]: “Therefore the divine intellect, insofar as it is the same, never distinguishes several reasons in its essence. But, once all respect to creatures is removed, the divine intellect is, in knowing its essence, only disposed in one and the same way alone; therefore it does not distinguish several reasons of attributes without respect to creatures, but it has one reason of the essence, by which it perfectly knows the essence... The divine intellect knows distinct attributes through respect to the human intellect distinguishing the attributes.” Again: “For because our intellect – on account of its imperfection – cannot know in one conception the perfection of the divine essence, therefore it has need to understand it in diverse conceptions, which are diverse reasons that it receives from creatures and attributes to God.” Again: “For because the created intellect cannot know the one divine perfection, in the way it is, according to its own single reason, therefore it has need, because of its imperfection, to know it under many distinct reasons.” They also quote the following from Bernard of Auvergne criticizing Henry [*Quodlibet* V q.1]: “But as to his [Henry’s] imposing on this position that ‘only one concept can be formed of the divine essence’, it is false, because the position says that ‘one complete concept is formed of the divine essence and that concept God forms, who conceives himself completely; but the created intellect can form many concepts of the divine essence, because it cannot capture the whole perfection all at once’; hence that position is true.”

a single and simple concept can be formed about the divine essence (which would be expressed in a single name for, if other names were imposed, either they would be synonymous names, because the same thing in reality and in reason would correspond to them – or they would be empty, because nothing would correspond to them).”

162. “Their mode, then, of positing attributes is of the following sort: to all the ideas of the attributes (namely those that state a perfection in God and in creatures) there corresponds in God the unity of essence, not according to the being which he has absolutely” – as was said – “but according to the respect which he has to creatures; not in the genus of efficient cause (for no attribute is thus taken, as wisdom because he causes wisdom), nor even to remove something from God – which two modes seem to be the ones asserted by Avicenna [*Metaphysics* VIII chs.4 and 7 (99ra, 101rb)] and Rabbi Moses [Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* p.1 chs. 53, 55-60] – but insofar as the divine essence is compared to creatures according to the idea of formal cause, containing in itself the completeness of every perfection which is dispersed and imperfect in creatures, and in this respect the divine essence can in diverse ways be imitated by everything. – Further: the plurality of attribution-al perfections, as it exists in the divine essence, is as it were in potency, but as it is in a concept of the intellect it is as it were in act (example about the universal in the thing and in the intellect). But this plurality has a diverse existence in diverse intellects; in the divine intellect, indeed, and in a creature made blessed by the fullness of the perfection of the simple essence, it is conceived according to diverse ideas, and from this comes the multitude of conceptions in act in the intelligence, but by an intellect understanding with natural light they are conceived *a posteriori*, insofar as this intellect forms, from perfections really diverse in creatures, corresponding conceptions and perfections proportional in God; yet no intellect actually understands them without respect to those they are proportional to – whether it understand them from those they are proportional to, as does the third intellect [an intellect understanding with natural light], – or not, but from the essence, as does the first and the second intellect [sc. the divine intellect and the intellect of a blessed creature]. – Limited perfections insofar as they are actually in the intelligence are called reasons, and reason here is said to be the conception of a determinate perfection, from its respect to the determinate perfection corresponding to it in creatures.”

163. [Godfrey of Fontaine’s clarification for the opinion] – Others clarify this position in the following way, that “the divine intellect, apprehending its own essence according to one simple reality, yet a reality virtually containing, without limitation and defect, the simple and absolute perfections of all things, insofar as it is more eminently perfect than the same perfections because of the eminence of its own perfection, understands that essence as one in reality, perfect with a multiple perfection that differs according to reason; and if it did not apprehend that the creature was perfected with diverse perfections really different insofar as the creature is good and wise, or because those perfections introduce diversities in the creature, it would not apprehend itself as perfect in wisdom under one reason and perfect in goodness under another reason, nor would it apprehend the difference in reason between its own wisdom and its own goodness unless it apprehended the difference in reality of wisdom and goodness in the creature, – otherwise unity and plurality would be taken from one thing disposed in the same way in reality and in concept. Since, therefore, the divine essence, as considered in itself, is something wholly without distinction – altogether simple – in reality and in

reason, it cannot be said that, without a comparison between it and other things in which is found a diversity of reality and reason, such a distinction could exist, because, when that is apprehended which is altogether simple and single under the reason that belongs to it in itself without any relation to anything else in which there is some distinction, then, just as the apprehended is only one in reality, so it cannot be apprehended save as one simple reason.”

164. “Nor can it – namely the intelligible and the intelligent – apprehend in its essence certain things as differing in their comparison with each other or as having a mutual relation with each other, unless these things are supposed already to exist in their own difference, or to be introducing a certain difference. For things which are apprehended as certain different things having a mutual relation to each other, and which are also, by the operation of the intellect, compared as differing from each other, these are also supposed to exist in their own difference; but things that, by the operation of reason or intellect, do not possess what makes them to be beings according to reason, and to differ by reason from each other, these cannot be said to be constituted in their own such being and to have this difference according to reason through comparison of them with each other by the operation of reason or the intellect; nay this second operation necessarily presupposes the first, such that, first, they are by one operation of reason constituted in such distinct being, and, second, by another operation of the intellect they are compared as thus distinct from each other; for just as things of absolute nature, when they are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being in reality, so too beings of reason, when these are compared with each other, are supposed to have a distinct being according to reason. Therefore, if the divine intellect apprehends its own essence as different in reason from the attributes, and if it also apprehends the attributes as different in reason, and if the attributes are compared with each other under this very difference, they are of themselves in it actually as so differing, and under their own actual distinction – which they thus have of themselves – they move the divine intellect so that it conceive them as so distinct and compare them with each other. But this does not seem to be concordant.”

165. This reasoning is confirmed as follows: “For all things that differ, or have a difference, formally in themselves or from themselves through what they are in themselves, without comparison to other differing things, all such things differ in reality. But there are other things that have plurality or difference from comparison with other things that really differ, and these things differ by reason; and this is plain in creatures, for once unity of specific form in reality is presupposed, the intellect distinguishes in it the idea of genus and difference – which are said not to be diverse things – but this diversity could not be taken in any single and simple thing unless it were compared by the intellect to some things really different and, according to some order, agreeing with that single thing; one and the same thing would not have diverse reasons of true and good unless to understand and to will the ‘one and the same thing’ were, for some subject, acts really diverse and ordered with respect to each other. This is plain also in God, because, when every kind of comparison to the diverse essences of creatures introducing a real diversity has been stripped away, the divine essence would not be apprehended by the divine intellect under the reason of diverse ideas (or of forms), differing by reason alone, but under one simple altogether indistinct reason.”

166. “And this is the intention of the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.39 where, speaking of this matter, he says that life, wisdom, etc. are said properly of God, because God is properly and truly said to be alive and to be wise etc. But such and the like things, which are signified by way of disposition and thing disposed, ‘are reduced’ in material things ‘to one thing in being and to two things in consideration; for the intellect is of a nature to divide things united in being, but in composite things – when it disposes the composite, or what has a form, through the form – it understands both the things that are united in some way and different in another way; but when the disposed thing and the disposition have been considered in immaterial things, then they are reduced to altogether one intention, and there will be no mode by which the predicate is distinguished from the subject outside the intellect, namely in the being of the thing. But the intellect understands no difference between them in being, save according to way of taking them, namely because the same thing receives the disposed thing and the disposition as two, the proportion of which to each other is as the proportion of predicate to subject; for the intellect can, in the case of composite things, understand the same thing according to likeness to a categorical proposition, just as it understands many things according to likeness’.”

167. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this position I argue first thus:²⁰⁴ “whatever is a mark of perfection simply in a creature is more principally and of itself in God, and not with respect to another;” an attribute is a mark of perfection simply in a creature, such that ‘it rather than not it’ is simply ‘better’ [n.22]; therefore etc.

Proof of the major: “the perfect is always independent of the imperfect, just as the imperfect is dependent on the perfect;” an attributal perfection is in God perfectly, in creatures imperfectly. – Likewise it would not be of infinite perfection simply unless it contained all perfection simply without respect to anything external.

The minor is made clear thus: for because any created thing, and any perfection of it essential to it, is limited in quidditative existence, therefore from nothing of this sort is an attribute taken (for by parity of reason an attribute might be taken from any created essence), but an attribute is taken from that which is an accidental perfection in a creature – or in its existing well – and which states a perfection simply in the subject substance, – because, although as a certain nature it has a limited rank, yet as perfecting another in its existing well it indicates no limitation, and thus it is an attribute. Thus too in God it does not indicate a proper perfection but as it were an accidental one, in his existing well, – *On the Trinity* XV ch.5 n.8: “If we say wise, powerful, beautiful, spirit, what I put last seems to signify substance, but the rest qualities of this substance.”

168. Again, those things are not distinguished by respect externally of which any one contains essence according to every ideal reason; but “any attribute contains essence according to every reason of ideal perfection;” therefore etc.

The proof of the minor is that the ideal reason corresponds to the perfection of the creature insofar as it is perfected in quidditative existence and, consequently, under the idea by which the essence is limited (hence also creatures are distinguished according to diverse degrees of limitation), but not insofar as the essence is perfect simply, because thus one attribute in God, as good or perfect, corresponds to all of them; from this the proof of the minor is apparent: for because any attribute is a perfection simply (from the

²⁰⁴ Scotus’ arguments here [nn.167-173] are, according to the Vatican editors, freely based on statements by Henry of Ghent (indicated by the quotation marks).

clarification of the minor of the first proof [n.167]), it follows that any one of them is imitable by every limited grade.

The proof of the major is that what contains every idea seems to regard equally everything patterned after the idea, and so in regard to none of them can it be distinguished from another, because it similarly regards any one at all; hence the attribute wisdom does not more regard wisdom patterned after the idea than color patterned after it, because both are equally limited, nor is the attribute taken more from one than from the other.

169. Again, “the distinction of attributes is the foundation of the distinction of the personal emanations, because the Son proceeds by being born as the word in the intellect, the Holy Spirit by being inspirited as love in the will, and not as the word, – which could not be unless there were some distinction of intellect and will internally,” such that the production of the persons is compared necessarily to nothing external; therefore etc.

170. Again, “he [God] understands his essence insofar as it is true, not insofar as it is good, – and he wills it insofar as it is good, not insofar as it is true;” “also from eternity he understood that he understands his essence and wills it simply, not in respect of something external,” because this act follows natural immateriality. Therefore, without such respect, it includes in its essence the idea of true and good, and similarly the idea of understanding and understood, of willing and willed, as formally distinct; therefore etc.

171. Again, “divine beatitude consists in its perfect acts, of intellect and will, but all the divine attributes mutually regard each other in perfecting those acts,” as will be plain [n.175]; but the beatitude of God depends on no extrinsic respect; therefore etc.

172. Against the reasons for the opinion [n.160].

The major is false. First because the divine essence is distinguished by reason from the attribute, just as one attribute is from another; can it therefore follow that ‘essence as essence is only there by outward respect’? – Second because true and good in creatures are distinguished by a distinction of reason; from which really distinct things, then, is this distinction taken? From none but from true and good in God, which differ in reason. – Next, third because where there is “a mere distinction of reason, no outward respect is required” (just as is the case with definition and defined); and such is the distinction in the case of attributes, “which are objects of the divine intelligence, different in reason, although they are one act of understanding in God.” For when an outward respect is required, then the distinction is partly from the intellect and partly from elsewhere; and this either from diverse circumstances extrinsic in diverse ways, as is plain in the examples adduced of the column and the point [n.160], – or from the same thing diversely circumstanced, as is plain in the second instance [above, n.172] against the major.

173. Again, against the minor of the reason [n.160] there is this argument: “since all the attributes pertain to the intellect and the will – which are the principles of the emanations – the distinction of attributes can be really reduced to distinct persons, such that those which pertain to the intellect have respect to generation, – those which pertain to the will have respect to inspiriting; so that, just as the natural intellect does not distinguish these and those save by respect to things in creatures to which it turns back all its understanding, so the blessed intellect distinguishes them about the persons, to which it directs all its understanding.”

B. Second Opinion

174. [Exposition of the opinion] – There is another position [Henry of Ghent’s],²⁰⁵ which says that “the divine essence absolutely considered, insofar as it is a nature or essence, has no distinction of reasons save as it were in potency, – for the Commentator says *Metaphysics* XII com.39 that ‘the multiplicity of reasons in God is only in the intellect alone, not in reality’; but the divine essence considered, not in itself, but insofar as it is truth – insofar namely as it has existence in the intellect – can be taken in two ways, either insofar as it moves the intellect as by simple intelligence, and thus it is still conceived by reason of its simplicity and does not have any plurality save as it were in potency, – or insofar as the intelligence, after this apprehension, busies itself about the very plurality of the attributes, as if reducing them from potency to act. In the first way [sc. the divine essence absolutely considered] the natural intellect does not attain it but then only perceives it from attributes conceived from creatures,” according to this opinion; “in the second way [sc. the first way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the blessed intellect grasps it as if in the first action of understanding; in the third way [sc. the second way of taking the divine essence considered as it is truth] the same intellect [sc. the blessed intellect] combining as it were and dividing, and the divine intellect in a single, simple intuition, distinguish the reasons contained in the essence, which essence contains, of its supreme perfection, all the perfections simply that are, by the sole operation of the intellect, to be distinguished.”

175. “These reasons of the attributes, which the intellect forms from the simple essence through diverse conceptions, are only respects founded in the essence (because simplicity prevents the concept of several attributes within it), and they are several concepts, lest the concepts be synonymous, and lest they be empty in the essence, but they are not outward respects” (as was proved [nn.167-171]), “but inward ones. Thus all the divine attributes pertain to the intellect or will, and they mutually regard each other inwardly insofar as they all – these and those – fall, by congruence, under the apprehension of the intellect; this intellect firstly conceives, in a simple intelligence, the essence as it is essence, and then, busying itself about it, conceives it as understood and as understanding and as the reason of understanding, – such that the essence, insofar as it is essence, has a respect to the other things as they are founded in it; but the essence as conceived, and as moving the intellect to understand, is called truth, whose proper reason is that it have a respect to the essence, insofar as it is essence, as being that of which it is clarificatory, and to the intellect as that to which it has to clarify it, and to the act of understanding as that by which it has to clarify it, and to wisdom as the habit in which the intellect is fit to have a clarification made to it. But the essence itself, as it is conceptive of itself by an act of understanding, is the intellect, and it has a respect to truth as that through which the essence which is conceived is made manifest,” – and likewise of the act, etc. – Thus too about the attributes pertaining to the will.

176. “From the supreme unity of the essence, in ordered manner, according to the mode of conceiving, the diverse reasons of the attributes are first conceived (and among these attributes there is still order, according as they are more immediately or more mediately ordered to the emanations), next the emanations are conceived, and there an inward stand is made, and finally there follow all the outward respects, which are *per*

²⁰⁵ Scotus again quotes, somewhat freely, from Henry.

accidens; but just as the distinction of real relations is to what corresponds to them, so too is the distinction of relations of reason to what corresponds to them, and wholly inwardly, according to the argument that was made for this part [sc. that the relations of reason are inward only].”

177. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion there is argument through the reasons I adduced against the first opinion [nn.167-176], – first, by the third reason, because it is against them [sc. the followers of Henry, n.169]: the distinction of the attributal perfections is the foundation with respect to the distinction of the emanations, – but the distinction of the emanations is real, as is clear; but no real distinction necessarily pre-requires a distinction which is only one of reason, just as neither does anything that is truly real pre-require something else that is merely a being of reason; therefore the distinction of attributes is not one of reason only but is in some way from the nature of the thing. – The assumption is plain, because a real being, which is distinguished against a being of reason, is that which has existence of itself, setting aside all work of the intellect as it is intellect; but whatever depends on a being of reason, or pre-requires it, cannot have existence when all work of the intellect has been set aside; therefore nothing that pre-requires a being of reason is a truly real being.

178. A confirmation of this reason is that what is naturally posterior cannot be more perfect than a being that is naturally prior; but real being is more perfect than a being which is a being of reason only [sc. therefore a real being cannot be posterior to a being of reason].

Although this reason is sufficient against one who holds the opinion, yet it is necessary to confirm it for the conclusion in itself [nn.180-181; the conclusion is that attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing.].

179. Let it be said to it that the attributes are not the foundations of the distinct emanations,²⁰⁶ nay the essence alone along with the relations is the principle of the diverse emanations; yet the intellect can afterwards consider the essence itself as it is, along with the relations, principle of this and that emanation, and then can consider the idea of nature and of will, and yet these will not there be prior from the nature of the thing.

180. On the contrary: in the instant of origin in which the Son is generated, I ask whether his productive principle is related to him in a way other than the productive principle of the Holy Spirit is related to him, or not in another way. If not in another way, then the Son is not more son or image of the Father by force of his production than the Holy Spirit is, – if in another way, then in those moments of origin, before all act of the intellect, some distinction and formal non-identity is obtained.

181. Nor is it valid to attribute this distinction to the relations, because every relation has a respect naturally to its correlatives; therefore the essence, as it is under the idea of inspiring, equally has a respect to the inspirited, just as under the idea of generative it has a respect to the generated or the begotten. The different modes, then, of producing – naturally and freely – cannot there be saved by the relations, but only if the absolute, by which the producer produces, is of a different idea.

182. This point [that the attributes are distinguished in the nature of the thing] is also argued against this position by yet another of their reasons, about the objects of true

²⁰⁶ Note by Scotus: “This response is rejected in distinction 13, by argument against the third opinion [I d.13 q. un n.5].”

and good [n.170] – because if ‘from eternity God, of his immateriality, understands himself and wills himself’, and this under the idea of true and good, then there is there a distinction of true and good by reason of formalities in the objects, before every act about such objects.

183. This is also confirmed by their argument about beatitude [nn.174-176], which belongs to God from the nature of the thing before every act of busying intellect, because the act of being busy about something is not formally beatific; but that beatitude (as is said) requires the proper idea of object and of power and of the one operating; therefore etc.

184. However the position [of Henry’s] is expounded in this way, that we can speak about the relation that the object makes in the intellect of itself, or about that which the intellect can make by busying itself about the object;²⁰⁷ if we speak of the first, it is

²⁰⁷ Note by Scotus: “[Henry of] Harkley [argues] otherwise – first proposition: a thing one in reality can be many in the intellect (Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.39 [n.166], ‘the intellect is of a nature to divide what is united in reality’); the reason is that one cause can have many equivocal effects, because none is adequate to the virtue of the cause; conception or intellection is an equivocal effect with respect to the object. Second proposition: yet two intellections have two formal objects (namely in cognized being), although they have the same material object in reality, – or they have the same object under this idea and that, and then there is a difference of reason only, and not of formal objects.

From these propositions the argument is as follows: on the supposition from distinction 3 [I d.3 n.35] that the creature can cause in our intellect some absolute concept ‘proper to God’ – either it will be a single concept differing only in reason (for whether it is a composition of the intellect according to logical reasons, or a composition outwardly, there are no differences in conception about an absolute concept save only relations of reason), or there will be many concepts having several formal objects, which may by diminution be the same object in cognized being, because they are reasons of it as it exceeds [the intellect].

In the first way it is easy to save the distinction of attributes in any intellect, even the divine one, because any intellect can understand the same absolute object under one or another relation of reason; as to relations outwardly the thing is plain, – and no less plain as to relations inwardly, to the persons; since indeed the essence is understood by God ‘to differ in reason from the person’. But then in knowing all the attributes of God there is no real science, because the same formal object about him is not known, but the first proposition [above] holds; but as it is under an idea, if it has the idea of ‘knowable of itself’, it only exists on account of the reason under which it is understood, which in some way distinguishes it from itself as absolutely understood, or it is under another idea. – In the second way, several absolute concepts can be posited.

But it seems difficult to distinguish these [sc. several absolute concepts] in a blessed intellect, because there is only one concept as existent, intuited by that intellect; again, one ‘object in itself’ has, in the intellect to which it is present in itself, one concept, adequate to itself according to the virtue of that intellect, otherwise it cannot show itself to it as it is intelligible. – On the contrary, it can cause every concept that can be had about it, and if something else – to wit its effect – can cause imperfectly, yet it itself can cause perfectly; again, otherwise something would now be known of God which would not be seen in the fatherland; again, theology will be a science for no intellect, not for ours, because of faith, not for a blessed intellect, because of the singleness of concept.

Theology is knowledge of God (of the things that are present in him, known naturally to the divine intellect alone), therefore it is knowledge of the things that are in this science ‘as it is this’ (of which sort are the properties of the persons and the notional acts, the attributes), under the ideas by which they are these. If however a distinction of reason is held to or of formal objects and, third, some aptitudinal respects to creatures (such as the creative, the resuscitative, the remissive of sins, the retributive), – first against [the last]: nothing is in that case present ‘*per se*’, as it seems, because it is then common to all three [persons]; second against [the second]: how does the metaphysician

single, as it is also single in reality, – and this the opinion in itself said, that it has, as it is in the intelligence by an act of simple knowledge, the idea altogether of something indistinct [n.174]; if in the second way, thus the intellect can form about that one idea of the object many distinct ideas, comparing this to that, – and this likewise the opinion said, that the object, as it is in the intellect busying itself, has distinct ideas, quasi-formed about it [nn.174-175]. Yet this exposition adds – which the opinion in itself does not seem to say – that the one idea in itself is formally truth and goodness, and any perfection simply, and that the one idea, which is made in the intellect by virtue of the object, is also the idea of goodness formally and of truth, etc. The opinion in itself, however, seems to say that they state diverse respects founded in the essence.

185. Because, therefore, the said opinion [nn.174-176] can be understood in diverse ways, besides the arguments already made, I append other reasons, – and first I show that truth and goodness are formally in the thing, as well as any perfection simply, before all work of the intellect; because any perfection simply is formally in a simply perfect being from the nature of the thing; truth is formally a perfection simply, and goodness likewise; therefore etc.

The major is plain, first because otherwise there would not be a simply perfect thing, because there would not be ‘that than which a greater cannot be thought’ [I d.2 n.137] (for a greater than it would be thought if it were perfect thus and so), second because otherwise perfection simply would exist perfectly in nothing (for there is no perfection perfectly in a creature, because it exists there finitely, nor is there any perfection perfectly in God if it is not in him as existing but only as known, because ‘to be known’ is to exist in diminished fashion in contradistinction to something existent), then third because perfection simply in something would exist formally by participation and would not exist formally in that from which it would be participated (nay, such perfection in the participant would not be by participation of the perfection in its cause, because there is nothing on which participation in something existent depends save something existent), all which – namely all these inferred results – seem absurd. – The minor is plain, because otherwise Anselm would not posit such things in God, because according to him, *Monologion* ch. 15, nothing such should be posited in God which is not ‘better existing than not existing’, and hence a perfection simply. The same minor is also plain because anything such can be formally infinite; infinity is repugnant to anything that is not a perfection simply; therefore etc.²⁰⁸

know them [sc. if the ideas of formal objects are not there from the nature of the thing]? – third against [the first]: ‘respects of reason’ are in potency. Against the first proof for all of them [sc. the preceding paragraph]: an angel naturally knows it [sc. the divine essence] as ‘this’, although it does not see this ‘as this’, – therefore it could have theology; again, any concept about it [sc. the divine essence] is proper to it, because not common, – wherefore it is about it ‘as it is this’.”

²⁰⁸ Note by Scotus: “[Henry] of Harkley proceeds in his discussion this way: the intellect according to its own proper and formal reason, namely according to its distinction from the will, is a perfection simply, – and the same about any attribute; the second proposition, the intellect according to its proper formal reason is in God from the nature of the thing as it is existent; third proposition, the intellect does not include *per se* any relation.

The proof of the first proposition, as the minor, is the following: first, because according to Anselm ‘anything that is better than not it’ is to be posited there (and he and the doctors treat of many cases [nn.195-197]). There would be only one single perfection simply (namely deity) unless the

186. Further, I prove that such perfections in the nature of the thing do not, before the work of the intellect, have formal identity; because the intellect can by its own act only cause a relation of reason, from the fact, namely, that it is a collative virtue, able to confer this thing as known to that. I ask then whether truth states precisely the perfection which is in the thing formally, or precisely the relation made by the intellect, or both? If precisely the relation of reason, then truth is not a perfection simply, because no relation of reason can be infinite; for if a real relation – as paternity – is not formally infinite, how much less so the relation of reason. If both, since they are not one save *per accidens* – because a relation of reason never makes with a real being something one *per se* (as is plain, because it makes one thing much less with a real being than a property does with the subject; for a property follows the subject from the idea of the subject, but no being of reason follows a real being from the idea of it) – then separate those two things apart that

intellect were formally such, because if it were such only materially – insofar as it includes deity – it is a single perfection understood simply or compared in many ways. – The second proof (and it is a confirmation of the first proof) is that the idea gives the understanding of the perfection which is the essence, although the formal reason of it is not simply perfection – so neither the formal reason of an attribute, according to you; nor is it valid about this and the other genus of cause, because the idea in a foundation which is perfection simply indicates eminence with respect to the thing patterned after the idea. – Third, because otherwise no perfection simply would be possible for an attribute; because it would not be second perfection (perfection in well being [n.167]); because nothing is a perfection simply save the first perfection in God. – Fourth, by that which is said here [n.185, end]; and prove it by the two reasons that are made for this purpose in distinction 13, against the seventh opinion in the second response [I d.13 q. un n.15]. – Fifth, because a perfection simply is in accord with a reason common to God and creatures; it is contained here, at the beginning of the solution [nn.192-193].

The proof of the second proposition: in three ways, as the major here is proved [n.185]. – Again, fourth: as here [Scotus marks here the reference back to the passage in the previous footnote, see*], by intuitive cognition of anything as intuited object in the first object. – Again, fifth: ‘he is blessed by nature’, as in distinction 13 [*ibid.*]. – Again, sixth, because it is the principle of a real production; and it requires the rejection of the seventh and sixth opinion in distinction 13 [*ibid.* nn.11, 7], hence let it be supposed for the present, unless it was proved in distinction 2 in the question ‘about the number of the intrinsic productions’ [not found in d.2 now, but presumably something Scotus intended to add]. – Again, seventh, that if the intellect is not there from the nature of the thing, it will never be there by an act of the uncreated intellect without a process to infinity; this reason is touched on here [n.189, at sign Z], and in distinction 13 [*ibid.* n.13]. – Again, eighth: science of these things would not be real, because the relation of some other reason to God (or conversely) would not be known of him, otherwise these things would not denominate; a confirmation: if they denominate through eminence, then God is in this way a stone. – Ninth Augustine *On the Trinity* XV as in distinction 13 [*ibid.* n.14].

Proof of the third proposition: from the first proposition, because no relation is a perfection simply (it is plain about divine relation), therefore it is not included in perfection simply. The proof of this consequence is, first, because perfection simply includes nothing to which the reason of perfection simply is repugnant (because then ‘it’ would in anything be better, and something ‘included in it’ would not in anything be better), and second because perfection simply is *per se* one, but relation does not make a *per se* one with the absolute [n.186]. – Again it is proved, third, from the second proposition, for from the second it follows that no relation of reason can be included in perfection simply, because then it would not be in the thing ‘from the nature of the thing’; but no real relation is posited as common to the three persons.

From these propositions it follows that an attribute, as it is distinct from another attribute, is in God as he is existent and for himself; and for this inferred conclusion some reasons are added to the three others that are made plain here [nn.177-178, 182, 183].”

come together in this being *per accidens*, and it then follows that truth always states precisely that perfection in the thing, and goodness likewise; and then further, since there is no distinction in the thing, whether according to the opinion or according to the exposition of the opinion [nn.174-176, 184], it follows that goodness and truth are formally synonymous (which they themselves deny [n.175]), because they would state the same perfection as it is a perfection in the thing, as was proved [just above at “then separate...”], and without any distinction of thing or of reason.

187. Further, the intuitive intellect has no distinction in the object save according to what is existent, because just as it does not know any object save as existent, so it does not know any things formally distinct in the object save as it is existent. Since, therefore, the divine intellect does not know its own essence save by intuitive intellection, whatever distinction is posited there in the object – whether of distinct formal objects or as of reasons caused by an act of intellect [sc. the two ways of taking Henry’s opinion, his and the expositor’s] – it follows that this distinction will be in the object as it is actually existent; and so, if this distinction is of distinct formal objects in the object, those distinct objects will be formally distinct (and then the intended proposition follows, that such distinction of formal objects precedes the act of the intellect), but if it is of reasons caused by an act of understanding, then the divine intellect will cause some intellection in the essence ‘as a relation of reason’, as it is existent, which seems absurd.

188. Again, there is an argument against the exposition [n.184], – that if only one real concept is of a nature to be had about any object, nothing causes a real concept of the object unless it causes that one concept; but about the divine essence, according to them, only one real concept is of a nature to be had, because the divine essence is only of a nature to make one real concept (but it is of a nature to make any real concept that can be had of it, otherwise it would be a more imperfect intelligible than is any created intelligible, which created intelligible indeed is causative of every real concept that can be had of it); therefore nothing will cause in the intellect any concept of God unless it make that single concept, and so since the creature cannot cause that concept in the intellect – because the concept is of the divine essence as the essence is a ‘this’, in itself, under its proper idea – it follows that by no action of a creature can any natural concept be had of God in this life [n.55].

189. Further, against the opinion in itself, because if these things [the attributes] are distinguished in some way or other by reason, they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing, but by an act of intellect or will. From this I argue: a distinction preceding the idea of the first distinguishing thing is not made by such a distinguishing thing; but a distinction between nature and intellection, or between will and intellection, precedes intellection, which is the distinguishing principle of things which are distinguished by reason; therefore the distinction between nature and intellection, or between intellection and will, will not be made by intellection.²⁰⁹ – The assumption is plain. For if no distinction of them were to precede, these [attributes] would not be distinguished more by intellection than by

²⁰⁹ The passage ‘From this I argue...’ to the end of the paragraph is marked as Z by Scotus. See the third paragraph of the long note to n.185 above.

nature or will; but whatever is distinguished by intellection, as it is altogether indistinct from nature, is also distinguished by nature; for whatever belongs to *a* as it is in every way indistinct from *b*, belongs to *b* itself, – the opposite seems to involve a contradiction.

190. And if it be said, as if despising this argument [189] (perhaps by precaution, because of the defect of the reply), that if there were, *per impossibile*, intellection alone, by itself, it would do the distinguishing, not nature or will, – this response is not sufficient, because however much certain things are *per impossibile* separated, if, when they are separated, something belongs to one and not to another, this cannot be except because of some formal distinction of the reason of this one from the reason of that one. Therefore if, *per impossibile*, with these things separated, a distinction would belong to intellection and not to nature, there is some distinction ‘between this reason and that’ even when they are not separated; for, after white and white are *per impossibile* separated, you will not be able to have it that white is the cause of something without white being the cause of the same thing, because there is no distinction between white and white; hence, there would never be a fallacy of accident here, ‘these attributes are distinguished by intellection, intellection is nature, therefore they are distinguished by nature’, unless the idea of intellection were extraneous to the idea of nature, insofar as they are compared to a third thing; therefore that extraneity precedes ‘any distinction’ of this idea from that, insofar as they are compared to a third, and it [sc. the idea of intellection or of nature] precedes the distinction of the ideas between themselves.

II. To the Question

191. [Solution of the question] – To the question [n.157] I reply that between the essential perfections there is only a difference of reason,²¹⁰ that is, of diverse modes of conceiving the same formal object (for there is such a distinction between wise and wisdom, and a greater one at any rate between wisdom and truth), and there is not there only a distinction of formal objects in the intellect, because, as argued before, that distinction is nowhere in intuitive cognition unless it is in the object intuitively known [n.187]. These two members are also proved by the reasons made against the preceding opinion [sc. of Henry, nn.177-178, 182-183, 185-190].

192. So there is there a distinction preceding the intellect in every way, and it is this, that wisdom is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and goodness is in the thing from the nature of the thing – but wisdom in the thing is not formally goodness in the thing.

The proof of this is that, if infinite wisdom were formally infinite goodness, wisdom in general would be formally goodness in general. For infinity does not destroy the formal idea of that to which it is added, because in whatever grade some perfection is understood to be (which ‘grade’ however is a grade of that perfection), the formal idea of that perfection is not taken away because of that grade, and so if it as it is general does

²¹⁰ Note by Scotus: “Every other opinion on this question, besides the one here, seems to evacuate as it were all the difficulties of the first book about the productions and the persons, as is touched on in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.8].”

not include it formally as it is in general, neither does it as infinite include it formally as it is infinite.

193. I make this clear by the fact that ‘to include formally’ is to include something in its essential idea, such that, if a definition of the including thing be assigned, the included thing would be the definition or a part of the definition; but just as the definition of goodness in general does not include wisdom in itself, so neither does infinite goodness include infinite wisdom; there is then some formal non-identity between wisdom and goodness, insofar as there would be distinct definitions of them, if they were definable. But a definition does not indicate only the idea caused by the intellect, but also the quiddity of the thing; there is then a formal non-identity on the part of the thing, and I understand it thus, that the intellect, when combining this proposition ‘wisdom is not formally goodness’, does not, by its collative act, cause the truth of this proposition, but it finds the extremes in the object, from the combining of which the act is made true.

194. And this argument ‘about non formal identity’ the old doctors [e.g. Bonaventure] stated by positing in divine reality that there was some predication true by identity that yet was not formal; thus I concede that by identity goodness is truth in the thing, but truth is not formally goodness.

195. The rule of Anselm, *Monologion* ch.15: “It is necessary that it be whatever is altogether better it than not it;” no relation of reason is of this sort [sc. a perfection simply, n.185], and nothing is unless, when relations of reason have been removed, it is altogether the same in the thing and in reason; therefore Anselm’s rule is nothing other than ‘God is God’.

196. On the contrary. In [*Monologion*] ch.16: “If it be asked what that nature is, what better response than that it is justice?” Therefore anything at all is said of it in the ‘what’. The perfect quidditative concept is only one, or at any rate there is no formal distinction between ‘what’ and ‘what’. – Again, ch.17: “The nature itself in one way and in one consideration is whatever it is essentially.”

197. Response. ‘What’ by identity, not formally; proof of this gloss: ch.17 says: “justice signifies the same as the other things, whether all together or singly.” It is not understood here that they signify the same ‘formally and first’, because then they would be synonyms; therefore they connote the same, or signify the same really, not formally. Again, Damascene [n.198]. To the second [quote from Anselm, n.196]: he adds an example about man, who “is not in one way or in one consideration said to be these three: body, rational, man.” As to why, he posits two reasons: “in one respect man is body, in another rational;” second reason: “each of these is not the whole thing that is man.” It was in opposition to these two reasons that the remark ‘in one way and in one consideration’ was made.²¹¹

198. This opinion [of Scotus, nn.193-194] is confirmed by the authority of Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.4 cited previously [n.158], and ch.9, where he himself means that, among all the names said of God, the most proper is ‘Who is’, because he says God is ‘a certain sea of infinite substance’; but the other names – as he said in ch.4 – state things that ‘circumstance the nature’. This would not seem true unless there were some distinction on the part of the thing; for God is not ‘a sea of infinite

²¹¹ The Vatican editors note : “It was by opposition to ‘body’ and ‘rational’ (because they are not in man in one way or one consideration) that Anselm said on God’s behalf ‘in one way and one consideration’, and not that it really is so.”

substance' because of the fact that many relations of reason can be caused in respect of him – for thus can they be caused by an act of intellect in respect of anything.

199. Note on behalf of the saying of Damascene, that 'sea of perfections' can be understood in one way for an act containing, both formally and in itself, all perfections under their proper formal reasons; thus nothing formally one is a 'sea', because it is a contradiction for one formal reason actually to contain so many reasons. In this way, then, nothing is a 'sea' unless it is identically one, that is: "God, wise, good, blessed", and all the rest of this sort. Damascene is not taking 'sea' in this way.

200. In another can be understood [sc. by 'sea of perfections'] something formally one, containing all perfections in the most eminent way in which it is possible for them all to be contained in one; but this way is that they are not only contained identically, because of the formal infinity of the container (for thus any [perfection] contains them all), but that further they are contained virtually, as in their cause, – and further still, in something as first cause containing them of itself, and as most universal cause, because containing them all. In this way 'this' essence is a 'sea', because in the case of any multitude one must come to a stand at something altogether first; in this [divine multitude] there is nothing altogether first save 'this' essence, therefore it is not only formally infinite, but it virtually contains the others; nor only some of them (as perhaps the intellect contains wisdom and understanding, and the will love and loving), but all of them, nor containing them by some other virtue of something else, but by itself. Therefore it has infinity formally and primarily, namely as well from itself as in respect of everything, an infinity universally causal and virtually containing, – and thus it is a 'sea', thus containing all of them as they can be contained eminently in some formally one thing. "All the rivers flow into the sea; whence they come thither do they return" (*Ecclesiastes* 1.7).

201. Therefore this proposition 'God is wise' is more *per se* than this other 'the wise is good'. The other [sc. perfections other than the essence] have formal infinity, and if they have causal or virtual infinity (which needs to be preserved because of their nearer or remoter order to the essence), yet they do not have causal infinity with respect to all, nor do they have it with respect to any from themselves, but from the essence. – All these points [nn.199-201] are plain in the example of being and its properties (if they be posited to be the same, as is necessary [sc. for the purpose of the example]), if infinity is avoided.

202. On the contrary: the truest unity is to be posited in God; formal unity is truer than mere identical unity.

Response: formal unity is posited, but not of anything whatever in respect of anything whatever. If the major be taken in this way it is false of person and person, and the gloss would be: '[the unity] which is possible is true'; but, as it is, formal identity of anything whatever with anything whatever is not possible, but only real identity. From this middle the argument is made to the opposite, that every unity simply of perfection is to be posited there [sc. in God]; such unity there is identical unity, without formal unity, because it is simple and unlimited, but formal unity does not posit un-limitation.

203. The opinion [n.198] is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2, where he proves that in divine reality 'two persons are not something greater than one, because they are not something truer'. What consequence would that be? If it were only a distinction of reason between truth and wisdom and greatness, the argument would not

seem to be different from an argument that proved ‘wisdom, therefore wise’, or conversely [n.191].

204. To what purpose, too, do the doctors who hold the opposite opinion [to that of Scotus] fill up so many pages demonstrating one attribute from another if there were between them only a difference of relations of reason? For God would seem thus to be perfectly known – as to every real concept – as he is known under one attribute just as if he were known under the idea of all the attributes, because the knowledge of several relations of reason does not make a more perfect knowledge, nor does it do anything for having a more perfect real knowledge of anything.

205. Likewise, third, in line with the aforesaid authority of Damascene [n.198], to what purpose do they [sc. those who hold the opposite opinion to Scotus] assign an order to the attributes, as if the essence were the foundation and certain attributes were closer to the essence and certain closer to the emanations? If they are only relations of reason, what is the order in comparison to the emanations?

206. Likewise, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.10 n.3: “If you can concede God the Father to be simple and yet to be wise, good, etc.” (and he enumerates there many perfections), “how much more can one God be simple and yet a Trinity, so that the three persons are not parts of one God.” – He argues there that if in the same thing without composition or division into parts there can be many perfections simply, therefore much more can there be in the deity three persons without composition and division into parts. What argument would that be if the attributes only stated relations of reason and the persons were distinguished really? For this inference does not follow: ‘relations of reason do not cause composition in anything, therefore neither do real relations’.

207. Also the same Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.3 n.5 says that all those predicates [the ones listed in n.206] are equal. But nothing is equal to its own self. For what does it mean to say that something under one relation of reason is equal to itself under another relation of reason?

208. Hilary too in *On the Trinity* XII n.52, addressing God the Father, speaks thus: “Of Perfect God, who is both your Word and wisdom and truth, there is absolute generation, who in these names of eternal properties is born.” He says then that these properties are eternal, and that in this the Son is born of the Father, that is: the Father, possessing them first, communicates them to the Son. But if they were only distinct in reason, they would not seem to be first in origin in the Father before the Son was produced. For whatever is produced there in being of reason by an act of intellect seems to be produced by the whole Trinity (and so is not in the Father as he precedes the Son in origin), as if necessarily preceding the origin.

209. But this formal non-identity stands along with the simplicity of God, because there must be this difference between the essence and the property, as was shown above in distinction 2, the last question [I d.2 nn.388-410] – and yet for this reason no composition is posited in the person. Likewise, this formal distinction is posited between two properties in the Father (as between not-being-born and father), which, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, are not the same property, because it is not the case that ‘he is Father by the fact he is ungenerated’. If then there can in one person be two properties without composition, much more, or at least equally, can there be several essential perfections in God ‘not formally the same’ without composition, because the

properties in the Father are not formally infinite, but the essential perfections are formally infinite, – therefore any of them is the same as any of them.

210. [Doubts] – Against this solution [nn.191-209] there are three doubts.

For first it seems that the divine simplicity is not saved, because from the fact the essence is posited as the foundation and the attributes as circumstances of the essence [n.198] it seems that the attributes are disposed as acts and forms with respect to the divine essence.

211. The second doubt is that when Augustine (*On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.9 ‘On Great Things’ and ch.2 n.3 ‘On Little Things’) denies the identity of paternity and deity – for he says he is ‘not Father by the fact he is ungenerated’ just as neither ‘is he the Word by the fact he is wisdom’ – he there concedes the identity of greatness and goodness, and of the essential perfections, because he says ‘he is great by the fact he is God’ etc. Therefore, just as he there denies identity, so he concedes it here; but he only denies formal identity there, so he concedes it here.

212. The third doubt is that, just as goodness would not be really infinite unless it was really the same as wisdom, so it seems that the idea of goodness is not formally infinite unless it is formally the same as the idea of wisdom. Therefore, for the same reason as you posit true identity between the former, you should posit the formal identity of reason with reason.

213. To these doubts. – To the first [n.210] I reply that form in creatures has something of imperfection in a double way, namely because it is a form informing something and because it is part of a composite, – and it has something which is not of imperfection, but is consequent to it according to its own essential reason, namely that it is that by which something is the sort of thing it is. Example: wisdom in us is an accident, and this is a matter of imperfection – but that it is that by which something is wise, this is not a matter of imperfection but of the essential idea of wisdom. Now in divine reality nothing is a form according to that double idea of imperfection, because it neither informs nor is it a part; yet there is wisdom there insofar as it is that by which it – what wisdom is in – is wise, and this not by any composition of wisdom with anything as a subject, nor as the wisdom is a part of some composite, but by true identity, by which wisdom, because of its perfect infinity, is perfectly the same as anything with which it naturally exists.

But you will object: how is something formally wise by wisdom if wisdom is not the form of it?

214. I reply. The body is ensouled as it were denominatively, because the soul is the form of it – man is called ensouled not as it were denominatively but essentially, because the soul is something of it as a part; there is no requirement, then, that, for something to be the form informing something, it be itself of such a sort in itself, because the form is not a form informing the whole, although the whole is formally said to be such through it. If therefore some form were the same as something by a truer identity than is its identity with the thing informed, or with the whole of which it is a part, that true identity would be enough for the thing to be of such a sort by such a form; so it is in the intended proposition. – And then if you ask whether by first act there could be some abstraction of the form, – I say that there is not there abstraction of the form insofar as by it something is of such a sort taken precisely, without consideration of its identity with that which is of such a sort in itself.

215. To the second, which seems to possess difficulty from the words of Augustine [n.211], I say that in five ways is God wise and great by the same thing, and yet he is not God and Father by the same thing; in one way because wisdom and greatness are perfections of the same idea, that is, of quidditative idea, because whatever is perfected by those perfections is perfected not as by reasons of the supposit but as quidditative perfections, – but paternity and deity are not thus of the same idea; wisdom and goodness are also in another way of the same idea, because they are perfections simply, – not thus paternity and deity; in the third way, because greatness is the same as deity anywhere, – paternity is not but only in one supposit; in the fourth way, because goodness and wisdom and the rest of this sort are the same as it were by mutual identity, because each is formally infinite, because of which infinity each is the same as the other, – but paternity and deity are not thus mutually the same, because one of them is not formally infinite, but only deity is formally infinite, and because of this infinity paternity is the same as it; and, from this, fifth, he is good and wise by the same thing, ‘by the same thing’ – I say – by identity adequate in perfection, because each is infinite; paternity does not thus have adequate identity with deity, because it is not infinite.

216. To the form [of the argument, n.211] I concede that he is good and wise by the same thing in the way that he is not God and Father by the same thing, because by the same thing he is good and wise, namely by the same thing anywhere and by the same thing as by mutual identity; but paternity and deity are not the same anywhere. Likewise, by the same thing – that is by perfection of the same idea – he is good and wise, because he is quidditatively good and wise; he is not God and Father in this way by the same thing, because each ‘by which’, there, is not the essential perfection of that of which it is, because although the quiddity of paternity remains there, yet the quiddity is not the quidditative idea simply of any supposit, but the personal idea of the same is.

217. To the third [n.212] I concede that the idea of wisdom is infinite, and the idea of goodness similarly, and therefore this idea is that by identity, because an opposite does not stand with the infinity of the other extreme. Yet this idea is not formally that one; for this does not follow ‘it is truly the same as the other, therefore it is formally the same as the other’; for there is a true identity of *a* and *b*, without *a* formally including the idea of *b*.

III. To the Principal Argument

218. To the principal argument that is taken from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* XV [n.212], I respond that in the creature there is no predication through identity which is not so formally,²¹² and therefore never has a logic of true predication formally and by identity in creatures been handed down; but in divine reality there is true predication by identity, in the abstract, and yet it is not formal.

219. The reason for this difference is this – as I think – that, when conceiving something abstract with ultimate abstraction, a quiddity is conceived without relation to anything that is outside the proper idea of the quiddity; therefore, by thus conceiving the extremes, there is no truth in the uniting of them unless precisely the quiddity of one extreme is the same precisely as the quiddity of the other extreme. But this does not

²¹² Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: entity is unity or truth; if they are properties of being, they are also the same as themselves.”

happen in creatures, because there, when abstracting the relations that are in the same thing (to wit, the reality of genus and difference) and considering them very precisely, each is finite and neither is perfectly the same as the other; for they are not in any way the same among themselves save because of a third thing with which they are the same, and therefore, if they are abstracted from that third thing, there does not remain a cause of identity for them, and therefore not a cause either for the truth of the proposition uniting the extremes. This proposition, then, is false ‘animality is rationality’, and conversely, and this in any predication whatever, because the extremes are not only not formally the same but they are not truly the same either; for this quiddity precisely is potential to that quiddity, and is not the same as it save because of identity to the third thing from which they are abstracted; therefore the abstraction takes away the cause of the truth of the affirmative proposition uniting them.

220. The opposite is the case in God, because by abstracting wisdom from whatever is outside the idea of wisdom, and abstracting goodness similarly from whatever is outside its reason formally, each quiddity remains, precisely taken, formally infinite, and from the fact that infinity is the idea of their identity – in such very precise abstraction – the idea of identity of the extremes remains. For they were not the same precisely because of their identity to a third thing from which they are abstracted, but because of the formal infinity of each.

221. And a sign that this is the idea of predication through identity is from the fact that this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is not-being-born’ (nor this proposition ‘paternity in divine reality is active inspiriting’), whether as true formally or as true by identity; but this proposition is conceded ‘paternity is deity’, and conversely. The reason seems to be that, by abstracting paternity and not-being-born from the essence or the supposit, neither is formally infinite and therefore neither includes in its thus abstracted idea the idea of its identity to the other, and so neither, as so abstracted, is truly predicated of the other; but by abstracting deity and paternity to whatever extent, one of the extremes still remains formally infinite, which infinity is a sufficient reason for the identity of the extremes, and therefore the idea of identity remains, and consequently the idea of the truth of the composition of the affirmative proposition. But in this proposition ‘deity is goodness’ there remains infinity not only in one extreme but in both, and therefore there would be truth here because of the identity included virtually in each extreme.

222. From this, and from the response to the saying of Augustine adduced before in the second doubt [nn.215-216], what was supposed before in the question ‘about genus’ is clear, namely how there remain only two modes of predicating in divine reality [nn.130-131], – because although by identity the relations pass into the essence, yet not in the way the essential predicates do, because all essential predicates state rather quidditative perfections, but the personal idea does not state a quidditative perfection; and therefore all the essential predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating among themselves more than the personal predicates are reduced to one mode of predicating along with them, so that, according to this, it can be said that two modes of predicating remain in divine reality, not only because of the modes of conceiving the predicates, but also in some way because of the reality of the things that are predicated.

Appendix

[*Reportatio* IC d.8 p.1 q.3]

Book One

Eighth Distinction

First Part. Question Three

[Point D. See n.104]

Again, the Philosopher says this in *Metaphysics* 7.101034b21-22, for “just as the nature – that is the definition – is to the thing, so are the parts of the definition or of the nature to the parts of the thing;” therefore, just like in a definition, there are several real parts, which should not always be set down as matter and form, but as other realities, one of which is the necessary in potency to another.

Again, by reason: the intellect, when conceiving a genus, has a concept about something which is in the thing from the nature of the thing, otherwise it would not conceive anything that might be said of man in the ‘what’; and I am not speaking here of the second intention of genus, but of that which is objectively conceived. Likewise, when conceiving the difference, I conceive something which is in the thing objectively. If therefore the genus or the difference were to state the whole reality of the defined thing, then – by joining the genus to do the defining – the same thing would be said totally twice, which is one discordancy, and the other discordancy is that the definition would not be first the same as the defined, which is false, because the quiddity of anything is the same as itself.

On the contrary: if everything finite is in a genus, since the personal properties in divine reality are not infinite, because they are not perfections simply, – therefore they are finite, because between the finite and the infinite there is no middle, – therefore they are in a genus.

I reply: they are formally neither finite nor infinite. Not infinite because then one person would have some perfection which another would not have; nor are they formally finite, because then they would not be the same really as the divine essence, which is formally infinite. Hence, just as the finite and infinite, properly speaking, are congruent in quantity of amount and in nothing else (*Physics* 1.2.185a33-b3), so these transumptively said things only agree with something possessing a virtual quiddity of which there are entities said quidditatively, and of these entities the intrinsic grades are the finite and infinite, and not the personal or individual hypostatic idea.

[Point E. See n.117]

Note here for the intention of the Philosopher that something can be formally repugnant to the subject which is not repugnant to the property, although it is virtually repugnant to it. An example: it is formally repugnant to man to be in the genus of accident, but it is not formally repugnant to risible, which is a property of man; but infinity thus belongs *per se* to it [sc. some supposed line]; therefore although it is repugnant to line, it is however not repugnant to straight as it is straight. And therefore, as to the idea of straight, a straight line is not well defined when it is said to be “that whose middle does not extend outside the extremes” (*Topics* 6.11.148b23-32), because straight, whence it is straight, does not essentially include either middle or extremes, because, if a

straight line were infinite, the idea of straight would remain and yet it would have neither middle nor extremes. – This as to the intention of the Philosopher, why he takes exception to this definition of straight line.

Eighth Distinction

Second Part

On the Immutability of God

Single Question

Whether only God is Immutable

223. On the immutability of God, that the Master treats of in the second part of distinction 8 (which, however, seems it could be concluded from the simplicity of God, about which the question has already been raised [nn.1-26]), I ask whether God alone is immutable.

That he is not

Because if he is immutable then he is disposed immutably to that to which he is immediately disposed; therefore that other thing is immutable.

Proof of the first consequence: an immutable thing, which is of itself the first agent, cannot be diversely disposed to its effect, because if it sometimes acts and sometimes does not, this seems to be from a change in itself; for this change cannot be posited as because of a new proximity of the passive thing or because of the removal of impediments, because the action of the first agent does not require these. – Proof of the second consequence: to whatever a necessary thing is necessarily disposed, that is itself necessary.

224. To the opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8: “Every creature is changeable,” “only God is immutable.”

225. And Paul, *I Timothy* 6.16: “Only he has immortality;” which Augustine expounds in *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.2 when he says that “true ‘immortality’ is immutability.”

I. God is Simply Immutable

226. The affirmative part of this question [the negative part begins n.230] is proved by the Philosopher *Physics* 7.1.242a13-20, 242b18-10, through the fact that “everything that is moved is moved by another;” the proof of which is that “when the part rests, the whole rests,” and it is not possible to proceed to infinity in things moved by another, because then an infinite movable could be made from them which would be moved in a finite time (which is rejected in *Physics* 8.10.266a25-b6, and before in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.152]); therefore one must make a stand at some mover which is not moved by another, and which consequently is altogether unmoved.

227. The same conclusion is also proved by him in *Physics* 8.4.255b31-5.256a21 through a division of movers and things moved naturally or violently, and because one

must ultimately make a stand at some mover which is not moved of itself ‘*per se* and first’, and must also ultimately make a stand at something simply unmovable.

228. But these processes (which are the principal ones in two books, namely books 7 and 8 of the *Physics*) need a greater exposition so as to show that the reasonings are valid, and if perhaps they are valid, yet they have a diminished conclusion, as will be shown elsewhere [II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.10-15]; perhaps they entail no more than that the First thing is not moved as a body, or as a virtue in a body, in the way the soul is moved *per accidens* in the moved body.

229. Therefore, without pausing now to make these reasonings clear, I show briefly the affirmative part from the simplicity of God: for because God is perfectly simple (as was proved from his infinity [nn.17-19]), therefore he cannot be changed to any form that is received in himself; also because he is necessary existence (as was proved from the primacy of his efficient causality in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.70]), therefore he cannot be changed from being to not-being or from not-being to being, which change is called ‘turning’ by Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.3. Therefore God is said to be simply immutable in respect of any change, whether substantial or accidental.

II. Nothing else besides God has Immutability

230. But the negative part of this question, namely that nothing else besides God has immutability, poses a greater difficulty; for on this point the theologians differ from the philosophers, and vice versa.

231. In order to consider this, one must first see what the intention of the philosophers was and what motives there are in their favor and what reasons there are against them.

A. Of the Intention of the Philosophers

I. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

232. As to the first point, specifically about the intention of Aristotle and Avicenna.

It is posited [by Henry] that in ten ways can something be disposed to existence, but for my purpose [n.230] let three modes be sufficient. For something other than God – to wit an intelligence other than the first – can be posited in being, or be immutable and necessary, in three ways:²¹³ in one way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence but is from another causally; in a second way, that it is of itself formally necessary existence and is dependent on another, such that, because of essential order, it would be a contradiction for the second to be without the first but not vice versa, and likewise for the third to be without the second but not vice versa, – and this order is between the more perfect and the less perfect [*supply*: as with figures and numbers [n.245]], but not between cause and caused; in the third way, that something have formally of itself possible existence and have from another also necessary existence, namely because this other causes necessarily.

²¹³ Note by Scotus: “Here Henry’s opinion, Quodlibet VIII question 9, is badly held.” The Vatican editors are puzzled as to what Scotus means here, since Henry’s opinion, they say, does not seem to be in any way a distortion.

233. Of these three ways the first way involves a contradiction, as they say [sc. Henry and his followers], and therefore the Philosopher did not posit it, because it does not seem likely that he posited contradictories; that it involves a contradiction is plain, because what is caused by another is of itself a non-being and is of itself a possible being (otherwise it would be impossible for it to be caused), but what is a necessary existent is in no way a possible existent; therefore it is discordant to say that Aristotle posited this way about the separate substances, because of the contradiction involved.

234. That he also denied the third way is proved by the fact it too involves a contradiction.

235. There is a confirmation also of this, because the Commentator in *Metaphysics* XII com.41 (in the question of John the Grammarian) means that since motion is of itself possible it can be made perpetual by another, because it has being from another – but a possible substance cannot be made perpetual; therefore a perpetual substance cannot be from another.

236. Again, as the Commentator says in *On the Heavens* I com.138, about Aristotle's remark 'It is impossible that the non-generable fall under corruption'; expounding this, the Commentator says that "if some eternal generable thing were found to exist, it would be possible that something possible, or some possible nature, should be changed into something necessary."

237. Further, it is imputed [by Henry] to the Philosopher that he wished there (*On the Heavens*, ibid.) that any substance have its existence from its nature – this one always, that one sometime – so that this one necessarily always is, that one necessarily sometime is not; nor could it be otherwise unless one nature were to change into another, or two contrary natures be at the same time in the same thing – as in the same book of *On the Heavens* both Aristotle and the Commentator conclude.

238. Again, from these places – namely *On the Heavens* I and *Metaphysics* XII [235-236] – [Henry] shows that [Aristotle] denied the first way above [n.232], because to every necessary substance is attributed the being of its intrinsic nature, and thus that he posited no perpetual caused thing save what is moved in the heavens (and, by its mediation, individuals which are not necessary, although their species are necessary), but that generable and corruptible things come to be; and from the fact that he posited some order among them, it is concluded [by Henry] that this is in accord with the second way [n.232]. But the species in incorruptible things he said were necessarily in one individual, while the species in corruptible things he said were necessarily in several and diverse individuals, so that the species are of themselves necessary, although corruptible *per accidens*, just as he posited that the elements were in their totality incorruptible but in their parts corruptible.

239. Against this opinion, which imputes these things to Aristotle, an argument is given first [by Scotus himself] that he did not deny the first way.

This is seen from his intention in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b28-31: "Of eternal things the principles must be the truest," because they are the cause of truth for the other things, – "but each thing is disposed to existence as it is to truth;" now it is clear, according to him, that everything eternal is necessary, from *On the Heavens* 1.12.283b1-6 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050b6-8. Again, *Metaphysics* 5.4.1015b6-11, nothing prevents there being other causes for certain necessary things [e.g. premises causing the conclusions of syllogisms]. If, however, a possibility repugnant to necessity were of the idea of a caused

thing (as the said opinion [of Henry] argues [nn.233, 235-236]), it would be a contradiction for any necessary thing to have a cause.

240. Again, *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a11-23, he deduces the oneness of the universe from the oneness of the end, – therefore everything other than the end is for it as for the end; but of whatever there is a final cause, there is also an efficient cause; therefore etc.

Proof of the final consequence: an end is not a cause save insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act and to give being. It moves, he says, as loved and desired (this is plain from the idea of end *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b25-27), for which end the agent acts, for which end – namely the end loved – the agent gives being to another thing that is ordered to itself.

241. Again, the Commentator *Metaphysics* XII com.37 concedes that there is there [in the heavens] cause and caused ‘as the intellect is the cause of intellection’, and Aristotle says that [the first mover] moves as loved and desired. ‘Bath’ as it is in the mind moves as efficient cause, according to the Commentator; at any rate the object moves, as efficient cause, to an act of understanding; therefore also to existence, because [Henry] imputes to the philosopher that he posited each of those substances to be its own act of understanding.

242. Again, Avicenna [*Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb)] expressly posits that the necessary ‘is from another causally’. Therefore if in this he saw no contradiction, why should it be denied of Aristotle, because of the contradiction that you [Henry] posit there [n.233]?

243. Again, the Commentator in *On the Substance of the Globe* ch.2 says: “The celestial body does not only need a virtue moving it in place, but also a virtue bestowing on it and on its substance eternal permanence, etc.,” and later: “of the opinion of Aristotle some said that he does not assert a cause activating the whole, but only a moving cause, and that was very absurd.”

244. To these points they [Henry and his followers] reply that “those who posit a false foundation on the basis of probable reasons, end up after a while contradicting themselves on the basis of true reasons.”

On the contrary: you [Henry] have shown [n.233] that Aristotle denies the first way ‘because it seems to involve a contradiction’, and now you concede that he himself contradicts himself;²¹⁴ but it seems more reasonable not to impute contradictories to him, but to say that he speaks consistent to a false antecedent when he concedes the consequent.

245. Again, that Aristotle did not posit the second way, which you impute to him [n.238], is seen from the irrationality of this way; proof: for nothing depends for its existence on another thing from which it does not get being, and so neither does it depend for its permanence on another thing from which it does not get permanence, because it gets being and permanence from the same thing. – Nor is the case of figures and numbers similar [n.232], because although there the prior is not the efficient cause of the posterior, it is yet the material cause, as a part is – by potency – in the whole; but in the proposed case no causality can be posited but that of the efficient and final cause, according to

²¹⁴ That is, Aristotle does not merely, on probable grounds, assert a first thing from which a contradiction then follows [n.233], but directly contradicts that first thing, by later, on true grounds [n.244], asserting the opposite of it.

Aristotle [n.240].

246. Also, what is imputed to Aristotle about the necessity of the species in corruptible things ‘in diverse individuals’ [n.238] is not true unless he understood it of the necessity of the motion of the heaven, and so of the production of individuals when there is such and such closeness or proportion of the agent to the patient; but necessity is a condition of existence; it does not then belong to species save in individuals. Nor is the case of the element ‘as a whole and in its parts’ similar [n.238], for the element as a whole is a singular, existent of itself, and a principal part of the universe.²¹⁵

247. Again, if what is ‘corruptible’ from its intrinsic cause sometime necessarily is not, as is imputed to him [by Henry to Aristotle, n.237], then it will be corrupted by itself without an external thing corrupting it.

248. The third way [n.232] is also imputed to Avicenna, and a proof is taken from *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (92ra), where he says that “a caused thing, as to itself, is that it not be, but, as to its cause, that it be; but what is of itself – as it is in the intellect – is prior [sc. in nature], not in duration, to what is of another,” and this “among the wise is called ‘creation’, to give existence to a thing after absolute non-existence.”

249. Against him it is argued [by Henry] that that way [n.248] involves a contradiction, because if the possible is posited not to be, it follows that it is not only false but also impossible – according to the Philosopher – namely that the cause does not necessarily cause and give being [the opposite of which is posited by Avicenna, nn.248, 242].

2. Scotus’ own Opinion

250. On the intention of these philosophers, Aristotle and Avicenna. – I do not wish to impute to them things more absurd than they themselves say or than follows necessarily from what they say, and I wish to take from their sayings the more reasonable understanding that I can take.

251. I respond then that Aristotle posited, and Avicenna likewise, that God is necessarily disposed to other things outside himself, and from this it follows that some other thing is necessarily disposed to God (which is as it were immediately compared to him), or disposed not by an intermediate motion, because from a uniformity in the movable whole they posited a lack of uniformity in the parts of the movable, and that by intermediate motion generable and corruptible things were non-uniformly compared to God.

252. By holding this false foundation, Aristotle does not seem, in positing that God is a necessary cause, to contradict himself by positing a necessary caused thing (as he intends in the *Metaphysics* 5, that of certain necessary things there is some other cause, and in *Metaphysics* 2 that “of eternal things the principles must be the truest,” as was argued [n.239]), and so he posited not only the third way but also the first [n.232].²¹⁶

²¹⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “That it is also imputed to Aristotle that no substance is from another seems manifestly false in the case of generable things. For generation is into substance; therefore by very generation a thing which before was not receives being, and generation is the efficient cause of what is produced; but nothing produces itself into existence.”

²¹⁶ Note cancelled by Scotus: “Again, there is the following argument: he [Aristotle] set down the first mover to be of infinite power; infinite power cannot immediately move the globe, because it moves neither in time nor in the ‘now’; therefore he posited that it precisely moves mediately. But this can

253. Also Avicenna seems immediately to contradict himself when positing the [caused thing] to be a possible [n.248], because then a necessary thing is not necessarily compared to it.

But there is an argument on Avicenna's behalf: if it is from another, then in the quiddity of it is not included its being of itself; therefore it is of itself a possible being and a non-being, just as humanity is not a being of itself, whether one or several. This way of possibility is conceded, namely the possibility which is just that, in the order of nature, this thing is capable of that, but it is not that quidditatively.

254. From this the response is plain to the first argument made against Avicenna [n.249], as though he were contradicting himself, because [from 'possible not to be'] there does not follow 'it is possible that it is not', nor [from 'it is possible'] does there follow 'it can be posited [that it is not]' – just as neither 'a being that is not one' – and thus Aristotle would concede something necessary from another to be a possible, but that 'it is possible for potency to be prior to act' he rejects in *On the Heavens* [n.249].

255. Therefore Aristotle and Avicenna agree in the things that follow from one false principle – in which principle they agree – namely that God is necessarily disposed to something that is outside himself, to which immediately, or by mediation of something immutable, he is compared.²¹⁷

256. To the things first adduced, to prove that Aristotle denied the first way [nn.233, 235-238].

To the first, that he tries to prove a contradiction [n.233], perhaps Aristotle would say that 'possible objectively' is not repugnant to the necessary if the producer necessarily produces; for it is not required that the possible could really not be such [sc. existent], but that 'in the order of nature' be implicitly understood when understanding it not to be such [sc. it is possible in its nature, but, because of its cause, it is necessary]. This is proved by the confirmation to the argument adduced by Henry [n.233], which is that from quasi-subjective potency – according to him – the Son is generated in divine

be understood in three ways, but none of these three ways [see footnote to n.290] is possible unless it produces into being the proximate mover, because the other two modes are there [*ibid.*] rejected; therefore he intends to posit such a production."

Another note cancelled by Scotus: "This also proves [sc. the previous paragraph in this footnote] that Aristotle posited that all the intelligences are immediately produced by the first intelligence (against Avicenna *Metaphysics* IX ch.4 (104vb-105ra)), because a cause of infinite power causes every infinite motion, and this mediately (but no other cause besides the first is of infinite power, because any cause is conjoined to some sphere; therefore it is finite); therefore any motion whatever is from the first cause by an intermediate mover and from its proper mover immediately moving it; therefore the first cause produced that proximate mover. Thus too the intellect is produced from outside (*On the Generation of Animals* 2.3.736b27-29), because, although he did not posit that the first thing acted without second causes, together with a matter disposed to the effect of the first thing, the first thing, according to him, necessarily informs the matter, so that this informing is the only change (not two changes, as in positing creation and informing). Thus too in *On Good Fortune* [*Eudemian Ethics* 7.15.1248a22-b7] he says that a separate cause moves immediately a man so disposed to what is of advantage to him, etc."

²¹⁷ Note by Scotus: "And do they both say the first way [sc. immediately]? – Avicenna in *Metaphysics* [footnote to n.252]. But whether Aristotle thought so about one produced intelligence only [sc. whether Aristotle like Avicenna thought God was compared immediately to one intelligence only or to all] is doubtful; however he posited nothing else immediately from the first thing save intelligence, which, if it did not produce it, would altogether not move it, because not according to any of the three ways contained here [footnote to n.290]."

reality; for it is certain that that quasi-subjective possibility does not prevent necessity; nor does the quasi-objective potency of the Son, because the generator necessarily generates.

257. To what is adduced from *On the Heavens* – “unless one nature were to change into another” – it can be said that the substance has permanent existence, and so there is not given to it always a new and a new existence. Therefore from the causer, causing necessarily according to Aristotle, there is given to it a necessary nature formally, and thus if it were able not to be it would change its nature.

258. Through the same point an answer is plain to the passage from the *Metaphysics* about motion [nn.235, 238], because, since it is of itself possible, not only can it be perpetual for the reason that it is from another, but also that, along with this, it always has a new existence, and so it never has a form which is necessity; but it necessarily always comes to be, because the whole movable is necessarily disposed uniformly to what gives it uniform existence necessarily, according to them [Aristotle and Averroes] (and this necessarily uniform disposition of the movable to the mover is the cause that motion necessarily comes to be, although the motion never has necessary existence formally, – there is also here a necessity of inevitability in the motion without a necessity of immutability in the motion, but from a necessity of immutability in the causes of the motion), such that both authorities are hereby solved. But a permanent thing, if it is necessary, has at the same time to be what is formally necessary, and thus, if it is corruptible, there will be a contradiction, – motion is not like this. Or the argument of Aristotle against Plato (*On the Heavens* n.237) proceeds on the supposition of a necessary agent, and then I conclude in this way: if the heaven could be perpetual, and from a necessary agent, then it will necessarily be perpetual; but to this ‘necessarily’ is repugnant the act ‘to corrupt’, therefore also the potency for this act, because anything to which the act is ‘necessarily’ repugnant, to that same thing the potency to such act is repugnant, although not to anything contingent; therefore potency to corruption only stands if potency to opposites at the same time stands. And by this the position keeps itself in place, for, from the positing of what is possible to be, no impossibility follows – nor a new impossibility – on anything necessary.

B. Reasons for and against the True Intention of the Philosophers

1. Reasons on behalf of this Intention

259. As to the second principal point [n.231].

For this conclusion, which has been said to be the intention of both, namely of both Aristotle and Avicenna [nn.251-255], I argue as follows: in every difference of being necessity is a more perfect condition than contingency; the proof is that necessity is more perfect in being in itself, therefore in every difference too of being; therefore also in this difference of being, which is ‘cause’, necessity is more perfect than the most perfect contingency; therefore the cause necessarily causes.

260. The response is that necessity is a more perfect condition where it is possible; but necessity is impossible with the idea of cause as cause, because thus are we speaking and not of the thing that is the cause. Against this: in many divisions of being one of the dividers is perfect, the other imperfect, and the extremes that are perfect

in the diverse divisions are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. An example: if being is divided into finite and infinite, into necessary and possible, into potency and act, – act, necessity, and infinity are either necessary concomitants of each other or are compatible with each other. Therefore since, in the division of being into cause and caused, cause is the more perfect extreme, concomitant with it, or able to stand with it, will be any more perfect divider whatever of being, – and consequently necessity will be so.

261. Further, if the first causer were to cause naturally and were to cause necessarily, then it would give necessity to its caused; but no perfection is taken away from the caused because of an equally perfect mode of causing in the causer itself; but to cause voluntarily is not a mode of causing less perfect than to cause naturally, and thus no perfection is, because of there being this ‘to cause voluntarily’, necessarily taken away from the effect; therefore a cause, causing voluntarily, can give necessity to the effect. – A confirmation for the reason is that, if a cause were to cause naturally, it could produce several differences of being, to wit the possible and the necessary; therefore if a cause causing voluntarily can only cause contingent being, it would seem to be an imperfect cause, because then its causality would not extend itself to as many effects as it would extend itself to if it were to cause naturally.

262. Further, some cause necessarily causes its effect, therefore the first cause necessary causes its caused. – The antecedent seems manifest because of the many natural causes that necessarily cause their effects. I prove the consequence by the fact that in things essentially ordered the ‘posterior’ cannot have necessity unless the ‘prior’ has necessary being; the connections of caused things to their causes are essentially ordered; therefore no such connection is necessary unless the connection of the first caused thing to its cause is necessary.

2. Reasons against this Intention

263. [Reasons of Henry of Ghent] – Against this conclusion, in which the philosophers commonly agree – that the first cause necessarily and naturally causes the first caused – there is the following argument:²¹⁸ the first agent is in no way perfected by anything other than itself; a natural agent is in some way perfected by its production or its product; therefore etc. – The minor is shown by the fact that a natural agent acts for an end, *Physics* 2.5.196b21-22; but nothing seems to act for an end by which it is in no way perfected.

264. But to this there is a response according to the intention of Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.5 (95ra), where he means that a perfect agent acts from liberality, that is, not expecting perfection from the product – as the intention of liberality was expounded in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ (I d.2 n.234). One should deny, then, the assumption made, namely that ‘a natural agent is perfected by that which it produces’ [n.263], because this is only true in the case of imperfect natural agents. And as to what is added about ‘acting first for an end’, it is not necessary according to the philosophers that a natural agent act for an end other than itself, but for itself as for an end – nor is it necessary that it be perfected by that end, but that it is naturally that end.

²¹⁸ Note by Scotus: “ Henry *Quodlibet* V question 4 makes two arguments, which are here:...”

265. Another response too is got from Avicenna, that just as water is of itself cold, and a consequent of this is that it makes cold something other than itself, so the first agent (if it is posited as a natural agent, according to them) will be perfect of itself, but consequent to its perfection would be ‘to produce perfection in another’, such that, however, the production of perfection in another is not its end, just as neither is it the end of water to make things cold.

266. This reason is turned back [by Henry] against these responses [nn.264-265], that if water could not remain in its coldness without its making something else cold, it would not be supremely perfect in coldness, because it would in its coldness depend in some way on another; the same here, then, as to the first cause in its own entity with respect to the entity of the first caused thing.

267. But this turning back of the argument is not very cogent, because, if water could produce a coldness standing by itself, Avicenna would say that however much it could not be cold in itself without its making something else cold, there would not for this reason be a dependence in its coldness but a complete perfection of coldness, from which perfection it would necessarily produce either cold in another or a cold standing by itself; and he would posit the same of the first being with respect to production in the case of other things.

268. Finally, it seems that this reason [of Henry’s, n.263] could be made clear in this way: every natural agent is perfected by its own action either in itself, or in something similar to it, or in the whole, or, by its production, its nature receives being in another.

For this appears by induction in all cases:

For the intellect, acting naturally, is perfected by its own action. Fire, acting naturally, is perfected in something similar to it and its nature has being in another thing in which that nature could exist even when the generating fire has ceased to be (and in this way there seems to be a necessity of generation in corruptible things, according to the remark in *On the Soul* 2.4.415b7 ‘generation is perpetual so that it may be kept being divine’). The sun generates a worm, and the sun, although it is not perfected in itself, nor does its nature receive being in another, yet it is perfected in the whole (insofar as the sun is part of the universe, some part of which universe is being produced), and the perfection of the whole seems in some way to be the perfection of the part. Although God the Father, in naturally producing the Son, is not perfected in himself nor in the whole (of which he may be a part, because he is part of nothing), yet his nature receives being in another supposit, or another supposit receives natural being.

This divided major [first paragraph of n.268] is plain, then, by induction, although it is difficult to assign the ‘why’ for this major; but if God were to produce creatures naturally, none of the following things would happen: for he would not be perfected in himself by such production, nor in something similar, nor in the whole, nor would his nature receive being in the product; therefore it is not the case that creatures are naturally produced.

269. A second reason posed against the philosophers [n.263] is that a power that has a respect to some object *per se* and essentially does not necessarily have a respect to the things that do not have an essential order – but an accidental one – to the first thing,²¹⁹

²¹⁹ Note by Scotus: “Anything else other than God has an essential order to him (although not conversely), hence it seems that the major should be taken in this way: ‘a power that necessarily has

because he who wills the end does not, for this reason, necessarily will another thing to be whose being is not necessary for attaining or retaining the end in itself; but the divine will has first a respect to the divine goodness, to which creatures have an accidental order, because neither are they necessary for attaining that goodness nor do they increase it; therefore the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to those creatures.

270. Although this reason [n.269] seems in itself in some way evident, yet it seems to contradict certain things said by the arguer [sc. Henry], because he posits that ‘the divine will, as it has a respect to things in their quidditative being, wills necessarily whatever it wills’, and yet things in quidditative being no more have an order to the divine goodness than things in the being of existence.

271. The reason also seems to have an instance against it that, just as the divine will has its own essence for first object, so also does the divine intellect; therefore the divine intellect too would accidentally have a respect to anything that it has a respect to for its object other than the divine essence, and so there would seem to follow that God would not necessarily know any intelligible other than himself, just as he does not will any willable other than himself.

272. The first instance [n.270], because it is not against the truth but against the one holding the opinion [Henry], I concede.

273. By excluding the second [n.271], I confirm the intended proposition [sc. against the philosophers] and the reason [n.269], because the will which is determined to the end is not determined to anything of what is for the end save insofar as, by a practical syllogism, the necessity of that thing for the end is deduced from the end, namely either its necessity in ‘being’ or in ‘being had’ for the purpose of having or attaining the end, – or its necessity in ‘being loved’, the way the end is loved or possessed. We see this in the case of all wills – which are of the end itself – because they would not, because of the end, need to be determined with respect to any entity for the end if such entity was not, by a practical syllogism, deduced to be necessary for the end in any of these ways [sc. those just mentioned]. Therefore, since the divine intellect does not know anything necessary for the ultimate end other than itself, there is no need that God’s will, from the fact that it is necessarily of the end, be in some way or other necessarily of something other than the end.

274. As for the instance about the intellect [n.271], it is not similar, because the fact that the intellect is necessarily in respect of some object does not make that object to be in its real being something other than the first object, because ‘to be known by the divine intellect’ does not make the known thing to exist in itself but to be present to the intellect or to be in the intellect as present; it is not so in the case of being willed, nay being willed makes then (or subsequently) the willed thing to have a being other than the will, and this when speaking of efficacious will, because something thus willed by God is

a respect to some first object is related necessarily to no other thing unless the object is the idea of necessarily tending to that other thing’; then the minor goes in this way: ‘the divine goodness is not the idea for the will of necessarily tending with efficacious volition to any other object, because neither is anything else necessary for attaining that goodness nor either does it increase it or along with it give more quiet to the will’; therefore etc.

But the ‘because’ [the one following the note in the text] is a proof about the volition of being well pleased, as about volition that is efficacious, – the confirmation about the practical syllogism, on which you rely [n.273], proves a similar conclusion; therefore either deny the necessity of each volition of the creature, or seek another special middle term.”

at some time in actual effect. The divine intellect, therefore, is not related to intelligibles other than itself in the way the will is related to other willables, because the intellect can be necessarily of other intelligibles – nay of all intelligibles – without them having a being other than divine being (insofar as they are present to it), nor by this is there posited that anything other than God is formally necessary in real existence; but the will could not be necessarily of other willable things unless these other things were at sometime necessary in some real existence other than divine existence.²²⁰

275. [Scotus' own reasons] – To these reasons of a certain doctor [Henry], in some way thus strengthened [nn.268, 273], I add other reasons.

And I first argue thus: an absolute being, supremely necessary – as much as anything can be thought to be necessary – cannot not exist, whatever else other than himself does not exist; God is supremely necessary, according to the understanding just accepted [sc. 'as much as anything can be thought to be necessary']; therefore, when whatever else other than him does not exist, it does not for this reason follow that he does not exist. But if he had a necessary relation to the first caused thing, then, when that caused thing does not exist, he would not exist; therefore he does not have to it a necessary relation.

276. I prove the major by the fact that the more impossible does not follow from the less impossible, just as neither does the more false follow from the less false; and I prove this because, if the more false has a double reason for its falsity and the less false has only one, we would isolate out by the more false the reason for falsity in which it exceeds the less false; with this other reason standing in place, the more false will be false, and the less false will not be false, because the reason for the falsity of the less false has been isolated out; therefore, on this supposition, the false will be the more false and the true will be the less false, and then from the true will follow the false;²²¹ and also from this it is then plain that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible. But such a necessary thing as has been described [n.275] is more necessary than any necessary thing other than it, even according to all the opinions of the

²²⁰ Note by Scotus: "Therefore can [the divine will] be necessarily well pleased in something displayed to it without wanting it to exist, as the intellect necessarily understands it without however understanding it to exist? I concede that it is similar on both sides, – and then when the minor is proved, namely that 'it is not required for attaining the end nor for increasing it' [n.269], the conclusion would hold equally against the willing of being well pleased as against efficacious willing; therefore the instance against him [sc. Henry] seems to be good, because it concedes that the divine will necessarily wills a thing in its quidditative being [n.270], since its proof 'from accidental order' is equally there [n.269] conclusive.

Let then the reasoning be formed as before [see footnote to n.269], and the minor [*ibid.*] is proved by the remark about the practical syllogism; which proof is conclusive about efficacious willing (as is plain), but not about the willing of being well pleased; the proof is that it concludes that the will, perfectly loving the first goodness, is well pleased in anything shown to it that participates that goodness, just as in the intellect the first object is the reason for necessarily tending to the second, because it manifests that it is in some way a participation of it."

²²¹ The argument as contained in the text does not seem to make sense, or to make a sense opposite to that required (although how the text is to be construed is dubious). The point, however, seems clear: if we posit that the less false is true, we are not thereby compelled to posit that the more false is true (for if the more false has lost the reason for falsity it shares with the less false, it has not lost the reason for falsity it has by itself). So likewise, if we posit the less impossible we are not thereby compelled to posit the more impossible.

philosophers; therefore from the non-existence of any other thing – which non-existence is less impossible – the non-existence of that which is more impossible does not follow.

277. I prove the other assumption, namely that ‘if he had a necessary relation, etc.’ [n.275], because what has a necessary relation to something does not exist when that relation does not exist, – but when the other extreme does not exist, the relation does not exist; therefore when the extreme of the relation does not exist, the foundation of the relation does not exist.

278. Against this reason there is an instance, that ‘the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed’ (*Physics* 2.9.200a20-22), and yet the principle seems to be formally of itself necessary; but the conclusion is not necessary save from the principle; therefore etc.

279. This instance is nothing, because the proof of the major remains, that from the less impossible does not follow the more impossible [n.276]. But neither is it similar in relation to the intended proposition, because the conclusion is only a certain partial truth of the principle (which principle has a total truth), just as a singular is as it were a certain partial truth in respect of the universal. But in beings ‘a caused being’ is not a certain ‘quasi-partial’ entity of a cause, but is altogether another thing, dependent on the entity of the cause. So although the principle is destroyed when the conclusion is destroyed, it will not be so with the entity in the cause and in the caused.

280. But, to make this point ‘about the principle and the conclusion’ better understood, some examples can be given. First a conclusion of geometry, that the fact the sides of a triangle constructed in such and such a way are equal seems to be only a certain particular instance of this universal ‘all the lines drawn from the center to the circumference are equal’, – and so in many other cases, the conclusion seems only a particular or a less universal, or one of many things from which it is at the same time inferred, just as if we were to join to the universal mentioned this universal ‘things equal to the same thing are equal to each other’; and although the predicate belongs first, that is, adequately, to the subject of the universal, yet it does not belong first, with such primacy, to the less universal subject. Nor is it the case that, because of primacy in the principle and non-primacy in the conclusion, such causality in the principle with respect to the conclusion is, in the case of beings, the sort of causality of one being with respect to another, such that ‘causality in the principle’ posits in the conclusion a truth formally different from the truth of the principle in the same way as in beings the entity of the cause is formally different from the entity of the thing caused. Now the primacy of the predication is because of the primacy of the terms, and although special terms are not adequate to the predicates, yet the attribution of the predicate to the special terms taken particularly is included in the attribution of the same predicate to the common terms taken universally; included, I say, as some part of that truth.²²²

281. Second, I argue thus: something happens contingently in beings, therefore the first cause causes contingently.²²³

²²² Note of Scotus: “On the contrary: therefore there is no necessary propositional truth other than the truths of the first principles, which seems discordant; again it is against you, who above adduce, against them on Aristotle’s behalf, the statement that ‘the conclusion has a caused necessary truth’ [nn.239, 252].”

²²³ Note by Scotus: “This reason and the two following [nn.283, 286] are not valid against the philosophers, but they are valid for us later in the matter of ‘future contingents’ [d.39, which however is lacking in the *Ordinatio* and so the equivalent discussions in the *Reportatio* and *Lectura* must be

282. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers.²²⁴ The consequence I prove in this way: if the first cause is necessarily related to the cause next to it, let the next cause be *b*, – therefore *b* is necessarily moved by the first cause; but in the same way that *b* is moved by the first cause, it moves the cause next to it, – therefore *b* causes necessarily when moving *c*, and *c* when moving *d*, and, by thus proceeding with all causes, nothing will exist contingently if the first cause causes necessarily. – This reasoning was handled in distinction 2 question 1 ‘On the Infinity of God’, in the argument proving that God is formally intelligent [I d.2 n.149], and so there is no need to dwell on it further.

283. Further, and it comes back to the same: something evil happens in the universe, therefore God does not cause necessarily.

284. The antecedent is conceded by the philosophers. And the consequence I prove by the fact that a cause acting necessarily produces its effect necessarily in what receives the effect insofar as the effect can in it be produced; the effect of the First thing is goodness and perfection; therefore, if it acts necessarily, it necessarily produces in anything at all as much goodness as that receptive thing can receive. But what has as much goodness as it is capable of has no malice; therefore etc.

285. Although there could be a way out of this argument about evil in nature – as was touched on in the aforementioned question of distinction 2 [n.282] – yet a way out of it about evil done contingently, namely the evil that is blameworthy, does not seem possible, but rather, if any such evil as is blameworthy happens, and if from this it follows that it happens contingently, then the first cause does not necessarily cause, as this deduction shows.²²⁵

286. Again, an agent acting necessarily acts according to the utmost of its power, for, just as acting and not acting is not in its power, so neither is acting intensely or lightly in its power; therefore if the first cause necessarily causes, it causes whatever it can cause; but it can cause of itself everything causable, as I will prove [n.288] – therefore it causes everything causable; therefore no second cause causes anything.²²⁶

287. I prove this second consequence because a prior cause naturally has a respect to the caused before a later cause does, from the first position in the book *On Causes* [of ps.-Aristotle = from Proclus’ *Elements of Theology*]; therefore in the case of the prior cause, if it causes totally, it causes the whole of what in the second moment should be caused by the second cause, and so in the second moment, in which the second cause

looked at instead]; for if the first cause is omnipotent, then it does not will necessarily any possible; the consequence is proved by these three reasons.”

²²⁴ Note by Scotus: “Response: the antecedent is true precisely of what depends on our will in order to come about; for there is nothing else they can say happens contingently. – About our acts there is the same difficulty for them as for you, namely whether our will moves moved by the First thing – except that you can save contingency in its motion from the First, but they cannot, as is here argued” [nn.285, 287].

²²⁵ Vatican editors: “if evil happens contingently and is blameworthy, it is possible for it not to be done when it is done, because if it is necessary then it will not be blameworthy” [*Lectura* I d.8 n.258].

²²⁶ Note by Scotus: “This reason and the following one ‘about what moves in no time’ [n.290] are solved later [footnote to n.290], where the intention of Aristotle is proved that [God] can only be the proximate cause of intelligence and that he is called the ‘remote’ cause of motion and of other things, insofar as he gives being to the first mover [sc. the first mover after God]; each reason then [nn.286, 290] proceeds badly against the Philosopher, as if God could immediately move anything besides the intelligence, one or all, that he causes” [footnote to n. 255].

should cause, no action will be possible for the second cause, because the total effect caused by the first cause is already presupposed.

288. The assumption in this argument, namely that ‘it causes everything causable’ [n.286], I prove from this, that it has the power of any second cause whatever, even the total power that exists in the second cause, as far as whatever perfection of causality there is in any second cause,²²⁷ as was deduced in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [n.282], in the first way, taken from effectiveness [I d.2 n.120]; now there is not required along with the efficient cause any imperfection but only perfection, because to cause effectively is a matter of perfection simply,²²⁸ therefore the First thing, possessing in itself all the causality of the second cause, as regards anything of perfection, can immediately cause of itself everything causable just as it also can along with the second cause.

289. And if the final consequence, namely that second causes are deprived of their actions, is not held to be discordant, I reduce it to a greater discordance, that [the first cause] will cause both everything and only one thing, such that everything will be only one thing, – because just as it will cause all causables, on account of its causing everything that it can cause, so also in any causation it will cause as much as it can cause, and so something most perfect, and thus all the causables will be that single caused thing, and in that case everything will be one.

290. Also through the same middle term ‘from the necessity of causing and with the utmost of causation’ it follows that it will move in non-time, or at any rate it will change the heavens in non-time, so that the heavens will be moved in non-time.²²⁹

²²⁷ Note by Scotus: “I concede this, but of the way of eminence. The power of the second cause is also required as proximate, because the first cause itself is of a nature to be, as it were eminently, in a remote cause. – When the statement ‘now there is not required along with the efficient cause, etc.’ [sc. the next statement in the text] is taken, I say that some formal perfection that is more imperfect is required eminently, such that the same perfection when eminently possessed cannot be the proximate idea of producing. Nor yet is the imperfection in the proximate cause *per se* the idea of acting, but such perfection (which yet is an imperfection) is the idea of thus acting, namely for the proximate thing, – which proximate thing is to act imperfectly; the other perfection, the more eminent one, is the idea of acting remotely, – which is to act more perfectly.”

²²⁸ Note by Scotus: “It is not true of ‘to cause immediately’, but this is a mark of some sort of perfection along with imperfection; but to cause first, and as a result mediately, is a mark of perfection.”

²²⁹ Note by Scotus: “In a second way: it can be said to the discordance ‘that the First thing will move the heavens in an instant’ that this does not follow, because the body is not susceptible of motion in the ‘now’; therefore no power at all is able to do this. The point is clear precisely about motion in a circle, because, if it go round in a ‘now’, any part of the moved thing is in the same place as it was before, otherwise, if some part do not return wholly to the same place and reach it afterwards – when the circular motion is complete –, then the circular motion was in time. So it follows that, if it go round in the ‘now’, in that ‘now’ any part is in the same place it was before, from which it follows that it is altogether not moved, because it remains altogether in the same ‘where’ and place, both as to the whole and as to the parts. Therefore to go round in a ‘now’ is not to go round, and altogether not to change.

This second reason well proves that, by not positing a conjoined mover, the First thing (even if it has infinite power) cannot move the sphere round in a ‘now’, – but not in time either, because of Aristotle’s proof, that then a finite virtue or power would move it ‘in an equal time’ [*Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6]; from which points it follows that an infinite power cannot immediately move the sphere round, and yet we see the sphere moving round. So this seems to be Averroes’ necessity [*Metaphysics* XII com.41] for positing a conjoined mover (that is an immediate and finite mover),

291. Nor is the response valid that was touched on above, in the aforementioned question ‘On Infinity’ [nn.282, 288], because infinite virtue has all the perfection of the efficient cause in itself that it has along with the second and proximate cause, and so the consequence is that it can immediately cause *per se* in the heavens the whole effect that it can cause along with the intelligence;²³⁰ therefore it also causes, if it acts necessarily, whatever it is capable of, – and further, if it causes immediately, then it also causes change in non-time, because an infinite power, acting according to the utmost of its power, cannot act in time; and if so, then there is no generation and corruption in the things down here, which is contrary to the philosophers; therefore, the premises from which these conclusions follow are false according to the Philosophers.

C. Scotus’ Own Opinion

292. To the question, as to the exposition of the negative part of it [sc. that nothing other than God is immutable, n.230], I reply: I concede the conclusions of those arguments [nn.275-291, 273, 268], although perhaps some of them would not so convince the philosophers that they could not reply, yet they are more probable than those adduced on behalf of the philosophers [nn.259-262], and some perhaps are necessary.

293. I say however, as to this part, that nothing else is immutable when speaking of the change that is called ‘turning’ [n.229], because nothing else is formally necessary.

without which the First thing would move nothing in spherical motion, for it can only act mediately, on account of its perfection and the effect’s imperfection, between which a mediating proximate cause is required.

Against this. I ask what is it for the First thing to move mediately? Either because it has produced a proximate moving cause, to which it has, by giving being, given a finite moving power, – Or if the second thing exists of itself, the First thing gives it virtue or some influence by which it causes motion, – Or, third, the First and the second thing cause the same effect in a certain order without the second cause receiving anything from the first cause. If the third, it follows that a finite power without another second cause will move in a time equal to the infinite power moving along with a second cause; if the second, it follows that the ‘influx’ is different from the nature of the second cause; therefore if it be denied, against the third answer, that the First thing has motion ‘for proximate effect’, and, against the second, that in no intelligence is the ‘influx’ an accident, the first answer must be said to be of the mind of Aristotle, and is what Avicenna expounds [*Metaphysics* XI ch.4 (104vb-105ra)] ‘on the order of the intelligences’. [Cf. *Lectura* I d.8 n.236: “Therefore Avicenna’s exposition of the Philosopher is most beautiful and better than all the rest, as to how many things can be produced without change in the First thing, by positing that only one thing is produced by the First, and so on.”] And then the infinity of the motion is reduced to the First thing, because the infinity of duration of the second cause is from the first cause always moving it, just as the Son is always generated, – but the First is of itself of infinite duration; but the succession is reduced to the finite virtue of the proximate mover, such that for no other reason is the first mover there save for giving being to the mover. Thus are well saved the first efficient and the final end (because the final end is loved by the mover for its own sake), but the first mover is saved only as a remote mover, that is by giving being to the mover.”

²³⁰ Note by Scotus: “Again, the second cause does not take away the first’s proper mode of causing. – Response: its proper mode of causing is to cause through the medium of the second cause, and not immediately; again, the primacy of adequacy includes the whole order of the many things to which the cause extends itself (it is here just as you say it is elsewhere [I d.28 q.3 n.11] about the primacy of the three persons to the essence, and about the other immediacy of the first person to the essence), and then the first cause, when it is posited, is in proximate potency to the second, and then it acts as much as it can act.”

For anything else whatever is mutable subjectively, save because of negative imperfection; for example, a final accident, which is capable of no perfection because of its own imperfection (as suppose it is a relation), is not mutable subjectively, because it cannot be the subject of anything, namely because it is imperfect negatively, that is, not capable of any perfection. But nothing other than God is, because of its own perfection, immutable, because if anything were such it would most of all be the first intelligence. But that intelligence is mutable from intellection to intellection; proof: for it can have intellection of any intelligible, because our intellect can have this, – but not one intellection of everything (from I d.2 nn.101, 125-129), nor an infinite number of intellections of all intelligibles, because then an intellect possessing all of them at once in act distinctly would seem to be infinite; therefore it can have intellection of one intelligible after another intelligible and after the intellection of another intelligible; therefore it is mutable.

III. To the Arguments

A. To the Principal Argument

294. To the arguments set down on behalf of the opinion of the philosophers [sc. that something else besides God is immutable, n.223].

As to what they argue about an ancient change in the First thing if the First thing is not necessarily related to what is next to it [n.223], I reply that a new effect could come about from an ancient will without any change of will. Just as I, by that same continued will of mine by which I wish something to be done, will then do it at the ‘when’ at which I will to do it, so God in his eternity wished something other than himself to be at some time and then created it at the ‘when’ at which he willed it to be.

295. And if you object, according to Averroes *Physics* VIII com.4, that he will at least be waiting for time, if he does not at once put the effect into being when he wishes it to be; –

296. – and in addition to this, according to Averroes elsewhere, a thing indeterminate by contingency posits such indeterminacy as to either eventuality, because what is thus indeterminate cannot of itself, as it seems, proceed to act; therefore if there is in God such contingency as to causing, he does not seem able of himself to be determined to causing.

297. To the first [n.295] I reply. Something existing and willing in time either wills with most efficacious volition, not having regard to the time for which it wills, – or it wills the thing to be for some definite time. If in the first way, it would at once put the willed thing into being if its will is perfectly powerful. If in the second way, to posit that its will were simply powerful would yet not put the thing at once into being but only at the time when it wanted the thing to be; it would wait then for time, because the thing is in time. – But when we apply this to God we must remove the imperfections. For neither is his will impotent nor does it have being in time so that it should wait for the time at which to produce the thing willed; which thing it does not will to be necessarily then when it wills, but it wills it for a determinate time; but it does not wait for the time, because the operation of his will is not in time.

298. And when Averroes speaks second ‘about the indeterminacy of a cause causing contingently’ [n.296], there was discussion elsewhere [I d.7 nn.20-21] about double indeterminacy, namely of passive power and of active unlimited power. For God was not indeterminate as to causing with the first indeterminacy but with the second, and this not to several disparate things (to each of which he is naturally determined) in the way the sun is related to the many effects it is capable of, but he is indeterminate to contradictories, to each of which he could be of his liberty determined. So too our will is indeterminate in this way, virtually, with indetermination of active power as to either contradictory, and it can of itself be determined to this or that.

299. And if you ask why the divine will, then, will be more determined to one contradictory than to the other, I reply: ‘it is a mark of lack of education to seek causes and demonstration for everything’ (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a5-8, 6.1011a8-13), ‘for there is not demonstration of a principle of demonstration’. But it is a thing immediate that the will wills this thing, such that there is no cause intermediate between these terms, just as it is a thing immediate that heat heats (but here it is a matter of nature, there of freedom), and so of this ‘why the will wills’ there is no cause save that the will is the will, just as of this ‘why heat heats’ there is no cause other than that heat is heat, because there is no prior cause.

300. And if you say ‘how can there be immediacy here, since there is contingency to either result?’, there was discussion elsewhere in the question ‘On the subject of theology’ [*Prol.* n.169], that in contingent things there is some first thing which is immediate and yet contingent, because no stand is made at something necessary (for the contingent does not follow from the necessary), and so it is necessary here to make a stand at this proposition ‘the will of God wills this’, which is contingent and yet immediate, because no other cause is prior to the reason of the will as to why it is of this and not of something else. – By this is apparent the answer to what Averroes adduces, that ‘his own action is in him by his essence’ and is not in him accidentally; it is true that his willing is his essence, yet his willing contingently passes to this object and to that, as will be said later ‘about future contingents’ [I d.39, see footnote to n.281].

301. By this the answer to the principal argument [n.223] is plain, that with the necessity of God stands the fact that what he is immediately related to is mutable, because ‘immediately from the immutable’ is mutable without change of the immutable, because the relation of the immutable to what is next to it is mutable; and therefore the extreme of that relation is contingent and mutable, although the foundation is immutable.

B. To the Reasons for the Intention of the Philosophers

302. To the arguments posited for the philosophers [sc. that the first cause necessarily causes, nn.259-262].

To the first, about ‘the things that divide being’ [n.259], I say that ‘necessary’ is a more perfect condition (than ‘possible’) in any being for which the condition of necessity is possible; but it is not more perfect in that being with which it is not compossible, because a contradiction does not posit any perfection, and this is not from its own nature but from the nature of the being with which it is repugnant. And so I say that necessity is repugnant in every respect to what is posterior, because, from the fact that every posterior is non-necessary, the first thing cannot have a necessary relation to any of them.

303. And when you say that ‘all of the more perfect dividers of being are concomitant with each other’ [n.260], I say that this is true of the dividers that state a perfection simply and in themselves (as are act, infinity, and the like), but not of those that state a respect to something posterior, because to have a necessary relation to something of that sort is not a mark of perfection, because it does not stand with the perfect necessity of that which is said to have such a relation; the confirmation of this is that such a relation is not formally infinite, although however infinity is the more noble extreme in the division of being.

304. To the other remark, when it is said ‘if it causes naturally, it would necessarily cause and would then give necessity to the product etc.’ [n.261], I say that it does then follow that it would cause necessarily, just as from an antecedent that includes impossibles follows a consequent that includes impossibles; for in the antecedent that mode ‘naturally’ is repugnant to ‘what it is to cause’, because ‘to cause’ states the production of something diverse in essence, and so of something contingent, but ‘naturally’ states a necessary mode of causing and thus a mode of causing in respect of something necessary; and therefore the consequent follows which includes two opposites at the same time, by reason of the causation and of the mode of causing. It is in this way that the first proposition is true. – And when you add ‘no perfection is taken from the caused because of the more perfect mode of causing of the cause itself’, I concede it; nor does the mode of causing ‘voluntarily’ take from the causable any perfection that is possible for it, but it takes necessity from the causable (which is in itself a perfection, but one impossible with the causable), and it gives the caused the perfection compossible with it, just as ‘voluntarily’ in creation states a mode compossible with causation.

305. By this is apparent the response to the confirmation about the many producible differences of being [n.261]; I say that causable being cannot have those several differences, necessary and possible, but every causable being is only possible; and therefore it is not a mark of perfection in the cause to be able to cause those several differences, because there is no power for what is impossible, – likewise, if it were *per impossibile* to cause necessarily, it would also therefore necessarily not cause several differences of being, because it would produce only necessary things and not contingent ones.

306. To the final one [n.262] I say that no natural connection of cause and caused is simply necessary in creatures, nor does any second cause cause simply naturally or simply necessarily but only in a certain respect. The first part is clear, because any second cause depends on the relation of the first cause to the caused; likewise, no second cause causes save by the first cause causing the caused along with it, and this naturally before the proximate cause causes; but the first cause only causes contingently, therefore the second cause causes simply contingently because it depends on the causation of the first, which causation is simply contingent. The second part, namely about necessity in a certain respect, is plain, because many natural causes, as far as concerns themselves, cannot not cause their effects, and so there is necessity in a certain respect – namely as far as concerns themselves – and not simply; just as fire, as far as concerns itself, cannot not heat, yet, with God cooperating, it can absolutely not heat, as is clear, and as was clear about the three boys in the furnace [*Daniel* 3.49-50].

Book One

Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Generation of the Son in Divine Reality is Eternal

1. About the ninth distinction I ask whether the generation of the Son in divine reality is eternal.

Argument that it is not:

Because where being and duration are the same thing, if anything is principle of the being it is also principle of the duration; but the Father is principle of the being of the Son, because he is principle “of the whole deity” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29; therefore he is principle of the duration of the Son.

2. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25: “it is a mark of imperfection in our word that it is formable before it is formed,” therefore it seems a mark of imperfection in a word that it is in a state of ‘being formed’; therefore this does not belong to the divine Word.

3. Further, if the generation of the Son is always, or eternal, then the Son is always being generated; therefore he has never been generated, and so he is never Son. – These consequences are proved through Augustine *On 83 Diverse Questions* q.37: “What is always being born has never been born,” – further, “what has never been born is never son,” therefore if the Son is always being born, he is never Son.

4. To the opposite:

Ambrose *On the Faith* I ch.9 nn.59-60, and it is in the text [of Lombard’s *Sentences*]: “If God first existed and afterwards generated, he was, by the accession of generation, changed; may God avert this madness.” Therefore he always had the Son.

5. Likewise the authority of Hilary [*On the Trinity* XII n.21] in the text: “between being generated and having been generated there is no intermediate,” namely of duration. If therefore it is proper to the Father to have always generated, it is proper to the Son that he has always been generated.

I. Solution of the Question

6. To the question I say yes, because generation is there not under the idea of change (as was said above in distinction 5 question 2 [d.5 n.87]), and therefore it does not have terms corresponding to the terms of generation-change, namely existence after non-existence (that is, being differently disposed now than before, and, because of these terms, eternity is repugnant to generation-change, because they cannot be at the same time; so there is one thing after another, and so no eternity); but there is there only generation-production in the being of substance by way of nature.

7. From this I show that it is eternal, because a sufficient agent (that is, dependent on nothing), and one producing by way of nature, has a production coeval with it – and

also a perfect product – if it does not act by motion; the Father generating is such an agent; therefore he has a production coeval with him, and also a thing generated.

8. The major is plain, because that a producer should precede its production is – as it seems – not possible except because either the acting and not acting is in its power, or because, although it is of itself determined to act, yet it can be impeded through lack of something on which it would depend in its acting. All these conditions exclude what was posited in the major, namely being a sufficient agent and producing naturally; also if, with these conditions not posited, the producer should precede its product, this would be because the product is produced through motion; therefore, with these conditions and motion removed, not only is the production coeval with it (namely with the producer), but the product too.

9. The minor is clear as to all the conditions, because the Father generating generates naturally, and he is altogether the first producer, – therefore dependent on nothing in producing; and he in no way communicates his nature through motion, because there can be no motion in that nature.

10. On this reason [n.7] stands the example of Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.1 n.1, about fire and brightness, that ‘if fire were eternal, it would have a brightness coeval and coeternal with it’.

I make this example clear as follows: when the natures of the more common and the less common come together in something, whatever in it follows *per se* the nature of the more common also follows when it is found without the nature of the less common (this is clear about all common things that have their own properties, and about all that is inferior to them); therefore, if the nature of what causes naturally and the nature of what produces naturally come together in a creature, whatever follows the creature by nature of the more common, which is the ‘to produce naturally’, follows it also when it is found without the causing naturally. But that fire have a brightness coeval with it does not follow it precisely for the fact that it causes naturally but for the fact that it produces naturally, because if, *per impossibile*, it did not cause but did produce, such that there would, along with the fire, be a brightness of the same nature, the brightness would be no less coeval. Therefore, where there is truly the nature of what produces naturally without the nature of what causes naturally, as is the case in divine reality, there it truly follows that the producer has a product naturally coeval with it.

11. There is also a confirmation of this solution [nn.6-10], if one takes whatever of perfection is, or is found, scattered about in the generations of diverse creatures, and if one leaves out what there is of imperfection; in the generations of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and a matter of imperfection that they do not abide but have only an existence in the flow of one part after another; in the generation of permanent things, it is matter of perfection that they abide, and of imperfection that they are not when they are coming to be (because this posits imperfection in the maker, that it is not a maker of what is perfect, – likewise in the thing made, that it necessarily has existence after non-existence); in the indivisible parts of successive things it is a matter of perfection that when they are coming to be they are, and that they are all at the same time, but of imperfection that they rapidly pass away. Adding together the perfections, one will have ‘a generated’ that at the same time ‘will be generated’ and ‘will be’ and ‘will permanently be’, that is: the generated is generated and

exists perfectly in a perfect stationary ‘now’ (which is the ‘now’ of eternity), and this is the intended proposition.

II. To the Principal Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.1] I say that ‘principle’ is said in many ways (as is clear in *Metaphysics* 5.1.1012b34-1013a23), and, if it be taken in the same way, one can well concede that, if it is the principle of anything, it is the principle of what is the same as it. But ‘principle’ is not wont to be construed with the ‘of duration’ in the sense of a principle of origin, but only in the sense of a principle that is as it were the term of the ‘from which’ of the duration, just as an instant is said to be the principle of time; and, whether this comes from the use or from the power of the words, one should not concede this proposition ‘the Father is the principle of the duration of the Son’ without further determination – but one could well concede this proposition ‘the Father is the origivative principle of the eternity of the Son’.

13. When, therefore, you argue on the basis of the identity of being and duration, because ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’ [n.1], – I concede it if ‘principle’ is taken uniformly with respect to being and duration. But ‘principle’ is not construed with the ‘of duration’ under the idea of such a principle as that under the idea of which principle is construed with ‘being’, because in respect of being it is an origivative principle, and so the consequence does not follow, but there is a fallacy of equivocation or of amphiboly;²³¹ but in order for the consequence to hold, one must determine principle in the consequent by the terms ‘originating’ and ‘original’, – in this way: ‘the Father is the original principle of the duration of the Son’, which I concede, as has been said [n.12].

14. To the second [n.2] I say that our word is in a state of becoming in two ways; in one way it is in the becoming which is the proper generation of the word itself, in another way it is in the becoming which is the investigation preceding the generation (which investigation Augustine calls ‘flowing cogitation’). But that our word is in a state of becoming in this second way is a matter of imperfection both on the part of the word, because it posits novelty, and on the part of our intellect, because it posits imperfect causality, – and in this way the divine Word is not in a state of becoming; and therefore Augustine concedes that our word is formed by cogitation, so that it is, in the preceding investigation, formable before it is formed. But that our word is in a state of becoming as to generation is not a matter of imperfection in it; nay this is necessary for the *per se* idea of a word (and it will also exist in the fatherland), and so it is not a matter of imperfection in the eternal Word that it is always in a state of becoming, that is, of being begotten without investigation preceding.

15. To the third [n.3] I say that Augustine seems to deny that the Son is always being born (in the aforementioned question [n.3]), although however Origen says the opposite (as the Master [Lombard] says in the text) on the verse of *Jeremiah* 11.9-10: “There is found...” [Origen *Homilies on Jeremiah* IX n.4], and also Gregory *Moralia*

²³¹ I.e. in the proposition ‘whatever is principle of being is principle of duration’, which seems to be a particular case of the general proposition ‘whatever is principle of the one is principle of the other’, there is in fact an equivocation in the term ‘principle’ or in the phrase ‘principle of’, so that the particular proposition is not in fact a case of the universal proposition, but is instead a fallacy.

XXIX ch.19 n.36 on the verse of *Job* 38.21: “Did you know when you would be born...?” – Can it be that they are contradicting themselves? – I reply. Gregory in the *Moralia* passage seems to be saying things with which what has been said can be made to agree: “We cannot,” he says, “assert that he is always being born, lest he seem to be something imperfect.” He says ‘lest he seem to be something imperfect’; he did not say ‘it is an imperfection if he is said to be always being born’, but he said ‘imperfection seems to be signified’, – that is, this way of speaking does not signify that the generation is as perfect as is signified by this statement ‘he is always born’; for this ‘he is always born’ is more expressive of the truth than is ‘he is always being born’, although both are true.

16. To understand this one must know that verbs of any tense are said truly of God, whether they signify personal or essential acts. The fact is plain from Augustine [*On the Gospel of John* tr.99 nn.4-5] on *John* 16.13: “For he will not speak of himself but whatever he will hear that will he speak.” Augustine says about the Spirit ‘whatever he will hear’, because indeed the Spirit has heard and hears, because the hearing of the Holy Spirit is his proceeding from the Father and the Son; and, consequently, that ‘he will hear’, has heard, and hears, just as he knows and has known and will know. Therefore Augustine himself wants the verbs of all tenses to be truly said of God, and the thing is clear from what the Master [Lombard] adduces [I d.8 ch.1 n.80].

17. But what do these verbs of diverse tenses signify when they are said of God? – I reply. They can more properly be said to co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity than differences of time; and yet they do not signify the ‘now’ absolutely, because then there would be no variation of diverse modes of signifying time, but they signify it insofar as it coexists with the parts of time, as when one says, ‘God has generated’, the ‘now’ of eternity is co-signified, so that the sense is that God has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as that ‘now’ was co-existent with the past, – when one says, ‘God generates’, this means he has an act of generation in the ‘now’ of eternity insofar as it coexists with the present. From this is plain that, since the ‘now’ truly coexists with any difference of time, we assert truly of God the differences of all the tenses.

More expressly however – according to blessed Gregory – is the truth of divine generation signified by this statement ‘he is always born’ than by the statement ‘he is always being born’; because by the ‘is born’ is the nativity signified as perfect, by the ‘always’ is it signified as perfect with every difference or part of time, and thus it is not only signified to coexist with every part of time (as is signified by this statement ‘he is always being generated’), but it is also signified to coexist with every part of time under the idea of being perfect, and in this way does the truth of this procession seem to be most truly signified.

Book One

Tenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the Act and Mode of the Will

1. About the tenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is produced through the act and mode of the will.

That he is not:

Because nature is “a force implanted in things, procreating similars from similars” [John the German, *Gloss on the Decretum* p.1 d.1 ch.7], according to the common description of nature; the Holy Spirit is like what produces him; therefore he is produced by nature, not by will.

2. Again, Averroes *Physics* VIII com.46 means there to be for one nature only one mode of communicating; therefore if the divine nature is communicated by act of nature, it will not be communicated by act of will.

3. Further, the will is a power of acting in creatures, so it is not a power of making; therefore similarly in God: if the will is an operative power it does not seem to be a productive power. – The proof of the consequence is that as the acting and making powers are disposed in creatures, so the operative and productive powers are disposed in God. For just as the acting power has an immanent act and presupposes its object, and just as the making power has a produced object and an act that passes beyond the maker, so in divine reality the act of operative power is immanent, and the act of the productive power is not immanent, – but the operative power presupposes its object, while the productive power does not presuppose its term.

4. Again, nothing is produced by an act of will unless it is first known, from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50. Therefore if the Holy Spirit is produced in this way, he will be known before he is produced, and then he would be known by the Father and the Son in a non-intuitive cognition, because the knowledge had of him insofar as he is known before he is produced does not seem to be intuitive, because intuitive knowledge is only of a thing as it is present in itself and existent; therefore it is discordant for the Holy Spirit to be known non-intuitively by the Father and the Son.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: the Holy Spirit exited from the Father and the Son “not as in some way born but as in some way given;” to exit by way of given and gift belongs to the producer by act of will, whose property it is to give, or donate, of its liberality.

I. Solution of the Question

6. I say yes to the question.

The proof is that there is will in God, – as was evident from question 1 of distinction 2, and also from the question about attributes in distinction 8 [I d.2 nn.75-88, d.8 nn.177-217].

7. For it is plain from this that God is blessed from his nature; but beatitude is not without the will, or without an act of will.

8. Also the will exists in him under the idea of productive principle, because productive principles, from the fact that they do not of themselves state an imperfection, are reduced to some single perfect thing, or to as small a number of perfect things as they can be reduced to; but they cannot all be reduced to a single principle – whether productive or active – because that single thing would have the determinate mode of acting of one or other of them, namely of nature or of will, because between these modes of producing there is no intermediate mode; therefore these principles cannot be reduced to a fewer number than two, namely of principles productive by way of nature and by way of will. And since the things at which, as at things perfect, this whole reduction of principles stops are simply perfect, both of these principles are posited in their proper idea in God as he is a producing principle [I d.2 nn.305-309].

9. And from these further. In whatever there is some principle which, of its idea, is a productive principle, in that thing the principle, if it is in it without imperfection and is not understood to have already some product simply adequate to it, will be a productive principle; in God, as has been proved [d.8 nn.177-217], there is will formally from the nature of the thing, and this under the idea of a productive principle free in respect of love, and it is plain it is there without imperfection; therefore in God there will be a principle of producing love, and this in proportion to his perfection, such that, just as a created will is as great a principle of producing love as is the love it can love the object with (which is called adequate love), so this [divine] will is as great a principle of producing love as it is of a nature to love an infinite object; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is of a nature to be a principle of producing infinite love, – but nothing is infinite save the divine essence itself, therefore that love is the divine essence. Now the love produced is not of a nature to be an inherent form, because there is nothing such in divine reality; therefore it is *per se* subsistent, – and not the same subsistent thing as the producer, because nothing produces itself, Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore it is distinct in person; this person I call ‘the Holy Spirit’, because the Son (as is plain from d.6 nn.16, 20, 27) is not produced in this way but by act of nature or of intellect, – therefore etc.²³²

²³² Note by Scotus: “Every perfect productive principle, when some supposit possesses it perfectly, can be a principle of producing (or thus: for every perfect productive principle some supposit, perfectly possessing it, can produce) a term that is adequate in comparison with the presented object; a perfect will, having a perfect or first object actually presented to it, is a perfect productive principle of as much love as such an object should, by such a will, be loved by; therefore etc. But such a will exists in a divine person, therefore some divine person can produce a love adequate to that will. – This is sufficient here; hence here there is nothing about ‘prior’, but in distinction 11 – because ‘the Son inspirits’ – the point about ‘prior’ is required [sc. there is no need to add here ‘prior to the term being produced’, as there is later in I d.11 q.1 n.2]. This minor of the first syllogism does not assert, nor does it deny, anything about a second object [sc. a secondary or finite object], but it asserts what is certain, namely about the first object. Thus are here solved all the doubts [nn.10-12], for from the minor is inferred that an infinite will, having an infinite object present to it, is a productive principle of infinite love, because with that much love should an infinite object be loved (this is certain, whatever may hold of a secondary object, because it loves it with all its effort, if it is a

II. Doubts

10. Here, however, there are three doubts.

The first about how the will can be this principle of communicating nature, since it is not so in creatures.

11. The second about how the will might be a principle also of producing necessarily, and what necessity is necessarily required in this production.

12. Third about how, if the production is necessary, it is not by way of nature but is distinct from nature and free.

A. Response of Henry [of Ghent] to the Two First Doubts

13. [To the first doubt] – As to the first doubt [n.10] it is said [by Henry] that “nature in divine reality is said in four ways:

In one way nature is called the divine essence itself, in which the three persons consist, – and in this way nature is said purely essentially.

14. In a second way nature is called the active natural principle, – and in this way nature is the productive force ‘of similar from similar’; and thus the power in the Father of generating actively is nature, and thus it is an essential feature contracted to a notional one, because it is the divine essence itself as said in the first way; for nature, which is the divine essence itself as it exists under the property of the Father determined to an act of generation, is the active power of generating, existing in the Father alone. – And these two modes of nature are touched on by Hilary *On the Trinity* V n.37 when he says of the Son ‘from the virtue of nature into the same nature, by nativity, does he subsist.’

15. In a third way nature is said to be any force naturally existing in nature said in the first way, which yet, although the force is free, can in this way be called nature, – and thus the will in God is nature, namely because it is a natural power existing naturally in the divine nature.

16. In a fourth way nature is said to be unchangeable necessity about some act.”

17. As to the intended proposition, it is said that nature in the third way is called the principle of inspiriting, because the will is the elicitive force of inspiriting “as it is free and freely acting.” In the fourth way it concurs with the will, in the first way it concurs “not elicitive but only subjectively,” in the second way it does not concur at all.

18. From these it is, as to the intended proposition, said that “neither the intellect nor the will, in the idea in which they are simply intellect and will, are elicitive principles of notional acts (by which is produced a thing similar in natural form to the very

correct will), or in another way, because it can love with that much love, – this is what the minor says; therefore the will loves. This follows from what is maintained later [n.48] ‘about the necessity of the act with respect to the object’, because, in the case of a necessary thing, what can be is. And thus is the first doubt [n.10] solved, about how it is a principle of communicating nature. – The second doubt [n.11] is solved by adding to the minor ‘an infinite perfect will, with respect to a present object that must necessarily be loved by it, is a necessary principle of producing as much love as such an object should by it be loved by’; therefore the will, with respect to a present infinite object is a principle necessarily productive of infinite love. Once it has been proved that that object must necessarily be loved by the will, and with that much love, this one minor proposition contains everything, both ‘necessary’ and ‘infinite’, – both in the ‘communication of nature’ and in the ‘inspiriting of a divine person’.”

producer), because then, in whatever they would exist, they would be elicitive principles of acts by which would be produced a similar thing in natural form to the very producer, and this is false in the case of creatures. For in divine reality they are only elicitive principles of natural acts as these exist in the divine nature, and, as such, they have in themselves a certain naturalness for notional productions.

19. It was according to this, then, that we [sc. Henry] said in a certain question ‘About emanations in general’ that the intellect and will, as they are simply intellect and will – namely as acting in an intellectual and voluntary way – are only elicitive principles of essential acts (which are those of to understand and to will), although this is passively on the part of the intellect and actively on the part of the will; but as they are nature and active principles naturally elicitive of acts, they are elicitive principles of notional acts (which are those of to generate and to inspire), and this ‘by the necessity of naturalness, whereby it is impossible for God, by the principles that are nature in him, not to elicit these sorts of acts.’

20. To make this clear, one must know that the principles have this naturalness from the divine nature (in which intellect and will are), but in different ways, – since the divine intellect has naturalness by being coincident with divine nature in idea of nature, which is the principal elicitive idea of the notional act (and this according to the aforesaid mode of nature), so that this naturalness is altogether first, and the idea of intellect is concomitant, or quasi-concomitant; for which reason it elicits its notional act only by way of nature and natural impulse, so that the Father is more properly said to generate by intellectual nature than by natural intellect, so that the intellect is understood to quasi-determine nature rather than conversely; and, in this respect, the idea by which the Son is produced by the eliciting nature is first, and the idea by which he is called the Word is, in respect of it, as it were second.

21. But the will has its naturalness, not by being coincident in idea of nature as said in the second way, but by having annexed to it a certain force of nature as said in the first way, from the fact that it is founded in that nature, so that this naturalness in the will in no way precedes its liberty (nor does the elicitive idea of the notional act precede, in the sense of according to nature, – for this would be altogether contrary to liberty itself), but rather so that it is consecutive to and annexed to liberty; and this not as something by which the will elicits, by way of principle, its notional act, but as something by which, with the assistance of the will, the will itself – from the force which it has from the fact it is will and free – can elicit its notional act, which, without that assistance, it could in no way elicit.”

22. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt [n.11] it is said [by Henry] that “there is a triple action of the will:

The first is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will without any naturalness or necessity, as it is that which proceeds from a choice of freedom (whether in God or in an intellectual creature), and as it tends in us only to a loved good which is below the supreme good.

23. The second is that which is elicited by the will as it is simply will along with the sole naturalness of immutable necessity, annexed to that action, as it is what proceeds from a choice of freedom, and as it tends to the supreme good loved and openly seen.

24. The third is that which is elicited by the will not as it is simply will but as it is nature, with naturalness said in the second way [n.21] annexed to it, as it is that which

proceeds from freedom of will or from choice of will in God alone, and as it tends not only to the supreme good loved and seen but also to that good proceeding into love itself (by which it is incentively loved), although it tends in different ways to each, and this according to different necessities of immutability annexed to the action; for insofar as an action is ordered to the supreme loved thing, there proceeds from the will alone itself – by the idea by which it is free – an immutability of necessity in its second action and in its third action; but insofar as an action is ordered to the produced love that tends to the terminal loved thing, there thus proceeds from the naturality annexed to the will a necessity of immutability about the sole notional act elicited by the will, or rather by the liberty itself of the will as to it such naturality is annexed.”

B. Against the Response of Henry

25. Against these remarks.

First: as to what he posits about the assistance of nature for the will, so that the will, by force of that assistance, can communicate nature [n.21], I ask what is that assistance? It seems that it is not necessary for the communication, because, once there is in place a perfect agent supposit and one that is appropriate to the action, and a perfect ‘by which’ principle for the acting, it does not seem that anything else is necessary for acting; but for you the will alone is the ‘by which’ principle in respect of the notional act, and it is clear that the supposit is perfect and appropriate to the action; therefore the assistance does not seem necessary for such production.²³³

26. Further, that a single necessity is posited in the will and a double one in the inspiriting [n.24] seems to be against both him and the truth, because he himself posits that the notional acts are founded on the essential ones, and everyone commonly concedes that the essential acts in some way precede the notional ones. But it does not seem that in something founded there can be any necessity formally greater than the necessity in that on which it is founded, or it does not seem that a double necessity will exist in the thing founded and a single one in the foundation; the proof is that then, when, *per impossibile* or *per impossibile*, one necessity is separated from the other (namely the necessity which the founded thing had from the foundation), the founded thing will remain necessary, because only one of the necessities it had will, in the foundation, be removed; therefore – once this position [of a double necessity] is supposed – necessity could exist in the founded thing and not in that on which it is founded. This to the proposal, because if the act of inspiriting has necessity from the freedom of the will and – besides this – from the necessity of naturality annexed to the will, and if the act of simple love has only the one first necessity, then, with the first necessity removed, all the necessity will be removed that there was in the foundation, and yet there will still remain the other necessity in the production, namely that which is from the naturality.

27. Further, it seems that the whole of the naturality is not consequent to the act of will, because – for him [Henry] – it belongs to the will from the fact that it is founded in the divine essence [n.21]; therefore, since the idea of the divine essence is prior to the idea of the will, whatever is consequent to the idea of the essence, or to the will by reason of the essence, will be consequent to the essence before that which is consequent to the

²³³ See Appendix Point F.

will, as it is will, will be; and so it seems that the naturality in some way precedes the liberty, and as a result it will impede the liberty.

28. Further, against the opinion.

What would that argument be which he himself makes, 'if the intellect and the will were principles of communicating the nature whereby they are such principles, then such powers in creatures would be principles of communicating nature' [n.18], if there were an altogether different formal idea of intellect and will in God and in creatures?

29. Further, what necessity is there for distinguishing between the will, which he posits as the principle of eliciting the act, and the nature, which he posits as co-assistant of the eliciting will [n.21], if there is between them only a distinction of reason, as he seems elsewhere to think about the distinction of attributes in divine reality?

C. Scotus' own Response

30. [To the first doubt] [n.10] – I say in another way that the will can be a principle of communicating nature, – and not the will as commonly taken for created and uncreated will, but will whereby it is infinite; for infinity is the proper mode of the divine will, just as it is of any other essential perfection.

31. This is plain from the reason posited above, to the solution of the question [n.9], that the will is a principle of a love adequate to itself, that is, of as much love as the will is of a nature to love the object with; but it is of a nature to love an infinite object with infinite love, therefore it is also productive of infinite love; anything that is infinite formally is the divine essence, – therefore the will itself is a principle of communicating the divine essence to the produced love.

32. And if you ask me about the co-assistance in any way of nature, I say that for the will, as it is a principle of communicating nature, there is no need to posit that nature co-assists it in some special mode of assistance (supposing nature could be the principle of communicating nature), unless some lesser perfection were posited for the will than for nature; but there is no such imperfection, because an infinite will is simply as perfect as an infinite nature.

33. There is a threefold argument against this answer [n.30].

First as follows: infinity is, of itself, of the same idea in the intellect and in the will; therefore there is no formal idea of distinct products, but they have to be distinguished by the formal principles.

34. Again, I argue thus: what does not belong to something – or what is repugnant to something – in its absolute idea, does not belong to it if it is infinite either; for infinity does not give to an active virtue the idea of another active virtue, but gives it intensity, both in itself and in its action; to this add this minor: but to the action of the will, as it is such an active principle, there does not belong – but there is repugnant to it – the communicating of nature; therefore etc.

35. Further, whence does the will get infinity? If from itself, then it is infinite everywhere, – if from the essence, then the will is infinite as having the assistance of nature or of essence, which is what the other opinion says [Henry's opinion, n.21].

36. To the first [n.33] I say that the two things in the act, namely liberty and infinity (which is a mode intrinsic to a thing), have two things corresponding to them in the principle 'by which', namely liberty and infinity, as the mode of that principle (look

in the final Parisian collation),²³⁴ whence I do not say that infinity is the formal idea of inspiring, but that infinite will is, – nor do I say in this respect that there are two formal principles, because ‘infinite’ is a mode intrinsic to both principles, namely the free and the non-free. – In another way it can be said that the will, whereby it is will, is altogether simple (that is, not combinable with the nature of which it is the power, nor with its act); for from this it follows that it is productive of an act, because this belongs to it as it is will, – and further, the act is the same as the nature, and this because it is altogether simple; therefore it is communicative of nature.

37. To the other [n.34]. If ‘repugnance’ is taken for the middle term, the major is true and the minor is false, for the transcendent idea of the will (which idea abstracts from finite and infinite) is not a reason for repugnance, but the limitation supervening on it. But if ‘does not belong’ is taken for the middle term, I say that to an active infinite principle there only belongs an infinite action, of the transcendent sort that belongs to something transcendent; but now, just as a ‘to will’ belongs transcendentally to a transcendent will, so also belongs to it the producing of a ‘to will’; therefore to an infinite will there belongs the producing of an infinite ‘to will’, not so much *per se* but concomitantly (the deity is an infinite ‘to will’, but the finite ‘to will’ of an angel is not the essence of the angel). – Then to the minor I say that to communicate nature is not the transcendent action of the will generally, but that the producing of a ‘to will’ is that is proportionate to itself and to the object, – and therefore an infinite will produces something infinite, and consequently it produces nature.

38. To the third [n.35] the answer is plain in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.209-222], that it gets it from what it is fundamentally – because it gets it from the essence, from which it formally is; I concede that the essence is required as foundation and as really the same, but it is in its own moment of nature – in which it is formally infinite – a precise ‘by which’ principle (along with the object) of thus producing as it is also of operating.

39. [To the second doubt] – To the second doubt ‘about necessity’ [n.11], the answer is plain through the same fact [through the will whereby it is infinite, n.30], that a perfect productive principle can give to a perfect product all the perfection which is not repugnant to itself; and an infinite will is a perfect productive principle, therefore it can give to its perfect product the perfection that is fitting to itself; but necessity is not repugnant to it (nay necessity necessarily belongs to it, because no infinite can be a possible, a non-necessary, thing), therefore that principle, which is infinite will, will be a sufficient principle of giving necessity to this product. If it is a principle by which necessity can be given to the product, then necessity is given, because to nothing which is not necessary can necessity of itself be given, – and further, if it is a principle by which necessity is given to the product, therefore also to the production; for the product gets being by the production, – nothing can get necessary existence through a non-necessary production.²³⁵

²³⁴ Collat.20: “Whether everything intrinsic to God is altogether the same as the divine essence, after all consideration of the intellect has been removed.”

²³⁵ Note by Scotus: “On the contrary: love for the creature is infinite in the divine will and yet contingent (and this is contained here immediately after ‘I prove the first etc.’ [n.41]). Response (as there ‘It does not seem’ [see footnote to n.49] and here [see footnote to n.41]): the love is necessary, but it does not necessarily pass to the secondary object, on which it does not depend, but it does necessarily pass to the first object, on which it quasi-depends; it is also really infinite, from the will and from the first object. – On the contrary: at least as it passes to the second object it is contingent;

40. This as it were *a posteriori* argument [n.39] seems to deduce the necessity of the production from the necessity of the product. If an *a priori* reason, or a reason from the cause, is sought, what it is by which the will gives necessity to the production, I reply that neither does a will infinite of itself alone give necessity to the produced love, comparing it to any object whatever, nor does the loved object alone – which is the end –, compared to any will whatever, give necessity to the act of willing or to the production of love.

41. I prove the first point [n.40] by the fact that the will is not a necessary principle of producing love of any object unless it is a necessary principle of loving that object; but an infinite will is not a necessary principle of loving an object save an infinite one, because then God would necessarily love any creature at all, nay also any lovable thing at all; therefore it is not a necessary principle of producing its love, comparing it to any object whatever.²³⁶

42. The second point [n.40] was proved in distinction 1 ‘On enjoying’, that the will, by reason of will in general, does not tend necessarily to the end [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140].

43. And if you reply that the will can be considered as will or as nature [nn.19, 22-24], or as by comparing it to the end or to what is for the end; but as it is compared to the end it is nature, and thus there is merely necessity, – this is refuted by both authority and reason.

44. The reason is that there are not opposite modes of acting of the same active power, and especially not these modes ‘naturally’ and ‘freely’, which first distinguish active power; because if the will is compared to the end by way of nature and to ‘things for the end’ by way of freedom, it will not be one active power with respect to them, and then there will be no power that chooses ‘a thing for the end’ for the sake of the end; for no power chooses this because of that save by willing both extremes, just as no cognitive power knows a conclusion because of the principles unless it knows in the same cognition both the principles and the conclusion, as the Philosopher argued about the common sense in *On the Soul* 3.2.426b15-29.

45. The authority is from Augustine, *Handbook of the Faith* ch.105 n.28 (and it is placed by Master Lombard in II d.25 ch.4 n.218): “Nor must it not be called will – nor said not to be free – because we so wish ourselves to be blessed that not only do we not wish to be miserable but we altogether cannot wish to be miserable;” therefore he intends to say that the will whereby we wish for beatitude is free; the will has a respect for no end more necessarily than for beatitude in general, therefore it has a respect for no end necessarily.

46. Again, this response [n.43] would posit that the Holy Spirit is not inspirited freely but by way of nature, because his principle would be will not as free but as nature.

47. Therefore I say [n.40] that the necessity of this production of adequate love – just as also the necessity of the love by which what possesses the will formally loves – is

therefore it will not in this way be infinite. Response: it is not necessarily of this object, nor is it infinitely of this object, – in the way the mode of the relation is noted on both sides as the mode of the act founding the opposed relation. – On the contrary: ‘as it passes to...it is contingent’ is denied, because contingency is present in the act under no mode or relation, although the relation is contingent. If this is understood in the antecedent, let it be said in the consequent.”

²³⁶ An extended note is added here by Scotus. See appendix.

from the infinity of the will and from the infinity of the goodness of the object, because neither suffices for necessity without the other.

48. Now these two [n.47] suffice in this way, that an infinite will cannot not be right; nor can it not be in act, because then it would be potential; therefore necessarily it is in right act. But not every 'to will' is right precisely because it is from that will only, as if nothing is to be willed of itself but only because it is willed by that will; for the divine essence, which is the first object of that will, is to be willed of itself; therefore that will is of necessity in right act of willing the object which is of itself to be rightly willed, and just as it is of necessity a principle of willing, so it is of necessity a principle of producing love of that object.

49. And then I say that neither precisely the infinite will alone (not determining the object it has), nor the infinite good alone (not determining which will it has, as object, a respect to), is the total cause of necessarily loving, nor even of necessarily producing adequate love; but the infinite will – having such an object, which is of itself to be rightly loved, perfectly present to it – is the necessary reason both for loving that good and for inspiring love of that good;²³⁷ and such a will, having such an object present to it, is a principle of communicating divine nature, because it is a principle of producing a produced infinite love; for such a produced love is proportionate both to the power and to the object, – it is not thus when an infinite will has a respect to a finite lovable good, because although there the act is infinite as concerns the part of the divine will, yet it is not infinite as concerns the part of the object.

50. But whether the will is a principle not only of loving an infinite but also a finite good, and of producing love of such a good, – and this either with the same production in fact, though different in idea, by which the Holy Spirit is produced, or with an altogether different one, or with none, – of this matter elsewhere [I dd.18, 27], because it has a similar difficulty to the production of the Word, whether the divine intellect is the principle of producing a Word of the same essence or a word of any other intelligible thing, and then either by a production the same in fact, though different in idea, as the production of the divine Word, or by one different both in fact and in idea.

51. [To the third doubt] – There remains the third doubt [n.12].

Here the statement is made in this way, that nature acts through impression (as does the intellect), not the will. – See Henry.

²³⁷ Note by Scotus: "It does not seem that the will's being right is to be assumed together with its being infinite, as if this other is on an equal footing, because an infinite will is not then a sufficient 'by which' for communicating nature – even a will having the object present – but an infinite right will; again, if this rectitude is conformity to right reason, therefore reason is the principle of the production of the Holy Spirit, at any rate as the rule, the way a rule is rule of an act of will. – So in this way: an infinite will (adding altogether nothing about the presence of the object) is necessarily in act of willing, so that to no act of willing is it in potency to contradictories, because then it would be combinable; and it has for adequate object an infinite willable thing; therefore it wills it by a necessary act, – and this holds of further production just as it does of necessary operation. The second proposition [it has for adequate object an infinite willable thing] is proved from the idea of a power that can have an object adequate to its capacity; therefore it has an infinite object, and not as contained under the first object, because then it would depend on something finite in its operating and so would be cheapened. It is proved secondly from the idea of act, because an infinite volition does not depend on a finite volition; therefore a finite thing is not its first object. Any volition that there is possible is infinite, because..." The note is left incomplete.

52. On the contrary. This is false, and was rejected in distinctions 2 and 5 [I d.2 nn.283-289; d.5 nn.52-92]; again, it is not to the purpose, because it is asking about a distinction of the active principle in its mode of acting (or of eliciting an action), whether it acts on something or not.

53. Another response [to the same doubt, n.12]. The word is formally of the knowledge of memory; the will, when eliciting, gives to the object the first gift (because it gives love and, in this, gives itself), nor is it gift for this reason, – hence neither is it something similar to the object presented; therefore love is not generated, nor is the Holy Spirit an image as the Son is.

54. This [n.53] indeed is true, and well said about the image, but the point about how these principles can elicit is not saved, although some distinction is posited in the terms, compared to the principles in act of assimilation.

55. Third way [to solve the doubt, n.12]. That if there exists some necessity as the act tends to the object, yet not as it is elicited by the power; or in another way: if, as it is in an act already as it were elicited, it is confirmed, yet it does not as quasi-prior in act elicit that object.

56. In another way. On the part of the principle, as it quasi-precedes the act, there is a necessity to elicit, nor is will repugnant to the necessary, because a perfect will can have the condition of a perfect elicitive principle.

57. Again, conversely, necessity does not take away liberty (because of what has just been said [n.56]).

58. Again, to act necessarily is a condition of a way of acting, therefore it is not repugnant to one of the things that divide active principle, just as neither is the mode repugnant to that whose mode of positing it is; just as there is a double principle – nor is there any other reason for distinction than that this is this [sc. that the will is will, the intellect is intellect] – so there is a double fitting necessity, because this and this [sc. this is the necessity of nature, this the necessity of will]; not every necessity, then, is natural necessity. – Taking ‘natural’ strictly, how is will nature? Another difficulty: whether this is what ‘freely’ is, because of an identity between producer and the product?

III. To the Principal Arguments

59. To the arguments. To the first [n.1] I say that that definition of nature proves that the Holy Spirit is not produced as a ‘similar’ by the first rule and by the force of his production,²³⁸ and it is true that he is not the image of the Father as the Son is, who by force of his production proceeds as a similar to the Father.

60. To the second [n.2] a response has been made diffusely elsewhere, in distinction 2 question 4, and in the question where the question is asked ‘whether there can be several productions in divine reality’ [I d.2 nn.327-344].

²³⁸ Note by Scotus: “The opinion of Godfrey [of Fontaines] (as it is contained here in distinction 13 [I d.13 q. un n.5]) says that [the Holy Spirit is produced] by way of will ‘because he is produced on the supposition of another production’, but he is altogether uniform in reality with the Son, because [Godfrey] posits no distinction between intellect and will save by comparison to what is outward [d.8 nn.163-166], and so what is there in these two ‘words’ that solves [the difficulty] of the first book [sc. how the processions of Son and Holy Spirit differ]? Surely Thomas [Aquinas, *Sentences* I d.2 q1 a.3], surely Henry [solve the difficulty of] the whole book with a distinction by means of the divine intellect inwardly? What more is needed for productions?”

61. To the third [n.3] one should say – as was said in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [*ibid.*] – that the accidental differences of power, namely active and passive, are not differences of productive power. For, generally, what is produced by such a principle is that of which such a principle is productive, whether in that in which it is (if it is of a nature to receive it), or in another, or in nothing. If in nothing, because nothing is of a nature to receive it, then it is produced as *per se* subsistent, if the productive power is perfect with respect to something *per se* subsistent; so it is in the intended proposition: the will by which the producer produces neither acts by producing in the supposit in which it is, nor does it by producing make something in another, but it produces a term that stands in itself, as a person, which is not received in anything subjectively. – But there is a response in another way in distinction 6 [I d.6 nn.10-15], where it is said that production is not formally intellect, and where it is said how the intellect can be a principle not only of understanding but even of saying as well.

62. To the final argument [n.4] I say that for an act of loving – or for an act of love – the loved thing must be pre-known (this is said by blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* [n.4]), but it is not necessary that the love itself be pre-known, – to wit, if some honorable good is offered to me, it is not necessary that before I am able to have the act, namely the act of loving that good, I should, to be sure, pre-know the act; so in the intended proposition: the divine essence – the love of which is inspirited – must be pre-known to the Father and to the Son so that they might inspirit, but there is no need to concede that, in the instant of origin, the Holy Spirit – who is inspirited love – should be pre-known to the Father and to the Son, although in the instant of eternity the whole Trinity is always known to any person in the Trinity, because, in distinguishing between instants of origin, one is not distinguishing between duration and duration, but only distinguishing what origin which person is from. It could in another way be said that, in the prior moment of origin, before the Holy Spirit is understood to be inspirited, the Father and the Son know the Holy Spirit, and do so intuitively, although not as existing in himself, because they know the divine essence, which is the reason for knowing intuitively any intelligible object whatever, – just as the Trinity knows the creature, and intuitively, before it is produced, because the Trinity’s own essence, which the Trinity intuitively, is the reason for most perfectly knowing everything else, and, as a result, it is the reason for knowing intuitively anything knowable, even if none were in itself existent.²³⁹

²³⁹ See appendix point G.

Appendix

Scotus' extended annotation to n.41

On the contrary. The same thing is principle of 'producing' and of 'producing necessarily'; therefore if there is infinity of will – or rather, an infinite will – it is not of itself a principle of producing necessarily, therefore not of producing absolutely, nor of communicating nature, because the nature cannot be communicated except necessarily; therefore in the solution of the question [n.9], and in the solution of the first doubt [n.31], one ought to speak about the object as here in the second doubt [sc. that the object does not give necessity to the act of willing, n.40]; there is confirmation because even an infinite will is not a principle of producing love of a finite object, – otherwise there will either be many Holy Spirits, or there will be one love produced for every creature (which you deny, n.41), because then they would be necessarily loved. I concede, then, that the reason for the solution here [n.9], and likewise about the Word as concerns the intellect, and the whole reason set down above in distinction 2 question 6 [I d.2 nn.221, 226], only conclude by taking, along with the will here [about the Holy Spirit] and along with the intellect there [about the Word], the productive principle, namely the object, without which it does not produce, just as it does not operate either.

In another way and better (immediately after 'It does not seem' footnote to n.49), because, by absolutely adding nothing to the idea of infinite will, the conclusion follows that it has a first object infinite and always present, nay always actually willed, and nothing else is necessarily required for its act; and therefore it has no contingent act, although it contingently passes to some object on which its act does not depend (about this in distinctions 38 and 39).

If it be said to the 'I concede that the reason, etc.' [above, in the first paragraph of this annotation] that the will is not the principle of producing unless it has the object present to it (which object is the co-principle of producing), and that it cannot be the 'principle' when it has any object whatever but precisely when it has the first object present to it and along with that one (and this either because, before the presence of the secondary object, it has an adequate production, because it has it with the first object, but it has no power for another production beyond the adequate one; or, secondly, because an infinite principle does not require any finite principle producing along with it, but the secondary object is finite; or, thirdly, because a necessarily productive principle does not have as co-productive principle that to which it has no necessary relation, but the divine will does not necessarily have a respect to a secondary object; or, fourthly, because in these cases the general supposition is true, namely that the will is a principle of producing that necessarily requires the object as co-productive, just as does also the intellect [this is valid in d.7 n.42]), – hence it was said in distinction 2 that perfect memory, which is the complete principle of the speaking, is the intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself [I d.1 n.221]; so perfect will is a will possessing the lovable object actually presented to it through intelligence [I d.1 n.226].

But as to what is added [in the previous paragraph] about the difference between the first object (that it is co-productive) and the second (that is not co-productive), this is doubtful both in the case of the intellect and in the case of the will – nor do any of the causes assigned [in the previous paragraph] seem sufficient; not the first, because either it

is understood of production adequate in extension, and then the question is begged, or adequate in intension, and then the ‘but...beyond the adequate one’ is false (as is plain in the case of operation, because it has, beyond a thus adequate operation about the first object, power for operation about a second object). Nor the second reason, because I want the second object not to be co-productive but the first object to be co-productive, not only of knowledge of itself – which is present formally – but of knowledge of the second object, which is present in it virtually; so that, just as the divine memory precisely contains the first object formally and the second object is only in the memory virtually (because it is in the first object), and yet the memory is the reason for understanding the operation about both objects, so also is it the idea for producing declarative knowledge of both objects – not indeed a knowledge proceeding from both objects but from the infinite one only, yet making both objects clear through the object which is first formally and has the second in itself virtually (so also about inspiring); again, [the second seems insufficient because] the will in its first production does not require a co-productive principle save an infinite one; whence, then, is its imperfection proved if in the second production it were to require a finite co-productive principle? (response: although sometimes it co-acts with the creature, yet it never necessarily requires it, – for its being as principle would be imperfect; but the first instance stands, that ‘only the first object is co-productive of double word and love’ [sc. word and love of God and of creature]). The third reason is not probative, because just as will operates about an object to which it is related contingently – yet in respect of that operation the quasi-principle is only the first object which has a respect contingently to the second – why cannot it be so about production? Again, it is not conclusive about the word; again, the being well-pleased is necessary.

Note: in anything in which there is a perfect productive principle, unpreventable and not dependent on anything else, the principle can produce a term in that thing unless it is repugnant to the term to be produced by it, – and likewise it cannot produce a term in it if it is repugnant to that term to be produced by it; for each of these the major seems immediate. Or thus: in anything in which there is a perfect principle before the term is produced, it is not repugnant to the term to be produced by it,²⁴⁰ – and likewise, it cannot be produced by it if it is not in it before the term is produced; each minor seems immediate. First conclusion: anything in which there is a productive perfect principle before the term is produced can by such a principle produce the term; second conclusion: anything in which there is no principle before the term is produced cannot produce the term.²⁴¹

Further in this way. Let the first conclusion be the major and let the minor be thus: ‘perfect memory is a perfect productive principle of a knowledge declarative of the object, a knowledge reducing it both formally in the memory and virtually in the object’;

²⁴⁰ Note by Scotus: “‘before in duration’ is plain in the first minor, ‘before in nature’ is doubtful, and it is directed to the intended proposition; ‘before in origin’ causes no difficulty for the intended proposition, because the minor of the third syllogism [see in a later paragraph in the text] is only about ‘before in nature’, as is plain, – but by taking the first minor about prior in origin, there seems to be a begging of the question and the minor is the same as the conclusion. – The remark about ‘before’ is not cogent here [sc. in d.10], as is plain here [footnote to n.9], but it is valid in distinction 11 [I d.11 q.1 n.2] ‘About the Son’.”

²⁴¹ Note by Scotus: “[not] at the same time, therefore the Word does not speak itself, – nor posteriorly, therefore the Holy Spirit does not generate.”

therefore what has a perfect memory can produce knowledge of this or of that, if it has it before knowledge of another is produced. Make a similar syllogism about perfect will and love.

Let the third syllogism (because the two first are counted as one and the two second as one) be as follows: let the last conclusion be the major; let the minor be this: ‘the whole Trinity has perfect memory before declarative knowledge of the creature is produced’, from the first question of the second book [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15], because in the first instant of nature there is completed the whole origin simply of the persons, and the knowledge of the creature is in the second moment of nature; therefore the whole Trinity produces declarative knowledge of the secondary object. Similarly about will and love.

The consequent seems false, because either the Trinity produces it [declarative knowledge of the creature] in any person at all, and then in the Father there will be something produced, – or in determinate, produced persons, with whose productions these productions are consonant (to wit, knowledge of the creature in the Son and love and of the creature in the Holy Spirit), and it follows that there is in the Son something from the Holy Spirit, and also that the Son will produce something in himself and the Holy Spirit something in himself. Therefore, by avoiding the inferred conclusion, one or other of the three minors must be denied. If the first is denied, the denial is about the ‘before in nature’, because that stands in the same degree of origin (where however there is no production), or a gloss is made to the effect that it is true if, ‘before the first producible term is produced’, the productive principle exists in it, not if it is before the second is produced, and the reason is that the second term is in the same degree of origin as the first; both responses seem to be the same (at least it is conceded that the Word is declarative knowledge of the creature and the Holy Spirit is love of the creature, although not produced by the Trinity; the contrary is in distinction 18 ‘About gift’ and 27 ‘About the Word’ [I d.27 qq.1-3 n.24; d.18 was left blank in the *Ordinatio*]). If the second minor about the secondary object is denied, the difficulty here treated of returns – above at ‘If it be said to the ‘I concede that the reason,’ etc.’ – and then one must speak differently about will than about memory ‘because to the will the secondary object is actually presented through intelligence’ (response: the second object does not have of itself, as does the first object, a reason for being lovable). The third minor only has force about the ‘before’ (just as does the first minor): for it is plain that it is not true of the ‘before’ in origin; about ‘nature’ it is doubtful if there is only a difference of reason between the production of the Word declaring the first object and of the Word declaring the second object, because a difference of reason is not sufficient for the order of nature.

One should note for the three syllogisms posited above that, although the minor of the first syllogism is denied of ‘before in a way other than in origin’ in the case of divine reality, and by this, *a*, seems to be excluded all force of arguing ‘whom about what’ (because ‘before in origin’ is the same as the conclusion), yet there still remains the difficulty about the productive principle, which was touched on here above, at the beginning – namely about the secondary object – because either the major (on which you altogether rely in the question about productions) will be false or it will be difficult for it not to be extended to the secondary object; but once, *b*, it is conceded that it is extended to it, then there is lost, *c*, the point in the first distinction of the second book ‘about the creature in intelligible being, that it is from the whole Trinity’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.14-15] (because from that which knowledge of the creature productively is, from that the

creature as understood is produced), there is lost, *d*, the point ‘about the relation of the secondary object to God’s knowing’ in the question about ideas [I d.35 q. un n.10], there is lost, *e*, the point ‘about the relation of the Word and the Holy Spirit to creatures’ in distinctions 18 and 27 of the first book [same reference as before], there is lost, *f*, the fact that ‘the Holy Spirit is not necessarily love of the creature’ [I d.32 qq.1-2 n.14] (and it will be necessary to say that it is necessarily love of being well-pleased, although not love of existing), and then there will be lost, *g*, the point in distinction 8 ‘against the philosophers, about the non-necessity of the creature’ [I d.8 n.274], – and then returns, *h*, the point there ‘about being well-pleased’ [*ibid.*], and the first argument in the first question of the second book stands [that if there were only one person, it could produce everything possible, II d.1 q.1 n.1], the point about the respect of the first object is not valid [*ibid.* n.9], and the Holy Spirit will not as freely love the creature as the Father does (because love is from production), nor will the Word understand by virtue of memory as it is in himself but as it is in the Father.

To these remarks. First to *a*: the principle which of its idea is of a nature to exit first in act of really producing, in real subsistence, proves that its productive principle is before in origin, that is ‘without which there is no other’, and from this is proved that from him there is another (so about the Holy Spirit, because he is from the Father and the Son, distinction 11 of the first book); likewise, the product, which is of a nature to be produced in real subsistence before in another, is that ‘without which there is no other product’, – therefore ‘from which there is another product’ (thus the three persons, in relation to creatures in outward existence). I concede therefore that the person taken in real subsistence (as he has everything, whatever order they possess in him) is really productive of the second person (likewise taken in the way that everything is in him), yet in each there is a distinction between what is first in him – namely that by which he is a divine person – and what is as it were adventitious to the person as already quasi-constituted, of which sort is everything in comparison with the second object.

I concede *b* and likewise *c*, save that (according to what was said before in *a*) the three persons, in existence simply of divine person, precede in order of nature the understanding of the creature, and precede, as a result, the creature in its intelligible existence; this antecedent indeed is true (there, in the first distinction of the second book [same reference as before]), but the consequent is denied, ‘therefore creatures are produced by the Trinity in understood existence’; the reason for the denial is this, that, just as operation about the second object is really different (however it is so, whether essentially or subsistently) from the operation about the first object, not so production about the latter from production about the former; therefore it cannot be of another that is really producing in this way and in that; therefore only the Father speaks the word of the creature, just as only he speaks the Word of his essence. A confirmation is that, just as this operative principle has one operation adequate to itself not only intensively but also extensively, that is, about everything that is virtually in it, so it has, insofar as it is productive, one production adequate in both ways, because neither is repugnant to one product. Another confirmation is that the knowledge, whether as operation or as product, can only be of the same first term, – not of others, save as they are secondary; therefore no knowledge can be produced which is immediately of another object as term (about this in distinction 36 [I d.36 q. un n.9]).

In another way. I concede *b* and *c* is not lost, because the production of the second object in known existence is not real production, just as neither does the term receive real existence, – therefore it is a diminished production, just as the product is a diminished being; such production can exist, because it is not production but quasi-production; of this sort is knowledge. Therefore the Father in himself, through the knowledge in which the second object is virtually, quasi-produces in himself that object while he actually knows it and, when communicating the knowledge, communicates it as quasi-producing the same object, because it is posterior to the person to whom it is communicated; therefore the Trinity quasi-produces the object, and so produces it in known existence (because to be produced in that is to be quasi-produced), although only the Father really produces in the Son, by force of generation, and the Father and Son in the Holy Spirit communicate knowledge of this sort of object, – which knowledge (communicated in all of them) is a quasi-production, and so a diminished production. – In another way, more plainly: to be knowledge of the second object is to produce it in known being, just as to be knowledge of the first object is to be of it as of quasi-producing knowledge, because the first object is quasi-presupposed and the second is quasi-produced by it – in act – because it is knowledge of it; therefore, as really communicating knowledge as of the second object, it really communicates it as producing the secondary object, by the production which there is possible, which is only a diminished production.

Whether the Father or the Trinity produces the second object in known existence, *d* is not lost, because the idea is a second object, whether produced in this way or in that, or it is not produced but quasi-produced. – And if someone says that the idea is not thus really referred to God's knowing, because thus the idea is nothing, – by parity of reasoning neither conversely does knowing have any relation of reason to the second object, because the second object is altogether nothing, just as it neither founds nor terminates any relation.

Nor is *e* lost, because from whatever source the second object is produced (or quasi-produced), the divine person has perfect existence, comparing the intellect and will to the first object; however I do concede that the Word, from the quasi-secondary production, is really produced knowledge of the creature, just as the Father is quasi-secondarily unproduced knowledge of it, and so necessarily the Son, like the Father, is knowledge of it – but this relation neither with non-generation constitutes the Father, nor with generation the Son.

From this *f* [is not lost – i.e. repeat of the Holy Spirit what has just been said of the Son]; – or it can be asserted of being well-pleased; insofar as the 'shown thing' is shown to have goodness participated from the First thing; or in another way; just as the person of the Father necessarily has the operation of the will, which operation is of some object necessarily and of another contingently, – so he produces a subsistent quasi-operation, which operation, necessarily produced, is of some object necessarily and of another contingently; and just as this does not follow 'the volition of the creature is the same as the person of the Father, therefore the Father necessarily has volition of the creature' (but only this follows 'therefore he necessarily has a volition that is of the creature'), so this does not follow 'the Father necessarily inspirits volition of the creature' (in the composite sense), although he necessarily inspirits a 'voition' which is of the creature.

Note that above, when it is said [at the beginning of this annotation]: ‘On the contrary. The same thing is principle’, contradictory responses are seen; one, that together with infinite will one must take the fact that it has a present infinite object, – the other, afterwards, that one should add nothing to the object, but from infinite will is deduced an infinite object always actually present, necessarily (and how it is deduced is contained here [footnote to n.49]).

But this contradiction is thus removed: from the idea of power is deduced the condition of the first object and of its presence, not by a ‘proof-why’ but by a ‘proof-that’; for the idea of power requires an object that is a quasi-co-principle with respect to the operation, and so, in order to have a complete ‘proof-why’ of necessary love, one must take it thus, ‘infinite will possessing an infinite object actually presented to it through the intellect’, –and the first response is understood in this way; but of this whole ‘proof-why’, including the two co-principles (necessarily being co-principles of the act) the one part proves the other part by a ‘proof-that’, – and the second response is understood in this way.

Nor does the proof ‘So in this way’ [footnote to n.49] conclude more: for the subject of the first proposition does not state the whole ‘proof-why’ with respect to the predicate, but the other principle does – from whose idea, however, is deduced that the remaining co-principle concurs not as to ‘proof-why’, but nature thus requires that to such a will there correspond a proportionate co-principle, therefore an infinite one, and in a proportionate way, therefore always present; for example, according to Aristotle ‘some cause simply necessary moves the heavens’ [I d.8 n.251]; here in the subject there is a partial ‘proof-why’ of the predicate, but nature requires that to it there correspond a proportionate co-principle and in a proportionate way, – as a necessary heavens and necessarily present and movable; therefore the total ‘proof-why’ of this effect – namely of the necessary motion – includes the active cause and the movable thing, but from the proper idea of one of these there is concluded, by a ‘proof-that’, that the other concurs, and so the effect is proved, but by a diminished ‘proof-that’.

[From the *Cambridge Reportatio*]

Point F. [See n.25]

Further, when things are so disposed that they join together as ‘prior’ and ‘posterior’ for some action, the one that is ‘prior’ joins in more principally for the action; but the essence, which is the nature (insofar as they [Henry and his followers] take ‘nature’ in the first mode [n.13]), in which the three divine persons consist, is prior to the will; therefore if nature joins in for the action in this way, as assisting the will, it will necessarily be more principal in this production; therefore a contradiction is involved in its joining in as assistant, concomitant to the will, and not, as they themselves say, preceding it.

Point G. [See n.62]

Concerning the tenth distinction, where the Master [Lombard] determines what one must see if the divine will is the principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit, – and because there are three things that cause difficulty, namely the consubstantiality of the product, the necessity of the production, the apparent impossibility of liberty and necessity, therefore I ask three brief questions about these three points; the first is whether the divine will can be *per se* a principle of communicating the divine nature; second, whether

it can be *per se* a principle of producing necessarily; third, whether necessity and liberty are compatible with each other in the very same respect of the same production. Fourth – the principal question – whether the divine will is *per se* the principle of inspiring the Holy Spirit.

To the first question it is argued no: Averroes *Physics* 8 com.46, ‘Whether each thing’ [I d.2 nn.212-214].

Again, the common description of nature is convertible with it.

Again, the image is the principle in artificial things.

On the contrary: the will is not less perfect than the memory.

As to the second question it is argued no: Aristotle *Metaphysics* 9.2.1046b4-11, a rational power is to opposites.

Again, the ways of being a principle are opposed.

On the contrary: that which is perfect in production is not repugnant to the production of a perfective productive principle.

As to the third question it is argued no in this way: the necessity of a principle naturally determines necessarily; therefore the principle is from its nature necessarily determined; therefore by natural necessity.

Again, necessary dominion does not dominate [sc. cannot determine itself to this or that], otherwise anything natural would be called free.

On the contrary: perfection in productive principle is not repugnant to a perfect productive principle.

To the fourth question it is argued no: as doing and making are, so are operation and production.

Again, it would be precognitive.

On the contrary: the Master [Lombard] *Sentences* I d.10 ch.2 n.102, through Jerome *On Psalm 14* [=Abelard, *Christian Theology* IV: “Hence there is this from Jerome on psalm XVII: ‘The Holy Spirit is not the Father nor the Son but the love which the Father has in the Son and the Son in the Father’.”], and Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7, and Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* VI ch.17.

Eleventh Distinction

Question 1

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son

1. About the eleventh distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son.

That he does not:

Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.7: “the one proceeding from the Father and resting in the Son we call the Holy Spirit.”

2. Again, ch.8: “We say the Holy Spirit is from the Father, we do not say he is from the Son.”

3. Again, the same in his letter *On the hymn the All Holy* to the Archimandrite [Jordan] n.38, at the end: “Father and Word and Holy Spirit;” and he adds: “From the Father indeed; but of the Son, and not from the Son, but the Spirit of the mouth of God.”

4. Again, by the reasoning of the Greeks: nothing is to be held as an article of the faith save what is contained in the Gospel (which confusedly contains the faith), or at any rate in the Scripture of the *New Testament*; but it is not seen expressed in the New Testament that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son; therefore etc.

5. Again, love in us does not proceed from the word, because knowledge does not have causality with respect to volition; therefore likewise not in the prototype either.

6. Again, the will is posited as the third part of the image, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.50; therefore it is not a principle of producing but a product. – Response: love is called ‘will’; but will ‘in potency’ pertains to the parent, although it does not constitute the parent, but quasi-arrives as a second fecundity in the Father.

7. Again, passive inspiring is proper to one person in divine reality, therefore active inspiring is too. – Proof of the consequence: for each seems equally perfect and equally incommunicable.

8. On the contrary:

In the *Nicene Creed*: “who proceeds from the Father and the Son;” and Athanasius in his *Creed* [Ps-Athanasius, *Creed* ‘Quicumque vult’]: “the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.”

I. To the Question

9. On this question the Greeks are said to disagree with the Latins, as the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] seem to indicate. But about this disagreement [the Bishop of] Lincoln [Robert Grosseteste] says (in a certain note on the end of the letter *On the hymn the Thrice Holy* [ms. in Magdalen College, Oxford, 192, f. 215rb]) that “the opinion of the Greeks is that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son but does not proceed from the Son, but only from the Father, although through the Son; and this opinion seems contrary to ours where we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But perhaps, if two wise men – one Greek and the other Latin – each a true lover of truth and not a lover of his own way of speaking, insofar as it is his own, were to inquire into this contrariety, it would eventually be plain to each that the contrariety is not truly real as it is verbal; otherwise either the Greeks themselves or we Latins are truly heretics. But who dares accuse this author, namely John Damascene, and blesseds Basil, Cyril, and other like Greek fathers, of being heretics? Who indeed will accuse again blesseds Jerome, Augustine, and Hilary and other like Latins of being heretics? It is likely then that there is not, under the said contrary words, an opinion of contrary saints; for the thing is said in many ways (just as here ‘of this’, so there ‘out of this’ or ‘by that’ of ‘from that’), in which multiplicity of contrary words perhaps, when it is more subtly understood and distinguished, no opposed opinion would appear.”

10. However it may be with these matters, from the time when the Catholic Church declared that this is to be held as of the substance of the faith (as is plain [in the *Decretals of Gregory IX* bk.1 tit.1 ch.1], ‘About the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic

Faith': "We firmly believe"), one must firmly hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds "from both".

11. For this there is the following sort of reason: that which first has a perfect productive principle before it is understood to have a product can produce by that principle, namely when the principle is so perfect that it does not depend on something passive nor can be impeded by anything; the Son has will, which is a principle productive of adequate love, and he has it as it is pre-understood to 'the produced act of the will'; therefore he can produce it, therefore also he does produce it.

12. I prove the minor [n.11]: generation and inspiriting have a certain order, so that in some way generation is prior to inspiriting; in that prior stage there is communicated to the one generated all the divine perfection that is not repugnant to it, and so the will is communicated; therefore the generated then has will as prior 'to what is produced by act of will', because there is not yet understood any production made by way, or by act, of will.

13. Also, the assumption about the order of these productions [n.12], although it seem to be manifest from the order of the powers, is however proved from the fact that when first acts have an order in something – provided each is perfectly active – they will also have a like order in eliciting their acts. But I have added the phrase 'perfectly active' to exclude substantial form and quality in the case of corruptible things, where, although the substantial form is active, and the quality likewise, and the substantial form is prior to the quality, yet the quality has its act first; but this comes from the imperfection of the activity of the substantial form. Now in the Father intellect and will are perfectly active principles, and they have a certain order, because the fecundity of the intellect has constituted the Father but not the fecundity of the will. Therefore the fecundity of the intellect will in some way have its act before the fecundity of the will has its act.

14. Others prove this order of production to the product by the fact that, as understanding is to willing, so saying is to inspiriting.

15. But this proof [n.14] seems defective: for willing presupposes understanding, because the object, about which there is to be a love, is through this 'understanding' sufficiently present, and without this intellection it would not be sufficiently present to the will so that it might will; but through the act of speaking there is not present to the will precisely the object of which the love is inspirited, because, although the Father inspirits by the will as it is in him, yet he does not have the object formally present through generated knowledge (because he knows nothing by generated knowledge, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n2), but by the intellection ungenerated in him does he have the object present to him, and this is the knowledge presupposed to the act of inspiriting; therefore there is not the like necessity for generation to be presupposed to inspiriting as there is for intellection to be presupposed to volition.

16. I concede that this instance [n.15] well proves that there is not altogether a like necessity, but there is an order between intellection and will for two reasons: one is because of the presence [of the object] already stated [n.15], the other is because of the order of these powers in operating, because these powers are such that one is naturally ordered to operate after the other. The first reason is not the reason for the priority of generation to inspiriting, but the second is; for just as, to the extent they are operative powers, there is some order between their operations, so there, to the extent they are

productive powers, there is some order between their productions, although no order of necessity is required by the need to have such a presence of the object.

17. An example of this: if in fire heat and dryness are active causes, yet of a nature to elicit their acts in ordered fashion such that dryness cannot dry unless heat first heats, the order of necessity is not because the dryable object is, by the heating, made present to the dry so that it might be dried, but it is because of the nature of these active powers; and if in the prior stage in which the hot heats by heat it should communicate to the heated, or produce in the heated, not only the heat but also the dryness which it had, the heated would be dried by the same dryness as is in the heater, because in the instant of nature in which there is drying, there is one dryness in the heater and in the heated.

18. So must it be understood here, that in the moment of origin in which the Father produces by an act of will, there is the same productive principle in the Father and in the Son, and therefore the Son produces the Holy Spirit with the same production as the Father does.

II. To the Principal Arguments

19. To the authorities from Damascene [nn.1-3] it seems that a response can be made through that note of my Lord of Lincoln, about which we spoke [n.9]. However Damascene's first authority [n.1] might, if he is speaking of the will and not of the Holy Spirit, be given an exposition: because it could then be said that the will, which is the principle of inspiriting, is 'from the Father in the Son' because the Father communicates it to the Son; and 'it rests in the Son', that is, it is not further communicated under the idea of fecund principle, although the same will is communicated to the Holy Spirit, in himself. But the literal meaning of Damascene in the same place [n.1] seems to be that he is speaking of the Holy Spirit, and not of the will by which he is inspirited.

20. To the reasoning about the Gospel [n.4] I say that the doctrine 'Christ descended into hell' is not taught in the Gospel, and yet it is to be held as an article of faith, because it is placed in the *Apostle's Creed*. Thus are many other things about the sacraments of the Church not expressed in the Gospel and yet the Church holds them, handed down with certitude from the Apostles, and it would be dangerous to err about things which have not only come down from the Apostles but are also to be held by the custom of the universal Church. Nor did Christ in the Gospel teach all things pertaining to the dispensation of the sacraments; for he said to his disciples (*John* 16.12-13): "I have yet many things to say to you, but ye cannot bear them now; however when he, the Spirit of truth, has come, he will teach you all truth." Therefore the Holy Spirit taught them many things which are not written in the Gospel; and thus have many things, some by writing, some by the custom of the Church, been handed down.

21. Likewise, diverse creeds have at diverse times been put forth against diverse heresies newly arisen, because, when a new heresy was arising, it was necessary to declare the truth against which the heresy was; which truth, although it was before of the faith, was yet not before as much declared as it is now against the errors of those who were denying it.

22. To the other point, about our word [n.5], I say that it is a mark of imperfection in the created image, because through our word the same nature as is in the mind is not communicated, and therefore not the liberty either, formally and simply. But to the divine

Word is communicated the nature of the Father and the same will as is in the Father, and therefore the Word has the will as fecund with respect to the production of the Holy Spirit, because he is understood to have it first in order of origin before the Holy Spirit is inspirited.

23. To the final one [n.7], I say that it does not follow, because the divine nature cannot be had by one person in several productions, as will be plain in the following question [n.47], because in each production it would have the nature and in neither it would have the nature; yet one person can communicate nature in several productions, and several persons can produce a person in one production; and therefore if passive inspiriting is in one person alone, it does not follow that active inspiriting is in one alone.

Question 2

Whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real Distinction between him and the Son could stand.

24. Second I ask whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand.

I argue that it could not:

Because, according to Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.6: “the essence contains unity, relation multiplies the Trinity;” therefore no person is distinguished from another which is not referred by relation to another; therefore if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son no real distinction from him could stand, because there would be no reference to him, – therefore, etc.

25. Further, Augustine *The City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is for this reason simple, that he is that which he has, excepting what is said relatively; just as the Father has a Son and is not the Son.” Therefore, if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son, he would be the Son, because he would then not be said relatively to him.

26. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “It is clear that the Holy Spirit is not a son, although he exits from the Father, because he exits not as in some way born but as in some way given.”

I. On the Question itself

27. [Opinion of others] – Here it is said²⁴² that the question is null, because a position that involves impossibles cannot be posited nor sustained, for the refutation is included in it all at once, which is the ultimate discordance to which a respondent can be reduced; for when such a position is set down, no rule of disputation can be kept to (namely by conceding what follows and denying what is repugnant), for at once must the repugnance be conceded that is included in the position set down. Now the proof that the position is of this sort is that the supremely impossible is repugnant to the supremely

²⁴² The Vatican editors say the opinion is found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sentences*, though they also note that the opinion is attributed by some to John of Berwick and William of Macclesfield.

necessary; whatever is in God inwardly is supremely necessary; therefore what is repugnant thereto is supremely impossible. Therefore the position that supposes the Holy Spirit not to proceed from the Son is 'supremely impossible' because its opposite is supremely necessary inwardly (namely that he proceeds from the Son), and an impossible that includes impossibles seems to be more impossible than an impossible that does not include such; therefore etc.

28. [Against the opinion] – Against this position [n.27] is that the position seems to be an avoiding of the question. For the question is being moved so as to inquire what the first real thing is that distinguishes the Son from the Holy Spirit, whether filiation or active inspiriting only, – because if it is filiation, then, however much active inspiriting is *per impossibile* removed, there remains still a reason for distinguishing.

29. Further, although a position that, as soon as it is understood, includes contradictories cannot be admitted, yet that which, when understood, includes only one of the contradictories, and the other only through an accidental consequence or through topics extrinsic, seems it can well be admitted, because when such a position is set down rules of disputation can be kept to; for 'what follows by an essential consequence' can be conceded and what is repugnant can be denied; but if something 'repugnant' is inferred that follows from an extrinsic topic or by an accidental consequence, one must deny that it follows, because the proposition by which such a consequence would hold would be destroyed by the position. But now active inspiriting is not of the *per se* understanding of the Son, as he is a person, but is a quasi-property common to the Father and the Son; therefore, with this removed, then, in the positing of the Son in the being of Son, there are no contradictories posited by the first understanding of the proposed supposition [sc. that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son], but only one of them, namely that the Son is Son, and the other exists only as it were by accidental consequence and by an extrinsic topic, from the removal of the quasi-passion by removing the quasi-subject; therefore the position does not so include opposites that it cannot be admitted.²⁴³

30. Again, if something included essentially in something is posited as removed from it, which was yet not the reason for the inherence of any predicate, – one can well ask whether, with this or that removed, such a predicate would inhere or not; and however much the proposed supposition includes contradictories, it is yet not repugnant to this supposition that one part of the question is not determinately to be given; for example, if animality is removed from man – which however includes impossibles – and the question is asked whether, with this removed, man can be distinguished from ass, a response that he can would seem determinately possible, because it does not belong to man to be distinguished from an ass by animality but by rationality. Therefore, even if active inspiriting were of the idea of the Son, yet one can still ask whether – with that removed – the Son may be distinguished from the Holy Spirit or not, because the question is only 'whether the removed predicate was the precise cause of the distinction, or whether some other predicate was that was not removed'.

31. Further, it is one thing to posit something and, with that posited, to ask about some proposition, – and another thing to ask about the truth of some conditional, because to ask about some conditional commits one to nothing. Although therefore the opinion [that the question cannot be posed, n.27] has some probability if one posited that the Holy

²⁴³ The logical point being made here is hard to follow, even with the explanations provided by the Vatican editors.

Spirit did not proceed from the Son etc., yet it has none when the question is proposed (in the way I have proposed it) as follows: ‘whether, if the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son, a real distinction between him and the Son could stand’. For there I am asking about a certain conditional, whether on ‘the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son’ it essentially follows that ‘he is not distinguished from the Son’, so that the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent, speaking of the formal understanding of them.

32. Against this position [the opinion stated in n.27] there are also many authorities.

One is from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “If the Father were not unborn, nothing would prevent him from having generated the Son,” – and yet this position concomitantly includes impossibles, namely that the Father is unborn [sc. since the Father is by definition unborn, to suppose him not unborn is to suppose impossibles].

33. And Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* ch.16: “If there were just one person, nothing would prevent him having the fullness of wisdom,” – although, however, on the fullness of wisdom or intellect there concomitantly follows a plurality of persons.

34. Thus too the Philosopher *Physics* 4.7.214a9-11 argues: supposing that there were some space, and it contained no body but sound or color, he asks whether it would be a vacuum; and he responds that if it was of a nature to receive a body, it would be a vacuum; if not, not. Therefore, with such a supposition in place, which however of itself posits impossibles (because an accident – as sound or color – would be without a subject), one can ask about something whether it follows, namely by understanding it of natural consequence, – because although the posited supposition includes impossibles, it does not however include all the impossibles by natural consequence, but one of the contradictories can follow on it by natural consequence and the other contradictory not at all, save as on something or other impossible.

II. Response to the Question

A. Opinion of Others

35. Therefore, allowing of the question, there is one opinion that says that if the Holy Spirit did not proceed from the Son he would in no way be distinguished from him, – and it has on its behalf two reasons.

36. One reason is this: relation in divine reality distinguishes either according to its quiddity or according to its being; not according to its being because thus it passes into essence; therefore according to its quiddity. But according to its quiddity it only has a respect to its opposite, therefore it only distinguishes from its opposite; but, on the supposition of this hypothesis, there would not be in Son and Holy Spirit opposite relations; therefore etc.

37. The second reason is this: if disparate relations could sufficiently distinguish persons, since there are two such relations in the Father – as active generation and active inspiring –, the Father would be two persons. There is a confirmation for the reason in that these relations – active inspiring and active generation – seem to have as great a distinction as do their relatives or correlatives; therefore the latter can distinguish just as can the former.

38. Anselm's authority is adduced, in his book *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.2, but since each side adduces him on their own behalf and there is much disagreement about what his intention was, I do not for this reason wish here to dwell much on his intention.

B. Against the Opinion

39. Against this opinion are the reasons that are taken from two middle terms: the first middle is from the idea of what is formally constitutive, the second from the distinction of emanations.

40. [From the idea of what is formally constitutive] – The argument from the first of these is as follows: by whatever something is formally constituted in being, by that it is distinguished, because it is by the same thing that anything is a being and is one (with the unity fitting such an entity), and, if it is one, then it is not distinct from itself and is distinct from others; but the Son is constituted in 'personal being' by filiation, therefore he is by it formally distinguished from every other person; therefore, after everything else, and especially 'later' filiation, *per impossibile* or *per incommpossibile* has been removed, the Son will by filiation remain distinct in person from any other person. – The assumption is plain, because the Son is not constituted in 'personal being' by active inspiring, because that is common to the Father and the Son; and there are not in him other positive properties besides passive generation and active inspiring; therefore etc.

41. A response is that something is not distinguished by what is formally constitutive from anything at all, but only from things with which it most agrees and from which it is not distinguished in any save that formal way. An example: man is distinguished by rationality, not from a stone, but from the species of animal, with which he most agrees and from which he seems to be in very few things distinct; but he is distinguished from a stone by animality, because a stone is inanimate, but this animality is not formally constitutive of man. – So is it said in the intended proposition, that the Son agrees with the Father in active inspiring, and is in this respect distinguished from the Holy Spirit; but by his own proper formality (namely filiation) he is distinguished from the Father, with whom he most agrees; wherefore etc.

42. Against this [n.41], and first that anything possessing a certain existence is, by a distinction that belongs to that existence, distinguished from anything else through something that is of the idea of that in which it has such existence. Therefore the Son is distinguished as a person through something which is of his idea insofar as he is a person, but active inspiring is not of the idea of the Son, but, once the Son is already posited, it is as it were an adventitious property. From this it is plain that the example adduced is not to the purpose, because, although man is not distinguished from stone first by rationality, yet he is distinguished by something that is of his essence, so that it would be discordant for him to be distinguished from a stone through nothing that is of his essence but through risibility. So it is then in the intended proposition.

43. Secondly in this way: what is constituted is distinguished by what is formally constitutive of it from everything else, even if *per impossibile* all things other than it were removed, because by it is it first distinguished – that is adequately – from everything not such; but anything that does not have that constitutive form is not such; therefore by that form is it distinguished from everything else that does not have it.

44. This reason [n3] is made clear by the fact that, although man is distinguished from a stone not only by rationality but also by animality, he is not distinguished by rationality first as well, that is, he is not adequately distinguished by rationality (because then anything distinct from a stone would be rational), but he is first distinguished in the genus of 'body' from a stone by 'animality'; however, after by intellect removing from man whatever is other than rationality, he would yet by that alone be essentially distinguished from whatever is not rational, and so from a stone, which is not rational. Therefore it is not only what distinguishes adequately that distinguishes really but also what, merely if it were posited, would be impossible with that from which it is distinguished.

45. For this reason, taken from what is properly constitutive [n.40], there is a confirmation in that, if the Father *per impossibile* did not inspirit but the Son did, the Father would still be distinguished from the Son and from the Holy Spirit by paternity, just as he is by paternity constituted in his personal existence.

46. [From the distinction of emanations] – From the second middle term, namely from the distinction of emanations [n.39], the argument is as follows: generation is distinguished from inspiriting, and this when *per impossibile* everything other than the idea of generation and inspiriting is removed, or at any rate when the fact is removed that active inspiriting would be from the Son, provided however that the distinction of the principles of generating and inspiriting would stand; therefore also, when all such is removed, the distinction between Son and Holy Spirit would stand.

47. The proof of the consequence is that it is impossible for one person to receive existence from two total productions; for a person receives existence from no production or distinction such that, if the production or distinction were *per impossibile* removed, the person would no less receive existence; but if it received existence from this production and from that – and from each completely, because each would be perfect – then, when either was removed, it would have existence completely through the other, and so it would receive being from neither and from each.

48. To this reasoning certain responses, as to the antecedent, are made, and because this matter will be treated of in distinction 13 [I d.13 n.7], I do not now enter on it. The conclusions of the above reasonings [nn.40, 46] I concede, and the intended proposition will become clearer when the distinction of the emanations has been made clear [d.13].

III. To the Principal Arguments

49. To the authority from Boethius [n.24] I concede that 'relation multiplies the Trinity', and yet it distinguishes not only from the opposite relation but also from any disparate relation with which it is formally not the same; because, just as in the genus of quality whiteness is distinguished not only from the other opposite quality [sc. blackness] but also from every other disparate one, because whiteness is not formally sweetness nor smell (and if any disparate quality were impossible with another disparate one in the same supposit, not only would the nature be distinguished from the nature but there would also be required a distinction of supposit), so any disparate relation is distinguished from any other disparate relation, without any other impossibility. There is a confirmation: active generation is distinguished from inspiriting as it exists in the

Father, because the Son does not have an inspiriting more distinct from active generation than the inspiriting of the Father is distinct from it, because the Son's inspiriting is the same as the Father's. However some relations have not only a distinction but also an impossible idea (or an impossibility) in the same supposit, of which sort are the disparate relations of receiving the nature, because a person that received the nature in disparate ways would not have the nature in a single way.

50. To Augustine on *The City of God* I say that any person is that which he has, except that the relative has the correlative and is not it itself. But once the hypothesis in question is in place [n.24], the Holy Spirit would not have the Son as correlative and as inspiriter, and so it does not follow that the Holy Spirit would be the Son because he would not have the Son either as intrinsic or as correlative originator. But Augustine makes an exception when he says that that which is had does not have when it is had as a correlative; so Augustine does not take things otherwise than that what is had is had either in the way in which the Son is said to have deity, or in the way in which he is said to have a Father; one way is to have it formally or essentially, the other way is to have it correlatively or originally.

IV. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others on the Question

51. To the reasons for the first opinion [n.35].

To the first [n.36] I say that the relation remains there both according to quiddity and according to being. For in whatever way it remains according to quiddity, in that way it remains according to the being of that which is 'being toward another', because the quiddity of relation cannot be without 'being toward another', because by understanding a relation without 'being toward another' one understands not a relation but something absolute, because – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9 – if it is toward another it is not substance, and so if it is substance or toward itself, it is now not relation; for in whatever way the relation passes into essence, the being and the quiddity pass into it, because just as 'being toward another' – which is the being of relation – is truly the same as the essence, so also the quiddity of the relation is the same as the essence; for nothing is there which is not the same. Therefore both the being and the quiddity remain, because relation is not formally the divine essence, because, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* V ch.2 n.1: "he is not Word by that which he is wisdom;" but both pass into the essence because, along with the fact that they are not formally the same, they are truly the same, as has often been said [I d.2 n.410, d.4 n.10, d.5 nn.43-45, 117-118, 138].

52. When, therefore, you say 'it is distinguished either according to its quiddity or according to its being' [n.36], – I say that it is distinguished according to quiddity and according to 'being toward another'. And when you say 'thus it passes into essence, therefore it does not thus distinguish' [*ibid.*], the consequence is not valid, because it passes according to identity, because true identity does not have to be formal identity, because the formal idea of that which passes is not formally the idea of the essence into which it passes; and therefore to this formal idea belongs what is proper to it; but it is proper to it to be distinguished really from every relation, both an opposite one and a disparate one impossible with it, and therefore, along with the fact that it truly passes, it truly remains, as much as is sufficient for being really distinguished both from the opposite relative and also from a disparate relation impossible with it.

53. To the second, when the two properties in the Father are talked of [n.37], the response is in distinction 2 question 3 [I d.2 nn.221-237]. For there need not be as much distinction or impossibility of active productions as of passive productions, because it is impossible for the same thing to be produced by, and to receive being from, two opposite productions [*ibid.* n.357]; but it is not impossible for the same thing to communicate being to distinct persons by two active productions.

Twelfth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether One or insofar as they are Distinct

1. About the twelfth distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one or insofar as they are in some way distinct.

Proof that it is insofar as they are distinct:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.5 n.7: “The Holy Spirit is the common union (or the communion) of the Father and the Son.” From this it is commonly received that he is the nexus of them both, – but a nexus is only of things insofar as they are distinct; and he is the nexus of them insofar as he proceeds from them; therefore he proceeds from them insofar as they are distinct.

2. Again, action belongs to a supposit, therefore to two supposits there does not belong one action; the Holy Spirit is produced by the action of the Father and the Son as agents; therefore to them insofar as they are distinct.

3. Again, if they produce insofar as they are altogether one thing, – then either insofar as they are one thing in essence, or one thing in person, or one thing in inspiriting force; not insofar as they are one thing in essence, because then the Holy Spirit would produce himself, because he is one thing in essence with the Father and the Son; nor in the second way, as is plain; nor in the third way, insofar as they are one in inspiriting force, because then it would follow that the Father was two principles with respect to the Son and the Holy Spirit, because of the two productive forces in him with respect to them.

4. Again, the love of generated knowledge is the third part of the image, therefore ‘the love that proceeds’ is the love of the Word. – The proof of the antecedent is in distinction 6, from Augustine [I d.6 n.23]; look for the response there [*ibid.* n.27].

5. There are three acts to the will: with respect to the object, with respect to the act of being well pleased, with respect to command. The third is in no way in God, since neither is it in us with respect to the first intellection; the first is more principal, the second is more universal [I d.6 n.26], – each is essential in God. But ‘the love that proceeds’ is principally love of the object, not of the Word unless it is the Father’s (perhaps it belongs to neither from first production), just as neither is there a Word save of the essence; now all love in us is a love that proceeds, not there, however, but only love of the known lovable object.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15: “Father and Son are one principle for the Holy Spirit, just as Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one principle for the creature;” but the creature is from the three insofar as they are one, not insofar as they are distinct; therefore etc.

I. Response to the Question

7. In this question it is plain that the Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. This was made clear in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X, as is plain in the *Extra*, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic faith’, and it is today in book 6 of the *Decretals* [*Sixth Book of the Decretals of Boniface VIII* lib.1 tit.1 ch. un].

The reason for this truth is as follows, that, as was said in distinction 11, the Father has first in origin the act of fecundity of the intellect before that of the will [I d.11 n.13]; in that prior stage there is communicated to the Son the same fecundity as is in the Father, because in that moment of origin – in which the Son is produced by the fecundity of the intellect – there is communicated to him by the Father whatever is not repugnant to him, and so the fecundity of the will is communicated [*ibid.* n.12]; therefore, in the other moment of origin, when a person is produced by the act of the second fecundity (namely of the will), that person is produced by the Father and the Son as altogether by one principle, because of the one fecundity of the productive principle in them [*ibid.* n.18].

II. Whether the Father and the Son inspirit more by the Will insofar as it is One or insofar as it is Concordant.

8. But there is another difficulty. For since the will is single in two supposits, which supposits will concordantly with this will, and concord connotes some distinction of the concordant supposits, the difficulty is whether the Father and the Son *per se* inspirit more by this will insofar as they are one or insofar as they are concordant.

A. Opinion of Henry of Ghent

9. Here the following is said [by Henry], that the producing supposits are distinct, and because of this distinction they would not in any way be conceded to inspirit insofar as they are plural, – for they have one inspiriting force; but further, this inspiriting force is not wholly under the idea of its unity the proximate fecund principle for inspiriting, but rather under the idea of concordant will, where some distinction is connoted; and, because of this distinction, connoted on the part of the principle ‘by which’, one can concede that they inspirit insofar as they are distinct. – This opinion is given confirmation through Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* III ch.16.

10. “Since²⁴⁴ the intellect, as it exists in one person, can have perfect fecundity for the production of the Word, but the will, unless it exists in a double person, cannot have perfect fecundity for the production of the Holy Spirit, and this because the fecundity of the intellect consists in the fullness of perfect wisdom, which can exist in a single person, as Richard says [*ibid.*]: ‘Nothing is defined contrary to nature if the fullness of wisdom is said to be able to exist in only one person in the deity, for if there were only one person in the deity he could nevertheless have the fullness of wisdom’; but the fecundity of the will consists in the fullness of true love, which cannot exist save, at a minimum, in two persons, on the saying of the same Richard [*ibid.* ch.3]: ‘Love cannot be delightful unless it is mutual’, because, since the fecundity of the will cannot exist in essential love unless the love is supremely perfect and delightful, it is necessary that, if the will is fecund, the love be mutual, ‘so that there may be’ – according to him ch.3 – ‘one who bestows love and one who pays it back’, because, as he says in ch.7, ‘there is no satisfaction for a supreme lover if the supreme loved does not pay back supreme love’.

11. And for this reason, so that – as was said above [n.10] – the common will of the Father and the Son may be fecund for inspiriting the Holy Spirit, it is not enough that

²⁴⁴ Scotus here proceeds to quote Henry, though, according to the Vatican editors, his quoting, for whatever reason, is not fully accurate.

both have one will and an essential common love in it, whereby both of them love and will together, but it is necessary that both have a mutual and concordant will, such that one of them bestows supreme love on the other and the other in turn always pays supreme love back to the first; when this love exists, the will is fecund so that it produces love from itself, which love is the Holy Spirit, as Richard says (*ibid.* [n.10] ch.11): ‘in love mutual and most fervent there is nothing more admirable than that by him whom you supremely love, and by whom you are supremely loved, you should wish another to be equally loved’; ‘therefore in that love, as it is mutual, the love of each, in order to be consummate, requires there to be a sharer in the love already possessed’, and this through the inspiriting force, which is concordant will in mutual love, by producing the Holy Spirit, – not only as they are one in that will or love, but as they are plural distinct among themselves, which distinction is connoted by the fact that the will is said to be concordant and the love mutual; this cannot be unless it be of more than one insofar as these plural are inseparable, for the prefix ‘con’ indicates association, which is only of several who are distinct (and, for this reason, it is well said that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three co-eternals’, although it is denied that ‘Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three eternals’).

12. By the fact too that this will is concordant, and although the mutual love of both is one and the same, yet there is not the same idea to it as it is bestowed by the Father on the Son, and as, conversely, it is paid back by the Son to the Father, – since (according to Richard, *ibid.* ch.19) ‘when the two love themselves mutually and pay each other back the affection of supreme desire, and the affection of the first runs round to the second and of the second round to the first, it tends as it were to things diverse’, because it is in some way diverse in idea; but this diversity is in love and essential will, notwithstanding which, the fecundity is thoroughly one and the same in that concordant will and mutual love, in which fecundity the Father and the Son are one and they uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit, who ‘is loved concordantly by both, and the affection of the two is melted into one by the fire of the third love’, as the same Richard says.

13. And accordingly, in the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit, a double distinction between Father and Son is to be considered; in one way as they are expressed in eliciting the act, – in another way as they are understood to be concordant in mutual love and will about the act to be elicited. And, by the distinction of inspiriting considered in the first way, they are in no way to be said to inspirit as plural; for although they are plural who inspirit, yet they do not inspirit because of the plurality that is prior in them, but only from the distinction between them considered in the second way; and thus the Father and the Son do not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are plural in eliciting the act (although they concur in the one idea according to which the act is elicited), but as they are plural in one will, which is the idea of eliciting the act, by being concordant in their love in that mutuality.”

B. Against the Opinion of Henry

14. Against this position.

[First reason] – If the Father and Son produce the Holy Spirit by will as by it loving themselves in concord, then there is another Holy Spirit produced beforehand, – which is a discordant result.

15. Proof of the consequence. First because in whatever moment of nature, or of origin, the productive principle is in itself perfect and is in a supposit suited for the action, in that moment there can, on such a supposition, be a reason for producing; but infinite will, as it is infinite will, understood before all act of will, having an infinite object present to itself, is a sufficient productive principle of infinite love, and the Father and the Son are persons suited for production; therefore the will as it is in the Father and the Son, not understood as that by which they formally will but as it is an infinite will having the divine essence present to it by an act of intelligence, will be for the Father and the Son the productive principle of the Holy Spirit, – and so, if the Holy Spirit is produced by will insofar as it is in act of willing, or insofar as by it the Father and Son love themselves in act, it follows that, before the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is in act of willing, the Holy Spirit has been produced by the will as it is first act, which is discordant.

16. This reasoning about the will [n.15], that it is a principle of inspiring as it is will, but not as it is in act of willing, is confirmed in two ways: first by the formal idea of the will in being a principle, which is liberty, and it does not in this way belong to the act of will itself; second by a likeness with the intellect.

17. In the first way [n.16] the argument is as follows: the will, as it is first act in us, is free to have an act of willing, but the act itself of willing is not free, or a principle of producing anything freely, because an act of willing is a certain natural quality, – and, if it is a principle of any act, it seems to be a natural principle of it not a free one (in the way that, if a habit of appetite were generated from such an act, the habit would be naturally generated, so that the generation of such a habit is not, as it seems, in the power of the act). Therefore it seems that the free production of the Holy Spirit is more saved if he is produced by will as it is first act than if he is produced by will as it is in act of willing, namely as it is understood to be in second act.

18. In the second way [n.16] the argument is as follows, that the Son is not produced by the paternal intellect as it is in act of understanding, such that actual intellection is the formal idea by which the Father generates the Son, as was shown above in distinction 2 [I d.2 nn.291-296]; therefore, by similarity, the will, as it is in act of willing, will not be the principle of producing the Holy Spirit, but the will as first act will be.

19. Next I prove the principal consequence [n.14] in this way, by taking the same major as before [n.15], ‘in whatever moment of nature or of origin etc.’; then I add this minor, that the divine will – having the first object present to it – is the idea of producing a love adequate to that object more perfectly than when having a secondary object present to it, or at least it is not so less perfectly; therefore, since the divine essence is the first object of the divine will – not the Father as Father, nor the Son as Son, because then the Father would be formally blessed in several distinct objects – then the will that has the divine essence present to it (whether as lovable or as loved, I care not in this second proof [as opposed to the first proof, n.15]) will be more a principle of producing love adequate to the object, at any rate not less than it, and so, since the will has the essence for object before the Father as he is Father, the Holy Spirit will be inspired by the will as it is of the divine essence as first object before he is inspired by the will as it is of the Father as of its object, or of the Son as of its object.

20. A confirmation of this reason [n.19] is that the divine essence is formally infinite, but paternity as paternity is not formally infinite; therefore the Holy Spirit, who

is infinite love, and this not only by reason of infinite will but by reason also of infinite object, as was said in distinction 10 [I d.10 nn.9, 30-31, 47-49], will be inspirited by the will as it is of the divine essence (which is the infinite object) rather than as it is of the Father as Father or of the Son as Son, as of its object.

21. If it be said that the essence is not the first object of the will but the formal idea in the first object is, which is the person, – this is false, because there is one first object of the will, and because the idea of the formal loved is what is first loved; it also concedes the intended proposition, because it will be the formal idea of inspiriting in the way in which the object contributes to the inspiriting.

22. From these two proofs [sc. nn.15, 19, proofs of the principal consequence, n.14] the conclusion is drawn that the Father does not inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as he loves the Son first, nor the Son insofar as he loves the Father, but the Father and the Son insofar as they have the divine essence present to them as first object of their will, and this because of the second proof of the principal consequence [n.19]; likewise, the conclusion is drawn that they inspirit insofar as they have the essence present to them, not as actually loved, but as lovable, presented in an act of their intelligence, because of the first proof of the consequence [n.15].

23. And if you object to the first proof [n.15], ‘surely the Father and the Son are lovers of the essence in itself before they inspirit the Holy Spirit?’ – one can reply as was said before in distinction 6 [I d.6 n.15] about the production of the Son, how the Father in some way understands first in the origin before the Son is generated, and yet not such that the actual understanding of the Father is the idea of begetting the Son, but the memory in the Father [I d.2 nn.290-296]; one can speak in this way of the love by which the Father and the Son love concordantly and formally, and about the act of inspiriting.

24. [Second reason] – Again, second [n.14]: a principle that is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two is a principle of acting as equally in one supposit as in two, because there seems to be required for action only a perfect principle ‘by which’ and a perfect acting supposit; but the will is as equally perfect in one supposit as in two, and one supposit is as equally perfect – with the perfection requisite for an acting supposit – as two; therefore the will can be as equally a principle of producing in one as in two, such that the mutuality [sc. in concordant love] is not a reason for producing on the part of the productive principle.

25. The proof of the major [n.24] is that the principle ‘by which’ does not receive the perfection belonging to it from the supposit but gives it to the supposit – because by it the supposit is perfect – so that it can act; therefore such a principle is not more perfect in several supposits than in one when there is the same principle in several supposits and in one.

26. And if you say [against the argument of n.24] that the principle is not in one person as it is a productive principle but only as it is in two, and only as residual in the Father after the Son has been generated, – this seems absurd, because all the reality, both relative and absolute, that the Father can have, he has in himself in the first moment of origin; therefore he has, after the Son has been generated, none that he is not pre-understood to have in origin before the Son is generated, – wherefore he has that fecundity [of inspiriting] too, whether the fecundity is posited as a relation or as something absolute [I d.3. n.584].

27. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.29: “The Father is the principle of the whole deity,” and from him – in the authority cited before [n.6] – it is plain that Father and Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, altogether one, as the three persons are one principle of the creature; they do not, however, altogether ‘uniformly’ inspirit if the Son had at once, in the first moment of origin, the fecundity of inspiriting and the Father, in the first moment of origin, have all fecundity, did not but only had it in the second moment, after the Son has been generated.

28. And if an instance is made [against the response to the objection, n.26] about the power of creating, that it is not in the Father before the production of the Son and the Holy Spirit, – the response will be clear partly here in the exposition of Richard’s intention [nn.38-39], and more fully about ‘the order of the intrinsic productions to the extrinsic ones’ [II d.1 q.1].

29. [Third reason] – Again, if there is perfect will in the Father, it is plain it is first in origin there before it is in the Son; but it is not a perfect principle of inspiriting, for you [sc. Henry]. – I ask what is understood to be added to the principle so that it be a perfect principle of inspiriting? Not some supposit, because that adds nothing to the principle ‘by which’, but by a supposit the principle only has that it can act. If it is the mutual love of this person for that, and conversely, then the double relation of reason will be the ultimate reason or actuality of the principle of inspiriting; this is impossible for two reasons: first, that no relation of reason is a prerequisite for divine production (it is proved in distinction 13, against the opinion positing that the intellect and will are only distinguished by reason [I d.13 nn.31-40]), – second, because then there would be two proximate formal principles of inspiriting, and so the two supposits would not inspirit entirely as they are one, which is contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity*, as cited in the argument to the contrary [n.6].

30. [Fourth reason] – Again, if they had two wills, they could, with such mutuality, be concordant [n.24]; therefore to inspirit insofar as they are concordant is not to inspirit ‘as one principle’, because they do so neither as one supposit nor as one principle ‘by which’, insofar as they are concordant.

31. [Fifth reason] – Again, the Father, by will and volition as they are in him, along with relation to the loved Son, is either the whole principle of inspiriting or he is not. If he is, it follows that the Son does not inspirit insofar as he has a relation, because he does not as such have the idea of the ‘by which’; for he does not inspirit insofar as he loves if, when his loving is removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited; but, when the relation has been removed, the Holy Spirit would no less be inspirited by the Father as total principle, by his act of will as it tends to the Son. If it is granted instead (in the alternative above) that he is not, it follows that each, insofar as he loves the other, is only a diminished principle, and both together are one principle as it were by aggregation (as two people hauling a ship), but not one principle by identity of perfect principle.

32. [Against the reasons taken from Richard] – Further, against the reasons that Richard gestures to on his behalf [sc. Henry’s], namely that mutual love is most delightful [n.10]; from this it follows that the Father would be formally blessed by such love, because the love by which he is blessed is most delightful, and then the Father would not be formally blessed in himself but in the Son, objectively, which is heretical.

33. Again, second, against that reason [n.32], I argue as follows: in us mutual love is more delightful because by such mutuality a fuller idea of lovability is had in the

beloved. For any beloved able to love, if he loves back, makes himself more lovable, because not only is whatever goodness is in him the idea of lovability, but also loving back is another idea of lovability, and for this reason he who has the goodness which is the first idea of lovability, and likewise has loving back, is more lovable. Therefore it will be the opposite in divine reality, where this idea of lovability can in no way be found or posited; for the Son is not more lovable than the Father, or more a lover back of the divine essence (because of which he is first loved back), nor is this loving back another idea of lovability in the Son.

34. Further, mutual love in us is not more delightful unless it is known. For just as goodness is not loved unless it is known, so neither is he who loves back loved insofar as he loves back unless his loving back is known. But if loving back or mutual love must be posited in this way as more delightful in divine reality, and if for this reason the Holy Spirit is by such love inspirited, – then the Father and the Son would inspirit the Holy Spirit, not insofar as they love each other back, but insofar as they love and know they love each other back, such that the knowledge of being loved back would then seem to be a more formal and more immediate principle of inspiriting the Holy Spirit than love, and so the Holy Spirit will be more formally and more immediately produced by the intellect than by the will.

35. [Against the one holding the opinion] – Further, against the one who holds this opinion [sc. Henry], because he holds that the Holy Spirit can be distinguished from the Son even if he did not proceed from the Son, because of his distinct mode of proceeding from the Father. But if the fecundity of the will for inspiriting the Holy Spirit exists only as it is formally the will in two persons, his own mode of proceeding – a mode other than the mode of proceeding of the Son – could not belong to the Holy Spirit unless he was from the Son. Therefore Henry seems to be contradicting himself.

C. Scotus' own Opinion

36. As to this article [n.8] I concede that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit by the will insofar as they are altogether one, because for the idea of principle, precisely as principle, there is only required its perfection in itself and that it be had in the person before it is understood to have an adequate term; but the will is 'altogether one' in the Father and the Son, and it exists in them by origin before it is understood to have an adequate term (because both persons are also inspiritive), and therefore the will, as it exists in them, is the same productive principle with respect to the Holy Spirit.

37. But, for understanding the words of Richard [nn.11-12], I draw a distinction, that 'concordant will' can be understood in many ways; either concordant in some elicited second act, as in loving the same thing, and then loving either the creature or the Holy Spirit; or in loving themselves and in loving back, as that the Father loves thereby the Son and conversely; or 'concordant' can be understood habitually, insofar as first act is of a nature to have a second quasi-act. The Father and the Son do not seem to inspirit the Holy Spirit with a concordant will in the first two ways, because (as was proved in the first reason by two proofs [nn.14, 15, 19]) they do not formally inspirit either by love of the essence (as was proved in the first proof [n.15]) or by love of each other (as was touched on in the second proof [n.19]). Therefore the understanding must be taken in the third way: 'by concordant will' that is 'by will insofar as it is first act, in which they are

of a nature to be concordant in their act, by concordantly producing love'; by such a will – I say – they inspirit, and more by a single will than by a concordant will, because, as the will is understood to be first act, it is understood to be one will in them and not to have concord save in the following way of speaking, 'because these persons are understood to be able to be concordant in their quasi-second act by concordantly inspiriting'.

38. Then, by saving the words of Richard in some way, I say that, when in some one and the same thing there are two active principles 'active in an ordered way', that one thing is not in proximate power to acting with the second principle unless it is pre-understood in the act of the first principle, – an example is about intellect and will in the soul; therefore the Father is not altogether fecund with a power proximate to inspiriting (which is an act of the will as the principle 'by which') unless he is pre-understood in the act of the prior principle (which is the intellect), and consequently the will is not the proximate principle save as it is in the two of them; this follows because, by that prior production – without which this power is not proximate – the will is in the two of them because, by the act of the first fecundity, there is communicated to the produced person the second fecundity, namely the fecundity of the will with respect to the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit; there is however no other fecundity – namely fecundity of will – in the two than in the one, but the same in both the producer and the product.

39. There is in some way an example of this in us. The soul is not fecund 'with proximate power' for having an act of willing unless it is in actual intellection, although it does not, by that intellection, formally produce the act of loving but by the will as it is first act, which preexists in the soul before intellection, although not in power altogether proximate to acting. If then the soul, in producing intellection, were to communicate to it the fecundity of volition, the will would not be in proximate power to producing love unless the word was first produced, and so after fecund will had been communicated to it; and thus the will would never be proximately fecund save in the two of them, – not however such that this fecundity should, of its idea, require existence in two because it could not exist in one (nay, it itself would already preexist in the mind itself); but, because of the order of fecundities in producing, there would necessarily have to be a second fecundity – when it is in proximate power – in the two of them.

40. It can therefore be conceded that the Father and the Son inspirit by the one will which is in them, and which is perfectly fecund existing in the two supposit, because it is understood to be communicated to the generated supposit – and so to exist in both supposit – before the Holy Spirit is produced by it.

41. But how is the Holy Spirit inspirited by mutual love [n.11]?

I reply: by love, that is by the will by which the Father and Son as in first act are of a nature to love themselves mutually; by this will – I say – as existing in them, and of a nature to be the sort by which they may love themselves mutually, the Holy Spirit is inspirited, but not by any second act as it were of love actually bestowed and requited. But if this does not suffice for the intention of Richard, let him expound him who can, because his determination does not seem to stand well with the statements of Augustine – who attributes to the Father and the Son the perfect idea of one principle with respect to the Holy Spirit as he does to the Trinity with respect to the creature [n.6] – if his determination contradict what was just said above; but as to how Augustine says that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, as if the Holy Spirit is the very mutual love of the Father and the Son (as Augustine seems to say in *On the Trinity* VI

ch.5 n.7), it will be expounded in distinction 32 [I d.32 qq.1-2 nn.1, 11], where the Master [Lombard] treats of this question ‘Whether the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’.

III. Whether the Father and the Son are one Inspiriter or two Inspirites

42. Connected to this question [n.1] is a quasi-grammatical difficulty: whether the Father and the Son might be called one inspiriter or two inspirites.

Here the thing is said in many ways, but because the force of the question is about the signification of a name, I do not delay over it much. For it seems that such a verbal name [sc. ‘inspiriter’] signifies such a principle of acting, as it is of a nature to denominate an active supposit; for just as ‘reading’ signifies an act quidditatively by way of habit and rest, so ‘reader’ signifies the principle of this sort of act by way of habit and rest as it is denominative of an active supposit; ‘inspiring’ therefore signifies the force of inspiring as it concerns the supposit – and because there is one force in the Father and the Son, and a numerical term attached to some determinable places on it its own signification, it does not therefore seem one should, as to the force of the word, concede that there are two inspirites, because the inspiring force would seem to be enumerated in these words.

43. And if you object that this inference follows ‘there are two inspiring, therefore there are two inspirites’ (the proof of the consequence is that just as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural), – I reply: I say that the consequence is not valid, because a participle signifies the act in its being done, for it co-signifies time as does a verb, – and so, just as it is conceded that the Father and the Son create, thus is it conceded that they are creating; but it is not conceded that they are two creators but one creator, because the verbal name does not signify the act by way of act and in its being done, but by way of habit and rest.

44. But what is the reason for conceding that a numerical term can be attached to adjectival terms but not to substantives?

This reason is posited, that adjectives are added to supposits and signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, and therefore they can be counted by the number of the supposits; but substantives do not thus signify the form in the thing added to the supposits, but they as it were signify in a way that is abstracted from the supposits; therefore they cannot be thus counted, because the number of the form would there be signified, and so it is not conceded that ‘there are two Gods’ as it is conceded that ‘there are two possessing deity’.

45. But this reason does not seem sufficient, because a numerical term puts its signification on the signification of the determinable; but what is signified by an adjective and a substantive is one and the same thing, – and they differ only in mode of signifying; therefore it seems that a numerical term primarily puts its signification on the same thing, and so, if a numbering of the determinable form is signified in one part and not in the other, because of the addition to the supposit that belongs to one and not to the other – then not by reason of the thing signified but by reason of the mode of signifying could there be truth in one and falsehood in the other.

46. I assign another reason of this sort: everything dependent depends on something altogether and simply independent (for never is the dependence of anything

sufficiently terminated save at something altogether independent), and therefore when things are equally dependent, neither is of a nature to terminate the other, but both would depend on some third, independent thing; an adjective is dependent on a substantive. When, therefore, an adjective is added to a substantive, an independent thing is found, at any rate, where its dependence is terminated, – but when two adjectives are added mutually to each other, neither depends on the other, because neither is terminated at the other but both depend on some third thing, which sufficiently terminates the dependence of both. Therefore when a numerical term is added to a substantive, as when it is said ‘two inspiriters’, at once the numerical adjectival term has a substantive terminating it, because the adjective is determining that which terminates its dependence; therefore the signification of its substantive is denoted as numbered. But when it is added to an adjective, as when it is said there are ‘two inspiriting’, both are dependent and therefore neither determines the other just as neither terminates the dependence of the other, but both depend on a third thing which terminates their dependence and is determined by them. And this holds in the proposed case [n.43], ‘somethings’ or ‘persons’, as if to say ‘three somethings’ or ‘three persons’ creating, because although the masculine form is, by usage, not a substantive, but only the neuter form is a substantive²⁴⁵ [I d.5 nn.36, 42], yet in divine reality, when a masculine adjective is set down by itself, it is then understood to be a substantive there, like ‘someone’ or ‘person’; as when it is said ‘the Father and the Son are one’ – as the authorities say [n.47] – , although they are one God, because ‘one’ posited absolutely is signified adjectively and is understood to have its own substantive, that is ‘someone’; hence [by ‘the Father and the Son are one’] is signified that the Father and the Son are one-someone or one-person.

47. Hence, as to this consequence ‘there are two inspiriting, therefore there are two inspiriters’, – I deny it.

And when you prove it ‘because as a singular implies a singular, so a plural implies a plural’ [n.43], I say that it is not necessary – if on some antecedent some consequent follows – that on a distinction in the antecedent a distinction in the consequent follows, except when the consequent is distinguished in the antecedents as a genus is distinguished in its species. But in the proposed case the inspiriting suppositis are distinguished, and on ‘inspiriting supposit’ there follows ‘inspiriter’, but this consequent is not distinguished or numbered by the numbered antecedent; and therefore, by arguing ‘inspiriting, therefore inspiriter, – therefore if there are two inspiriting, then there are two inspiriters’ there is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing from a distinction in the antecedent to a distinction in the consequent. And if it is sometimes found in authors that the Father and the Son are two inspiriters, these authorities should be given an exposition and understood soundly; for many authorities of the saints, which are sometimes not true as to the force of the speech, are to be expounded according to the Master [Lombard] in distinction 12 [*Sentences* I d.12 ch.2 nn.109-111].

IV. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the arguments.

²⁴⁵ In Latin the neuter ‘album’ (‘the white’) can be treated as a substantive, but the masculine ‘albus’ (‘a white [man]’) cannot be.

To the first, when an argument is made about the nexus [n.1], – I say that the Father and the Son have a nexus in the Holy Spirit as in a common product; for although they are distinct (otherwise the two would not have a nexus), yet they do not have a common product insofar as they are distinct, but insofar as they are one; hence the one product is from them insofar as they are one producing, and so the authority in question [sc. from Augustine] is to the opposite side.

49. To the second [n.2] I say that action is ‘of a *per se* existent singular’ – but it need not be of any incommunicable *per se* existent singular, as was said in distinction 4 [I d.4 nn.11-13].

In the way that this proposition is true ‘God creates’ or ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, so is it posited that there is some ‘this inspiriter’ to whom it first belongs – that is adequately belongs – to inspirit, and who is somehow pre-understood in the Father and in the Son, to whom the act of inspiriting belongs, because both are ‘this inspiriter’; and then it would be said of this ‘*per se* existent’, which is as it were something common in real being to the Father and to the Son, that there is one action, although it is not one supposit (that is, incommunicable), just as neither is the Trinity one supposit, yet it does create with one creation.

50. This does not seem as probable here as ‘God creates’ is there, because there does not seem to be here someone *per se* existent, common to the Father and to the Son but not to the Holy Spirit, because then that singular *per se* existent would, although not incommunicably, yet really be referred to the Holy Spirit, and it would be something really related inwardly prior in some way to the first person being understood, and so not every real relation inwardly would be of a person, which would not seem probable.

51. In another way it could be said that action denominates with ultimate denomination only the supposit, or something having the mode of a supposit. I say ‘mode of a supposit’ for the separated soul and for accidents separated by miracle, which are denominated by action with ultimate denomination, because they *per se* exist, – although not incommunicably, because they are of a nature to communicate being to supposits; but while they are communicating nothing, nothing is denominated by their action save by ultimate denomination itself. But every form, existing in another as a form, just as it gives that other being so it gives it to be in some way denominated by the form’s action, not however with ultimate denomination, but there is denomination further of the supposit by the same action; but if some *per se* existing form were of a nature to have some proper action, and if it were to give the same being to several supposits, then, from the fact that the supposits are not denominated by the action of the form save because they have being through the form, they would be denominated by the same action, just as they would have the same being of that active form (an example: if one whiteness were in two surfaces, the surfaces would cause a change [sc. in the eye] with one change); so therefore, since ‘fecund will’ is one principle of inspiriting, whatever is denominated by this action would, by the fact that it has being by this form, be denominated by the same action. When therefore he [sc. Henry] says [n.2] that ‘action belongs to a supposit, therefore several actions belong to several supposits’, I deny the consequence, except when that is multiplied in them which is the idea of the acting, by which, when it gives being, they are said denominatively to act.

52. And if you object that from the one soul of a man there are many distinct operations (as to understand and to will), and also many operations of the sensitive parts

(as to see, to hear, and many such), and, if these parts were supposits, there would be many actions of them when they are acting, – I reply that one thing is not always one idea of acting; rather, one thing can include in itself several ideas of acting, as will be said of the soul in respect of its powers, if question is made about this [II *Suppl.* d.16 q. un nn.15-19], IV d.49 p.1 qq.1-2 n.18]. But it was said in the response already given [n.51] what sort of idea there is in the Father and the Son with respect to the production or the producing of the Holy Spirit.

53. To the third [n.3] I say that the Father and the Son inspirit the Holy Spirit insofar as they are altogether one; and not insofar as they are one in essence, nor insofar as they are one in person, but insofar as they are one in inspiriting force. And when you infer ‘therefore the Father would be two productive principles, because of the double fecundity in him’ [n.3], I deny the consequence, because in order to say ‘several producers’ a numbering of the supposits is required; for someone is not said to be ‘several knowers’ although he has several sciences, but there would have to be several supposits for this to follow (about this elsewhere, in book III, where the question is raised ‘whether, if several natures were assumed by the Word, he would be one or several men’ [III d.1 q.3 n.3]).

Question Two

Whether the Father and the Son uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit

54. Second I ask whether the Father and the Son altogether uniformly inspirit the Holy Spirit.

That they do not: Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.17 n.29: “The Holy Spirit proceeds principally from the Father.” Therefore not principally from the Son; therefore not altogether uniformly.

55. Again, Jerome *Epistle* 88 [=Ps.-Jerome *Epistle* 17 to Cyril]: “The Holy Spirit is properly from the Father,” through the Son. Not therefore properly from the Son.

56. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* XII n.57: “May I merit the Holy Spirit, who is from you through your only Begotten.” Therefore he is from the Father through the Son; therefore not uniformly from both.

57. Again, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* V ch.9: “The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father mediately and immediately, but from the Son only immediately.” Therefore etc.

58. Again, every first cause acts more than the second, from the first proposition in *On Causes*; and it is plain from the statement of the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30, and in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30: “The principles of necessary things must always be most true, because they are cause of truth for other things.” Therefore every first producer produces more than the second producer; the Father seems to produce first, because he gives the producing to the Son, therefore etc.

59. On the contrary:

They inspirit the Holy Spirit by one principle, insofar as it is altogether one in them, – from the preceding question [n.36 above]; therefore altogether uniformly.

I. To the Question

60. I reply. An act can be considered in three ways: either in itself, or insofar as it is of a term, or insofar as it is compared to the acting supposits. In the first two ways there is altogether uniformity, or rather unity, because there is most truly one act and one produced term. Speaking in the third way, just as the inspiriting force is communicated to the Son by the Father, so also the Son has from the Father the fact that he inspirits, – and so the Father inspirits from himself, the Son not from himself.

61. On the contrary: therefore the Father inspirits the Holy Spirit before the Son inspirits the Holy Spirit, because in the first moment of origin, in which the Father has being from himself, he has inspiriting from himself, – and then the Son would not inspirit, because if the Holy Spirit is pre-understood to have being from the Father prior to from the Son, then the Son will not produce an already existing Holy Spirit.

62. I reply. About these orders or origins, or about many orders of priority and posteriority, there will be discussion elsewhere [II d.1 q.1 nn.13-18]. But as to what concerns the intended proposition, one should not understand that the Father inspirits before the Son inspirits, in the way that the Father generates first in origin before he inspirits, because then the Son would not inspirit (as the argument [n.61] deduces), just as the Holy Spirit cannot generate a Son already understood to be generated. But the order that exists in the Father is as follows: first both fecundities are from himself; second, there is in the Father the act of first fecundity, and then in the Son there is the second fecundity; third there is the act of the second fecundity, from the Father and the Son together as then having that fecundity, – yet still in a certain order, because the act is of the Father from himself, but of the Son not from himself but from the Father, just as neither in the second moment is there that fecundity of the Son from himself, but it is of the Father from himself. There is not then an order of origin between the inspiriting of the Father and of the Son, as if the Father inspirited in some moment of origin in which the Son does not inspirit, but they inspirit together in the same moment of origin; there is however there an order of inspiritings in the act of inspiriting, because the Father in that moment of origin inspirits from himself, but the Son not from himself.

II. To the Principal Arguments

63. Through this is the answer plain to all the authorities adduced [nn.54-58], – because it is for this reason that Augustine says the Father inspirits principally [n.54]; for he himself expounds it: “Therefore I said ‘principally’, because the Son has from the Father the fact that he inspirits.”

64. However, a certain doctor [Bonaventure] says that the Father inspirits principally and more principally, but the Son only principally, because the Son has authorship with respect to the Holy Spirit while the Father has authorship both with respect to the Son and with respect to the Holy Spirit, insofar as he inspirits. – But another doctor [Henry] contradicts him, because there is not there any comparison properly speaking in some one form, but there is only there comparison in words; just as [the Archangel] Michael is said to be holier than the demon, where there is only a comparison in words and not in any from common to each extreme (but the form is only in one extreme and not in the other), so principality is in the Father, so that it is the same thing for the Father to inspirit more principally and for him to inspirit principally.

65. As to the other from Jerome [n.55], I say that he alone is said to be proprietor who does not, in possessing a thing, depend on another, but a borrower is said to be he who, in using a thing, depends on another and is not properly a proprietor. The Father, therefore, who has inspiriting force from himself, is rightly said properly to inspirit, but the Son does not thus properly inspirit – that is from himself –, although he does properly inspirit, that is not improperly or imperfectly.

66. Through the same point [n.62] the answer is plain to Hilary when he says that the Holy Spirit is from the Father through the Son [n.56]. – Yet a distinction is drawn, because something determined by this preposition ‘through’ with its causal force is compared either to a transitive verb or to an intransitive one; if to a transitive verb, then sub-authorship is noted in the causal force of this preposition, as ‘the Father creates through the Son’; if to an absolute or intransitive verb, then authorship is noted in the causal force of this preposition, and this either authorship of efficient causality, as ‘man lives through God’, or authorship of formal causality, as ‘man is wise through wisdom’.

67. And through the same point [n.62] the response is plain to Richard [n.57]. For the Father, with the same fecundity, inspirits the Holy Spirit immediately, but, insofar as he gives to the Son the virtue of inspiriting whereby the Son inspirits, the Father can be said to inspirit mediately; nor is there here any difference of form in perfection and imperfection, or anything which might posit diversity in act, but only a different way of having the same virtue, – because the Father has it from himself and the Son not from himself but from the Father.

68. To the final one [n.58] I say that the proposition is true about cause and caused, because of the fact that, in ordered causes, there is a different and a more principal virtue of causing in the prior cause, but it is not so in a principle which is not a cause, because there is not there a different virtue of being principle. Thus it is in the intended proposition, and therefore the first principle is not more of a principle than the second, just as neither is a superior cause more of a cause if it causes along with the second cause by the same causative virtue as that by which the second cause causes.

Thirteenth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the Production of the Holy Spirit is Generation or is Distinct from it

1. About the thirteenth distinction I ask whether the Holy Spirit is generated, or whether the production of the Holy Spirit is generation or is distinct from it.

Proof that it is generation:

Because generation in creatures is distinguished from other changes by the fact that it is change to substance, or by the fact that by it something is produced in the being of substance; the Holy Spirit is, by inspiriting, produced in divine being, just as by filiation or generation the Son is produced; therefore the production of the Holy Spirit is generation. – A confirmation of the reason is that changes and motions are distinguished by their formal terms, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 5.1.224b7-10; but the formal term of the inspiriting of the Holy Spirit is the same as the formal term of generation, because the essence is communicated to both; therefore inspiriting is generation.

2. Further, things that are the same as one and the same thing are the same as each other, therefore things that are univocal with one and the same thing are univocal with each other; generation and inspiriting are univocal productions when compared to the same third thing, as to the Father, because it was said above in distinction 7 that both productions are univocal in themselves [I d.7 n.42]; therefore they are productions univocal with themselves, and so they are of one and the same idea.

3. Further, a real difference does not depend on a difference of reason, because a real difference is more perfect; but the difference between the principles of these productions – which are nature and will – is only a difference of reason, because a real difference between absolute things does not seem capable of standing with the divine simplicity; therefore the distinction between these productions, which pre-requires the distinction of principles, will be only one of reason.

4. The minor is also proved in another way, doubly:

First, because otherwise there will be a real relation, and so a real distinction, between the intellect and the act of understanding in God. The proof of the first consequence is that wherever the intellect is, by the nature of the thing, distinguished from the act of understanding, the intellect receives the act of understanding (or is the idea of receiving it), and so there will be there a relation of recipient to thing received; and there is a confirmation, because, if the intellect in God is not the idea of receiving the act of understanding, God will not be said to understand more properly with the intellect than with the will. Thus also can it be argued about the relation of ‘prior’, because the principle is prior to that with respect to which it is principle.

5. The proof, second, of the minor is that the intellect absolutely is the principle ‘by which’ with respect to intellection, both in eliciting it and in receiving it, and so the two will be unequal, because the one exceeds the other; therefore when the same thing is added on both sides, an infinite intellect will be the principle in this way with respect to an infinite act of understanding, and so there will be there a real relation.

6. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.14 n.15 says that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son “not in some way born but in some way given.”

I. The Opinions of Others

7. There are here many suppositions and many modes in which these productions may be distinguished.

A. First Opinion

8. One way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the formal terms that are the produced persons.

9. And this supposition is confirmed by the statement in the *Physics* 5.5.229a25-27, where motions are distinguished by the terms, as it seems, because there is a different term for a different motion; and although these productions are not motions or changes, they are yet as it were certain ways to persons; therefore they are distinguished by the persons.

10. On the contrary: the productions do not have 'being' through the terms, therefore not distinction either. – The antecedent is plain because the terms have being formally from them; the consequence I prove because being and distinction are got from the same thing.

11. Again, the statement of the *Physics* [ibid.] is to the opposite: for motions are not distinguished by the terms save because the terms in flux are of the same idea as the terminating terms; but here the flux is not of the same idea as the term, – and the way too, which is as it were a flux, is not at all of the same idea as the formal terms, because the formal term is the essence, the way or the production – which is a sort of way – is the relation.

B. Second Opinion

12. Another way of supposing these productions are distinguished is by the fact that one production is from one person and the other from two persons.

13. Against this is that, if the same thing is the formal principle of producing something, the principle of production will not be of a different idea because of its being in this supposit or in that, because whiteness in a stone and in a horse is a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight; so too, if the same whiteness were in two things and in one, it would be a principle of making a change of the same idea in sight. But these productions are distinguished in such a way that they are not of the same idea, therefore to this distinction another idea must be assigned than the unity or duality of the acting supposits.

14. Again, according to this way an infinite number of persons could be posited in divine reality; for a fourth person could be posited from the three, and a fifth from the four persons, nor would there be any idea of trinity in the divine persons if there was only a distinction through a unity, or plurality, of acting supposits, and there was no distinction through ideas of producing.

15. Again, every distinction is reduced to certain things primarily diverse, which things would be distinct if, *per impossibile*, they were separated from everything else, – therefore this distinction is through some such things as would be distinct with everything

else *per impossibile* left out and as would also be in themselves primarily diverse; the unity or plurality of acting supposits are not such things if there is not any other distinction in the principles of acting; therefore etc. For when everything other than the unity or duality of supposits is removed, this unity or plurality do not seem to be the primary reason for distinguishing the productions.

C. Third Opinion

16. In another way it is posited that these productions are distinguished by the fact that one production goes along with another and with its opposite, such that the idea of the distinction of disparate relations is the distinction of opposite relations, namely insofar as one disparate relation is compatible with two other opposite relations – just as the force of inspiring stands along with active and passive generation, and is therefore distinguished from each of them.²⁴⁶

17. Against this [n.16] one can argue as against the preceding opinion [n.12]; for this opinion does not give a reason that there are not infinite numbers of persons, because a later relation may always stand with the prior opposite relations; further, there would not be a primary diversity between this production and that, because this production [inspiring] would exist along with one opposite, its own, while the other [active generation] does not stand with its own opposite [passive generation], and so this would not be the primary reason for distinction, because the primary idea of distinction is an idea of things primarily distinct.

18. Against this way and the other preceding one I argue together as follows:

I ask why active inspiring can stand with active and with passive generation, and active generation cannot stand with passive generation? – There is no reason other than the distinction of active inspiring from active generation. For this is why something is compossible or impossible with something else, because it is such in itself and not conversely, because the truth of the negative is confirmed and founded on the truth of the affirmative; for that is why man is not an ass, because man is man, – *On Interpretation* 2.14.24b3 and *Metaphysics* 4.41008a16-18. So there is first some distinction between active generation and active inspiring, because of which the former is impossible with passive generation and the latter not, before there is this compossibility or impossibility. Therefore this compossibility and non-compossibility is not the first reason for the distinction of productions.

19. Further, these productions are distinguished by the fact that one exists by way of nature and the other by way of will; but this distinction of productions does not come precisely from the producing supposits, nor because one relation stands with one relation, and another with another, but the distinction is taken from the distinction of productive principles, which have opposites modes of being principle; therefore etc.

20. The one who holds this opinion [n.16] replies that one of the productions exists by way and the other by way of will “not because one person is naturally produced and the other not,” but because one production is like natural production and the other is

²⁴⁶ Note by Scotus: “Godfrey of Fontaines Quodlibet VII q.4: ‘On the contrary [to the opinion of n.16]: essence stands along with opposites, therefore it is distinguished from both. – Response: essence is not opposed to anything from which the generator and the generated are really distinguished; the one inspiring is thus opposed.’”

like voluntary production. For a natural agent produces without presupposing another production, and this speaking generally, although *per accidens* one natural agent presupposes another that produces prior to itself; for in this way the production of the Son is by way of nature, because it does not presuppose another production. For the production of will presupposes another production, namely the one which is by way of nature and intellect; and in this way the production of the Holy Spirit is by way of will, because the Holy Spirit is produced in a similar way to the production which is properly called the production of will, namely ‘by presupposing another distinction’.

21. This exposition [n.20] does not seem valid against the intention of the saints who attribute these productions properly to the intellect and the will; because if these productions must be understood to be distinguished by the fact that one of them presupposes another production while the other does not presuppose another production, there seems no reason that from these productions the Son should be more Son or Word – by force of his production – than the Holy Spirit, nor that the Holy Spirit should, by force of his production, be more love than the Son, which seems absurd.

22. Again, many other productions can be posited, whether with presupposition or without presupposition of another production – just as production by way of art seems to presuppose another production, namely the production of the inner word in the mind of the artist; therefore the Holy Spirit could be produced by way of art, which is false.

23. And there is proof, as was argued in distinctions 2 and 10 [I d.2 nn.75-88, 221-226, 300-303, d.10 nn.6-9], because, from the fact that in God there is properly intellect and will, and each of these is a sufficient productive principle along with the object when present to itself, one person is truly produced by act of intellect as productive principle, and another person is produced by act of will as productive principle – and not merely metaphorically, because of such an extrinsic likeness, namely ‘being produced when another production is presupposed or not presupposed’.

D. Fourth Opinion

24. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by opposite relations, namely of prior and posterior, because one production is naturally prior to the other.

25. On the contrary. This distinction is not primary. For one must give some cause why one production is prior to the other; nor is there any reason other than that this production is of one sort and the other of another, whether on the part of the productive principles or on the part of the acting supposits.

26. Besides, a relation is not primarily and precisely distinguished from a relation by a relation, because a relation does not first have a reference; therefore, since these emanations are relations, they are not distinguished from each other first by other relations, namely relations of prior and posterior; and it is plain that these relations [sc. of prior and posterior] are different from relations of origin, because they are between different extremes, for the relation of origin is between producer and produced, but the relation of prior and posterior is between origin and origin.

E. Fifth Opinion

27. In another way it is said that these emanations are distinguished by the formal elicitive principles that are posited as the personal ideas of the agents, to wit the generative and inspiriting force.

28. But this was rejected in distinction 7 [I d.7 n.23], whether it is understood of the elicitive principle or of the terminative principle.

29. And in addition, how are these relations [sc. generative and inspiriting force] distinguished so that through them the opposite relations are distinguished [sc. passive generation and passive inspiriting]? For the latter seem less distinct than the former, that is, than their opposite relations, because the former can come together in the same person (to wit in the Father), while the latter cannot, because no one and the same person is produced in two ways; therefore it is more manifest that the latter emanations are distinct than that the former, that is their opposite relations, can be on the part of the productive principle. Therefore to assign a distinction to the latter through the former is to assign a more manifest difference or distinction through a less manifest distinction – and also not through intrinsic features, because relatives are not intrinsic to their correlatives.

F. Sixth Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

30. In another way it is posited that they are distinguished by principles distinct in reason, namely by nature and will, which have to be principles of distinct emanations, – and yet these [sc. principle, nature, will] are not distinguished in the essence save by reason alone [sc. according to Henry], as was proved in the question ‘On attributes’ in distinction 8 [I d.8 nn.174-176].

2. Rejection of the Opinion

31. Against this: a real distinction does not necessarily require first a distinction of reason; but the distinction of these emanations for you necessarily requires first a distinction of elicitive principles; therefore if this distinction [sc. of emanations] is real, it is not distinct only through a distinction of reason alone [I d.8 n.177].

32. The major of this reason [n.31] is denied by some, and an instance is posited about ideas, which only differ in reason while creatures differ really, – and yet the real distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of reason in the ideas.

33. There is an argument against this objection [n.32] – and first the major is proved [n.31], and second the instance [n.32] is excluded.

34. The major is proved according to this understanding, that a difference of reason in the cause will not be the proper reason for a real distinction in the effect.

[First proof of the major] – Because if it is [sc. if a difference of reason in the cause *is* the proper reason for a real difference in the effect], let the cause be *a*, and let the diverse reasons under which it causes be *b* and *c*; but let the things caused be *d* and *e*. Then as follows: if *b* and *c* are the proper reasons for *a* insofar as it causes *d* and *e*, then *a* is, insofar as it is under *b*, the proper cause of *d*, – for if not, ‘this difference’ is no more a distinct reason for causing than if the difference did not exist, because neither reason [sc. neither *b* nor *c*] is the proper cause appropriating this cause to this effect; anyone then who concedes that the cause, insofar as it is under *b* and *c*, causes *d* and *e*, has to concede

that each reason is the proper reason of the cause with respect to its proper effect. But this consequent is false, that ‘*a* insofar as it is under *b* is the proper cause of *d*’, because a being, insofar as it is under *b* – which is only a being of reason –, has being only in the intellect, because a being of reason is not caused by the object save insofar as it is known, and it has, as such, being only in the intellect, because it is a diminished being, from *Metaphysics* 6.4.1027b25-1028a2. But nothing, insofar as it is a diminished being, is the proper reason of a true being and the proper cause of a perfect being; and the proof of this is that everything that causes a true being must have some being of existence, insofar as it is cause; but a diminished being, namely which is known being, does not have being of real existence; therefore neither can it, insofar as it is such, be the proper cause of any real being.

35. And if you say that although it does not have the being of existence, yet it does have the being of existence of the intellect in which it is, because it participates in the ‘being of the intellect’ insofar as it has being in the intellect, – on the contrary: from this it follows that no causation belongs to known being, insofar as it is such, save in virtue of the actual existence of the intellect itself, in which it has the being of actual existence in a certain respect; and then the will, further, will not be the principle of inspiring save insofar as it participates the idea of the intellect, and then the divine intellect will be the reason of the inspiring rather than the will; and thus it follows further that the intellect with respect to the generation of the Word will be a double principle, namely immediate, insofar as it is a productive principle, – and mediate insofar as it is the operative principle, through whose operation it has being insofar as it is productive, just as a known thing, insofar as it is known, has participated being in its knower. But if you do not attribute such real action to the existent intellect itself but to the object that has diminished being in the intellect, – it follows that there would be a real action of a thing that ‘is no less such than if it altogether did not exist’, for it is not repugnant to anything to be a known being although it have in itself no true and real being.

36. If it be said here that the divine intellect knows nothing here save intuitively, and thus that which has being known in the intellect – insofar as it is such – has the being of true existence, but it does not have such being as is being known in abstractive intellect or cognition (of which sort is my intellection of a rose that does not now exist, which is not intuitive intellection), – on the contrary: the reason that is posited as proper to a principle, insofar as it is a principle, is posited as being caused by an act of intellect in a known object; but the divine intellect causes nothing in the divine essence as it is existent (as they concede about the opposite opinion, that there is no difference there of reasons in the essence as it is existent but only as it is known), and it is *per se* plain, because whatever is in the essence as it is existent would exist in it if *per impossibile* there were no intellect busying itself about it.

37. [Second proof of the major] – Further, second: the divine essence, as it is in the Son and the Holy Spirit, naturally has some priority to the simple intellection of the essence; for just as the essence is of a nature ‘as it is in the Father’ to move the intellect of the Father to simple intellection of itself, so it is of a nature ‘as it is in the Son’ to move any intellect to simple intellection of itself, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.23 “the Father sees everything in the Son as in himself.” But if the essence ‘as it is in the Son’ has such priority as regard the simple intellection of itself,

then ‘as it is in the Son’ it precedes every idea that the intellect can, by busying itself, construct about it; therefore no idea constructible about it naturally precedes it ‘as it is in the Son’, – otherwise there would be a circle in natural priority, because the reason too ‘that is caused by the intellect’ would naturally precede its being in the Son, and conversely.

38. If you say that the essence in the Father naturally precedes every reason producible about it, but that ‘as it is in the Son’ it follows some reason already produced in him by the act of the paternal intellect, – and then there is not a circle of the same thing to the same thing in accord with the same extremes, or in accord with the same existence or in accord with existence in the same thing, because the essence according to its existence follows in one supposit and precedes in another:

39 [Third proof of the major] – Against this response [n.38], I argue as follows: of one cause, in one order of causing, there is one *per se* reason of causing, – therefore much more in divine reality, where there is a primacy of being principle, must there be posited one reason *per se* of being principle; therefore the reason of being principle of the generation of the Word will be some one *per se* real reason. But thing and reason do not make a *per se* unity, because neither can any property consequent to a thing from the nature of the thing make a *per se* unity with the subject whose effect it is; therefore much more is this not so with a reason that is not consequent to the thing from the nature of the thing but is only consequent to it through an act of intellect. Therefore the second of these two [sc. the reason and the thing] will be precisely the principle ‘by which’ – by the Father himself – of the producing, and not the reason alone, because it is not formally infinite; the proof is that neither is a real relation formally an infinite perfection, because then some person in divine reality would not have formally all infinite perfection; therefore much more can a being of reason not be formally infinite and, consequently, not be the principle ‘by which’ of producing an infinite supposit; therefore the thing alone, to which this reason is attributed, will be the principle of producing the infinite supposit. But in whatever there is a principle ‘by which’ of some production, in that there is the principle of producing, if the supposit is suitable to such production; but the suitable supposit in divine reality for producing such a person in divine reality is something that does not have such nature by that production, nor by any production prior to it; such is the Father; therefore the thing alone will be for him the principle by which he produces, and in no way the reason.

40. [Fourth proof of the major] – Further, fourth: in divine reality that which is not formally the same as something is not truly the same as it unless either each is formally infinite, or one is, or at least each is truly the same as something formally infinite. But these reasons, which are posited as appropriating the productive principle of the two persons [nn.34, 30], are not formally the same, because then they would not be distinct reasons; nor are they truly the same as anything formally infinite, because then they would exist in that ‘formally infinite’ thing from the nature of the thing, as wisdom exists in the deity formally from the nature of the thing; nor is one or other of them formally infinite, as was proved in the preceding reason [n.39]. Therefore neither of them is truly the same as the other, in any way. Therefore in the way that both exist there, they are so truly distinct that they seem to stand in the way of supreme simplicity, whatever sort of entity is posited for them, because nothing can be posited there – according to any

entity – which is not simply the same as the other, because of the simplicity of that essence.

41. [To the instance] – I exclude the instance [n.32], – first because it seems to be for the opposite; for if the distinction of creatures necessarily presupposes a distinction of ideas, and if for this reason God is under one idea the proper cause of one patterned thing [patterned after the idea], this would therefore be because a diminished being of God, namely known being, is simply more perfect and naturally prior to a perfect patterned thing, because patterned things are artificial things in respect of God, and the known being of an artificial thing, or the exemplar – in which the example or the artifact has being – is simply prior to the being of existence of the patterned thing. But this reason is altogether lacking in the divine persons, because the known being of essence cannot be naturally prior to the perfect being of the essence in itself; and therefore, although in the case of the artificial agent the first major were false [n.31] – for the proof of which four reasons have been posited [nn.34, 37, 39, 40] –, it would yet not be false in a natural production where there was communication of the same nature (as in the intended proposition), because there it does not seem that any known being could naturally precede the natural being of the nature.

42. Further, the instance assumes something false about the ideas, because the distinction of reason in God is not necessarily presupposed to the distinct patterned things, nor is God under the reasons of the ideas the proper cause of the diverse patterned things, as will be clear later in distinction 35 ‘On Ideas’ and in distinction 45 ‘On the Will’ [I d.35 q. un nn.5-10, d.45 q. un nn.2-3].

G. Seventh Opinion

43. There is another opinion [from Thomas of Sutton] relative to the question which posits that the essence under one reason, altogether indistinct, is the principle of these productions; because just as two limited things can be the principles of two acts, so the same unlimited thing, containing those two virtually in itself, can be the proper principle of the same acts, and under no reason of distinction in itself but only from its lack of limitation, as it is indistinct, – just as is plain about the single respect of many generable things in what is down here.

44. And the confirmation of this position is that the divine essence must be posited as having immediately wisdom and goodness, and to be in some way the root as it were and principle of these perfect attributes, and without any distinction in the essence itself, – otherwise there would be a process to infinity. So therefore the essence seems it can be posited as the immediate principle of the two personal productions.

45. Against this [n.44]:

The action of willing in us is not formally free but the will itself is formally free, because action itself is a certain quality and a certain natural form in itself, and is not something intellectual having an inclination to opposites; so the action is not free. Thus therefore in divine reality the production of the Holy Spirit – as already posited in being – does not seem to be formally free, because there seems precisely to be liberty in the principle of this production, insofar as it is of this sort. But if no distinction precedes the production of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the first distinction which there is between this production and that is between them as they are posited in existence from that

principle; therefore there is not one production in divine reality by way of intellect or nature and another by way of freedom, because no principle precedes what would be disposed differently toward this production than toward that, – and these productions, in which there is a first distinction, are altogether in themselves, as already posited in being, uniform in naturalness.

46. The assumption ‘about volition’ [n.45], although it could be proved in many modes or ways, can yet be made plain by the fact that, whatever volition generates, it generates naturally; hence appetitive habits are by virtue of acts of appetite as naturally generated from these acts as intellective habits are generated from intellections. It is also apparent from another fact, that then [if the assumption were not true] someone could formally rejoice and be sad freely, namely insofar as joy and sadness are properties consequent on willing and not willing, because the things that are immediate causes of those properties would be posited as formally free.

The consequent, however, ‘about properties’ seems to be sufficiently discordant, because being glad does not seem to be in the power of the will save because in its power is the ‘willing’ of that on which being glad is consequent – and so neither is being sad in its power save because in its power is the ‘not willing’ that on which being sad is consequent; and therefore someone who is sad about the happening of some harmful or disagreeable event, if he wishes to remove the sadness, must desist from not wanting what he did not want; but he is not at liberty to deliberate about this, that, while his not wanting and the event he does not want stay in place, sadness should not follow.

47. If this reason were conclusive [n.45], it would necessarily prove a distinction of intellect from will in the creature, and this a distinction in absolute realities on the part of the thing, which does not seem necessary; hence I reply that the same principle can have different relations to two products or two productions; but as it is freedom and naturalness do not essentially state an active principle but an aptitudinal relation of the principle to the product, and an aptitudinal non-relation – to wit, naturalness states a determination of itself of the first act to the second and third act, but freedom states a non-determination of this sort.

48. To the form [sc. of the reason, n.45]: I concede that neither posited act is free. Therefore freedom is in something preceding the act, as I agree, but not absolutely in it, but rather it states a respect of it to the act, – and naturalness likewise states another respect of the same preceding absolute thing to the other act. Likewise, in the case of the intended proposition, the response is easier, because the principle ‘by which’ seems to be naturally related (distinction 10 above, nn.20-21) to each production and product.

49. On the contrary: therefore in the ‘by which’ there is no distinction as it is ‘by which’ in respect of the production or the product save one of reason only, because it has no relation to the production or the product save one of reason only; again, freedom is an absolute condition, because it is a perfection simply (response: it gives one to understand perfection simply, but it only states a respect). – A corollary: therefore the whole deduction in distinction 2 about the primary duality of the active principles [I d.2 nn.300-303] is not valid save about relations that state a disposition of the active principle to the product; and it seems probable that there be a stand at something simply one, both in the productive principle ‘by which’ (although not ‘what’) and in the cause, because to be ‘by which’ belongs, for you [sc. Scotus] to perfection simply, just as to be a cause does.

50. Response: I concede that ‘freely’ and ‘naturally’ state a disposition, a determinate and a non-determinate disposition, to acting or to a term, but they establish a distinction in their foundations [sc. in will and in intellect]. And because it is a mark of ‘perfection simply’ to be an absolute thing by respect to what is posterior, therefore the principle to which belongs a greater absoluteness with respect to being a principle is simply more perfect than the principle to which belongs a greater determination with respect to being a principle, and this whether the things that are to depend on the principle are equally perfect or if the thing that depends on the principle of something absolute is more perfect than what depends on the principle of something natural, because in relation to an equally perfect posterior thing the more ‘absolute’ being is more perfect; therefore if our willing is not less perfect than our understanding, then from the respect of liberty in the will to willing, and of naturalness in the intellect to understanding, there follows on the will ‘the foundation of respect’ of being simply more perfect; this is in accord with the distinction of powers, on which see IV d.49 p.1 q.4 n.10.

51. But how is it in God?

The same thing seems to follow, that the Holy Spirit is as equally noble as the Son. Therefore the productive principle that is more absolute will be more perfect.

52. Response: each is infinite, both insofar as it is operative and insofar as it is productive.²⁴⁷ Therefore there is no excellence in the formalities, but only perhaps of reason, comparing infinite formalities to the finite ones with which they agree – and thus what agrees with the more perfect is conceived to have a certain reason of nobility, a reason that is a relation of reason to what is more noble.

53. To the argument [n.51]: the Holy Spirit and the Son are not posterior to the principles, nor are they more imperfect, but they are the same as them, – therefore absoluteness there does not argue perfection, nor determination imperfection, but only another way of producing.

54. On the contrary: at any rate in respect of creatures the intellect naturally understands, but the will freely wills; therefore with respect to them the will is more noble.

55. Response. This and that disposition [sc. naturally and freely] to first operations and products – if they were posterior – would prove the excellence of the foundation, but when the first operations and the first products are not posterior, but are the same or simply equal, the dispositions are of a different reason and are in different formalities, but without the excellence of one foundation in relation to the other. In whatever way the foundations may afterwards be compared – under these respects – to later operations and products which are simply posterior, no excellence of this foundation to that follows.

56. Note. A free power is a sufficiently active power, not determined of itself to operating about any object which is not finally perfective of it.

‘Active’ by action in the genus of action and from consequent operation; nor does ‘active operative’ suffice, because thus the intellect would be active although it is passive.

‘Sufficiently’ in its own order of acting; therefore it receives no act from another by which it may act in its order, because then it would be insufficiently active.

²⁴⁷ Note by Scotus: “Another way – in distinction 10 nn.18-19 – that infinite will is not more indeterminate for operation or production than the intellect.”

‘Not determined of itself’, that is of its own first act – and this in its order of causing (it follows from the corollary ‘sufficiently’) – and of the fact that it determines itself to acting; not indeed by any determination preceding the action in the genus of action, but it determines itself, that is, it is indeterminate from its own first act; yet it acts determinately, nothing else determining it to act.

57. This conclusion – thus expounded – is proved by the fact that whatever in its own order is sufficient for acting, if it is determined to act by another, it was already first determined to this in its own order or insofar as it was in its own order; for the fact it did not act was not because of defect of form or of determination on its part (but of the superior on which it depends) for acting, for operating; therefore it is operative and active. But freedom has *per se* more of a respect to action, at least more immediately; nor is it therefore determined to acting, but to some operation which is not about an object essentially perfective; but it is consistent with liberty that it be determined to operating about that object, and to acting – as a result – with respect to that operation; it was proved about the divine will with respect to God in distinction 10 [nn.41, 48], – here rather [sc. the proof is that] infinite liberty is necessarily determined.

58. But surely finite liberty is determined to operating about it [sc. an essentially perfective object]?

Response: liberty does not prevent that, as is plain about infinite liberty; nor does imperfection, as I prove because it is a mark of perfection to be determined to the perfective object, – it is plain about the will of God with respect to himself.

59. Therefore it belongs more to a more perfect thing to be determined with respect to a perfective object; the created will is more perfect than the created intellect, and the created intellect is necessarily determined to its perfective object, therefore the will is more thus determined (the opposite is held in distinction 1 question 4 [I d.1 nn.91-133, 136-140]).

60. Response: to determine oneself naturally to anything whatever is a mark of greater imperfection than not to determine oneself freely to a non-perfective object, because determination to what is non-perfective is a mark of imperfection; the intellect is necessarily determined to anything whatever, because it is determined naturally. And then to the proposition ‘it is a mark of perfection to be determined to a perfective object’: this is true when it is thus determined to that alone, and consequently not naturally [sc. but freely]; ‘therefore it belongs more to the more perfect’ is true, uniformly, because it belongs to the divine will and to no intellect.²⁴⁸

61. But if from the greater perfection of the created will than of the created intellect [n.59] you at once infer that it is necessarily determined to its perfective object, this does not follow, because determination to the natural necessity which belongs to the intellect is repugnant to the will; but the other determination [sc. to the perfective object, as in the case of God nn.57-58] does not belong to the will from the perfection of the will in general but only to an infinite will. In another way: the intellect is necessarily determined by another; it is a mark of perfection that a thing not be so determined, and

²⁴⁸ Note by the Vatican editors: “This is true but not in diverse way, as it is taken in the major [n.59] where two diverse things – intellect and will – are compared, but it is true in uniform way, namely by comparing either intellect to intellect or will to will; and thus it is true that it belongs more to the more perfect will, namely the divine will, which is more perfect than ours; but it does not belong to any intellect more, because any intellect is determined necessarily.”

that, in determining itself, it necessarily determine itself to what is perfective, – and this belongs to the infinite will alone.

62. Whence is this indetermination of the [created] will?

Response. Not from the intellect, which is necessarily determined to anything whatever, although it can be impeded by a sophism (thus can a heavy object be impeded from falling); nay here, when it is determined by a sophism, it is necessarily determined, – in other ways by an opposite agent. The indetermination, therefore, is radically from the essence, but formally from the proper idea of the will. For because its nature is as it were unlimited, namely many things can be agreeable to it – therefore is given to it an unlimited appetite for agreeable objects and an apprehensive intellect, but determinately, according to determinate evidence for directing something; therefore further, so that as ‘undetermined to either’ it may be determined [sc. by itself].

63. Besides, second [nn.44, 45], if essence as altogether indistinct were the principle of the double production, then since the intellect under the idea of being infinite is a sufficient reason for producing the infinite word, and the will under the idea of being infinite is a productive principle of infinite love – and, before the infinite intellect and the divine will distinctly formally infinite are understood, the essence as essence is pre-understood – therefore through the essence, as it is pre-understood, there is a double intrinsic production; and when later the formally infinite intellect and the formally infinite will are there understood, there will be two infinite persons produced by virtue of those two principles; therefore there will be five produced persons.²⁴⁹

64. But if you say that there is never there infinite intellect and infinite will from the nature of the thing, but that there is only there the one nature altogether indistinct from the nature of the thing, and that from the idea of it there are the three persons there, and that intellect and will are there precisely through the consideration of the intellect and so these are not there principles, distinct from the nature of the thing, productive of real persons, – on the contrary:

If there are certain things distinct there by act of intellect, let them be *a* and *b*. Then I ask: either these are distinct from the nature of the thing, – and thus, you are contradicting yourself; if not, they are distinct by intellect, therefore the intellect under the idea of intellect distinguishes and not under the idea of nature. Either then the intellect is there under the idea of intellect before distinction of these things – and the intended proposition is obtained, because it is there from the nature of the thing; or it is not, but the intellect itself under the idea of intellect is there produced by act of intellect busying itself and doing the distinguishing, and then one would ask by what act this intellect is produced – either from the nature of the thing or from the intellect as intellect – and there will be a process to infinity, or wherever a stand is made the intellect will be there insofar as it is intellect and from the nature of the thing, or the first distinction that is placed there will be from the nature of the thing, the opposite of which you posit.

65. Further, God is formally blessed from the nature of the thing and not formally in relations of reason; but his beatitude formally consists in intellection and volition;

²⁴⁹ That is, the three persons before intellect and will are understood and two more afterwards (Son and Holy Spirit being, as it were, produced twice). The Vatican editors say otherwise: “namely two persons before the intellect and will, and three afterwards, because intellect and will are in the Father; cf. n.70.”

therefore intellect and will – which are the principles of them – are there from the nature of the thing.

66. This reason is confirmed through the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 12.8.1074b17-21, who proves that “if God is not actually thinking there will be nothing honorable in him, – for he will be as if asleep;” therefore, according to Aristotle, God is not formally perfect in the nature of the thing unless intellect is formally there from the nature of the thing, because actual intellection formally cannot be understood without intellect formally.

67. Further, if the intellect is not formally there from the nature of the thing but in its foundation, then the intellect is not formally perfection simply, because it is not better to have it formally than not to have it; nay for you, it is not formally possessed in that essence, which is best, but only in an opposite way of possessing; therefore one cannot conclude that intellect is there ‘because it is a perfection simply’, but rather the opposite seems to follow. Why then does Anselm say in *Monologion* ch.15, that whatever is in God “is better it than not it”? – as is true of ‘being wise’. And Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.4 n.6: “In the volumes of the divine books authority only preaches that God is, but all of nature around us proclaims that he is the best and most outstanding Creator, who has given us mind, by which we judge that living things are to be preferred to non-living, things endowed with sense to things without, and intelligent things to non-intelligent ones, and incorruptible things to corruptible; and because of this, since we without doubt prefer the Creator to the things created, we must confess that he both supremely lives, and understands all things, and is most just, best, and most blessed, etc.,” see Augustine there. – What would that consequence be if natural reason says that to be blessed is better than to be miserable, therefore God is blessed (if what ‘it’ is in creatures is better than its opposite, this is because of its reality), and in God from the nature of the thing this reality is in some way there but only in its foundation, with the opposite mode of this sort of formality

68. But that this intellect – which is proved to exist there from the nature of the thing [nn.64-67] – is infinite the proof is:

For, as intellect formally, it understands the divine essence as object; nothing comprehends an object formally infinite unless what comprehends it is formally infinite; therefore etc.

69. Further, the divine intellect as intellect understands infinite intelligibles at the same time – according to Augustine *City of God* XII ch.18: “Is it really the case that God does not know the numbers because of their infinity? Who, even a complete madman, would say this?” and he adds: “The infinity then of numbers, although there is no number of infinite numbers, is yet not incomprehensible to that intellect *of which there is no number* [Psalm 146.5].”

70. And if you say [another instance against n.63] that the intellect is not formally infinite insofar as it is intellect but insofar as it is the same as the divine infinite essence, and therefore it does not, insofar as it is intellect, have that whereby it is the productive principle of another infinite person, and so there will not be five divine persons [n.63], – against this I argue that in this way one could say that paternity is formally infinite because it is the same as the infinite divine essence, and then it would not be more discordant for the Son not to be simply intelligent than for him not to be formally Father, which is manifestly absurd.

71. There is proof also from another point, that things which are not formally infinite in divine reality, if they are taken in the abstract, are not predicated of each other, not even by identity just as not formally either; hence this proposition is not conceded ‘paternity is the property of not being born’. The reason for this was stated in distinction 8 in the question ‘About the attributes’ [I d.8 nn.219, 221], because ‘abstraction takes away that which was the cause of truth’, namely the identity of the extremes, – because, as precisely taken, ‘neither is formally infinite, and therefore neither as taken precisely abstractly includes its being the same as the other’. But this proposition is true ‘intellect is paternity’ and ‘intellect is filiation’, although there is not there formal predication; therefore the intellect has formal infinity, of the sort that filiation and paternity and the property of not being born do not have.

72. And if you ask, is the intellect altogether infinite from itself as the essence is? – I reply:

It can be said that, just as by distinguishing things from each other, one thing is infinite from itself and in itself (as the first person in divine reality), another thing is infinite in itself but not from itself (as the Son and the Holy Spirit), but another thing is finite from itself and is likewise finite in itself (as is the creature), – so, by considering things which are not formally the same, something can be taken as infinite in itself and altogether from itself, as the divine essence, which is the root and foundation, which has its infinity from nothing; hence according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.9, the being of God is like “a certain infinite sea of the infinite substance of God [I d.8 nn.199-202],” but something is infinite through itself and in itself but not altogether from itself as first root and foundation of all infinity, as the divine attributes, which according to John Damascene *ibid.* ch.4 state something that concerns the essence – and well can such things be posited as formally infinite in themselves and through themselves, but radically in the essence as in the foundation with which they are identical; further, something is what is neither in itself formally infinite nor formally the same as the infinite, as the personal properties.

73. But what is the reason why these do not have formal infinity from the essence, as the intellect has?²⁵⁰

74. To the arguments for this finally rejected opinion [nn.45-46, 63-72].

When it is said that ‘the infinite from itself, altogether indistinct, can be the principle of distinct things’ [n.43], this is true when the distinct things do not from their own idea require a prior distinction in principles; but such a prior distinction is required by free production and natural production, because there cannot be a distinction first for such distinct things but there is pre-required some distinction in the principles, which in some way have to be principles naturally and freely of the divine persons.

75. Again, if the essence is *per impossibile* posited – as it is understood – to be the foundation of the perfections [n.72], and it is not understood to be intellective or volitional, nor consequently to be source of saying nor of inspiring – could it really be a principle of communicating itself?

76. And from this [n.74] is plain the response to the confirmation adduced there [n.44]. The fact that the essence has wisdom and goodness and all the other perfect attributes before all consideration of the intellect, and this without any distinction presupposed in the essence, is true because those perfect attributes do not require an

²⁵⁰ An empty space is left here by Scotus; the question is unanswered in the *Ordinatio*.

opposite mode of coming from a principle nor a distinction in the principles; for the essence is will as naturally as it is intellect; likewise these attributes do not properly come from the essence as from a principle, although the essence be conceded in some way to have the idea of radical and foundational perfection with respect to them [nn.72, 44].

II. Scotus' own Opinion

77. To the question [n.1] I respond that the productions are distinguished formally by themselves. For generation is itself formally generation, and inspiriting is itself formally inspiriting, and from their formal reasons it is impossible for generation to be inspiriting (when everything else is *per impossibile* removed), such that it is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished [n.7], because the whole formal reason of one is not the same as the whole formal reason of the other.

78. This is clear through Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.27 n.5, where he says that “thus you will see how or what distance there is between the nativity of the Word and the procession of the Gift;” and a little later that: “the will proceeds from cognition, but it is not the image of cognition; and therefore in this matter he who can see and discerns a certain intelligible distance between procession and nativity (since to describe a thing by knowledge is not to desire it, nor even to enjoy it by will),” – where from the distinction of the processions he wants to deduce a distinction of persons proceeding.

79. Likewise in *ibid.* V ch.14 n.5: “Where too this shines forth why the Holy Spirit is also not a son, although he too exits from the Father; and for this reason is he not called a son, because neither is he born; for he exited from the Father not as somehow born but as somehow given.” Therefore he solved there the question about the distinction of persons through their distinct emanations.

80. And if it be objected that ‘the emanations are not from themselves, therefore they are not distinguished by themselves’ (the proof of the consequence is that from what something has entity, from that it also has unity, *Metaphysics* 2.1.993a30-31), – because being and one are said to be convertible), I reply:

Specific differences are not effectively from themselves and yet they are by themselves formally distinct, but they are effectively distinct by that from which they effectively are. But to be distinguished ‘first formally’ is not to be distinguished by something included in one thing, and agreeing with another thing [sc. as Socrates is distinguished from Plato by socrateity and agrees with Plato in humanity], but to be distinguished itself in its totality formally, even if *per impossibile* everything other than its idea is excluded; thus I say that if ultimate differences were composite, they would be distinguished themselves in their totality and would be themselves in their totality distinct first formally.

So I say in the proposed case, that if *per impossibile* these distinct persons could exist without a principle, they would themselves in their totality be formally distinct, such that nothing formally included in one would be formally included in the other; and yet, as they do have principles, so are they in their having principles or in their having an origin distinct from their principles (namely from intellect and will), which are not only distinct by reason, as was argued against the penultimate opinion [nn.31-40]. But the intellect is from the nature of the thing not formally will and, since infinity added to something does not destroy its formal idea, infinite intellect is not formally infinite will; and so, although

it would not be necessary for this formal distinction [sc. of emanations] to be reduced to another distinction [sc. of principles] insofar as it is formal, yet because it is formal and is in things that have a principle, it is reduced to this distinction of principles.

81. If it be said that although two things are distinguished from three, yet two infinite things are not distinguished from three infinite things, – on the contrary.²⁵¹

III. To the Principal Arguments

82. To the principal arguments [nn.1-5].

To the first [n.1] I say that it seems to conclude against those who posit that the quasi-subject of generation is the divine essence, for since generation in creatures is natural from the inclination of the passive principle, but not from the reason of the active principle (because if my will were to generate fire from the matter, the passive generation would be natural because of the inclination of the passive power to the form, although the active principle would be free), so it seems that, if the divine essence were the quasi-subject in divine reality with respect to the personal properties – since the essence as naturally inclines to the property of the Holy Spirit as to the property of the Son –, the passive production of the Holy Spirit would be as natural as that of the Son, although this production and that would be from a different productive principle; but it does not conclude against me, because I deny generation there under the idea of change, and deny altogether anything passive with respect to act (as is clear in distinction 5 nn.97, 113, 118, 131-132, 137-138), but I posit there precisely generation under the idea of production, whose terms are the producer and the produced; so there precisely will generation be called natural, because the relation between producer and produced is natural, and the naturalness of this sort of relation is on the part of the naturalness of the producer itself, because it produces by a principle naturally inclining to act, – and the Father does not inspirit in this way. Alternatively it is said that generation is in one way taken for the generation of substance, or in another way specifically for the production of the living from the living (and in this way is an animal said to be generated but not fire), and in this latter way there commonly concurs on the part of the agent a natural inclination or a natural form, which is the principle of generating; and it is in this latter way that generation in divine reality seems to exist. – The first response [earlier in his paragraph] is better, perhaps.

83. To the second [n.2] I say that, when two things are compared to an unlimited or indeterminate third thing, the union of them among themselves does not follow from their union in the third thing. An example: ‘if I am with God here and the Pope is with God in Rome, therefore I am together with the Pope’ does not follow, because God is unlimited as to the presence by which he is present at places; so too it does not follow that ‘I am with eternity, and Abraham was with eternity, therefore I am together with Abraham’, because God is eternal and his eternity is unlimited. So do I say in the intended proposition that the Father has in himself a double fecundity perfectly, but each production corresponds precisely to one fecundity; and therefore the Father is, with respect to the two productions, a sort of thing unlimited, or as it were indeterminate, as compared to determinate things, – and therefore it does not follow that, if both

²⁵¹ Scotus added nothing here but left a blank space.

productions are univocal with such an unlimited third thing, these productions are univocal among themselves.

84. Against this there is an argument as follows:

If the productions are not univocal but are of different ideas, therefore the terms too will be of different ideas, – from the *Physics* [n.1]; but if the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal to some third thing; therefore from the opposite, if the terms are univocal to some third thing, the productions too will be univocal among themselves.

85. Further, the intellect and will, insofar as they are operative powers, require a formal distinction in their objects, and if they were, in respect of their objects, productive powers, they would produce such a distinction in their objects; therefore, since the produced terms require such a formal distinction, the terms will not be univocal [sc. to some third thing].

86. Further, what is produced through the intellect is, from the force of its production, generated knowledge, while what is produced through the mode of will is proceeding love; but knowledge as knowledge and love as love seem to be of formally different ideas; therefore etc.

87. To the first [n.84] I say that the proposition about motions and terms – which is adduced for the intended proposition – is only true when two other propositions are true, namely that ‘the form in flux, according to which there is motion, is of the same idea as the terminating form’ [n.11], and ‘motion is of the same idea as the form in flux’ [I d.2 n.339]. Now applying this to the proposition, there is no flux nor a form in flux, but this production is not of the same idea as the form which is the formal term of production, because the formal term of the production is something essential, but the production is formally a relation; and therefore one should not conclude from a distinction of productions to a formal distinction of objects or terms. An example of what has been said about motions is plain from the *Physics* 5.4.227b14-18, because the same ‘where’ can be acquired by motion in a straight line or circular motion, which are altogether of a different species, as is proved in *Physics* 7.4.248a10-13, 248b4-6 “because they are not comparable.” But in this case the form according to which there is flux in the form of motion, if it is of the same idea as the term, is not for this reason distinctive of the idea of motions. – This response was touched on above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On productions’ [I d.2 n.339], for the argument of the Commentator [*ibid.*, n.212].

88. And if you object that at least the first terms, namely the formal terms, will not be univocal, whereby the productions are not univocal, and so the persons – which are the first terms – will not be univocal among themselves, and so they will not be univocal in a third thing, – I respond:

Production does not formally include the divine essence, but the person does formally include it, because the person is not only a property or a relation but a hypostasis subsisting in the divine nature, – just as Socrates does not only include the individual property but also human nature. Although, therefore, the first terms are of the same idea as the productions as to the fact that the first terms include the relations (because the productions are relations), yet they are not of the same idea quasi-adequately, because the first terms do not only include the relations but also the absolute reality; and then the persons must not only be distinguished as the productions are distinguished, because what includes certain distinguishing things must not only be distinguished as the

distinguishing things are (as was said above in distinction 8 in the question ‘Whether God is in a genus’ n.106), because the differences are primarily diverse, but the things that primarily include them are not primarily diverse.

89. To the other point, about powers [n.85], I say that as they are operative powers they do not require a distinct formal object. Rather, the same thing that is the first object of the divine intellect is also the first and formal object of the divine will, such that each power is beatified in the same first object, according to the same formal idea of the first object. For no perfection quasi-founded in the divine essence is primarily beatific of the divine intellect or the divine will, but the essence is, under any sort of first idea (namely as it is the foundation of every perfection in divine reality), such that the argument is to the opposite, because just as there is not also required a formal distinction in the objects as they are operative powers, so neither in the products as they are productive.

90. To the third argument [n.86] I say that it is not to the purpose, because those who hold that generation in divine reality is equivocal in itself say that it is in itself equivocal because of the equivocation of the produced term with the producer, – and likewise, they have to say that inspiriting is in itself equivocal because of the difference of the inspirited from the inspiriter. This conclusion therefore would not be sufficient for them, that the generated and the inspirited are equivocal. – But the argument in itself, if it proves anything, only proves a distinction of the generated and inspirited or of the formal terms of generation and inspiriting, – and so not their intended proposition.

91. But on the contrary I argue as follows: it can be said that the assumption, namely that ‘the generated, from the force of its production – namely of its generation – is actual knowledge’ [n.86] can be distinguished about the primacy of origin and about the primacy of adequacy. If it is understood about the primacy of origin, it can be denied, because then the three persons would not be uniformly God; for in the Father deity is understood to be in him a quasi-principle and foundation of any perfection, and then, if knowledge is pre-understood in the Son before the essence, the Son would not have essence before anything else in himself but would have knowledge, and so he would not be God uniformly with the Father.

93. As to this primacy, then, although it is not one of origin, yet it does correspond to the primacy of origin of several perfections in one creature; and it can be said that the first thing in any person is the essence, because when something contains in itself many communicable perfections, when it communicates that one first thing, it communicates all the perfections in the order in which they are of a nature to be in that one thing. An example, both in the distinction of things and in the distinction of non-things (though on the part of the thing): first indeed – if fire were to generate the whole fire and were to produce both the matter and the form, it would communicate the matter first in origin before it communicated the form (in the order namely in which these are in the generator); an example of the second is – fire is a corporeal and inanimate substance and element. Just as these then exist in order in the generating fire, so they are communicated in a like order to the generated fire, and yet the first term in adequacy is fire as it is fire, because this is what is principally intended by the generating fire and in which the generated fire (namely fire as fire) is most perfectly made like it. So can it be said in the proposed case, that although the divine essence in any person is altogether first, a quasi-foundation of any essential perfection, – the first person, however, has memory

appropriately, and by virtue of that productive principle it produces adequately with a first production the second person, and the second person quasi-adequately by its own productive principle produces as it is actual knowledge, and the Holy Spirit, being quasi-adequate to this own productive principle, is produced as actual love.

94. But then the argument [n.91] still seems to stand, because equivocation or non-univocation seem to be proved more from the primacy of adequacy than from the primacy of origin; for although the sun is a substance and a worm is a substance, yet not for this reason is there univocal generation of a worm by the sun, because the sun does not assimilate the term to itself in its specific form; so therefore there seems to be equivocation here, from which the first adequate produced term is not altogether univocally of the same idea as the productive principle.

95. I say that there is not equivocal production if the productive principle is not of the same idea as the produced formal term – speaking of the first productive principle and of the first produced formal term – but there is required that that which is the productive principle not be of the same idea in the generated thing, nor that that which is the form term in the product be of the same idea in the producer; but the opposite of this is in the intended proposition, because memory is both formally in actual generated knowledge, and actual knowledge is formally in the generating person, although neither of these is the first reason of acting and the first reason of terminating the production. An example of this is: if an ass generates an ass, although the specific form is the first principle of producing, the generation is not for this reason equivocal or non-univocal, because that which is the *per se* formal term of generation is also of the same idea in the generator, although it is not for it the idea of generating; but that something of the same idea is first in this (as in the producer) or first in that (as in the produced term) is not required for univocal generation. Thus can be posited an example about animate flesh, generating animate flesh naturally by the virtue of heat, where however the soul itself – or whatever other form be granted – is not necessarily the first principle of producing and the first formal term in the product; therefore this is not required for univocity of generation.

96. To the second principal argument²⁵² I say that active generation and active inspiring are the formally the same, nor are the first formal terms of them (namely actual knowledge and actual love) formally the same; yet the first terms, produced by these productions, are both univocal among themselves and the producer, because the produced persons have the same absolute perfection, both with each other and with the producer.

97. To the other I say that the antecedent ‘about the distinction of principles by reason alone’ is false [nn.64-67].

98. To the first proof, when it is argued that ‘the opposite would not stand with the divine simplicity’, the response was given often before in distinctions 2 and 8 [nn.191-127, 388-410], where mention was made about formal non-identity without real distinction.

99. To the second proof, when it is argued ‘otherwise there would be a real relation between intellect and understanding’ [n.6], I reply that the intellect is both an operative power and a productive power; but insofar as it is an operative power, neither the intellect, nor the supposit of which it is the operation, has a real relation to real

²⁵² The second principal argument [n.2] was in fact responded to already [n.83]; the argument responded to here is only found in the *Lectura* I d.13 n.4.

operation, but this happens in us, because in us there is a real difference between the intellect and the operation for which it is; but as it is a productive principle, although it does not have a real relation to the product (because it is the same as the product), nor to the production (for the same reason), yet the producer itself has a real relation to the product, and this is enough for the production to be real. But such relation is not required between the intellect and understanding, because there is no real distinction between this and that; nor does the fact that the intellect is for the Father the principle for understanding indicate a real relation of the intellect itself to the intellection that is in the Father himself according to the principle, because this is seen more in the case of generation than of intellection (because generation requires a greater distinction), yet neither when it is said that 'the intellect is for the Father the principle of saying' is a real relation indicated between the intellect and saying.

100. And when it is argued that 'he would not understand more with the intellect than with the will' [n.4] the consequence is not valid. Nor does 'to understand with the intellect' indicate that there is a real relation of the intellect or of the Father according to the intellect to understanding, but only that this is some operative perfection, according to which such operation belongs to the Father, – nor does it follow that 'he does not understand more with the intellect than with the will', because this operation which is to understand is of a nature to belong first to the intellect and is not thus of a nature to belong to the will, nor is there any other reason save that the intellect is intellect and the will is will; for to any operative principle, from the fact that it is such, whether it is a *per se* thing or is contained unitively in something, its proper operation is of a nature to belong.

101. On the contrary: it is conceded that in the Father the intellect is for him the principle of understanding; to be principle implies some relation, and if it is principle from the nature of the thing, it will be a relation from the nature of the thing, and consequently it will be a real relation.

Response: whatever would really belong to something – if it were a thing –, this same thing should belong to it (and not to another) when it is a reason or in accord with reason; in this way is there intellect in the Father in respect of understanding, because the principle is altogether the same as understanding, really.

102. To the other proof – about unequals and about adding the same thing – that the first consequence should still hold, in the proposed case [n.5], I reply:

Just as in consequences it is said that, when the same thing is added, if the consequence holds, it will still hold (this is true, when the same added thing does not destroy the idea of the consequence, as when it is said 'man, therefore animal, – every man, therefore every animal') with respect to any predicate, or conversely negatively, – so in the intended proposition I say that the inequality of intellection and intellect is because of the limitation of the extremes, because of which (or without which not) the one exceeds the other; but when an infinite thing is added to both extremes, it takes away limitation, and so inequality, from both extremes, – and then it does not follow that they are unequal, nay infinite intellect and 'infinite understanding' are of equal perfection.

103. And if it is objected against this that infinity does not take away all inequality, because infinite whiteness would exceed infinite blackness, – I say that infinity added to something of itself limited is infinity in a certain respect (of the sort that can belong to the idea of such a limited thing), because it does not state infinity or

illimitation save in the idea of that to which it is added, which in this case cannot be simply infinite; but infinity added to some perfection simply (namely to which infinity simply is not repugnant), there is infinity in that idea, and so infinity simply. But understanding and intellect are formally 'perfections simply', and do not involve limitation, – and therefore infinity added to each states infinity simply; not only in these ideas but also concomitantly in being and truth and goodness, and in every perfection simply, because all 'perfections simply' mutually and unitively include each other; and therefore 'infinite understanding' is simply equal to infinite intellect.

Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Distinctions

Single Question

Whether any Person at all may send any Person at all

1. About the fourteenth and fifteenth and sixteenth distinctions I ask whether any divine person at all may send any divine person at all, or be sent by any divine person at all.

And it seems not:

Because whatever is essential in divine reality belongs to the three; sending (mission) – both active and passive – is essential, because it states a relation to the creature; but such respect to the creature is common to the three. Now proof that both sending and being sent state a respect to the creature is that each is said about God from the perspective of time; but nothing is said about God from the perspective of time save what asserts a respect to the creature; therefore etc.

2. Again in *John* 14.23 the Savior says about the Father (and about himself): “We will come to him;” therefore the Father comes in time to someone. This ‘coming’ asserts some effect of the Trinity, therefore it states that the Father might be sent by the three persons, just as the Son and Holy Spirit are.

3. Again, according to Augustine *To Durandus* ‘De Praesentia Dei’, each person gives and is given; therefore, by parity of reasoning, each person sends and is sent.

4. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “The Father, when he is perceived by anyone in time, is not said to have been sent; for he does not have one from whom he is or from whom he proceeds.”

Also the Master [Lombard] adduces for this conclusion the authorities from Augustine in the text [*Sentences* I d.15 ch.9-10, nn.136-137].

I. Opinion of Peter Lombard

5. [Exposition of the Opinion] – On this question it seems to be the opinion of the Master that being sent does not agree with the three persons but only with the two persons that proceed.

For according to Augustine no person is sent save him that has another from whom he is, and in this way ‘to be sent’ asserts a respect to the creature yet with connotation of the respect of eternal procession.

6. But ‘to send’ is common to the three, according to the Master.

His proof is from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* II ch.5 n.8, where Augustine says about the Son that “the Son cannot be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit,” and his proof is: “because the Father is understood to have sent him by the fact that he made him from a woman, which the Father did not do without the Holy Spirit;” therefore the Holy Spirit sends the Son, – and it is agreed that the Son himself sends himself, as is got from the same Augustine and in the same *On the Trinity* II ch.8; therefore ‘to send’ belongs to each person.

7. And this point the Master proves by reason, because otherwise one person of the Trinity would do what another does not do, although 'to send' is to cause an effect outwardly.

8. [Rejection of the opinion] – An argument can be made against this opinion:

If 'to be sent' involves in some way a double respect, eternal and temporal, since it only states a respect either to him for whom he is sent or to him who sends, it is plain that the first is common to the three, because it is a respect of reason outwardly; but the second is either a real respect or a respect of reason; if it is a respect of reason, then it can be in the Father with respect to himself, just as the Father can give and be given, for 'to be sent' by way of a mere respect of reason is not repugnant to the Father; if 'to be sent' states a real respect to the sender, namely procession from the sender, then 'to send' is not an essential feature, because then the Holy Spirit would not send the Son because he does not produce the Son.

9. Besides, 'to send' and 'to be sent' seem to mean the same thing, although in diverse ways according to their grammatical forms; if then one of them connotes some respect inwardly, the other too will connote it, – if therefore 'to be sent' connotes 'to be produced', then 'to send' connotes 'to produce', and so neither is purely essential; or if one of them does not connote a respect inwardly, neither does the other but only a respect outwardly, – and in this way both will be common to the three.

10. And this is what can thus briefly be argued: if 'to be sent' includes 'to be produced', then 'to send' includes 'to produce'; therefore the Holy Spirit does not send the Son because he does not produce him. – Besides, 'to send' and 'to be sent' seem to state opposite relations; therefore if 'to send' does not include 'to produce', then neither does its correlative include the correlative.

II. To the Question

11. It seems possible then to reply otherwise to the question. For it is manifest that, according to the intention of Augustine in *On the Trinity* IV ch.20, the Father is not said to have been sent, but 'to be sent' has to connote – along with its asserting an outward respect – an inward procession [n.5], and it seems reasonable to say the like of 'to send', because although it principally states a respect of outward action, yet it connotes a respect of inward active production; and thus neither will be purely essential, but 'to be sent' belongs only to the produced person and 'to send' only to the producing person; and in this way there are only two persons who send (the Father and the Son) and only two who are sent (the Son and the Holy Spirit), nor does any person send himself, nor does the proceeding person send the producing person.

12. An example of this can be found in something else; for the Father is said to create through the Word, and thus it can be conceded that the Son creates through the Holy Spirit; but not conversely so, for 'to create through the Son' does not assert absolutely an outward action but action along with authority, and in this way it connotes active production in the operator with respect to the person through whom he operates as it were with sub-authority. Thus it can be said that 'to send a person' is to operate through him and thus to work the effect along with that person by way of an authority that gives action to that person, and it belongs only to the producing person with respect to the produced person, – and 'to be sent' would mean the same as to operate with sub-authority,

by virtue of the sending person, because it only happens when the operating person receives the power of acting from another.

III. To the Reasons of Peter Lombard

13. Next in response to what the Master adduces on his side, from Augustine, that the Holy Spirit sends the Son and that the Son sends himself [n.6].

It can be expounded first of the Son incarnate, not of the Son as he is to be incarnate, in the way that Ambrose says in *On the Holy Spirit* III ch.1 nn.1, 2, 6, that the Spirit of God sent the Son, – as we read in *Isaiah* 61.1 “the Spirit of the Lord is upon me” etc.; “well did he say,” says Ambrose, “‘the Spirit of the Lord is upon me to preach’, because he was sent and anointed as son of man, for according to his divinity the Holy Spirit is not upon Christ but in Christ.” This authority, then, of Isaiah, which says that Christ was sent by the Holy Spirit, is understood of Christ as man, but not of the sending of the eternal Word as he is to be incarnate. – In like manner can be expounded the authority that says the Son sent himself.

14. To the argument of the Master it can also be said that the consequence is not valid [sc. that if ‘to send’ did not belong to the three, something would be brought about by one person that was not brought about by another, n.7], because there is a change from ‘in what way’ to ‘what’. For the consequence is not that ‘the Son does not operate through the Son as the Father operates through the Son, therefore the Father does something that the Son does not do’, but the consequence is: ‘therefore the Son in a certain way does not operate’, because not through authority, – and this is true; or also ‘if the Father send the Son and the Son does not send himself’, one should infer ‘because the authority of bringing about an effect in the creature is in the Father, not in the Son’, – and this too is true.

IV. How the Opinion of Lombard might be Held

15. Although this way [nn.11-12] seem probable, yet because the authorities of Augustine seem to speak not only of Christ sent as man but of the sending of the Word of God ‘because he is to be incarnate’ (the incarnation itself, as Augustine himself says, is understood as the sending), therefore the opinion of the Master can be held in this way, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* IV ch.20 n.28: “when he is conceived in time by anyone’s perfect understanding, he is said to be sent;” and more clearly n.29: “To be sent is for the Son to be known that he is from the Father, – so to be sent is for the Holy Spirit to be known that he proceeds from the Father.”

16. ‘To be sent’ then is a person shown to proceed, and ‘to send’ is to show a person proceeds. This ‘to show’ is purely common, because the whole Trinity manifests that the proceeding person proceeds; but ‘a person shown to proceed’ connotes that a person proceeds. And, if these are what these terms signify (because things signified are to be taken according to the usage of authors), it follows that ‘to send’ is purely essential and does not connote a real eternal respect in the sender; but ‘to be sent’ connotes a respect in the person sent insofar as his eternal procession is manifested. And indeed another word might be imposed which would signify ‘to show a person produces’, and its passive form would signify ‘a person shown to be produced’, – and the active form would

be common to the three, but the passive form would belong only to the two persons who are produced.

V. To the Arguments against the Opinion of Lombard

17. One must respond accordingly [n.16] to the arguments that are against the opinion of the Master [nn.8-10].

To the first [n.8] I say that ‘to be sent’ states a respect of reason to the sender formally; but it connotes an eternal respect, not indeed to the sender because he sends, but to someone indistinctly. Hence the following proposition is to be denied, that “‘to be sent’ only states a respect to him to whom he is sent, or to the sender,” if he be understood insofar as he is sender, and this both as to the principal thing signified and to the connoted thing; for the proposition states by connoting a respect of the one proceeding, and this in relation to the one producing – not insofar as he is sender, because a person that is not producer can be a sender, although a producer is always a sender.

18. To the second [nn.9-10] I concede that the active and the passive voices signify the same thing under opposite grammatical forms, although something the same that is not diversified by those forms could be connoted in each; ‘to show’ indeed and ‘to be shown’ – which are what is principally implied – are diversified by those forms, but not so as regard ‘person proceeds’; for the latter is what is connoted uniformly, both by the active and by the passive voices. There is an example of this in other things: for I know fire heats, and fire is known to heat. Although there is here a grammatical variation as to the ‘know’ and ‘to be known’, yet not as to that which is indicated to the term ‘to know’ and ‘to be known’, because that is uniformly the same in both cases; and if one active form were imposed to signify the whole phrase ‘to know fire heats’, its passive form would not connote ‘fire known to be heated’ but only that the ‘to be known’ is in the passive form and that the thing connoted is in the active form, namely ‘fire heats’.

19. Hereby things are made plain for the confirmation ‘to send and to be sent are correlatives’. This is true as to the things formally signified, and each states *per se* a respect of reason; however it is possible for one of them to include, as a thing connoted, some extreme of the relation and for the other of them not to include that extreme’s correlative, as is clear in the example given, because the verb thus imposed would include ‘to heat’ and the passive verb corresponding to it would not include the ‘to be heated’.

IV. To the Principal Arguments

20. To the principal arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1] I say that not everything said in time of God is common to the three when it involves not only a respect to creatures but also connotes along with it an intrinsic respect, as is the case with ‘to be sent’.

21. To the second [n.2] I concede that the Father invisibly comes and indwells, but yet he is not said to be sent because he does not have one from whom he is [n.4]; for he is not shown to proceed unless he proceeds. However, he can well be shown absolutely or shown to produce, but this way of being shown is not indicated by ‘to be sent’ [n.16].

22. To the third [n.3] I concede that any person at all gives any person at all, because to give is to communicate freely; but any person, by the will as it belongs to him, communicates himself freely; nor does it follow from this that any person sends any person, because it is now plain that ‘to give’ does not include such an intrinsic respect as ‘to be sent’ includes.

Seventeenth Distinction

First Part

On the Habit of Charity

Question One

Whether it is necessary to posit a created Charity that formally inheres in a Nature capable of Beatification

1. About the seventeenth distinction I ask whether it is necessary to posit a created charity that formally inheres in a nature capable of beatification.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.7 n.10: “He who loves his neighbor loves as a consequence love itself; but ‘God is love’; therefore the consequence is that he loves God.”

I ask how he is taking ‘love’ in the minor? If formally, I have the proposition [sc. that positing a created charity is not necessary]; if effectively, then there will be four terms, because the major is not true save of the formal love by which the neighbor is loved.²⁵³ Even if you say that ‘besides the love which is the Holy Spirit, there is another formal love’, then there is a fallacy of the consequent in Augustine’s argument, by arguing ‘he loves love formally, therefore this love’, – because the antecedent can hold true of the other love.²⁵⁴ If the argument then has to hold, it is necessary that God formally be love and be every love that is formally in someone who loves in respect of his neighbor.

2. Again, *On the Trinity* XV ch.19 n.37: “No gift is more excellent than this gift, which is love; and no gift of God is more excellent than the Holy Spirit; therefore the Holy Spirit is love.” This argument would not be valid unless it was about formal love, and because precisely the Holy Spirit would be that.

²⁵³ The four terms will be ‘loves neighbor’ and ‘effective love’ in the minor, and ‘God’ and ‘formal love’ in the major, and so a claim that love of neighbor is effective love of love will not establish that that effective love of love is the formal love that is God, for there will be no common middle term. Hence, if Augustine’s argument is to be valid, ‘love’ cannot be taken to mean effective love only.

²⁵⁴ Sc. if love of neighbor is a formal love other than the formal love that is the Holy Spirit, then one cannot argue from one to the other; in particular one cannot argue back from the formal love that is the Holy Spirit to this supposed other (created) formal love that is love of neighbor (which would be the fallacy of asserting the antecedent from asserting of the consequent).

3. Even if it be said to these authorities that the Holy Spirit is called 'love' by way of causality, the Master in the text stands opposed, who adduces Augustine, because he understands him formally. For Augustine says *On the Trinity* XV ch.17, n.27: "We will not say that 'charity' is said to be God by the fact that it is the gift of God, the way it is said 'you are my patience' (*Psalm* 70.5); for Scripture's locution itself refutes this sense; for 'you are my patience' is of the sort that 'you are my hope' is (*Psalm* 90,9), etc." "But the saying is not like this, 'Lord, my love', or 'you are my love', but it is said like this, 'God is love' (*I John* 4.16) as it is said 'God is spirit' (*John* 4.24)."

4. Again, by reason: every creature can be understood to be non-good, because it is good by participation; but charity cannot be understood to be non-good; therefore it seems that it is good by essence, – therefore, etc.

5. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Morals of the Church*, treating of the saying in *Romans* 8.35 'Who will separate us from the love of Christ', says: "This sort of love of God is called virtue, which is the most correct affection of the spirit."

Question Two

Whether it is necessary to posit in a Habit the idea of Active Principle with respect to Act

6. Alongside this question I propose another, in general, about habit: whether it is necessary to posit in a habit the idea of active principle with respect to act.

Argument that it is:

A habit is that which the possessor of it uses when he wills, from the Commentator on *De Anima* 3 comm. 18; 'to use' belongs to the agent, for the patient does not use a passive principle.

7. Further, we attribute four conditions to a habit and to what has a habit: that it operate with pleasure, easily, without impediment, and promptly.

8. From each an argument can be given for the intended proposition:

From the first, that an act which was first disagreeable to the agent does not become agreeable to it unless the agent itself, insofar as it is agent, be differently disposed; therefore when, through this habit, by which action belongs to it, action is agreeable to it and so pleasant, the agent itself is differently disposed insofar as it is agent.

9. From the second condition the argument is that what is of itself supremely disposed to undergo something does not need to be helped so that it might undergo it; but a habitual potency – of which sort is the intellect and will – is of itself supremely disposed to receiving act (because they do not have a contrary and, for this reason, they do not need motion in order to act); therefore the habit whereby the potency is helped disposes it to acting and not to undergoing.

10. From the third condition the argument is that absence of impediment belongs to that of which there is a being impeded; but being impeded belongs to the agent when its active power fails and is overcome by another; therefore the habit by which acting without impediment belongs to something belongs to it insofar as it is active.

11. From the fourth the argument is as follows, that promptness belongs to that of which there is an acting sluggishly or promptly; but 'not to act promptly' belongs to an

agent insofar as it is active, not insofar as it is passive; therefore the promptness, which the habit bestows, belongs to the agent insofar as it is agent.

12. Further, to the principal point:

A habit inclines a power to act. But there is a double inclination, namely of a passive power to form and of an active power to act; habit does not incline in the first way, for act is received in the power immediately, otherwise perfect and imperfect act would not have the same thing susceptible of them; therefore it inclines in the second way, as an active principle for acting, – and this is the intended proposition.

13. Again, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 8.4.255a30-255b5 and *De Anima* 2.5.417a21-28, the soul is, before knowledge, in essential potency, but when it has knowledge it is in accidental potency. But what reduces something from essential potency to accidental potency as regard operation seems to be the active principle with respect to it, because it is that whereby the possessor of it acts; hence the Philosopher intends, in *De Anima* 2.2.414a4-7, 12-13, that just as science is ‘that whereby we know’ so the soul is ‘that whereby we live and sense’ etc., and consequently, just as the soul is that whereby we perform vital acts, so science is that whereby we actively speculate.

14. Again, some habits are practical, and one such is active, as prudence, and another productive, as art; the idea of a practical habit in general, and of a productive one in particular, seems to involve in such habit the idea of active principle.

15. On the contrary:

Relation is not an active principle, nor anything that essentially includes relation; but habit is ‘in relation to something’, according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 7.3.246a30-b21; therefore etc.

16. A confirmation of the reason is that absolute real entity is no less required in the principle of motion than in its term; if therefore a habit lacks the absolute entity that would suffice for terminating motion (according to the Philosopher in *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13), much more does it lack the absolute entity that is required in an active principle.

17. Further, second, in respect of one action there is one active potency (the Commentator on *Physics* 5 com.38); but the habit alone is not the active power with respect to operation, because then the habit itself would be a power (because power is that by which we are simply able), and ‘what is perfected by it’ would not be power simply; therefore only that which is perfected by a habit is the active principle of operation.

18. A confirmation of this reason is that a single action requires a formal principle ‘*per se* one’ whereby to be elicited; something composed of power and habit is ‘*per accidens* one’ and not ‘*per se* one’; therefore this composite whole cannot be the ‘by which’ in respect of an operation ‘*per se* one’.

19. Further, an accident is not a principle of acting in its proper subject; but operation, for which habit is posited, is repeatedly received in the power to which the habit belongs; therefore with respect to operation the habit is not the active principle.

20. Further, some habits are in the sensitive appetitive powers; this appetite is not active, because according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.36, “sense does not lead but is led;” therefore neither can the form of it be an active principle, because if it were it ought to concur with the power in acting.

I. To the Second Question

A. Five Ways of Giving a Solution are Expounded and Examined

1. First Way

21. [Exposition of the opinion] – To this question it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that things are differently disposed as regard acquired habit and infused habit. For the natural act of a man, and the lack of impediment in the act, is from another, because of the indetermination that nature has with respect to that act, – and therefore acquired virtue is a perfection of nature, with nature presupposed under the idea of the principle of act; but if supernatural virtue belonged to nature (with nature presupposed in that to which such an act corresponds), then the supernatural virtue alone would facilitate nature, as acquired virtue does; but this is false, nay by the same thing there is ‘gratuitous existence’ and a gratuitous act, according to that [supernatural] degree, is simply elicited – the result being that acquired virtue is a virtue according to the idea of virtue that is posited in *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, but theological virtue is not like that but accords with the idea of virtue by which it is laid down that virtue is ‘the utmost of power’ (*De Caelo* 1.11.281a10-12).

22. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion [n.21], if thus he [sc. Henry of Ghent] understands that a supernatural habit is simply principle with respect to act, I argue as follows:

That by which someone can act simply is a power; therefore a supernatural habit will be a power. The antecedent is plain, because power is that whereby we are simply and first able to act.²⁵⁵

23. Further, from this [sc. that a supernatural habit is a principle of act] it follows in addition that no more will the will be good if it acts through the habit of charity than a piece of wood is perfected in acting if it acts by the heat inhering in it accidentally;²⁵⁶ an example: for just as from this fact [sc. the wood acting through heat] no action belongs to the wood through the form of wood but only to the agent [sc. the heat] that is received in the wood, so also it seems that the action that would belong to charity as to principal principle would in no way belong to the will as will. And it also follows further that just as heat, if it were separated, would heat equally as much, so charity, if it were separated, would act equally as much, for every form that is the total principle of acting as it exists in a subject, can, if it exists *per se*, operate *per se* – and thus the intended proposition evidently follows, namely that the habit will be a power.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁵ Note by Scotus: “This is true of the genus of action, it is false of operation-action.”

²⁵⁶ Note by Scotus: “By that action a subject, whose formal principle is ‘an accident through an accident’ of that subject, is not *per se* perfected.”

²⁵⁷ Note by Scotus: “If heat were an active principle in respect of something which would be a perfection of wood, there would be nothing similar to ‘heat is active’ (each unfitting result rightly follows when one posits habit as the reason for receiving the operation); nothing would be similar about operation, – for a material cause of operation is lacking; nothing either about acting, about genus of action, because in this way it is only a principle of something immanent, not of something transient (but why is it not?).”

24. Further, an operation whose active principle is purely natural is not freely elicited; but a habit, since it is not formally the will, nor as a consequence formally free, will, if it is an active principle, be purely natural; therefore its operation will not be purely free, and thus no 'willing' will be free if it is elicited by the habit as by a total active principle.

25. Further, in that case a man who once has charity could never sin mortally, which is unfitting. – The proof of the consequence is that he who has some active form predominating in him can never be moved against the inclination of that predominating form, just as never can a heavy mixed body be raised upwards against the inclination of the dominating earth in it; but charity – if it is the total active principle – is predominant over the will itself, which has no power for that act; therefore the will always follows the inclination of charity in acting, and so it will never sin.

26. Further, that act is not mine which is not in my power; but the action of the habit itself is not in my power, because the habit itself – if it is active – is not free but is a natural principle; therefore the 'loving' will not be mine, such that it be in my power, and so I will not merit by that act.

2. Second Way

27. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way it can be said that acquired and infused virtues do not differ in the aforesaid way [n.21], but both are compared as to substance of act in the same way; and then there is one way of speaking, that the act has its substance from the power but has such and such intensity from the habit, so that to the two things as it were in the act – namely the substance and the intensity – there correspond two things in the idea of the principle or the cause.

28. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this I argue that the intensity of an act is not something extrinsic, an accident of the act, but a degree intrinsic to the act, – such that an intense act is something '*per se* one', just as an individual of this sort is one in species. There cannot, therefore, be one principle of the substance of this sort of act and another of its intensity, because that by which there is this individual is that by which there is an intrinsic degree proper to this individual; for it cannot receive nature, and a nature designated 'this nature', from something else without receiving it in a certain degree. – Following on from this, as if from the same middle term, one could argue the way it was argued before against the principal point [n.18], that since an intense act is '*per se* one', and what is combined from potency and habit is as it were '*per accidens* one', this whole cannot be the principle of that. But this form of arguing is not cogent (hence it will also be solved later [nn.73-74]), though the first form is, because that whereby it is 'this one thing' is that whereby it has a definite degree intrinsic to this.

29. Further, second, whenever a naturally active principle concurs with a free acting cause, the natural principle always jointly acts as much as it can (an example about the will and an inferior power acting naturally as much as belongs to itself); for although it be prevented from acting when the free principle does not act, yet – when the free principle is acting – it necessarily acts, because it acts by way of nature, as much as belongs to it, it jointly acts with the free principle as much as it can; therefore if a determinate habit in the will give a determinate intensity to the act, then, with the will operating on the substance of the act, the habit will necessarily give the intensity

corresponding to itself, and thus, however much the will operates with a modicum of effort, its act would always be equally as intense, because, although the will causes the substance of the act, the habit – because it acts by way of nature – would necessarily cause what is its own.

30. Further, if the habit give intensity to the act, this would be in some designated degree (that degree will be given the mark *a* below); therefore the will can, along with this habit, have an act that is intense to that degree. Let there be another will, more perfect than this will in proportion to ‘degree *a*’ by relation to an act in the lowest degree (to wit, if *a* is the fourth degree in the act, let there be another will exceeding the first will by four degrees), then this will – without a habit – could have an act as equally intense as the will with the habit. Therefore the substance of the act is not so precisely from the power that the intensity is not from it.

31. Further, only an infinite will – excluding all idea of habit – has power for an infinite act; therefore too the will, in whatever degree of nature it is, has power for an act of a determinate degree. – The antecedent is plain, because a will, by the fact it is infinite, is not receptive of any habit, because there is not lacking to it any perfection that is possible to will. The proof of the consequence is that ‘as the highest is to the highest, so is the simply to the simply’ and so is any degree whatever to the degree corresponding to it.

3. Third Way

32. [Exposition of the Opinion] – In a third way, by attributing somehow to the habit the idea of active principle in respect of the act, one can say that the habit is a partial active cause, along with the power itself (which is also a partial cause), in respect of a perfect act proceeding from the power and the habit, although the power itself could be the total cause in respect of an imperfect act preceding the generation of the habit. And then one would have to speak about the distinction of these two partial causes, and how they *per se* make one total cause, in the way spoken above in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the Cause of Generated Knowledge’ [I d.3 nn.495-498].

33. [A doubt] – But then there is a doubt. Since these two [sc. power and habit] are not causes of the same order, as are two people hauling a boat, – which of them has the idea of prior cause?

34. It seems that the habit does, because it belongs to the prior cause to determine the second and not conversely; but the habit determines the power toward act; and it gives inclination to it, and not conversely; but to give inclination belongs to the superior in respect of the inferior, and not conversely

35. But the opposite of this seems to be the case:

First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely, – because what uses another in acting is more principal than it, and that which it uses is as it were the instrument or the second cause with respect to it [I d.3. n.562]

36. Likewise, the power is more unlimited in acting than the habit, because it extends to more things; but the superior cause seems to be more unlimited in extent; therefore etc. [ibid. n.559].

37. Further, third, a habit is a natural cause. Therefore if it be the principal cause, which moves the power, it would move it by way of nature and consequently the power,

since it acts in the way in which it is moved, would act by way of nature; for an agent that acts insofar as it is moved – if it be moved by way of nature – also acts further by way of nature, and so every action of an habituated power would be natural and none free (at any rate none would be in the power of the will), which is a unfitting result.

38. Again, fourth, the habit would be the power, because it would be that by which the possessor of it can first act.

39. Again, fifth, when there are two ordered causes one of which is cause of the other, that which is cause of the other is the superior cause; but the power is the cause of the habit – at any rate by the mediation of acts – and not in any way conversely; therefore etc.

40. [Clarification of the opinion] – I concede, for these reasons [nn.35-39] that, by holding the habit to be a partial cause with respect to the act [n.32], the habit would be second cause and not first, but the power itself would be the first cause and absolutely would not need the habit for operating; yet it operates less perfectly without the habit than with it (and that when an equal effort on the part of the power is posited), just as, when two causes come together for one effect, one cause alone does not have power *per se* for an effect as perfect as both together do. And in this way there is saved why the act is more intense when from the power and the habit than when from the power alone; not indeed that the power is the cause of the substance of the act and the habit the cause of the intensity of the act (as if there were two causes corresponding to the two caused things [n.27]), but that both causes coming together are able to produce a more perfect effect than one alone [I d.3 n.296], – which effect, however, being a whole in itself and as ‘*per se* one’ is from the two causes, but causing in diverse order [nn.32-33].

41. [Against the opinion] – Against this opinion there is the following argument:

No things distinct in species are equivocal agent causes for each other; habit and act are distinct in species; therefore they are not equivocal agent causes for each other; but an act is necessarily an equivocal cause in the generation of a habit, an acquired habit at least, – not therefore conversely.

42. The proof of the major is that an equivocal cause contains eminently in itself the perfection of the effect; but two things distinct in species cannot eminently contain each other. – Further, in comparing the same first cause to two effects, it seems that the second of the effects would have a determinate order, immediate or mediate, prior or posterior – and that when speaking of the whole species of the second of those effects. The point is evident by induction in passions that follow the same subject, wherein there is necessarily a determinate order, that one follows the subject more immediately than the other, and that according to its whole species, so that this order does not vary in any individuals whatever of the species. Therefore with respect to the power – which is the common cause of the act and the habit – the two effects will have a determinate order, so that either necessarily the act according to its whole species would precede the habit or conversely; and since some act of necessity precedes the habit as the cause of it, the habit would not precede any act.

43. Further, if the habit is a partial and equivocal cause with respect to the act, then the cause of this cause will be more perfect than the equivocal cause of the same act (the consequence is plain, because in equivocal causes the cause of the cause is a more perfect cause than the cause closer to the thing caused); but the act is the cause of the generation of the habit; therefore if the power along with the habit can perform a perfect

act [nn.32, 40], it could much more perform the same perfect act if it were under the act that generates the habit, – which seems an unfitting result, because two perfect acts cannot exist in the same power, or at any rate, if they could, it does not seem that one of them could in any way be the active principle with respect to the other.

44. Further, if the habit is as it were the second cause [n.40], supplying some degree of causality that is lacking to the power, then the habit could become so perfect that it would supply the place of the whole power; for universally, in agents of the same nature, it seems that the virtue of one could be so intensified that it would equal the two [I d.3 n.497].

45. Further, if it be held that, in the process of making more or less intense, the preexisting individual is corrupted, it would be necessary to posit that the habit is not the cause of the act, because it is corrupted in the act whereby it is made more intense; but a cause is not a cause when it is corrupted, because what does not exist is not cause of anything.

4. Fourth Way

46. [Exposition of the opinion] – He who would maintain the conclusion of these reasons [nn.41-45] could negate of habit all idea of active principle, and say that a habit only gives an inclination to operation as a sort of prior act agreeing with second act and giving a determination to that act – just as heaviness is a prior act, giving determination and inclination to a determinate ‘where’, although, according to some, heaviness is not a principle with respect to existing in that ‘where’.

47. [Approval of the opinion] – And this opinion seems probable, because to nothing should causality with respect to anything be attributed unless such causality is evident from the nature of the things (whether of the cause or of the thing caused); also to no cause should perfect causality be denied unless imperfection of causality appears manifestly in it, because no nature should be denied to possess a perfection which it does not evidently lack. But there seems to be no necessity of positing any active causality in the habit with respect to the act, because without this all the conditions commonly attributed to the habit will be saved [n.48]; also there is no necessity to take away from the power the perfect idea of causality so as to attribute a partial causality to the power. Therefore there is no need to attribute any causality to the habit.

48. The assumption is plain, because the four conditions that are attributed to the habit, namely that it is ‘that whereby the possessor of it operates easily, with pleasure, without impediment, and promptly’ [n.7], are saved by the habit’s inclination alone, which the habit attributes to the power as the power is receptive of operation.

49. Pleasure indeed exists because of the condition of the receiver, to whom belongs the operation received and the object about which the operation is. For pleasure is never in a making that is precisely a making, but because action is in the agent action can be pleasant because of the agreement of the agent with the object; but this agreement can be provided by the habit from the fact that it gives an inclination toward the action and the object. Pleasurability, therefore, does not include the idea of active principle, but only the agreement of the passive principle with the power and the object, and that as to action which is of the genus of quality, not action which is of the genus of action, – which difference in actions was stated above in distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.600-604]. Operation

indeed is an action that is a quality, and it belongs to an habituated power that is, by the habit, inclined to such an act and to the object that terminates such an operation; but it does not thus belong to a non-habituated power, nor does such a form or such an object so belong.

50. Likewise as to the second condition. Difficulty in operation occurs from the fact that what is receptive of the operation is not disposed to receiving it, and not merely from a defect in the active virtue; therefore if what is receptive is disposed, there will be easiness in acting, to the extent the agent acts on such a receptive thing.

51. Likewise about absence of impediment and promptness. For impediment to, and slowness of, the agent in acting can be because of the indisposition of the receptive thing itself, especially when the same thing is agent and recipient, so that it will not itself operate promptly because it is indisposed to operating. This indisposition, then, is not for performing an action in the genus of action, but for having an action in the genus of quality; for nothing is said formally to operate insofar as it elicits operation but insofar as it receives it in itself.

52. Also, the way that the other things commonly attributed to a habit are saved, by attributing the whole action to the power and no activity to the habit, will be plain from solving the arguments to the principal point [nn.6-7, 12-14, 87-91].

5. What One should Think about the Four Ways

53. Thus then it is plain how, once the two first ways ‘about habit’ are abandoned as unfitting, the two last ways, namely the third and fourth, can be sustained as probable, by attributing, in line with the third way, some activity to the habit and not only ‘the idea of active principle’ to the power [n.32], – and, in line with the fourth way, by denying to the habit the idea of active principle and saying that it is as it were a form giving inclination to receive some further form, although it not be the idea of receiving with respect to it (as heaviness gives inclination downwards, although it is not the idea of that which receives what is downwards, but ‘a bodily magnitude’ is, insofar as it is receptive of some ‘where’ n.46)).

54. To the arguments that are against these two last ways, each of which ways can be sustained with probability, a response will be given later [nn.71-86], according to one of these two ways by maintaining it about the act either as to the substance of the act or as to the intrinsic degree.

6. Fifth Way

55. It remains now to inquire further about the accidental goodness of the act (which is the sort moral goodness is), and about moral habit, whether moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is in any way an active principle with respect to moral goodness in the act.

56. [Arguments for the fifth way] – It seems that it is

Because, according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-17, virtue is “what perfects the possessor and makes his work good;” but it does not make it good in the idea of passive principle, because it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it does so in the idea of active principle

57. Further, virtue is “the disposition of the perfect in relation to the best”, from *Physics* 73.246b23; but it is not a passive disposition because – as before – it is not the idea of receiving; therefore it is in the idea of active principle. – There is a confirmation also for the reason, because ‘as good is to good so is best to best’ [*Topics* 3.2.117b22-26]; but since ‘the best idea’ belongs to the active principle, then according to this reason virtue perfects the power, and so perfects it for acting.

58. Further, virtue is moderator of the passions; but it does not moderate the passions through the idea of passive principle, because the object, by the fact it is the natural cause, causes the action according to the utmost of its power, – therefore as much as it can, if it is not impeded by some contrary agent; therefore the habit, by preventing the object from thus acting completely, moderates it in repressing the passion through the idea of active principle.

59. Further, *Ethics* 2.3.1105b7-9, the Philosopher says that ‘he who does not have justice, although he could do just things, not however justly’, – and so in the case of other acts; but moral goodness requires acting justly or formally, – and thus in other cases; therefore virtue, insofar as it is good, is such a principle of act, because without it an act could not be good.

60. [Arguments against the fifth way] – But there is an argument to the contrary of this through the fact that moral goodness in an act asserts only relation, because that an act is circumstanced with its due circumstances is not anything absolute in the act but is only a due comparison of it to the things it ought to agree with; therefore this does not have any proper active principle, just as neither does a respect have it.

61. Further, if a habit, insofar as it is a ‘virtue’, were the active principle of the moral goodness in an act, since the habit is not a virtue save in a respect, namely from its conformity with prudence (for it is “an elective habit of the mean, as determined by right reason” *Ethics* 2.5.1106b36-07a2), therefore some relative idea in virtue would be the idea of active principle, which is impossible.

62. [Response to the fifth way] – As to this article [n.55], it can be said that, just as beauty is not some absolute quality in the beautiful body but is the aggregation of all the things that become such a body (to wit size, figure, and color), and an aggregation too of all the respects (which are aggregations of all the becoming things in relation to the body and to each other), so the moral goodness of an act is as it were a certain comeliness of that act, including the aggregation of a due proportion with all the things that it has to be in proportion with (to wit, with the power, the object, the end, the time, the place, the manner), and that specifically in the way these are determined by right reason to be needing to agree with the act; the result is that we can say on behalf of all of them that the agreement of the act with right reason is that by which, once posited, the act is good, and that by which, when not posited – whatever other things it agrees with – the act is not good, because however much an act is about an object of some kind or other, if it is not according to right reason in the one who does it (to wit if he do not have right reason in his operating), the act is not good. Principally, therefore, the conformity of the act to right reason – a right reason determining fully all the circumstances due to that act – is the moral goodness of an act.

But this goodness has no proper active principle, just as neither does any respect, – especially since this respect is, from the nature of the extreme terms, consequent to the extremes posited; for it is impossible for any act to be posited in existence and for right

reason to be posited in existence without there following in the act, from the nature of the extreme terms, such a conformity to right reason; but a relation that necessarily follows the extremes does not have any proper cause other than the extremes.

Therefore, as concerns this accidental condition of the act, which is moral goodness, there is no necessity for any habit to have any idea of proper active principle, save insofar as it has the idea of active principle with respect to the substance of the act – which act is of a nature to agree with the full determination of prudence;²⁵⁸ and toward that act some habit inclines in itself from the nature of the habit, and from this – as a consequence – it inclines to the act which is conform to right reason, if right reason is present in the one acting.

65. What has been said of the moral goodness of an act [n.62] must be said proportionally of the habit, because moral virtue adds over and above the substance of the habit – as it is a form in the genus of quality – only an habitual conformity to right reason. For the same habit in nature, which might be generated from acts of abstinence elicited along with an erroneous reason in the one eliciting them, when it remains afterwards along with right reason, would afterwards be the virtue of abstinence and would before not be a habit of virtue, as long as there was no right reason of abstaining; nor yet has

²⁵⁸ Note by Scotus: “This respect – aptitudinal respect – follows from the nature of the extremes [sc. habit and prudence], but actual respect does not; for this habit is fit, of its species, to be subordinate to prudence in acting, but it is not subordinate – in acting – from the nature of the very extremes, even when they exist together in the same thing; for when he [sc. who has both the habit and prudence] has an appetite in accord with this habit and not from the dictate of reason (if this is possible), then the habit is not subordinate, nor is the act morally good.

On the contrary: he always uses it as a virtue, because he uses it as it is fit to be subordinate; for it is not a virtue precisely as actually subordinate in acting, because then someone who is not doing anything would not have any virtue. – Again, every respect that is not from the nature of the extremes has a proper cause. What is the cause here?

To the first: he uses it but not as making it a virtue. In another way: although he uses that which is a virtue, not however as it is a virtue, because although being fit for subordination is sufficient for the being of virtue, nevertheless for using it ‘as it is a virtue’ requires it to be subordinated, because to use it is to be subordinated.

To the second: the respect in an effect is from the two causes, conjoined in the acting; and not from the form of one in relation to itself, nor from the form of the other, nor of both and of both as conjoined in the subject, but of them as conjoined in actually acting, and thus of both as conjoined such that the habit moves to desire from the dictate of prudence. Such conjoining of them, therefore, in actually acting is the source whereby the relation is in the effect; not that it is the source whereby the acting is moral (because this would be got from prudence alone, without the other habit moving), but that it is the source whereby the acting is moral and easy and pleasant, – as in *Ethics* 2.5.1106a15-21.

But what is the source of this conjunction of them in acting, because it is an extrinsic respect? – Response: from their absolute natures there is first this conjunction, and second the relation of them in the effect.

But what is the ‘absolute’ from them such that this respect should be caused second? – Response: from prudence there is an absolute act in the intellect, – and from that act as prior cause and rule, and from the appetite as ruled, there is an absolute act of desiring. If the conjunction of the causes precedes in nature the common effect, nothing ‘absolute’ comes from the two causes before their conjunction does (a resulting difficulty: the source of the action primarily is not the source of the second conjunction in the action). If the first – in the order of nature – is a caused ‘absolute’, from it there is a relation of it to each cause, and from it conversely a relation of each cause to it, – from it the conjunction of one with the other.

anything changed in that habit in itself but only now it is conjoined with prudence while before it was not.

66. To be conjoined, therefore, to prudence²⁵⁹ attributes to the habit (as it is a form in the genus of quality) the being of virtue, when the habit is of its nature naturally conform to prudence, – and so the habit that is a moral virtue indicates nothing in absolute entity other than is indicated by a habit such in nature, but does not indicate a virtue, if it be without prudence; and consequently it can have no other causality as it is a virtue than as it is such a natural quality, save that ‘as it is conjoined with prudence’ it is of a nature to be second cause – directed as it were by prudence – with respect to the common effect of both; but as it is without prudence it cannot be second cause with respect to the same effect (just as sight in a phrenetic cannot be a free power by participation, because he is unable to have use of will, which is a free power by essence – but in someone healthy sight does have use of free power by participation, and it is as it were a second cause with respect to the will). But still, when it is a second cause with respect to prudence, it has a proper causality – agreeing with it in its order of causing – precisely from the fact that it is such a form and a certain quality in nature, but not by respect of conformity or conjunction with prudence, because although a second cause joined to a first acts otherwise than when it is without it, yet it does not have its proper active virtue from such conjunction, but from its absolute nature.

67. [Conclusion to the fifth way] – Neither, therefore, on the part of the act insofar as it is morally good, nor on the part of the habit insofar as it is a moral virtue, can there be found any special idea according to which a virtue ‘as it is a virtue’ is a principle of an act insofar as the act is morally good save the one which is on the part of the habit and the act as concerns their nature.

68. [What one should think of the fifth way] – This fifth way, therefore, about the action of a moral virtue with respect to the act as it is morally good, should not be treated as other than the ways that touch on the substance of the habit and the substance of the act [n.67], – and so, in brief, as to the whole of the fifth way, one should hold either the third or the fourth way [nn.32, 46] about every habit.

B. Solution of the Question by Maintaining the Third Way

69. By maintaining the third way (which seems to attribute more to the habit), it can thus be said that, just as, if there were some heaviness in a stone that would not be a sufficient active principle with respect to descent downwards, yet it would be a partial active principle (as will be said in II d.2 p.2 q.6 nn.2-11 about a sufficient heaviness, because it is a total active principle with respect to descent downwards), that – I say – diminished heaviness, along with another moving power moving it to the descent, could act in a diminished way, such that, with the other moving power acting with equal effort, the descent that is caused by that other extrinsic moving power and by the diminished

²⁵⁹ Note of Scotus: “I do not say ‘conjoined in the same subject’ but, along with this, ‘conjoined to it as to a rule and prior cause’, to which this habit is subordinated insofar as it is a mover, – and this subordination or conformity is the essential idea of virtue; and the absolute form, as it is precisely mover under such a respect, is precisely active for an act that has a like respect (because what agrees with the ruled agrees with the rule), and thus the habit ‘as it is a virtue’ is precisely a mover to an act morally right, which – as it is absolutely such a form – is absolutely active for such an act ‘in its substance’, nor does it there have the idea of subordinate cause with respect to prudence.”

heaviness moving intrinsically would be quicker than a descent that is caused by the extrinsic moving power alone moving with equal effort, yet the extrinsic moving power could, with so much effort, move a neutral body (namely one which had no heaviness or lightness), just as this body would be moved by intrinsic heaviness and by an extrinsic moving power acting weakly; – so, in the proposed case, the habit moves the power as a sort of weight, which, however, is of itself not sufficient for actively eliciting the operation, but the virtue alone of the active power, without such weight, is sufficient; but when both come together, yet such that there is not on the part of the power a greater effort now than before, a more perfect operation is elicited now than could be elicited before by the power itself alone.

70. And common experience seems to be in favor of this way, because anyone can experience that, when he has been habituated, he can with equal effort have a more perfect operation than he could have when not habituated (which perfection of the act could not be attributed to the habit, if the habit were only an inclining passive principle), because at any rate, as it seems, in the prior instant of nature in which the operation is elicited – before it is received in the power – there would be an equal idea of active principle in the eliciting, and so a perfect operation would be elicited with equal effort by an habituated and by a non-habituated power.

C. To the Arguments when Maintaining the Third Way

71. [To the principal negative arguments] – To the principal arguments. By holding this way [sc. the third], I reply to the first argument [n.15]. Although it be said that a habit is not an absolute form, because of those words of the Philosopher in *Physics* 7 [n.15], yet, by holding any quality to be an absolute form (and a quality of the first species is no less a quality than one of another species [*Categories* 8.8b25-11a38]), it can be said that something which the relation is the same as can be an active principle, although relation is not an active principle; nor either is that which the relation is the same as an active principle by reason of the relation, but by reason of the absolute which the relation itself is the same as. The distinction between these things, namely relation and the absolute essence which the relation is the same as, can be plain from many other things said above, where formal non-identity is posited along with perfect real identity [I d.2 nn.388-410, d.8 n.191-217]; and this will be plainer in II d.1 q.4 nn.21-25, where it will be said that the relation of the creature to God is the same as the absolute essence of the created thing and yet is not formally the same. To this extent, then, can the Philosopher by expounded, that ‘habit is in relation to something’, because by identity it includes the respect;²⁶⁰ and yet it is not a respect only, but something absolute, – and therefore action can belong to it as to a principle of acting.

²⁶⁰ Note of Scotus: “There is a doubt about the respect with the *per se* object, whether it is identical with the habit. It is certain that the respect whereby it is said to be a virtue – which is respect to a rule – is an extrinsic addition; hence it is not, on account of Aristotle’s intention, necessary to proceed to a respect identical with the habit, but it is sufficient that any habit be not in relation to something in divisible degrees.

On the contrary: that whereby the place ‘accident through accident’ is not divided, neither that of which it is the accident? – Perhaps one idea in *Physics* 7 is about identical respect, another about ‘*per accidens*’ respect.

72. In confirmation of the reason [n.16] it can be said that a greater absoluteness is required in a term of motion than in a principle of acting, because nothing can be the term of a motion that has the same relation to itself. It is not so with the active principle.^{261 262}

73. To the second argument [n.17] I say that of one action there is one principle *per se*, and that in one order of being principle; however, there can be many principles in diverse orders of being principle, which do not have a unity insofar as they are principles save the unity of order, although sometimes along with unity of order comes the fact that there is a unity of subject and accident, but this is accidental.

So in the proposed case. Habit and power are two active powers of different order, each is in its order 'a *per se* one'. And along with this unity of order there comes the unity of accident and subject among these ordered things, and this is accidental, because if the first cause could be conjoined to the second without such an informing of one by the other as they are conjoined with when one is informed by the other, they could in the same way have sufficient unity for causing one effect. When therefore it is said that 'of one action there is an active cause *per se* one', I concede that there is, namely in one order, – but in another order of being principle there can well be one cause and another cause, and that whether this and that cause constitute 'a one *per accidens*' or not but only 'a one in unity of order'; and although there be here 'a unity *per accidens*', yet there is always still preserved a unity of order of principle to thing caused by the principle.

74. By this the response is plain to the confirmation about the unity of formal principle [n.18]; for I concede such unity in what is the principle 'by which' in one order of being principle.

²⁶¹ Interpolated text: "Or what is more to the purpose, it can be said that the reason does not prove the proposition save in a diminished way, – and to get its conclusion, which it intends, one must handle it in a way other than the words primarily signify (on which matter I do not now wish to dwell), or one would have to make clear other reasons for it so as to prove principally the said conclusion (this conclusion 'whether a habit is something absolute' will be spoken of elsewhere)."

²⁶² Note of Scotus: "One must add to the Philosopher's minor [n.15] as follows: 'every habit is identically in relation to something not according to divisible stages.' And in this way the major is true: 'whatever is identically in relation to something not according to divisible stages cannot terminate motion' [n.72]. – But it can well terminate change. Hence a habit is not generated by way of continuity (so that its generation should thus be motion), but if it has stages, each is indivisible and in each the object is indivisibly regarded; and each is generated by simple change, which does not terminate motion in that form (but perhaps motion in the passions or certain other things), for more and less in a form do not suffice for motion in that form unless each stage is divisible, so that one can proceed continuously from one to the other. For motion is not composed of changes.

Therefor the Philosopher's middle is not 'habit is in relation to something', – but it is this 'in relation to something not according to divisible stages', if in each stage it indivisibly regards that with which it is identically relative. And from this perhaps, as from something more manifest, it follows that the absolute itself – which it thus regards – does not have divisible stages; but this does not follow as from the cause; rather the fact the absolute does not have divisible stages is the cause of the fact that 'the respect is not divisible' (because a relation takes the more and less from its foundation), not conversely, although sometimes the converse could be the cause of its becoming known.

But this indivisibility of respect identical with the absolute does not prove that it is not the principle of acting, as is plain about any active form – if any is indivisible, it has 'a respect identical' with God. Therefore it does not follow 'it does not terminate motion because of an indivisible identical relation, therefore it is for that reason not a principle of acting', because an identical indivisible relation is repugnant to a form acquired through motion, not however to an active form."

75. To the other [n.19] I say that an accident can well be the principle of some effect that can be received in its subject, just as the intelligible species is the principle of understanding received in the possible intellect; and thus can a form be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to the change of its subject.

76. To the other [n.20], about sensitive appetite, I say that it has the idea of active principle in some way, although not of being active freely; and this is what Damascene means, that ‘sense does not lead but is led’; that is, it is not master of its own action, which is ‘to lead’, – but with respect to its own action it is determined by the agent itself to a definite operation, and this is ‘to be led’. Also, that the sensitive appetite is not free, although it is in some way active, and the sense itself similarly – this will be spoken of elsewhere [II d.29 q. un nn.3-4, Suppl. d.25 q. un nn.8, 24].

77. [To the arguments against the second way] – To the arguments that are made against the second way, which posits that the habit is an active principle of intensity in the act, because they seem to be against this way [sc. the third] (to this extent, that it posits the act ‘elicited by the habit and the power acting with equal effort’ to be more intense than the act elicited by the power alone), I show, by running through them, how they are not repugnant to this way.

78. About the first [n.28] it is plain that this way does not posit two distinct things in act possessing two principles, but the same ‘*per se* one’ act has two principles in diverse orders of being principle [n.40].

79. To the second [n.29] I concede the inference, namely that when the power is operating with equal effort ‘the act is always more intense when the habit is working along with it than when it is not’, but from this the unfitting result does not follow – which does result against that way [sc. the second] – namely that when the power is acting with any effort whatever ‘the act is always equally intense’; this does follow there, because all of the intensity is attributed to the habit, – but it does not follow here, because all of the intensity is attributed to two causes; and it is attributed to the power, indeed, according to its greater or lesser effort, – but to the habit always equally, as far as concerns itself [n.32].

80. To the third [n.30] I concede that a will could come to exist in pure nature that would elicit a more intense act than another will along with the habit does; and this is not unfitting if one posits these two to be ordered principles, as it would be unfitting if one posits the whole intensity to be from the habit or attributes the whole intensity to the habit and not to the power.

81. The same point answers the fourth argument [n.31].

82. [To the arguments against the third way specifically] – To the arguments made against the third opinion [nn.41-45].

To the first [n.41] one should deny the major, because one should say that two equivocal partial, but not total, causes of distinct species can be causes for each other.

83. To the proof of it, which is through ‘the eminence of an equivocal cause’ I reply: this proof holds of a total cause, and I do not posit a circle in total equivocal causes. – To the other proof I say that two effects, when compared to their one common cause, can have a mutual order to each other in nature of partial cause, – as intelligible species and understanding, when comparing the agent and possible intellect, because with respect to intellection the species is partial cause, and ‘intellection’ can be posited as a sort of cause of the species insofar as it includes it.

84. To the other [n.43] one can say that the generative act of the habit need not be the idea of acting ‘by which’, as the generated habit can be the idea ‘by which’, – just as the virtue of the sun cannot be the principle ‘by which’ with respect to every act with respect to which the form of what is generated by the sun is the principle ‘by which’. And when it is said that ‘whatever is the cause of a cause etc.’ [n.43] – this is true as the remote principle ‘by which’ (when there is a remote principle ‘by which’), but not as the immediate principle ‘by which’.

85. To the third [n.44] I say that a habit – at whatever stage – cannot supply the whole place of the power, because although its causality is diminished, and the causality too of the power is diminished, yet the causality of the habit is of a different idea from the causality of the power; because, although the causality of the power is diminished, yet the habit is ‘in its idea’ the second cause, namely which the power is able to use, – and thus, if it is increased to infinity, it could never become the principle that uses (as the generative virtue of the father, however much it is increased, cannot become the virtue of the sun). The causality of the power, therefore, is not of the same idea as the causality of the habit, nor can the habit, when made intense, reach to its level, but they are always of a different idea; and yet the habit, when causing along with the power, causes a more perfect act than would be caused by one of them alone.

86. To the last one [n.45]: the supposition will be denied in the following material ‘On the Increase of Charity’ [nn. 225, 249].

D. To the Principal Positive Arguments while Maintaining the Fourth Way

87. He who wishes to maintain the fourth way [n.46] is able to reply to the principal reasons adduced for the first part [nn.6-14]:

To the first [n.6]: the power (or the one who has the power) uses the habit, because the habit is itself a certain inclination to action; not indeed as a power active for acting, but as a prior form inclines to a posterior form, as heaviness downwards.

88. To the four conditions [n.7]. One would say that pleasure [nn.7-8] is from the agreement of the operation with the power and with the object which the operation is about; this agreement is of the object with the power insofar as the power receives the action, not insofar as it elicits it, because mere making as making is never pleasure, and therefore one should, because of the pleasure, never posit the idea of active principle [n.49]. – Likewise, ease, absence of impediment, and promptitude [nn.7, 9-11] are set down under the idea of the passive, because the passive can receive with difficulty, and with impediment and slowly or not promptly, when it is not disposed, and by reason of the indisposition of the passive thing there is difficulty there and slowness. Therefore the agent can act without impediment and promptly and easily because of the disposition of the passive thing, and habit is such a disposition in the passive thing [nn.50-51]. When it is said, therefore, that ‘there is no easiness for undergoing because the passive is supremely disposed’ [n.9], I reply: by the abnegation of the contrary it is supremely disposed, but not through the positing of an agreeable disposition. An example about dry wood and neutral wood: wood that is neutral indeed is supremely disposed to heat by way of privation, through lack of any opposed disposition, – but it is not disposed positively by the positing of an agreeable disposition of the sort that dryness is; and if this

agreement was accompanied by sense the dry wood would be heated with pleasure, but not so the neutral wood, because the received form does not similarly agree with it.

89. To the other, about inclination [n.12], one could say that it inclines as the prior form to the taking up of the later form, as heaviness inclines to be downwards (even according to those who say that heaviness with respect to downward descent is not an active principle [n.69]); nor need what thus passively inclines be the reason for receiving the form to which it inclines, just as neither is heaviness the receptive principle ‘where’ [nn.53, 46].

90. To the other, about science [n.13], I say that science, by which the soul is reduced from essential potency to accidental potency, is the intelligible species of the object itself, and about that I concede that it is the active principle with respect to consideration [nn.83, 75]. But the species is not the habit we are speaking of, which is a certain quality left behind from acts frequently elicited; for the species itself naturally precedes the first act elicited about the object which it concerns, and although this species could be rooted in the intellect and – once it has been rooted – could be called a habit, it is however not the habit which is generated from acts repeatedly elicited, as was said [n.90]. Therefore all the words that are spoken about the species as about a habit do not progress to the understanding of this question, nor either do those words that take science for this species (the distinction of these habits, namely of the habit which is the intelligible species and the habit of the intellective part properly speaking, will be plain in II d.3 p.2 q.3 n.15). Through the same point is clear the response to what is added about the being ‘by which’ [n.13]; I say that science, taking it strictly for the habit acquired from speculations, is not properly that by which we speculate but is a certain inclination for easily and pleasantly speculating; but that by which as by the active principle – on the part of the object – we speculate is the intelligible species.

91. To the other [n.14] one can say that the intellective habit – or the practical habit – can be called active or making because it is inclined to action; not that action belongs to it as to the active principle, but as terminating its inclination, – such that the action belongs either to the habituated power itself or to another power as to the active principle; just as choice ‘practically right’ is actively elicited by the will and not by prudence which, however, is the practical habit with respect to that choice (because it inclines to it), although it is not the active principle of it.

E. To the Arguments for the Fifth Way

92. [At the same time to all of them] – To the arguments adduced for the fifth way, which seem to show that moral habit, insofar as it is a virtue, is an active principle of an act insofar as the act is moral [nn.56-59], I reply that moral goodness in an act (as was said before [n.62]) is the completeness of all the conditions and circumstances, and this principally so that these conditions be dictated by right reason as needing to be present in the act. Simply necessary, then, for the moral goodness of a moral act is that a complete dictate of right reason precede it, to which dictate it be conform as the measured to the measure.

93. But it is not necessary that the declaration be from some intellective habit, namely from prudence, nor that the act conform to the dictate be elicited by some moral appetitive power; for right dictate simply precedes prudence, because by it the first

degree of prudence is generated, and thus right choice simply precedes the moral habit, because by the choice itself moral virtue in the first degree is generated; at that point, then, in a first act, and correctly, someone gives a dictate without generated prudence and rightly chooses morally without generated moral virtue. However, prudence, generated from the first act or from several other right dictates, inclines more to eliciting similar dictates, that is, to rightly drawing conclusions of practical syllogisms about all the circumstances that ought to be present in the act to be elicited; likewise moral virtue, generated after the first act, inclines more to eliciting acts similar to those from which it was generated.

94. However, one must understand that what is generated about moral virtue is a certain quality, in whose idea – as it is absolutely such a quality – is not included its conformity with prudence; for the same quality could be generated from similar acts, in the same species, elicited without prudence (nay with erroneous reason, if it were so [n.65]), but that quality – which is generated from those acts according to a species of nature – is not a virtue from the fact that it is a quality, but there is further necessarily required its conformity with prudence, or, which is more express, its coexistence with prudence in the same actor [n.66]. For always indeed, whether prudence is present or not, the habit is of a nature to be conform to prudence, if prudence were there (just as the habit of abstaining, generated from acts done from an erroneous reason, is always – as far as depends on itself – of a nature to be conform to prudence, although prudence not be present in it), in the way that another habit, generated from excessive acts, is not of a nature to be conform. When the quality, therefore, which is of a nature to be conform to prudence, coexists with prudence, then it has not only an aptitudinal but an actual conformity with prudence, because both habits incline to similar things [n.93], – and the act elicited according to the inclination of those two habits is morally good; but if any act were elicited according to the quality alone that is materially moral virtue, and prudence does not coexist in the same actor nor is inclining to that act, the act would not be morally good.

95. Thus, therefore, it is plain that the quality which is materially a moral virtue (which has completely the idea of moral virtue through this, that it coexists with prudence) is related to prudence – when prudence is present – as second cause to first cause, and this in respect of the same common effect to be elicited by them; for then prudence is as it were the prior cause and the moral habit as it were the posterior cause. But these two causes, when they come together at the same time to elicit the act, can attribute to the act the moral goodness which the latter habit alone, if it were without prudence or right reason, could not attribute to it; to attribute moral goodness, indeed, is to attribute conformity to right reason – and this is attributed²⁶³ by that quality, not from the fact alone that it is a quality, but from the fact that in causing it coexists with prudence, which is inclining it at the same time.

97. And one must note that this goodness, as it is attributed to prudence so inclining, does not, as was said at the beginning [nn.92-93], necessarily belong to the habit of prudence, nor to it solely, but to the act which would be of a nature to be an act

²⁶³ Note by Scotus: “Nothing: the extreme [sc. prudence] to which the other [sc. the moral habit] is referred does not give anything to its correlative effectively but only terminatively.” I.e. [Vatican editors] the habit as it is completely a moral habit, just as it causes nothing in respect of the act, so it gives nothing to the act.

of prudence, which is right dictate; for if right dictate is present, and if appetite desires in accordance with it – as if in accordance with a measure – the act is morally right; and if that right dictate were not present, but prudence was present (according to which the intellect could dictate rightly), still the act – elicited without right dictate – would not be perfectly good. Therefore, when prudence is not present, the act which is right dictate suffices for dictating the right act; but, when prudence is present, prudence does not suffice without its own elicited act, and thus the rightness which prudence attributes to the moral act it attributes by the mediation of the proper act of prudence.

98. [To the individual arguments] – To the authorities, therefore, adduced on behalf of the fifth way, which seem to say that virtue, whereby it is virtue, effectively causes the moral goodness of the act:

First to the statement from *Ethics* 2 that virtue “makes his work good” [n.56], I say that either it does so by inclining, and this belongs to it from the fact that it is this quality in species of nature, – or, since this is not sufficient (for it would incline thus without prudence), it does so whereby it is virtue, that is, whereby it coexists with prudence; it does so indeed in its own class of cause, because it does so as second cause, – and this by virtue of the superior cause, which is prudence. If therefore the third way is maintained, namely about the activity of the habit [n.32], then it does so actively, but as partial and second cause; but if the fourth way be maintained [n.46], then it does so by way of inclination, and this, not from the fact alone that it inclines, but from the fact that the virtue itself along with prudence-virtue inclines.

99. To the other, about ‘moderating’ [n.58], I say that moral virtue does not actively moderate passion, as if, when the passion has already been excited – by the object – it makes it to be less; for a pleasant object, when present, naturally moves according to the utmost of itself. But the habit can make the object less agreeable to an habituated power than to a non-habituated power; for just as it is more disagreeable for a heavy object to be upwards than for a neutral object (although heaviness were not the active principle of descent), so some pleasant excessive thing would be in itself agreeable to the power, but to the power when habituated by a habit inclining it to moderate acts that pleasant excessive thing is disagreeable – or is not as pleasant and agreeable. And to this extent, as if by formal or virtual repugnance to the habit, the habit moderates the disagreeable or excessive object, lest the pleasant thing give immoderate pleasure; and from this there does not follow any activity of the habit, just as neither of humidity in a piece of wood, although the humidity moderates the fire so that it does not heat immoderately or strongly, as it does a dry body.

In another way it can be said that virtue moderates a passion that is not already generated or inhering but coming to be, to the extent it inclines the power – and this with coexisting prudence – to flee immoderate pleasant things that are of a nature to introduce immoderate pleasures, and only to admit pleasant things that are of a nature to give moderate pleasure. And in this respect indeed it does moderate, not by diminishing an already existing pleasure, but by warding off in advance an immoderate pleasure – which would be present.

100. To the other, about the fact that ‘without justice no one can operate justly’ [n.59], I reply: I say that in the first act, when there is a right dictate generative of prudence and the choice of someone just is conform to it [n.93], there the chooser not only does what is just but does it justly. But one should understand that he operates non-

justly – without justice – according to the whole perfection according to which someone could act justly, one of which perfections is pleasure and facility in operating, which does not belong to a non-habituated power as it does to a habituated power.

II. To the First Question

A. The Opinion which is Attributed to Peter Lombard

101. As to the first question, the opinion of the Master is said to be that the indwelling Holy Spirit alone, without any intermediate habit informing the will, moves the will to a meritorious act in a way other than he moves it to acts of belief and hope (for he moves it to acts of belief and hope through the medium of the habits of faith and hope), and in this way the Master is said to have denied any created charity.

1. Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

102. One can argue for this conclusion in two ways.

103. [First way] – The first way is taken from form's or habit's imperfection, or from its non-necessity for causing movement.

104. Here the argument goes first as follows: as a natural act is related to a natural or acquired habit, so is the act of an infused habit to an infused habit; but an acquired habit only bestows pleasurable acting and a facility in the power for the act (but it does not give the substance of the act), as is plain from the preceding question [nn.47-51, 88]; therefore in like manner an infused habit bestows only pleasurable acting, or would so bestow it if it were present within. But he who was a sinner before and is now justified does not elicit an act of loving God with pleasure; for resistance by his vices and persistence in good works seem as difficult to him as when he was in his sins, or not much easier, until by battle and victory over his passions he has acquired some contrary habit, and then he will act with pleasure. Therefore the justified sinner has no infused habit, because in that case he would, if it were present in him, act with pleasure.

105. Further, if a supernatural good be shown to a will in its purely natural state, the will would love it well enough because it has the object sufficiently close to it; therefore an infused habit is not required for loving a supernatural good. The proof of the assumption is that if a lesser good when shown to the will has the wherewithal to be loved, then a greater good has it too; therefore if the will in its purely natural state can love something, it can love the supreme good if that good be shown to it.

106. Further, the act of loving that would belong to that supernatural habit would also be supernatural, and so it would be created immediately (for supernatural things are not brought into being by any transition from something, but only by creation), and if the act would be something created then it does not presuppose anything for its creation.

107. Further, a habit can be used when the possessor of it wants to (Averroes above, *On the Soul* com.18); but no one has experience of being able to use this habit when he wants to; for he cannot, when he wants, elicit with pleasure and ease fervent acts of loving God, – as is plain in the case of contemplatives, who sometimes after some effort experience themselves possessed of great devotion and sometimes after equal effort possessed of a lesser devotion or none.

108. [Second way] – The second way is taken from the fact that without a habit the Holy Spirit suffices for causing motion.

109. Here the argument goes first as follows: the first cause can do of itself what it can do along with a second cause when the second cause is only an agent cause (or the major is taken this way: ‘the first cause can do of itself whatever it can do with a second cause that is not part of the essence of the thing’; I add this because of the form and matter in a composite thing, – for God cannot make a composite thing without the intrinsic parts that compose it); but a habit, if it is present within, does not have a necessary causality with respect to its acts save after some manner of agent causality (plainly at least not after the manner of a formal cause, or of a material cause ‘about which’ [*Prologue* n.188]); therefore its causality is extrinsic. Therefore whatever the Holy Spirit can cause in the act along with the habit, he can cause without the habit; plurality without necessity should, it seems, not be posited,²⁶⁴ because it is superfluous, – therefore, etc.

110. Further, in order for a will possessed of a habit to act in accordance with the habit, the cooperation of the Holy Spirit is necessary, otherwise he would not be the first cause in every action of creatures; but he does not cooperate because the will has the habit, because then a created will would use the Holy Spirit as a second cause, and the Holy Spirit would not be the first but the second cause with respect to the will that has the habit, because he would be determined by the will’s habit to act along with the will; therefore, on the contrary, because he cooperates with the will therefore the will operates in accordance with the habit. But the Holy Spirit can cooperate as equally with a will – in the first instant of its nature – that has the habit of charity as with a will that does not have it; therefore etc.

111. Further, the Son of God was thus united to our nature, because he was doing the works of that nature in such a way that the acts were truly said to belong to the Son of God as to the acting supposit; and yet there was by this fact no derogation from the assumed nature that prevented it being also the principle of its own operations. Therefore, by an argument from similars, the Holy Spirit can be in some way united to the will such that he himself does the works of the will without there being by this fact any derogation from the nature of the will in its idea as an operative power that would prevent it being able to be the principle of its own operations.

112. Further, the intellect is more passive than the will, and less active; therefore it is more in need of something to activate it so that it has power for its own act. But the intellect is posited as being capable, without any form informing it, of the beatific vision by the mere fact that the essence of God is as it were present to it by way of form [n.193]; therefore much more can the will be capable, without any form informing it, of every one of its acts by the fact that the Holy Spirit is for it as it were the form for performing acts of love.

2. Arguments against the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard

113. Against this conclusion, whether it be according to the intention of the Master or not, one can argue in two ways assumed from the faith: the first is taken from

²⁶⁴ Tr. A clear anticipation of Ockham’s razor, so called, namely that entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.

the justification of the sinner or from divine acceptance, and this without any elicited act, – the second is taken from the nature of a meritorious act.

114. [First way] – From the first way the argument goes first as follows: the sinner before repentance is unjust, after repentance just, in the way the Scripture calls the sinner ‘unjust’ and him who has been freed from sin ‘just’. – From this the argument runs: injustice, since it is formally a privation, cannot be taken away from anyone unless the opposite habit is given to him, because ‘to deprive of a privation’ is to put a habit in its place, for opposites are immediate in the case of a subject naturally fitted for them (*Metaphysics* 10.4.1055a33, 55b3-6); the soul is naturally fitted to receive justice; therefore the one who is justified, having been made just from being unjust, receives the habit opposite to the privation; for if there were nothing formally more present in him now than before, he would not more lack the privation now than he lacked it before.

115. Further, a sinner before repentance is not worthy of eternal life, but after repentance he is worthy of eternal life; but he is not worthy save by something formally inhering in him to which, according to the rules of divine justice, it is judged that eternal life should be given, and he had nothing of this sort before; therefore something positive is in the just man formally, by which he is worthy of eternal life.

116. Further, God does not accept a sinner for eternal life, but he does accept him who has been justified. I ask then what it is ‘to accept for eternal life’? It is not ‘to will – with the will of being well pleased – to beatify him for the present now’, because then God would immediately beatify him; therefore it is ‘to will that person – in accord with the disposition he now has – to be worthy of such a reward’ whom before God did not will to be worthy of such a reward. The difference here cannot, as it seems, be posited in the divine will, because nothing is new there, for the divine will is immutable; therefore it is because of a difference on the part of the person, because the divine will wants any person disposed in the same way to be disposed in the same way.

117. The confirmation of this reason [n.116] is that divine volition, because it is in itself one act, does not have the idea of opposed or distinct acts – as acts of willing and not willing – in the absence of any distinction in the connoted objects; for this ‘divine willing’ is not some willing of being well-pleased – and likewise not some not willing – unless the objects are distinct, otherwise contradictories will be true without any distinction to cause that truth; therefore, since God wills the justified person for some being for which he does not will the sinner, on account of which difference he is said in Scripture ‘to love the just’ and ‘to hate sinners’ [*Proverbs* 15.9; *Ecclesiastes* 12.3, 7; *Psalms* 5.7], the consequence is that this difference – according to its idea on the part of the divine volition – necessarily requires an actual distinction on the part of the objects themselves. Therefore the person in question is disposed in himself in one way when he is said to be ‘beloved of God’ or ‘accepted for eternal life’ but in another way when he is ‘hated’.

118. Lastly there is, according to this first way, an argument as follows, that if there is in the soul of this person nothing after repentance other than what was there before, it does not seem that his soul is disposed any differently toward God, nor God toward him, because this difference does not seem to be on account of any change that has happened on the part of God. Therefore if it be conceded, as seems necessary, that he be in some way differently disposed toward God, and conversely God toward him, then this is because of a change in him, – and so something will come to be formally in him *de*

novo; but faith and hope do not come to be in him *de novo*, because they have remained in the sinner, – therefore charity does.

119. One might also argue, according to his first way, that God, who was offended by the sinner before, remits the offence when the sinner later repents; this is not because of any change in the divine will (as there can be in me when I remit an offence); therefore it is because of the fact that he to whom the offence is remitted is differently disposed in himself.

120. But this argument is not conclusive, as will be plain in IV d.16 q.2 n.19, where it will be said that God remits the offence to the sinner first in nature before he gives the sinner grace. Hence the arguments – if any according to this first way are valid – must be taken from passive acceptance and from order or dignity for eternal life, which accord with a justified person and not with a sinner, as has just been argued [n.119]; but they must not be taken from mere remission of the offence [n.113], which is in itself a lesser thing than to be just.

121. [Second way] – From the second way, namely from the idea of a meritorious act [n.113], the argument goes as follows:

Nothing is said to act formally in any action unless the principle of the action is the form of the agent; this is taken from *On the Soul* 2.2.414a12-14 where, from the fact that the soul is ‘that whereby we live and sense’ etc. [n.13], the conclusion is drawn that the soul is the act and form of what performs those acts; therefore, since meritorious action belongs to the will, or to the man working through his will, the result is that that by which he meritoriously acts is his form. But that by which he meritoriously acts cannot be pure nature, because then he could meritoriously act from his natural powers alone, which seems to be the error of Pelagius; therefore something supernatural is required; clearly not faith or hope, because these remain in a sinner, – therefore charity.

122. Further, no action is in the power of an agent unless that agent has a form by which it can act; for if it could act through something assisting it – something merely extrinsic – which is not in its power, such an action is not in its power, just as neither is the assistance of the extrinsic thing in its power. But the Holy Spirit assisting the will is not in the power of the will, just as neither is universally the action of a superior cause in the power of an inferior cause. Therefore if the will could act from the assistance alone and did not have a form in itself by which it was sufficiently able to proceed to a meritorious act, the result follows that the meritorious act would not be in its power, – which seems discordant.

123. Further, if the Holy Spirit is moving the will in a special way in the case of a meritorious action, the consequence is that the motion is cause of something in the will itself and that, with respect to it, the will does not have any causality but only a passive receptivity; either then that something is an act of loving, and then the result is that the act of loving is in no way from the will; or it is some other thing which naturally precedes the act of loving, – and this other thing I call ‘a habit’, because a perfection prior to act in a power (a perfection that is habitual or can be habitual) seems to be a habit.

124. Further, fourth, the identity of the Father with the Son is greater than any union of the Holy Spirit with the will can be; but the Father is not said, because of this identity, to do anything by the Son, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, because ‘the Father is not wise by generated wisdom’; therefore much less will the will be said to do anything because of the union with it of ‘the Holy Spirit at work’.

B. Scotus' own Response

125. For the solution of this question three things need to be looked at: first, whether some supernatural habit needs to be posited that gives grace to a nature capable of being beatified; second, whether it is simply necessary to posit such a habit so that such a nature may be beatified; and third, what the Master thought on this question, on account of the many things imputed to him.

1. Whether some Supernatural Habit needs to be Posited that gives Grace to a Nature Capable of being Beatified

126. [A supernatural habit bestowing grace is present within] – As to the first article [n.125] one can say that from no act which we experience, whether from the substance of the act, or from the intensity of the act, or from the pleasure or ease in doing it, or from the goodness or the moral rectitude of the act, can we conclude that some such supernatural habit is present; because from none of them can anyone possessed of charity know with certitude that he exists in charity, namely from the fact that an act with such and such intensity is experienced to exist within him, or to be in him with pleasure and ease, or to be consonant with right reason.

127. Now the reason that one cannot conclude from the act or from any condition of the act that such a habit exists within is that either the act is able of its own power alone to have all the aforesaid features, when there is concurrence of right reason (as is the case when one holds the fourth way set down in the preceding solution [n.46]), or, if some habit would, because of any of the aforesaid conditions [n.126], be concurrent with the act, it could be some acquired habit; for acquired friendship could give just as much intensity to the act (as second cause, along with the power as first cause [n.40]), could also bestow just as much pleasure and ease, could even be a habit just as consonant with right reason, because an elicited act would have no clearly apparent condition from which the conclusion would necessarily follow that it was elicited according to a supernatural habit.

128. But if you say ‘the will is moved suddenly to acting intensely, easily, pleasurably, and this in a way consonant with supernatural reason (that is, consonant with the dictate of faith), but the will cannot suddenly acquire a habit of ordered friendship consonant with the faith, therefore it has some non-acquired habit whereby it is inclined suddenly to act’, – I reply: the will can be moved to natural acts with suddenness enough, and these natural acts are totally subject to its power, because – as Augustine says *Retractions* I ch.22 n.4 – “nothing is as much in the power of the will as the will itself”; therefore the proposed conclusion cannot be drawn from this suddenness.

129. I say, therefore, that over and above all the aforesaid conditions, namely the intensity of the act, pleasure and ease in acting, rectitude or goodness and conformity with right reason (right either according to the dictate of prudence or according to the dictate of faith), over and above – I say – all these, there is one condition in the act that is a matter of belief, namely that the act is acceptable to God; not indeed merely with the common acceptance by which God accepts every creature (which is even the way he wills the act that is substrate to a sin, otherwise the act would not have its existence from

him), but with a special acceptance, which is in the divine will an ordering toward eternal life of this sort of act as of something condignly deserving of the reward. And in this way we have belief that our nature is capable of beatification, is just, is habitually accepted, – that is, that when it is not actually operating, yet still the divine will is ordering it to eternal life as being worthy of so great a good, in accord with the disposition that it possesses habitually in itself. And it is because of this habitual acceptance of a nature capable of beatification even when it is not operating, and because of the actual acceptance of an act elicited by such a nature, that one must posit a single supernatural habit whereby he who formally possesses it is accepted by God and whereby his elicited act is accepted as meritorious. So the nature or the act does not seem to be accepted without some habit informing them, because – in accordance with what has been argued [nn.116-117, 122] – God does not seem to have a will different in nature about an object that has in no way been made different [nn.116-117]; nor would even an act ‘as it is acceptable to God’ seem to be in the power of an agent unless that by which he formally acted were his form [n.122].

130. [Doubt 1] – But there is a doubt about how this habit may be the reason for accepting the nature and the act.

131. The reason indeed for accepting the nature seems to be just a sort of comeliness of nature, pleasing to the divine will, such that, whether the habit is posited as active or non-active, from the mere fact that it is such a form, beautifying and adorning the soul, it can be a reason of acceptance and a reason for accepting the nature.

132. But for the acceptance of an act more is required than that the agent have this spiritual comeliness, otherwise he who has such a habit could not have any act that was indifferent, nor could commit venial sin, which is discordant [II d.41 q. un nn.3-4]. – The proof of the consequence is that neither of these things [indifferent acts and venial sin] takes away the comeliness from the actor, and so each of them would be accepted, if an act were to be accepted merely from the comeliness of the actor.

133. One must therefore say that the habit, besides the fact that it is a spiritual comeliness, also inclines toward definite acts, and this either non-actively, according to the fourth way posited in the preceding solution [n.46], or (which seems more to be the case) actively, according to the third way [n.32].

134. The proof is as follows:

First, because otherwise it would seem that, without the habit, one could have a very intense act of loving God, and this both as a wayfarer and in the fatherland, and thus also have beatitude; for in the instant of nature in which an act is elicited by an active principle, if the will alone were the active principle, it would ‘insofar as active’ be a principle that was just as perfect without the habit as with it, and the power alone could, with equal effort, perform the act (as is plain [n.70]); therefore a most perfect act of loving God could be had without such a habit.

135. A second proof to the same effect is that otherwise what Augustine says [Pseudo-Augustine *Hypognosticon* III ch.1 n.20] about free choice would not seem to be true, namely that ‘grace is related to free choice as a rider to a horse’, because the rider actively directs and moves the horse, in some way or other. – Nor even would that remark seem to be true which he is says in a letter to Boniface [Augustine, *Epist.* 186 *ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10]: ‘With the will accompanying,’ he says, ‘not going ahead; a foot

follower, not a lord'. Now the will would not be a foot follower to grace if grace itself had no causality.²⁶⁵

136. [Doubt 2] – But then there is a further doubt about this habit when compared with the operating power – namely which of them should be called the first cause and which the second.

137. For it seems from what has been said [n.135] that grace is the first cause.

138. But it seems the opposite is the case:

First, because the power uses the habit and not conversely.

139. Second, because the action would not be free if grace were the first cause; for the will would be moved naturally, because grace would move it naturally, – and just as the will would not be moved freely, so neither would it act freely, since it would not act save because it was moved.

140. Third, because the will – once it has grace – would not seem able ever to sin, because the second cause always follows the inclination of the first cause, nor seem able to be moved to the opposite of that to which the first cause inclines it.

141. Similarly, fourth, the will is more without limit as to acts than the habit is; being without limit as to several effects seems to belong to the superior cause [cf. nn.33-39].

142. Here it can be said that in a meritorious act (about which the discussion now is [nn.129-135]) I am considering two things, namely: that which precedes the idea of its being meritorious, and in this rank are included the substance of the act and its intensity and its moral rectitude; over and above this I consider also the very idea of its being meritorious, which is that it is accepted by the divine will in order to a reward, or that it is acceptable or worthy of being accepted.

143. This second thing would be truer if the act had complete merit through something that is in him who merits; to accept is not in him but is a divine action; but

²⁶⁵ Note by Scotus: "There is a position [from St. Thomas Aquinas and Godfrey of Fontaines] that for a meritorious act the will along with charity is not sufficient but a special influence is required, – not the influence of a permanent form but of a motion, just as an instrument has motion from the principal agent over and above its own form.

The first reason: a natural form is given to something so that it might act, because such action is proportioned to it; grace is not given to us so that we might act but so that we might be acted on (*Romans* 8.14: "as many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God"), and this because such action is not proportioned. – A confirmation comes from *John* 4.14: "the water that I shall give him shall be in him a well of water springing up" etc. An example: grace is like a weight, not like art; a weight is not an operative principle, and grace is like the spherical shape given to a mass of lead. Another example: grace is compared to the active generative power of a mother; a mother has this force (because she has a human soul), but in a diminished way and not as capable of acting unless it be moved by the active force of the father.

Second reason: grace now does not perfectly heal nature. The point is taken from Augustine *On Nature and Grace* I ch.26 n.29, where he says in general: 'as the healthy eye cannot see without light, so neither can even the just soul live rightly without the spiritual light'. – A confirmation comes from *Romans* 7.25 about 'the law of sin', and 8.26 'we know not what we should pray for as we ought' and 'the Spirit makes intercession'.

Third reason: an act is considered as it is from free choice, as it is from free choice informed by grace, third – in addition to this – as it is from free choice moved by the Holy Spirit. In the first way it is not even worthy of a reward; in the second way it is worthy (just as is also a baptized child) but not with condign worth (*John* 4.14: 'a well springing up' whose water does not rise above its beginning); in the third way then it does have condign worth."

divine action does not seem to be *per se* required for merit. – There is also proof for this in that there seems to be a merit [sc. in him who merits] with respect to this sort of ‘being accepted’, for some act is worthy to be accepted and another not; therefore before it is understood to have been accepted, there is something in the act whereby it is worthy to be accepted; therefore there is then in it the idea of merit, at least with respect to acceptance.

144. On the contrary: the idea of merit is not completely had unless the idea of being worthy or worthily ordainable to a reward is had (which reward is beatitude), and this ‘worthily’ accords with commutative or retributive justice; but no act has this order merely from what acts from within (for then God could not fail to reward beatitude to him who has so acted without unjustly depriving him of it, – this is false); therefore such order according to justice is from the divine will alone gratuitously ordering it, and thus the idea of merit will be complete from the divine will ordering this act to a reward.

145. And as to what is said about the second thing that ‘divine action is not of the idea of merit’ [n.143], – I reply: the relation to divine action in the action of him who merits belongs to the idea of merit, because there is no relation of the one who merits without divine action.

146. If you say that ‘then it is not in the power of the one who merits to merit, just as neither is the divine action in his power’, and similarly ‘the meriting would belong more principally to God than to me, because what is more principal in the merit comes from divine action’, – to the first point: the act which is merit is in my power, on the supposition of the general influence, if I have grace and the use of free choice; but the completion of the idea of merit is not in my power save dispositively, although dispositively in such a way that the completion for my acting always follows from the divine disposition, just as animation always follows on the organizing done by the natural cause. The same thing makes clear the response to the second point, because although what is more principal in merit – that is, what is last and complete – is from God, yet it does not follow that ‘therefore God merits’, because merit is an act of a free power, and an act elicited according to the gift of grace, accepted by God as being rewardable with beatitude – and therefore to merit is to act thus; God does not act thus.

147. On the contrary: at least what is more principal in merit is from God. – I reply that if by ‘more principal’ is meant what does the ultimate completing, let it be conceded; if is meant the first reality or the more perfect reality, let it be denied, because an act is something absolute and prior in nature to ‘the passive acceptance’, and is more a being than it is.

148. To that which was adduced second for the second thing, which was ‘the act merits to be accepted’ [n.143] – I reply: there is in it the idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, because the ordaining of the act to beatitude is not to it as to a reward that has to be justly rendered for such an act, – and let it be conceded that the passive divine acceptance is not included in the idea of merit ‘in a certain respect’, just as it is not required in the idea of merit by congruity, in the way that someone contrite merits to be justified.

149. And what has just been said [nn.144-148] must be understood of the divine eternal acceptance by which God, foreseeing from eternity this act being elicited from such principles, willed it to be ordered to a reward, and by the act of his will ordering it to a reward, willed it to be a merit; which act, considered in itself without such divine acceptance, would not, in strict justice, have been worthy of such a reward from the

intrinsic goodness that it would have from its own principles; the fact is plain because a reward is always a greater good than the merit, and strict justice does not render a greater good for a lesser one. Therefore it is well said that God always rewards beyond condign worth, indeed universally beyond the worth of the act which is the merit, – because that the merit is condign merit is something beyond its nature and its intrinsic goodness, and comes from gratuitous divine acceptance; and perhaps further it is beyond that other merit which an act needing to be accepted would have by common law, whenever God rewards it from pure generosity.

150. In addition, just as in a meritorious act there are the two aforesaid things (namely the substance of the act along with rectitude, and the idea of merit [n.142]), likewise the habit of grace is a certain quality, – and the proof is that besides the relation which it has to right reason insofar as it is a morally good habit, it has a special relation to the divine will accepting it or accepting the subject that has it.

151. This habit according to its substance actively inclines to act, and this it does actively as a partial cause (when one holds the third way in the preceding solution [n.32]), and in this causality the habit is second cause and the power first cause, as was said in the preceding solution about the habit in general and about the power, when positing the habit as ‘active’ [n.40]; and this is proved by the reasons already adduced [nn.138-141].

152. But when one takes the act according to its idea of being meritorious, one can say that this condition belongs principally to the act from the habit and less principally from the will; for the act is more accepted as worthy of reward because it is elicited by charity than because it is freely elicited by the will, although both are necessarily required. An example of this can be posited about the cutting up of a body by means of a knife; the cutting, to be sure, is itself absolutely more from the moving power of the cutter than from the knife, and therefore a stronger moving power cuts more quickly; but yet insofar as this cutting is compared to sight under the idea of being acceptable – as pleasing to someone – it is attributed more to the knife, because the smoothness of the cut parts, which pleases sight, comes more from the sharpness of the instrument than from the efficacy of the virtue that principally does the cutting. Likewise, a sound is more from the percussion of the sounding body than from the orderedness of the percussion, and yet, as acceptable to hearing, it is more from the orderedness of the percussion than from the efficacy of the percussive power; nay the percussive virtue could be more efficacious and less acceptable, – nay altogether not acceptable to hearing, because the sound is not harmonious. Another example: if the father is the principal cause with respect to the son and the mother is less principal, yet she can be a more principal cause of the son insofar as he is loved or lovable by someone, such that the son is more loved because he is the mother’s as his bearer than because he is the father’s as his begetter.

153. So it is possible for God to have ordained to accept some act as worthy of reward – or as acceptable or to be accepted – because some habit inclines to that act as the partial active principal of it, and which because of this is more principally accepted or more principally acceptable than because it is from the remaining partial cause.

154. In this way [nn.152-153], then, can the remark of Augustine be expounded that ‘charity is like a rider to a horse’ [n.135], and also the remark that ‘the will in respect of grace follows on foot behind and does not go ahead’; this is indeed true with respect to the act insofar as it is meritorious, but not insofar as it is the act ‘in its substance’.

155. And the first example [about rider and horse] would be altogether similar if the horse were free and the rider were directing the horse by way of nature to a definite end. The horse's course would be more pleasing, and that to some ordained will, from the fact that it was according to the natural inclination of the rider himself to a definite end than from the fact that the horse was by its own motive force running quickly. Then too the horse could of its own liberty throw off the rider, or move itself to something else at a tangent to the rider's direction to the end; and in the first case indeed the horse would become altogether non-acceptable, because it would not have the rider on account of which it would be accepted by such a will, – in the second case, although such a horse would be acceptable, yet its course would not be accepted, because it would not be according to the direction of the rider. – This is how it is in the proposed case. The will is as it were a free horse, and grace as it were the rider by way of nature, inclining it to an object in a determinate way; a course of the will in accordance with this sort of inclination would be pleasing, – a different course would not be pleasing, as when there is venial sin or an indifferent act; but when the rider is thrown off, which is done by mortal sin, the will itself becomes altogether displeasing.

156. In this way too the will is a foot follower, because it does not of itself as determinately incline to the term (on account of which inclination the act is accepted) as grace inclines, and the will participates that inclination from grace, because the inclination belongs more to grace by its essence than to the will; and in this respect is the will itself a second cause, not because in causing 'something intrinsic to the act' it is second cause, but it is so in being that because of which the act is accepted, because it states a respect of the act to what is extrinsic; certainly it is possible enough for some relation to what is external to belong less principally to an effect because of a more principal cause of the effect than because of a less principal cause of it, as is plain in the examples set down above [n.152].²⁶⁶

157. But this habit, just like any other moral habit also, has to incline itself determinately to the object – or to the end – by virtue of the object which in some way it participates; for just as an intellectual habit has the object in some way in itself as present to it under the idea of intelligible object, so a moral habit has the object in some way in itself under the idea of lovable good, – and thus, just as the former by virtue of the object has in some way to act in the presence of the object, so the latter by virtue of the object it in some way contains has to incline toward the object; from this it is clear how the habit inclines more determinately to the object than the power does, because it more determinately includes the object.

158. And in accord with this [n.157] one could also say that the partial causality which is attributed to the habit [nn151, 40, 32] comes to it from the part of the cause by which the object is said to be active with respect to the action and not from the part of the cause by which the power is said to be active, because a habit has its force more from the object which it determinately includes than from the power itself.

²⁶⁶ Tr. As that the directing of the horse to an end by the rider, which is a relation to something extrinsic to the horse caused by a more principal cause (for the rider is such a more principal cause), is less principally a property of the horse than the running of the horse (for the running belongs more to the horse than the direction of the running), which running is caused by the less principal cause that is the horse itself.

159. And if it is then argued, as was argued in the aforesaid solution, that ‘the habit determines and inclines the power, therefore it is a prior cause’ [n.34], – look for the response there [n.85].

2. Whether a Supernatural Habit giving it Grace has to be posited so that a Nature Capable of Beatification may be Beatified

160. About the second article [n.125] I say that God could of his absolute power have very well accepted – with the special acceptance stated before [n.129] – a nature capable of beatification that was existing in its pure natural state; and likewise, the act of it, for which it had a purely natural inclination, he could have accepted as meritorious. But he is not believed to have so disposed things that he should thus accept its pure nature or act, because to say that ‘an act from purely natural powers is meritorious’ comes close to the error of Pelagius [n.121]. Therefore the more likely belief is that he accepts nature and its act as meritorious on the basis of a supernatural habit.

161. But there is a double doubt here.

One as to how something in created nature could be a reason for acceptance by the divine will (whether absolutely or in such a way [sc. of special acceptance]), since nothing in nature is a reason for divine action, whether in itself or as it tends about such an object.

162. The other doubt is because, when every supernatural gift of God is excluded, there is a distinguishing between friend and enemy, – so that an enemy is said to be he in whom sin has not been destroyed (and so the offense remains), and a non-enemy is said to be he in whom it is not an offense; but in advance of the conferring of any spiritual gift an offense could be removed from someone who was ‘an enemy before’, as will be said in IV d.16 [n.120].

163. I reply. A non-enemy is not a ‘friend’; because someone who forgives an offense in another – for the reason that he no longer seeks punishment for the offense – does not become that other’s enemy more; but it does not follow because of this that he at once recover him as a friend, nor that he repel him as an enemy in some contrary way, but in a negative one – that he neither will him evil as an enemy nor good as a friend.

164. As far as this article [n.162] is concerned, then, there is no necessity to posit a supernatural habit conferring grace when speaking of the necessity that regards God’s absolute power (especially since he could give beatitude without any preceding merit), although however this may be necessary when speaking of the necessity that regards God’s ordained power, which ordaining we pick up in Scripture and from the sayings of the saints, where we have it that a sinner is not worthy of eternal life and that a just man is worthy.

3. About the Opinion of Peter Lombard

165. As to the third article [n.125], one could say that the Master does not deny every supernatural habit. He himself indeed, in d.37 of the first book, in the chapter ‘That also is marvelous’, ch.2 n.338, adduces Augustine to Dardanus [*On the Foreknowledge of God* ch.6 n.21] saying that “to the temple of God belong sanctified children, who are not able to know God”; therefore God dwells in a child who, however, cannot have an

elicited act about God. This indwelling, which belongs to a regenerated child and not to some other, cannot exist in the child without a supernatural habit; for it cannot be posited there either because of an act, because a child has (and can have) no such act, or because of nature alone, because God does not indwell some other non-regenerated child, although the same nature nevertheless exists in him.

166. Likewise, in d.26 of book II, ch.1 nn.228-229, he seems to posit created grace in the soul.

167. Therefore it can be said that the Master posited one habit whereby, when it informs the soul, the Holy Spirit indwells and, as indwelling, perfects the soul's powers as it were with supernatural habits: perfects two powers indeed – namely intellect and will – with faith and hope, for act of believing and hoping; but he perfects the will – for act of loving – with no habit other than that by which he is said to indwell, because the act of loving is so perfect that it can be attributed immediately to the habit by which, when it formally inheres, the Holy Spirit indwells, as by a most perfect habit. Acts of believing and hoping cannot thus be immediately attributed to the habit by which the Holy Spirit indwells, on account of the imperfection of those acts and the perfection of the habit whereby the Holy Spirit indwells the mind; for that habit should be thus perfect, because it will not be removed even in the fatherland, when the soul will be the temple of the Lord; for believing and hoping will not remain there [n.101].

168. And in this way the authorities from Augustine [nn.1-3] make for the Master, not because there is no supernatural habit formally giving the soul grace, but because it is not a different habit from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul in the way that the habit of believing and hoping is other than the habit by which he indwells; and this will be plain from solving the reasons that are adduced for the first part of the question [nn.171-177].

169. In this regard, then, the Master does not seem to disagree with others save because they either posit grace to be a habit other than charity, or at least say that this habit – which in reality is grace – is formally in the will and not in the essence of the soul, for then the Holy Spirit would not indwell by a single as it were radical habit with respect to faith and hope as these first come to be, but he would indwell by a habit formally inherent, informing the will, which habit would be posterior, in some order of nature, to faith and hope.

170. But when one holds that the same habit is in reality charity and grace [II d.27 q. un nn.3-4], it seems that this habit would inform the essence of the soul first, and thus the virtues that inform the powers would flow first from the Holy Spirit indwelling the essence of the soul, – or that this habit is in the will formally, on the presupposition already of faith and hope in the powers (on which point see II Suppl. d.26 q. un); at any rate charity does not seem to be a different habit in reality from that by which the Holy Spirit indwells the soul, and thus the Holy Spirit does not move to act of love through a 'mediating' habit [n.101] – supply 'habit other than that by which he indwells' – as he does so move to act of belief and hope.

C. To the Principal Arguments

171. To the principal arguments [nn.1-6].

To the first [n.1] I say that the argument of Augustine holds as follows: ‘everyone who loves his neighbor loves his own love formally, if he turns himself toward it; but everyone who loves his own love formally loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love; therefore everyone who loves his brother loves the Holy Spirit who is by essence love’. – The second proposition in order here (which however would be the major if one arranges it in a syllogism) is proved as follows, that everyone who loves a lesser good in an ordered way ought to love more some greater good, especially when the reason for lovability in the lesser good is only from the greater good; but my love is formally a lesser good than the love by essence that is the Holy Spirit, and in particular it gets from that love its own reason of lovability. The reasoning of Augustine, therefore, has to be reduced to two syllogisms as follows: ‘he who loves his love-act loves love by essence; but he who loves his neighbor loves his love-act; therefore he who loves his neighbor loves love by essence. But God is this sort of love; therefore etc.’²⁶⁷

172. About his second argument, namely about the most excellent gift [n.2], one could say that the argument holds as follows: ‘no created gift is more excellent than created charity, therefore charity is perfection simply, and includes of its nature no imperfection or limitation’. – The proof of this consequence is that more eminent than any gift which is not perfection simply is some other gift in creatures that is perfection simply. Further: every perfection simply belongs more formally to the Holy Spirit from his being himself the simply most excellent gift, and thereby from God being so (because God can give himself), and so the most excellent gift is God; therefore the Holy Spirit, from his being the simply most excellent gift, is every perfection simply. But there stands along with this the fact that this ‘perfection simply’ is participated in by us and is essentially other than the divine person who is perfect by this perfection simply.

173. Absolutely, then, the arguments of Augustine [nn.1-2] presuppose [nn.171-172] that God is formally charity and love, – not only effectively, as ‘hope’ or ‘my patience’ is so effectively, because it effects patience as a non-perfection simply, and so as not agreeing with itself formally; but he effects in the soul charity – and love – as a perfection simply, and therefore as agreeing with himself formally. In this way he in one way makes humanity in a man and in another way goodness; from the fact, to be sure, that he makes humanity it does not follow that he is formally man, but only that he is effective cause of man; but from the fact that he causes goodness it does follow that he is formally goodness, – and the reason is that every perfection simply that exists in the caused thing is reduced to a cause that formally possesses that perfection. It is not so with a limited perfection.²⁶⁸

174. But what do these authorities [nn.1-3], so understood [n.173], do for the proposal of the Master [nn.165-170]?

²⁶⁷ Text cancelled by Scotus: “This argument of Augustine, then, proves that God is to be loved and yet not that he is my love formally, nor that there is in me another love formally. Two arguments must, indeed, be understood in Augustine’s argument, one of which is: ‘he who loves his brother loves the love by which he formally loves; but that love is participated love; therefore he loves participated love’. Further, the other syllogism is: ‘he who loves participated love ought to love love by essence; God is love by essence; therefore etc.’

²⁶⁸ Tr. In this way Scotus shows and preserves the truth in Platonism that good things are good by participation in the perfect form of goodness but not that men are men by participation in some perfect form of man.

I reply that the habit by which the soul is inclined toward meritoriously loving is a perfection simply, insofar as the ‘perfection simply’ belongs to the Holy Spirit; it follows therefore that this habit could be an immediate habit with respect to the love that is perfection simply, and hereby the Holy Spirit – as indwelling through this habit – more immediately causes that act of love than do acts of believing and hoping, with respect to which acts there cannot be any proximate cause that is perfection simply.

175. But against this response there is the following argument:

First, that the proposition on which it relies is false, namely that ‘more eminent or more perfect than any perfection non-simply in creatures is some perfection simply’ [n.172]; for it seems to have an instance against it in the case of the essence of the supreme angel, which is not a perfection simply and yet nothing more noble than it seems to exist in the whole of creation.

176. Besides, the intention and reason of Augustine seem badly adduced for the intention of the Master [n.174], because from the first reason [n.1] it is had that the Holy Spirit is formally love by essence [n.171], and from the second [n.2] – if it is valid – is had that the Holy Spirit is formally charity by essence [n.172]. How then from this is it inferred that there is not in us some habitual love, or charity, different from the habit by which the Holy Spirit is said to indwell? The habit indeed by which the Holy Spirit indwells is either not a perfection simply but some limited perfection, – or, if it is, there does not fail to follow that a habit other than it could be posited as the proximate principle for eliciting my act of meritoriously loving, for that act is limited and a limited ‘perfection’; one cannot speak about the reason of Augustine otherwise for the proposal of the Master.²⁶⁹

177. To the other argument [n.9] it is plain how charity is a good by participation from I d.8 n.213, where it was expounded how a simple form participates its own cause.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion attributed to Peter Lombard.

178. To the arguments for the opinion imposed on the Master, namely the opinion that denies a supernatural habit bestowing grace [nn.101-112].

179. [To the arguments for the first way] – To the first [n.104] I say that the habit in question gives acceptable acting [nn.150, 129], and that it gives some activity with respect to act, as some second cause with respect to it [n.151]; but it does not give pleasurable or easy acting, which belong to an acquired habit insofar as it is distinguished from an infused habit, on account of its being acquired from repeated acting.

180. To the second [n.105] I say that although some say the will in its purely natural state cannot have any act about a supernatural object seen bare, yet this was rejected in I d.1 nn.88-89, 141-142. I concede, then, that the will could have an act about such an object whether shown bare or by an act of faith, – but the act about an object shown by faith would not be meritorious, because it would not be according to the inclination of the habit by which alone God makes disposition to accept the act; nor even in the fatherland would it be beatitude, because it would not be as perfect as it could be possessed by such a power if the power were perfect in a way proportionate to the supernatural habit.

²⁶⁹ No response was given by Scotus to these two objections [nn.175-176].

181. And if you object that the act about the divine essence as seen could be so perfect that it would give rest to the will, because the act would be elicited in accord with its total effort and would consequently be beatific, – which seems to be the case also because such a will would have ‘whatever it wanted and would want nothing badly’ (but this is ‘to be blessed’ according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XIII ch.5 n.8), – I reply that it would not be blessed, not only because it would not have whatever it wanted in the way it should want it (for it should want ‘to love acceptably’ and this it would not have), but also because it would not have an act as perfect as to agree with it in the grade of its nature. For no power capable of being habituated can have, without that habit, an act as perfect as it can with it [nn.40, 70, following the third way, n.32]; nay, the more perfect the power the less can it, if it lacks all habit, have an act proportional to its perfection, because, from the fact that the geometrical proportion between two unequal powers is like proportionally perfective habits, there will be therefore another proportion, arithmetical proportion – and thus a more perfect power, if it has not been habituated, will be simply more deficient than a lower and more imperfect power [III Suppl. d.27 q. un. n.19]

182. As to the remark added that ‘it has whatever it wants’, – I reply: not with as much volition as it can in an ordered way desire the object with. For it can in an ordered way desire to have it with an act as great as would agree with it from the nature of the power and the habit proportional to it, and not merely with an act as perfect as agrees with it from its purely natural resources; now it would not have [sc. whatever it wants] in the first way but only in the second.

183. Against this [nn.181-182]:

It seems then that no will would be blessed that did not have the greatest charity it was capable of.

184. Further, as was argued in the preceding solution [n.30], by that reason by which a power in the supreme grade of the power is perfect, it is capable of the supreme act such that nothing is lacking to it from lack of the habit; therefore to a will in any grade nothing in that grade is lacking to it because of lack of the habit.

185. To the first [183] I say that it cannot in an ordered way will to have the beatific object with a greater act than corresponds with its merits; such an act is not the greatest ‘it is capable of’, although always greater than the one it could have existing in its purely natural state.

186. To the second [184] I say that an infinite will contains eminently in itself by identity every perfection or the whole perfection of the habit, and so it does not give any lesser perfection to its act on account of not being understood to be informed with the habit; but a finite power does not include by identity the habit proportional to it, and so it can in its acting fail of the proportion that agrees with it, if be not perfected with the habit.

187. To the third [n.106] I say that this act is not created, speaking of creation properly; both because there is, with respect to it, the concurrence of some active second cause, while creation belongs to the first agent alone without a second cause, – and because there is presupposed here something that is receptive of the act (namely the will), while in creation nothing is presupposed that is susceptible of creation. When therefore it is said that ‘everything supernatural is created’ [n.106], if it be conceded of every supernatural first act, yet it should not be conceded of something supernatural that is a second act, because there is for this latter the concurrence of created power, both in idea

of what is active in some way [nn.152-153] and in idea of what is receptive; and yet it can be called supernatural by reason of the form or the habit that concurs in its production, even though it be not immediately created.

188. One can in another way say [to the third, n.106] that the act is not properly supernatural the way the habit is, because although ‘the presupposed habit’ is immediately from a supernatural cause, yet it is, when posited in existence, a natural cause with respect to its act; and so the act that is produced by such a habit is not supernatural; for the form that is supernaturally produced can be as naturally related to its act as a form that is merely natural is related to its act, so that the difference in the production of the forms does not cause nor entail a distinction between them in comparison to their acts.

189. To the fourth [n.107] one can say that a will thus habituated has in its power the use of a habit of this sort; and when the will operates with equal effort, the habit cooperates equally along with it, because a habit acts, on its own part, by way of nature. However, there will not always be an equal pleasure following on the elicited act; the pleasure is, to be sure, from the object that is attained by the act and not only from the power acting about the object; but now [sc. in this present life], when the object is not present in itself but in figure, the pleasure can be caused by a limited object in diverse ways, now more now less, although an equally intense act with equal effort be elicited about it. – As for what is said of contemplatives [n.107], it is true about the devotion, that is, about the pleasure consequent to the act; but it is not true about the elicited act of loving itself, which is sometimes more intense and sometimes more meritorious, although a lesser pleasure or almost none follow upon it, – and sometimes a lesser act, lesser both in itself and in divine acceptance, is accompanied by a greater pleasure, for attracting little ones so that they might more eagerly pursue that whose sweetness they have had advance taste of.

190. [To the arguments for the second way] – To the first argument about the second way [nn.108-109], I concede that the Holy Spirit could cause an act immediately in the will, and could accept that act – as caused by himself – as worthy of eternal life; but then that act would neither be of the will nor in its power; nor do we believe that he accepts such an act, but he makes disposition to accept an act of free choice – which act is in the will’s power.

191. To the second [n.110] I say that the Holy Spirit’s cooperating with fire for it to heat is not a miracle; but his cooperating with water for it to heat (provided however some causality with respect to heating could, without contradiction, be said to belong to water), this would be miraculous. Thus I say in the proposed case that the Holy Spirit’s cooperating with an habituated human will for it to elicit an act in accord with the habit, that this is part of the common law by which God assists a second cause in doing its act; but his cooperating with a non-habituated will would be miraculous, provided however the will itself could operate. I say, therefore, that the Holy Spirit cooperates with a will possessed of charity; not indeed because the will possesses it such that its charity is the prior cause, namely moving the Holy Spirit to cooperate, – but because the Holy Spirit cooperates generally with a second cause in the act to which the second cause, according to its form, is ordered, the way it is with act of love in an habituated will. – When you say, therefore, that ‘the Holy Spirit cooperates before the will has charity’ [n.110], this is false unless it be understood of priority of nature, as a superior cause is prior. The Holy Spirit,

to be sure, cooperates with a will possessed of charity at the same time as the will operates, – or if it be conceded that the Holy Spirit cooperates with the will before the will have charity, it does not therefore follow that ‘he could be cooperating equally with a will not possessed of charity’ [n.110], because he does not cooperate with a will not possessed of a form for acting as he does with a will that is.

192. To the third [n.111] I say that although by the communication of properties [sc. between the two natures in the incarnate Christ] human operations are truly asserted of the Word, yet the proper acts of the Word in his divine nature were not in the power of ‘this man’ [sc. Christ] so that he could, insofar as man, merit by those acts; for Christ did not merit for us in this act, namely if the Son of God – who was in the flesh – created souls along with the Father and the Holy Spirit; and so as to the proposed case, the will will not merit if the Holy Spirit, in whatever way he is joined to it, were to cause in it an act of loving.

193. To the final argument [n.112] I say that although it cause difficulty for those who hold that the species is first act with respect to the intellect whereby the intellect is capable of second act (as hot wood heats by heat), because if this were true it would be difficult to save the proposition that the intellect ‘when not informed by any form’ would be capable of operation [I d.3 nn.456-459]; yet according to the way that I stated in distinction 3 of this first book [d.3 nn.494-498], that ‘the object – whether in itself or in the species – is a sort of partial cause, concurring with the intellect in causing intellection’, this argument does not cause any difficulty, because the object when present in itself (the way it will be in the fatherland) suffices without any informing for causing vision, or suffices of itself alone along with the intellect.

194. And if it be argued ‘if vision can be perfect without an informing habit, then the enjoyment can be most perfect too [sc. without a habit]’, – I reply: no one commonly denies that in glory there is ‘a habit of the light of glory in the intellect’ [I d.3 n.114; III d.14 qq.102 nn.2-4, 8; IV Suppl. d.49 p.2 q.3 nn.9-10], – and this habit on the part of the intellect can be set down as corresponding to charity on the part of the will.²⁷⁰

Appendix A

Next after this I ask whether he who possesses created charity is accepted by it formally as worthy of eternal life.²⁷¹

That he is not:

Because ‘to be an accepted person to God’ is nothing else than for a person to be accepted by God or for God to accept him; but nothing on the part of the creature can be the formal reason of a divine act (the proof is that nothing in a creature, or nothing extrinsic, can be the formal reason of anything intrinsic in God; but the act of accepting is intrinsic to God); therefore etc.

²⁷⁰ Interpolation, see the immediately follow appendix.

²⁷¹ From Scotus’ *Additiones Magnae* d.17 p.1 q.2.

Further, a person is accepted before charity is given him (the fact is plain, because, in the case of two existing sinners, God accepts this one for grace and not that one); but what is posterior cannot be the cause of what is prior; therefore etc.

Further, charity is not the form of an act because it is prior to the act; but an act should be accepted through something intrinsic to it; therefore not through charity. Further, if someone were accepted, and not from some formal thing that is intrinsic but from an extrinsic one, then ‘he who possesses that extrinsic thing’ could not have a non-meritorious act, – which is false, because it is retributive justice that accepts an act as worthy of eternal life, and then an indifferent act or a venial sin would be accepted as worthy of eternal life. There must be something else, then, in addition to charity, intrinsic to an act because of which the act is accepted.

On the contrary:

A person is formally such as he is through that through which he is distinguished from others who are not such as he is; but charity “divides and distinguishes between the sons of God and the sons of perdition” according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.18 n.32; therefore it is through charity that each individual is accepted to God.

Further, the argument proceeds in the same way about act, because each individual is formally such as he is by the act by which, once it is in place and all other acts are not in place, he is such, and by which, once it is removed and all other acts are in place, he is not such; but when charity is in place an act is worthy of eternal life, and when charity is removed – anything else whatever being in place – it is not worthy, as is plain about the state of innocence, where acts would have been most right and virtuous and yet not worthy, without charity, of eternal life. – In favor of this are the authorities of Augustine that the Master alleges in dd.27 and 28 of book II.²⁷²

Response:

First I put as preliminary that the will has a first object, just as the intellect does, but this object in the case of the divine will can be nothing but his essence. The fact is plain from this, that every operative power necessarily demands as a co-requisite its own first object; but no created thing whether extrinsic or finite is necessarily required for an act of the divine will or intellect; therefore the divine essence alone is the first object (for a better treatment of this argument see below, in the question ‘Whether God have some object other than himself’, [*Additiones Magnae* I d.36 q.2 n.5, 7; d.35 q.2 n.7]). His will then is its own reason for willing all other secondary objects.

Second: it then follows that the first object and nothing else is willed necessarily. Proof, for the power cannot sometimes be in act and sometimes not, but it must be always in right act, and consequently it always wills its first object necessarily (otherwise it could not be right).

Again, from this it follows that the first object is object from the nature of the thing – but other objects are not, for other objects have the fact that they are objects by act of the divine intellect.

Then to the intended proposition. Acceptance of the will can be understood to be ‘simple well wishing’, and this is necessarily of anything possible, just as also is simple intellection; another acceptance is ‘efficacious acceptance’, and this is when the will

²⁷² *On the Spirit and the Letter* ch. 9 n.15; *Epist.* 194 to the priest Sixtus ch.5 n.19; *On Grace and Free Choice* ch.5 n.12; *Retractions* I ch.23 n.3; Peter Lombard *Sentences* II d.27 ch.5 n.243, ch.8 n.246, ch.11 n.249, d.28 ch.3 n.257.

wants things to exist in fact and wishes the means necessary for that result. This very thing is plain in us, because sometimes we want a good for someone, but we do not work toward it, nor do we seek out the means necessary for him to attain that good – and then the will is one of simple well wishing; but when we will and seek out the means necessary for that good to be attained by him, then the will is efficacious. And in this last way God wanted creatures to be in real fact, and devils to be punished, and the act that is the substrate of sin to exist.

But there is another sort of special acceptance, which is ‘volition ordaining to a good’ so that someone may attain a greater good, – because God wants him not only to exist but orders him to a greater good or to fulfillment of this good. And in this way he accepts only the rational creature.

I say to the question, then, that created charity is not an eliciting reason on the part of the one accepting, because that reason is intrinsic to God. It will, therefore, be in some way an objectifying reason: not first reason, as has been proved [about simple well wishing]; nor is it reason only in real fact – as in the case of intelligibles – (namely the reason that is not followed by acceptance), but it is reason as making the subject apt for acceptance. However, from this making apt one does not get that the acceptance is a matter of justice.

We can therefore consider the divine will in two ways:

In one way as practical principles are offered to it that are not necessary from their terms, as is this one ‘the just man will be finally justified’. Therefore before acceptance by the will there is aptness only, but after acceptance by the will the proposition is then necessary and is a principle, nor can God do the contrary by his ordained power.

In a second way, there is a distinction in God between justice and judgment, because justice accords with law in its universality, but judgment accords with execution in the particular case. Before acceptance by the will, there is no justice, – but after acceptance there is justice.

I prove this by one argument and two examples.

By argument as follows: just as an intellectual habit in some way includes the object in its idea of intelligibility, so the appetitive habit in some way includes the object in its idea of lovability.

The example is this: what the center does in the case of heavy things, this God does in the case of spiritual things (for God is the center and term of spiritual things);²⁷³ for if the center of heavy things loved itself, it would love anything whatever insofar as that thing tended to the center, and, because every weighty thing tends to the center, it would love all weighty things, and not only weighty things but also motion itself and the center. – So in the proposed case. God loves himself because of himself, therefore he loves anything whatever insofar as it tends toward him; likewise, charity is the weight by which there is tendency toward God. Therefore God loves acts of love directed to himself and the weight too by which such movement of love comes to be.

Second example: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9 “justice rather is beauty” (and he takes justice for charity, because in Scripture all these things are taken for the same: justice, wisdom, charity, and grace); but beauty is the reason for

²⁷³ Ps.-Hermes Trismegistus, *Philosophorum* XXIV prop.2: “God is an infinite sphere of which the center is everywhere, the circumference nowhere.”

lovability in corporeal things, and justice is beauty that makes one similar to God; so there can be a reason for lovability in the mind which God loves. Likewise, it is plain that the center is the reason for accepting something weighty and is more the reason for accepting the motion by which the thing tends to the center. – Thus in the proposed case about charity. For if charity is the reason for accepting a person, it will be more the reason for accepting an act; and so the first example is valid about an act, not the second ‘about beauty’, because many acts are pleasing on account of beauty toward which beauty is in no way ordered, – just as sometimes someone beautiful asks for something and is heard because of his beauty, and yet beauty is in no way ordered toward this; but it is not like this in the case of an act with respect to charity, because charity is not the reason for accepting any act save only that act toward which charity inclines insofar as it is charity.

To the first argument, when it is said ‘nothing else than...’ [opening argument above], this is not taken absolutely but as it is compared to act. And then, when it is said that ‘nothing created is the reason of anything intrinsic to God’, I say that this is true, not as the created thing is a first object nor as a new object, but as apprehended in eternity, whereby God accepts it aptitudinally before the will’s acceptance of the principle which is not known from its terms, and after the will’s acceptance he accepts it from justice.

To the second argument: acceptance is double, namely ‘in a certain respect’, and this is first and the way to acceptance simply; the other is acceptance ‘simply’. The first is in respect of some gift, namely grace, the second in respect of glory; the first very well precedes, but the second follows or is concomitant.

To the third I say that charity is the formal reason, not intrinsic reason but inclining reason; and on this account, not every act is meritorious, but only that act to which charity as charity inclines. And so it is plain that the same form is the principle for accepting the act and the person.

Seventeenth Distinction

Second Part

On the Manner of Increase in Charity

Question One

Whether the whole of pre-existing Charity is corrupted so that no Reality the same in Number remains in a greater and a lesser Charity

195. About increase in charity, on the supposition that charity could be increased – according to what Augustine says in his letter to Boniface [*Epist. ad Paulinum* ch.3 n.10], and it is found in Lombard II d.26 ch.2 n.231, “charity merits increase so that,

when increased, it may merit to be perfected,” and according to what he says *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater”²⁷⁴ (for some charity is better than another because a greater essential reward corresponds to it, therefore some charity is greater than another) – I ask about the manner of increase in charity, and first whether the whole of pre-existing charity is corrupted so that no reality that is the same in number remains in a greater and a lesser charity.

196. And that it does I argue:

Because otherwise the form itself would increase in the subject, because while remaining the same it would be transmuted from imperfection to perfection; but form is unchanging, according to the author of *Six Principles* ch.1 n.1; therefore charity cannot be increased in this way.²⁷⁵

197. On the contrary:

De Generatione et Corruptione 1.5.321b10-13, “the thing increased has to remain”; therefore in any increase there is no corruption of what pre-existed.²⁷⁶

I. Opinion of Godfrey of Fontaines

A. Exposition of the Opinion

198. Here it is said that nothing of preexistent charity remains the same in number in increased charity, but the whole of what existed before is corrupted and another individual more perfect than it is generated.

199. The reason set down²⁷⁷ for this is that the terms of motion are impossible (*Physics* 5.3.227a7-10), therefore the terms of this motion or change – whereby charity is increased – will be impossible terms; therefore that which is the term ‘to which’ is simply impossible with the term ‘from which’; therefore it does not include anything the same in number.²⁷⁸

200. A confirmation for this reason is that just as, in the case of species, the positing of the more and less is on account of the essential ordering of species, so it seems it should in its own way be in the case of individuals of the same species; but a more perfect species (which is called a greater species) is simply a different nature from a more imperfect species, such that nothing the same in number – that is, of the inferior nature – remains in the superior, and the superior is in itself simpler than the inferior, because in the case of forms the superior is more perfect and more actual and simpler (the fact is plain in the forms of separate substances, and hence God is most simple); therefore in the case of individuals of the same species nothing of the more imperfect remains the

²⁷⁴ Interpolation: “in the case of things that are not great in mass, to be greater is to be better.”

²⁷⁵ Interpolation, replacing ‘because...increased’: “Because if it were not corrupted, then the form of charity would be changed from lesser to greater; this is false, because a simple form cannot be the subject of a transmutation.”

²⁷⁶ Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...pre-existed’: “therefore pre-existing charity, when increased by a new degree of subsequent charity, should remain and not be corrupted.”

²⁷⁷ Interpolation, in place of ‘nothing...reason’: “in every intensification of any form whatever, the degree of the preceding form is corrupted upon the advent of the other, subsequent form.”

²⁷⁸ Interpolation, in place of ‘therefore...number’: “the degree that precedes and that which arrives *de novo* are, in the case of this change of increase in the form, terms of the change, therefore they are not together at the same time; therefore one is corrupted when the other arrives.”

same in number in the more perfect, because then ‘the more perfect’ would be more composite than the more imperfect.²⁷⁹

201. A second confirmation is that it seems likewise that in a substance the more and less (if they exist there) should be posited in the same species, and also in an accident in the same species, especially in the case of an accident where there is no change in accord with it; but substance, because of its lack of change, the ‘more’ posited there is altogether another individual, not possessing in itself the ‘less’ as some part of itself but being as simple as or more simple than that ‘less’; therefore the like will be posited in the case of charity, which no change accords with – the point is plain.²⁸⁰

B. Rejection of the Opinion

202. Against this position [n.198] there is argument in six ways, one of which is taken from the presupposition of form in the case of increase in that form – and in accord with this way I argue first as follows:

[First way] – Although it is not necessary that God increase charity in the instant in which a meritorious act is elicited (by which ‘charity merits to be increased’ [n.195]), yet he can then increase it, such that the increase which someone merits is given at the same point in time as the act is elicited.

203. From this I argue: this act, which merits increase of charity, is meritorious, – therefore it presupposes charity in the instant in which it is elicited. I ask which charity? Not the new part which is acquired, because this follows the act as the reward the merit; therefore it presupposes the charity that was pre-existent, and consequently it is not corrupted in that instant, – because if so, then in that instant a meritorious act could not be elicited, in which instant however someone merits increase of charity.²⁸¹

²⁷⁹ Interpolation, in place of n.200: “For this opinion [n.198] I add two reasons. The first is this: the more and less in the same species are related in the same way that the more and less in diverse species are proportionally related; but in diverse species the more that one species is more perfect than another the more perfectly it contains it and in a simpler way, such that the species contained by it does not make any addition to it; therefore since simplicity is perfection in all forms, it seems too that in the same species the simpler form is more perfect, not possessing a preceding degree or form added to it.”

²⁸⁰ Interpolation, in place of n.201: “Again, more and less in accidental forms are related in a way similar to that in which they are related in substantial forms, if there be more and less in substances; but according to everyone who posits a more and less in substantial form, the more perfect substance, even in the same species, is simpler than another one, not by making addition to the less perfect but by containing it in a simple way – as is posited about the soul of Christ, which was not more composite than the soul of Peter but simpler, and yet was more perfect in essence of soul; therefore it is the same way with accidental form.”

²⁸¹ Interpolation, in place of nn.202-203: “Against this opinion [n.198] the argument goes as follows: the supposition is made that it is possible that God can increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, – so let it be posited in fact that he is then increasing charity. I ask then by which charity the meritorious act is elicited (because it is necessarily elicited by some charity, as was shown before [*Reportatio* IA d.17 n.27]); not by the newly infused charity which was increasing charity in the instant in which that charity was supporting the act, because the newly infused charity is the reward of such an act and follows that meritorious act in some order; nor is it elicited by the preceding charity, because according to you [Godfrey] it is corrupted, for in the infusion of the later charity the prior is corrupted; therefore in the instant in which charity is increased there is a meritorious act and yet it is not from any charity, which is impossible.”

204. But if someone impudently says that God never increases charity in the instant of time in which the act is had that is meritorious in respect of the increase but always later in duration, on the ground that God increases charity, not because of the act insofar as it is elicited, but insofar as it is in divine acceptance, and that in this way the charity remains after the instant in which the act is elicited, and that then after that instant the increase is conferred:

205. Although this response is altogether improbable if it deny that God can increase charity then [sc. in the same instant that the act is elicited] (because if he can, let his doing so be posited in fact, and the argument proceeds), nevertheless it does not in other respects escape difficulty.

First indeed because in moral and intellectual virtues virtue is increased by the elicited act, and not when the act is not, because when it is not it causes nothing; therefore then, when the act is present, is there reason for increasing the habit. Therefore if then a new individual is generated and the one that was before is corrupted, it follows that the act that is augmentative of the habit is not elicited by the habit but by the power alone, which seems discordant, because then – in accord with what was said in the preceding question [nn.69-70] – the act that is augmentative of the habit would be more imperfect than another act, elicited by the habit, that is non-augmentative of the habit.²⁸²

206. And if it also concede the conclusion that ‘the act augmentative of the acquired habit is elicited by the power alone’ (although this seems discordant), yet it does not escape the following special difficulty, if the intelligible species is posited as being increased by the act of understanding. For that act cannot be elicited by the power alone, the species having been removed, because – as was made plain in I d.3 nn.486-498 – the intellect is not sufficient without the species for eliciting an act of understanding; therefore no intellection that is elicited from the power alone can increase the species; the intellection, then, that is augmentative of the species presupposes the species, and not the

²⁸² Interpolation, in place of nn.204-205: “You will say that God does not increase charity in the instant in which the meritorious act is elicited, but the act of charity passes by and stands in divine acceptance as something rewardable, and then God – accepting the meritorious act – afterward gives increase to the pre-existing charity as a sort of reward for the act, and he does not at once in the same instant give the reward along with the merit, just as he did not give beatitude to the good angels in the first instant in which they merited it but in some later instant of nature. – On the contrary: although this could be said in the proposed case about the infused virtues, yet it could not be said about the increase of the natural virtues, moral and intellectual, and especially the moral; for moral virtue is increased by moral acts, just as it is generated from them (*Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-22); therefore the act which augments and increases moral virtue is only increasing it when it exists. Therefore I ask whether, when it increases it, it does so from some virtue or not. If from some virtue, from which virtue? Not from the preceding one, because that is corrupted – nor from the degree that it brings about, because that is posterior as effect to its cause; therefore, when it increases virtue it does so not from any virtue; but this is impossible, because then it would not be virtuous and yet it would generate virtue, which is against the Philosopher and against all understanding, because “from like acts like habits are generated” [*Ethics ibid.*]. – One could argue in the same way about an intellectual act: when the act of speculating exists the intellectual or speculative habit is increased, because when the act does not exist it does nothing; but that act is not from the preceding habit, because then there is no such habit because it is corrupted (because in the instant in which it comes to be is the habit increased, not from the preceding degree [of the habit]); nor is it from the subsequent degree, because that is subsequent; therefore such an act cannot be said in any way to cause increase, because there is no term at which the increase comes to be.”

individual one that is generated – so the preexisting individual, and consequently the preexisting one is not corrupted.

207. But if it be denied that intellection increases the intelligible species, the final instance – against the proposal – is as follows:

The will can, by its own act, weaken an act of understanding, – the proof is that it can totally corrupt and remove the intellect from this act; and yet the volition that weakens intellection necessarily presupposes intellection; not some new one that follows the volition itself, as is plain; therefore some intellection that precedes volition and consequently the preexisting intellection is not corrupted by it.²⁸³

208. [Second way] – The second way is from the perfection of that which is introduced by the increase.

Here the argument goes first as follows: in acts augmentative of a habit the tenth act can be more imperfect than the first, and yet by that tenth act the habit is increased to some degree to which it could not before be increased by the first or second act; this cannot be if the preexisting whole is corrupted, because the perfection of the first or second act was in itself greater than the perfection of the tenth act was in itself, and consequently the individual of whose generation the first act was capable could be more perfect than the individual of which the tenth act was capable; therefore the fact that what follows the tenth act is more perfect than what follows the first will not be because the new individual is generated by virtue of the tenth, but because something is added to the preexisting individual – generated by the preceding acts –, and thus the preexisting individual will remain.²⁸⁴

209. But if it be said that the preceding acts elicited by charity remain in divine acceptance (although not in themselves, nor in anything impressed by them), then the argument about the acquisition of intellectual and moral habits [n.208] is not solved.²⁸⁵

²⁸³ Interpolation, in place of n.207: “Again, the will can weaken an act of understanding, because it can corrupt the act of it altogether by its own willing, by turning it away from consideration of any secondary object so that it does not determinately consider it. But every act of the will is naturally preceded by an act of the intellect. In that instant, then, in which the will weakens the act of the intellect by its own imperative act, the intellect must be in its own act; not in the preceding intense act, because that act does not remain intense when the will thus weakens it, as the position holds; nor in the weakened act, because that act naturally follows the act of the will; therefore if the weakened act is not some part of the reality of the intense act, it follows that in the instant in which the will is in its act with respect to any object, the intellect is not first naturally in act with respect to that object, and then the will is willing something unknown, – which is impossible.”

²⁸⁴ Interpolation, in place of n.208: “Secondly I argue in this way by supposing that the second or third act could intensify the habit even though it is not more perfect or more intense than the first act, – then I argue: if the later act intensifies the habit and yet is not necessarily more intense nor more perfect than any preceding act whatever, then it does not generate a more perfect individual habit of charity, which is contrary to you [sc. Godfrey]. The proof of the consequence is that an act generating a habit cannot generate it save according to the proportion of its own virtue; so if this act, which is more imperfect than the first act, generates an individual habit of charity, and a more perfect one, this will be either in virtue of the preceding acts, and then these acts remain and are not corrupted, as the opinion supposes [of Godfrey], – or by its own virtue, and then the effect will be more perfect than its whole cause in virtue, which is false.”

²⁸⁵ Text cancelled by Scotus: “The reasoning about natural agents [n.208] is also not solved; for posit that to something with nine degrees of heat there comes something hot in a lesser degree, then the latter can in some way intensify the former thing with its nine degrees of heat, and consequently the hot thing that will exist in the term of the action will be more perfect in heat than the agent is that

210. If no agent can intensify the form, which it finds in what it acts on, to make it more perfect than the form which it could of itself cause in what it acts on, this whole second reasoning fails, because then an act never intensifies a habit save to that degree which it could of itself induce, and then it would not be apparent why it could not induce it if it was a new individual such that nothing of what preexisted would remain. But because it is manifest that a tenth act, as equally intense as the first, intensifies the habit beyond the degree induced by the first or second act, therefore the first proposition [sc. at the beginning here, n.210] seems in need of being denied.

211. But then there is a doubt whether this is so in the case of heat, namely that a weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies the more intense heat that is found in what it acts on (it seems it does not, as here below in the line marked **²⁸⁶). One can say that a

comes to it and increases it; this would be impossible if it were 'a new individual' generated by the act of the now present hot thing. The proof of the major is that, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 8.10.266a24-b6, "a greater extensive virtue exists in a greater magnitude," – therefore if from the beginning the virtue in the greater magnitude is close to the thing acted on by it, it will act more; but this, as far as the action is concerned, is just the same as if it was one greater continuous magnitude, or was many magnitudes all together – contiguous with each other – equal to that one magnitude; therefore a less extensive magnitude, if it is from the beginning contiguous with a greater extensive hot thing, has power for introducing a more perfect form, – therefore, if from the beginning a large hot thing acts of itself, it will not introduce as great a form as would be introduced if some small hot thing were contiguous with it; therefore the thing acted on is left potential with respect to a degree [sc. of heat] that can be introduced by that lesser hot thing if it becomes contiguous, – therefore the lesser thing, when it arrives, will reduce it to act. Response: let everything be conceded up to the final consequence; but let that consequence be denied, because a lesser thing, when it arrives, does not find the thing that is acted on to be in a contrary disposition which it could conquer but it is conquered by that disposition – therefore it will be simply acted on, and if it does any little thing to the contrary, this will be by being more intensely weakened, but eventually it will be conquered.

Nor can this be evaded by an order of degrees, to wit, that the agent can reduce the thing acted on, which was before in a different degree, to a more perfect degree than it could have reduced it to at the beginning, just as an agent can make a thing acted on, which is already organized, to be alive, and yet it cannot reduce a non-organized thing to as great a perfection as the prior one did (and this because of the order of forms in becoming, or of degrees in form, on account of which order the thing existing in a more imperfect degree can be at once reduced to a degree more perfect, – not so if it were not in that degree); this response – I say – is not valid, because if a thing hot in eight degrees intensifies a thing hot in nine degrees and this intensification is done by the heat of a weaker agent and by the generation of a new individual, then in the instant in which a thing hot in ten degrees is generated, the thing generated will exceed in perfection the heat of the generator – which is impossible; therefore increase does not happen in this way."

This interpolation is followed by the following note of Duns Scotus: "The two reasons are against Godfrey, one that in alteration there is no continuous change (because what subject would it have?), the other that a changeable thing will be hot with many heats, because the part in a motion more remote from the mover is not as intense in form as a part close to the mover. [**] But what is set down here above under [the above interpolation] is not certain, because what is there supposed, namely that 'the weaker thing, when it arrives, intensifies more intensely, even as to any degree at all', is rather the other way round, and then 'the thing that is acted on is contrary, insofar as what arrives is imperfect and is not able to conquer what is more perfect but is conquered by it, – therefore it does not act, or if it reacts in any respect, it will be more intensely weak in making it like itself'; this does not seem to be an instance, save in the case of light; perhaps there something less virtuous than the first agent intensifies the effect of it, and yet it would not be capable in itself save of what is weaker in the form which it finds in the thing it acts on. What is the cause there if the hot thing does not so act?"

²⁸⁶ A reference to the passage marked [**] in the note to n.209.

univocal agent does not intensify its own more intense form that is found in what it acts on, but rather the reverse; but an equivocal agent does intensify it, because it is of a nature to act on this and not to be acted on by it, and its own form is more noble than any degree of an equivocal effect that it finds, although it not have at once of itself power for so great a degree of equivocal effect. Therefore light is intensified infinitely if infinite lights of the same species are put around a medium, each one of which would intensify the light in that medium.

212. [Third way] – The third way is taken from natural things and the action of contrary on contrary.

For a hot thing acting on a cold thing weakens the cold thing before it corrupts it completely. If in this weakening of the cold thing a new individual cold thing is generated, I ask by what is it generated? If recourse is not had to a universal agent (which recourse is here irrational), no particular generator for this individual can be assigned, because the hot that is weakening the cold thing cannot of itself generate an individual cold thing; therefore neither is the weakened cold thing a new individual.²⁸⁷

213. [Fourth way] – The fourth way is taken from the fact that the Philosopher allows for motion in the case of accidents in the same manner in which he denies it for substances [*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11], and consequently the more and less, as

²⁸⁷ Interpolation, in place of 212: “Third as follows: a hot thing corrupting a cold thing first weakens the cold thing; for two movements go together, intensification and increase in heat and weakening in coldness (namely the motion of intensifying heat and weakening coldness); therefore according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] a new individual cold thing is generated. I ask then for the term ‘from which’ of this motion towards coldness; it cannot be said that the greater coldness is what precedes, because this coldness is corrupted; nor is the weaker degree of cold that which follows, because then the effect would surpass its cause in entity and perfection, which is not intelligible, according to Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* 12 ch.16 n.33 and 83 *Questions* q.2. – Again, everything which moves is, while it moves, partly in the term ‘from which’ and partly in the term ‘to which’ (*Physics* 6.1.231b28-232a6). If therefore the hot thing acts on the cold thing, then in the whole motion the cold thing possesses something of the term ‘to which’ (namely something of hot); if then in the whole motion the cold thing is not weakened before it is corrupted, the consequence is that the extreme contrary, and not a weakened contrary, exists along with some degree of its contrary, and consequently, since these forms of contrariety do not have any latitude in being contrary, extreme contraries could at the same time be true. The cold thing then is weakened. Therefore, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey] some supposit for cold is generated; but it is not generated from the preceding cold, because that has been corrupted; therefore it is generated from the hot, and thus the hot would generate the cold, which is impossible. – Again, fourth as follows: if the preceding form is always corrupted, the consequence is that there cannot be motion according to degree in the form of quality, because as soon as there is a departure from the term ‘from which’, another form is generated; therefore there will only be motion in quality according to the degree of the movable thing. But this is false, because then there would be a continuous motion whose parts were yet not joined to any common term, because the changing that joins them – I ask what is it in? Either it is in something divisible or in something indivisible; not in a part that is divisible, because no part is changed as a whole but part before part, according to this opinion [sc. of Godfrey]; therefore the motion would take place in an indivisible part, and so a point would become hot. – Again, it also follows that every heatable, while it is being heated, is heated with infinite heats; because if motion takes place precisely successively in accord with the degrees of the movable thing, since there are infinite parts in a movable thing (as in a heatable thing), at least potentially, and no part of the movable is made hot with the same degree of heat as another part, but with another heat and in another degree, – the result is that the whole will be made hot by infinite degrees of heat, which is impossible.”

they are required in accidents, so they are not required in substances; but if there were no increase in accidents save by corruption of what preexists and by generation of what is new – and this is how more and less can be found in substances – then the more or less would exist no more in accidents than in substances.

214. [Fifth way] – Fifth, an argument is drawn from the fact that a nature which admits of more and less in determinate degree will be a species in relation to individuals, and an inferior species to boot contained under a species of nature, and thus no species of a nature capable of being intensified or weakened – as we posit these species now – will be a most specific species.²⁸⁸

The proof of the first consequence is that anything that is said of individuals *per se* and in their ‘whatness’ and is ‘*per se* one thing’ is the species of them; nature in a determinate degree – in such and such a degree – is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘*per se* one thing’, because the nature in this degree belongs essentially to the things that have nature in this degree, and the degree does not add to the nature something accidental to it; so it is plain that the nature in such a degree is a species, and plain that it is less common than the species of the nature in itself; therefore it would be a species inferior in order to the species of the nature.²⁸⁹

215. [Sixth way] – Sixth and last there is the argument that if the reason adduced for the position [nn.198-199] is valid, it should work in the same way about the how much of bulk as about the how much of virtue, and so when a bulk is increased in amount nothing of it would remain the same; therefore in the case of increase in bulk properly speaking the preexisting quantity would not remain in the increased thing, which seems discordant.^a

a. [Interpolation] Further, the reasoning [n.199] is not valid, because then it would work universally about any increase, and so in bodily increase the term that precedes and the degree that increases would be impossibles, which is to destroy increase.

216. Response in accord with this position is made by conceding the conclusion – that there is a new individual in the how much of bulk when something is bigger just as,

²⁸⁸ Tr. Whiteness and blackness etc. are now posited to be most specific species in the genus of color, but if each of these has inferior species beneath it (sc. because each degree of whiteness or blackness is a sub-species under the species of white and black), then whiteness and blackness will be the genera of these inferior species and not most specific species themselves after all.

²⁸⁹ Note by Duns Scotus: “The fifth argument needs to be solved in the case of substances, against which it draws its conclusion. The minor then is false [sc. nature in a determinate degree – in such and such a degree – is said of individuals in their ‘whatness’ and it is ‘*per se* one thing’], because of the part that reads ‘in their whatness’, because the ‘what’ abstracts from all individual conditions, from ‘more’ just as much as from ‘thisness’ (*Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11). ‘More’ is an individual condition, not a determinate one as is ‘this’, but an indeterminate one, because there can be the same degree though not the same ‘this’; but not conversely; for there cannot be this individual without this degree. – On the contrary: in that case the degree is being understood to determine the nature rather than to determine the ‘this’, and to be doing so *per se* and at that prior stage; otherwise it is an accident and a common difference; therefore etc. Response: common, but not universal, because individual. – On the contrary: at least it is a *per se* predicable, a mean between the most specific species and the individual; likewise, some species is posited as being distinguished by degrees of the form, as animals by degrees of sensitive form and angels by degrees of intellectual form. Response: a species states the ‘what’, a species in a certain degree states the ‘what of the how much in virtue’; ‘how much’ is not a [specific] difference [I d.8 n.108].”

when something is ‘more intensified’, there is a different individual of that intensifiable form.

217. But against this there seem to be two discordant results that follow.

The first is that if the species of wine are diluted in the Eucharist,²⁹⁰ there will be a greater quantity in bulk than there was before, because greater quantity follows on dilution; if then the quantity of wine which existed before does not remain after dilution, then the blood does not remain there, because it is commonly held that the wine does not remain there except to the extent that the accidents remain that are the affections of the converted wine.

218. The other discordance is that then it would seem that such dilution could not be by virtue of a natural agent, or that the natural agent would act without any matter or substance presupposed; for it is plain that substantial matter is not there presupposed, for there is not there an alterable substance, nor is it even presupposed that a quantity the same in number remains (for you), and yet the natural agent is able – as it seems – thus to dilute or condense those species; therefore the natural agent is able to act without presupposing anything in its action, and thus to create.

219. Response to these discordances:

To the first, that as long as accidents remain similar to affections of the wine the blood remains; and although they do not remain the same, they do nevertheless remain similar after dilution.

220. To the other the concession is made that the natural agent can act when nothing common remains under the terms; yet it does not create, because this later thing follows – in order of nature – that former thing; creation is not like this.

221. Argument is made against these responses:

Because although this numerically new quantity differs from the preexisting quantity, and a quantity of water does not differ from a quantity of wine in any other way save in number alone (because it plainly does not differ in species), the result is that because of the permanence of the accidents, the same in species, not in number, the blood does not remain under the new quantity more than it would remain under the quantity of water, if water was what was chiefly there, since this new quantity is not inclined to affect the wine – whose quantity it was before – more than to affect the water.

222. Against the other response [n.220] there seems to be discordance in an active natural virtue presupposing a subject in its action.

223. Further, I ask how one of these follows on the other? Either without the action of the agent – and this is manifestly discordant, because then the natural agent would act in vain, because without it the consequent would still follow. Therefore the consequent does not follow save by the action of the natural agent. But such an agent cannot make the effect to exist unless the material cause is presupposed; otherwise creation, or the sort of action that is repugnant to a natural agent, would not – by such consequence – be prevented.

224. Further, according to this opinion [n.220] a natural agent could be said to be the effective cause of introducing the intellectual soul, because the intellectual soul follows by natural order on the organization of the body; the consequence here is commonly held to be discordant.^a

²⁹⁰ Tr. In preparing the wine for consecration a small amount of water is added to it, and this small amount of water must, to that small extent, dilute the wine.

a. [Interpolation] They reply – see elsewhere, and for the arguments contrary to it, namely in IV d.12 p.2 a.1 q.1 n.6-7, 14-17.

II. To the Question

225. In response, then, to the question [n.195], because of the reasons rejecting this opinion [sc. of Godfrey, nn.202-203, 208, 212-215] and especially the two or three first ones, I hold to the opposite conclusion, namely that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. But how this is the case will be plain in the solutions to the following questions [n.249].^a

a. [Interpolation, in place of n.225] I concede then the conclusion of these reasons [nn.237, 240, 243-244], and that the positive reality that was in the lesser charity remains the same really in the greater charity. [Followed by this second interpolation] Nor is it corrupted *per se*, save as to the existence that it had before, and it remains in the other [sc. in the greater charity] as a part in the whole; an example comes from matter *per se* or form *per se*, which are not corrupted as they exist in the whole but remain in the whole more perfectly than when they had existence *per se*; the thing is plain in the case of a how much of bulk when it is increased. – As to the reason for this opinion [nn.198-199] I say that the terms of motion *per se*, of which sort are privation and form, are impossibles; but a weakened form and an increased form are not *per se* these sorts of terms of motion, because a weakened form is not a privation but a certain positive state. Weakened and intense forms are terms of motion not *per se* but *per accidens*, namely to the extent that a weakened form is conjoined to a *per se* term that is a privation; hence although the *per se* term ‘from which’ of motion is, as a privation, corrupted when the term ‘to which’ is reached, yet the form that *per accidens* accompanies such a term ‘from which’ need not be *per se* corrupted. A fallacy of the consequent is therefore committed, because the weakened form is a term ‘from which’ as conjoined to the privation, insofar as it is precisely a being *per se*, and this does not remain; but as it exists in another it is not conjoined to the privation but to the term ‘to which’, and thus it remains the same in number as before, but more intense and more perfect. – To the first confirmation [see note to n.200] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because the order of species is according to quiddities and essences, and so one species does not contain the essence or quiddity of another; but the order according to degrees of the same form is according to material parts, which can exist at the same time, and the form is so much the more intense and more perfect the more it exists under such several degrees of form. It exists in opposite ways, then, in this case and in that. – To the other confirmation [see note to n.201] I say that it is to the opposite effect, because in the way the Philosopher asserts the more and less in accidents he denies it in substances [Metaphysics 8.3.1043b-44a11]; but he does not deny in substances the more and less by way of the parts of bulk (rather he in this way concedes their existence there), therefore he denies in the accidents the more and less in this way, namely by way of parts of bulk; now he denies in substances the more and less by way of degrees of form, so he concedes them in this way in accidents. Hence, because he lays down that substantial form is in itself indivisible, therefore he does not posit one degree of form along with another; things are the opposite way in accidents, because an accidental form is divisible by way of degrees, – therefore any degree is compatible with another degree and is perfected by it.

III. To the Arguments

226. To the argument on behalf of the opinion of Godfrey [n.199] my response is: the term ‘from which’ is *per se* a privation of the degree to be introduced.

227. But what is the positive term 'from which' that is necessarily required? I reply: an imperfect degree.

228. On the contrary: the imperfect degree remains in the term 'to which' [n.225]. – I reply: it does not remain in a distinct act, the way the term 'from which' was, but it remains in the whole potentially, the way a part does.

229. On the contrary: it remains the same in every absolute sense; a respect is not the idea of a term 'from which' or 'to which'. There seems to be the same difficulty about water when divided and united, namely what the term is 'from which' and 'to which'; for if all the water is the term 'from which' of the division, and if 'this separated part and that separated part' are the term 'to which', each term was before the same in number in respect of anything absolute; some other force is here involved, because the two divided waters are separately counted, – therefore when the same numerical unity of each remains, they are always separately counted; but the same numerical unity of each remains in the whole, otherwise neither would remain the same in number, and thus there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing. Whoever would say that the parts in an absolute whole have the absolute existence of the whole, with respect to which the proper being of the parts is material (*Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21), could say that the prior degree remains in the whole according to some absolute existence which was not there before; likewise about the water united to another water.

230. But the question still remains what the term 'from which' is that is impossible with anything absolute? – No answer is assigned, so I briefly reply:

Per se the term 'from which' is impossible with the term 'to which', – it is its privation; but the positive term 'from which' is not impossible with the term 'to which' save by being put in the combination 'the *per se* term from which':²⁹¹ unless one asserts the impossibility, that 'this is not this' – or that 'the same thing is not perfected at the same time by this and this' as they are acts in distinct act. In this way indeed the prior degree is in two ways impossible with the term 'to which': because it is never it, even when it is in it, and also because it is never the distinct act of that of which the term 'to which' is the distinct act.

231. But of these two ways of 'unless one asserts' etc. [n.230] the first is not sufficient for terms of motion, because whiteness is not sweetness [sc. and these are not terms of one and the same motion]; the second cannot posit the opposition of the term 'from which' on account of anything absolute in it, because being a distinct act adds to the absolute degree – in the way this degree remains – nothing but an exclusion, the exclusion of 'being in another' (the way a part is in the whole), and so to posit a term in this way is to posit it formally under the denial of a relation: therefore hold to the first remark, at '(—)' [n.230 and footnote].

232. To the other point, about the divided water [n.229], I reply: just as a part in a whole does indeed exist, and in the act which terminates its generation (because division is not generation), yet it does not exist in a distinct act, which is an act along with exclusion of being a part; so there corresponds to it the unity that accords with the first idea of act [sc. the act that terminates its generation], and this unity remains with it in division and in union, – but according to the idea of distinct act [sc. act along with

²⁹¹ The sign '(—)' was put here for this clause by Scotus.

exclusion of being a part] there properly corresponds the unity that is the principle of number.

233. To the form. The first consequence [n.229] holds, speaking of unity in the second way [sc. unity as principle of number], because number is of discrete things; all the parts of a continuous thing are one in number, speaking of number strictly. – Further, the minor [sc. ‘there would be no continuation of the things preexisting but simply a corruption of them and generation from them of a third thing’] is false of numerical unity in the second way; it is true of it in the first way. Yet it does not follow that the same thing has two numerical unities; rather the same thing has, according to its absolute being, a unique and perpetual unity while it remains; but according to its exclusive being there corresponds to it a unity that is separately counted. And just as exclusive being is accidental to it, so its having a separately countable unity is accidental to it; for when its being is exclusive, its proper unity is separately countable, – when its being is not exclusive but it exists in another precisely as some part of it, then its proper unity is not separately counted but is a part of some separately counted unity, such that, in brief, ‘to be a separately countable unity’ properly requires exclusive being, because number is of discrete things.

234. To the argument for the opposite [n.196] I say that this consequence does not hold ‘the same form remains in the imperfect and perfect individual, therefore it is changed in subject’, because it does not remain as a subject of change but it remains as a nature in individual things, to which nature any individual whatever adds something. And the reason for the failure of the consequence is because that which is the subject of one individual of the nature is also the subject of another individual of it, and because the subject is possible and changeable from individual to individual; but the form itself, just as it is not the subject of one individual, so it is not the subject of another individual, and consequently it is not changeable from one to the other.

a. [Interpolation] To the principal reason [see interpolation to n.196] I say that the form is not the subject of the change but is related to diverse degrees of it as a species to two individuals that possess the being of the species *de novo*; and the form is not the subject of them because, when individuals are multiplied *de novo*, the species begins now to be in one individual and now to be in another; hence there is no change of form according to those degrees, because they are not accidents superadded to the nature of the form but they are intrinsic modes, asserting a certain degree of virtual quantity of that form.

Question Two

Whether that which is Positive in the Preexisting Charity, and which remains when there is Increase of Charity, is the whole Essence of the Intensified Charity

235. Secondly I ask^a whether that which is positive in the preexisting charity, and which remains when there is increase of charity, is the whole essence of the intensified charity, such that if an intense charity without a subject were posited, it would have in itself essentially no positive reality other than that which preexisted in the mild charity.

And that the reality of the preexisting charity is in this way the whole essence and reality of the increased charity I prove thus:

Metaphysics 8.3.1043b32-44a11: “forms are like numbers,” – in this respect, that ‘just as any number, when added, changes the number, so any degree in form, when added, changes the species’; therefore nothing can be added to the essence of this sort of form while the species remains the same. But the supposition is being made that the intense form is of the same species as the mild one, and so no degree over and above the reality of the form is there added.

a. [Interpolation] The supposition that a prior charity is not corrupted when charity is increased raises a question, because of the other opinion about increase of charity [*Rep* IA d.17 n.103].

236. Further, in *Metaphysics* 10.9.1058b1-2 the Philosopher says that “formal differences change the species:” a difference of degrees in the essence of a form, if it existed, would be a formal difference.

237. Further, Porphyry says [*The Predicables* 3.3a47-48] that a formal difference does not admit of more and less: “The existence,” he says, “of each thing is one and the same, receiving neither increase nor decrease.”

238. Further, the author of the *Six Principles* [ch.1 n.1] says: “Form consists of a simple and invariable essence.”

239. Further, if any reality is added to a preexisting charity,^a then charity when increased will not be in the species, because it will include something that is accidental to the specific nature; or if it is *per se* in the species,^b it does not include anything other than what belongs to the nature of the species – and so^c the lesser charity, which does not include that degree, will not be in the species.

a. [Interpolation] [if any reality] exists in a charity which arrives *de novo*, different from what was in the preexisting charity...

b. [Interpolation] it has whatever is required for the nature of a species, and consequently...

c. [Interpolation] since it has one degree beyond the lesser charity, a degree pertaining *per se* and precisely to the nature of the species, it follows that...

240. On the contrary:

In that case [sc. if the reality of the preexisting charity were the whole essence of the increased charity, n.235] the charity of any of the blessed would be equal in nature of charity with the charity of Christ; and since according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 “in incorporeal things to be better is the same as to be greater,” the charity of any of the blessed would be as good in itself as the charity of Christ and so each one of them would be equally blessed.^a

a. [Interpolation] [as equally blessed] as Christ, because the essential reward corresponds to the quantity of the charity, which is impossible.

I. Opinion of Others

241. [Exposition of the Opinion] – An opinion that rests on the arguments given for the first part [nn.235-239, the opinion of Godfrey] seems to say that, when one removes the form from a subject, there is not, because of the added reality, a more and a less in the form in itself; and because one must, according to the authorities, preserve there a more and less in some way, one must posit them there according to the existence of the accident in the subject itself (which indeed is to be existent in the subject's existence), and so a more-ness as to existence is attributed either to a greater disposition of the subject or to a greater removal of the opposite indisposition.

242. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this position I argue first as follows: contraries when extreme cannot coexist in the same thing, but they can when in mild degrees.^a But this is only because there is something in the intense degree that is not in the mild one; for if the whole reality that is in the mild degree is in the intense one, then there is no repugnance between the mild and intense degree. – But this inability to coexist, or impossibility, is not a relation to the subject nor is it from any relation to the subject; for the impossibility of forms in themselves is prior to the impossibility of forms in some third thing, as in the subject that receives them (for it is because they are impossible in themselves that they cannot be received in the same subject, – not contrariwise). Therefore that which is the reason for their impossibility in intense degrees is something in them that is positive in itself and not only in order to a subject.

a. [*Interpolation*] that is, hot and cold when extreme but not when in milder degree (the thing is plain, because when the hot or the movement of the hot or of heat are made mild, the movement of cold is made more intense, and conversely).

243. Further, the same thing cannot be produced twice, and consequently some reality cannot be acquired by some change; therefore the reality that is acquired by movement or change in intensity is not the same in positive being as that which existed before, because then that which was before would be really acquired.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] I make this supposition [sc. that the same thing cannot be produced twice]; again I make supposition that a real motion or change is impossible without a real term. From this I argue as follows: in the increase of charity the lesser charity is the term 'from which' and the greater charity is the term 'to which', and this is a real production; therefore it is, in accord with the second supposition, necessarily toward some real term: not to the reality that altogether preceded, because the same thing cannot be produced twice, and the preceding reality was the term of a different production; therefore to another reality.

244. Further, if the form is indivisible it gives indivisible being to the subject and does so indivisibly; for the subject is not of such a sort in form save because the form is of such a sort; therefore if the form is of such a sort in itself, there is no more-ness of perfection to it, and the subject that accords with it will not be said to be more such in accord with it.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] for it is because the form is such that what has it is said to be such in accord with it. Therefore if the form is indivisible in itself, it is impossible that the subject could be more or less in accord with it; for it is contradictory that a 'form in itself' be indivisible and yet that the subject be divisible in accord with it.

245. Further, against these modes whereby more and less are posited in forms [n.241]. First against the mode about the disposition [sc. of the subject] to more and less:

For if there is the same disposition – that is, same in idea of being one – to more and less, and if that disposition is the form, the result is that there is more and less in some form.^a If then in some form there is a disposition to more and less but not according to the idea of being one disposition, as some want to say because^b humidity in air is a disposition to greater heat and dryness in fire is a disposition to greater heat,^c – against this I argue: one species, taken in its totality, seems to have, in what is susceptible to it, the idea of one disposition.^d Further,^e then there will not be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, nor conversely; for nothing will be moved to a mild degree save what has a disposition agreeing with the reception of that mild degree; but an intense degree does not have the disposition that agrees with a mild degree; therefore, in order for it to be moved to a mild degree, it must be moved to a disposition agreeing with a mild degree – and thus, in order for the mild degree to come to exist from the intense degree, there must first be a motion from the disposition that is to the intense degree to a disposition that is to the mild degree, and so^f there will never be one motion from an intense to a mild degree, because they do not have the same immediate susceptible subject agreeing with each disposition.

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, against their mode [sc. Godfrey's] of positing more and less in the case of a form, and first against the mode about disposition of the subject, on account of which the form will be said to receive more and less; that disposition either is some form or it is not. If it is a form, and the subject is said to be more or less disposed according to it, the proposed conclusion follows, that in some form there is more and less.

b. [*Interpolation*] If the disposition is not a form according to which the subject is said to be more such but it is some other form, then the subject will be said to be more such according to that form because of some preceding disposition, – and then one must ask about that disposition whether it is some form or not, and so there will either be a process to infinity in dispositions or a more and less in some form in itself must be granted. Again, there must first be a disposed subject before it may be moved to the term of the motion, because nothing is moved to anything save what is disposed to receiving that thing; since therefore in every motion, in the term of it, something is acquired that was not there before at the beginning of the motion, the consequence is that something is acquired in the term of the motion other than the sole idea of disposition. – He says [sc. Godfrey] that more and less are in diverse subjects because of diverse dispositions, not dispositions of the same idea but of contrary idea, just as fire is said to be more hot than air, because...

c. [*Interpolation*] and therefore that more-ness is not in any single disposition.

d. [*Interpolation*] hence all individuals of one disposition of accident have a disposition of one idea just as they also have a form of the same idea; therefore, when everything else is taken away that is not the proper disposition, there can be more and less in individuals of the same species and so an intensity and a mildness in the form of that species without any such contrary or opposite dispositions preceding them in the subjects. Then the question is asked, as before, why something is more disposed now than it was before, as was argued [in interpolations a. and b. just above].

e. [*Interpolation*] if such opposed dispositions precede, to more and to less...

f. [*Interpolation*] and so, in order for the intense degree to become mild, there must first be a movement from the disposition that is in the intense degree to a disposition agreeing with the mild

degree before the mild degree may come to be from the intense degree, and conversely, – which is impossible, because then...

246. The other way, which speaks of disposition or of removal of the contrary indisposing factor [n.241], seems to be refuted by the fact that in angels in the state of innocence there was not a greater or lesser disposition toward charity; therefore all would have received an equal charity, which is not what is maintained.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the good angels did not in meriting have any indisposition, and yet they did not have equal charity; hence this does not follow, that ‘any angel in the same species is equally disposed to grace, therefore any angel has grace equally’.

247. Also a third way – which is held by some people – about ‘the rooting down of the form in the subject’ seems to be refuted by the fact that this rooting down is either some absolute form (and the proposed conclusion is obtained, because in such a form there is a more and a less), or not. If not but there is only a respect, then it seems they cannot have a more and a less save by a more and a less in the foundation, just as absolutes do not agree in respect save in their foundation.

248. Then too a more intense form is not properly saved,^a because when a form is less rooted in a subject it can in itself be more intense; just as redness from shame can be more intense than a redness that is a quality able to be received in another.

a. [Interpolation] Again, this mode does not save the fact that one form is more intense than another.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Question

249. As to this question [n.235] I concede – especially because of the first three reasons adduced against this opinion [of Godfrey, nn.242-244] – that the positive reality which preexists in the lesser charity is not the whole positive reality which exists in the greater charity. Rather, if there existed a greater and a lesser charity separated from a subject, the greater charity would have in itself the positive reality of the lesser charity and another reality in addition; if *per impossibile* all relation to a subject were taken away (as with a quantity of bulk, if it were posited as separate from a subject), even if *per impossibile* it did not have an inclination to a subject, nevertheless one charity would be greater than the other and it would have in itself the whole of the positive reality of the lesser charity and something in addition.

III. To the Principal Arguments

250. To the arguments for the opposite [nn.235-239].

To the first – about numbers [n.235] – I say that it proceeds from a failure in understanding the Philosopher. The Philosopher is there in fact comparing quiddities to numbers, to the extent they are definable, in the way Plato used to speak of quiddities, by positing them as separate [Scotus, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics* VIII ch.4 n.22]; substances taken in this way, the quiddities of things, are indeed compared to numbers according to the four properties [*ibid.* nn.22-25] – one of which is this, that ‘anything added changes the species’; and I understand it thus, that the addition makes

another species from the species, or that it makes a species from a non-species. For any difference, when added to the definition, either indicates the quiddity, or it constitutes a species other than the preexisting one, or if the preexisting one was of the nature of a genus it determines it to the nature of a species, which is something that was not had before the addition of the difference.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] An example about the intellective soul, when it is added as the difference to the sensitive soul.

251. I say, then, that an addition to the quiddity, when the quiddity is taken according to the idea of quiddity, alters the species in the second of the ways stated [sc. making a species from a species]. But what is not added to a quiddity as it is a quiddity does not change the species; now any individual degree, just as also an individual difference that contracts a thing to being a ‘this’, whether it is an individual unity or an individual plurality, and in short any individual condition whatever added to a specific nature, is not added to it as to its quidditative idea such that it determine it according to that idea, and for this reason it does not change the species of the quiddity to which it is added; for it cannot change what preexists into another species, nor can it change it from a non-species into a species, unless what is added is of the idea of a species, – and no individual condition is of this sort.

252. Next, as to the form of the authority [n.235], I say that if something that was a quidditative part were added to a preexisting quiddity it would change the species, just as if something that was a part of number were added to a preexisting number the species of the number would be changed; but if something be added that is not of a nature to be a part of number (to wit, some accident) or is a material part of number (to wit, if one of the units in a triple were made more intense than before [e.g. made more white]), then the species would not in itself be changed.^a So in the proposed case: any individual difference (or degree) that is added to a quiddity is not of the nature to be a part of the quiddity.

a. [*Interpolation*] but in some individual degree.

253. By the same fact [n.252] the response is plain as regard Porphyry [n.237], that he likewise is speaking of difference insofar as it is a *per se* part of definition. Difference in this way consists in something indivisible, that is, taking it according to the indifference according to which it is abstracted from individuals, which indifference – in its totality – is its degree as it is a specific difference; for thus it does not receive the more and less, because ‘all cases of more and less’ can belong to individuals in this way and these cases are all within this indifference of the difference and do not, in accord with this indifference, add anything to the difference.

254. To the passage from the *Metaphysics* 10 [n.236] the same response can be made, by calling formal difference ‘quidditative difference’.

255. One can also reply – as to the form – that not every difference of forms is a formal difference, speaking properly of formal difference, namely insofar as formal difference is a difference according to forms, just as not every difference in men is a difference in the form of humanity. A reason in reality and in logic is assigned for this. In reality as follows: men can possess the form of humanity and be different, though not by

humanity – and so they do not differ in humanity; thus pure forms can differ and yet not be different by formality, and so not be formally different, because to differ formally – properly speaking – is the same as to differ in form or according to form.^a In logic as follows: because the term of a difference is understood through the negation that is included in the difference, therefore it can be taken confusedly or distributively with respect to that negation; so too, that which is denominated as being the idea of the difference (of which sort is what is construed along with the verb ‘differ’, as that in which or according to which the denomination is made) could be confounded by the negation. But, as it is, the negation of the superior does not follow on the negation of the inferior, but there is denial of the antecedent and a fallacy of the consequent.²⁹²

a. [*Interpolation*] I also say as to the reality that things can differ in species between themselves and yet not cause such a difference in a third thing, – just as white and black differ in species and yet white Socrates and black Plato do not differ in species; so although the individual differences are diverse primarily, yet they do not vary the essence, because they are accidents of the essence and material with respect to it, – and the same as to masculine and feminine, and also as to degrees with respect to the form in itself, which form does not, according to its existence, determine for itself a determinate degree.

256. To the other authority from the *Six Principles* [n.238]: its conclusion is to be conceded in the way it proves the simplicity of the form. But it proves a simplicity opposite to quantity of bulk, because when a form is added it does not make a greater in bulk (for a form when placed in a subject is not something more than it was before). So let a simplicity of form opposite to quantity of bulk be conceded – but this is nothing against an intensity in amount, which is what pertains to the proposed case.

257. To the reason [n.239] I say that as to the remark ‘something that is accidental to the nature of the species’, it can be understood in two ways: in one way like this, that it is outside the quidditative idea of the species, in the way a difference is said to be accidental to the genus – and in this way an accident is taken in the fallacy of accident for something extraneous that is outside the idea of another thing; in another way an accident is said to be what does not make a ‘*per se* unity’ together with that of which it is an accident, as white together with body. In the first way I say that an intense whiteness has something which is accidental to the nature of the species (so also does a mild whiteness, nay any individual has something that is accidental to the nature of the species – otherwise the nature of the species would not be contracted to individuals); in the second way I say that an intense whiteness does not have something that is accidental to the nature of the species, because the degree which is understood to be added to the nature in

²⁹² Vatican editors: “by saying, ‘there is a difference or a non-identity between men, therefore there is a difference or a non-identity between them in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’; or, in other words, ‘this man differs from that man or is not that man, therefore they are different or not the same in the form of humanity or according to the form of humanity’”. Tr. the denial of a logically inferior difference (e.g. an individual difference that distinguishes this man from that) is not followed by the denial of a logically superior difference (e.g. a specific difference that distinguishes this species, man, from that species, horse). Or, to put it in logical form: while the conditional statement ‘if they are the same individual then they are the same species’ is true, one commits the fallacy of the consequent if one argues from the denial of the antecedent (the denial of the inferior difference) to a denial of the consequent (the denial of a superior difference), as in ‘but they are not the same individual, therefore they are not the same species’.

itself makes a '*per se* unity' with the nature, just as any individual difference added to the nature makes a '*per se* unity' with the nature. When therefore you say 'if the intense thing includes something which is accidental to the nature of the species, then the mild thing, which does not include it, is not in the species' [n.239], the consequence is not valid speaking of accident taken in the first, but the antecedent is true in this first way – and not in the other way.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] So the inference 'therefore such a degree is not in the species' is not valid, but the inference should be 'therefore such a degree is not the species'; so it exists in the species as contained under it. Nor does this inference follow, 'therefore the other degree will not be in the species'; for this does not follow, 'it does not have whatever pertains to the species, therefore it is not in the species'. – Or one can say that 'something pertains to the species' is taken in two ways, either as to quiddity or as to subject. Quidditative parts belong *per se* to the understanding of the species, though not to the understanding of the subject but are as it were remote parts of it; so things are in the proposed case: no formal degree belongs to the species as a part *per se* and essential to the species (because the species can be understood without any degree), but it does very well pertain to the species as being contained under the species.

[*N.B. A large blank space was left here by Scotus, both for a further question within distinction 17 and for distinction 18, but neither the further question nor the further distinction are contained in the text of the Ordinatio. They have to be supplied from the Reportatio or the Additiones Magnae.*]

[Eighteenth Distinction

About Gift and Holy Spirit as Gift
Lacking in the *Ordinatio*]

Nineteenth Distinction

Question One

Whether the Divine Persons are Equal in Magnitude

1. About the nineteenth distinction I ask first whether the persons are equal in magnitude.

That they are not:

Because in the *Categories* 6.6a26-27 is said that “it is proper to quantity that according to it a thing is said to be equal or unequal;” but quantity is not in God, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.1 n.2, “God is great without quantity, good without quality;” therefore etc.

2. Again, nothing is to be posited in God which asserts imperfection. Equality is of this sort, – the proof is that it is repugnant to perfection in creatures; the thing is plain from Augustine 83 *Questions* q.41: “If all things were equal,” he says, “they would not now be ‘all things’;” therefore the perfection of the universe could not stand along with equality; equality, therefore, is not in everything better than its opposite, therefore it is not a perfection simply [I d.8 nn.22, 185]. Therefore it should not be posited in God as an essential feature or as common to the three persons.

3. Again, perfect equality is mutual; this [sc. equality in God] is not mutual, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “An image, if it is perfect, is coequal with what it is the image of, but not the latter with the image.”

4. The opposite is found in the Creed of Athanasius: “The persons are coeternal with each other and coequal,” – and the Master in the text gives a special proof of this from Augustine [rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

I. To the Question

5. Here one must look first at equality properly taken, second at equality taken generally, and third at how there is equality in the proposed case [sc. the divine persons], and fourth one must show that in this way [sc. of taking equality] there is perfect equality in the divine persons.

A. About Equality Taken Properly

6. On the first point the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-12 ‘On Relation’, distinguishes three relations founded on unity or ‘one’, namely the same, the like, and the equal – and speaking of these strictly and properly he appropriates them to three categories, as identity to substance, equality to quantity, and likeness to quality. And thus perhaps other relations can be founded on the principles of other categories, as proportionality on relation, – and this is what Avicenna seems to say [*Metaphysics* III ch.10 83rb], at least about the three common relations that the Philosopher expressly posits.

7. However, I say that the remote foundation of these relations is the thing in the category, as that the foundation of equality is the thing in the category of quantity, and of likeness the thing in the category of quality, and of identity the thing in the category of substance; but the proximate foundation or the proximate idea of the foundation is the unity of such thing, because disparate and not common relations are founded on things in categories in the way those things are diverse.

B. On Equality Taken Generally

8. On the second point [n.5] I say that any being in itself is a ‘what’, and has in itself some determinate degree among beings, and is a form or has a form; and

accordingly, just as any being can be considered in these three ways, so also there can be founded on it a triple relation taken commonly; because identity [and diversity] are founded on any being insofar as it is a ‘what’, equality and inequality are founded on any being insofar as it has some magnitude of perfection (which is called ‘quantity of virtue’, about which Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VI ch.8 n.9 that “in things that are not great in bulk, to be better is the same as to be greater”), while likeness and unlikeness can be founded on any being insofar as it is ‘of a certain sort’ and is a certain quality (about this mode of quality the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 5.14.1020a33 ‘On Quality’, that “one mode of quality is difference in substance,” that is, substantial difference, and in this way individuals of the same species are essentially alike insofar as they have the same specific difference, which is as it were their essential quality).

9. In this way, namely taking the common relations and not the relations in the strict sense, the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 10.3.1054b25 that “any being compared with any being is the same or diverse;” so too any being compared with any being is equal or unequal. Just as then the foundation of identity, equality, and likeness – taken in this common way – is being in general compared with any being in general, so also the relations are transcendental along with being (though not convertible with it), but they are disjuncts and divide being, as being is divided into necessary and possible.

C. How there is Equality in the Proposed Case

10. On the third point [n.5] I say that just as no genus nor anything of any genus is said formally of God, so neither is a property of any genus so said of him, and consequently not any of the common relations either, in the way they are taken strictly, namely as they are properties of determinate genera or categories [n.6]; but because being is said formally of God, and any property convertible with being, and so always also the nobler extreme of non-convertible – but disjunct – properties, therefore in this way will that extreme be said of God that either asserts nobility or is not repugnant to nobility, while the other extreme is repugnant.

D. About Equality in the Divine Persons

11. On the fourth point [n.5] (setting aside for the present identity and likeness, which are not now in question [I d.31 q. un]), I say about equality that it exists perfectly in the divine persons.

12. And although equality in the case of some created beings can be taken according to quantity, whether continuous or discrete, and according to permanent and successive continuity, and although on this basis one could ask ‘whether there is in the divine persons equality in number’ (if perfect number were to exist there) and ‘whether there is perfect equality there in duration and according to eternity’ (which corresponds to successive quantity in creatures) – the first [sc. discrete quantity, or number], however, does not pertain to the present Distinction but to Distinction 24 (nor does the Master touch on anything about this here in the present Distinction, because he does not posit number here positively in the way perhaps it will be touched on in Distinction 24); but the Master does in a way touch on the second [sc. duration] (and he adduces Augustine [or rather Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* [n.4], and the thing was proved in Distinction

9 nn.6-11). The question is about the third [sc. continuous quantity], namely about equality in magnitude.

13. And that the equality is perfect is proved both from the remote foundation, namely magnitude, – and from the proximate idea of the foundation, namely unity [n.7].

The first proof is plain from the fact that magnitude of virtue is not perfect unless it is infinite; because infinity is not repugnant to it [sc. to magnitude of virtue], and nothing ‘which infinity is not repugnant to’ is perfect unless it is infinite; but every other magnitude of virtue is finite, and only it is infinite, as was made plain in I d.2 nn.131-136.

14. As to the second proof [n.13], the proposed conclusion is proved from the fact that in all other natural equalities the unity of the magnitude, in respect of which they are said to be equal, is diminished – because the magnitude in those equal things is separately counted; here however [sc. in the divine persons] there is perfect unity of magnitude and yet, along with it, a sufficient distinction between the related persons as is required for real relation.

15. But there is here a doubt because, since magnitude passes over into the essence, a relation founded on magnitude does not seem to be different from a relation founded on essence the way essence is a ‘what’, and so the equality does not seem to differ from the identity, – or if equality could be attended to in things that seem to be quasi-properties of the essence [sc. the attributes: power, wisdom, goodness etc.], this is not attended to in them save insofar as they have magnitude of virtue; but this magnitude is not an attribute different from such perfection as asserts a mode intrinsic to the attribute (as was said often above [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221; d.10 n.30; d.13 nn.72, 80]); therefore if likeness ‘in accord with such a property’ [sc. one or other attribute] is equality in the magnitude of the property, equality would not differ from likeness in the property – and thus it seems that equality insofar as it is equality should not here [sc. in the divine persons] be posited, because it exists neither as distinct from identity, speaking of the equality of essence, nor as distinct from likeness, speaking of the equality that is in magnitude of attributal perfections.

16. There is also another doubt because, if there can be infinite attributal perfections, infinite equalities of divine persons should be posited; for each perfection has its magnitude as a mode intrinsic to itself in accord with its own proper nature; therefore there will be as many magnitudes and equalities as there are attributal perfections.^a

a. [Interpolation] And further, since magnitude in divine reality is of itself of one idea, the consequence is that something of one idea in divine reality is not itself a this, and then the reason is not valid that was given above [Reportatio IA d.19 n.28] as to why there cannot be several supposits of the same idea in divine reality, namely that each of them is of itself a this and each production is of itself a this; but the opposite hereof seems to be true in the case of magnitude and equality in divine reality.

17. In response to these doubts.^a To the first I reply – see the response etc. [I d.31 q. un. nn.6-7].

a. [Interpolation] [I reply] that magnitude in divine reality does not state an attribute distinct from the others (as was said above about infinity [see reference in n.15 above]) but a degree that is intrinsic to any one of them, because there is no attribute in divine reality so simple that one may not ask about the quantity of its virtue; for if there were only one attribute in divine reality, as wisdom for example, it would still be possible to ask, as to its degree of virtue, how great it was;

hence if each [sc. perfection simply, such as wisdom] existed without any other, each would still have a certain degree in its quantity of virtue, and each would be infinite and would have a magnitude formally infinite. And therefore magnitude is not in divine reality a single foundation merely of equality but is a single indifferent foundation, because it is preserved and included in every perfection simply, each of which perfections can be the foundation of equality, because each has its own magnitude; hence if in divine reality there are infinite ‘perfections simply’ there will also be infinite magnitudes, and likewise infinite equalities corresponding to them. But on the essence as it is a quiddity there is founded identity, – and as it asserts an infinite magnitude for the quantity of virtue, there is founded on it an equality between the persons that possess that essence. – But is equality distinguished in divine reality from likeness and identity? I reply that it both is so and is not so. For equality is not distinguished from likeness and identity as much as likeness and identity are distinguished from each other, because neither is its foundation (i.e. magnitude) distinguished from their foundations as much as their foundations are distinguished from each other, because magnitude – on which equality is founded – only asserts a mode or degree intrinsic to the foundations of identity and likeness, and is not distinguished from them formally as a ‘what’ or a ‘some sort of’ in the way they are distinguished from each other. Hence equality does not seem to assert in divine reality a different relation simply from likeness and identity, but it asserts only a perfect mode of each relation; a clarification can be given of the point: for if there are two white things one of which is whiter than the other, they are indeed alike although not equal – but they are not perfectly alike unless they be equal in whiteness, such that equality does not assert quasi-simply a relation other than their likeness, but asserts a perfection of likeness in each of the extremes and one that is in accord with a perfect mode of existence of the foundation in respect of which there is a likeness in each. So, if in the Father – according to the error of Arius – there were a greater deity and in the Son a lesser deity, the Son would indeed be like the Father; but he would not be equal with the Father because he would not have the form of deity as perfectly as the Father has it. Positing however – as we from the Faith posit – that nothing is less there in deity than anything else, the Son is perfectly alike, because they [sc. Father and Son] are altogether and perfectly equal in foundation of likeness. Hence, just as magnitude only states a perfect mode intrinsic to any essential perfection in divine reality, as with the essential perfections that are the foundations of identity and likeness, so equality states a perfect mode of these foundations and thus it does not state simply a relation different from them.

To the second doubt [see the interpolation to n.16] one can reply in two ways. In one way as follows, that nothing of one idea can be multiplied unless it first require several things of another idea, through whose plurality the things of one idea are determined to their own plurality; but this does not hold of the divine persons, as is plain in the same place [*Rep.* IA d.19 n.29]; but in the proposed case equality requires a distinction of persons and of perfections simply, each of which has its own magnitude and all of them are distinct formally and in idea (the point is plain about justice and wisdom, which are of a different idea). One can say in another way, and equally well, that although unity goes along with the foundation of equality, yet it is not so remote a foundation of equality that by its diversity the equality is not multiplied, – which fact is plain in the relation of likeness: for just as knowledge is distinguished from charity, so is the likeness which is founded on unity in knowledge distinguished [sc. from the likeness which is founded on unity in charity]. But nevertheless one must say, as to the proposed case, that those equalities, founded on the magnitudes of diverse perfections, are not of the same idea formally, but of different ideas; and therefore, just as magnitude in wisdom is of a different idea from magnitude in goodness and the unity different from the unity, so the equality is of a different idea in the one case and in the other – and then one does not have to concede that something of the same idea is multiplied in divine reality.

II. To the Principal Arguments

18. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that there is not there [sc. in divine reality] a quantity of bulk but of virtue; and if the name of quantity is made proper to magnitude of bulk (but if magnitude is not made proper to magnitude of bulk), then one

could concede that there is magnitude there without quantity; and this magnitude is truly the foundation of transcendent equality, because every being is in this way great or small, and equal or unequal, although the magnitude is not a foundation of equality as equality is a property of quantity, which is a category.

19. But against this an argument is made that it does not seem anything can be said of God unless what belongs to the understanding of that thing is said of him; therefore, since quantity belongs to the understanding of magnitude, then magnitude cannot be conceded of God and quantity denied of him.

20. Again, when asking how great God is, one may well reply that he is immense; but if there is no quantity in God, no such question would arise.

21. Again, a property common to every being does not belong to any being by a specific difference; equality is a property common to every kind of quantity; therefore it does not belong to anything by any specific difference in the category of quantity, – and thus one cannot posit in God any difference in the category of quantity by saying that the category of quantity is not there but that there is there, by a difference in quantity, the idea of equality.

22. To the first [n.19] I reply that magnitude is equivocal according as it is a species of quantity distinct from multitude (*Metaphysics* 5.13.1020a7-10) and according as it is opposed to smallness and as its concrete form – that is, ‘great’ – is opposed to small (this distinction is sufficiently got from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 10.6.1056b3-14 in the likeness ‘about long and short, great and small, many and one’). In the first sense magnitude is not applied to God, nor its difference as something belonging to him, as is plain from I d.8 nn.124, 136, because then the genus included in it would be applied to him; nor is magnitude in the second sense applied to him, in the way ‘great’ is taken properly and states a property of quantity, because a property proper to a thing does not exist without its proper subject. But magnitude taken in another sense is a property of being, and it is distinct from small, and in this way one or other extreme exists in every being; this is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 5.13 1020a23-26, in the chapter on quantity: “But great and small, greater and smaller, are said absolutely and in relation to another; absolutely indeed they are properties of quantity; these names are also applied to other things” (as if he were to say: ‘properly taken’ they state properties of quantity, ‘commonly taken’ they state common properties of being).

23. As to the other [n.20] – how great God is – a rational question should be denied if quantity is denied of God; but if a rational question is conceded then a quantity of virtue should be conceded in God, not a quantity of bulk.

24. The third argument [n.21] only concludes that equality as it is a property in the category of quantity does not belong to God by any difference in the category of quantity, and that it is not applied to divine reality; and I concede that no difference in the category of quantity belongs to God; nor does any property in that genus belong to him, but a transcendent property does so belong.

25. To the next [sc. principal argument, n.2] I say that perfection simply, that is, a perfection that could formally be infinite, only asserts that in divine reality which can be essential to it and self-referred (and such is what is in some way pre-understood in the relations of origin), of which sort are wisdom and goodness etc. But equality is not pre-understood in the relations of origin, nor can it be self-referred; for the Father is not equal to himself but to the Son, and therefore equality in this way does not state a perfection

simply; yet it does state a perfection which, in the case of every nature – when comparing it to something of the same nature –, is better than its opposite, because its opposite of necessity states imperfection; for no inequality in the same nature exists unless a second individual has the nature imperfectly. From the fact, then, that a relation can exist between supposita in that nature, an inequality of imperfection might exist in them because it might posit a diminished perfection in one of them; but equality of imperfection does not exist there, nay rather equality first requires perfection simply, because it first requires a nature that is perfect and that exists perfectly in each of the terms of the relation. And this is what Augustine says in his book *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15 when he speaks to the disciple: “Equality,” he says, “you rightly put before inequality, nor do I reckon there is anyone endowed with human sense to whom this would not be apparent.” This is indeed true, when making comparisons with things in the same nature; and things with which equality is compossible are simply more able to be perfect than things with which equality is not compossible, because in the latter case one or other of them is imperfect.

26. Next, as to the proof about perfection in creatures [n.2], – I reply that some things are necessary for perfection in creatures that do not state a perfection simply; and this is because creatures – being of themselves imperfect – cannot without these things have perfect perfection (as much perfection as they can have and of the sort they can have), and therefore these things in some way make up for the imperfection of creatures, as was said above in I d.7 n.64 where it was denied that the specific difference of anything was a perfection simply. Thus I say that limited perfection cannot be as great in one limited nature as it can be in several natures that are ordered; and so there an order of nature, that is an order of unequal perfection, is necessary for the greatest perfection they are capable of, – but it is not simply necessary for the greatest perfection, because that can exist in the most perfect unlimited nature, without an order of imperfection.

27. And if you argue that order belongs to perfection and that order seems to require inequality, – I make reply: I say that an order of origin stands along with perfection but that an order of inequality does not stand along with perfection. Therefore not every order belongs to perfection, but some order stands along with perfection in the same nature and some order does not.

28. To the third [principal argument, n.3] I say that sometimes equivalent opposite relations are founded on a common relation, just as if one were to speak of ‘the assimilating and the assimilated’. These state a relation of the active to the passive, founded on this common relation of ‘likeness’; for the assimilating is what causes likeness as the whiten-ing is what causes whiteness, and the assimilated is what is caused as to likeness just as the whitened is what is caused as to whiteness. There is here, then, a relation of active to passive in the assimilating and the assimilated, just as in the whiten-ing and the whitened; but, in the case of the whiten-ing, that on which the relation of the active is founded is something absolute, but here – namely in the case of the assimilating – that on which the relation of the active is founded is the relation of equivalence. And such a name imports two relations of the following sort: one common and one of non-equivalence. As to the common relation, it exists in mutuality with the correlative of the relation; but it does not exist in mutuality with the correlative according to a relation of non-equivalence. – So also here, to be made co-equal imports the relation of the co-equalled with the co-equaling, and so the equality is mutual; for the Son, who is made co-

equal with the Father, is equal with the Father and conversely. But the other relation, by way of what is passive, namely ‘to receive equality from another’, is not mutual but belongs precisely to the Son, and the opposite relation of non-equivalence – namely to make co-equal – belongs to the Father, that is ‘to give equality to the Son’. The image then [i.e. the Son] is equal, and conversely, but only the image is made co-equal in the sense of the two aforesaid relations.

Question Two

Whether each Person is in the other Person

29. Second I ask about the circumincession of the divine persons, whether each person is in the other.

And argument to the negative is:

That if anything whatever were in anything whatever (according to the position adopted by Anaxagoras) there would be the greatest confusion; therefore if the divine persons were in each other they would be in confusion – against this is the remark of Athanasius [*Athanasian Creed*] “not confusing the persons.”

30. There is also a confirmation of the argument, because an indivisible is not distinguished from an indivisible unless it is outside it, – which is proved by the Philosopher *Physics* 6.1.231b3-4 through the fact they would be one indivisible; therefore since the divine persons are indivisible, they would, if they were together, not be distinct.

31. Further, if any distinction stand along with the ‘being of person in person’, then composition would stand along with it also. Proof of the consequence: if there were something in deity that were not deity itself, then deity would be composite or compositional, – which is plain from Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1 (and it is put by Lombard in *Sent.* I d.8 ch.8 n.89): “Therefore God is simple because he is what he has, excepting that person is said relatively to another person and is not that person;” therefore if the person has something in itself which is not itself, it is composite or compositional, which is false and was refuted before [I d.2 nn.376-410, d.8 n.209].

32. Again, in the same thing in which there is the Son there is also filiation; in the Father there is the Son (on the supposition of circumincession); therefore in the Father there is filiation. And further, what there is filiation in that is the Son; therefore the Father is the Son.

33. Further, if the Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, then the Father is in himself. The proof of the consequence is from the Philosopher *Physics* 4.2.209a33-35: “If air is in fire and fire is in the heaven, then air is in the heaven;” therefore by similarity here too. There is also a confirmation from the Philosopher’s remark in *Categories* 3.1b10-12: “whatever follows on the predicate follows on the subject,” and by the maxims [from Walter Burleigh and Nicholas Ambianensis] “whatever follows on the consequent follows on the antecedent” and “whatever antecedes the antecedent antecedes the consequent” and “what is prior to what is prior is prior to what is posterior” and “what is cause of the cause is cause of the caused” and the like.

34. Again, if the Father is in the Son, then God is in God; and then, further, God is distinct from God.

35. Again, what comes from something is not in that thing; but the Son came from the Father (as is said in *John* 16 v.28: “I came from the Father”); therefore etc.

36. To the opposite:

John 14 vv.10-11: “I am in the Father and the Father is in me,” – and the Master adduces authorities in the text, namely from Augustine and Ambrose and Hilary.

I. To the Question

37. The truth of this question [sc. circumincession, that one person is in another and conversely] is plain and certain from the authority of the Savior in *John* and in many places elsewhere, as well as of expositions of the saints [n.36]. But so that it can be in some way made intelligible, three things need to be seen: first about the mode in which person is in person, second what is the reason for this being in, and third whether this mode of being ‘in’ can be reduced to some mode of being ‘in’ found in creatures when speaking of the modes that the Philosopher lays down in *Physics* 4.3.210a14-24, or whether it could be made clear by some mode that could be found in creatures.

A. About the Mode in which a Person is in a Person

1. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

38. [Exposition of the Opinion] – About the first point [n.37] the statement [sc. of Henry] is of the following sort, that something’s being in another can be understood in two ways: by being in it ‘first’, that is, totally – the way wine is in a jug; or by being in it partially, and this in two ways: either such that a part is in another and is not anything of the other, as the foot of the bird is in the trap and is not anything of the trap (and for this reason the whole bird is said to be in the trap), or that a part of it is in another and is something of that other (and for this reason that of which it is a part is said to be in that other).^a

a. [Interpolation] just as if some monster, possessing two bodies and two heads, had only two feet, then one [body and head] would be said to be in the other [body and head] by that other’s foot, because the foot is a part of the other.

39. As to the proposition then [n.37], the statement [of Henry] is that the Father is not in the Son in the first way.

40. The proof given is threefold:

First, because everything whatever of that which is in another in the first way is equally first in it – just as if earth is first in the center, then any part whatever of earth, as far as concerns itself, is equally first in the center; therefore if the Father is first in the Son, everything whatever of the Father will be first in the Son, and so paternity will be as equally first in the Son as deity. And from this further: just as by deity the Son is God, so by paternity he will be Father, which is false

41. Second, because that in which something is first seems to surround it and penetrate and contain it; but that the same thing with respect to the same thing contains and is contained, surrounds and is surrounded, is unintelligible; therefore etc.

42. Therefore it is necessary that, just as in creatures something is said to be in another as a part and not first, so one person may be said to be in another as to something of itself; but not as to something of itself that is nothing of that in which it is, because that would be the personal relation of the in-being person, and that relation is not the reason whereby a person is in a person (as will be plain in the second article [nn.58-62], wherein I agree with Henry); therefore it is the essence which is in such way something of the in-being person that it is something of that in which it is.

43. And the proof that it is by reason of this essence of the Son, which exists in the Father, that the Son is in the Father is that wherever the foundation of any relation is, there the relation founded on it is; therefore wherever the essence is on which filiation is founded, there filiation is.

44. A distinction, however, is made as to the person 'which is in another' and the person 'which another is in', because although the person 'which is in another' is placed in another not first but by something of itself, that is, by its essence [n.42], yet the person which it is in is what the other is in first, that is itself totally, because it is itself totally disposed in some way as the reason of that which is surrounding and containing deity, which, although it is not part of the in-being person, is yet something of the person.

45. [Rejection of the Opinion] – Against this opinion.

First: to be 'in', as everyone thinks, does not state something self-referred, because then the Father would be in himself; therefore it states the relation of a person to a person. Not the relation of origin, because that does not have the same idea in the extreme terms (while the persons are in each other uniformly, according to them [n.60]); therefore it states a common relation [n.6]. But a common relation in accord with the same idea of foundation is in the supposit that is referred and in the supposit that it is referred to, just as likeness requires the same idea of whiteness in the like thing that is referred and in the like thing it is referred to; therefore if that to which the in-being person is referred is first such as what that person is in itself, the consequence is that the in-being person will be related by this relation first through itself and not through something precisely of itself.^a

a. [Interpolation] this is plain in the example about a rivalry between *a* and *b*.

46. Secondly as follows: when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it 'first'. An example: if a man is on the earth by his foot, just as the foot is located on the earth so the man is by a part located on the earth – but it is not the case that if the foot is there as by location, the man will be there as form in matter; so too if whiteness is in a man by a part, because it is in his face, then in the same way of being 'in' as to the category in which it is in the face first – to wit, as an accident in a subject – in that same way, I say, it is in the man by a part, because it is in him as in a subject. Therefore if the Son is in the Father because of the essence that is formally in the Father, the consequence is that the Son is in the Father formally as it were (although according to something of himself), which is not to be 'in' by way of circumincersion [sc. one person being in another and conversely].

47. The response is made that the major premise [sc. when something is said to be in another by a part, it is in it by a part in the same way as the part is in it 'first'] is true when speaking of that which is the proximate reason of something's being 'in', but is not true of the remote reason; but the essence, as it is formally in the Father, is not the

proximate reason of the Son's being in the Father but the remote reason – the proximate reason, however, is that he falls under the property of the in-being person.

48. On the contrary. This response includes the proposed conclusion, because that is said to agree with the whole 'first' which does not agree with it according to any part of itself but according to what comes from all the parts of itself, in the case of creatures; therefore things are such here that, since – according to them [sc. Henry and his followers] – there is in the person only relation and essence, whatever belongs to a person not precisely by reason of one of these, but by reason of the essence together at the same time with the relation (and conversely), belongs to it first, because this states the person in its totality.

49. Further [i.e. thirdly], the property of a person, since it is incommunicable, does not belong formally to the essence (as: the essence does not beget nor is begotten, nor is it distinct or referred), and not the converse either (the property that belongs to the essence as it is communicable does not belong to the person, because this property is proper to the essence as essence is distinguished from person [I d.2 nn.389-390]), because essence is single in the three persons, but person in no way – neither first nor according to something of itself – is single in the three; therefore since this way of being 'in', by which the essence is in the Father as a quasi form (to wit, as that by which the Father is God), belongs in no way to the person, because it is proper to essence as essence is distinguished from person, therefore in no way will the Father be said by this to be in the Son, just as neither from the fact that 'the Father is essence' will the Father be the same as the Son.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

50. As to this article [n.37] I say as follows, that a predicate belongs to the whole 'first' as 'first' is distinguished from that which is according to a part (as is said in *Physics* 5.1.224a21-34), because it does not belong to it precisely for the reason that it belongs to a part of it.²⁹³ And contrariwise, nothing is said to belong to any whole because of a part save what belongs to a part and is, through that part, said of the whole – as is plain from the Philosopher in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] in his example: "The man is healthy because his thorax is healthy;" the 'to be healthy' is said formally and first of the thorax, and by this it is said of the whole, of which whole the thorax is part.

51. A predicate that inheres first in some whole is sometimes in no part of that whole, and sometimes it is in some part of it.

52. An example of the first case: triangle is what first has angles equal to two right angles, and yet no part of the triangle (speaking of integral parts) has this predicate, namely 'to have three angles equal etc.'; likewise man is what first is capable of laughter, and yet this property is not first in any part of man; and the composite is what is first generated, although no part of it [sc. form or matter] is first generated, speaking of this way 'of that which is generated'; and so universally in all heterogeneous substances and their properties. And the reason is as follows, that the nature of such a subject is adequate to such a predicate, which adequacy is indicated by such primacy (as is plain from the definition of 'universal' in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73b32-33), and the nature of that

²⁹³ Vatican editors: for example, 'capable of laughter' belongs first to man not because it belongs to a part of him, because it does not belong first either to his soul or his body [n.52].

adequate whole is not saved in any one part, and so its property does not belong to any one part of it.

53. An example of the second case [n.51] is: if fire is what is first hot, any part of fire whatever is hot. So too does the Philosopher in *Physics* 7.1.241b32-242a15 argue that no body can be moved by itself first, because then it would rest on the resting of a part; for it would not be first moved unless motion were in every part of it; for if motion were not in some part of it, motion would not be in the whole 'first'. And so it is universally in homogeneous substances and their properties, because the nature to which first – that is, adequately – such property belongs is of the same nature in the part as in the whole; therefore a predicate adequate to such a nature is in every part in which that nature is, and in this way it belongs to a part.

It is not therefore because of the idea of primacy that a predicate – which belongs to the whole – must belong to the part, nay never should it for this reason belong to the part, but rather when the nature of the whole is the same in such whole and in its part.

54. As to the intended proposition [n.37] I say that this way of being 'in' [sc. circumincession] is not in the way that nature is in a supposit or form is in matter, but as a subsistent is in a subsistent, according to Hilary *On the Trinity* ch.7 n.41 when he speaks as follows: "The being-in is not as one thing is in another, the way body is in body, but it is to be the way that to subsist is in the subsistent, but to be in it such that it itself also subsist." Now to subsist, that is, 'to exist *per se* incommunicably', belongs first to the person (for it is not said of the person because it is said of the essence or the relation), just as also 'to act' in the case of creatures, or 'to be produced', belongs first to the supposit of the whole (that is, does not belong to it because it belongs to a part). Therefore also 'to be subsistently in' belongs first to the person; for although the nature is first in the Father, as nature in a supposit, this however is not the subsistence or the in-being of a subsistent in a subsistent, but is precisely the in-being by which the whole Son by presence and intimately is in the whole Father; and to this alludes the remark of Ambrose in his hymn [*Splendor of the Father's Glory*]: "The whole Son in the Father, and the whole Father in the Word."

3. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Henry

55. And next to the arguments for the aforesaid opinion against this [n.51].

To the first [n.40] I say that the major premise is false in two ways:

First, because there is no need for the predicate that agrees 'first' with the whole to agree with any part (as is plain enough from the clarifications [nn.52, 54]), because its primacy is that of adequacy.

Second, because if it do agree with any part, or agree with the whole by reason of any part [n.50], it need not agree with a second part by reason of any part,^a especially when the parts are not of the same idea in being integral to the whole [n.52]. It is just as if man is first rational because his specific difference (as 'rational') is said first of the species, and also man has first that act which agrees with rational animal insofar as it is rational, namely the act or understanding or reasoning; and yet this predicate [sc. rational] does not agree equally with each part of man, namely with soul and body; for perhaps it can be said formally of the soul and in no way of the body, but it is not said of man because it is said of his soul, because then it would agree with man as to a part, just as 'to

be tall' agrees with man as to a part, because it agrees with him as to the body. Also if 'to understand' were to agree with each part in such a way that it could be said of the part, nevertheless each part is not equally disposed to that predicate as regard the inherence of the predicate in the 'whole'; for the body is not the reason for the inherence of this sort of predicate in the way the soul is, and this because the parts – namely body and soul – are not parts possessed of the same idea in being integral to the whole, but one part is matter and the other form; for matter is not the reason for the operating of the whole, which is what operates first, in the way the form is.

a. [*Interpolation*] and so it need not be the case that it agree equally with the parts because it is first present in the whole, because the parts in a whole are not equally cause of the property as it exists.

56. So it is then in the intended proposition [n.54, 37]: one should not concede that because 'the Father is first in the Son' therefore deity or paternity is in the Son in the same way of being 'in' [sc. the way of being 'first' in]; but if one do concede it, one should yet not concede it equally, because they [sc. deity and paternity] are not of the same idea in the person that includes them. And further, when it is argued 'if they were equally in the Father, then if one of them were in him formally, the other would be too' [n.40], – the argument is not valid, but there is a fallacy of equivocation, because when the 'to be in the Father' is taken in the antecedent it is taken as being in a subsistent by way of presence, while in the consequent a different mode of being 'in' is inferred [sc. the mode by way of informing], which mode is not formally this mode [sc. the mode by way of presence], although it is presupposed to this mode of being 'in'; hence from a mode of being 'in' by way of presence a mode is concluded to that is 'in' by way of informing [sc. which is the fallacy of equivocation].

57. To the second [n.41] I say that it is not only contrary to the part about being 'in' first, but also contrary to the principal conclusion [sc. about being 'in' simply and not first]; for it seems in creatures as impossible that the same thing should with respect to the same thing contain and be contained, or should contain by reason of the whole and be contained by reason of a part, as that the same thing should first contain and be contained. And therefore I reply to the argument and say that this mode of being 'in' [sc. circumincession] does not state containment but the presence of the subsistent in the subsistent, and it has the same idea in both of them, because just as this subsistent is present to that one so that one is present to this one.

B. What the Idea is of the Being in of the Divine Persons

58. As to the second article [n.37] I say that the reason for this being in is neither the essence nor the relation alone [n.42].

59. My proof of the first point [n.58] is that then the Father would be in himself, which is false in the way in which the Savior understands the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father [n.36], because this way of being in requires a real distinction.

60. My proof of the second point [n.58] is:

First that the relations of origin do not have the same idea in the related persons, and so if these were the formal reasons for the being 'in' of the persons in each other the

persons would not be in each other uniformly, – which is contrary to what was before said [nn.54, 57].

Second that if *per impossibile* this God were to produce another God, this God would not be in that God, because – according to John Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.5 – if there were two Gods they could not be together at the same time, and so neither would be immense, and so neither would be God; and yet there would be a true relation of the producer to the produced.

Next, third, that if *per impossibile* there were two persons without origin, but if they had the same essence along with a real distinction, they would be in each other, because the essence of one person could not be in the other if the relation itself (which is altogether the same as the essence) were not in it, although in another way of being ‘in’, because what the foundation is in the relation is also in, even though one person would not be from the other in origin; therefore the relative property is not ‘in’ the cause.

Then, fourth, that in creatures there are truly relations of origin, of the thing that is a principle and of the thing that has a principle, and yet there – because of the diversity of nature in the things related – neither is in the other.

61. And from these arguments it follows that, since there is in the persons only essence and relation, according to the common opinion [e.g. of Henry of Ghent and Thomas Aquinas], therefore both of them will be the total reason for the being in [n.42].

62. And to understand how this is so, one can take an example about likeness in creatures: for according to Hilary ([*On the Trinity* III n.23] and it is set down in Lombard, *Sent.* d.31 ch.1 n.266), nothing is like itself but like another; yet likeness is founded on unity in quality, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a11-12, the chapter ‘On Relation’; so neither the mere diversity of the related things, nor the mere unity of the foundation, suffices for likeness, but both are required *per se* as one total cause. – So it is here: neither the distinction between the person who is in another and the person in whom the other is, nor the unity of the essence by which they are in each other, is the whole reason for the being in, but both together are. Yet just as unity of foundation in the case of likeness is the more principal, and likewise the more immediate, reason than the distinction between the related things, so here unity of essence can be posited to be the more immediate and more principal reason for this being in than the distinction of the persons.

C. There is no Like Example in Creatures for the Being in of the Divine Persons

63. As to the third article [n.37] I say that this mode of being ‘in’ [sc. circumincession] is not any of the modes that the Philosopher sets down in the *Physics*, – formally, I mean, because all those modes are based on the fact that the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa, or on the fact that something of the contained thing is something of the containing thing and not vice versa; neither of these accounts or ideas holds in the proposed case [sc. of circumincession], because diversity is there a greater reason for being ‘in’ than unity is. Therefore did Hilary well say, *On the Trinity* III n.1 (and it is set down in the text, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.4 n.172): “The nature of human intelligence cannot grasp the idea of this statement [sc. “I am in the Father and the Father is in me”], nor will human comparison provide any example for divine things.”

64. However, by taking what belongs to perfection in the case of creatures and by removing what belongs to imperfection, one can set down some examples of this mode of being 'in', at least imperfect ones and ones that imperfectly represent the mode:

First indeed from the flowing in of the divine essence in respect of creatures, which flowing in has the simultaneous concurrence of the divine nature's immensity and its sustaining of things. Let then the idea of sustaining be removed from the flowing in, such that the idea of presence, because of the immensity, is preserved but without the idea of conservation or of the active power that pertains to sustaining; once this is removed then, just as God – because he is immense – is present to every creature, so too then is his presence to something understood without the fact of his sustaining it; and then, if a single nature is posited for that which is present and for that which it is present to, because of which single nature it must be present, then there will be an example for the proposed case about this way of being 'in'.

65. Another example is from the soul not informing the body though being present to the body (as in the moment of death); or from an angel being present to a body but not informing it; or from a glorious body present to a non-glorious body, – or a better example, if a glorious body could exist in another glorious body that was equally subtle. In all these cases the being 'in' is that of a thing subsistent and present, but not by informing or by way of part; and if in these cases there is added unity of nature, which by necessity of nature requires such presence, there will be a more perfectly similar example.

66. There is also another example from the powers of the soul, which if they are posited as differing on the part of real existence and yet, along with this, as being really the same as the essence of the soul, then of necessity one will be in the other, because the essence of the soul, with which the power is identical, is in the other; therefore things in some way distinct will be really indistinct. If each of these distinct things were *per se* existent, a distinct subsistent will be in a subsistent by presence to it, and will be an example of being 'in'.

67. On behalf of all these examples – and to make clear the two preceding articles [nn.61-63] – one can add that in this way of being 'in' each extreme is in the other according to the same idea of being 'in', because here what is being noted is mutual presence, not the containing of one extreme by the other. Just as when a body is understood to be in a place, this is in the way that a contained thing is in the containing thing; but if two bodies be understood to be in each other in the same place, this is according to the same idea or account, because the bodies are together and togetherness states the common relation of a single idea in both extremes; and if *per impossibile* place be removed and a simultaneous presence of bodies be posited, there will be the relation of a single account in the extremes, and each extreme will be in the other without one of them being contained by the other or both being contained by a third.

II. To the Principal Arguments

68. To the principal arguments [nn.29-35].

To the first [n.29] I say that there would be confusion if anything whatever were in another according to the opinion of Anaxagoras, because thus anything whatever would be in another thing as a part of it, the way the Philosopher seems to impute the

opinion to him; but a person is not in a person as something of it; and so the conclusion does not follow.

69. When the reason is confirmed by the remark in the *Physics* 1.4.187b4-7 ‘about indivisibles’ [n.30], I reply that either it is false that ‘indivisibles of quantity are not distinct unless they differ by position’ (about which elsewhere, II d.2 p.2 q.5 nn.9-13), or, if it is true, it is not to the purpose, because the account that would hold in that case is not found in the divine persons, to whom position does not belong.

70. To the second [n.31] I say that deity is common to everything subsisting in the divine nature, and is a something of that which subsists in that nature, and therefore it could not really be distinct from another unless it were in some way compoundable with it, because that there be several things in some subsistent is not intelligible unless one of them is compoundable with the other; but the person is not a something of each thing that subsists in that nature, and therefore, although person is in person, yet there is no necessity that this person be that person or that it be compoundable with it in the way one has to say this about deity.

71. To the third [n.32] I say that when something abstract is said to be in something, either the virtue of the words denote that it is ‘in’ it the way a form is in the informed thing (as when it is said that ‘color is in the stone’), and they indicate that it is ‘in’ not as a part is in the whole but as a form is in the formed thing, and then the proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ is to be denied, – and in that case the first consequence is not valid; or this denoting is not got from the virtue of the words but from use (as we say ‘heat is in light’ not in the way of being in a subject), and in that case one can concede this proposition ‘filiation is in the Father’ by taking the being ‘in’ for intimate in-being, as has already been said [n.54]. Nor does the further conclusion follow that ‘therefore the Father is the Son’ [n.32], but there is a fallacy of equivocation, by making an inference in the antecedent as if the ‘in’ there were taken after the manner of a form.

72. To the fourth [n.33] I say that that way of arguing holds when this sort of proposition is true (through which proposition the sort of arguing in question holds): ‘whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation’. This proposition is frequently true in the case of relatives where one of the things related is above in position and the other below,²⁹⁴ but it is not universally true. But I am not speaking of this now, because the argument here [sc. the fourth] proceeds of being ‘in’, which – as is assumed in the proposed case – indicates a common relation [n.45].

Therefore as far as the common relations are concerned I say that the proposition is universally false, to wit ‘whatever is like Socrates is like everything that is like Socrates’: for this proposition includes saying that something is like itself, because this falls under the universal quantifier ‘everything that is like’. But for the proposition to be true one must add this specification ‘everything other than himself that is like [Socrates]’; and then by virtue of this specifying proposition the sort of argument in question here holds in the direct sense forward but not in the converse sense backward, – I mean, the inference ‘Socrates is like Plato and Plato is like Socrates, therefore Socrates is like Socrates’ does not hold, for this proposition is false ‘whatever is like Socrates is like

²⁹⁴ Tr. As in the case of the prior and the posterior, where the prior will be prior to whatever the posterior is prior to [n.33 above].

everything that is like Socrates', unless one adds 'everything other than himself that is like Socrates', and then Socrates is not included under the universal quantifier 'everything', nor can the argument be made to go backward to Socrates²⁹⁵ but to go forward. Yet such an addition is still not enough for the truth of the proposition in question, nor for the efficacy of the argument in question, but one must add that the middle term – to which the extremes are compared – is limited as to the sort of idea of comparison in question, because it is not necessary that whatever is together with *a* be together with everything that *a* is together with (everything – I say – other than itself) if the *a* is unlimited, – because then someone existing at Paris would be together with someone existing at Rome, because they are both together with deity, which is immense and unlimited with respect to them. Nor even do all these additions suffice unless one add that the middle term not vary in its comparison with the extremes.

73. As to the proposed case, then, I say that the argument [n.33] is not valid because it argues by converting back and not by going directly forward; and the proposition confirming this sort of way of argument [sc. 'whatever has some relation to something has a like relation to that to which that something has such a relation'] is false. The argument of the Philosopher, however, in the *Physics* [*ibid.*] holds because he only argues by directly going forward and by taking a middle term that is limited and not varied; but his argument is about relatives where one of the related things is above in position and the other below, hence it is not much to the purpose about the being 'in' of the proposed case as this case is talking of a common relation. In order, however, to make a brief remark about the relatives of disparity [sc. where one of the related things is above and the other below in position], I say that such a way of arguing generally fails to hold unless it is on the basis of prior and posterior, which is something pretty much common to all such relatives; for whatever is prior to the prior is prior to the posterior [n.33], – and, to speak more generally, 'whatever has an order toward another has a like order to anything else that that other has a like order to'; this proposition is true in the case of essential order, when no special condition of order is understood (to wit, mediate, immediate, near, remote). Because, therefore, the being 'in' of air in fire states an essential order, and the being 'in' of fire in the heaven states a like order, so that consequence holds [n.33] by directly going forward, and that because it proceeds in accord with a general idea of order and does not specify a mediate or immediate order. Hence the inference '*a* is father of *b*, *b* is father of *c*, therefore *a* is father of *c*' does not follow because 'father' denotes an immediate order to *c* as to a son; but the inference does well follow as it indicates paternity in general, to the extent that 'father' is extended to include grandfather and great-grandfather.

74. To the other argument [n.34] I concede that 'God is in God' and Hilary concedes it *On the Trinity* VII n.32. But when the inference is made 'therefore God is distinct from God' I deny the inference, because there is a fallacy of the consequent; for this preposition 'in' does not mark a power of confusedly embracing the whole of the term whose case it governs (nor does it have this power), and so the term whose case it governs can stand for some determinate supposit indeterminately; but 'to be distinct' distributes the term of this relation [sc. the relation of being distinct] confusedly and

²⁹⁵ Tr. That is, one can argue in the direct sense forward '*a* is like *b*, *b* is like *c*, therefore *a* is like *c*', but one cannot convert back and argue 'therefore *a* is like *a*', for the phrase 'everything other than *a* that is like *a*' blocks this backward move.

distributively, because of the negation it includes, and therefore the term of this relation [of being distinct] is not inferred from the term governed by the proposition ‘in’, – just as, for a like reason, the inference does not follow that ‘God generates God, therefore God is distinct from God’.

75. To the final argument [n.35] I say that the Son’s from the Father is the procession of the produced from the producer, but is not a diversity in nature; such a coming from in no way prevents that which comes-from remaining in that from which it comes, because it receives the same nature as what it proceeds from has.

Twentieth Distinction Single Question

Whether the Three Persons are Equal in Power

1. 1. About the twentieth distinction I ask whether the three persons are equal in power.

I argue for the negative:

Because then, just as the Father can generate, so the Son could generate.

Proof of the consequence:

First because Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.7: “If the Father cannot generate a Son equal to himself he is powerless;” therefore, arguing from the opposite, if he is not powerless but all powerful, he can generate a Son, and consequently ‘being able to generate’ belongs to omnipotence, – and thus if the Son cannot generate he is not equally powerful as, or equal in power with, the Father.

Second because the Son would not be omniscient if he did not know the generation of the Father; he would not then be omnipotent if he were not capable of that generation.

2. Further, Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.25 proves that there cannot be several omni-potents, because then one of them could make the other nulli-potent; therefore it seems one could give a similar argument in the case of the issue at hand, if one posited several divine persons who were equally powerful.

3. And just as this inference of Richard’s was made clear [in I d.2 n.179] in two ways, I make it clear too in rather similar ways of the issue at hand:

First, because one person could by his act of will produce everything possible, and, once they were produced into existence, another person could not produce them; for the same things cannot be twice produced in their totality [I d.2 n.181]. There is also a confirmation for this proof, that the Father has an act of will for creatures before the Son does – before in order of origin –, because the Son, according to Hilary [*On the Trinity* IX n.48], is potent “of himself but not from himself”; therefore the Father is understood to have produced things prior in origin to the Son’s producing them, and so at the moment when the Son is understood as needing to produce nothing is possible for him.

4. Second, because an omnipotent being can by his act of will prevent everything that is possible to some other omnipotent being, if there be some other, because there is no need for their wills to be agreed about things other than themselves, since their will for

all those things is contingent [I d.2 n.180]; so here, it does not seem necessary for the will of one person to agree in the act of willing of another person.

5. But if you say that they have the same will and so they do agree in willing the same things, – on the contrary:

If the form that is the principle of acting is in several things, the principle is for each of them a principle of acting in just the same way as it would be if it were in one of them alone (just as if whiteness were in two surfaces, the two surfaces would have the principle of diffusing sight in the same way as they would have it if it existed in only one of them); but if will were in the Son alone it would be for him a principle of contingently willing the existence of a stone in such a way that the Son could then, by that will, equally will the stone not to exist; therefore, after one has posited this will as existing in the Father, the Son will still have the principle of contingently willing the stone to exist, and thus, whatever one posits in the Father, the Son can equally will the stone to exist or not to exist, – and thus, if the Father wish the stone to exist and the Son do not, one omnipotent makes the other to be nulli-potent, by preventing all the possible things that it has willed.

6. Again, a first cause causes more than a second cause does, according to the author of *On Causes* prop. 1 and according to *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b26-30 and *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.72a29-30; but the Father gives to the Son the virtue of causing and not conversely; therefore the Father is more powerful.

7. On the opposite side is what the Master puts in the text, *Sent.* I d.19 ch.1 n.168 and he adduces Augustine [rather: Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4.

8. Again, Augustine *Against Maximinus* II ch.14 nn.7 & 9, ch.18 n.3 proves this conclusion in three ways:

First by the authority of the Savior in *John* 16.15: “Everything that the Father has is mine;” therefore the Father’s power too.

9. Second by reason, because “if he could not give equal power he was not omnipotent, – if he could give it and he refused, he was envious.”

10. Third by a likeness, because “a carnal father would generate an equal son for himself if he could, or a greater son; therefore much more so in the issue at hand.”

I. To the Question

A. Determination of the Question

11. I reply by setting aside logical power or possibility (which refers to a mode of combining terms done by the intellect), and power said metaphorically (of the sort found in geometry, in the way geometers themselves imagine a point having power for a line and a line for a surface) [cf. *Metaphysics* 5.17.1019b30-32, *Ord.* I d.7 n.27]:

12. Power (as said in I d.7 nn.28-29) is properly taken in one way as it is a differentia of being, the differentia opposed to act, in another way as it signifies the same thing as principle does (as the Philosopher speaks of it in *Metaphysics* 5.17.1019a19-20). And power taken in this second way is divided into active and passive, and in each way – however it is taken – it can be understood either for the relation itself that it signifies in the power, or for the proximate foundation of that relation.

13. As for the issue at hand. It is plain that one should posit active power in God, since he is an efficient principle (from I d.2 nn.43-58), and it is about this power that the Master is speaking in the present distinction.

14. Equality in power of this sort can also be understood in two ways: either as to the extent of possible objects to which the power is extended, or as to the intensity of the very power in itself. An example: a power to heat is said to be equal in extent if it is extended to an equal number of heatable things (and in this way all charity is equal and is extended to everything that can from charity be loved); it is said to be equal in intensity if the power is equally perfect and is capable of an act that is equally perfect, although not as many things be subject to it as to another power, as is plain from positing the case that was posited in I d.7 n.41, that heat possessed of a heating adequate to it would produce another heat.

15. And these two equalities frequently accompany each other; each can however be understood without the other. Now, when speaking of equality of extent, no difficulty arises save about the notional acts [sc. the acts that concern the production of the divine persons], and about the terms of those acts, because the two terms are not producible by all the persons, but the Son is producible only by the Father while the Holy Spirit is producible only by the Father and the Son.

B. Opinion of Others

16. [Exposition of the opinion] – Hence as concerns this point [n.15] one statement is as follows, that the power of generating pertains to omnipotence in the Father but not in the Son.

17. This statement is clarified in two ways:

First, because omnipotence is power for everything that does not include a contradiction; but that the Father generates does not include a contradiction, while that the Son generates does include a contradiction; therefore etc.

18. Further, second, because what holds of actions that are transitive, or pass onward to something external, is different from what holds of actions that are immanent; possibility in the case of a transitive action is judged from the idea of the action in itself and from its term, while possibility in the case of an immanent action is not judged exclusively from these features but also from comparison with the agent which such action is immanent in; since therefore generation is an immanent action, its possibility is to be judged not only from it in itself and from its term but also from its being compossible with the acting supposit which it should be immanent in; but generation is compossible with the Father and not with the Son, therefore the same as before.

19. A third clarification is added that that is said to be ‘potent’ which has power for everything for which it has the form, and is said to be ‘impotent’ for that action to which its form does not extend (as fire is said to be ‘impotent’ because it cannot cool things, for it does not have the form for cooling); but the Father has a form that agrees with generation and the Son does not; therefore the Father is impotent if he cannot generate but the Son is not impotent if he be unable to generate, – and so ‘being able to generate’ pertains to the omnipotence of the Father and not to the omnipotence of the Son.

20. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this:

Without comparing the ‘to generate’ with any supposit I ask: either this generating, as it belongs to the generated supposit as to a term, is something for which some active power is naturally fit, or it is not. If it is, then whatever does not have power for this generating does not have omnipotence (that is, it does not have power for everything for which power is naturally fit); if it is not, then nothing has this power for generating, and thus this power does not pertain to the omnipotence of the Father.

21. The confirmations too [nn.18-19] are not valid. Not the second²⁹⁶ [n.18] because omnipotence is capable of everything which is the term of power simply, and this either by producing it in that which it is of a nature to be produced in, if it is of a nature to be produced in something, or by producing it as subsistent in itself, if it is not of a nature to be produced in something. But there is no necessity that omnipotence be able to produce all such things formally in themselves; just as omnipotence can produce running in an animal (as in a man or a horse), which is what running is of a nature to be in, but cannot produce running in itself (as neither can it produce running formally), because this neuter word ‘itself’ would signify that such a form existed in itself formally. Although therefore the Son not be able to generate formally such that generation should be in himself, nor be able to be a principle of generation in himself, yet, if generation be a term of omnipotence, then one should say that the Son is able to be a principle of generation in that which generation is of a nature to be in, because otherwise he would not be omnipotent, just as neither would he be omnipotent if he could not cause understanding in an intellect capable of receiving understanding. But ‘to generate’ cannot in any way be from the Son, not even as it is in the Son – therefore if ‘to generate’ is a term of power simply the Son will not be omnipotent.

22. The third confirmation [n.19] is not valid, because what has a form that is limited with respect to acting is not omnipotent with respect to acting; for although fire be potent as to burning and heating, if yet it be not able to cool it will not be simply omnipotent, because its form – limited to one act – entails that it is not simply omnipotent; therefore that the Son does not have a form agreeing with every action, although the action is one which power is of a nature to have simply regard to, entails that the Son is not simply potent.

23. Again, this way [n.16] does not save the fact of how the Father and the Son are equally potent, because the Father has power for an act of generation (which, for you [sc. the holder of the opinion in question here, nn.16-18] is a term of power simply), for which action the Son does not have power, and so they will not be equally powerful as to extent.

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

24. As for this article [nn.15] I say differently that the first correlative for active power is the possible, – not taken generally, the way the possible is opposed to the impossible, because in this way God’s existence is possible; the possible then, as it is the correlative of active power, must be taken more determinately. But this correlative seems only to be what accords with how Avicenna takes the possible, *Metaphysics* VI chs.1, 3

²⁹⁶ Vatican editors: the text actually says ‘the first’ because it is first in the *Lectura* though second here, just as the text says ‘the second’ in n.22 because it is second in the *Lectura* but third here. The one that is first here [n.17] lacks an argument against it.

(91va, 93rb) and elsewhere, VIII chs.4, 5 (99rb, 99vb), I ch.7 (73rab), in the way that what is opposed to the possible is the of itself necessary. And then, since anything intrinsic to God is in itself formally necessary (or exists by identity with the essence, which essence is formally necessary), nothing intrinsic to God will be the term of active power properly stated; and if so, since the three persons possess the same idea of principle with respect to everything other than the divine essence, because the principle of producing creatures is understood first to be communicated to the three persons before the principle is able to have the act of producing those other things, – the consequence is that the power of the three persons is equal as to number of possibles.

25. Now the assumption [sc. ‘the principle of producing creatures is understood first...’] is made clearer in the question ‘On the Order of Extrinsic Productions to the Intrinsic Ones’ [II d.1 q.1 nn.8-11, 22].

26. It is also plain, in brief, from the fact that a principle necessary in respect of one production and contingent in respect of a second production is first a necessary principle of producing before it is a contingent one; now whatever be the principle of producing the persons, it is necessarily related to the production of them, but the principle of producing creatures is contingently related to the creatures themselves; therefore it is communicated to the three persons first before it can have an act with respect to possible things outside it.

27. Hereby it is apparent that power in the divine persons is equal not only as to extent but also as to intensity; for if power be taken for what is absolute (namely for the foundation of the relation of the principle), it is plain that it is in the three to the same magnitude, not only to same magnitude ‘in a certain respect’ but also to the same magnitude ‘simply’, as was said in the preceding question ‘About Equality of Magnitude’ [I d.19 nn.13-14]; or if it be taken for the relation (which is founded on what is absolute), then there is the same relation in the three and, if the relation has any magnitude, the magnitude of the relation is the same in the three, and so there is an equality of power in every way, both in extent and in intensity.

28. Now as to what is said about the first correlative of active power, which is the possible [n.24], one must understand it of the objectively possible (namely the object which is the term of the power), not of the subjectively possible, because the subjectively possible is not a convertible correlative in respect of active power; for not every active power has something that is thus [sc. subjectively] possible corresponding to it, but only that active power does which is transformative.²⁹⁷ The objectively possible then is, as correlative, equal to the active power, but the subjectively possible is not – and such an objectively possible is the possible that Avicenna was adduced for [n.24], namely the one that is opposed to the of itself formally necessary.

29. But that the objectively possible differs from the of itself formally necessary, or from the producer, may be confirmed from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.1.1013a17, where he intends it to be the case that principle and cause are really convertible; but

²⁹⁷ Tr. An active power that transforms or changes things has a subject that it acts on and an object that is the term of its acting on the subject (as fire acts on a cold thing as subject and has heat as the object which it brings about in that cold thing and which is the term of its acting on that cold thing); but an active power can have an object it produces without having a subject which it transforms or changes in producing it, as is precisely true of the power of producing persons in divine reality or of producing creatures *ex nihilo*.

everything caused is other than its cause, therefore the possible too (that is, the thing that has a principle) is other – according to him – than the principle.

30. There is a confirmation too from the idea of active power set down in *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019a15-16, 19-20, that it is “a principle of transforming that which is other, or insofar as it is other;” therefore much more is it a principle of producing what is other, because a caused thing cannot be as identical with the cause as the active can be identical with the passive in creatures.

31. But in that case there is a doubt how the power of generating may be called a ‘power’, since, according to what has been said [nn.24-30], it has no respect to anything possible.

I reply. The possible can be taken in a still more extensive way than as it is opposed to the *of* itself necessary, namely by saying that that is possible which is opposed to the *by* itself necessary – and in this way everything that is originated would be possible, but neither the saints nor the philosophers seem commonly to speak thus. And it is in this way that the Son could be conceded to be possible, because he is originated, and so the active power corresponding to this term is a ‘power’. However, the Son is more truly conceded to be something from a principle and not to be something possible; still there is conceded to be in the Father an active power of generating, because active power in creatures asserts a certain perfection – though the possibility corresponding to it, because it is repugnant to *of* itself necessity, asserts an imperfection; so the name for that which asserts perfection is transferred [sc. to God], but the name for the other correlative – which asserts imperfection – is not transferred in itself but in something more common than itself, so that in this way power is said to exist on the part of the producer and yet possibility is not said to exist on the part of the produced but only the idea of being from a principle.

32. Hence is apparent the irrationality of the saying that ‘under omnipotence, by virtue of the word, there is contained the power of generating, though not according to the usage of the saints’, because although the saints or the doctors sometimes say that ‘the power of generating is a power’ and that ‘to generate is the term of a power’, yet by virtue of the word neither is simply true but only when applying the idea of power to the idea of principle insofar as principle commonly has regard to that which can come from a principle.

33. By speaking in this way I reply to the question about the equality of power in the divine persons, – and I say that they are equal even in this way, because according to the Master in distinction 7 of this book [I d.7 ch.2 n.77] ‘by the same power by which the Father can generate the Son can also be generated’; but then this equality of power is not relative to the same thing; just as, if one were to posit an equality of power in color for affecting sight and in savor for affecting taste, these two would indeed have equal power yet they would not have the same power, nor relative to the same thing. Thus it is in the case of the issue at hand: when speaking of power in this way – extending it to the notional act – Father and Son are equal in power both in extent and in intensity, because the power that is in the Father for the act of generating is equally perfect in the Son and in relation to equal objects; yet it is not in this way altogether the same power the way a power is the same that has regard to what is possible – and in this respect one should concede that not every power is in the Son, or that there is not in him power for every

possible, taking power in this extended way [sc. so as to include the notional act], although there is in him the omnipotence that means power as to all possible things.

34. And if you ask ‘if there is in the Father and the Son the same absolute reality on which a power equal in extent and in intensity is founded, even as to power that is inwardly directed, why is not every power the same in both of them?’ – I reply: I say that although the same absolute reality, which is the power, is in the Father and the Son, yet it is not in each of them under the idea of power as far as the notional act is concerned, because it is not under the idea of what is prior to act, and power or principle requires the order of priority to a term.

II. To the Principal Arguments

35. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.1] I speak by denying the first consequence, as far as the form of the consequence is concerned.

When proof is given from Augustine *Against Maximinus* I reply that the argument does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as on the move from a universal whole to a part of a universal whole, by supposing that ‘to be able to generate’ is a particular ‘being able’), but it holds because of many implicitly understood propositions. In fact the argument has to be reduced to many syllogisms as follows: Maximinus has conceded that the Father generates a Son, though not an equal Son, – Augustine argues ‘if he generated and could not generate an equal Son, then he was impotent’. Proof of the consequence: from the fact that the Father gave deity to the Son (even according to Maximinus, because otherwise there would properly be no generation), but a deity lesser (according to Maximinus) than the deity of the Father, then deity is not of itself infinite, because there cannot be anything greater than the infinite, nor can the infinite be lessened; and if deity is not infinite then he who has deity is not omnipotent; for nothing is omnipotent (since omnipotence requires infinite power) unless it have an infinite essence. Therefore the consequence holds, not because the singular instance [sc. being able to generate] is contained under the universal [sc. being omnipotent], but because the universal – which is the ‘to be omnipotent’ – is accompanied by infinity of essence and so by an ability to be communicated equally. And this inference similarly holds, ‘if the Father cannot understand, the Father is not omnipotent’; but it does not hold on the basis of its internal logic (as if the Father’s act of understanding were the term of omnipotence), but on the basis of these implicitly understood propositions: ‘what cannot understand does not have every perfection simply, and in that case it is not of infinite essence, and therefore not omnipotent either’.

36. When the argument is then made about omniscience [n.1], I say that knowledge does not require an order that is determinate to knowable things, nor an order of prior or posterior,^a – and therefore knowledge is of necessity extended to every being, because every being is knowable; but power is not extended – as to extension to an object – to every being, but only to possible being, which possible being, in whatever way ‘possible’ is taken, is of a nature to be posterior; and so it is not extended to what is not of a nature to be posterior, and therefore not to that which is [not?] of a nature to be, in an infinite person, the same thing as that person.

a. [Interpolation] because knowledge, whether in respect of what is prior, as of its object, or of what is posterior, can also be in respect of itself; but power requires an order determinate to a term, as of prior to posterior.

37. When the argument next from Richard is made [n.2], I say the argument is valid if it be supposed, *per impossibile*, that there are two Gods (as was made clear in I d.2 n.180), but it is not valid of two persons who are equal in power.

38. When proof is given, first, through the fact that ‘one person could make another person nulli-potent by willing all possible things and bringing them into existence’ [n.5], I say that he cannot will them save with the other person also willing them, and so they are not brought into existence by one person while the other person is not bringing them into existence, but just as the three persons are in the same moment of nature understood to have a sufficient principle for bringing these things into existence, so they are also in the same moment understood to have the act by which these things are brought into existence. But if two Gods were posited, one of them could by its own action bring everything into existence or produce everything into existence while the other could not produce them by the same action; therefore either he could not produce them by any action, and thus he would not be omnipotent, – or he could produce them by another action, and thus the same thing could receive existence twice, which is impossible.

39. To the second proof, that ‘one omnipotent could prevent everything that was willed by another omnipotent’ [n.4], I say the proof is good about two wills, because – *per impossibile* – what has its own will could use it contingently as to any object other than itself; but the proof is not good about two persons who have the same will, because by the same necessity by which there is one will there is also one use of the will, and so it cannot be the case that one person wills with this will and the other does not, just as neither can one person have this will and the other not have it.

40. When – against this response – an objection is made about the form that exists in the two of them, that ‘the principle of operating exists in each of them the way it would if it existed in one alone’ I concede that the Son does not as it were naturally or by coercion will with this will, as if the Father by willing has predetermined the Son to will the same thing and the willing is not in the Son’s power the way it was in the Father’s, but rather the Father and the Son are in the same moment of nature understood to have the same will and to have any act of will – as the act is of this object – in as equally free a way as if one of them did not have the will. This form, then, is as much a principle for operating uniformly for any person who has it as it would be if he alone had it; but it is not a principle of operating for one possessor of it and a principle of not operating for the other, with an operation that is the same as the will, just as this same will is not both ‘a will’ and ‘not a will’. Hence the necessity of the inference ‘if the Father wills this, the Son wills this’ is not against the freedom of the Son’s volition, just as neither is the inference ‘if I will, I will’ against my volition’s freedom; thus it is not in this case either, ‘if the Father wills *a*, the Son wills *a*’, because the Father’s and the Son’s act of will is the same.

41. As to the other argument about first and second causes [n.6], the response has been given in distinction 12 n.68, because the proposition in question gets its truth from the fact that there is a different virtue or power of causing in the prior cause than in the posterior – and that what the prior has is more principal; but the proposition is false of a principle belonging to a prior in origin and to a posterior, where they have the same

power or virtue of causing in respect of a third – and of this sort is the power in the issue at hand, and so in this case the argument is not valid.

Twenty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether this Proposition is true, 'Only the Father is God'

1. That it is true:

Only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The antecedent is plain because only God who is Father is the Trinity. The inference is proved by taking a like case, because this follows: 'only the animal that is man runs, therefore only man runs'.

2. Again, only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God. The antecedent is plain from the expositors. The inference is proved by conversion of an exclusive proposition [sc. 'only...'].²⁹⁸

3. Again, only God is God, therefore only the Father is God. – The proof of the inference is both that 'God' in the antecedent stands for a person (because it is indefinite), and that the antecedent implies each exponent of the consequent.²⁹⁹

4. But the proof that an affirmative exponent is implied is that this inference follows, 'only God is God, therefore every God is God', and accordingly the Father is God; therefore a consequent that is an affirmative exponent follows.

5. This inference too holds, 'only God is God, therefore no one other than God is God', and the further inference, 'therefore no one other than the Father is God'. – Proof of the inference: to argue 'other than God, therefore other than the Father' seems to be a fallacy; so if one argues in the same pattern negatively [sc. 'other than God, therefore not other than the Father'] the argument will be good. Proof of the assumption, because if 'other than God' entailed 'other than the Father' this would be because the term of the relation of diversity [sc. 'God'] was distributed [sc. taken wholly];³⁰⁰ but it is not distributed, – the proof being that then every proposition would be false when the relative term in the diversity was predicated of something, to wit, any such proposition as 'man is diverse or other'; for what is given here to be understood is the first of the correlatives of this relation [sc. 'man' as the first correlative of the relation 'other'], and consequently the signification is that man is 'other than something else', and if the term of the relation [sc. 'something else'] is distributed, the result is that man is 'other than anything else whatever' and so that he is 'other than himself'.^a

²⁹⁸ Tr. If only *a* is *b*, then necessarily only *b* is *a*.

²⁹⁹ Tr., from Vatican editors' note to n.27 below: If the term 'God' in the first proposition, the antecedent, stands indefinitely for a person, then it is equivalent to 'only some person who is God is God', which is equivalent to 'only the Father or only the Son or only the Holy Spirit who are God is God', and so entails each exponent of the consequent, namely 'only the Father is God' and 'only the Son is God' and 'only the Holy Spirit is God'.

³⁰⁰ Tr. Only if 'God' in 'other than God' is distributed or taken wholly, that is, as equivalent to 'other than God altogether', would the conclusion 'other than the Father' follow. For the Father is other than God in some sense, because he is other than God the Son, but the Father is not other than the Father.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Again, a negative that excepts something and an affirmative taken in exclusion of the excepted part are convertible; *Matthew* 11.27: “No one knows the Father but the Son,” [sc. which as converted to an affirmative will read ‘only the Son knows the Father’] – therefore only the Son knows, therefore only he is God. Again, *On the Trinity* VI ch.7: “The Father is as great as are the Father and the Son together;” therefore only the Father is so great, therefore only the Father is God. – To the first: ‘No one’ – no man; God is called ‘man’ (“he gave a marriage feast for his Son”, *Matthew* 22.2). Therefore let ‘common to God’ be taken, let ‘no God’ or ‘no intellectual being’ be taken so as to be a substantive, let ‘[no one] but the Father knows’ be conceded, – and thus no intellectual being other than the Father [knows], because ‘other’ indicates an otherness in the thing signified by its substantive [sc. here ‘the Father’]; thus universally, wherever there is a substantive common to the three persons, the proposition is true with ‘only’ and with ‘no one’.³⁰¹ The response to the second is plain through the second: ‘only’ is taken in a syncategorematic sense.³⁰²

6. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.9 n.10

I. To the Question

7. As to the question,^a a distinction can be made (the way it is commonly, and well, made), that ‘only’ can be taken as categorematic and as syncategorematic.³⁰³ For ‘only’ signifies the same as ‘not along with another’, as is plain from the Philosopher *Sophistical Refutations* 2.22.178a39-b1. But this negation of association can be understood either to determine something in itself or in its nature, or to determine something as it is an extreme in composition relative to the other extreme, namely by denying that what is other than it is associated with it in receiving the predication of the relevant predicate. In the first way the word ‘only’ is not admitted in divine reality, because nothing is solitary there. In the second way the word is conceded whenever someone, of whom the same predicate is said, is not associated with the subject; so it is not conceded when the essential is predicated of the personal, because the essential belongs to the other excluded by the first extreme – and therefore such a proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] is denied.³⁰⁴

a. [Note by Duns Scotus]³⁰⁵ There are three opinions as to this question:

First opinion: the correlative is not excluded because it belongs to the understanding of what is included (response: not what this is, but to what or of what this is),³⁰⁶ again, this

³⁰¹ Tr. That is, the proposition ‘no one knows... but...’ can be repeated as to all three persons of the Trinity: no one knows the Son but the Father, no one knows the Holy Spirit but the Son, no one knows the Father but the Holy Spirit, etc.

³⁰² Tr. That is, the term ‘only’ is taken like a quantifier, such as ‘all’ or ‘no’, not like a term. So it is not taken as excluding the Son and Holy Spirit but as making ‘Father’ precise.

³⁰³ Tr. ‘Only’ as categorematic qualifies the noun, so that ‘only the Father...’ is equivalent to ‘the Father on his own’. ‘Only’ as syncategorematic qualifies the proposition, so that ‘only the Father...’ is equivalent to ‘the Father with exclusion of everything other than the Father...’

³⁰⁴ Tr. The proposition ‘only the Father is God’ is false because it excludes the Son and the Holy Spirit from being God. But ‘God’, being an essential and not a personal name, belongs to all three persons.

³⁰⁵ The Vatican editors, in the *Preface* to this volume, point out that this note assumes that passages from the *Reportatio* are to be added. The note makes frequent reference to these passages and has to be understood in relation to them.

consequence holds: ‘only the Father is, therefore the Father is’, and further ‘therefore the Son is’ – therefore ‘the Son is’ is included, and consequently that he is God is included (deny the consequence, because they are opposites in the subject term.³⁰⁷ On the contrary: a syncategorematic term [sc. ‘only’] makes a disposition about the categorematic concept [sc. ‘the Father’];³⁰⁸ again, it would rule out, in respect of any predicate, ‘only the Father is Father’.³⁰⁹ Therefore in another way: the correlative is formally excluded; thanks to the matter the predicate does not follow about the excluded correlative, because correlatives go together, and therefore opposites go together in the antecedent³¹⁰; again, when the accident is included the subject is not excluded (response: true about a concrete, because it is predicated of a subject; false about an abstract – hence ‘only...whiteness’ is contradictory).³¹¹ – To the contrary, in three ways: *Physics* 1, “only the principle is” [n.13 below];³¹² again, opposites are such that it is impossible for this one to be that one (any ‘not-this’ is excluded);³¹³ again, the whole concept does not allow of being expressed, because nothing can be attributed precisely to a relation, not even a proper difference; still a relation can be understood.³¹⁴

³⁰⁶ Tr. That is, in ‘only the Father is God’ the correlative, or the Son, is not what the Father (the included) is, but to what or of what the Father is, as that the Son is not what the Father is but to what or of what the Father is the Father.

³⁰⁷ Tr. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposed relatives in the subject term ‘God’.

³⁰⁸ Tr. ‘Only’ determines the concept ‘Father’, but the concept ‘Father’ includes the concept ‘Son’ (for they are relatives), so ‘only’ does not exclude ‘Son’ from the subject term.

³⁰⁹ Tr. If one denies the consequence ‘only the Father is, therefore the Father is, therefore the Son is, therefore the Son is God (or wise or omnipotent etc.)’ on the grounds that ‘Father’ excludes ‘Son’, then one should, by parity of reasoning, rule out saying ‘only the Father is Father’ because this too, by rejecting the same sequence of inferences, will exclude ‘Son’ and so will exclude the Son’s being or being God or being wise or omnipotent etc. But it is absurd to rule out saying ‘only the Father is Father’.

³¹⁰ Tr. ‘Only the Father is God’ is excluded, not because ‘Father’ does not include ‘Son’ (on the contrary it does), but because ‘only’ as applied to ‘Father’ excludes, not ‘Son’ from ‘Father’, but the application to ‘Son’ of the predicate ‘God’.

³¹¹ Tr. A suggestion about this puzzling remark: The claim being made is that to speak of an accident or property (e.g. wisdom) is to include and not exclude the subject whose property it is (e.g. a wise man). Thus to say ‘only the Father is God’ is to include ‘Son’ because ‘Son’ is also subject of ‘God’. Scotus’ response is that the subject is included when a property in the concrete is in question (as ‘wise’), but not when a property in the abstract is (as ‘wisdom’). Hence it is contradictory to say ‘whiteness’ includes a subject, because, as abstract, it is taken precisely as excluding a subject. In relation to ‘only the Father is God’, then, the point perhaps is that ‘God’ taken concretely or along with a subject always means one or other of the persons. But when it means the essence without reference to the personal subjects it is not taken concretely but, as it were, abstractly (as ‘God-ness’). So if ‘God’ is taken concretely in ‘only the Father is God’ then it includes the subject, that is, the person in question, and is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God the Father’, which is true and uncontroversial. But if ‘God’ is taken abstractly then ‘only the Father is God’ is equivalent to ‘only the Father is God-ness’, which is false if not indeed contradictory.

³¹² Aristotle is arguing at this point in the *Physics* against Parmenides and Melissus, that if they say that only the principle is, then they are saying that what is from the principle is not. So the Philosopher thinks that to assert ‘only’ of one of a correlative pair (here the pair of ‘principle’ and ‘from a principle’) is to exclude, and not implicitly to include, the other correlative.

³¹³ Tr. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are opposite relatives, and opposites exclude one opposite from being the other, so to say ‘only the Father...’ cannot be to include the Son implicitly.

³¹⁴ Tr. Relational terms, as ‘father-son’, do not have a strict conceptual definition, because neither relative can be defined in isolation from the other (as that one cannot define ‘father’ without mentioning the son relative to whom a father is father). But one can nevertheless understand relations and relatives. Hence it is not to the point to say that ‘only the Father...’, with ‘Father’ taken in its whole conceptual idea, implicitly includes the Son, because there is no whole conceptual idea of ‘Father’ in the first place and the ‘only’ attached to it has to be interpreted according to this feature of

In another way: [the substantive is] one thing, [the adjective attaching to it] is another. – To the contrary: the adjective conforms to the substantive in its mode of signifying, therefore so does anything included in the adjective, and the same of the converse ‘no non-Father...’; the substantive states a whom, not a what.³¹⁵

In another way third: composition and division. – To the contrary, as argued above.³¹⁶

Solution: ‘only’ – not along with another (*Sophistical Refutations* [n.7 above]). When ‘only’ is taken categorically, ‘solitary’ is what is *per se* predicated. When taken syncategorematically it makes a disposition as to an extreme term in the intellect combining the terms, and it states the mode under which the extreme is taken in the combined proposition – but this in two ways: either to the extent that (as reduplicative) it states a disposition in relation to the predicate, because it states the *per se* reason for the inference of the predicate, – or it states the formal reason according to which the subject is taken in itself, not that it is the formal reason for the inference of the predicate. Thus the subject can be taken in itself precisely, and something can be said about the subject so taken, – in another way the subject can be taken precisely in its order to the predicate as the predicate is asserted of it; in the first way ‘only’ indicates that the subject is in itself precise, whatever may agree with it in respect of the predicate, – in the other way it indicates the subject precisely, whether the subject is precise in itself or not: taken in the first way is Augustine’s “so great is the Father only”, that is the Father precisely taken truly has the predicate “so great [is he]” (we speak like this in other cases: “You only will count for 10,000” is true; even if there are many other lords who would count for so many servants, yet ‘You’ precisely taken will so count, and yet not as solitary or on its own but as existing among others; hence ‘only’ here is not a categorical, because neither is it a predicable but a co-predicable³¹⁷); taken in the second way Augustine’s proposition is false, as is proved above and by its consequences.³¹⁸

But an instance is made in objection to the remark from *On Interpretation* [see n.11 below] by taking what is distinct ‘in the respect in which it is dependent’: this sequence is true, ‘only man or non-man is non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man,’ – the inferences ‘therefore no non-man is non-identical with man or non-man, therefore no entity [sc. no man or non-man] is not identical [sc. with non-man], therefore every entity is identical [sc. with man]’, and ‘nothing non-identical with man or non-man is a non-man, therefore nothing non-identical with man or non-man is not a man’, these inferences do not hold, because then every such thing [sc. everything identical with man or non-man] is a man. – I concede the point; the inference from the negative to the affirmative in the case of a subject that includes contradictories is not valid; the term ‘non-identical with man or non-man’ is such a subject. This as to consistency in the subject term, namely that what is taken here on the part of the subject should be capable of being a subject, that is, should not include contradictories, because

relative terms, that is, as excluding from the predicate the opposing relative (‘Son’) which its understanding nevertheless implicitly includes.

³¹⁵ Tr. The other way of saving ‘only the Father is God’ is to say that ‘only’, taken as an adjective (as categoric), signifies the Father as to deity, while the substantive ‘Father’ signifies the Father as to person. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means something like ‘the Father only as to deity is God’, which does not exclude the Son from also being God. Scotus’ response is that if the substantive is taken personally, as signifying a ‘whom’ and not a ‘what’, the adjective attaching to it must be taken personally too. Hence ‘only the Father is God’ means ‘the person alone who is Father is God’, which does exclude the Son from being God. The response is confirmed by appealing to the converse of ‘only the Father’, namely ‘no non-Father’, because to say ‘no non-Father is God’ also clearly excludes the Son from being God.

³¹⁶ A reference to *Reportatio* IA d.21 nn.27-30. And see n.14 below. Perhaps the point about composition and division is that if ‘only’ is taken as dividing Father from Son, the proposition is false; if it is taken as combining them (because they are said relatively to each other), it is true. Scotus’ response is doubtless that ‘only’ as used here excludes taking the proposition in a combined sense.

³¹⁷ Tr. ‘Only’ in this case means ‘you by yourself count as so many, even if others also by themselves count as so many’; it does not mean ‘you alone and no one else count as so many’.

³¹⁸ Tr. In the second way ‘so great is the Father only’ means ‘only the Father is so great and not also the Son and Holy Spirit’, which is false.

contradictories make no single term, *Metaphysics* 5 “what is in itself false is false of everything,” and so too every predicate is false of it, because it is repugnant to itself and to each of its parts. – To the contrary: to which affirmative is this negative reduced from such an antecedent (reduced to it enthymematically)? Response: to affirmatives about its parts.³¹⁹

8. A clarification of these points – namely how a syncategorematic term disposes the extreme in the intellect as the intellect combines and divides it in respect of the other extreme, and how a syncategorematic term differs from a term of second intention [sc. a logical term], and how diverse syncategorematic determinations differ among themselves – would require a long treatise but, because of more useful and more necessary things, we should not delay over it.

9. The falsity of the proposed proposition [sc. ‘only the Father is God’] is also proved through the rule in the ‘Sophisms’, that ‘an exclusive affirmative entails a universal affirmative about the terms when they are transposed’ [Walter Burleigh, *Longer Treatise on the Purity of the Art of Logic* tr.2 p.3 subpart.1 ch.1]; therefore this proposition ‘only the Father is God’ entails this other ‘every God, or every divine person, is the Father’.

10. The rule is also proved by reason of exclusion, namely the exclusion that indicates precision in what it is added to with respect to the other extreme – or that indicates precise commensuration, namely that one extreme does not exceed the other; and this is what the universal affirmative ‘about the terms when they are transposed’ indicates, and especially in the case of common terms, where either extreme can be taken universally.

11. The rule is also logically proved by a single proposition that expresses the whole understanding of the exclusive term; for this proposition ‘only man is capable of laughter’, although it is commonly posited as having two exponents, is nevertheless sufficiently expounded by this one, ‘no non-man is capable of laughter’; from it there follows (by conversion) ‘nothing capable of laughter is a non-man’, and further that ‘therefore nothing capable of laughter is not a man’ (through the rule, in *On Interpretation* 2.10.95b-20b10,³²⁰ ‘from a negative about an infinite predicate there follows an affirmative about a finite predicate and a negative about a denied predicate’, – which is proved by the first principle ‘an affirmation about anything whatever etc.’ [*Ord.* prol n.89], and this in the case of simple predicates, because, when the consequence is

³¹⁹ Tr. The negative statement ‘nothing non-identical with man or non-man is non-man’ should, like any negative, be reducible or convertible to an equivalent affirmative (according to the rules for obversion, as that ‘no a is b’ is equivalent to ‘all a is non-b’). Scotus’ answer is that it is reducible to two affirmatives, according to its two-fold and contradictory subject: ‘everything non-identical with man is non-man’ and ‘everything non-identical with non-man is man’.

³²⁰ Vatican editors: This rule is not as such found in Aristotle but arises from two of the things he says. For he says first: “On the proposition ‘no man is just’ there follows the proposition ‘every man is non-just;’” he says second, “‘a non-just man is’ whose negation is ‘a non-just man is not.’” From the first of Aristotle’s statements this rule follows: ‘from a negative about a finite predicate there follows an affirmative about an infinite predicate’, and conversely ‘from an affirmative about an infinite predicate there follows a negative about a finite predicate’, from which finally there follows ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’. But according to the second of Aristotle’s statements, by adding ‘not’ to his first example, this sequence follows: ‘no man is non-just, therefore every man is not non-just’; there also follows ‘therefore every man is just’ and ‘no man is not just’, because this sequence holds ‘man is non-just, therefore man is not just’, as has been said.

denied, both opposites are denied of the same thing), and further ‘therefore everything capable of laughter [sc. is a man]’ by equivalence – therefore from the first etc.³²¹

12. Here some people object that when one relative is included the other is not excluded, because the one is included in the understanding of the other [see note n.7], because ‘things posited are posited (and things taken away are taken away [Peter of Spain, *Logical Summaries* tr.3 n.21])’ and also relatives are ‘by nature together’ [*Categories* 7.7b15].

13. But this is contrary to the Philosopher’s intention in *Physics* 1.2.185a3-5 when he argues there: “If only the principle is, then what is from the principle is not.” Therefore a correlative is not included in the understanding of its relative as something belonging to it (to wit as an essential or integral part), but as something to which the understanding of it is determined – and such is diverse enough from what is included in the relative that it has as much diversity as is required for being excluded from it.

II. To the Principal Arguments

14. To the first argument [n.1]. The antecedent [sc. ‘Only God who is Father is God’] is distinguished into a composite and a divided sense, as with ‘every man who is white runs’.³²² The composite sense is false, because in that case ‘God’ is made to stand for the Father, through the implied ‘who is Father’, just as ‘man’ is made to stand for white man in the composite sense in ‘man who is white’ – and then the inference [sc. ‘only God who is Father is God, therefore only the Father is God’] holds. The divided sense is true because then two predicates are asserted of the same subject, of which subject both predicates are true, namely of God that ‘he is Father’ and that ‘he is God’ (as if the two predications were made in two categorical propositions joined to each other by ‘and’, neither of which propositions would specify the other), and then an inference from the inferior term to the higher [sc. from ‘Father’ to ‘God’], along with exclusivity [sc. ‘only the Father is God’],³²³ is false.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The inference can be allowed to be absolutely true in both senses, because the term ‘God’ is not contracted [sc. as a universal to a singular]; it is a ‘this’ [‘this God’ or ‘this deity’, see n.31 below].³²⁴

³²¹ Vatican editors: “that is: therefore by running through from the first (‘only man is capable of laughter’) to the last (‘therefore everything capable of laughter is a man’), the rule [n.9] follows.”

³²² Tr. The composite sense of ‘every man who is white runs’ is ‘every white man runs’; the divided sense is ‘every man runs – and it just so happens, as an independent fact, that every man is white’.

³²³ Tr. ‘Only God is Father’ (where the addition to ‘only God’ of ‘who is Father’ is divided off) is true, but it does not entail ‘only the Father is God’. The divided sense does not allow an inference from person to nature (from ‘Father’ to ‘God’), which would exclude the other persons, the Son and Holy Spirit, from also being God.

³²⁴ Tr. The inference ‘therefore only the Father is God’ can be allowed to be true whether the antecedent ‘only God who is Father is God’ is taken in a composite or divided sense. For ‘only the Father is God’ does not mean ‘only the Father, and not the Son or Holy Spirit, is God’ as if ‘God’ were a universal term under which only the singular instance ‘Father’ was contained. Rather it means ‘only the Father is this God’, where ‘this God’ means the Trinitarian God. Hence whether ‘only God who is the Father’ is taken in the composite or the divided sense the inference that he is this God, namely the Trinitarian God, remains true.

15. And if you object that a like inference³²⁵ holds of creatures in the divided sense, I reply:

If the same common thing – a numbered thing – may belong to several particulars under it, that inference does not hold in the divided sense; for it holds precisely because the animal that is rational, taken in the divided sense, is not other than the animal that is rational taken in the composite sense; but in the issue at hand the reasoning does not hold, because the same God who is Father in the composite sense is the Son who is distinct from the Father, and so the God who is Father in the divided sense can be asserted truly of anything of which he is not asserted in the composite sense; but it is not so with the animal that is man, because this is truly predicated in the divided sense of nothing of which the same is not truly predicated in the composite sense (but not conversely), and so the predication is made indifferently in this case – not so in the case of God.

16. However, just as the antecedent is distinguished into a composite and divided sense, so some also distinguish the principal proposition in like manner, as if this proposition ‘only the Father is God’ could have a false composite sense and a true divided sense – adducing the remark of Priscian *Constructions 2* (or *Grammatical Instruction 18*) ch.1 nn.6-7, that ‘...who is’ falls in the middle between a qualified and a qualifying term.³²⁶

17. But this is neither logically nor grammatically said.

Not logically, because then nothing could be limited or determined by any term of limitation or determination; for however immediately any categorematic or syncategorematic determination is added to something (as ‘a white man runs’ or ‘every white man runs’), there would still be space to distinguish, as here, a composite and a divided sense, and so on ad infinitum – nor could any sense be determinately conceived or expressed.³²⁷ Nor did the Philosopher [*Sophistical Refutations* 1.4.162a6-38] teach that

³²⁵ Vatican editors: e.g. ‘only the animal that is man is rational, therefore only man is rational’.

³²⁶ Vatican editors: “Some say [such as Richard of Middleton] that, according to Priscian, in every conclusion where there is a noun and a qualifying adjective a ‘who is’ is always understood as the copula by which the construction is expressed, as in ‘a white man runs’, that is, ‘a man who is white runs’. So in the proposition here [‘only the Father is God’], if it is divided thus, ‘only the Father, who is God, is God’, it is true, but in the composite sense [sc. ‘only the Father-God is God’] it is false.” Priscian ch.1 nn.6-7: “But there are occasions when, by an ellipsis of a verb or participial substantive, a construction of the following sort is wont to be made in these sorts of grammatical cases (that is, the nominative case along with the oblique cases): ‘Achilles the son of Peleus killed many Trojans in battle’; for the participle of a verb for the substantive is implicitly understood, namely ‘being’ [sc. ‘Achilles being the son of Peleus’], but we do not now use it, and in its place we can say or understand ‘[Achilles] who is’ or ‘who was’ the son of Peleus. Likewise with other cases following a nominative, the aforesaid participle, or things taken for it, must be understood with the nominative: ‘an agreeable friend is going with me’, that is, ‘a friend who is agreeable to me’.” Also ch.2 n.27: “And in all these cases, even oblique ones, a ‘who is’ is understood: as ‘of a horse white in color’ (that is ‘of the horse which is of white color’), ‘for a horse white in color’ ‘toward a horse white in color’.”

³²⁷ Tr. If any qualification or adjective, categorematic or syncategorematic, added to a noun is an implicit relative clause (as that ‘white man’ is implicitly ‘a man who is white’, or that ‘only men’ is implicitly ‘only those who are men’), so that all qualified nouns admit of a divided and a composite sense, then, however closely one tied the adjective to a noun so as to express the composite sense and exclude the divided sense (as, say, ‘white-man’ or ‘white-man man’), the result would itself admit of a composite and divided sense (as ‘man who is white-man’), and so on ad infinitum. Consequently, one would never be able to disambiguate any statement as composite instead of divided, and so one would never be able to express or conceive anything determinate.

there was in such cases a multiplicity according to composition and division, but only in those cases where the same materials create, when composed and divided, a diversity of senses; but these materials ‘every man runs’ create – when composed and divided – no difference of sense, nor can they be divided, because syncategorematic terms [sc. here ‘every’] only have a signification along with the categorematic term [sc. here ‘man’]; but it is otherwise with ‘he sees that I am running now’, as one combines the adverb ‘now’ either with the preceding or the following verb [sc. ‘he now sees that I am running’ or ‘he sees that I am now running’].

Neither even is it grammatically said, because ‘qualified’ and ‘qualifier’ are called construable of the sort that one of them is said by Priscian to govern the other by some force of grammar; but a syncategorematic term is not construable with respect to a categorematic term as if one of them ruled the other by some force of grammar, and therefore although an implied relative falls in the middle in the case of ‘Socrates’ cloak’ (that is, ‘the cloak which is of Socrates’), yet it does not do so in the case of ‘white man’ or ‘every man’.

18. To the second [n.2] I say that neither the conversion [sc. ‘only God is the Father’ to ‘only the Father is God’] nor the inference [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’] holds, but there is a fallacy of the consequent, because – as was proved in the solution to the question [n.9] – an exclusionary proposition [sc. ‘only...’] is convertible with a universal affirmative proposition ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. ‘only man runs’ is equivalent to ‘everything that runs is a man’];^a therefore to infer an exclusionary proposition from an exclusionary proposition ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. to infer ‘only the Father is God’ from ‘only God is the Father’] is equivalent to inferring a universal affirmative from a universal affirmative ‘about the terms when transposed’ [sc. inferring ‘all B is A’ from ‘all A is B’]; but in such an inference of a universal from a universal there is a fallacy of the consequent, as in the case of ‘all men are animals, therefore all animals are men’, by affirming from higher to lower [sc. by affirming the predicate, the higher term, universally of the subject, the lower term]

19. So it is of the issue at hand [sc. ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’]. There is a proof too, because the procedure with distribution – by the force of the words – is always from the inferior [sc. the subject] to the superior [sc. the predicate]; for the predicate of a universal affirmative is not marked as being convertible, but stands as it were superior to the subject; therefore from the distribution of the such a universal subject the distribution of the predicate with respect to the same thing does not follow, nor can the distribution of the predicate follow with respect to something if the distribution of the predicate does not follow with respect to what is superior to that something. Arguing then like this, ‘all *b* is *a*, therefore all *a* is *b*’ is the fallacy of the consequent, because from the distribution of a term that is marked as lower the distribution of the superior term does not follow (the same too in respect of a predicate marked as lower to a superior one), but it is the fallacy of the consequent, as if one were to argue, ‘every man is an animal, therefore every animal is Socrates’.

20. But when proof is given of the inference by the conversion of an exclusionary proposition [n.2, ‘only God is the Father, therefore only the Father is God’], I reply:

Not every inference ‘when the terms are transposed’ is conversion simply, namely a conversion that indicates as great a union of terms when it is converted as could be had

by virtue of the first [unconverted] proposition; hence a universal negative is not converted to a particular negative ‘when the terms are transposed’, although it implies it.³²⁸

21. As to the issue at hand I say that that proposition ‘when the terms are transposed’, which receives only as much of the understanding of the exclusionary affirmative as any proposition can receive ‘when the terms are transposed’, is the universal affirmative, as was proved in the second reason for the principal solution [n.9]; therefore such an exclusionary affirmative is converted to a universal affirmative, and contrariwise, by parity of reasoning, a universal affirmative is converted to an exclusionary affirmative.³²⁹

22. And if you object ‘therefore Aristotle was mistaken and incomplete in his teaching about the conversions [of propositions], by not teaching that the universal affirmative is to be converted to an exclusionary affirmative’,³³⁰ I reply that he taught the conversions with a view to making perfect the imperfection of the imperfect syllogisms;³³¹ but an exclusionary proposition would, in completing an imperfect syllogism, occupy no other place than some non-exclusionary indefinite proposition would occupy, because it entails no conclusion other than what was already entailed in the imperfect syllogism; and so Aristotle was, in teaching about conversions, correct and complete as far as was necessary for his intention there.³³²

23. To the third [n.3, ‘only God is God, therefore only the Father is God’] I say that from a negative proposition expounding the antecedent [sc. ‘none other than God is God’] a negative expounding the consequent [sc. ‘none other than the Father is God’] does not follow.

24. When it is proved on the ground that ‘the inference “other than God, therefore other than the Father” does not follow’, I deny it, because that inference is good.

25. And when proof is further given that [n.5] ‘the term of this relation of diversity is not distributed because then there would be an impossibility in asserting such a relative term of anything’, I reply that in all relatives involving equivalence the common genus, when taken by itself – as it is common –, is not in relation to anything, because, from the fact that it is common, it abstracts from all related terms or terms of relations, and there is no real relation save of a distinct thing to a distinct thing; but if the common genus were in relation as such to something, then one would have to give for it some ‘thus related’ distinct term, and so it would not be related to anything of the same idea as the particular related thing, but it would be related to something of a different idea.

³²⁸ Tr. The universal negative ‘no A is B’ converts simply to ‘no B is A’, but it implies also the particular form, ‘some B is not A’.

³²⁹ Tr. That is, ‘only man runs’ (an exclusionary affirmative) converts to ‘all that runs is a man’ (a universal affirmative with transposed terms), and contrariwise, ‘every man runs’ converts to ‘only what runs is a man’.

³³⁰ Vatican editors: Aristotle only taught that the universal affirmative, ‘all A is B’, was to be converted to the particular affirmative, ‘some B is A’, *Prior Analytics* 1.2.25a28-29.

³³¹ Tr. Imperfect syllogisms are those in the second figure (A is B, C is B, therefore A is C) and third figure (B is A, B is C, therefore A is C). They are made perfect by being reduced, through conversion of propositions, to forms of the first figure (A is B, B is C, therefore A is C).

³³² Tr. Converting a universal affirmative, all A is B, to its exclusionary affirmative, only B is A, is to do the same as converting it to a particular affirmative, some B is A, so it does no more to reduce imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones than that particular affirmative is already doing. Therefore Aristotle had no need to introduce it in this context.

Such a relative then is only related to a particular contained under it, just as the like is not as 'like in general' related to the like but as some particular under the like in general, which something can be distinguished from the like that it is related to; the same is true of the different; for the different is not related to a different thing in general as to its first correlative (as if there were two first extremes in the relation and each extreme was the most common genus for any particular different), but the different is different from this different.

26. And if you object that a relative gives to understand first its own common correlative, I reply:

The correlative is not its correlative 'as something common' unless it is taken for some particular under the common, as which particular it can be distinguished from the related term. There exists an example of this fact in real things, because if the whole nature of fire existed in one individual, that individual could not generate fire (because if it could, then it would generate another fire in which the whole nature of fire would exist, and there would as it were be two species of fire, which is impossible), and yet, as it is now, the nature in one individual fire is the principle of generating fire, because it has enough unity for being an active principle and enough distinctness [sc. enough distinctness as this individual fire to be capable of generating another distinct individual fire]. So it is here in the present case: likeness is indeed a principle in something for forming a relation, or being the term of a relation, but it neither forms nor is a term unless it is taken for a distinct thing in which it may exist, such that neither unity nor distinctness is accidental but both are essential in respect of such a relation, just as was said in the question 'About Circumincession' [d.19 n.62]; for 'not other than God, therefore not other than the Father' does not follow (however in the affirmative the inference is good [n.24], by reason of the distribution of the term in the relation), because of the negation included in the idea of otherness.³³³

27. To the other proof, when it is said 'only God, therefore only the Father or only the Son' [n.3, and footnote], the response is that the subject of an exclusionary proposition [e.g. 'only God'] can be taken in comparison to the exclusion or to the predicate; in the first way it is has simple supposition, for exclusion is made by it because of what is signified; in the second way it has personal supposition, because the predicate is attributed to it as to a supposit.³³⁴

28. Against this: one extreme in one act of combining and dividing has one idea according to which it is taken in respect of the other extreme, because diverse ways of taking the same extreme in respect of the same other extreme do not seem to cohere with unity of combining act.

29. And if it be said that, in respect of exclusion, the extreme supposits under one idea, and that as taken under exclusion in respect of the predicate it supposits under

³³³ Tr. Sc. 'not other than God, therefore not other than the Father' is equivalent to 'not not-God, therefore not not-Father', which is equivalent to 'God, therefore Father', which is false of the Son and the Holy Spirit

³³⁴ Tr. Simple supposition is when a term is taken as to its meaning (a dog is a species of animal), and personal supposition is when the term is taken as to the thing it signifies (dogs run). So in the case of 'only God is God', if the subject term is taken in simple supposition the proposition is about the meaning of the term 'God' and not about the persons, so nothing follows about the persons. If the subject is taken in personal supposition, then it means 'only the Father is God' or 'only the Son is God' or 'only the Holy Spirit is God', and this way of speaking was rejected above in n.7.

another idea, – on the contrary: the subject does not supposit in respect of its own disposition but in respect of the predicate, and so it does precisely have the supposition [sc. personal supposition] that, as taken under its own disposition, it is understood to have in respect of the predicate.

30. Therefore I say that the subject of an exclusionary affirmative supposits only confusedly, just as does the predicate of a universal affirmative (which is proved from the fact that they are convertible, and because to give, in respect of the same extreme existing in the same way, a distributive argument on the part of the other extreme from a confused to a distributive supposition, is the fallacy of figure of speech), and one is not permitted to proceed downwards under a term that so stands – namely confusedly.³³⁵

31. However, one could also say that in the proposition in question things are otherwise than they are in creatures, namely because ‘God’ under exclusion [sc. ‘only God’] stands for ‘this God’, who is common to the three persons (which response was touched on in d.4 nn.11-13), and for this God the subject there, ‘God is Father and Son and Holy Spirit’, stands; and this point could also be valid by d.30 qq.1-2, that he [sc. God as this God] is the subject to which action in respect of creatures first belongs (because he is ‘this God’, as he is God ‘by this deity’, without understanding any personal property), although every predicate which is true of this predicate [sc. the predicate ‘acting in respect of creatures’] is true of the Father *per se*, yet not only of the Father but of the Son and Holy Spirit too.³³⁶

Twenty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether God is Nameable by us with some Name signifying the Divine Essence in itself, as it is a ‘This’

1. About³³⁷ the twenty second distinction I ask whether God is nameable by us with some name signifying the divine essence in itself, as it is a ‘this’.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] That he is not.³³⁸ – Augustine on the Lord’s words in *Sermon* 34: “Whatever can be said is not unsayable (or ineffable);” but God is ineffable (the proof is from St. Paul). Again, Augustine *On John* sermon 19 and *John* 5: “The Son can do nothing save what he

³³⁵ Tr. If the subject term supposits confusedly (not determinately to this or that supposit) then one may not descend to such a determinate supposit. So here, because ‘only God’ in ‘only God is God’ supposits for the persons confusedly, one may not proceed from it to the determinate ‘only the Father is God’. To do so is to commit the fallacy of figure of speech, because it is to move from ‘God’ in simple supposition to ‘God’ in personal supposition.

³³⁶ Tr. In other words ‘only God is the Father’ could be maintained if it is understood to mean ‘only this God, who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’.

³³⁷ See the Appendix at the end of this question.

³³⁸ Vatican editors: this note is a contraction of what is found in the *Reportatio* on the same question. The references are found in full there and are not repeated here. See the Appendix.

sees the Father doing;” what the ‘seeing’ of the Word is cannot be demonstrated by word. Again, Hilary *On the Trinity* III.9: “Do not be ignorant that, as to speech about this nature, virtue does not reach it.” Again Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels.” Again, by reason: he is not understood in this way [sc. as a ‘this’], therefore he is not named in this way either. The inference is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4: “He is more truly thought than talked of;” and *Enchiridion* 13: “Instructions are that by which someone conveys his thoughts to the knowledge of another;” and Plato: “so that [sc. thoughts] may be present to hand.”

On the contrary. – Augustine *Against Adimantus* 13: “That sublimity must be signified by human sounds.” Again, [God] is understood in this way [sc. as a ‘this’], therefore etc.; proof of the antecedent: he is understood to be of himself a ‘this’, therefore he is understood as a ‘this’. Again Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] in *Guide* I ch.61: “We have no name [sc. for God] that is not taken from his work, save the ‘Tetragrammaton’ [sc. JHVH], therefore it is called ‘the separated Name’, because it signifies the substance of the Creator with a pure signification;” “it is written down, it is not spoken,” “save in the sanctuary, by the holy priests, in giving priestly blessing alone, and by the high priest on the day of fasting.” “This name ‘Adonai’ (*Exodus* 6) is a recognition of a second name that is more abstract than the other names known about God” besides the first name imposed (the four letters of the tetragrammaton were imposed by God to signify some articulated spoken word that, according to the first imposition of letters, would be signified by other letters; this spoken word was imposed by God to signify his essence purely). Maimonides is treating of the same letters, which are those of the “tetragrammaton” (jod-heth-vau-he, which are the same as the Latin letters j-e-v-h), from which letters – joined together in one syllable – no meaning is collected, but rather from teaching, about which teaching he adds ch.62: “No man knew how speaking in its case would go; the wise used to hand on, one to another, how it might be spoken.”

A spoken name should be a symbol between speaker and spoken to, so that the thing signified (in the way it is signified) might be known to both, and so that the name might be a sign of the thing; the truth of the divine nature, as to the idea of its immensity, is known to God alone, – it cannot, as to the idea of its immensity, be known to any creature; therefore God could appropriate to himself, and make to be his own, this ‘nameable name’ –, no name of a creature, just as no note of a creature, can be a name proper to the divine nature like this, by leading, through some process of removal, to a knowledge of the divine immensity. However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature as it is known by the intellectual creature (a proper name made by the divine or the created intellect), by which sign the saints speak about the truth of the divine nature in the way it is known to them; that name would not be a name-sign for wayfarers, because the divine nature is in no way known to them the way the blessed know it; therefore it is not a known note, just as neither is whiteness to one born blind. A proper name can be made for us, at God’s pleasure, in accord with the way he is known by us; but that name is not transferred from creatures, because what is transferred from creatures is common to creatures and was imposed on them first; therefore a name is imposed on him first and principally. ‘Deus (God)’ signifies what is of perfection simply, as if supreme among Latin words; it is more proper in comparison with other words that express some idea of dignity as if in particular fashion.

Against the minor [sc. the first statement in the preceding paragraph] (against the major later): any of the blessed knows the object as it is infinite, because the object is seen in its supremacy (*Ord.* I d.1 nn.42-50); again, comprehension is not required for something to be signified; again, the mental word is a natural sign; again, a name given to God would not be an essential sign in its being; again, the saints would be able to use the name. – I concede the second point [sc. ‘However, some proper name can be had for signifying the divine nature...’], but it would be of the same signified thing. On the contrary: conceiving the signified thing under the same idea as on the part of the object, such the wayfarer knows; proof: the wayfarer has some quidditative concept, otherwise he has no concept at all; that concept is a concept of the quiddity under its proper idea as object, because it is not a common concept in any way, nor a concept capable of being narrowed down, but it is diverse primarily.

Solution. ‘Nameable by me’ is understood in two ways: by me as the one who imposes the name, or by me as imposing it on the user when he says it to me or to another. In the first way the point is denied, because [God] is not known thus, according to Aristotle and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 8 (the contrary here below, about names of substances, – the way is set down here

below, in the solution of the question [end of n.2 below]; response to Aristotle: he is understanding it confusedly; an example: letters). In the second way it is true, not only as with a magpie [sc. when a magpie imitates and repeats a word of human language], but also with someone grasping it from the letters; an example: when someone who does not have a distinct image of Rome speaks about it, – and in the case of proper names generally, whether the name be imposed by us (as in the first case) or by God (Maimonides, *Guide* I, above). In a third way I conceive it as I am able to, because it is something that falls under the confused concept I have.

But surely I cannot have a proper and quidditative concept? No, because creatures are deficient, even though we could draw a distinction through a simply simple concept (because the concept is proper and not able to be narrowed down, simply simple, primarily diverse), and though we could naturally know necessary truths.

To the arguments: it is ‘ineffable’ to him to whom it is expressed; by using the verb ‘he sees’, just as it is expressed.

I. The Opinion of Others

2. It is said that as God is understood by us so can he also be named by us. Therefore, according to the diverse ways some think about the knowledge of God had by the intellect of the wayfarer, in like manner do they as a result speak in diverse ways about the possibility of also naming God, – and someone who denies a common concept univocal to God and creatures and posits two analogous concepts (one of which concepts, namely that of the creature, is attributed to the other concept, namely that of God), will say accordingly as a result that God is nameable by the wayfarer with a name expressing that analogous concept [e.g. Henry of Ghent, above I d.3 nn.20-21].

3. But against this opinion I argue in particular that every real concept capable of being had about the divine essence is of a nature to be caused in the intellect by virtue of that essence (the proof is that any even the most minimal object is of a nature to cause every real concept capable of being had about it); but according to them only one concept is of a nature to be had about the divine essence by virtue of that essence, although the intellect, as it busies itself, might be able to cause and fashion about the object several concepts; therefore whatever object can cause in the intellect a real concept about God can cause that one concept which the essence would be of a nature of itself to cause; but that single concept is of ‘this essence’ as it is a ‘this’, therefore any object whatever that causes in our intellect some knowledge of God will cause – according to this opinion – a concept of him as he is ‘this essence’, and so God will be nameable by the wayfarer with a name signifying ‘this essence’ as it is a ‘this’ [I d.8 n.188].

II. Scotus’ own Response

4. One can say briefly to the question [n.1] that this proposition, common to many opinions – namely that ‘as a thing is understood so also is it named’ [n.2] –, is false if it is taken to be understood precisely, because something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood.

5. The point seems to be shown by this, that since substance cannot be understood by the wayfarer save in the common concept of being (as was proved in I d.3 nn.128-129), then, if it could not be signified more distinctly than it is understood, no name imposed by the wayfarer would signify anything of the genus of substance, but that, just as some property is precisely understood by the wayfarer which he uses to impose the name (and this property is commonly expressed by the etymology of the name), so it is precisely

such property that would be signified by the name; for example, by the name ‘stone’ (or ‘lapis’) nothing of the genus of substance would be signified but only something of the genus of action, to wit ‘striking the bone of the foot’ (or ‘laedens pedem’), which the etymology expresses and was the origin of the imposition of the name.

6. And so it can be argued about all other names imposed on things in the genus of substance, because none of them signifies anything save some accidental property that was understood by the one who imposed the name – or instead one must say that the name signifies the thing more distinctly than that thing was understood by the imposer of the name.

7. But how this may be possible can be understood as follows, according to the way of Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.6 n.8, by which he proves there is composition in every creature. For many accidents are conceived by anyone, accidents coming together in the same thing, for example such and such a quantity and quality – and the proof that neither of these is the other is because each of them remains without the other; there is also proof that for both of them something else is the common subject, because each of them can be destroyed while the other is not destroyed; therefore something is shown to be the subject of them, for example of the quality and the quantity, – but that which is the subject is not conceived in a quidditative concept save in the concept of being, or of ‘this being’. Also, since it frequently happens that such and such a quantity and quality are conjoined in something and are not conjoined in other things, and this not from the nature of quality and quantity, as was just shown above, – the conclusion follows that this is from the nature of a third thing which both the quantity and quality have for foundation; but the sort of quality and quantity conjoined in this whole are not the sort that are conjoined in that whole; for from the fact they are conjoined in diverse ways in diverse things the conclusion follows that the substrate of these is diverse from the substrate of those, and from this the conclusion follows that this third thing [sc. the substrate in the first case] is other than that third thing [sc. the substrate in the other case].^a But on this thus distinct third thing (whatever it be that goes along with the things conjoined in it, which are the things understood) some name is imposed; this name seems to be the proper sign of ‘this’ thing, under the idea in which it is a ‘this’, such that he who imposes the name intends to signify the essence of it in the genus of substance; and just as he intends to signify the thing, so the name he imposes is a sign of the thing, and yet he does not understand distinctly the thing he intends distinctly to signify by this name or this sign.^b

a. [Interpolation] therefore some third thing is known to be substrate, and likewise that it is different from the subject of other accidents; nor yet do I know distinctly what the subject is in itself, save that it is a being or a thing, qualified by such and such accidents; hence the further conception that I can have of it, as to what it is, is that it is something possessing such and such accident and relations. As to the issue at hand, then, it is not [the same as] such and such accidents.

b. [Interpolation] and thus it is perhaps that, after the fall, names have been imposed.

8. There would also be an example of this: if someone were to impose Hebrew characters not knowing Hebrew letters in particular – yet if, knowing that some letter is first and another second and another third, he were to impose them like this, ‘some letter or other is first, and whichever it is, I will that it be signified by such and such a name and such and such a character’, those characters would be signs of those Hebrew letters,

which some Hebrew would distinctly know when such signs were put in front of him, while a non-Hebrew, although he would understand what was signified by those shapes, would yet not know distinctly what was signified but only under the idea of first letter or second.

9. Therefore one can say briefly that, at a minimum, many names are imposed that signify God in general, because God can thus be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, as is clear from distinction 3 [I d.3 nn.58, 61]; or if it is true that ‘something can be signified more distinctly than it can be understood’ [n.4], then God can be named by the wayfarer with a name that signifies ‘this essence’.³³⁹

10. But however it may be in these cases, it is likely that God is named by some such name, and this whether the name is imposed by God himself, or by an angel who knows him, or by a wayfarer. For it is likely that there are many names in Scripture that signify the divine essence distinctly, – as the Jews say of the name of God with which they call him, the ‘Tetragrammaton’ [JHWH], and as God seems to say, *Exodus* 3.14: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name;” and in another place, 3.15: “I am the God of Abraham etc., this is my name;” and 6.3: “my great name Adonai I have not made known to them.”

11. God, then, is nameable by the wayfarer with a name properly signifying the divine essence as it is ‘this essence’, because the wayfarer can use that name and intend to express what is signified by the sign, whether he himself imposed the sign or anyone else who knew the thing signified; and also such sign or name can be used as a name by a wayfarer even if he could not have imposed it as a sign. And if the proposition is true that ‘no name can be imposed on anything more distinctly than the thing is understood’ [n.5], yet this proposition is false that ‘no one can use a name that signifies a thing more distinctly than he himself can understand it’; and therefore one must simply concede that the wayfarer can use many names expressing the divine essence under the idea of divine essence.

Appendix A

Twenty Second Distinction Single Question

[*Interpolation*] “After what has been said [sc. I dd.1-21] it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names, etc.” [Lombard, *Sent.* I d.22 ch.1 n.198]. According to what the Apostle says *Romans* 10.10: “With the heart faith is held unto justice, but with the mouth confession is made unto salvation,” in accord with this the Master [Lombard] – proceeding in this first book –, after he has taught what is to be believed about God and divine reality [I dd.1-21], teaches in this second part [sc. from I d.22] how one should

³³⁹ Vatican editors: which essence, however, cannot be naturally conceived by the wayfarer, I d.3 nn.56-57.

speak about what is believed. And that this division is according to his intention is plain to anyone who considers his text at the beginning of this distinction 22.³⁴⁰

Now this part is divided into two: the preface [the opening text just referred to] and the treatise (which begins at ‘That then chiefly’ [from d.22 to the end of the first book of the *Sentences*]). And the treatise is divided into two: in the first of which he makes determination about the divine names in general, setting down differences of six names about God, and in the second of which he pursues these differences separately and singly (and this part begins ‘One needs to know therefore’ [ch.4 n.201]). And this second part is divided into two: in the first of which he gives determinations about names for which a shorter treatise is sufficient, and in the second about certain names that require a special and distinct treatise (the second part begins at the beginning of distinction 35: ‘Since we have discussed above’). The first is again divided into two: for in the first he gives determinations about absolute names [dd.22-25], in the second about relative names (at the beginning of distinction 26: ‘Now about the properties of the persons’). The first of these is divided into two: for first he lays down a rule about absolute names which makes apparent their distinction from relative names – second he excepts from the common rule the name ‘person’ (and this at the beginning of distinction 23: ‘To what has been said one must add’). The first is divided into two, because first he lays down the rule and proves it from Augustine, and second he adduces a proof from Augustine, with which he proves the conclusion asserted (the second part at the place ‘But God is not great etc.’).

[*Interpolation*]³⁴¹ About this distinction I ask whether God is nameable by a human wayfarer with some proper name.

That he is not:

Augustine in sermon 34 ‘On the Lord’s Words’ [*Sermon* 117 ch.5 n.7]:

“Whatever can be said is not ineffable; but God is ineffable.” The minor is proved by Augustine, by what he immediately subjoins when he says: “For if the Apostle Paul says that he was snatched up ‘to the third heaven and heard ineffable words’, how much more is he who shows him these ineffable things himself ineffable?”

Further, Augustine in homily 19 on *John* [*On the Gospel of John*, tract.19 n.1], when expounding the verse, *John* 5.19: “The Son can do nothing that he has not seen the Father doing,” says that “the seeing of the Son is the very being of the Word of the Father, which cannot be shown by words.”

Further, Hilary *On the Trinity* III ch.9 [n.20]: “The virtue of the generation [sc. of the Son] exceeds the speech of human nature.”

Further, Ambrose *On the Trinity* I ch.5 [*On the Faith* I ch.10 n.64]: “Voice is silent, not my own only, but also that of angels” (he is speaking of the generation of the Son).

Further, by reason: nothing can be signified by anyone save what can be understood by him as well; but God cannot be understood by the human wayfarer with a proper concept; therefore etc. – The major is proved by Aristotle (*Metaphysics* 4.4.1006a22-24) and the Commentator (Averroes, *Metaphysics* IV com.10), and is

³⁴⁰ Vatican editors give the text from Lombard thus: “After what has been said, it seems we must discourse of the diversity of the names we use in speaking of the ineffable Unity and Trinity. Next we must show in what ways something is said about that Unity and Trinity.”

³⁴¹ From *Reportatio* IA d.22 q. un.

proved as to the issue at hand by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7 (“God is more truly thought on than named, and exists more truly than he may be thought”), and by the Philosopher *On Interpretation* 1.16a3-4 (“Words are signs of affections” that is of concepts): therefore there cannot be a sign of some remote signified thing save under the idea under which the concept is the proximate sign of it. The minor is proved by the saying of *Exodus* 33.20: “No man will see me and live;” and by reason, because the proper concept, if it were had, would include virtually a proper knowledge of all the things that are necessarily in God; the proof of this consequence is that, universally, the proper concept of a subject, even in creatures, virtually includes a proper knowledge of everything that is in the subject; and then would follow further that, just as he who has the proper concept of a subject can naturally know simply all that is knowable about the subject, so the wayfarer who has such a concept could naturally know all necessary truths about God, and consequently all that we have faith about, as to unity and trinity in divine reality and as to creative and incarnative power, and so about the other things necessarily belonging to God.

To the contrary:

In *Psalms* 75.2: “Great is my name in Israel;” and *Exodus* 3.14-15: “These things shalt thou say to the children of Israel: He who is sent me to you, this is my name etc.”

Further, Augustine *Against Adimantus* ch.13 n.2: “That inestimable sublimity must, in order to be adapted to the ear, be signified by human signs.”

Further, by reason: the wayfarer can have a proper concept of God, therefore he can also name him with a proper name. – The proof of the antecedent is that he can know by natural reason that some being is first and infinite, and that it is unique and a ‘this’; therefore he can have a concept of that essence as it is a ‘this’ (but such a concept seems to be most proper to any object, namely to conceive as it is a ‘this’, in itself).

Here is one opinion [Henry of Ghent], as follows:

A name or vocal word must be a symbol between the speaker and the spoken to, such that the signified thing be in itself known to each of them, and also that each know that the name is imposed to signify that thing; but the truth of the divine nature is known, as to the idea of its immensity, only to God; therefore only he can appropriate a proper name to himself. Now the opinion subjoins for the second minor (to be assumed under the first major) that the blessed know that essence in itself; therefore by some word (as a sign of that essence) under that idea they can name God, whether that word be instituted by God or by one of the blessed. The third minor is that the wayfarer cannot conceive the divine essence, neither as to the idea of its immensity (this is proper to God) nor in the same way that the blessed see it; and therefore a sign imposed on the essence in the first or second way cannot lead them to any knowledge of the divine essence, just as neither can someone born blind be led to a knowledge of colors by the words which those lead themselves by who see and know colors, through recollection, to a knowledge of colors. Fourth minor: the intellect of the wayfarer can in some way conceive God; therefore he can name him in a proportional way. – The opinion adds there that no name proper to God, imposed at will, can be transferred from creatures (because any such name is also common to creatures and is imposed on them first), but that that name must be first and principally imposed on him, up to the little extent that God can be known by creatures. The inference is further drawn that this name ‘God’ signifies, from its imposition, what is simply more perfect, as if in sum and in general by comparison with other names which

express as it were in particular fashion something that has the idea of dignity in God, as are 'wise', 'good' etc. Also this name 'God' is imposed on him first, such that it does not belong to creatures save by transference (the way Moses was called the 'god of Pharaoh', *Exodus* 7.1); therefore of all Latin names the name proper to him is this name 'God', and proper in this way in the Greek tongue is the name 'Theos'.

How the major in the reasoning of this opinion is true will be stated in the solution of the question. But the minors, or the diverse parts of the same minor, seem doubtful. The first indeed, namely that 'only God knows himself under the idea of his immensity', is, as to its affirmative part that 'he thus knows himself', most certain. But as to its negative part, namely that 'no intellect knows God under that idea', it is refuted as follows:

No operative power can be most perfectly at rest save in an object that includes the highest perfection possible for the adequate object of the power; but infinity or immensity is the perfection possible for being or truth, or for any transcendent idea, and one or other of them is the adequate object of any intellect; therefore a created intellect is not perfectly at rest save in God under the idea of his immensity. – The major is proved by an example from sight and from the visible object agreeable to it, and by reason, because, whenever anything else is had, the power still has an inclination to something not had and more principle than what is had. The first part of the minor was proved in distinction 2 [I d.2 n.147], the second part in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.137].

The second refutation is as follows: only an act of intellection that 'comprehends God' is repugnant to a created intellect; but some act of intellection of God 'according to the idea of his immensity' can exist that does not comprehend God; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that an act that comprehends an infinite object is infinite in intensity, because it is as perfect in idea of act as the object is perfect in idea of object, and so it is simply adequate; but there can be of an object as it is immense a non-infinite act, because, just as the object can be simply more perfect than the act, and this under the idea under which it is the object of the act, so it can also be infinite without infinity of act. A confirmation is that there seems to be no reason why there could not be about an object 'under the idea of infinity' an act more perfect in one intellect and less perfect in another.

With this part of the minor refuted, the corresponding conclusion is refuted, – and first as follows:

Someone who names an object under some idea does not have to comprehend the object under that idea, but it is enough that he distinctly apprehend it; a created intellect can thus apprehend God under the idea of immensity (the thing is plain from the reasons already set down); therefore, etc. – The proof of the major is that Adam imposed names on diverse animals proper to them and yet he did not comprehend them, because then he would have known them with a perfection equal to that which the soul of Christ had, which is not maintained.

Second, because a natural sign is more truly a sign than one imposed at pleasure; a created act of intellection can be a natural sign of God as to the idea of his immensity; therefore someone so understanding can impose on God a sign at pleasure. – The proof of the minor is that intellection, as it is of the object, is a natural sign of it (Aristotle *On Interpretation* *ibid.* "Words are signs of affections" and this naturally so), which is for this reason, that intellection is the proper idea of the object; but it was proved before that some created intellection can be of God under the idea of his immensity.

Third, because any name is a finite sign, even if it be imposed by God himself according to the idea of his immensity; therefore, in order for it to be a sign for someone who understands, there is no need for that someone to have an infinite intellection of it. God can, then, be named with some name or other by a finite intelligence, nay more, God cannot name himself with any name that as much exceeds the name by which he is nameable by the blessed as the comprehension of God exceeds the apprehension of the blessed; and no wonder, because neither does there need to be for us a proportion of a name to a named thing when signifying it, just as neither a proportion of intellection to the intellection of the one who imposes or uses it, – and therefore a name imposed by one of them can be a sign for both of them. Thus therefore, this name imposed by God who comprehends can be a sign common to himself and the blessed, because it only signifies finitely, and so neither does it require in the user an infinite intellection.

The fourth part of the minor, although it be itself true when maintaining that the wayfarer could not have a proper quidditative concept of God, and although the blessed has imposed a name to signify the sort of proper concept that he has of God, yet there is argument that it is repugnant to what he [sc. Henry of Ghent] said elsewhere:

First as follows: for he concedes that the wayfarer has some quidditative concept of God, and plainly so because otherwise no one could have a qualitative or relative concept of God, for a qualitative concept always requires some quidditative one wherein it is; but according to him a quidditative concept of God cannot be had that is common to God and creatures; therefore it will be a proper concept and so simply primarily diverse from the concept of a creature. Therefore the name that is imposed on God under his proper idea would not be a name for the wayfarer just as neither is the name of color for one born blind. – If it be said that the wayfarer cannot intuitively understand God as the blessed can, this is not an obstacle, because an intuitive concept of the thing signified by the name is never given by the name, but only some recollection for considering a thing already known; the point is plain from the example, for a blind man not born blind, because he did once see colors, does very well use the name of color as a sign common to him and someone sighted, because both can understand colors by recollection, even though the blind man cannot now intuit colors.

The second argument is as follows: a perfect object can produce in a proportioned intellect some concept capable of being had about it (the proof of this is that a less perfect object can do this); but the divine essence – according to Henry – can only make in a proportioned intellect a single real concept (other concepts, if any are had, are had by the intellect busying itself about it); therefore the single real concept is the only one capable of being had about that essence. Therefore if he has some concept of God (he does have one!), it will be a proper concept. Nor is concept in this argument taken for the nature of conceiving, but for the formal object terminating the act. – Although the major of this argument seems probable, it may yet be denied of a proportioned intellect (that is an infinite one), because that intellect comprehends with a single concept, and so it is not capable of many concepts about the object in the way an intellect that does not comprehend is; the major may also be denied of any intellect at all, by understanding it of the immediate object that in itself moves the intellect, because, on account of its perfection, it would not move the intellect to imperfect concepts that can be had about itself through the motion of other objects that imperfectly move the intellect to knowledge of itself.

As to the question I set certain things down first:

First, that any name, signifying something that can be present in a particular thing alone, can be called the proper name of that thing, although simply the thing's proper name is only what first signifies it under its proper idea, because only that name is the proper vocal sign of it.

Second I set down that 'to be named by someone' can be understood in two ways: either as a name for the imposer or as a name for the user; and each of these in two ways, that is, perfectly and imperfectly. Using a name perfectly is not only using the name as some natural vocal sound, namely by forming the sound (the way a trained bird can form it), but is to use the name 'as a sign' not only of a concept able to be got through that name by someone else (in this way a Latin speaker could pronounce some Hebrew word to a Hebrew without knowing what he was saying), but also as a sign of a concept possessed by the user, so that thus 'to use a name perfectly' is to use it as a sign expressive of a proper concept; but to use it as in some way the cause of the hearer's having a like concept by recollection is not necessary for simply using it perfectly but for perfectly using it as a sign common to two people, and therefore this is required for perfectly using the name morally, because it is required for using the name for the due end. And both these perfections are touched on by Augustine *Enchiridion* ch.22 when he says: "Words are introduced so that by them someone may put forward his thoughts for the knowledge of another;" behold the first perfection 'his thoughts', – behold the second 'for the knowledge of another'. Understand the 'of another' (or 'as it were of another') in that sometimes someone by speaking leads himself more effectively to knowledge by recollection than without speaking (to a knowledge then, I say, that is not new), as when we speak to God in prayer; again, as to the first perfection, I draw a distinction in 'his thoughts', because either he has a concept as proper as the name signifies it (and then he signifies 'his thoughts' perfectly), or he has a less proper or a confused concept, as for example when someone who has only the concept of animal puts forward this vocal sound 'man', intending to express to the hearer by this name what others conceive through the name and for which the name was imposed, while knowing that it was imposed on some species under animal but not understanding it with the particularity that the name signifies. The order then is as follows: to use the name as it is such and such a thing; next, to use it as a sign at pleasure of something else, of which however the user has no concept (save in this very universal way, that there is something signified by the name); third, as a sign of something of which the user has only a universal concept (yet he intends to express what is signified by the name, although he does not conceive it thus in particular); fourth, as a sign expressive of the proper concept in particular. And here a prior stage is always imperfect with respect to a later one; the first stage then is most imperfect, the last simply perfect.

Having laid down these premises, let the first conclusion with respect to the question be as follows: it is possible for God to be named by the wayfarer with a name that is simply proper according to the first three ways aforesaid; the second conclusion is this: it is not possible for God to be named perfectly by the wayfarer, namely according to the fourth stage; third conclusion: how God is in fact named by us.

The proof of the first is that, if it is not true, this would only be because one cannot have a proper concept of God, – and because the thing must be conceived the way it is named. But this second point is false: proof, because we have no concept that is *per*

se and proper about any substance; if then it is impossible to name a thing more distinctly than one conceives it, the result is that the wayfarer does not, as user of the name, distinctly signify substance with any name, nor will any name imposed by the wayfarer signify any substance distinctly. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent is too. The first proposition, namely that ‘we do not understand substance distinctly’ was proved above in distinction 3 [I d.3 n.140].

As to how the opposite of the consequent is true (because it is a preamble to the proposed solution), this is made clear first by the denomination of substance, by using the imposed name, – second, by the denomination of it when imposing on it a name.

The first as follows:

By this name ‘man’ we do not intend to signify animal merely (as is plain), but something under animal distinct from horse and other animals; hence this proposition is true for us, ‘man is *per se* distinct from horse’ etc. Nor do we intend to signify by the name ‘man’ some accident or accidents, but the species in the genus of substance only; hence this proposition is true ‘man is *per se* distinct from any accident whatever’, even by the greatest distinctness because in accord with the most general of genera. Nor do we intend to signify some description made up of animal and an accident (or accidents), but rather something *per se* one and of a nature to have in itself a definitive concept that is *per se* one; but that which we intend to signify under its proper idea, although we do not so understand it, this we name imperfectly according to the third stage, as was said before; therefore etc.

The second, namely about imposition as about use, is similarly plain:

For just as, if Adam, when understanding man under its proper idea, imposed on it a name proper to it, which name, when I use it, I intend to signify the thing the way its name was imposed on it (about which, however, I do not have a concept save an imperfect one in general, or accidentally, or in some description), so I, if I were likewise to understand the same thing when it was not yet named, could impose a name on it, intending by that name to signify it in just the way I intend now to signify it with a name already imposed by another. And when someone imposes a name like this, although he do not have a concept of the thing save under some description, which is signified by the etymology of the name, yet the name is not imposed to signify that etymology or description, but the substance of which it is the description; just as this name ‘stone’ is not imposed to signify this action ‘striking the bone of the foot’ (because then stone would be in the genus of action *per se*), but it is imposed on the substance under its proper idea, of which substance this is a sort of description ‘striking the bone of the foot’. This point is also plain, because sometimes many names are imposed on the same thing, not from the same property but from different ones, as stone-rock; nor are the names imposed on the properties, because then they would not be names of the same thing *per se*, nay one would be a name of something in the genus of action and the other of something in the genus of passion (as ‘rounded down by being struck by the foot’).³⁴²

It is plain, then, that the reason for the imposition of a name is one thing (and it is what the etymology signifies) and what it is imposed on is another; and so although the one imposing it did not have a distinct concept save of the reason for which he imposed

³⁴² Tr. ‘Rounded down by being struck by the foot’ is an Englished version for the etymology of ‘rock’ mimicking the Latin ‘pede trita’ (‘worn down by the foot’), given by Scotus, for the Latin ‘petra’ (‘rock’).

the name, yet he did not impose the name on that reason but on the substance of which the reason is the description, and on the substance under its proper idea, which however he does not thus understand, – and consequently he names it as imposing the name imperfectly in accord with the third stage.

Twenty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether Person, according as it says Something Common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely Something of Second Intention

1. About the twenty third distinction I ask whether person, according as it says something common to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, says precisely something of second intention.

That it does not:

The proof is that a person is the term of a real production and is adored; a second intention does not terminate a real production nor is adored; therefore, etc.

2. Further, the Trinity in divine reality is not a matter of concepts only but of things, – against the error of Sabellius; therefore, etc.

3. On the contrary:

Everything common to many things that is univocal, distinct, and multiplied in them, is said of them according to some idea of a universal; person is a common univocal to the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7; therefore person is said of them according to some idea of a universal; and if it state some second intention, there would truly be in divine reality some idea of a universal, which does not seem discordant; but if it state a first intention, there will be in divine reality a real common universal, and so some potential reality, – this is discordant.

I. Opinion of Others

4. [Exposition of the opinion] – An assertion here [of Henry of Ghent] is that person only states a second intention:

5. Because what an individual is in any nature that a supposit is in substantial nature and a person in intellectual nature; but individual and supposit state only a thing of second intention; therefore person too states only a thing of second intention.

6. A confirmation of the reason is that the nature in which these are [individual, supposit, person] does not belong to their *per se* idea; for nature is set down in the definition of them as something added, therefore it does not vary their formal ideas.

7. Again, everything common said of many things is said of them according to the idea of some universal; therefore if person signify a thing of first intention, common to the three persons, it will state it of them under the idea of a most general genus, or of some intermediate genus, or according to some idea of most specific species, – the

opposite of all which is manifest. Not under the idea of most specific species because it would follow that there will be as it were two most specific species with respect to the same persons; for deity – according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* ch.48 – indicates as it were the species that surrounds and embraces the hypostases [I d.8 n.41], and person will indicate the most specific species with respect to them. Therefore, etc.

8. There is added to this opinion [n.4] that although person state something of second intention, yet it does not state it in the abstract but in the concrete, – and therefore it can be predicated of a thing of first intention and supposit for it. An exemplification: in the statement ‘species is a second intention’ species is taken for the very intention in itself – and in the statement ‘species is predicated of many things differing in number’ etc. species is taken for the thing that it denominates; for this intention ‘species’ is not, as it seems, predicated of many things, but man is so predicated or ass, of which this intention is stated.

9. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, and first against him who holds it [Henry]:

Whenever from the formal constituents of certain things something common of first intention can be abstracted, then with equal or greater reason something can be abstracted from the constituted things; but the divine persons – according to them [the followers of Henry] – are constituted formally by relations. But from those constitutive relations can be abstracted something real of first intention; for paternity is a relation and filiation is a relation,^a and this when taking relation univocally, because there can be certitude about a concept of inward relation while there is doubt about every special concept whatever – and such a one, being thus certain, not only has certitude about the vocal word but about some concept; therefore the concept of the relation in general is other than the concept of it in particular. Therefore much more will a thing of first intention be able to be abstracted from the things constituted by those relations. – But the assumption about the univocity of relation will be clearer below, in this question.³⁴³

a. [Interpolation] and is predication in the ‘what’; but no second intention is predicated in the ‘what’ of a thing of first intention.

10. Against the opinion [n.4] in itself:

Because every second intention is a relation of reason, not any such relation, but one pertaining to an extreme of an act of the intellect combining and dividing or at any rate comparing one extreme to the other (the thing is plain, because a second intention – in everyone’s view – is caused by an act of the intellect busying itself about a thing of first intention, which act can cause nothing in the object save only a relation or relations of reason); but person does not state a relation of reason, and certainly not a relation pertaining to an act of the intellect combining extremes. But that it does not state any relation of reason is evident because then at any rate it would necessarily co-require the correlative to which it is referred, because it is impossible to understand a relation and not understand that it is in relation to some term and correlative, as every second intention

³⁴³ Vatican editors: this assumption is not dealt with below, for it seems to have regard to the second way [nn.24-25], which Scotus did not complete. The assumption is dealt with extensively in *Reportatio* IA d.25 nn.24-29, although here in n.20, and also in the *Lectura* I d.23 n.20, Scotus did not concede a univocal common quidditative concept abstracted from the constituents of the persons.

requires its correlative (as the species requires the genus for its correlative, and the particular the universal, and so on of others); the point is plain about idea, which is a relation of reason, nor can it be understood save by respect to another. But person is not said to be person of someone, or at least it does not state an extreme of the intellect comparing things.

11. Again, I take their reasoning [of Henry and his followers] to the opposite by taking the same major and the opposite of the minor, that an individual that imports individual unity states a thing of first intention, because unity is a property of being (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 4.2.1003b22-25), and consequently unity follows a thing from the nature of the thing – and this is above all true of the unity that is true unity, of which sort is the unity of the individual; therefore such unity does not state a second intention; and just as unity in any nature does not do this, so neither does unity in intellectual nature; if then person states unity in intellectual nature as individual does in any nature, what follows is the opposite of their conclusion [n.5].

12. Further, against the second reason [n.7]:

Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* I ch.5 n.5 (and it is Lombard's text in I d.25 ch.2 nn.220, 222) says that "things to be enjoyed are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit:" hence, according to him, the three persons are three things; but thing does not seem to state a second intention, and yet it is common to the three persons and is numbered in line with them; therefore one should not say that person, because it is common and multiplied in number several times, signifies a second intention.

13. The Master too, in d.25 ch.2 n.220, expounds three persons through 'three subsistences or three subsistents'; but by subsistence he does not seem to signify a thing of second intention, and yet it is common to the three and multiplied in number with them ('for they are called three subsistences or three subsistents, three beings or three things').^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the aforesaid opinion asks 'how person can be univocally predicated of several subjects in divine reality unless it be a universal', but the same difficulty arises about relation and follows in the same way; for it seems that a common element could be abstracted more from the things constituted than from the constituents. But how something common of first intention can be abstracted and yet not be a real universal will be stated in distinction 25 [Reportatio IA d.25 nn.27-29].

14. Further, against the other thing added [n.8] I argue as follows: an adjective does not determine anything save that which is the term of its dependence; but an adjective cannot be the term of the dependence of another adjective because their dependence is equal; therefore neither determines the other, – and so if this name 'person' is a concrete of the sort in question [n.8], then the statement that there are 'three persons' will not be well made save by understanding another substantive which would be determined by both adjectives; but no such implicitly understood other substantive is given, therefore etc.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Response: there are many concretes that are not adjectives (for example cause, genus, species), and the argument [n.14] is against adjective, not against concrete.

II. Scotus' own Response

15. My response to the question [n.1] is that by taking the definition of person that Richard [of St. Victor] posits in *On the Trinity* IV ch.21, that it is ‘the incommunicable existence of intellectual nature’, by which definition is expounded or corrected the definition of Boethius when he says that person is ‘an individual substance of rational nature’ (because thus it would follow that the soul is a person, which is discordant, and that deity is a person^a), I say that there is nothing in this definition of Richard’s that signifies a second intention, because from the nature of the thing – without the work of the intellect – there is in the Father intellectual nature and incommunicable entity.

a. [Interpolation] and also it would not properly belong to God, because there is no individual save where is something divisible, which does not belong to God; likewise the name of person would belong properly only to man, who alone is properly said to be rational.

16. But this incommunicability is double (which can be understood from what was said in distinction 2 [nn. 379-380]), because ‘communicable to many’ is said in two ways: in one way that is said to be ‘communicable to many’ which is the same as each of them, such that, whatever it is, it is said to be communicable as a universal is to the things under it; in another way something is communicated as a form by which something is but which is not it, as the soul is communicated to the body. And in both ways deity is communicable, and in neither way is person communicable, and so the incommunicability that pertains to the idea of person is double; for which reason the separated soul, although it has the first incommunicability, is yet not a person because it does not have the second, – and each incommunicability is required for the *per se* idea of person, and each is in the thing from the nature of the thing, and so nothing of the idea of person states a second intention.

III. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

17. Against this can be objected that, according to it, person would seem to signify only a double negation of a double communicability,^a – and if this be true then it seems doubtful how negation could be common to the three persons unless some affirmation be common to them because of which such a negation is in them;^b but that affirmation is not ‘deity’, because deity is not multiplied in number along with the three [sc. one does not say ‘three deities’ or ‘three Gods’]; therefore some common positive – as person – must be given first that is abstracted from them before there is such negation, and then the intended proposition is obtained.

a. [Interpolation] Again, I argue as follows: if person formally states incommunicability, then it formally states negation; but negation is a second intention, since it is a being of reason; therefore person states a thing of second intention, which is the intended proposition. – I reply that person does not only state incommunicability but gives to understand the intellectual nature in which it is, as individual gives to understand nature in general. However, I am in doubt whether it state existence formally along with double incommunicability, or only state formally incommunicability-negation and existence in the concrete as a way of having the nature, so that the sense is ‘person is incommunicability having existence in intellectual nature’; and even if one suppose it to be so, I still say that person does not state a second intention (because a second intention, since it is a being of reason, is only caused by the intellect busying itself about something), for that to the knowing of which the thing moves the intellect before any busying of the intellect is not a second intention, but a thing that moves the intellect moves it to negation of

the opposite before any busying of the intellect, because such negation follows the thing from the nature of the thing before any busying of the intellect (and hence it is that one of the opposites moves to knowledge of its opposite before any busying of the intellect, for which reason the Philosopher says that ‘the same science is of opposites’ [*Posterior Analytics* 2.26.69b8-32]). Therefore although it be posited that person only formally states a negation, yet it does not state a second intention, because a negation that follows from the nature of a thing is not a second intention, and negation in general chiefly so, of which sort is incommunicability. When therefore it is said that ‘negation is a being of reason’, I say that it is a negative entity from the nature of the thing; for just as Socrates is man from the nature of the thing, so he is not-ass from the nature of the thing; also negations – in the intellect – are entities, because the first motion of the intellect (not first before affirmation but first before negation) is to apprehension of negation. – Thus therefore I hold that person is not a name of second intention but of first, and that it formally signifies the double negation of communicability and connotes intellectual nature. And perhaps it also formally imports existence, and then it not only imports a common negation but something positive; or perhaps it does not formally state existence and then there belongs to what it formally signifies only double negation which gives to understand a double positive, namely nature and the mode of having it. And hereby, whichever way of importing is given, the answer to the arguments [nn.1-2] is plain, because if person states existence in the abstract and the way of having it in the concrete, it is formally positive, and then person is formally incommunicable existence possessing an intellectual nature; but if it only formally imports negation, then it connotes existence in the nature, and thus it stands for that which is incommunicable, – and thus is person adored and is a term of real production. But to the other argument [n.2] the answer will be plain elsewhere, in distinction 25 [*Reportatio* IA d.25 n.24; also above nn.12-13, and below n.24].

b. [*Interpolation*] because negation does not seem common to the three unless it follow a common affirmation.

18. Even if it state such negation precisely, it does not seem to state the whole idea of person, because person states something pertaining to dignity, but negation posits no dignity or perfection.

19. It seems too that it states a relation of reason, because of the fact that its opposite – namely what is communicable – only states a relation of reason in the divine essence; for essence is communicable to the Son and yet essence is not really referred to the Son; therefore communicable too states a relation of reason.

20. To the first of these objections [n.17] I say that from the ultimate distinctive and constitutive factors of the persons nothing common that is said in the ‘what’ of them can be abstracted from them, because these factors are primarily diverse, that is, they do not include anything really the same (for in that case it would be possible to ask about them what they were distinguished by [I d.3 n.132]); and therefore everything common abstracted from them is either a concept altogether negative or at any rate is not a quidditative concept of reason. But it is certain that some common negation can be abstracted from those ultimate factors, and that a negation of one idea, because negation is of one idea by the fact that it opposes an affirmation of one idea. Therefore whatever things an affirmation of one idea opposes, to those things belongs a negation of one idea, – and so to the three persons, and also to the ultimate factors distinctive of them, there can belong some common negation. But if that negation be said to be incommunicability, and if it be posited that incommunicability alone is of the *per se* idea constitutive of a person (so that personality be ‘incommunicability of what subsists in intellectual nature’, and everything beside the first [sc. incommunicability] be an addition to the idea of person), then person properly does not state some concept of second intention; for every concept is a concept of first intention that is of a nature to be caused immediately by the

thing, without work or act of the busying intellect, of which sort is not only a positive but also a negative concept.

21. And if this be posited, then when it is doubted ‘how there can be a common negation without a common positive which it is in’, I reply: however diverse things are, even if they have nothing common, they can have a common negation, – just as not-Socrates is a univocal common to everything other than Socrates, beings and not beings. And although the things to which the negation is common have something common that is positive, yet it is not necessary that the common negation be in them because of that common positive; for non-rationality agrees with the ultimate difference of horse and ass, and not because of something common to the things to which that negation belongs, because either there is nothing common to the ultimate differences, or if entity is common to them, such negation yet does not belong to them because of entity, just as neither is the contrary affirmation opposed to them because of entity.^a

a. [Interpolation] And so one should say that the major [interpolation b to n.17] is false, for a negation is of one idea because it is opposed to an affirmation of one idea and not because it follows an affirmation of one idea; for not-man is of one idea because man, to which it is opposed, is of one idea and not because it follows an affirmation of one idea; for not-man is common to being and not-being, to which nothing affirmative or positive is common.

22. And when, second, it is objected that ‘negation does not state anything of dignity’ [n.18] (and for this can also be adduced the reasons for the principal conclusion, that ‘negation is not adored’, ‘nor is it even a term of a real action’ [n.1]), – it could be said that negation in a genus differs from negation outside a genus and from privation. Privation indeed requires an appropriate subject, either in itself if it is a privation in itself, – or in a genus, if it is a privation in genus (the way a mole is called blind, *Metaphysics*, the chapter on privation, 5.22.1022b24-27). Negation outside a genus requires absolutely nothing, because it is said equally of being and not-being. But negation in a genus is as it were in the middle, because it requires a subject of which to be said, though it does not indicate aptitude for a form; such negation is perhaps imported by diversity (about which elsewhere [I d.18 qq.1-2]), because it indicates such non-identity in being – therefore incommunicability, as it is included in person, can name such non-identity, because it indicates the negation of a double communicability in intellectual nature; nor yet does it state any aptitude for communicability, but it states the negation in positive intellectual nature, – and so it states dignity, not by reason of what is signified, but by reason of what is connoted and of the subject, and thus can person be conceded to be adored and generated (just as ‘a blind man walks or is loved’, not because the blindness is the principle of the walking, but because that in which such privation exists is the subject in respect of such predicate).

23. When argument is raised about the communicable and incommunicable [n.19], I say that one opposite can be a relation of reason and the other a real relation (or at any rate a real negation or privation of some relation), just as ‘the same’ with perfect identity states a relation of reason (*Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4, on ‘the same’), and yet ‘diverse’ – which denies this identity – belongs to a thing without act of reason or intellect; and the reason is that, although something not belong to a thing save from work or act of intellect, yet that something can be opposed to the thing of itself, without any act of intellect, just as universality is opposed to Socrates, although universality does not belong to man save

through an act of intellect working and busying itself about man. Although therefore communicability state only a relation of reason in the essence, yet it can be opposed to person by something that is real, and incommunicability can belong to person on the same basis.

24. If therefore this way is supposed as certain (that from person can be abstracted some negative concept of negation in a genus, and this abstracted not only from the persons as wholes but also from the formal constituents of them [nn.20-23]), there is a further doubt whether only such a common negative is abstractable from them or some common positive.

And it seems one should posit something positive, capable of being abstracted from them, because of what Augustine says in *On Christian Doctrine* and of what the Master says in the text of distinction 25, which were adduced against the first opinion [nn.12-13].

25. It can be said that from individuals can be abstracted not only the species, which states the quiddity of the individuals, but also something quasi-proper.³⁴⁴

Twenty Fourth Distinction Single Question

Whether Number properly exists in Divine Reality

1. About the twenty fourth distinction I ask whether number properly exists in divine reality.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] [References to Henry, John, *Metaphysics*, Damascene, Avicenna, contained in the *Reportatio*]

On the contrary. – Boethius: “That is truly one in which there is no number.” Again, one is prior in nature to two. Again, part than whole. Again, either in substance or in relation.

Solution. – ‘One’ is double (synonym): that which follows form and is the principle of number and adds above ‘one’ the idea of measure (and therefore it is in the genus of quantity), – that which follows form because of matter; thus there is a double number in Averroes, *Metaphysics* 5 com.12 (or triple number: formal, mathematical, sensible). The first number exists there [in divine reality], by the ‘one’ that preserves unity; the second number is not there; or otherwise: for there is not number there simply but along with determination of forms.

Response. – Numbered things are several things divided, hence they are not counted in a whole save potentially; they are of a nature to be contained in the unity of one continuous thing. All are of a nature to be a unit, therefore they are of one species and located in different parts of the matter.

In God there are no things divided from each other, because of unity of essence; by the opposite fact there is formal number in an immaterial species.

Again, whatever is there [in divine reality] is as it were a species, but does not make a many contained under the same species; therefore only number ‘in a certain respect’ is there (namely with the addition of the persons and the attributes), such that if these are of one species, absence of division prevents numbering them – if there is division of the essence, difference of species prevents numbering them; number there agrees with mathematical number because it arises from unity of essence and from the root, – it differs because here [in divine reality] the unity is not divided but is distinguished as it were in species (in this it agrees with formal number, but it

³⁴⁴ Vatican editors: Scotus did not finish the question but left here a blank space.

[formal number] is never rooted in one singular form, and the difference there [in divine reality] is through absolute forms, here [in formal number] not).

To the first [argument – see opening paragraph of this note]: it is not one in number, because it does not constitute number. To the second: he is speaking of number along with determination, namely of persons. To the third: multitude is more known to us and is marked by position – but a multitude is a division of units, which is negation of union, therefore they are not ‘many’ save along with determination; contrariwise in God; although according to the mode of the name it [‘one’] signifies negation, the negation is only of a negation [‘one’ denies ‘division’ and ‘division’ denies ‘union’], and so it is, as to real being, a true positive.

2. I respond:

Either one posits that number has formal unity, with respect to which formality the unities are material and as it were the matter of the form, – or one posits that number is one only by aggregation of units,^a as a heap of stones is said to be one by aggregation of stones.

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] A number of distinct things exists not only by aggregation but by distinction of beings.

3. Which of these is true will be said elsewhere when number is dealt with.³⁴⁵

4. In the first way [n.2] I say that number does not exist in divine reality, because each person is infinite and each personal property is the same as the infinite. But nothing that is formally of itself infinite, or the same as the infinite, is potential or a part of something, because then there would be something greater than the infinite (because the whole would be greater than the infinite, provided only a part were infinite), and therefore if this position is maintained there will not be number in divine reality.

5. If the second position is true, namely that number is only one by aggregation of units [n.2], since aggregated things are simply diverse, such that they do not make nor are they something *per se* one (rather they are less one than things that are one *per accidens*), and what is in divine reality is the same as something truly one, namely the essence, – the result is that there is no aggregation there of thing with thing, and so there is no number there according to the second position.

6. If however number has being in the intellect only, when the intellect conceives many units or many unities at the same time, then since some intellect can conceive three persons together or one alone (not conceiving the three persons), and since a concept in the case of conceiving one person without conceiving three persons is not as perfect and complete (hence certain distinct articles of the faith have regard to distinct persons), there can be posited in the intellect as it were one total concept of the Trinity.

7. But passing over whether number is in the intellect and speaking of number in reality – I say that, when holding either one of the two first concepts [nn.4-5], number simply is not in divine reality. Yet number is conceded to be there ‘in a certain respect’ (namely with the determination of persons [sc. ‘three persons’]), because in that case an abstraction is made of that which – in number – does not state imperfection (namely of distinctness) from that which does indicate imperfection (either in each of the numbered things or at any rate in one of them), namely abstraction from potentiality, if the number is one according to form, or from diversity, if the number is one by aggregation of several

³⁴⁵ Vatican editors: no such treatment of number by Scotus exists.

unities. Yet there is well conceded there is a distinction without diversity or potentiality (or even aggregation), which indicate some imperfection of unity.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] As to the remark in *Metaphysics* 106.1057a3-4, about the 'one' that constitutes number etc. ["For number is a multitude, measurable by a one."] add: 'one' in the intellect, by a unity of order, can have the idea of measure according to reason; number is such a 'one', through definite distance of the last unit from the first; therefore number is a measure according to reason (it is thus perhaps that Augustine was speaking about time). – On the contrary: 'a measured thing' is measured in accord with something of itself; if in accord with quantity, then it is in itself a discrete how much.

Response, by maintaining the common way:

The units that are parts of number are of one nature, and they are not merely one concept but the individual units are of one nature. Second: 'ones' are distinct such that one unit does not include in itself the other unit; therefore a unit of nature does not make a number along with a unit of supposit, nor with a unit of formality, because nature is included in the second and includes the third. Thirdly, in each unit and each 'one' there is required potentiality of part to whole.

Because of the first fact God is not numbered along with creatures, because his singular unity – which is existentially in God – is not of the same nature with other unity (because then it [God's unity] would be narrowed down by the qualification 'infinite' [sc. infinite unity] and so God would be composite).

Because of the second fact, a white thing and a sweet thing are not two, but whiteness and sweetness are two. The reason is grammatical, that an adjectival term of number determines a substantive; the substantive in the first case is the subject [sc. the thing that is white and that is sweet], and what is indicated about it is that the subject is two distinct units – in the second case [sc. whiteness, sweetness] the substantive is the form as form; for the same reason whiteness and colored-ness are two, but whiteness and color are not, because one unit includes the other unit [sc. whiteness includes color as part of its definition], just as de-whitening includes both natures [sc. whiteness and color are both included in the definition of de-whitening]. A cause could also be assigned for these on the basis of the first fact, namely that the unit of a supposit, the unit of a nature, and the unit of a formality are not of the same nature; so none of them is counted up along with the others.

Because of the third fact nothing outwardly or inwardly intrinsic in God is countable, because neither is it potential; yet by extending number to distinction among entities, number is admitted in divine reality. And these two points – namely entity and distinction between the numbered things – are required for number but are not sufficient; therefore when number on their basis alone is posited, it is imperfectly posited (thus 'three persons').

Corollary: a threefold grouping of stones is *per se* one (according to the common opinion), such that it is not merely this-this-this; the trinity of divine persons is merely this-this-this, and is not any further a one. Another way of speaking would be possible if number in the intellect is posited, because then there is agreement with both cases.³⁴⁶

Twenty Fifth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Person in Divine Reality states Substance or Relation

1. About the twenty fifth distinction I ask whether person in divine reality states substance or relation.

2. Without arguments.

³⁴⁶ Vatican editors: number as posited in the intellect allows one to speak equally correctly of three in the case of a threefold grouping of stones and in the case of a trinity of persons.

I. Response to the Question

3. I reply:

Person does not state a proper relation, because this name ‘person’ is common to the three (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7: “If there are three persons, that which is ‘person’ is common to them”), and not by a commonness of equivocation, as ‘this man’ is common to Socrates and Plato. The phrase ‘this man’ is indeed equivocal because the demonstrative ‘this’ signifies what it points out; not so here [sc. with ‘person’] because an equivocal is not counted up along with equivocals; for dogfish and dogstar are not two dogs, because the counting of something in several things requires the unity of what is counted in them. Person is common in this way, because it is counted (Augustine, *ibid.*).

4. Nor does person state a common relation, – which is proved by Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, because “the Father is not the person of the Son,” nor conversely. And this reason can be deduced as follows: whatever a subordinate [sc. specific] relative is said with respect to, to that same thing the higher [sc. more generic] relative is said, although not said first. An example: if the double is double of the half, and this first, then the double is a multiple of the half, although not first; and not only this but even up to the most general genus it is a relative of the half, although not first, that is, not adequately. Therefore if person stated a common relation, then Father, just as it is Father of the Son first, so Father would be person of the Son *per se*, although not first – which is false.

5. Nor does person state a secondary substance, that is, a quiddity, because this is not counted up in the three [sc. ‘three deities’ is not said]; but person is counted up [sc. ‘three persons’ is said].

6. Therefore [the reply must be] in accord with the two opinions treated of in the question ‘On Person’ in distinction 23 [d.23 n.24], that according to one opinion person states a negation in general, common to the three, and so in this way it does not signify either substance or relation. It does however connote something positive; and first it connotes that of which it is first predicated (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), not as if by what is first understood from it but as a common term connotes the inferior for which it supposit; secondly it connotes the relation whereby such common negation agrees with the Father and likewise with the Son; third and lastly it connotes the essence, which although it is in what is first connoted is yet not in it the reason for the negation.

7. If however the other opinion in that question is held, that person states something positive, abstracted from the three as a quasi-property, not as a species – then it can be said that it signifies a positive ‘what’; but not substance nor relation (and this when extending substance to include both primary and secondary substance), but first something positive that is indifferent to both of them; for the idea of a subsistent, when one holds that the divine persons are relatives, is indifferent to the absolute and to the relative. Yet it gives to understand as a consequence – the way the superior genus gives to understand its inferior species – that for which it is taken, namely the relative of which person is said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second the relations themselves, and third the essence – such that each opinion (set down in distinction 23, *ibid.*) agrees here that person in its first idea states neither relation nor substance, and this

neither primary nor secondary substance. But according to one of the opinions it states a concept of negation (in general) common to the three, and so it states a concept of negation common to the three that is distinct in them; according to the other of the opinions it states a concept of a common thing that is positive and distinct in them. And according to both opinions such a common thing, whether positive or negative, connotes – as its inferior – that of which it is formally said (namely Father and Son and Holy Spirit), and second as it were it connotes the formal elements that are distinct in them, and third the essence that is common to them.

II. The Objections of Others

8. But an objection is raised that person signifies secondary substance (that is, quiddity), because of what Augustine says in *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, that through the phrase ‘three persons’ response is made to the question whereby it is asked ‘what three?’, but ‘what’ is asking for the essence.

9. Further, Augustine says [*ibid.*] that “to be God and to be person are not different things;” therefore person is purely essential, and so it signifies a secondary substance, that is, quiddity.

10. To the first of these [n.8] I say that ‘what’ sometimes is asking for the definition and sometimes is asking for that about which something is said. The first is plain from the *Topics* 5.101b39: “Definition is a statement indicating the ‘what is’ of something.” The second is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 10.2.1053b27-28: “the whole question is what is ‘one’, how it is being and what being it is, because to say that this very thing is its nature is not enough” (he means to say that it is not enough to say that the ‘one’ is principle, the way the old philosophers said the ‘one’ was principle, like the Platonists, but something must be asserted that is what the ‘one’ is said about). And accordingly the question ‘what is the element’ has a double response; one is to give the essence of the element, and the other is to give that about which element is said, as ‘fire is an element’. Now when Catholics were confessing the ‘three’ (according to the canonical epistle of *John* ch.5), the heretics asked ‘what three?’, not questioning what the definition of the word was, but asking what the substantive was that was determined by the adjective ‘three’ (or, what thing ‘three’ was being said of) – and to this question response was well made by the remark ‘person’. When therefore it is assumed that ‘what’ asks about the essence, this is not generally true, nor is it true in particular of the issue at hand [n.9].

11. As to the second, from Augustine [n.9], the answer will be plain in the following distinction, that person is referred to itself (both in itself and in its specific subordinates), although it is not referred to itself as essence is referred to itself, and this provided the position is laid down that the persons are constituted in personal existence by certain absolutes; but if this position is not laid down, then expounding Blessed Augustine’s authority seems difficult; but there will be discussion of this in the next distinction [d.26 n.52].^a

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Henry of Ghent says [a.43 q.2]: “A specific relation under its genus is not distinguished save by what it is founded on, and so there is no universal nature truly in it save for the fact it is founded on a universal” (he gives an example about likeness and whiteness); “but every divine relation is founded on the essence, which cannot in any way have the idea of a

universal,” because a universal nature is “that nature alone which is nature only by reason of quiddity” (Avicenna, *Metaphysics* V), “without reference to the idea of universal or of particular, but of a nature in itself to receive the idea of each of them; a singular by determinate existence in a supposit, – a universal by the fact it is of a nature to fall under consideration by the intellect, taken as one in its idea, applicable by predication to the many particulars it is multiplied over,” that is, “of itself it is a certain singularity;” “although therefore relation is predicated univocally of paternity and filiation, yet it is not a universal.”

Twenty Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether the Persons are Constituted in their Personal Being through Relations of Origin

1. About the twenty sixth distinction I ask whether the persons are constituted in their personal being through relations of origin.

That they are not:

Relations of origin are of different ideas, just as are relations differing by species in creatures; the point is clear, for paternity and filiation differ more, or paternity differs more from filiation, than filiation differs from filiation or paternity from paternity; therefore things constituted formally by these relations differ in species. The persons therefore differ in species, and so generation is equivocal in divine reality – all which was disproved in distinction 7 [nn.51-64, 47-50].

2. Again, the idea by which the relations of origin constitute persons is the same idea by which common relations constitute them, and so the same person would be constituted by a double formal constitutive feature, – which is unacceptable. The inference is proved by the fact that common relations require equal distinctness in the extremes, and they in the same way stand along with unity of essence; therefore they distinguish equally [sc. as the relations of origin do].

3. Further, opposite relations of the second kind of relatives [sc. relations of active and passive, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b26-32] can be based on the same thing, the way the will moves itself; but the relation of mover and moved pertains to the second mode of relatives; therefore by parity of reasoning the relations of producer and produced, which pertain to the same mode, can exist in the same thing, – and so they will not distinguish opposites.

4. The reason is confirmed by Boethius, who at the end of his book *On the Trinity* ch.6 says that this relation is as it were ‘of the same thing toward itself’. Therefore these relations are not distinct.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Note. Relations are distinguished either by species or by number.

If they are distinct by species, this distinction is received because of a distinction in the foundation, and that in two ways: either because there are two foundations in the some related thing, – and then it is plain that the two relations founded on them are distinct in species (as Socrates by his generative power, through the medium of a previous act, is related to Plato by the

relation that is 'paternity', – and by another relation, founded on whiteness, that is called 'likeness' he is related to a white thing; and these relations are different in species); in another way there can be a distinction of foundations, not in the related thing itself in which the relations are, but in the terms to which those relations are relations (for example, by the same whiteness Socrates is fundamentally related by the relation that is 'likeness' to a white thing and by the relation that is 'unlikeness' to a black thing; and these two relations are distinguished by species through a distinction of foundations in the extremes to which the related thing, in which the two relations are, is related).

If one asks about numerical distinction, I say that sufficient for this is either of the two aforesaid distinctions and their foundations (the proof is that whatever suffices for the distinction of certain things in species, suffices for a distinction of them in number); and I speak of the distinction of essence, not of a distinction of supposit or subject. A distinction also of related things suffices for a numerical relation between them (the proof is that the same relation in number never exists in two related things, as neither does any other accident). A distinction of terms in number also suffices for a distinction of the relations in number (the proof is that one of them can remain when the other does not remain). A numerical distinction of foundations also, along with unity of subject and term, suffices for a numerical distinction of relations; hence, when the unity of the related thing and the term remain, but a variation is made in the foundation of the relation, then there is not in each of them (namely the related thing and the term) the same relation in number, because by the action of a natural agent no return is made to the same thing in number. An example of this last point: white Socrates is related to Plato in the relation that is called 'likeness'; but if afterwards he become black, then he is not related to Plato by any such likeness; but if again become white, then he is related to him by 'likeness', but not by the same likeness in number as before.

Hence note that a specific distinction of relations is founded on a distinction of the foundations existing in the related thing in which the two relations are, or in the extremes to which the related thing is by the aforesaid relations related. But sufficient for a numerical distinction of the relations is either of the distinctions of the aforesaid foundations (whether of the subject or of the term) toward which the relation is.

The reason for all the aforesaid points is that, whenever many things are required for something, a distinction of any of them suffices for a distinction of it; and for the unity of it there is required a unity of all the other things required. Hence for the unity of something more things are required than for its distinction.

[*Additional note:*] Note that a white man is like blackness in whiteness [sc. because white and black are both qualities qualifying a subject?] and unlike the same in color, and these relations are yet distinct in species although they have the same terms. So correct these additions in this way.

5. On the contrary:

Boethius, *ibid.*: "The essence contains the unity, the relation multiplies the trinity."

I. Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

6. The response of some – as of Praepositinus – is that the persons are distinct by themselves, and so there is no need to ask by what they are formally distinguished or by what they are constituted, because they do not have a constitutive element.

7. A confirmation of this reason is that a divine person is as equally simple as the essence; but the essence, because of its simplicity, is distinct by itself from anything else; therefore the person is too.

8. Again, abstract and concrete signify the same thing, – therefore paternity is the Father. Therefore to say the Father is distinct by paternity is to say that he is distinct by himself.

9. Argument against this as follows:

Things that are not primarily diverse are distinct by some part of themselves, because things that are wholly distinct are primarily distinct (for if they are not primarily diverse but are beings in some way the same, then they are not distinct by that by which they are the same but by something of themselves by which they are not the same); but the divine persons are not primarily diverse, because they belong to the same essence; therefore one must still ask by what they are made distinct.

10. Again, there are many properties in the same person, as not being begotten and action-generation in the Father; but they are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, where he means that if the Father were not unborn yet he could be Father, and conversely; therefore although – *per impossibile* – one property would not distinguish the Father from anything, the other property could distinguish him, and conversely. Therefore one must ask by what the Father is distinct from the Son.

11. Again, in the Father there is active generation and active inspiring; active inspiring does not distinguish him from the Son, because it exists in the Son; therefore the Father is not equally primarily distinguished by his whole total self but by something that is in him.

12. Again, in the *Preface about the Trinity*, “a property in the persons” is spoken of; but a person is not in itself in the way that a property is understood to be in a person; therefore a person can be said to be distinguished formally by a property in a way that a person is not distinguished first in itself.

13. There is also argument against this opinion [n.6] that if the Father is distinct in his totality from the Son then also by parity of reason he is distinct in his totality from the Holy Spirit, – and the converse inference holds; and if he is distinct from both by the same thing, then he has the same relation to both; therefore conversely too, each of them has the same relation to him, and a relation of the same idea (just as if Paul is like Peter and Linus, then Peter and Linus have the same likeness and a relation of the same idea to Paul), and then the Son would seem to be distinguished from the Father by a relation of the same idea as that by which the Holy Spirit is distinguished from the Father.

14. But perhaps this argument is not conclusive, because whatever be way the Father is constituted in personal being, he would be distinguished personally from the Son and the Holy Spirit; yet it does not follow conversely that the Son and Holy Spirit would be distinguished from the Father by something of the same idea.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

15. There is another opinion, the common one, which says that the persons are constituted by relations.

16. For this opinion the authority of Christ is alleged in the Gospel (*Matthew*, last chapter), as will be touched on below against the third opinion.

17. For this opinion is adduced Boethius [n.5], where he seems to touch on many things about it.

18. And Augustine likewise, *On the Trinity* V ch.8 n.9: “Whatever that most outstanding sublimity is said to be in relation to itself, it is said to be substantially;” and a little later: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves, is not taken multiply in a sum but singly.” And *ibid.*: “Whatever is said about the individual persons in relation to themselves is said all at once.” And in ch.11 n.12: “But as to the individual things that are properly spoken of in the same Trinity, these are not in any way said in relation to themselves but to each other – or to the creature; and therefore it is manifest that for that reason they are said relatively not substantially.” – In these words the view seems to be most expressly held that everything said ‘in relation to itself’ belongs to the three persons and is common to them, and everything not common to the three is a relative; but what is constitutive and distinctive of the person is not common to the three; therefore it is a relative.

19. Again, Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10 n.1: “God is whatever he has, save that one person is said in relation to another and is not the other.”^a

a. [Interpolation] “For the Father has the Son, but is not the Son himself.” – Again, Boethius *On the Trinity*: “Substance contains unity, relation multiplies the Trinity,” and many other words in the same place.

20. And with this agrees Anselm *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit*, that everything is one in divine reality “when the opposition of relation does not prevent it.”

21. Again, Damascene ch.8: everything is one in divine reality “besides generation and non-generation and procession; for in these three properties alone do the three holy hypostases differ.”

22. Again, he says in ch.51: “we recognize them in these three alone, paternal, filial, and processional incausability.”

23. Richard of St. Victor seems to say in *On the Trinity* IV ch.19 that the persons are not distinguished in divine reality save by way of having the same nature; therefore etc.

24. Again, by reason:

Because if a person is constituted in divine reality by something absolute, an absolute added to an absolute will necessarily produce composition; but if the divine persons come together in an absolute, clearly the absolute in which they come together is not the same absolute as that by which they are distinguished as persons; therefore they are distinguished by some other absolute. Therefore there is there an addition of absolute to absolute, – therefore composition. This consequence does not hold about relation, because relation adds nothing to the foundation nor does it make a composition with it.

25. This position and this idea are confirmed in another way, that relation in one way can pass over into substance and to this extent does not make a composition with an absolute, and in another way it can remain because of comparison with its opposite and thus it is really distinct. These two ideas do not seem to belong to the absolute, because the absolute either passes over in every way or remains in every way; if it passes over in every way it does not distinguish (as neither does the essence into which it passes), – if it remains in every way then there is composition.

26. Again, the same nature cannot exist in diverse absolute supposits unless it is distinguished from them. For although it could exist in diverse relative supposits (because the same unlimited thing can be the foundation for several relations in diverse

supposits), yet it does not seem able to do this in diverse absolute supposits unless it is distinct and separately counted up in them; for if there were two absolute supposits, it seems that whatever was in one would be other than whatever was in the other; therefore the divine essence would be separately counted up in God if the divine persons were constituted by absolutes.

27. Again, according to everyone, relations exist in the divine persons. Therefore if they do not constitute the persons they will be there as it were accidental and additional to the constituted persons (which seems to oppose the simplicity of the divine persons), and also such relations – which are proper to the persons – will be relations of reason, because the relation of God to creatures is for this reason not real that it presupposes a divine person in perfect existence and not dependent on the creature, and not naturally or necessarily requiring the creature for its own personal existence. Therefore, by similarity, the same seems to hold of the matter at issue: if the first person is absolute, he will not depend on the second, because he is pre-understood to be perfect in his personal disposition before the second person, and consequently he will not necessarily require the second person for his personal existence; therefore his relation to the second person will be only a relation or disposition of reason.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] In addition, some absolute property, if it were to be constitutive, would not be merely virtually in God, because then God would not be this person more by this property than he would be an ass (for God virtually includes the perfection of an ass in itself); therefore it must be there actually; therefore it exists there as act. Therefore there will in divine reality be three things.

Further, the absolute property – if it makes a unity with the essence – is either act, or potency, or a perfection of the essence; the essence does not perfect the personal element, because it does not presuppose it, but rather contrariwise; therefore the personal element will be the perfection of the essence. And two discordant things follow: first, that the essence in itself is not altogether perfect, the other that one person is not altogether perfect because he does not have the absolute element of another person (which is a perfection, as shown). – There is also a confirmation of the second point, because according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15, “besides the relations, as to everything else it is either simply better that it is than that it is not – or it is not simply better but in some respect it is better that it is not than that it is;” but what is so in this second way does not exist in God, according to Anselm; therefore as to everything other than relation – that exists in God – it is simply better that it is than that it is not. And from this it follows that no person will be simply perfect, because no person has the absolute element of another; it also follows that two persons are more perfect than one, which is in conflict with Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2.

Further, third, when one absolute is multiplied, every other absolute associated with it is multiplied too (example: when quantity is multiplied, whiteness is multiplied, and conversely); therefore if there were thus distinct proper absolutes associated with the divine essence, they would also distinguish the divine essence. – There is a confirmation too of the major, that several things of the same species cannot exist in the same thing; these absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species, – because, if not, they will be of different species, and so it will be necessary to ask by what it is that one or other of them is incommunicable; for just as it is set down that paternity (which differs in species from filiation) cannot be of itself incommunicable, so will it follow about the *a* in the Father (if it is an absolute) and the *b* in the Son – if they differ in species – that neither of them will be of itself incommunicable, and it will be necessary to come to a stand at some things proper to them of the same idea. A confirmation of this reason is that at least there are not several things of the same idea in the same perfect thing (as in divine reality there are not several Words nor several Fathers), because it seems a mark of imperfection that in some nature there can be several things altogether similar; therefore in the simply perfect divine nature there will not be several absolutes of the same idea.

Fourth: if an absolute property *a* is expressed by the essence, and a property *b* likewise, and the ‘thing expressed’ is in the same supposit as that by which it is expressed (according to the way of expressing posited here), then *a* and *b* will be in one person, and so no person will be originated by another (because the things proper to them will be in the same person), nay it will follow that there will be no personal distinctions.

Fifth: it follows that there is no origin there, because an originated person gets its being through the origin; but person, if it is absolute, precedes the relation itself of origin; therefore the second person would precede in existence its passive origin and so would not have existence through it.

28. But it is further posited, in particular, that not just any relations – even real ones – constitute the divine persons nor distinguish them, but relations of origin, because these burgeon first in the divine essence; because there is first in the essence a double fecundity, insofar as the intellect is infinite and the will infinite, and, by the mediation of these, there burgeon at once the relations of origin that pertain to the communicability of nature, which nature or divine essence is communicated according to the double fecundity just stated; when these are already pre-understood, the common relations, which presuppose them, burgeon, and so such common relations, although they are real, yet do not constitute or distinguish the persons.

29. Now the way that relation can constitute persons and distinguish them is made clear by the fact that the one who produces is necessarily really distinct from his opposite, because the same thing does not produce itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* I ch.1 n.1; therefore there will be some real distinction between some things that exist in divine reality; but these things cannot in any way be there by in-forming, because of the divine simplicity, – therefore the real distinction will be *per se* subsistent in the divine nature; therefore there will be persons really distinct.

30. But as to how no distinction of the essence in which they subsist follows from this is made clear by the fact that the same unlimited reality can be foundation for opposite relations, and then the relation is said in one way to remain and in another way to pass over [into the essence] – and on this point there are many disputes as to what the idea is by which the relation distinguishes.

31. But in brief it can be said – in accord with the present way [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations] – that relation, in the respect in which it is relation, is not formally essence, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “if essence is in relation to another, it is now not essence;” and one can argue conversely: ‘if relation is formally an entity for itself then it is not relation’. Also relation – from the fact it is relation – is of its opposite as of its term,^a and from the fact that it is of its opposite it is necessarily really distinguished from it; and yet there is no need for the essence to be formally distinguished, because essence is not formally a distinct relation. Nor need there be composition there, because although the relation remain in the sense that it is not formally the essence, yet relation – because of the infinity of the essence – passes over into the essence according to perfect identity with it. Relation then remains formally, because the idea according to which it is formally is not the idea of the essence, – and it passes over, because of perfect identity, into the essence, though not into formal identity. And the ‘remaining in this sense’ suffices for formal and real distinction without any distinction of essence; and from the fact that this essence is simple, the distinction will not be of things that in-form but of things that subsist – and from the fact that this essence is infinite, the ‘remaining formally’ will be without composition.

a. [Interpolation] such that to compare it with the essence by not including disposition to the opposite is not to compare relation with essence.

2. Arguments against the Opinion

32. Against this conclusion [sc. that the persons are constituted by relations and not by something absolute] there is argument in four ways: first by comparing relation to the related thing, second by comparing relation to its origin, third from the proper idea of the constitutive thing itself, and fourth by authorities.

33. [First way] – As regard the first the argument is as follows:

Something is related formally by relation (as someone is made white by whiteness), but the relation itself is not related (because according to blessed Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2, “every relative is something when the relation is removed;” and: “If the Father,” he says, “does not exist to himself he will not be anything that is related;” for the relation is not related, because that which is related by a relation is not a something afterwards nor is it simultaneous in nature, – therefore it exists naturally prior); but the essence is not really related, therefore the supposit alone is related; therefore the supposit is really and naturally there prior to the relation. Therefore a divine supposit is not constituted or distinguished first by relation.

34. Proof of the assumptions: everything composite of necessity pre-requires parts and the union of the parts, and this is so not only in a composite that is *per se* one but in a composite that is *per accidens* one; for just as the essence of man pre-exists the essence of body and soul and their union, so the essence of a white man pre-requires the being of man and whiteness and their union. Therefore the being of some related thing, which is said ‘to be related first’ as a quasi-whole, pre-requires relation as the form, and that which is related by the relation as the subject, and their union. Therefore something is first in-formed by relation before it is something relative as a composite, and this is said ‘to be related first’: that prior thing, in-formed by the relation, can be said to be related, because everything in-formed by some form can be said to be of the sort the form is.^a

a. [Interpolation] Therefore nothing in divine reality can be said to be related unless there is something that is said to be denominatively related as it were; and it will not be constituted formally by the relation as *per se* included in it (the point is clear from the difference between the first related thing and that to which it is said to be denominatively related), and this can only be the supposit (this was shown before [n33]); therefore, etc.

35. This reason is confirmed by a likeness, because just as man would not first be animated unless he were *per se* an animated body (being in-formed, as it were, by the soul), so will it be – as it seems – in the question at issue, because nothing that is not first constituted formally in ‘being’ by the relation will be first a related thing unless something is first related as it were denominatively on account of denomination from the relation.^a

a. [Interpolation] In accord with this one can argue – but less effectively – as follows: if the relation is not related neither is the divine essence (as is plain); therefore only a person is related. But what is related exists in itself first. Proof: according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.3a, “if the Father is not something in himself he will not be anything that might be said in relation to another.” – Next by reason, because what is related is not simultaneous in nature with the relation, because nothing is simultaneous in nature with the relation save the relation; therefore that which

is related would be relation, and so relation would be related. Nor is it posterior in nature to the relation, because what is 'of such sort' by a quality is not posterior to the quality (likewise of quantity and other forms); therefore similarly in the case of relation. Therefore some third member must be granted, namely that that which is related is prior to the relation, and then the consequence seems to follow that it is something absolute, because nothing save the absolute seems to be prior to relation.

36. Again a real relation pre-requires a real distinction between the extremes, therefore no relation is first to cause the real distinction between the extremes; therefore not in the present case either. – Proof of the antecedent: the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.9.1018a2-4, about 'the same', proves that identity is not a real relation, because it does not pre-require a real distinction between the extremes.

37. If it be said that a relation is not real which neither pre-requires nor makes a real distinction between the extremes, – on the contrary: then this argument is not valid, 'the extremes are not really distinct, therefore the relation is not real'. For either what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, and then the consequence 'therefore the relation is not real' does not hold, because so could it be taken in the question at issue; or what is taken in the antecedent is that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction made by the relation, – if you thus take 'therefore a distinction between the extremes is not made thereby [sc. by a distinction made by the relation], because it is not a real relation', then to argue from the antecedent so taken that the relation is not real is to argue 'because it is not real, therefore it is not real', which is empty.^a

a. [Interpolation] It can be said in another way that the major [sc. the above antecedent] is true of an accidental relation that is added to extremes already distinct; the relation here is not of this sort, but is a relation that constitutes a supposit that is made formally distinct by the relation. – Against this: to a relation 'whereby it is a relation' there belongs that it be toward another, because if it is not toward another it is not a relation (otherwise one could even say that paternity could be a real relation in abstraction from the Son, if there was no need in any way for the extremes of the relation to be distinct, as there is no such need in the case of identity). For either 'this paternity' is toward something else distinct from mere filiation or it is toward something distinct by a distinction prior to the distinction that would come to it from the Son. If the second holds then the proposed conclusion is obtained [sc. that the persons are not constituted by relation]. If the first holds then to argue 'paternity is not toward something distinct, therefore it is not real' is to argue thus: 'to this relation there is no real relation opposed, therefore it is not a real relation'; but this seems to be a manifest begging of the question, because the antecedent does not seem to be more manifest than the consequent. Therefore in the case of many relations no argument may be constructed to conclude that they are not real on the ground that these relations are not between really distinct extremes, but there would in all cases be a begging of the question.

Again, third, as follows: every relation has its term first in something absolute; but the first term of the relation 'in a person' is some other person and not the essence, because just as the essence is not related so it is not the term of a relation (for thus the term of the relation is distinguished as the related thing is); therefore a person, insofar as it is distinct from another person and is the term of the relation of that person to itself, is absolute. The major will be made clear in distinction 30 [nn.35-38], in the question 'On the Relation of God to Creatures'.

38. [Second way] – In the second way the argument is as follows:^a

A relation cannot be originated save by something absolute previously originated, whether in the related thing or in the term;^b therefore the divine person that is first

originated cannot be merely a subsistent relation, but one must posit something absolute that is originated first.

a. [Interpolation] first from the order that origination necessarily pre-requires, which order seems to be twofold, – for the first originating thing is prior to the originated thing; a relative is in no way prior to its correlative, because these are simply simultaneous; therefore etc. – There is also a confirmation of this reason from the opposite, as it were, of the conclusion, as follows: if the persons are not absolute but are relatives first [then follows n.40]

b. [Interpolation] just as neither can motion be in a '[relation] toward another' save only *per accidens*, because it is *per se* toward an absolute in the subject or in the term of the relation, as is plain from *Physics* 5.2.225b11-13.

39. This reason is also very much confirmed if one denies that the essence is the formal term of this production; for then neither will the originated thing exist toward itself nor will it be the formal term of the origination, – which seems to be unacceptable.

40. Again,^a it will then be the case that for the Father to originate the Son is no other than for the Father to have the Son as correlative; but the Father of himself – by the fact he is Father – has the Son as correlative, because in no instant whether of origin or of nature can the Father be understood without the Son or without being understood to have the Son; therefore the Father of himself, without origination, has the Son, therefore he does not originate the Son if nothing is originated save the correlative.^b

a. [Interpolation] from the priority of the originator to the originated: the originator is prior to the originated; a relative is in no way prior to the correlative, because they are simply simultaneous. – And each reason is confirmed by the fact that it follows from the opposite of the conclusion: if the persons are not absolute but relatives first.

b. [Interpolation] This is more clearly argued as follows: that thing is not originated which possesses – when the being unable to be begotten is posited and all action is abstracted – its whole being; such is the correlative of what is unable to be begotten, because from the nature alone of the relation, as it is first act (with every action or second act removed), the correlative of what is unable to be begotten exists when the unable to be begotten exists; therefore etc.

41. Further, third: every relative equally naturally has regard to its correlative, therefore the inspiriter as equally regards the inspirited as the generator the generated. Therefore if what is produced by each production is merely relative, each is equally naturally produced, and so there will not in divine reality be a double production (by way of nature and by way of will), and then it can be said that the Son is produced by way of will and the Holy Spirit by way of nature as equally truly as the opposite, – which is against what everyone says.

42. Again, then no production in divine reality will be generation, because generation is to primary substance [n.60] as to the produced term; but here relation or the relative is posited as the first thing produced; therefore there will be production in the category of relation and there will not be generation.

43. Again,^a a supposit is in some way pre-understood for action, because each thing is first understood to exist *per se* before understood to act *per se*; if in that prior understanding the supposit is for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. the persons are not constituted merely by relations]; if the supposit is not for itself but toward

another – as toward the Son – then the Son is understood at the same time, and so the Son is pre-understood to generation, and so the Son will not be the term of generation.

a. [Interpolation] from the second priority the argument is, second, as follows: [alternative text] from the priority of originator to origin.

44. And there is a confirmation, because by whatever priority one correlative is pre-understood for something, by that same priority the latter correlative is pre-understood for it, because the of the simultaneity of relatives.^a

a. [Interpolation] One can argue in accord with this about the third priority, namely of relation to person, which is proved by the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.3.1029a5-7: for form is prior to the composite (according to him there), so paternity is prior to the first person and consequently the opposite relation will be prior to the first person; therefore this relation is not obtained by the first person through the action of the first person. The consequence about the opposite relation is proved through the simultaneity of relatives.

45. [Third way] – As to the third way [n.32] the argument is as follows:

Whatever constitutes existence in something, and in the unity corresponding to such existence, is wholly first repugnant to a distinction opposite to that unity (example: if rational first constitutes man in his being and specific unity, rational is wholly first repugnant to a specific distinction such that, when removing if possible or *per impossibile* everything other than rational that is not part of the meaning of rational and keeping only the meaning of rational, a division into diverse specific natures will be repugnant to it). And the proof of this proposition is that if such a distinction is repugnant to the constituted whole, then it is repugnant to it by something; let that something be *a*; if it is wholly repugnant to the *a* itself then the intended conclusion is gained, – if not but it is repugnant to the *a* itself through *b*, there will be a process ad infinitum or, wherever a stand is made, that will be the ultimate constituent in such a unity and a distinction opposed to such unity will be wholly repugnant to it. Therefore if paternity constitutes the first supposit in its personal being under the idea of its being incommunicable, then communicability must of its own idea be first repugnant to paternity.

46. But this seems false for many reasons:

First because, according to those who hold this opinion [n.15], quiddity is not of itself incommunicable; therefore neither is paternity.

47. Second because paternity is not of itself a ‘this’, when everything that is not of the formal idea of paternity has been removed; for when deity is removed, which is not of the formal idea of paternity (according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, ‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’), paternity is not of itself formally infinite, and consequently neither is it of itself a ‘this’ – and if so,^a then neither will it much more be of itself incommunicable, because incommunicability presupposes singularity.

a. [Interpolation] Proof of this consequence: what contains by identity something that is outside its primary idea is in some way unlimited; therefore what formally contains such a thing is simply infinite (for formal containing requires a greater perfection in the container). From this further: if paternity is not of itself a this...

48. Next, third, because any divine relation of origin is equally the same as the divine essence; therefore if it contracts from it some incommunicability, any relation would contract it equally; but this is false, because active inspiriting, although it is a 'this', is yet not incommunicable, for it is in two things, namely the Father and the Son.

49. And from this result is proved, fourth, that since opposite relatives seem to be uniformly related to incommunicability, and since active inspiriting is not of itself thus incommunicable, then neither is passive inspiriting, which is the opposite of active inspiriting, incommunicable; therefore neither will passive inspiriting thus constitute the Holy Spirit in his personal being, which is false.

50. Next, fifth, because even if certain positions are set down, impossible or impossible when the understanding of 'rational' is in place, it would be repugnant for it to be divided into several specific natures; for example if it were set down that 'rational' were the difference of color and that the color could produce substances from nothing, or any suchlike things. But once this impossible position is set down, that the production of the will is prior to that of the intellect, then, when preserving the ideas of generation and inspiriting, active inspiriting would be in one supposit and active generation would then be in two, because there would be communicated to the Holy Spirit – in the instant in which he is inspirited – generative force; therefore now communicability is not formally repugnant to active generation in itself.^a

a. [Interpolation] To this argument about 'the first incommunicable' there is a twofold response:

In the first way that paternity, although it is not incommunicable 'whereby it is paternity', yet divine paternity or paternity 'whereby it is divine' is incommunicable.

In a second way: that subsistent paternity (of which sort paternity is in God) is incommunicable, but not inherent paternity, of which sort is created paternity.

Against the first response, although the three final proofs [nn.48-50] are conclusive, yet I argue otherwise in two ways:

First as follows: when two things '*per se*' constitute a third, neither of them has from the other the condition that is proper to it insofar as it constitutes the third, but each has such condition from itself first. For example, about matter and form: matter does not have from form the potentiality that is its in causing the composite, nor does form have from matter the actuality that is its in compounding; thus too in the case of definition: the genus does not have from the difference a determinable concept, nor does difference have from genus a specific individual act indivisible into several specifically different things. Therefore if a person is constituted from essence and an incommunicable property, neither of these will have from the other what is proper to it; as follows, just as essence does not have communicability from the property but is of itself communicable, after one removes in thought the property, so the property will not have incommunicability from the essence, but will be first such of itself, when the essence is *per impossibile* removed.

Further, essence does not give incommunicability to the Father as it is merely essence, because essence is communicable; therefore as itself it is understood to have paternity virtually in itself, and so the same thing 'as virtually in the essence' will be the reason for itself 'as formally such', – which is unacceptable: first because I ask about it as it is virtually in the essence whether it is communicable or incommunicable; if it is communicable, it will not be the reason for incommunicability in paternity as it is formally in itself, – if it is incommunicable and from the essence (according to this response), the counter argument will again be, as before, that it is not from the essence as it is merely essence, and so the question 'either it is communicable or incommunicable' will be raised *ad infinitum*; second because no unity more truly or intensely belongs to anything as it exists merely virtually than belongs to it as it exists formally, and this when speaking of unity proper to it, and the point is plain as about entity proper; third because what is in another is in it by way of it – therefore what is in the essence virtually, as it is precisely in it, does not exist there as incommunicable.

Against that which is replied afterwards about subsistent relation, that it is incommunicable, I ask: since something must be understood to be a 'this' before it is subsistent, I ask by what is paternity a 'this'? Not of itself, since it is not formally infinite – therefore much more is it not subsistent of itself either; therefore neither is it of itself incommunicable.

51. Again, an argument as to this way [n.32] is made, second, principally as follows: from the ultimate constitutive and distinctive elements of certain things there cannot be abstracted something common that is predicated in the 'what' of these things; proof: because if there is something common to them, they are not first distinguished by that common thing, but they are distinguished by something that contracts them, and so they are not the first distinctive elements; if then they are first distinctives, nothing predicated in the 'what' is common to them. But from paternity and filiation is abstracted that which relation is, and this seems to be something common to them and univocal; for the intellect can be certain about relation and doubtful about this relation and that. Therefore the things from which relation is abstracted are not first distinctives.^a

a. [Interpolation] Response is made by denying the minor [sc. relation as common to paternity and filiation and univocal], by saying that the divine relations are first diverse. – Against this an argument has frequently been made [n.51], and one middle term can be repeated: because then he who knows one origination in divine reality and does not know whether that origination is generation or inspiring, would have no concept save about the verbal sound. Vain then would those problems be that are raised about generation or about production in general, and they are solved by their proper middle terms before asking about productions in particular.

52. Again, third: the first constitutive element of a supposit in any nature seems to make something that is *per se* one with that nature, because it does not seem that the *per accidens* could be 'first simply' in any genus, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23;^a but just as in creatures relation is of a different kind from the absolute and so does not make something *per se* one with it, so in divine reality there does not seem to be one concept *per se* of the absolute and of relation; therefore if person includes these two things, namely essence and relation, essentially, then person does not seem to be a supposit *per se* and first of such a nature but is a supposit as it were *per accidens*, and so it seems that some prior thing could exist that is constitutive *per se* of the supposit in that nature.

a. [Interpolation] There is confirmation for the reason: the first identity seems to be of the first nature with its proper supposit, therefore that identity is not *per accidens* nor quasi *per accidens* but is altogether *per se*; therefore the supposit does not include anything of a quasi other genus than the nature.

There is also confirmation in that otherwise the identity of a created substance with its supposit would be more '*per se*' than the identity of the divine nature with its, which seems unacceptable.

There is a third confirmation in that secondary substance states the whole 'what it is' of primary substance, – therefore in primary substance there is no concurrence of another quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance; for if primary substance includes *per se* a quiddity distinct from secondary substance, then it is not more a '*per se* supposit' of the secondary substance than of that other quiddity, and so not more of neither or of them or of both.

Nor is the response valid here that this quiddity is that one by identity, and therefore the same '*per se* one thing' can be the *per se* supposit of each quiddity. – For this does not save the

‘*per se* unity’ of the supposit, because a supposit is set down as a ‘*per se* supposit’ of a quiddity by actuality, according to formal idea, but not because of a real and non-formal identity of itself with some other quiddity (for then a *per se* supposit of being would be a *per se* supposit of unity because of the true identity of ‘one’ with being). Therefore a supposit ‘*per se* one’ is only a *per se* supposit of a quiddity formally one, and consequently of no quiddity formally distinct from it, – and consequently it includes *per se* in the first mode no formally distinct quiddity, because there is no reason why it should not be a *per se* supposit of that distinct quiddity if it were to include it *per se* in the first mode.

If an objection be made here about the [divine] attributes, the case is not similar, because no attribute constitutes *per se* a supposit of deity, but it is a passion (according to Damascene chs. 4, 9), and it is not unacceptable for a quasi-passion to be quasi *per accidens* the same as a quasi-subject (and even as the supposit of the subject), although it is unacceptable for the first supposit of the first subject to be in itself a being *per accidens*.

To the third reason, that proceeds from the *per se* unity of a supposit of divine nature [n.52], the response is made that relation constitutes as it passes over into the essence and so is not as if it is of another genus; nor does it follow because of this that the thing constituted is absolute, because relation preserves that which is proper to itself, – though it is well conceded that that which is left behind through relation is absolute, because the ‘left behind’ is existence.

Against this response. I ask: either relation constitutes as it is the same as the essence formally (or quidditatively), – and if so, two absurdities follow: one that relation will not be relation, because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII “if it exists to another then it is not substance”, and by parity of reasoning, if it is formally substance then it does not exist to another; likewise another absurdity: whatever is constituted by something insofar as it is formally absolute is formally absolute, and so a constituted supposit would be formally absolute. Or, supposit is constituted by relation insofar as relation passes over into or is the same as the essence not formally but really, – and with this stands the fact that it is constituted properly by relation as it is relation, because relation can in no way be considered in divine reality without being really the same as the essence. If therefore, when considered in some way, it were to constitute a supposit *per accidens*, given that it might constitute in this way – and yet it is, in any way considered, the same really though not formally as the essence – the consequence is that, from the fact that it constitutes as the same really as the essence, nothing prevents what is constituted from being an entity *per accidens*; but it cannot constitute as more the same with the essence than really, because it does not do so as formally the same.

Further, as to the remark that ‘relation leaves behind absolute existence’, this would seem to be repugnant with itself, because a form does not leave behind an existence other than itself, just as whiteness does not leave behind in the white thing any other existence than itself by which the thing is white; therefore a constituting property, if it preserves that which is proper to itself, leaves behind that which is proper to itself and nothing else. Likewise, how could absolute being be left behind by a relative property if it preceded it in the person?

53. [Fourth way] – In the fourth way the argument is from authorities:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2: “Every relative is something when the relative is removed etc.” Therefore, as was deduced by the first reason [n.33], he seems to concede that that which is related is something in itself.

54. Again, *ibid.* ch.4 nn.8-9: “Every being subsists for itself, how much more God?” And he speaks of ‘subsist’ which pertains to substance in the way the Greeks take substance; but they (according to him) take substance the way we take person; therefore the ‘subsist’ which belongs to a person insofar as it is person, which is counted up in the three (namely the way we speak of ‘three subsistents’), that ‘subsist’ exists for itself, according to him, and it is unacceptable for a divine person to subsist toward another when taking ‘subsist’ in this way.

55. Again, third: all the things put in the definition of person, whether by Boethius *De Persona* ch.3 or by Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* IV ch.22, are absolute, such

that none of them includes relation essentially; and a definition ought to express the intrinsic quiddity of the defined thing, – therefore etc.^a

a. [Interpolation] To the authorities of Augustine already adduced (here in the fourth way) response is made that Augustine is speaking of that which is formally signified by the name ‘person’, not of that which is materially signified; but formally this name ‘person’ signifies something in intellectual nature that is indistinct in itself and distinct from something else; but that by which such distinction exists is an accident of that which is formally signified – yet it is necessary that in some nature that distinct thing is absolute (as in the created nature) and that in some nature it is a relation (as in the issue at hand, namely divine reality).

Against this response. Either Augustine understands the ‘indistinct in itself and distinct from something else’ in that which is formally signified by person in accord with essence, and then he no more has to concede that there are three persons than that there are three essences (or three things distinct according to essence), which seems manifestly contrary to his intention, when he means that we use the name of substance otherwise than as the Greeks do; so they use it for primary substance and concede that there are three substances in the way that we concede that there are three persons; therefore we properly concede – according to him – three persons. Or he understands ‘indistinct in itself’ according to incommunicable substance (and so ‘distinct from something else’), and then if that – in accord with that which is formally signified – exists for itself, the intended conclusion is obtained [sc. person is something absolute not relational].

C. Third Opinion

56. [Exposition of the opinion] – In a third way the position is otherwise,^a that the divine persons are absolute.

a. [Interpolation] A third opinion agrees with the reasons and authorities adduced against the second opinion, and this posits...

57. And lest it seem novel and out of the way, a certain older doctor’s saying is adduced who distinguishes ‘something said in twofold way according to substance.’ For he speaks thus [Bonaventure, *Sentences* I d.25 a.1 q.1]: “One must understand that – as Richard of St. Victor says [*On the Trinity* IV chs.6-7]—‘being said according to substance’ is double: in one way by indicating substance according to common nature, and thus ‘man’ is said according to substance; or by indicating substance as a certain supposit, as in the case of ‘a certain man’. To say substance in the first way (namely as the quiddity) is to say a ‘what’, and in the second way it is to say a ‘whom’.” He says further that “the name of essence or substance (or of quiddity) is said according to substance because it indicates the common nature, but person is said according to substance because it indicates a definite and distinct supposit; for the common nature is not multiplied nor is it related, – and therefore what it calls substance according to common nature is in this way said to be ‘for itself’ because it can in no way be said according to relation;^a but a supposit (or hypostasis) is of a nature to be multiplied and to be compared to another, and so to be related; and what is thus said according to substance in no way impedes – by reason of the superadded relation – its being said according to relation. And this is what Richard of Saint Victor means.”

a. [Interpolation] “and in this way indeed it is divided from the opposite”

58. The same doctor also^a says – in the question ‘Whether the properties distinguish the persons’ – that ‘in the way that they are dispositions they do not distinguish the persons, but in the way that they are origins’; which statement – even if he himself perhaps not so understand it – can be expounded as that the origins do not distinguish the persons formally but as it were by way of principle; just as motion in creatures, and especially if the motion be in the mover and not in the moved, would not distinguish the terms of motion formally but effectively, which pertains to the genus of efficient cause, – in the way also that, if human nature were posited in one man and could not be multiplied save by generation, one could say that generation multiplies men, not indeed formally (as if men were distinguished formally by generations as they are generations), but as it were effectively, because generation is reduced to the genus of efficient cause. One could speak thus in the case of the issue at hand, that the divine nature is not communicated to the supposita save by origin, and thus it is that the persons are distinguished in nature by their origin as it were by a principle, reducing this to the principal source itself, which distinguishes not formally but in a way corresponding to what distinguishes effectively in creatures.

a. [Interpolation] And if the objection be made: how will then the common opinion of the authors be saved who say that the persons are distinguished by relations – in answer to this can be taken a certain saying of the same doctor, for he says...

59. Accordingly then the position would be that the divine persons would be constituted in personal existence – and distinguished – by absolute realities and as it were by way of principle, and the ‘produced persons’ would not be formally distinguished by origins; but the things constituting the persons would be absolute not in the first way but the second way, because although they would not formally be relations, yet the things constituted by them would be relatable. This could be a way of stating the position.

60. [Proofs] – Now the solution given by this position is not only proved by the four ways touched on against the second opinion [nn.32-55], but also by certain other persuasive points.

First indeed because^a primary substance is substance most of all, according to the Philosopher in *Categories* 5.2a11-14, – and this is not a mark of imperfection; therefore it seems that in this way one could posit that primary substance in divine reality, namely the person, to which it most belongs to subsist, that this is ‘to exist per se’. But relation does not seem to be able formally to constitute something subsistent, nor consequently to constitute primary substance.

a. [Interpolation] Again, according to this third way there is an argument, fourth [cf. nn.45, 51, 52], as follows:

61. There is a confirmation too for this reason, that secondary substance states the whole ‘what it is’ of primary substance, – therefore in primary substance there does not concur any quiddity distinct from the quiddity of secondary substance; therefore neither does the quiddity of relation, which is distinct from the quiddity of essence, pertain to the idea of primary substance.^a

a. [Interpolation] There is a confirmation because, since secondary substance does not include anything that is not formally substance, therefore neither does primary substance – which is most of all substance – include it, because substance does not come from non-substance.

62. There is a confirmation too in that if it is necessary – in things that exist toward something in divine reality – not only to posit quiddity, namely not only paternity but this paternity, and that too under the idea of incommunicability, and to posit that all these things belong to it insofar as it exists toward another and as it is not formally that which is for itself, – that if so, why can this not hold of that which is for itself, namely that what it is to be incommunicable is not had through that which is formally ‘what exists toward another’?

63. And this is ultimately confirmed efficaciously, as it seems, by the fact that in created substance, although it is a mark of imperfection to be limited to one subsistence or to one most perfect existence, which is in no way determinable or contractible and which cannot be anything of something else, yet the fact that nature itself can have ultimate existence, because of its being of a nature to be contracted by something else, this is not a mark of any imperfection, because this is conceded to substances and denied, because of their imperfection, to accidents; therefore it seems that divine nature ‘as it is for itself’ will have of itself ultimate actual existence and ultimate unity without limitation to a single being of subsistence.

64. Then too one can set down an example, because just as if the intellective soul were first to perfect or constitute the heart in the being of supposit and just as if the animated heart were able, second, to produce the hand in the being of supposit, there would not be anything distinct in the nature of the animated whole save by their origins, and yet formally they would be certain absolute things one of which is produced by another; yet in them there would truly be relations of producer and produced; for relations are not less preserved – on the contrary they are more preserved, it seems – if one posits certain absolutes that can be related, than if any such absolute things are not posited.^a

a. [Interpolation] Through these two statements – the first about the double absolute, the second about origin distinguishing as it were in a way corresponding to an effective, not a formal, principle in creatures – many authorities can be expounded that seem to be the contrary.

65. Response is made to what has been touched on here about primary substance [namely that relation cannot constitute it, n.60] that relation^a has here the force of constituting a primary substance or a supposit of secondary substance. The fact is confirmed by this, that what is scattered about in lower things is united in higher things, and that therefore, although ‘to exist toward’ and to subsist belong to a thing in the case of creatures through something different, yet they can both belong to God or to the divine persons through something the same.

a. [Interpolation] Response is made to this fourth reason, which proceeds from the idea of primary substance, by saying that relation here has the force of an incommunicable property of primary substance, and therefore...

66. Against this an argument is made as follows: I ask what force you mean, whether the force of an efficient or of a formal cause? If of an efficient cause, it will as it were cause there a certain absolute reality that will formally constitute there a primary

substance, – and thus the point at issue is conceded, namely that primary substance is constituted by some absolute reality; and, along with this, there is added one other impossibility, that relation could cause that absolute person. If in the second way, namely formally, since no form has the force of constituting anything formally save such a thing as is of a nature to be something by such form (as whiteness does not have the force of constituting anything save what is white and what is included in white), the consequence is that relation – which is essentially a disposition ‘toward another’ – does not have the force of constituting anything ‘in itself’. The confirmation [n.65] seems to have no validity: because it is for this reason that such union is brought about in God, namely because of the infinity of the divine essence, which includes unitively in itself every perfection simply and also every reality compossible with itself; but a property is not infinite formally, and so there is no need for every reality to be united in it (and especially not that reality which seems to be formally repugnant to it or unable to be included in it), as if it were stating a greater perfection formally, or not a lesser perfection, than the essence does.

II. What one Should Think about the Third Opinion

67. And if it be objected against this way [sc. the third] that it cannot stand along with the faith, because the Savior, when expressing the whole truth of the faith, named the three persons (*Matthew* 28.19) Father and Son and Holy Spirit, and blessed John in his first canonical letter 5.7 says ‘there are three who give testimony in heaven: Father, Word, and Holy Spirit’, – and the saints, when later treating of this matter, base themselves on these words of the canon [of Scripture] and seem always expressly to say that the persons are not distinguished formally save by relations, as was argued for the second opinion [nn.18-22]:

68. One could here say that the Savior taught three persons and that they are relatives by these relations, and that a person receives essence from a person – and this indeed is not denied by the present opinion [n.56]; yet the inference does not follow that ‘the Savior did not say that the divine persons were constituted by anything absolute, therefore they are not so constituted’ (for the place taken from the authority does not hold negatively), just as the inference does not hold, ‘I speak with the bishop and the official and the archdeacon, therefore these are distinguished in their personal being by these relations’. And perhaps the Savior, seeing that we cannot conceive the proper absolute realities, if there are any, by which the divine persons are formally constituted in their personal being, wanted to express them to us by names more intelligible to us; for we can in some way conceive those relations of origin from relations of origin in creatures. And perhaps another reason could be assigned, that in this way [sc. through relations of origin] more of the faith is expressed at once than in the other way [sc. through absolutes]; for if the persons are absolute and are constituted by absolute properties (*a, b, c*) and can be named by their names – if the Savior had expressed them [sc. absolute names], he would precisely thereby have expressed the distinction of the persons and not the origin of person from person; yet, by expressing the persons with relative names, he expressed both facts by them, namely distinction and origin.

69. But that the divine persons could be named and expressed by some absolute names seems able to be shown by Scripture, – as in *Proverbs* 30.4 where Solomon (after

the many questions he moves about God) asks: “What is his name and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – If the first name of ‘his Son’ is ‘Son’ (which it should be, if he is constituted in being by filiation), this question seems to be empty, because every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16). The question then would be empty, because it would suppose and ask about the same thing; for it supposes that he is Son and asks ‘what is his name’, – and likewise it supposes, through the nature of relation, that ‘that of which he is relative’ is the Father and asks about the name. One could reply to Solomon: you are asking about the name of the Father and of the Son, and you state their first names!

70. Therefore it seems one could say that if the New Scripture [Testament] expressly intends them to be relative persons, and that this is of the substance of the faith, yet nothing express is found that the relations are the first forms, constituting and distinguishing the persons first, – nor has the Church declared this. Neither in the Apostles’ Creed nor in the Nicene Creed nor in the General Council under Innocent III is this declared (as to the article ‘On the Trinity’, an ‘Extra’ is set down, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly”); nor in the General Council of Lyons under Gregory X (which, as to the matter ‘On the Trinity’, is set down an ‘Extra’, ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly”, and it is today in the sixth book of the *Decretals*), nor in any other Council is what may hitherto seem manifestly handed down in any authentic Scripture made clear.

71. If therefore Christ did not teach this nor has the Church declared it, namely that the persons are first distinguished by relations, neither Christ nor the Church then seem to assert that this is of the faith, because, if it is not true [sc. that the persons are distinguished first by relations], it is not reverently said of the divine persons that they are only ‘subsistent relations’ [Henry of Ghent]; if however it is true, yet it is not handed down as a certain truth, it does not seem safe to assert that this is to be held as a certain truth. And although it be true that the persons are distinguished by relations (and it is while holding to this in general that the saints have labored on how a distinction of persons can stand with unity of essence), yet one should not deny that any other distinction, which will also concede this distinction, may be posited as prior, – such that every way holds this affirmative to be true, namely that the divine persons are distinguished by relations, although some way says that this distinction is as it were preceded by some real distinction. Nor should one restrict an article of faith handed down in general to one particular meaning, as if the general meaning could not be true save in the particular one; and just as one should not restrict this article, that ‘the Word of God was made man’, to one determinate mode (which is not expressed in the canonical Scripture or by the Church), such that it could not be true unless that mode were true; for this is to reduce an article of faith to incertitude, if anything is uncertain that has not been handed down as an article of faith (for what cannot be held without some uncertainty seems to be uncertain).

If this position [n.56] be held, one should say that this absolute reality – constituting and distinguishing the person – would not be a reality for itself as the essentials are for themselves, but a reality that is personal and for itself in the second way [n.59], according to the distinction of that master which was set down at the beginning of the opinion [n.57].

III. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion when Holding the Third Opinion

73. [To the authorities] – Someone who held this opinion [n.56] could respond to all the arguments of Augustine for the opinion put before [n.15], contrary to this opinion, through the distinction of the aforesaid doctor [n.57] – because^a he [Augustine] is speaking of things that are for themselves simply, such that they are neither related nor relatable, but are opposite to relation, as is plain from his examples there [*On the Trinity* V]. For he himself seems to say there that something is for itself although it is relatable to another, as is expressly intended by *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 nn.8-9 where, when treating of how the Greeks say that there are three substances, he means that to subsist – in the respect it belongs to substance in the way the Greeks say substance – is for itself. For he subjoins there: “If it is one thing for God to exist and another for him to subsist, just as it is one thing for him to be God and another to be Father, then he subsists relatively, just as he generates relatively;” and from this he infers: “therefore substance will not now be substance, because it will be a relative;” and later: “But it is absurd that substance be said relatively; for every substance subsists for itself, how much more God?” – What is more express than that substance, as the Greeks take it (namely for the person), is primary substance and not secondary substance, and exists for itself and subsists for itself, with the ‘to subsist’ which belongs to substance as so meant?

a. [*Interpolation, for n.67 to n.73*] Against this opinion [n.56] can be objected that it does not stand along with the faith:

First, because the Savior, when expressing in *Matthew* 28.19 the whole truth of the faith that is to be held about the Trinity, named the three persons with relative names (“in the name,” he says, “of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit”); likewise John in his canonical letter 5 (“There are three that give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit”), – and generally, wherever the canonical Scripture speaks of the divine persons it expresses them with relative names. It seems then that to posit they are absolutes contradicts Scripture and the faith.

Second, because the Church (or anyone who expresses the truth that is to be held about the Trinity) expresses the persons with relative names, as is plain in the Apostles’ and Athanasian Creeds, and in the Nicene Creed, and all other authentic declarations of the faith by the universal Church. Therefore the opposite is repugnant to the faith, when it has been declared by the Church.

Third, because when the saints – and catholic doctors commonly – treat of this article, they only posit and keep a trinity of relative persons – whose doctrine, at least of many of them, has been authenticated by the universal Church, as is plain in the canon at distinction 15 (*Decretum Gratiani*). Therefore to contradict the sayings of these saints is to contradict the Church that authenticates their statements.

It is replied to this objection that the said opinion not only does not conflict with the faith, but – what is more – agrees with the sacred Scripture; the first point is shown in two ways:

First as follows, that whatever sacred Scripture has handed down about the Trinity or that the Church has declared or that an authentic doctor has so manifestly asserted is conceded by this opinion, namely that the three persons are appropriately expressed by the names of Father and Son and Holy Spirit; because it concedes that there really are relations of origin there, because it concedes the true origination of one person from another that is generation (and so the person generating is the Father and the person generated is the Son), and it concedes the procession of the third person from the two (and thus does the Holy Spirit proceed, that is inspirited by chaste and holy will). But Scripture does not say – nor does the universal Church say by declaring anywhere – that the persons are distinguished by these relations alone, just as neither does it say that they are distinguished by absolute properties. But now, although whatever authority hands down is to be held as true, yet whatever it does not hand down is not to be denied to be true; “Many works,” says John the confidant of Jesus, “did Jesus do which are not written in this book” (*John* 20.30); and certainly not elsewhere either, because he adds , 21.25: “I reckon that the world cannot

contain the books etc.” Even logically speaking it is plain that a place taken from authority does not hold negatively.

Second thus: nothing is to be asserted to be of the truth of the faith save what is handed down in Scripture or is declared by the universal Church, or is necessarily and evidently entailed by something so handed down or declared; that the persons are distinguished by no absolute properties does not appear to be such; therefore etc.

The first part of the minor seems plain, because Scripture nowhere hands this down; for he who affirms relations nowhere denies absolute properties.

The second part is similarly plain, because all the things that the Church is found to have declared as needing to be held about the article ‘On the Trinity’ are contained in the Apostles’ or Athanasian or Nicene Creeds, or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “Firmly” – “We condemn” (both which chapters were promulgated in the General Council celebrated under Innocent III), or in the Extra ‘On the Supreme Trinity and the Catholic Faith’, “To the faithful”, and it is today in the sixth book (which chapter was promulgated in the Council of Lyons celebrated under Gregory X). Not many chapters, or authentic writings, are found containing a declaration of the Church about the article ‘On the Trinity’! Nor is it declared in any of these that the persons ‘have no properties save relative ones’; the thing is plain if one looks.

The proof of the third part of the minor is that the reasons given for inferring the proposition [sc. the persons have no properties save relative ones], as taken from what is handed down in Scripture or declared by the Church, seem all to be solvable, as will later be said in reply to them.

The second point – namely that this opinion agrees with Scripture – is shown by the verse from *Proverbs* 30.4 where (after moving many questions about God) Solomon asks: “What is his name, and what the name of his Son, if you know?” – And from this the argument runs: every question supposes something certain and asks about something doubtful (from *Metaphysics* 7.17.1041a10-16); but here that the ‘Son’ is supposed and what is asked about is his name, – and by parity of reasoning, by the name of relation is supposed that that of which he is the Son is ‘Father’, and what is asked for is his name; therefore with this given as certain, that he is ‘Son’ and he ‘Father’, there is doubt about what is the former’s name and what the latter’s. But if these persons be constituted first in personal existence by paternity and filiation, then the first name of the latter is Father and the first name of the former is Son, – and so there would be certitude about ‘Son’ and doubt about what his name is; therefore Solomon seems to mean that the Son is not first constituted by filiation, just as too that ‘Son’ is not his first name. But once it is known that he is Son there yet remains to ask – according to Solomon – what his name is; here a brief argument is made to reduce this to impossibility: given that the first name of the person – which is ‘Son’ – is the name of Son (which consequence holds if the Son is first constituted by filiation), then Solomon is supposing and asking about the same thing; for he is supposing the first name of the person and is asking ‘what is his name’.

If response is made in the above way to this objection about the faith as directed against the third opinion, arguments can be made against this response:

First as follows: why did the Savior wish to express the persons with relative names if they are absolute and the absolutes (if they exist) were not hidden from him – and it would seem fitting for baptism to be given by invoking the divine persons with their first names?

Second as follows: when the article about Christ is handed on, it is proper to take it according to the understanding that is the greatest that can be had about Christ; such understanding is about persons firstly relative and in no way about absolutes; therefore etc.

Third as follows: the inferences of the saints and doctors must be supposed to be necessary ones; but when these or similar ones are used, the conclusion to be drawn from what is manifestly believed is that the persons are not absolutes, as is plain in many deductions by the masters.

To the first of these arguments someone might perhaps say that for two reasons the Savior gave in this way a fitting expression:

First because he taught us in the way that we were capable; but if the properties were absolute, he saw that we could not conceive them, or not as easily as we could conceive relations, because they can be known by us neither by way of causality and eminence (since they are not perfections simply), nor by anything similar in creatures (the way we can perhaps conceive

relations from the relations of origin in creatures), because to those incommunicable absolutes – if they exist – nothing is similar in creatures, nay not even to any created incommunicable thing is anything similar, because anything such is primarily diverse from anything else; and this impossibility or difficulty in knowing those absolute properties, if they exist, could be grasped by someone from the aforesaid question of Solomon. An example of this is plain in the common way of speaking, where we more frequently express persons with relative names than with absolute ones, because the relative names are more known; yet it is clear that the persons we intend to express with those names are in themselves absolute; for example, we say the pope or a bishop or a king did so and so; we do not as often say ‘Peter did it’ or ‘John did it’; for the duties are more known than the absolute persons. So could it be said here, that through the origin of person we can conceive its absolute property (if the person has such a property), or we cannot conceive it, or not as easily through the origin.

Second, because if there are absolute properties, and in this respect the persons could be named with absolute names, then, by so naming them, not as much is expressed by those names about the truth of faith as is expressed by the names ‘Father, Son, and Holy Spirit’, because by these names not only is the distinction between the persons expressed but also the origin that exists in them, and also in some way – as a result – the unity of the essence, because in such origination there is perfect communication of the same essence; three absolute names would not thus express all these things.

To the second of the arguments someone might perhaps say – first – that the understanding which Christ expressed (namely that they are relatives) is without doubt to be maintained, but about that of which he was silent (namely whether they are absolute) one side is no more against the understanding of the article than the other is, unless it be shown to be repugnant to the understanding which he did express.

Second, that to restrict the article of faith to a particular understanding – which however is handed on in a general way – as if the general understanding could not be true unless the special understanding was true, this seems to reduce the article to uncertainty; for that seems uncertain which cannot be held without uncertainty. At any rate greater reverence seems to be given to an article handed on in a universal way, provided one say that the universal understanding of it can be true whether any special feature is posited or denied – which special feature is not handed on as to be firmly believed – than that the article could not be true unless some special determination were true. An example of this in other articles: ‘Creator of heaven and earth’; one should not reduce this to the fact that, if the omnipotence in God be in any way distinct from the will, he could not create, – and so of the opposite side. Likewise one should not reduce ‘the Word was made flesh’ to many special facts, nor to some one of those things with any of which and with its opposite this truth can stand. A more apt example seems to be: if what was handed on to the Jews as a thing to be believed was that ‘God is one’ and nothing was handed on specifically about the Trinity, not only would there be less reverence but irreverence and falsity in asserting that this article could not be true unless God were one in person as he is one in essence; and yet this would in that case seem to be more consonant with the words of the article handed on to them than the opposite opinion. Therefore just as the Jews were obligated then to assert neither side to be necessarily determinate (but it seems that what was handed on to them in general was necessarily to be held), so it seems that we, as to articles handed on to us in universal terms, should not assert – without a declaration of the Church – that necessarily this or that special thing is to be held, with either of which the articles as they are handed down can stand; for not without cause did God, who knew the truth in particular, hand it on to be believed only according to a universal understanding, and did not reduce it to this or that special mode as something needing to be held by faith.

Third, because in the issue at hand it does not seem – because of the reverence due to those persons – that one should say that there are only relations in the essence unless this were most certainly handed down, on account of the limited entity of relation in regard to absolute being.

To the third of the arguments someone might perhaps say that something is not to be held to be of the substance of the faith merely because of a soluble piece of reasoning – by whomever it be made –, nor perhaps because of the conclusion of such reasoning, insofar as the conclusion is drawn precisely through that reasoning: someone arguing like this would expose himself to death, and no one should according to right reason so expose himself; therefore a higher authority is

needed for something to be held to be of faith than that someone so argues (some people argue what they do not altogether assert). And although that which a saint, approved by the Church as to doctrine, asserts as needing to be held is sufficiently certain, yet other authorities – doubtful ones – can be given an exposition, and much more so in the case of other less approved writers.

In the first way one might say that nothing is found contrary to the aforesaid opinion [n.56; the persons are not absolutes]

As to the things that seem in the second way to be against it, those who hold the third opinion reply by running through the authorities in order. As to the authorities and reasons that were adduced against the third opinion, or in favor of the second opinion (to the first, from the Gospel, response seems already to have been made):

To the authorities from Augustine, *On the Trinity* V, those who hold the third opinion respond by the distinction set down at the beginning of the opinion [n.57], which Augustine...

74. And if it be objected that the words of Augustine ‘about substance and person’ [n.73] should not be more taken of the personal than of the essential, because he says that ‘God and person exist by the same thing’, – response: ‘by the same thing’, that is, by something said ‘in relation to another’, because the Father is not the person of the Son, just as neither is he the God of the Son, – the way that Socrates is not Socrates of anyone, just as neither is man of someone, understanding this as man of his correlative. But there is no need that he be God and person ‘by something altogether the same’, such that person be said to exist altogether to itself the way God, or deity, is said to exist to itself, because then, just as there are not three deities and thereby not three magnitudes either, according to Augustine (because magnitude, like deity, is said to exist altogether to itself), so neither would there be three persons, which he himself denies. Things then that exist altogether to themselves are not separately counted, – things that exist altogether to another are not common to the three persons; but things that exist to themselves though not altogether to themselves but are relatable (because it is not repugnant for them to be related) are common (but counted up), or can be said to be proper things from which some common and counted thing can be abstracted.

75. As to Augustine *On the City of God* XI [n.19], I concede that ‘God is whatever he has’ save for the relative he has which is not him; he does indeed have a correlative, as the Father has the Son as Son. And therefore I concede that the first person is ‘whatever he has’ to which he is not related; but he is not the second person, which he has as correlative person, although he is not first constituted by that relation.

76. As to Boethius, when he says that ‘relation multiplies the trinity etc.’ [n.17], I say that that doctor takes relation for origin, and, understanding it in this way, ‘to multiply’ is taken, not as to distinguish formally, but by way of principle as it were, correspondingly to effective principle [n.58]; and this indeed is not to twist the words; for ‘to multiply’ means to make many, as Christ truly multiplied the Gospel loaves (*Matthew* 14.13-21, 15.29-39), and yet he was not the form by which those loaves were formally multiplied, – and God by creating multiplies souls is yet not himself the form by which souls are formally distinguished.

77. As to John Damascene [nn.21-22], I say that one of his authorities solves the other, because precisely in ch.8 he posits [sc. in the Father] non-generation and in ch.52 he posits paternal property; but these two properties are distinct, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7; therefore by excluding everything else that is in Father – in ch.8 – besides non-generation, he understands by non-generation the personal being of the Father. And wherever he excludes all other things from some property of some

supposit, through the property that is included he includes every other personal aspect, and so the absolute reality, if there is any, would be so included; and it is included most of all, as it seems, because when, in the case of creatures, an accident is included, the subject is not excluded, and so when relation is included in a divine person that which is related by it is not excluded, – just as, if it be said only paternity exists, the Father who by paternity is Father would not thereby be excluded.

78. To Richard [n.23] I say: the fact that the mode of existence is different does pertain to origin, but it does not follow from this that the originated is not something subsistent to itself, distinct from the originating by some absolute personal reality.

79. To Anselm [n.20] I likewise say that ‘all things are one and the same where the opposition of relation does not prevent it’ either formally (as relation prevents relation) or as of a nature to be related by the opposite relation: this is the way the persons – if they were absolute – would be distinguished, because in them there are relations by way of principles.

80. [To the arguments] – To the arguments for the second opinion [nn.24-27].

To the first [n.24] one can say that if any absolute reality constitutes the persons, yet it will not make a composite with the divine essence, just as neither would the constituting relation do so; the fact is confirmed by the argumentative place ‘from the greater’, because a reality proper to subsistence in a creature does not make a composite with the essence, but relation in creatures makes a composite with the foundation, as will be explained elsewhere [*Ord.* II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6, nn.9, 11-12, 15-16; d.1 q.4 nn.5-6, 26]; therefore if here [sc. in God] relation cannot make a composite with the essence, much more will the reality of a supposit also not make a composite with the reality of nature.

81. And when the reason is confirmed because the absolute ‘either altogether remains or altogether passes over’ [n.25], I say: as was said in making clear the second opinion, namely that ‘relation remains by the fact that its idea is not formally the idea of essence, and it passes over because it is essence according to perfect identity’, so can it be said that absolute reality – if it constitute the person – does indeed pass over to the essence because of perfect identity, but it remains because it is not formally the reality of the essence. And there is a confirmation for this reason, that the attributal perfections seem to be absolute and not relative (as was said in distinction 8, in the question ‘About the attributes’ [d.8 nn. 185, 209, 215-217, 220, 222]), and yet they both remain and pass over, such that they do not make a composite with the essence nor are they formally the same as the essence; and if any of them would, according to their formal reason, have to be distinguished really from another, the distinction would be formally through that formal reason and not through the essence, and yet there would be no composition.

82. To the second argument [n.26] I say that when positing relative persons one must posit them as truly subsistent and that in them there is the same undivided nature; one cannot do this because of any imperfection of the persons in subsisting, because they are posited as being as truly subsistent as they would be if they were absolute; therefore one must posit them because of the infinity of the essence that is in the subsistents; but there would be the same infinity of essence if the persons were absolute, – so the nature should not in that case be divided just as neither does the property now divide it. Let this then be proved, ‘every nature, common to absolute supposits, is distinct in those supposits’! [n.26]. This is indeed true in the case of creatures, but in the issue at hand it begs the principal conclusion.

83. To the third [n.27] reply is made by instancing that to the Father when constituted in his personal existence, and to the Son too when constituted in his personal existence, active inspiriting is at it were an adventitious property – according to some people – and yet it is not quasi accidental according to them, nor is it even a relation of reason. Why then could it not be thus understood in the issue at hand, that the person is constituted by an absolute reality and that to the person – as constituted in such reality – the relation, according to mode of understanding, is adventitious and yet is neither accidental nor a thing of reason? And when the proof that it is a relation of reason is given through similarity with relation to creatures [n.27], I say that it is not similar; for the relation to creatures does not arise from any necessity in the nature of the foundation, the way it does arise here [sc. in God].^a

a. [*Interpolation*] The fourth reason [see interpolation to n.27] rests on this proposition: ‘every absolute is act and as a result bestows existence’.

This is disproved in many ways:

First because in the case of creatures, where it seems most of all to be probable, there is an instance from the hypostatic property, because this property is not an act bestowing existence – because then human nature in Christ would not have the same existence as it had when buried [sc. when, namely, it precisely did not bestow existence or life].

Similarly, an act that gives existence gives operation, – the hypostatic property in creatures does not give operation. The thing is plain from Damascene in ch.60: “We say that wills and operations are natural and not hypostatic; for if we grant them to be hypostatic we will be compelled to say that the three hypostases of the Holy Trinity will and do different things;” here he himself, from the fact that the divine persons do not have three operations, concludes that operation is not hypostatic – that is, operation is not on the basis of hypostatic property, and this in general whether the property is absolute or relative.

Further, third: in everything that in any way has being by something, there is, besides that which gives it being, something by reason of which it receives being (the thing is plain about the composite of matter and form, and about all other composites of act and potency); therefore in everything that has being through something that gives being, there is something which is not an act giving being but a reason for receiving being – and so it seems to be in the case of a supposit of nature, that since the supposit has being and nature gives being, the hypostatic property will be the reason for receiving being.

To the argument then [interpolation to n.27] one can say that since there is a double idea of entity, namely quidditative and hypostatic, then just as it is a mark of the quidditative to give being, because it is of itself communicable, so it is a mark of the hypostatic that it not be an act giving being, because it is of itself incommunicable as a ‘by which’. And although in creatures the individual property gives being, because it is of some grade of positive entity beyond the quidditative entity of nature, yet the property of a supposit states no entity beyond the entity of singularity, nay it adds nothing positive (from the first question of Book III, d.1 nn.31-39, 44); and even if it were to add something, that something would not be the reason for giving being, but it is merely incommunicable, because this existing nature – in which is included nature and the entity of singularity – is the total reason for giving being, and thus whatever is understood to be adventitious to it, whether positive or privative, whether absolute or relative, will not give being, because being is totally given through that which is already pre-understood. So although in divine reality the ‘personal property’ is not merely a negation but some positive property, yet because divine nature is of itself a this – a per se existent – it itself will have the whole reason for giving being; just as in creatures too ‘this existing nature’ totally gives being, and not through the fact that the adventitious property is merely a negation (nay, if a positive property were to be adventitious to it, nothing would be taken away from this existing nature), so in divine reality too nothing will be taken from this nature – which is existent of itself – but what will totally give the being of a person, although in the person a positive personal property be understood.

To the argument, then, although proof is given that it is act, since it is not potency, I say that there is there the fallacy of equivocation; for in one way act is the difference opposite to potency, and all being is divided in this way, – and in another way act along with potency constitutes some whole (as the Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* VIII chs.1-6, about potency and act), because it does not belong to the power that is opposed to act, because that power remains along with act; therefore this property is not merely virtually in the divine essence (as is ass, which is in potency prior to act), and consequently this property is in act there insofar as act is opposed to such potency. But the inference ‘therefore it is act giving being’ does not hold; because for this inference there would be required that it be formal act; for in this way matter would give being, because ‘in the composite’ it is in act, and not in a potency prior to act.

The second reason [interpolation to n.27] seems deficient [sc. that an absolute property would be added to essence as act to potency]:

First because it [an absolute property] is not related to essence as perfection to perfectible, as has been made clear extensively also ‘about the relative property of a person’ in distinction 5 of Book I, d.5 nn.113, 118, 129-138, where it was said that person is not constituted from essence and property as from quasi potential and actual, nay the essence possesses more the idea of act. If therefore this property be understood as in some way posterior to essence, yet it is not a perfection of it; for there is there the same order for origin as for perfection, and therefore what is prior in origin is prior in perfection, as was then made clear extensively.

Second: given that it [an absolute property] would be in some way disposed toward the essence itself as in-forming it, yet it is not a perfection simply, because according to Anselm the idea of ‘perfection simply’ is that in anything it be ‘better it than not it’, which is impossible about a hypostatic property, because that property is of its own idea repugnant contradictorily to anything other than that to which it belongs, and so it cannot in anything else be better ‘than not it’, because it is repugnant to anything else.

Thus therefore as to the reason, it is plain that something false is assumed if what is taken is that the absolute thing perfects the essence; nor is the proof of this ‘through the fact that it in some way follows and does not precede’ valid, because in divine reality – in the way that preceding can be posited there – act and form are first. Second, given that that ‘which informs’ were possessed, the consequence that it is a perfection simply does not follow, nor do those things follow that are further inferred, namely that ‘the divine essence is not simply perfect’ or that ‘one person is not simply perfect in itself’.

Further, this reason would conclude better to the contrary about relation, because it seems more probable that relation could be a perfection than that a hypostatic property could be a perfection, because to be perfect belongs to no hypostatic property (whether in creatures or elsewhere), but to some relation according to its proper idea there does belong the being of perfection; for one relation is more perfect than another, and yet none is a perfection simply, as is plain of equality with respect to inequality, because according to Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* chs.9-11, nn.15-17; ch.12 n.19: “You rightly put equality before inequality, nor is there anyone endowed with human sense – as I suppose – to whom this does not appear.” But this does not come from the foundation alone, for inequality can be founded on more perfect foundations than equality; it is also plain that if it came only from the foundation Augustine would be begging the question; for he intends to conclude to an excellence, namely of circle in comparison with rectilinear figures, and he does this on the basis of equality and inequality, – because if the excellence were only on the foundations and he were to deduce therefrom the excellence of the foundations, then he would be reasoning in a circle.

If it be said that the saying of Augustine is true by reason of the proximate, not the remote, foundations, but the proximate foundation of equality is parity – this is false and nothing as regard the *b* [a reference to a text in III d.1 n.189]. For I ask whether parity asserts something for itself, and then something can be understood to be at par without its being par of anything; and similarly, whence will perfection of parity be in this way obtained in respect of imparity in a triangle? For either parity states quantity, and then either the same quantity as that which is commonly posited as the foundation of equality, and then there will no distinction between the remote and proximate foundation – or it states a different quantity, and then in the equal thing there will be said to be two quantities; or you are inventing some other mode in which parity could be an absolute that is more perfect than imparity and is other than quantity. But if you say parity

asserts a relation, as seems manifest, then a relation will be per se founded on a relation; nay it seems to state the same relation as equality; a quantity is equal with a quantity and on a par with it!

To the statement of Anselm in *Monologion* [earlier here] the response is that he is speaking only of quiddities and not of hypostatic properties. – This is proved, first, by his examples about wisdom and truth on one side, and about gold and lead on the other. Second by reason, because only that is a perfection simply which can be infinite in something, and only that in something is better ‘not it than it’ which is of itself finite; these things belong to quiddity (namely to be finite or infinite), but not to a hypostatic property, because a divine personal property – whatever it be – is neither formally finite nor formally infinite. So a ‘whatever’, that is a ‘whatever quiddity’, is additional to relation, – not a ‘whatever hypostatic entity’, because this is not divided into the such and the not such but falls under the not such; likewise a hypostatic property is repugnant to anything besides the one thing it belongs to – so it cannot be for anything better it ‘than not it’, but also not for some particular thing either. Therefore Anselm excludes from the universe of quiddities relation according to quiddity, and then every absolute quiddity is either a perfection simply or a limited perfection; but from this does not follow the proposed conclusion about absolute hypostatic property.

The third reason [sc. in the interpolation to n.27, that every absolute circumstance of an absolute is multiplied along with that absolute] has a major that, by its form, is false in the case of all things that are essentially ordered, although it may sometimes be true by its matter; and it is similarly false in the case of everything that is not equally unlimited. For in no order essential in proper idea of prior and posterior must the priors and posteriors be multiplied together, but multiplication of the posterior can stand without multiplication of the prior, although not conversely; likewise, whenever two things are compared to a third thing which is unlimited, one must not, in the way in which the two things are unlimited, make joint distinctions with them (an example: compare the intellective soul to its parts; because the intellective soul is in some way unlimited, one must not distinguish it in its distinct parts in the way in which the parts are unlimited). The major then is, as to the proposed conclusion, false in two ways: both because the essence (in the way in which there is there a priority in person) is in some way prior to the properties, not conversely, according to them [sc. those who hold the third opinion], – therefore one should distinguish the essence on the distinction of the properties; and also because the essence is formally infinite, but the properties are not formally infinite – and therefore one should not distinguish ‘the formally infinite’ on the distinction of things that are not formally infinite.

Even if the major is taken generally, as to any absolutes whatever that are circumstances of the same – there is a manifest objection to it from the soul and the powers, because the powers are multiplied when the soul is not multiplied.

But if they evade this objection by specifying the major to be about things of the same species (the way the first confirmation of the major takes it), even then the proposition is not true universally of relations, as will be plain in distinction 8 [of Book Three]. That many things of the same idea exist in the same thing – even in absolutes – is not a contradiction, if any of them is not an act adequate to that in which it is.

Now when the major is made clear by an induction, there is a fallacy of the consequent, because certain singular instances are taken that are not like the proposed case, to wit those in which a distinction in prior things does constitute a distinction in posterior things, or in which there is a similar limitation on both sides and not an unlimitedness of one of them with respect to the other; from these things the conclusion cannot be universally drawn, because it is false when the conditions are lacking, as in the proposed case.

But to the final argument, added for confirmation of the major, which is about the ‘same’ [sc. there cannot be many things of the same idea in the same perfect thing], one could say that just as something simply perfect – the same in number – is communicable to many suppositis of the same idea (such that this is not, from its perfection simply, something repugnant to it, but its being in several suppositis of the same idea is something that belongs to it), so from its perfection there can belong to it the fact that several things of the same idea can exist in it as suppositis in a nature and, consequently, even several hypostatic properties of the same idea; but this cannot be so about the other things of which it is exemplified (as of the Father and the Word), because the perfection of what is simply perfect requires that any production have an adequate term, but does not require that some hypostatic property is adequate to the nature in constituting a supposit.

Hereby one can say in answer to the first confirmation of the major, applying it to the proposed conclusion, that there is there a fallacy of equivocation. For the major [sc. ‘many things of the same species cannot be in the same thing’], if it were true, should be understood of being ‘in’ the way act is in that which is in-formed; but the minor [sc. ‘the absolutes, if they are posited, will be of the same species’] is not true; for the property is not in the essence as in-forming it, but as constituting a supposit in it.

However one can say to both confirmations that the properties are not of the same idea formally, just as in creatures the individual properties are primarily diverse and not of the same idea. And if one infer from this that they are of a different species or that each of them has the idea of a different species, and that, because of this, each has to be determined by something else so as to be incommunicable – the inference does not follow, just as it does not follow in the case of the individual properties in creatures; even though these are not of the same idea in anything, yet none is a quidditive and common entity but each is of itself a ‘this’.

The fourth reason [sc. in the interpolation to n.27, that if two absolute properties are expressed by the essence they will both be in one person and will not distinguish the persons] proceeds from the false imagination that the properties are expressed by the essence as if by way of origin, – which is not what was said. But, as some concede [sc. Henry of Ghent and his followers] that relations burgeon up in the essence (provided however this is properly said), so one could concede against them that these properties – the absolute ones, if they exist – burgeon up in the essence; and although each property be in the same supposit from which it burgeons (because the essence is in all the persons), yet none is in the same person as that from whom it is obtained by way of true origination. Nor is the true origination ‘of the person who has one of the properties’ repugnant to the person who has another, even though all the properties are not originated but do in some way burgeon from the essence – just as others have to say about origination through relation, that the Son burgeons from the Father by origin and yet the Son in some way burgeons in the divine essence or from the divine essence.

The fifth reason seems deficient [sc. that there is no origin in the persons because an absolute person would precede any relation of origin], because it seems more difficult to sustain origination by positing that the extremes are only formally relative than by positing that they are absolute. For if they are only relative, then that ‘a person originates a person’ will be nothing other than that a relative has a correlative; but a relative, once posited, seems to have a correlative without any other action. But if the extremes are posited as absolute, there does not seem to be as much difficulty in how one supposit is generated by another, since in the case of creatures – according to them – there are absolute supposits and yet origination of one creature from another is not denied there.

When it is then argued that an absolute precedes relation and so precedes origination, I reply: it was said that origination pertains to the genus of efficient causality, not formal; and just as in creatures the term does not exist by origination formally but effectively (nor from the fact that it does not exist by it formally does the consequence follow that it precedes it), so one can say in the proposed case; nor does there seem greater difficulty about the priority of the absolute to the relative in the case of creatures than here [sc. in the case of the divine persons].

IV. To the Reasons against the Second Opinion when Holding the Second Opinion

84. For someone who does not like this opinion (which, however, does not seem to contradict the faith, as was touched on when explaining it [nn.56, 68-71]), if he likes the second opinion more (which is the common one [n.15]), one can reply to the reasons against [nn.33-55] this second opinion:

To the first [n.33] the response is by denial of the proposition ‘every relation presupposes that which is related’; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and is true in the case of other ones. When it is proved by the fact that ‘a relation is not related, but something which is not merely relation is related by

relation', and when it is further said that 'what is related is prior to relation' [n.33], – it is denied.^a

a. [Interpolation] Holding to the second opinion, which is more common, one can respond to the reasons against it:

To the first [n.33], that a relation is not related is conceded; but something that is not merely relation is related by a relation; not the essence indeed, but the supposit is related, because supposit is not merely a relation (but it is, however, a relative, not an absolute), – and so the whole deduction is conceded up to the final consequence [sc. that the supposit is there really and naturally before the relation], and that consequence is denied.

85. To the proposition that says 'one must understand the parts and the union of the parts prior to any composite' [n.34], if they hold that relation is not in the essence as an act in what receives act, they should say that in the person itself – which is a quasi-whole – one should not pre-understand an in-forming of a quasi-part by a quasi-part before the whole is understood, but one should if such a quasi-informing is pre-understood, though as by way of a denominating form. But when one holds the second opinion [n.15], it seems one should better say that relation is not a quasi-form or an act with respect to the essence (as was touched on in distinction 5 [d.5 nn.113,131, 137-138]), but rather the essence seems to be a quasi-form and quasi-act, whereby a subsistent relation is God. And this seems proved by the fact that whenever a foundation is potential to a relation, the foundation is in-formed by the relation before the supposit is; conceded too – as a result of this – is that in that case [sc. when the foundation is potential to a relation] the related thing is formally 'being to' by the foundation itself or in accord with the foundation itself, just as Socrates is conceded to be white by whiteness or in accord with whiteness. Neither seems it should be granted in the issue at hand: neither that paternity exists in the essence before in the Father, – nor that the Father by deity or in accord with deity is the Father formally, because this seems to accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: 'he is Father by one thing, he is God by another'; but he is God by deity formally – he is not therefore Father by deity formally, but by something else, according to Augustine.

86. Therefore one can speak differently (when holding the second opinion) that, although the parts and the union of the parts are pre-required for the whole, and quasi-parts and the union of quasi-parts are pre-required for the quasi-whole, yet, where there is no partial-ness but perfect identity of the things that would otherwise be parts unless one or other of them were infinite, the union of such should not be pre-understood to the whole but rather the perfect identity of one thing with another should be pre-understood. And so it seems to be in the issue at hand, that to the Father – which is said to be first related – there is in some way pre-understood a perfect identity of the relation with the essence, but not the union of a quasi-form to some quasi-matter or quasi-potential; nor is such perfect identity a reason that the essence is formally denominating by the relation.

87. But if the reason [n.34] be confirmed by the fact that 'nothing is a quantity first and per se unless something is a quantity per se and not first but denominatively' [cf. n.35, *to which note however this confirmation does not entirely correspond*], I say that if a quantity could be the same as something which would otherwise be susceptible of it, and the same could be such that it did not in-form it, then something could well be a quantity first and yet nothing would be a quantity by in-forming (nor does this seem remarkable, because the 'first' seems to be separated from that which is 'per se and not first');

therefore in this way something can be posited as related first although nothing is related 'not first but per se', as if informed by the relation.^a

a. [Interpolation] To what is argued at 'in accord with this' [see interpolation to n.35], this proposition is denied, that 'what is related is first something to itself'.

To the first proof, which is taken from Augustine, I reply: 'what is related is something when the relative is removed', that is, it includes something absolute which is the foundation of the relation; and therefore if the Father 'is nothing to himself' (that is, does not include anything absolute), he will not be Father 'to another'. But Augustine does not understand that every relative is formally to itself before it is to another by relation.

As to the second proof, the conclusion or the proposition is denied which it rests on for proof, namely that 'that which is related is prior to the relation', or – which is the same – that 'every relation presupposes that which is related'; for this proposition is false in the case of a relation that constitutes a supposit, and it is true in the case of other things.

When proof is given by division [sc. into three]: if one of the three members of the division should be granted, the one that should more be granted is that relation is prior, the way form is prior 'to an entity that exists by form'; nor does the inference 'the supposit is thus quasi-posterior to the relation, therefore it is a relation' follow, but rather 'therefore it is a relation or a relative constituted by a relation', -- and the second alternative here is true.

88. To the second [nn36-37] I say that, just as any form is per se such a form, nor is there any intrinsic reason why it is such a form, so too some relation by its very self is formally real and some relation is by itself formally only a relation of reason; however sometimes there are extrinsic effective or material causes of the former or the latter, sometimes too there are some caused things or some posterior signs from which the relations mentioned can be inferred by a demonstration-'that'. I say that identity, because it is identity, is a relation of reason, nor is there any other formal reason 'because of which' it is so, – paternity, because it is paternity, is a real relation, nor is there any other formal reason 'because of which' it is so. Yet because a real relation is of a nature to have extrinsic causes causing it, then, speaking generally in the case of creatures, the consequence here is that a relation that does not have such causes is not real, just as on the destruction of the cause there follows the destruction of the caused thing; likewise, some real relation, if it does not have such a prior distinction of causes, does at any rate cause a distinction. And then from the removal of both the cause and the caused (one of which corresponds to the real relation) the conclusion can be drawn that some relation is not real, such that the consequence holds that 'this relation does not pre-require distinct extremes, nor does it make them to be distinct, therefore it is not a real relation' [n.37], and then one must look for the middle terms that prove why the premises are true; but the consequence is good, just as from the destruction of the cause follows the destruction of the caused, and from the removal of the caused follows the removal of the cause from it, because at least one of them should concur for a real relation, such that wherever either is removed there results – a consequence through extrinsic facts – the removal of the real relation. When it is said that "therefore to infer 'the relation is not real because it is not between distinct things' is to infer 'it is not real because it is not real'" [n.37] I say no, because although it does not distinguish the extremes for this reason, namely that 'it is not real', because it is arguing from cause to caused – yet the consequence 'it does not distinguish, therefore it is not real' does follow, as from caused to cause (and this when the clause is added 'because it does not pre-require distinct things'), because then there

concur there both a denial of the cause of the real relation and a denial of the sign, from the concurrence of which the negation of the real relation is perfectly inferred.^a

a. [Interpolation] but sometimes relations go along with a preceding distinction, and sometimes not, but only with a formally caused one [n.37].

And not only is there a real relation of will to will, but also of will as active to itself as passive, and universally an effect dependent on an active and a passive principle necessarily requires a real relation; and yet the will, which is the foundation of these opposite relations, namely 'of mover and moved', is denominated by both of them.

I say that it is necessary to prove, in order to infer the conclusion, that the extremes are not distinct by a distinction preceding the relation, by a distinction pertaining to the genus of relation, just as this consequence 'they [sc. the extremes] are said of the same thing, therefore they are not real' does not follow; it does not hold from the nature of the thing, without any act of intellect. Hence it can well be conceded. If however they are proved, the consequence is good. But one must eventually come back to this, when one has set aside that which belongs to the distinction of the extremes; for the consequence 'if a relation does not follow from the nature of the thing it is not real' at once follows. One should expound the antecedent, and say that 'the extremes are not distinguished by a distinction preceding the relation.'

To the third one can say that an absolute can very well be the term of a relation, and it always is in relations of measured things – and this is principally preserved in distinction 30 [nn.35-40], that the relations of creatures terminate in God insofar as he is absolute; but universally speaking, one should not concede that the term of a relation is an absolute save in dissimilar relations (about which the argument is there), namely those that are in a genus (divine relations are not of this sort), or about the formal term (namely by reason of which the first term terminates), but not about the first term: for as the foundation in a related thing is an absolute, but not always what is related is an absolute (according to this opinion [sc. the third]), so thus too what is the reason for terminating a relation is always an absolute, and it is pre-required on the part of the relative term as the foundation is on the part of the related thing.

89. To the first argument about the second way [n.38] I say that the proposition is false that 'relation cannot be the formal term of origin', as will be appear in the material 'On the Incarnation' [III d.1 nn.57-61]; and however it be with the formal cause, at least a relative can be the first produced term, such that the essence 'to itself' – in the relative – is the formal term, and thus was it posited in distinction 5, in the production of the person [d.5 nn.27-30, 64-71, 97]. When therefore the argument says 'a relation is originated unless an absolute is originated' [n.58], if you understand 'to be originated as the first term of production', one can concede it about a relation but not about a relative – but if you understand it about 'to be originated as the first formal term', then it can simply be conceded; and in neither way is it against the issue at hand, because neither is relation posited as what is first originated, but the supposit is – nor is relation set down as the formal term of production, but an essence simply absolute is.

90. To the second I say that 'the Father originates the Son' is for the Father to have the Son for correlative (not for any correlative, but for a correlative of this sort, because such co-relation is a relation of origin), and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about the supposit as if pre-understood to origin), and it will be made clear in distinction 28 nn.93-99, 108-110.^a

a. [Interpolation] therefore one extreme can be prior to another in origin, although it be simultaneous in nature – and this is the response to the fifth argument about this way (namely about a supposit as pre-understood to origin or about the priority of supposit to action), and it will be made clear in distinction 28; [or another text] therefore one extreme can be prior in origin to

another, although it be simultaneous in nature. This response, and likewise to the second (about the priority of supposit to action) will be made clear in distinction 28.

91. As to the third [n.41], it seems difficult to respond to those who say that the persons are relative and that relations are the principles of acting [e.g. Henry of Ghent], because then neither on the part of the agent nor on the part of the principle can there be liberty; but although the second opinion may be held as far as concerns the first, yet I have denied the second in distinction 7 [nn.20-26, 35-42].

92 To the fourth [n.42] is said that 'it is generation', because this relation has the force of constituting primary substance in the divine nature [n.65]; and one must say – when holding this way – that relation can be the property of a personal subsistent in divine nature just as if it were some absolute property.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] and thus the production of it will be the production of what subsists in the nature of substance; and therefore it is 'generation', because generation is generation from a formal term (which is the nature communicated to the produced thing), but not from the individual or incommunicable property of the produced thing – just as universally every motion receives its species from the formal term of the motion.

93. The arguments about the third way [nn.45, 51-52] seem difficult, and yet they are soluble if the second opinion [n.15] is true. Let him solve them who knows [cf. *Lectura* I d.26 n.75].

94. The authorities about the fourth way can be expounded otherwise [sc. in favor of the second opinion], the way authorities are commonly drawn to one sense or another.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] To the other [the first about the third way, n.45] I say that paternity is of itself formally incommunicable; not however the concept which – according to what is said elsewhere [d.8] – can be abstracted from divine and created paternity, but the reality that is in divine reality, which is not formally the essence itself, is incommunicable formally and as it were through an extrinsic determination, namely 'because it is divine'. The reason for its incommunicability is this, that just as essence is ultimate act and therefore cannot be determined by anything with respect to which it is quasi potential, so whatever is in it is ultimate, in the ultimate act possible for it, so that in the instant of nature in which wisdom burgeons in the essence, it burgeons according to the ultimate determination that it is able to have; hence too the reality that is wisdom formally is not determinable. Likewise, whatever can be incommunicable in the first instance of nature in which it burgeons in nature burgeons as incommunicable, and not as first communicable, because then it would be determinable by something by which it would be made incommunicable.

And if you say that then paternity is not incommunicable save because it is in the divine essence, for this reality does not have whereby it might of itself be ultimately determinate save because it is in the essence, – I say that whatever is quasi originally or fundamentally intrinsic in divine reality is from the essence, because according to Damascene (ch.9) it is a 'certain sea of infinite substance'; but yet the other things have formally their own ideas and are by themselves such first formally, so that wisdom, although it has from the essence quasi fundamentally and originally that it is a perfection simply, is yet formally a perfection simply and is in itself formally infinite – such that in the same instant of nature in which wisdom is now in act in the essence, let the essence be *per impossibile* removed and the understanding of wisdom simply and infinite will remain. So in the 'now' of nature in which paternity is understood in the essence, it is in itself formally incommunicable, the essence being then *per impossibile* removed.

Nor is there a contradiction here that something quasi originally or causally have from something which belongs to it formally, just as the hot is formally contrary to the cold, although causally it comes from fire to which it is not formally contrary. So it is in the case of other things, because the essence by which something is constituted in its specific being is of itself formally

indivisible into several species, even given *per impossibile* that it were uncaused, although now it has causally that lack of division from which it comes causally.

And if you object ‘why does some other entity arise as communicable in the essence and this one as incommunicable?’ – I say that of this fact there is no formal reason other than that this entity is this and that entity is that; and this entity ‘because this’ is communicable and that entity ‘because that’ is incommunicable, such that the latter can only arise if it arise formally incommunicable, and the former only if it arise formally communicable. But the reason for this is extrinsic – quasi fundamental or original – because the essence is radically infinite, from which can intrinsically arise not only perfections simply and communicable, but also incommunicable properties; each of them arises, however, when it arises, with the determinate, highest determination possible for it.

Hereby is plain the answer to all the proofs that paternity is of itself not incommunicable [nn.46-50]:

For when you say that ‘it is not of itself a this’ [n.47], I say this is false, understanding it formally of the reality that is paternity and not of the concept common to this paternity and to that, because (as was expounded in distinction 8 nn.136-150 and will be stated in III Suppl. d.22 q. un. nn.7-8) there can be some concept without an order of realities outwardly, one of which realities is contractive or determinative of the other. Paternity, however – that is the reality – is not of itself a ‘this’, that is fundamentally, but is so from the essence, and from this very same essence it is incommunicable paternity, because it is not a ‘this’ before it is incommunicable and because it is afterwards made quasi-incommunicable by something else that determines it, but there arises, without any order of singularity for incommunicability in that reality, a reality supremely determinate in the first instant of nature in which it arises.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘every quiddity is communicable’ [n.26], but only a quiddity that is perfection simply or divisible (for the first is communicated in unity of nature, the second is communicated along with division of it); this quiddity is neither a perfection simply nor divisible, because it is in a nature simply perfect.

Nor is the proposition true that ‘opposite relations are equally communicable of themselves’ [nn.48-49], nay active inspiring arises as communicable to two, nor can it ever be made incommunicable by anything that determines it; but passive inspiring is, in the same instant in which it exists in divine reality, of itself formally incommunicable.

Also as to what you say that ‘whatever position is set down – possible or impossible – it will, with its idea standing in place, remain incommunicable’ [n.50], I concede ‘with its idea standing in place’ and do not concede ‘when something is posited repugnant to its idea’. But if one sets down that its idea is standing in place and there is something repugnant to it, from opposites in the antecedent follow opposites, namely that it is incommunicable of itself formally and can be communicated; so in the issue at hand: if one posits that inspiring precedes active generation, one posits something impossible with the paternity of the Father and yet the idea of paternity remains, and thus it follows that paternity is communicable from what is first and yet incommunicable from what is second; hence it is formally a contradiction for generation to be the second production in divine reality.

Paternity, therefore, because divine, is incommunicable, such that the ‘because’ is a circumstance of the original or fundamental principle, though not a contracting or determining principle, in the way in which white is contracted when ‘white man’ is said or ‘human whiteness’; for this whiteness is pre-understood as existing in itself, and as such it would be indeterminate and able to be determined so as to be of a man (and to this it is determined when ‘human whiteness’ is said), but not that whiteness arise from the nature of man and that in that very instant it be of itself indeterminate. So – oppositely – in the issue at hand, because just as a cause would not give being to the effect unless it gave itself ‘a being agreeable to the effect’, and just as it would not produce the effect unless it produced something that was of a nature to have such an effect (for example, no cause would cause a triangle formally unless it produced something that necessarily had three angles equal to two right angles, and if it could produce something that did not necessarily have three such angles, it would not produce a triangle but something else, – nor is there any reason for this save that the formal idea of triangle is that it be a triangle), so I say that deity would not be the fundamental reason for any intrinsic reality unless the reality arises such that – in the first instant in which it is – it is determinate with ultimate determination; if therefore it produce something

determinable by some reality that is as it were adventitious to it when already produced, it would not produce something intrinsic in divine reality, – even if it were to produce something communicable, it would not produce a personal property, but something in some way different from it.

To the other proof [n.51] I say that although some common concept might be obtained that is stated in the ‘what’ of divine generation and of divine inspiriting (nay perhaps that might be stated in the ‘what’ of divine and created paternity), yet no reality can exist in divine reality in any way distinct on the part of the thing – wherefrom this concept stated in the ‘what’ may be taken – which reality might be determinable by some other reality, as a concept is determinable in the intellect by some other concept; and the possibility of this and the reason for it has sufficiently been touched on [d.8 nn.135-150].

I say therefore that paternity and filiation are not primarily diverse as to understanding such that the intellect not be able to abstract from them some common reality, but they are primarily diverse as to reality and reality, so that they include no one grade of reality which is quasi potential and determinable by proper differences (or quasi by proper differences), the way that whiteness and blackness include some reality of the same idea that is determinable by proper differences specific to them, from which their specific differences are taken. And then the major proposition, that ‘the first distinguishing things are first diverse’ [n.51], should only be understood of the realities themselves that first constitute them as to their non-agreement in some one formal reality, which they formally include.

To the other proof, about a supposit per accidens [n.52], I say that in one way the metaphysician speaks of the ‘per accidens’ and in another way the logician; for the metaphysician says that there is a being ‘per accidens’ that includes in itself things of two genera, as is clear in *Metaphysics* ‘about being’ and ‘about one’, V.7 and 6. 1017a7-22, 1015b16-36; the logician says that a proposition is ‘per accidens’ whose subject does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate, and if one concept is made from two such – neither of which is per se determinative of the other – he says that that concept is ‘one per accidens’. There is no example in creatures of a logical concept ‘one per accidens’ save a concept to which there corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ metaphysically, because although this proposition ‘the rational is animal’ is per accidens, yet by joining one concept to the other, one concept is per se determinative of the other; therefore the whole concept is not one per accidens, but only some concept that puts together concepts of two genera is one per accidens, and to it there always corresponds a ‘one per accidens’ in the hands of the metaphysician.

To the matter at issue. This proposition can be conceded per accidens ‘paternity is deity’, because the subject as subjected does not include the reason for the inherence of the predicate as predicated, because the subject is not formally the predicate. Also by joining the concept of the subject to the concept of the predicate (thus: ‘God is Father’), one concept does not per se determine the other, because according to Damascene [ch.50] properties determine hypostases not nature; therefore the concept is not ‘per se one’, and so it does not state the concept ‘of a per se supposit’ with respect to another; for what is not in itself ‘per se one’ is not the ‘per se supposit’ of anything, and just as this is not so in reality so it is not so in concepts. Thus therefore, speaking logically, one could concede that the Father is not a ‘per se supposit’ of God.

But against this I argue that the first identity cannot be per accidens, and as not in things so not in concepts either; but the first identity in predication seems to be of the first nature with its supposit; therefore this identity is not per accidens but per se.

I reply: the first identity of predication is of whatever exists to itself, as ‘man is man’, ‘God is God’. But comparing God here to supposit and asking about identity there, I say that speaking really according to the metaphysician – since there are no genera here nor anything of any genus (from distinction 8 nn.95-115) – nothing here will be a being per accidens; nor does this inference hold ‘it is a supposit per accidens logically, therefore it is a supposit per accidens metaphysically’, because ‘it is a supposit’ states the disposition of something as subject to something as to a predicate, and so a supposit can be said to be ‘per accidens’ because of accidentality on the part of inherence, not on the part of the extremes.

And if it be objected ‘here it is conceded that there are things as it were of two genera, namely of substance and accident’, I reply: the proper idea of things, as concerns genera or quasi-genera, does not make a ‘whole’ to be a being per accidens, but the disposition of thing to thing

does, namely non-identity simply; but now although the proper idea of relation – which remains there – does not include formally the idea of essence, yet one real thing is truly the same as the other, because of which identity there is no disposition of reality to reality of the sort required of things that constitute a ‘being per accidens’.

If it be objected against the first member [sc. accidentality on the part of inherence], ‘since in creatures there can be per se a supposit of nature, why is it not so here?’, one could say that an imperfect absolute can be incommunicable, and universally anything ‘that contracts per se in any genus’ can be incommunicable, just as can anything communicable, – and so in any created thing that pertains to any genus there can be something of that genus which constitutes an incommunicable; but a simply perfect thing cannot be incommunicable, nor anything of the same idea (everything absolute in divine reality is of this sort, according to the third way), and therefore nothing ‘quasi of the same genus as the essence’ can constitute there a supposit, but only something that is as if of another genus. An example: if anything of the genus of substance, up to the ultimate element by which it is constituted as ‘this substance’, were a perfection simply and consequently communicable, ‘this substance’ could not be further contracted in itself through anything (because what is a ‘this’ is not further determinable in itself), but only something of the genus of quantity or quality could constitute ‘in this substance’ something incommunicable, because quantity or quality would not be a perfection simply; then that thing constituted from substance and quantity would be a supposit per accidens (and also would be a being per accidens), if one of those realities were not perfectly the same as the other. – So in the issue at hand the position is that essence is a perfection simply, and whatever is of the same genus as the essence exist ‘to itself’; and therefore anything such is communicable, and yet is of itself a ‘this’. And further: that which is of itself a ‘this’ cannot be contracted, but only in that which is a ‘this’ can something incommunicable be constituted by something which is not a perfection simply, and therefore something not of the same genus as the essence but quasi other.

Hereby one can say to the other confirmation, whereby is inferred ‘the identity of created substance to its supposit would be truer than the identity of the divine nature with its’; this does not follow, if it be understood on the part of the thing, because although an individual entity in a creature per se determines nature and makes it ‘per se one’ with it, yet that ‘one’ is composite by some composition that is also real, – but relation, although it does not per se determine the divine nature, yet is so truly the same as it that no composition there can come to be; and therefore, really or metaphysically speaking, the identity of the divine supposit is much truer, both in itself and with the nature, than the identity of a created supposit is in itself or with its nature, – but logically speaking one can well concede that a created substance is formally predicated of its supposit (because predicated ‘per se in the first mode’), but ‘God’ is not so predicated of the Father, because ‘Father’ does not have so per se one a concept in the intellect as ‘Socrates’ does.

If you infer ‘therefore this predication is truer than that’, the consequence can be denied, because some predication that is not formal, or not per se, can be truer than some predication that is formal and per se, provided however there is a greater identity of the real extremes, in whose concept however there is less formal inclination or inherence.

As to the final confirmation [sc. the third in the second interpolation to n.52], one can concede logically that of neither quiddity is there a ‘per se supposit’; but really it is a supposit of the nature, not of the relation, because relation there is an incommunicable property, but the nature is not. Likewise, the relation passes over into the essence and not conversely, because of the infinity of the essence.

To the fourth [n.60 with interpolation]. Primary substance in creatures possesses something of perfection, namely ultimate unity (that is why it is indivisible), and this follows on ultimate actuality, because of which there belongs to it ‘per se existence’; two opposites come together in secondary substance, which is both divisible and does not have ‘existence’ save in primary substance. These conditions of primary substance are possessed by the divine essence of itself, and not formally by relation; for it is of itself a ‘this’ and it subsists of itself (that is it exists per se), or at any rate it is the whole reason for subsisting (therefore, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11, the Father does not exist by that by which he is Father but by that by which he is God). More than this, primary created substance – because it is limited – does not possess communicability, because the same limited thing in number is not communicable; this property of primary substance does not belong to the divine essence.

Hereby is plain the answer to the first point there touched on [n.60], because I concede that primary substance in divine reality, as that which is meant by 'to be substance most of all and to subsist per se', is not formally constituted by relation but by deity.

Likewise to the second point [interpolation to n.61]: because 'primary substance does not include non-substance' is true, because of the conditions of perfection that belong to primary substance, and so, wherever those conditions are preserved, this will not be through non-substance; but in the nature in which there cannot exist through substance the condition which belongs to imperfection in created primary substance, namely incommunicability (the way it is posited in God, where anything 'to itself' is posited as simply perfect and so communicable), primary substance there must – as to possessing that condition – include non-substance.

To the third point there touched on [n.62] I reply: paternity and this incommunicable paternity – whatever may be true of them in conception – are altogether the same in the thing, such that there is no distinction there formal or real; for the thing, in the first instant in which it exists or burgeons in the essence, exists there under the idea of the ultimate determination possible for it, otherwise in that instant it would be potential for determination. Because therefore determination for incommunicability is not repugnant to relation, for that reason it is not only a quiddity and a 'this' but incommunicable, and it is altogether not a 'this' in the thing before it is incommunicable; but 'this' deity is communicable, such that it is repugnant to it – according to this opinion [sc. the second] – to be by anything as it were of its genus incommunicable. I deny therefore the consequence 'in relation there is quiddity, and this is incommunicable insofar as it is relation, therefore these cannot be found in that which exists to itself', because incommunicability is repugnant to anything 'to itself'; in God, according to this opinion, it is not repugnant to relation, and therefore relation has it at once.

To the fourth point there touched on [n.63]: 'to exist per se' is conceded to 'this essence', or to God 'whence he is God', – but not to be able to be that by which formally something per se is, this belongs to created nature from its limitation, because of which it is incommunicable both as 'what' and as 'by which' (of this double incommunicability there was discussion in distinction 23 n.16). It is true, therefore, that created substance has 'per se existence', but accident not, and this belongs to substance from its perfection, – but the fact that it cannot communicate this 'per se existence' to something in which it exists, this is a mark of limitation. Here then I concede that essence is determined of itself to 'per se existence' (whether as 'what' or as 'by which'), but that, along with this, it is communicable to a relative person, as that by which the relative person has the same 'per se existence'.

To the points about the fourth way [nn.53-55].

To the first, from Augustine [n.54], the response was given after the response to the first argument against the second opinion [interpolation to n.87].

To his other authority [n.54] here is the reply. Augustine there, *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7, says how there is said to be 'one essence' and by the Greeks 'three substances' but by the Latins 'three persons'; and in text that is adduced [n.54] (taken from ch.4), that 'substance exists to itself', because 'they are not properly said to be three substances, because substance (the way it is conceded in divine reality) exists to itself, and therefore essence and substance are the same' [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; he also says: "they are not to be called three substances, as they may not be called three essences" [*ibid.* ch.4 n.9]. He does not therefore intend that substance as the Greeks take it (namely for person) exists to itself [n.73], but that they concede three substances not properly but only because of a necessity of speaking; hence he seems to prefer the way of speaking of the Latins, that they are 'three persons' [*ibid.* ch.5 n.10]; but even that he proves consequently not to be proper, showing that person is simply said 'to itself', as is essence [*ibid.* ch.6 n.11]. Therefore take his final conclusion on this matter from there: "We want indeed some one word to serve for the meaning whereby the Trinity is understood, lest we should be altogether silent when someone asks 'three what?'"

When therefore the Latins speak of three persons or the Greeks of three substances, Augustine would say that they speak improperly and because of the necessity to speak. One does not therefore get from his intention that something which signifies incommunicable subsistent in divine reality exists to itself, but only that the names – which are accommodated by some for expressing such incommunicable subsistent – are in themselves absolute names, nay purely absolute, because they are essentials. But one should accept the first point from him, so that the

proposed conclusion in this question on behalf of the third opinion [n.56] may be obtained (the opinion that posits that in the thing 'this subsistent incommunicable' exists to itself), and that so much cannot be expressed by any essential name, accommodated from use or the necessity of speaking.

On behalf of the second opinion, use these means against everything that is adduced from Augustine [n.73].

To the third, from Richard and Boethius [n.55], the response is that just as from the absolute and the relative – speaking quidditatively – can be abstracted something common quidditatively, so also from such and such incommunicable something common can be abstracted which is of itself neither an incommunicable absolute nor an incommunicable relative; some such thing is described by Richard and Boethius, with this added, that it exists 'in intellectual nature', so that as the description of the superior should not include the proper idea of anything inferior, so the description of person – by which it is incommunicable in intellectual nature – should not include anything properly pertaining to an incommunicable absolute, nor properly to an incommunicable relative, but ought to be indifferent to both; and thus do both describe person. I concede therefore that neither in the definition of person assigned by Boethius nor in the one assigned by Richard is anything relative posited, and so I say that neither is there posited anything whence the thing defined might express absolute existence, but it is indifferent to both; such that, just as in some nature there is not found 'the assigned idea in general' save in an absolute and by reason of an absolute (as in a creature), so in the divine nature it is not found save in a relative.

V. To the Principal Arguments

95. To the principal arguments.

To the first [n.1] it is plain how persons do not differ in species, nor also is the production of person by person equivocal – as was touched on about this in distinction 7 nn.51-64, 47-50.

96. To the second [n.2] the response is (according to those who hold the second opinion) that common relations do not first burgeon in the essence, but that relations of origin first burgeon in it [n.28]. However it does not seem that this can be proved, because magnitude more pertains to essence as it is understood in abstraction from the persons than action or passion do, which belong only to a supposit; therefore relations that follow magnitude – of which sort is the relation of equality – can be more understood in the essence as essence, as it seems to be abstracted from person, than relations of origin can be. Similarly one can argue – in the case of the matter at issue – about likeness, which follows the essence as it has the idea of form, in which form the suppositi are alike. Therefore the latter do not burgeon first before the former, or if they do burgeon first, what is the reason? But if common relations equally burgeon first or in advance, and these can constitute [sc. persons], – therefore they do constitute them. For there is no possibility there for anything which is not in act, nor can any form constitute a person unless it constitute in act (if the form is in act), as it seems, just as neither is any form able to constitute in act something in a species without – if it exist and not have imperfect existence – constituting something in a species.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] To this one can say that, just as any created essence, although it is a quiddity and a quantity (because it is in a certain grade of perfection) and an essential quality (as is touched on in distinction 31 nn.10, 16-17, distinction 19 n.8), yet it is a quiddity before it is a quantity or a quality (and therefore there is in the individual first the idea of identity to another individual before of equality or likeness), so too there is first in a supposit the idea of acting – if it is an active form – before there is the idea of equality or likeness; for the idea of the active does not follow it

later after there is the idea of identity. In divine reality, therefore, since to communicate is an action whose formal principle is the essence as a 'what', there will in some way be first in it relations pertaining to communication before other relations, those of equality or likeness, which are founded on the idea itself of quantity in virtue and essential quality. Hereby I say to the argument [n.2] that neither action nor equality can be understood inwardly in the same nature unless it be of supposits or things related (yet they will be natures and foundations), and of these action is prior to equality, just as action itself follows the foundation first – by reason of which it belongs to supposits – before equality follows it.

On the contrary: this response seems to suppose that the essence merely as a 'what' is the reason for communication in divine reality, the opposite of which was said in distinction 13 nn.45, 63.

I reply: the essence 'as it is a what' is the reason for communicating the essence, but not this only, but along with this the essence 'as it is intellect and as it is will' is a productive principle of a person and communicative of the essence, as was said there [*ibid.* n.93] and in distinction 2 of this first book [nn.221, 226, 300-303, 355-356]. But now, just as essence is understood to be the idea of communicating itself before it is understood to be a quantity or a quality, so also it is understood to be the idea of operating before it is a quantity or a quality; for being an operative principle with respect to operations proper to such a nature does not belong to the essence after the active principle belongs to it, and this whether the active principle is productive with respect to producibles in the nature or is communicative of the nature itself. But the divine essence is a principle of operations proper to such a nature, insofar as the nature is intellect and will, because to understand and to will are the proper operations of that nature; therefore first it is essence, not only essence but also intellect and will, before it is a quantity or a quality. Therefore, although production does not belong to the essence alone 'as it is essence' as to a productive principle, but also to intellect and will as productive principle along with the essence insofar as it is essence, yet the fact still stands that the relation of producer and produced first burgeon in the essence before the relation of equal and like.

On the contrary: from this response it seems to follow that intellect and will are not attributes, because an attribute quasi perfects in second being something quasi presupposed in first being; therefore nothing that pertains to essence before it is understood to be a quantity or a quality is an attribute. Likewise, from this it seems that intellect and will are not distinguished there from the nature of the thing; the consequent is contrary to things said before in distinction 13 nn.64-67; the proof of the consequence is that that which in God precedes the idea of quantity and quality is only a 'what', – but a 'what' as a 'what' is not distinguished in God from the nature of the thing, because then his 'what' would not be simple.

To these points. To the first I say that if in created substance the power – or that which is the principle of proper operation belonging to such a nature – is not something pertaining to the genus of quality, but is either merely the substance itself to which the operation belongs, or it is some perfection identically contained in the substance (and this belonging to it as it is substance, but not as a certain quality circumstancing the substance, – in the way one must posit about powers when positing that there is some real distinction between them and yet that they are not accidents), much more does the divine essence – when everything is removed that is a quasi quality – have in itself 'as it is essence' the things that are the principles of proper operation belonging to God; of this sort are understanding and willing. I concede therefore that, when properly calling 'attributes' those things only that as quasi qualities perfect in second being a thing presupposed in perfect first being (namely as far as concerns every perfection that belongs to the thing as it is substance), then in this way intellect and will are not attributes, nay they are certain perfections intrinsic to the essence as the essence is pre-understood to every quantity and quasi quality.

This point is made clear by the fact that if some [Henry of Ghent etc.] concede that life or living is not an attribute (because it states such being, not with a quasi accidental suchness, but as if per se contracting the thing, – just as man is such an animal, because he is rational), in the same way, since the intellect is a certain life and the will a certain life, they will not properly be attributes.

Or it is made clear in another and better way, that this essence as 'this essence' – preceding every quasi quality – is an intellective and volitional essence, such that, just as

rationality is not an attribute of man, so neither is intellectuality an attribute of this essence. The point is plain from a likeness about the infinite, which infinite I have denied elsewhere [d.19 n.15, d.31 n.19] to be properly an attribute, because it states a mode intrinsic to whatever is in God, both substance and any attribute; so intellectuality states a mode intrinsic to this essence (but properly the attributes are wisdom and charity – and in another way the transcendentals, namely truth and goodness).

To the second point I say that a ‘simple what’ is not simple unitarily (as containing in itself only a single perfection), but this essence is simple and unlimited, because unlimited not only intensively in one idea but in everything that is a principle of proper operations in God, just as created substance is in some way unlimited because it is by identity any such principle of operating whatever. But along with this unlimitedness of the divine essence – a quasi extensive unlimitedness – stands simplicity; nay the simplicity follows from the infinity, because the infinite is combinable with nothing as part with part, but it can be really the same – although not formally – as any infinite at all.

97. To the third [n.3] response has been given in distinction 3 [nn.519-520], that there are certain relations of the second mode that are impossible in the same thing, and that these relations state an essential order of origin, – but some relations of the same mode are not impossible, because namely they state an accidental order, as mover to moved. For the moved does not depend on the mover save per accidens, namely as to the act which it receives from it, namely to move, – and therefore, although the will can move itself, yet no supposit the same can produce itself; and therefore the relations of producer and produced sufficiently distinguish the supposits really.

98. To Boethius [n.4] I reply that he is thinking of a relation of identity according to nature, not formally, as if he were to say that certain relations necessarily require a diversity of nature in the extremes; but the relation in question here – which is a relation of origin – has no such requirement, but identity of nature is compatible with it, and therefore it is a relation ‘quasi of the same thing to itself’ because of the identity in nature of the things related, although it is a relation of a distinct thing to a distinct thing, speaking of the distinction of supposits.

VI. To the Arguments of the First Opinion

99. To the arguments for the opinion of Praepositinus [nn.7-8] I reply:

To the first [n.7] I say that it is true that ‘person is simple like the essence’; however person includes certain things one of which is not formally the other, the essence not so, and therefore the essence is itself totally distinct although person, because of the essence, which is common, is not itself totally distinct; for such a non formal identity is sufficient in something for the fact that the Son is distinguished by one and not by the other.

To the second [n.8] I say that a concrete – whether it signifies or connotes – at any rate gives to understand a subsistent in form or nature, but an abstract precisely gives to understand form;^a but in the matter at issue a subsistent, possessing paternity, has also along with this the divine essence, which essence is not formally paternity, nor conversely (as is said in *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3), and therefore to say ‘the Father is distinguished by paternity’, taking Father not adjectivally but substantively for a hypostasis (as the Master takes it in distinction 27 ch.2 n.238^b), is not to say ‘the Father is himself wholly distinct’ first, but by something that is in him, yet giving to understand the whole.^c

a. [Interpolation] but if this be doubtful to anyone about a concrete adjective, it seems sufficiently certain about a concrete substantive, which either signifies or necessarily connotes a subsistent in the nature that is implied by its abstract.

b. *A blank space was left here by Scotus*

c. [Interpolation] for Father (as taken substantively) does not per se include deity in all the same way that paternity does.

Twenty Seventh Distinction

Question One

Whether a Created Word is Actual Intellection

1. About the twenty seventh distinction I ask about the word, and first about the word of a created intellect, whether a created word is actual intellection.

That it is not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VIII ch.6 n.9: “the image of Carthage, in my memory, this is its word;” the image there is taken for the species, not for actual imagination; therefore in the same way the intellectual word is an intelligible species and not actual intellection.

2. Again, Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.11 n.20: “the word that sounds exteriorly is a sign of the word that shines interiorly;” but the external word is a sign of a thing not of an intellection, – otherwise any affirmative proposition in which the same thing is not predicated of itself would be false, because the intellection of the subject is not the intellection of the predicate, although the thing is the thing; therefore the word is object and not actual intellection.

3. Further, Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18: “the word is offspring and thing born from memory;” but action is not born, but is that in which something else is born; therefore the word is something formed by an act of understanding and is not the act itself.

4. On the contrary:

In the same place Augustine calls the word knowledge: “the knowledge of it, which is the offspring of it;” and *On the Trinity* XV ch.12 n.22, ch.21 n.40: “It is vision from vision and knowledge from knowledge.”

Question Two

Whether the Word in Divine Reality States something Proper to the Generated Person

5. Second I ask about the Divine Word, whether word in divine reality states something proper to the generated person.

That it does not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “the Word is knowledge along with love;” all these things [sc. knowledge and love], placed in the definition of word, are essentials; therefore the word is an essential too.^a

a. [Interpolation] Again, the word is the intellectual term of operation; ‘to understand’, whereby the Son is produced, is not only a personal property but also a common essential one; therefore through it is produced an essential word.

6. Further, *On the Trinity* XV ch.7 n.12 ‘On Great Things’ and chs.15 and 16 ‘On Small Things’: “Just as the Father understands for himself and wills for himself and remembers for himself, so also do the Son and Holy Spirit;” but the proper act of intelligence as it is intelligence is the word; therefore just as in the Father there formally exists intelligence as intelligence, so there exists in him word as word.

The assumption is proved by this, that the trinity which Augustine assigns in *On the Trinity* IX ch.12 n.18 (‘mind, knowledge, and love’, which knowledge is the word, according to him in the same place), and the trinity assigned according to him in *On the Trinity* X ch.10 n.13 (‘memory, intelligence, and will’) correspond to each other in turn, – the first part to the first part, and the second to the second, and the third to the third; therefore, just there is no perfect will without love formally, nor perfect mind without memory formally, so there is no perfect intelligence – as it seems – without the word formally.

7. Again there are not two things proper to one person, because there is one formal constitutive property for one thing constituted in being; filiation is the property constitutive of the generated person (according to Augustine *On the Faith to Peter* [really Fulgentius] ch.2 n.7), therefore the word is not; for these do not seem to state the same property, because not every son is word nor is every word son.

8. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3: “He is word by that by which he is Son,” and each of these is said relatively.

Question Three

Whether the Divine Word states a Respect to the Creature

9. Third the question is asked whether the divine word states a respect to the creature.

That it does:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VI ch.10 n.11: “the Word is the art of the almighty God, full of all living reasons;” art states a respect to the thing made by art; therefore word also states a respect to creatures.

10. The opposite:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.2 n.3, through the same as before [n.8]; Son does not state a respect to creatures; therefore neither does the word, because “he is word by that by which he is Son.”

I. To the First and Second Questions

A. The Opinion of Others

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. [To the first question] – To the first question it is said that the word is actual intellection, and not any intellection but a declarative one.

12. To understand this the position is set down as follows:

The intellect receives first a simple impression (or intellection) from the object, by which received impression the intellect – as it is active – converts itself to itself and to its own act and object, by understanding that it understands; third, there follows an impression of declarative knowledge in the bare converted intellect, and this from the intellect informed with simple knowledge, such that the intellect informed by such knowledge is the reason for impressing declarative knowledge, – and the converted bare intellect is something properly receptive. And between these two intellections, namely the first, which is the reason for the impressing, and the second, which is the one impressed, there is a middle disposition that is an action in the genus of action, and it is marked by that which ‘to say’ is; for this ‘to say’ is to express or impress a declarative knowledge of simple knowledge, – and so this ‘declarative knowledge’, impressed on the converted bare intellect and being the term of the act of saying, is the word.

13. Not any actual intellection, then, is the word, but the one that is declarative, that presupposes simple actual intellection and actual conversion to it, and is born in the act of saying, whose active principle is simple knowledge and whose receptive one is the converted bare intellect.

14. [To the second question] – In agreement with this, an answer is given to the second question [n.5], that the intellect of the Father is first informed with quasi simple knowledge of the essence, to which it was quasi merely in passive potency, and, when brought into this act of ‘simple knowledge’ as bare, it is converted to itself as thus informed; and on it when converted, as if on a passive disposed thing, there is impressed declarative knowledge by virtue of simple actual knowledge, which declarative knowledge and term of the act of saying is the word. And according to this, it is plain that the word is the term of generation as also of the Son, and so it will be proper to the second person.

This opinion was stated above in distinction 2 nn.273-277, 280, in the question ‘On the two productions’.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

a. As to the First Question

16. Against this opinion – as to the first question [n.12] – I argue first that it seems irrational to posit that the same power is active with respect to one of its acts and passive with respect to another of its acts, because from this it seems that it is not a power of the same nature. For any power of one nature involves a like disposition of the power to the object; for sight is not active with respect to one act of seeing and passive with respect to another; hence any act of one power has a like disposition of power to object. Therefore if the intellect is only passive with respect to simple knowledge of a stone, and perfectly active with respect to conversion – which is second act – whereby it understands that it understands a stone, it will (as it seems) not be one power; it also

seems unacceptable that it would be unable to have some activity with respect to a more imperfect act and yet could be totally active with respect to a more perfect act (now it is posited by some people that that conversion is a more perfect act than simple intellection).

17. As to what is added afterwards, that actual intellection is the reason for generating declarative knowledge [n.12], this seems to be unacceptable in our own case, because a more imperfect form cannot be a perfect reason for generating something perfect; but the first knowledge in us is confused and more imperfect than distinct knowledge; therefore etc.

18. Besides, if first knowledge is the reason for generating second knowledge [sc. distinct or declarative knowledge] – then either when it is not first, and then a non-being will be the reason for acting, or when it is, and then they [sc. first and second knowledge] will be either of the same idea or of a different one; if the latter, and the prior is more imperfect than the second, then it is not a principle for generating the second, because the more imperfect is not a principle for producing a more perfect (hence in equivocal production the cause is always more perfect than the effect); if the former, then two acts of understanding of the same species will be in the same intellect or in the same power (and with respect to the same object), because memory and intelligence are one power.

19. Again,^a then a trinity would not be posited in the mind according as it is mind, because the mind will not have any proper activity according as it is mind, but precisely according to an accident of it through an accident (which is simple knowledge), just as neither does wood have any activity with respect to the heating that is attributed to it through the heat that is an accident of it through an accident; and so it seems Augustine sought in vain for parent and offspring in the mind ‘according as it is mind’, because the idea of parent does not seem to belong to the soul according to anything in it, but according to some accident precisely, which is imprinted on it by the object.

a. [Interpolation] Further, as to any reflexive act of the intellect there is some more perfect direct act that can be had, because a direct act of the intellect – by which it understands a quiddity – is more perfect than the act by which it understands its own understanding, because it has a more noble object; therefore since the word is perfect knowledge of the thing, it does not include the act by which one knows that one knows.

20. Further, to generate a word is not an act of intelligence but of memory, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.14 n.24; but every actual intellection belongs to intelligence, not to memory, according to him *ibid.* XIV ch.7 n.10; therefore no actual intellection is a reason for generating the word.

21. Further, what it says about conversion, that it is necessarily previous to generation of the word [n.12], seems to be against Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.16 n.26, where he seems to say that our most perfect word will be in the fatherland with respect to the beatific object, – and yet that act will not be a convertive one, because the beatific vision does not have any created thing for immediate object (but every convertive act in us has something created for object, as the act or the power); nor does that vision presuppose conversion, because if that vision is the effect of the divine essence alone (or of the intellect cooperating with the divine essence), it naturally precedes the conversion of the intellect to its own understanding.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Again, as confused intellection is to an object confusedly presented, so is a distinct intellection to an object distinctly presented, – and it will not be a word of the object but of the act.

22. Also as to the statement that the intellect, as it is being converted, is purely active and yet, as converted, it is purely passive with respect to the generated knowledge which is the word, – it seems thoroughly irrational that the same thing under the idea under which it is ‘active’ is only passive with respect to an act of the same idea, or that insofar as it is purely ‘passive’ it is active with respect to an act of the same idea; but the intellect, insofar as it receives simple knowledge, is only passive and, insofar as it converts, it is only active; therefore it seems that it is unacceptable that insofar as it converts it is passive with respect to generation of the word, and insofar as it has simple knowledge it is active with respect to the same generation.

b. As to the Second Question

23. Also against what it says to the second question the same objection, it seems, can be made, that the intellect of the Father ‘as it is converting’ is purely active and ‘as having simple knowledge’ it is purely passive, according to him [Henry of Ghent]; therefore it seems unacceptable that ‘as converted’ it is that as from which the word is generated, and that ‘as knowing with simple knowledge’ it is the reason for generating the word quasi actively.

24. Further, some say that this conversion of the intellect is a quasi disposition of matter, – which seems unacceptable, because the disposition of matter is not more perfect nor as equally perfect as the active form of the agent; but this conversion is as equally perfect as simple knowledge, or more perfect; therefore etc.

25. Further, this conversion is with respect to first act as object, – therefore it is declarative knowledge of that act, just as any knowledge declares the object of which it is; therefore, before the generation of the word that follows this conversion (according to him [Henry]), there is had a declarative knowledge of first act, and so a word before the word!

26. Again, this opinion, as to the fact it posits the intellection of the Father to be the reason for generating the word, was refuted above in distinction 2 nn.291-296, in the aforesaid question ‘About productions’, and as to the fact that it posits the intellect of the Father to be that from which the word is generated, it was refuted in the same place, nn.283, 285, and also in distinction 5 nn.72-75; and I repeat one of the arguments touched on there.

Because the intellect as converted belongs to some supposit; for the conversion is, according to him, a certain action of understanding, and acts belong to supposits; therefore the conversion belongs to some supposit. I ask whose supposit it is as it is converted? If the Word’s, and ‘as it is converted’ it precedes generation (according to him [n.25]), then it precedes the Word, and so the Word exists before the Word! If the conversion is the Father’s, and whose it is ‘as it is converted’ is his as from whom generation happens by impression, and whose it is ‘as from whom something is generated by impression’ is his as the impressed thing exists in him and consequently is his ‘as he has that impressed thing’ – then, from first to last, it follows that the intellect of the Father ‘as Father’ formally has generated knowledge impressed on it, and so the Father

formally understands by generated knowledge, contrary to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2.

27. The response made is that, just as in generation in creatures there are three moments of nature to distinguish, the first moment in which matter is under the form that is to be corrupted, the second in which the matter is under no form but is quasi bare and in proximate potency to the form that is to be generated, and the third in which it is under the form of the generated thing, – so it can correspondingly be said in divine reality, that the intellect in the first moment, as it is in the Father, is thus being converted to itself, and this conversion is a quasi disposition of the matter for the generation of the Son; in the second moment, in which it belong as it were to no person, it is then in proximate potency to the term of generation; and in the third moment, in which it is under the property of the generated person, it belongs then to that person.

28. An example is set down: if wine is in proximate potency to vinegar (so that the form of wine is pre-required in the matter in natural order for its being in proximate potency with respect to vinegar), if along with this the matter of wine were not limited to these two forms and consequently neither of them, when introduced, would expel the other, and if along with this each is hypostatic, bestowing personal existence – then vinegar would be generated from matter ‘as it was the matter of the wine’ as if from matter disposed with a previous disposition necessarily preceding this form. But if it be asked whose it is as vinegar is immediately generated from it, – the response is that it is no one’s but is generated from it immediately when matter is under neither hypostatic form.

29. Hereby response is given to the argument here in the matter at issue; the concession is made that it is the Father’s, the way the matter is the wine’s as it is disposed to the form of vinegar.

30. And when it is argued ‘therefore as it is Father’s it receives generated knowledge’, the consequence is denied; nay, by the fact that it receives generated knowledge it belongs to another subsistent, and even that from which the word is immediately generated does not exist as the Father’s but as converted.

31. And if it be objected against this that generation is not from the intellect as it is the Father’s more than from the intellect as it is the Son’s and the Holy Spirit’s, – the consequence is denied, because there is a double ‘as’ there. One that indicates the idea of the immediate principle ‘from which’ – and thus the word is generated from it as it is no one’s, as from the immediate receptive thing, which indicates the idea of what is disposed to the form that is the term, although it is not the idea of the immediate receptive thing absolutely; therefore the word is generated from the intellect as it is no one’s – as however it was first the Father’s it was also first existing in the Father, so that neither reduplication [sc. of ‘as’] is precisely without the other. And yet by the fact the word is generated from it [sc. the intellect], it is not in the subsistent of the word but of the Father and not no one’s.

32. But the addition is made that some people are deceived when they argue against this opinion ‘from which, as from matter or quasi-matter’, as if they imagine that there is there [sc. in God] a distinction of a quasi-passive potency from act, – which is not true, the way it is held generally by certain people about the attributes; but only, just as there is there wisdom formally and goodness formally, without distinction, so it is posited that there is truly impression there and truly the one impressing, – and everything that is

said there to be without distinction; but a distinction of these things is only by act of intellect busying itself about the same one thing that exists in reality.

33. Against these arguments [nn.27-32]:

Generation in creatures is a change formally, for the reason that the matter, belonging to nothing before, is afterwards understood to be under the form of the generated thing; for by this it is understood to be changed from privation to form, which change is formally generation-change. Therefore if under this idea passive potency is posited in divine reality, then there will be true change in divine reality.^a

a. [Interpolation] at any rate in the intellect as it busies itself about it, and so there will necessarily be imperfection there; or if only through the act of the busying intellect this conversion and generating of the word takes place, the word will not be a real person but only a person of reason and in intention.

34. The reason is confirmed by the example they give [n.28], that although the wine is not corrupted in the generation of vinegar, yet the generation would be truly a change from privation to form, although there not go along with it the other change, 'from form to privation', as now commonly happens when one thing is generated and another corrupted; for in this case there commonly come together there two changes and four terms of change (two forms and two privations), but – after removing one of the changes and its terms – the other change would no less exist; therefore so will it be in the proposed case, that insofar as it belongs to nothing before – and so is under privation of the term 'to which' and is later under that term – it changes.

35. Further, if first it belongs to the Father and secondly to nothing, and third belongs to the Son by the fact that it receives the impressed knowledge (so by the fact it belongs to the Son, because it is quasi-potential, it receives the formal feature of the Son [nn.27, 30]), and belongs to the Son as the formal term communicated to the Son by generation (as was shown in distinction 5 nn.64-85), – then the Son will have intellect in a double way of having it, such that, when either of these ways is removed, it would no less have it in the other way of having; just as in creatures the composite has matter as something of itself, and truly has it, although it is not the formal term of generation; also the same composite has the form as something of itself, and truly has it, although the form is not subject of generation.

36. But the inferred consequence, namely that the Son has the essence in two ways of having, seems impossible, both in reality and in the consideration of the busying intellect. There is proof also through this, that what is material in generation is in potency to the formal term of the same generation; but the same thing, under the same idea, is neither in reality nor in the intellect in potency to itself; therefore neither will the intellect be at the same time a receptive potency and the formal term of the same generation.

37. And as to what is added about the double 'as' on the part of the matter, as if there is pre-required for the 'as' which is the idea of the proximate susceptible factor the 'as' which is the same 'as' under the form ordered to the form of generating [n.31], – this does not seem to exist per se in creatures, because if the matter which is under the form of wine is posited to be without any form and a created agent can act on it as it is denuded of form, then it would be the proximate receptive factor of any form that is of a nature to be impressed on pure matter, and such a form could be induced by any sufficient agent at all. Therefore the second 'as' is precisely sufficient in creatures for proximate potency,

although frequently now its ordering is concomitant with it, because matter is never without form and is, as it is under form, not changed indifferently from any form to any form – by a created agent – but from a determinate form to a determinate form; the proof is that when it is understood to belong to nothing, then it is not under the prior form, which is posited as the disposition for the form of what is to be generated [nn.27-29]; its order then to that form is only a relation of posterior to prior, which perhaps is not a positive relation (because the term ‘to which’ is not then of the nature of the thing), or if it is a real relation, it does not seem to be the proper reason in the matter for receiving the form to be induced. – Applying this to the issue at hand, it seems that although the intellect should in origin be in the Father before it is in the Son, yet, if it were posited as receptive of generated knowledge, it would not be posited to be such essentially because of some order to existence in the Father, but according as it belongs precisely to nothing and, according to the way they themselves say precisely, to ‘quasi nothing’.

38. What is added to exclude a deception [n.32], seems to be the remark of someone deceived, because that remark seems in itself absurd and to destroy itself.

39. The first point is proved by the fact that the intellect in the nature of the thing is as truly a passive potency and as truly receptive as God is from the nature of the thing truly act and wise and good, – which seems absurd, because what in creatures necessarily has imperfection annexed to it or is an imperfection (as is the nature of passive potency, because it always states an imperfection the way it divides being against active potency) is posited to exist as truly in God as what is a perfection simply!

40. And if you say that rather passive potency states a perfection, although one not distinct from act, – this seems to be a fiction, because there is nothing lower in creatures than the idea of passive potency; for this idea belongs truly to prime matter, which is posited as the lowest of beings; therefore more truly can it be said that God is formally a stone than passive potency, if it is because of some perfection in the idea of passive potency that passive potency should be formally posited there.

41. Second I prove that the remark destroys itself [n.38], because it does not seem intelligible that there be opposite relations there without there also being distinct relations (if real, really, – if of reason, by reason) just as much as opposite ones; therefore if there is there from the nature of the thing something that impresses and something that is impressed and something on which it is impressed (which cannot be understood without relation), then to posit that they are there from the nature of the thing without any distinction is a contradiction.

B. Scotus’ own Response

1. To the First Question

42. I reply therefore in a different way to these questions.

To the first. – Because we chiefly take the idea of the word from Augustine’s book *On the Trinity*, certain definite things must be supposed that according to him belong to the word;^a from these we must investigate what in the intellect they most belong to, and that thing must be set down as the word.

a. [Interpolation] and second these things are by division to be removed from everything that is not the word (as the Philosopher does in *Ethics* 2.5.1105b19-06a13 when inquiring into the genus

of virtue, where he divides the things in the soul into powers, passions, and habits); third, when those things have been removed that do not belong to what is being investigated.

43. The word according to him^a is not without actual cognition, as is plain from *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25.

b. [Interpolation] it is an act of intelligence, as is plain by comparing the trinity he posits in *ibid.* IX to the trinity that he posits in *ibid.* X (for knowledge corresponds to intelligence). Also the word...

44. Also the word is generated from memory or from science, or from the object shows itself in the science, as is plain from *ibid.* XV ch.10 n.19: "The word is thought formed from the thing we know;" ch.14 n.24: "Our word is born from our science in the way the word of God the Father is born by science alone." And all these things are the same, because according to *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18: "from the knower and known together knowledge is born," which two things are one integral cause with respect to generated knowledge, as was said in distinction 3 question 2 n.494.^a

a. *A blank space was left here by Scotus*

45. Third, the word is investigated by him because of the image [sc. of the Trinity] in the mind and is set down as the second part of the image (namely the offspring), as is plain from *ibid.* IX ch.32: "There is a certain image of the Trinity; the mind itself, and its knowledge (which is its offspring and its word from itself), and love third."

46. The word may therefore be described as: the word is an act of intelligence produced by perfect memory, not having existence without actual intellection, representing the divine word (because for this reason Augustine inquired into our word).

47. From these it is plain that the word is nothing pertaining to the will, nor to memory (because the word is the second part of the image, not the first or third), and consequently it is not the intelligible species nor the habit, nor anything pertaining to memory; it is therefore something pertaining to intelligence.

a. Which of the Things Found in the Intelligence is the Word

48. Now in the intelligence there seems only to be [1] actual intellection, [2] or the object that is the term of that intellection, or, according to others, [3] the species generated in the intelligence from the species in the memory, which 'species in the intelligence' precedes the act of understanding, or, according to others, [4] it is something formed by an act of understanding, or fifth, according to others, [5] intellection itself as a passion, as if caused by itself as action; and according to these five there can be five opinions about the word.

49. Now the species in the intelligence is not prior to the act of understanding [contra the third opinion], because positing such a species is superfluous. For it does not more perfectly represent the object than the species in the memory, and it is enough to have one thing perfectly representing the object before the act of understanding.

50. But that it is not 'more perfect' is plain from Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23: "There is nothing more in the offspring than in the parent."

51. Also in that case two species of the same idea would be in the same power, because these two species are of the same power; and the intellect itself as memory and intelligence is one power, because it is pure act, and that by which the possessor operates and that by which it has first act is in second act.

52. In that case too the habit would not be the immediate principle of the act, nor would what has the habit be in accidental power to acting according to the habit, because a prior form would be required for the operation, different from the habit.

53. Nor can the 'species in the intelligence' be posited as being born naturally, supposing it could never exist without actual intellection, because actual intellection is subject to the command of the will; nor even can it be said that it is born freely or that its generation is subject to the command of the will – as it seems – if it is posited as a species prior to act, because it seems that the first thing pertaining to the intellect that is in our power is actual intellection.

54. Nor can the object itself be posited as the word, as another opinion says [the second, n.48], because the object in itself is not anything produced by virtue of memory (or of anything in the mind), such as the word is, – nor is the object 'as it is in the memory' produced by virtue of the memory, as is plain; but the object 'as it is in the intelligence' is only generated because something is first generated in which the object has being, because, as was said in distinction 3 nn.375, 382, 386, these intentional actions and passions do not belong to the object save because of some real action or passion that belongs to that in which the object has intentional being.

55. Nor too is it some term produced by intellection [sc. the fourth opinion, n.48], because intellection is not the productive action of any term; for then it would be impossible to understand it to exist and not to be of the term, just as it is impossible to understand that there is heating and no heat toward which the heating exists. But it is not impossible to understand intellection in itself without understanding that it is of some term as produced by it.

56. There is a confirmation too, that such operations ought to be ultimate acts, from *Ethics* 1.1.1094a3-5 and *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a-b1. – This matter was spoken about above in distinction 3 nn.600-604, as to how it is a certain action of the genus of action, and another action that is quality, of which sort intellection is.

57. This way – and the following one about intellection-passion – are also refuted [sc. the fourth and fifth opinions, n.48] through the same middle term, that then the intelligence and not the memory would generate the word, which is contrary to Augustine [n.44]; for intelligence would produce the term of the action of understanding, if there were any – and intelligence would produce intellection-passion, if there were any.

58. Also this way 'about intellection-action and passion' [the fifth] does not seem reasonable, because intellection is one form, which although it can be compared to the agent from which it is and to the subject in which it is received, yet it does not have from it such distinction that it could be as it were the cause of itself or the term of action in accord with this [sc. the subject] and not in accord with that [sc. the agent]; because if it is the term of action, this is in accord with itself, and not in accord with this respect or that, but those respects are concomitants of it.

59. It follows, therefore, by way of division that the word is actual intellection [the first opinion, n.48].

60. And there is confirmation from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.16 n.23: “Our thinking, reaching to that which we know, and formed from it, is our word.” The same is held by him in *ibid.* ch.10 n.19: “Formed thinking, indeed,” etc. “is the word,” as was said above [n.44].

61. There is confirmation of this through a likeness about the vocal and imaginable word: for the vocal word is formed to signify and make clear what is understood, but that a vocal sound is not at once formed by someone who understands insofar as he understands but through some other middle power (namely a motive one), this belongs to imperfection; if therefore it were generated or formed at once as expressive of that which is latent in the intellect, and this by virtue of the understanding intellect, it would no less be the word. Now the object lies habitually latent in the memory; if therefore by virtue of it is at once caused some actual intellection, which once generated expresses and makes clear the object latent there, – truly it is the word, because expressive of what is latent and generated by virtue of it to express it.

b. Whether any Actual Intellection at all is the Word

62. But a further doubt remains, whether any actual intellection at all is the word.

63. [Opinions of others] – To this a reply is given in the negative, and that one must add – as a specific difference – ‘intellection which is declarative’ [n.11].

64. I argue against this because in the Father there is declarative knowledge formally, – for the intellection that is in the Father ‘insofar as he is intelligence’ is declarative of the Father ‘insofar as he is memory’, and thus perfectly, just as actual intellection ‘as it is in the Son’ declares habitual knowledge as it is in the memory of the Son; but in the Father there is not the word formally, as will be said in the solution of the question [n.71].

65. Likewise, the word declares itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4: “If,” he says, “this word that we pronounce is temporal and manifests both itself and that of which we speak, how much more does the word of God etc.” and manifest itself? ‘To declare’ then does not state a real relation, nor consequently the relation of what is generated; but the word is nothing but generated intellection (*ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), otherwise it could be posited formally in the Father.

66. A reply is also given in another way as concerns this article [n.62], that the word is actual knowledge ‘that is the term of inquiry’.

67. This is shown from Augustine *ibid.* when he says that the word is a thing born or an offspring; but it is a thing born because it is a thing found, – but it is not a thing found save because it is inquired into; hence Augustine means that this thing born of the mind is preceded by an appetite moving to inquiry.

68. He seems to mean the same in *ibid.* XV ch.15 n.25 when he inquires as follows: “Then a true word comes to be when that which I said to us ‘spreads with a certain rapid motion’ comes to that which we know and is thence formed, taking on its likeness in every way, so that in whatever way each thing is known so too is it thought;” this ‘rapid thinking’ is inquiry, of the sort that will not exist in the fatherland, as he indicates [ch.41 or 16]: “Perhaps there will not be rapid thoughts there.”

69. The position then is that after confused knowledge there follows inquiry and argumentation, and finally one reaches perfect knowledge, which is as it were generated by that inquiry; and the perfect knowledge, which is the term of inquiry, is the word.

70. Against this I argue as follows: if it belongs to the idea of the word that ‘it is born through inquiry’, then God does not have a word; second, in that case an angel does not have a word about things naturally known to him; third, then the blessed do not have a word about the divine essence, nor about anything perfectly known without inquiry; fourth, therefore he who has the perfect habit of science and at once operates through the habit cannot have a word, – all which things seem absurd.

71. [Scotus’ own opinion] – Therefore, setting these opinions aside, I say as to this article [n.62] that not any actual intellection at all is the word (as was proved against the way that set down ‘declarative’ as proper to the word [nn.64-65]), but generated knowledge is; and therefore in the Father there is no word formally.

72. But any generated knowledge whatever – which Augustine calls offspring – is a word, though not in the way Augustine posits a perfect word, namely one that represents the divine word [nn.45-46].

73. I make clear the first of these [sc. that any generated knowledge is a word], because any actual intellection is generated from memory, imperfect from imperfect as perfect from perfect; therefore any knowledge is offspring and expressive of the parent, and is generated to express the parent. – And this is confirmed first from Augustine *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Everything known is said to be a word impressed on the mind, as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory;” again *ibid.* XV ch.12 n.22: “Nor does it matter when he who speaks what he knows learnt it; for sometimes as soon as he learns it he says it.” And briefly, whatever difference is found between the first generated imperfect knowledge and the knowledge that follows inquiry, there is no formal difference because of which the latter could be called word and the former not, as it seems.

74. I make the second clear [sc. not any generated knowledge is the perfect word, n.72], because our intellect does not immediately have perfect knowledge of the object, because according to the Philosopher *Physics* 1.1.184a16-23 what is inborn in us a way of proceeding from the confused to the distinct; and therefore first, in order of origin, there is impressed on us a confused knowledge of the object before a distinct one, – and therefore inquiry is necessary for our intellect to come to distinct knowledge; and therefore inquiry is necessary previous to the perfect word, because there is no perfect word unless there is perfect actual knowledge.

75. So then one must understand that when some object is known confusedly inquiry follows – by way of division – into the differences that belong to it; and when all the differences have been found, definitive knowledge of the object is perfect actual knowledge and is perfectly declarative of the habitual knowledge which was first in the memory; and this definitive knowledge, perfectly declarative, is the perfect word.

76. This is what Augustine says *ibid.* IX ch.10 n.15: “I define what temperance is, and this is its word;” and in the same place Augustine premises, in the same chapter, what he was already set down above: “as long as it can be defined and produced from the memory,” [n.73] – that is distinctly and definitively and actually known, by virtue of what is in the memory.

77. It does not therefore belong to the idea of the word to be born after inquiry, but it is necessary for an imperfect intellect – which cannot at once have definitive knowledge of the object – to have such knowledge after inquiry; and therefore the perfect word does not exist in us without inquiry. And yet when a perfect word follows such inquiry, the inquiry is not the generation of the word itself formally, but is quasi-preliminary to the word being generated; which Augustine well indicates in the aforecited authority [n.68] “hither and thither with a certain rapid motion” etc. “when it comes to that which we know and is thence formed,” it is the word etc., – indicating that this scattering about (that is, inquiry) is not the generation of the word formally but is followed by the generation of the word from what we know, that is, from the object habitually known in the memory.

78. And if it be objected ‘for what then is inquiry necessary?’ – one can say to this that motion is necessary for the introduction of perfect form (which could not be introduced at the beginning of the motion), or there is introduction of many forms ordered to the introduction of the final form, and without that order of forms the final form could not be at once introduced. And accordingly this order is posited: first there is habitual confused knowledge, second confused actual intellection, third inquiry (and in inquiry there are many words from many habitual knowledges virtually contained in memory), which inquiry is followed by distinct and actual knowledge of the first object whose knowledge is being inquired into, – which ‘actual distinct’ knowledge impresses perfect habitual knowledge on memory, and then first there is perfect memory and it is likened to the memory in the Father; ultimately, from perfect memory is generated a perfect word, without inquiry coming between it and the word, – and this generation is likened to the generation of the perfect divine word, from perfect paternal memory. No word is perfect, then, representing the divine word (which is what Augustine is most investigating) save that which is born of perfect memory without inquiry coming between such memory and such word, although neither could that memory be had by us – because of the imperfection of our intellect – unless inquiry precede.

c. Whether Will Concurr in the Idea of the Word

79. The last doubt in this question [sc. question 1] is whether the will concurs in the idea of the word, – namely whether it belongs to its idea that it be generated voluntarily or by an agent will ‘joining the intelligence to memory’, according to what Augustine says in many places.

80. This question is moved by Augustine in *On the Trinity* IX ch.10 n.15: “Rightly,” he says, “is the question raised whether all knowledge is a word or only loved knowledge is;” and he replies: “Not everything words in any way touch upon is conceived, but some things are so in order only to be known and are yet not called words – as things that displease are said to be neither conceived nor brought to birth;” “in another way everything that is known is called a word, as long as it can be pronounced or defined from memory.” And afterwards he adds: “However, although the things we hate displease us, yet the knowledge of them does not displease us,” – such that it does not belong to the idea of the word that it is generated by love of the known object, nor does it even belong to the word to be born by love of the knowledge that is the word.

81. Yet there accompanies the perfect word a double act of will: one is previous, whereby the act and the previous inquiry are commanded without which the perfect word would not be reached (as is plain in *ibid.* IX ch.12 n.18), and the other is that in which the intellect rests in intelligible knowledge already possessed, without which the intellect would not persist in that knowledge. An act of will, therefore, is not of the essence of the word, neither formally nor as cause, but is necessarily concomitant with the generation of it in us because of previous inquiry into it and for continuing it; likewise because of the fact that the intellect – if the will is not well pleased in the knowledge – would not persist in it, and so this knowledge would not have the idea of permanent word. Yet this permanence is not of the idea of the perfection of the word intensively, because a whiteness of one day is not less perfect than a whiteness of one year; but the will that has regard to the object – of which there is a word – does not pertain to the idea of the word save when taking word strictly, the way Augustine takes it in the afore cited chapter [n.80], “No one can say ‘Lord Jesus’ save with the Holy Spirit” (this ‘saying’ includes acceptance of the said object and adds something beyond the idea of word absolutely).

2. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

82. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-3].

As to the first [n.1] it is plain the authority needs interpretation. For Augustine says there: “the image itself of it” (namely of Carthage) “in my memory is its word;” but it is clear, according to him *On the Trinity* XV ch.15 n.25, that the word is not formally in the memory; therefore it must be understood in a causal way and not a formal one.

83. To the second point [n.2]. Although there has been a lot of dispute about ‘vocal sound’, whether it is a sign of a thing or a concept, yet I concede in brief that what is signified properly by a vocal sound is a thing. However letter, vocal sound, and concept are ordered signs of the same signified thing, just as there are many ordered effects of the same cause none of which is cause of the other, as is plain about the sun illuminating many parts of the medium; and where there is such an order of caused things, apart from one being cause of the other, there is an immediacy of any effect with respect to the same cause, excluding anything else in the idea of cause but not excluding anything else in the idea of a more immediate effect. And then one could concede that in some way a nearer effect is cause of a remoter effect, not properly but because of the priority that exists between such effects in relation to the cause; thus one can concede about many ordered signs of the same signified thing that one of them is in some sense sign of the other (because it gives to understand it), for a remoter sign would not signify before a more immediate one in some way signified first, – and yet, for this reason, one is not properly sign of the other, just as is true on the other side about cause and things caused.

84. To the third [n.3] I concede that knowledge is offspring and truly generated, namely actual intellection, – but it is not an action in the genus of action (because, as said above d.3 nn.600-604, actual intellection is not action in the genus of action), but it is a quality of a nature to be the term of such an action, which is signified by what it is to ‘say’ and – in general – by what it is to ‘elicit’. A word, then, is not something produced by an action that is intellection, because the intellection itself is not productive of anything but is itself produced by an action that is in the genus of action, as was said above [*ibid.*]

3. To the Second Question

85. To the second question [n.5] I say that concrete and abstract per se signify the same thing, although in a different way of signifying, as son and filiation, – because just as filiation signifies a relation in the genus of relation, so does son (by way, however, of denominating the relative supposit), and if it is taken substantively [d.26 n.100] it signifies the same as such subsistent thing. Thus therefore word and the abstract of it signify the same thing: but its abstract – if it were named – would be ‘word-ness’, which indicates a relation formally (for it signifies the same as the passive expression of something of the intellect); but just as son connotes a living nature, in which there is such relation, so word connotes actual knowledge, of which it is such expression; therefore since in divine reality ‘to be intellectually expressed’ is the property of the second person, it follows that the word is there purely personal, and it signifies a personal property.

86. It is plain too that the reason for generating the word is not the Father as actually understanding, but the Father as perfect memory (namely as intellect possessing the actually intelligible object present to itself), as was made clear above in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Productions’ [nn.291-293, 221, 310].

87. It is plain also that the word does not have anything from which it is produced, from distinction 5 nn.80-82, – because if the productive principle have virtue sufficient for producing a per se subsistent, it produces such a subsistent, and especially if such subsistent is not of a nature to inhere in anything; but the expressed knowledge is not of a nature to inhere in anything, therefore it is of a nature to subsist per se; and the productive principle of it possesses sufficient virtue, therefore etc.

4. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

88. To the Arguments [nn.5-7].

When it is argued first from Augustine “the word goes with known love” [n.5], I say that his using the phrase ‘with love’ is a circumlocution for generated knowledge in us, because love does not have causality with respect to the word save as it commands its generation, as was said in the preceding question [n.81]. But in divine reality the word is knowledge naturally expressed, because the fact that the will has causality in us with respect to generating the word through its command is a mark of imperfection in our intellect; because it does not immediately have a perfect word; and as to how the will is disposed in God and in us, this was stated in distinction 6 nn.16-29.

89. To the other – from *On the Trinity* XV [n.6] – I concede that in the Father there is intelligence formally, but I deny the proposition that ‘every act of intelligence is formally a word’, because this is not true save of the intelligence that can have some generated act or generated knowledge; such an act cannot be had by the intelligence as it belongs to the Father, because the Father is form himself and has nothing by generation. Yet one can concede that the actual intellection of the Father is as it were generated by virtue of memory as it is in the Father, but it is not truly generated, because it is not distinct.

90. To the third [n.7] I say that they are not two properties but the same, because the son and word signify per se the same relation, although they connote something

different (namely the son connotes living nature, in general, and the word connotes actually expressed knowledge [n.85]). These connotations are not always the same, but passive relation – when signified – is always the same.

II. To the Third Question

A. The Opinion of Others

91. To the third question an answer given is yes [sc. that the divine word does state a respect to creatures], because of the authority of Augustine 83 *Questions* question 63, where he speaks of the beginning of John's Gospel and says: "Logos is better translated by us in this place as 'word'" (instead of as 'reason'), "so that there may be signified not only a respect to the Father but also to the things that are made through the word by his operative power."

92. There is added too that the word states a proper respect to creatures, because word, of its idea, is declarative knowledge; therefore it belongs to it in its idea 'to declare' things.

93. There is also appropriated to the Son a relation to creatures: but the appropriation is only made because of the agreement of such appropriated thing to the property of the person to which it is appropriated. And it is made clear by a likeness about gift.

94. And in a similar way is set down that just as there gift, as it connotes an aptitudinal relation, pertains to the property of the Holy Spirit, so the word, as it states an aptitudinal relation – not an actual or habitual one – pertains to the second person.

B. Rejection of the Opinion and Scotus' own Response

95. Against this one can argue as was argued above about gift [in d.18, which is missing in the *Ordinatio*; see equivalent in d.18 of the *Lectura* and *Reportatio*], that no respect to creatures is a property of a divine person nor is per se included in any property of a divine person, and just as it was rejected there so it can be rejected here, – and this I concede.

96. And then there is no force [sc. to the question] save about the name 'word'. For formally a respect of expressed knowledge to the one who expresses it is different from its respect to the creature that is declared; and not only this, but also the respect of the expressed word to the one who expresses it and the respect of the word as declaring something qua declared to the one who expresses it are two respects, because the first is real and the second of reason. But these two do not make anything per se one, because a true thing and a being of reason constitute nothing 'per se one;' and therefore if both these respects are signified by one name, they do not for this reason make a concept that is 'one per se', but one of them is precisely the property of the second person (namely the passive expression, which is a real respect), but the other – namely the respect of what is declarative – is only a respect of reason, or exists toward the declared Father or the declared creature. This was otherwise touched on above from the authority of Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.3 n.4 where he means that the word declares itself, – and the same *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23: "The Father is perfectly a sayer of himself," that is perfectly

declares himself etc.;^a from which two authorities is plain that the same thing can be referred to itself as declarer to declared, and consequently it is not a real relation.

a. [Interpolation] “As if saying himself, the Father generates a word equal to himself in everything; for he would not have perfectly said himself if something less or more was in his word than in himself;” and *ibid.* VII ch.1 n.1: “With a Word, equal to himself, he always says himself.”

97. And then indeed it seems that the word per se and first signifies that real respect, because its abstract – as was said [n.85] – and its concrete first signify the same thing; but because word connotes perfect knowledge, by which knowledge it has a respect of reason to the things known through it, therefore it also connotes – as if still more remotely – the idea of what is declarative. And so the word will signify the property of the second person, although it connotes something absolute in that person (which is as it were the formal term of the production of that person), and through it as means it will connote, as if more remotely, a respect to all that to which the absolute can have a respect of reason, namely to all things it declares.

C. To the Principal Argument

98. To Augustine *On the Trinity* VI [n.9] I concede that the Word or the Son is the art of the Father; he is thus also called the wisdom and virtue of the Father [*I Corinthians* 1.23-24], and yet just as the Father is formally wisdom and virtue, so also is the Father formally art; for if he formally creates, and this as artisan, the creative principle is formally in the Father, – and so the respect of art to creatures ‘as to artifacts’ is common to the three, although it is appropriated to the Son, just as to him is appropriated wisdom because of its agreement with his own production.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

99. To the remark – on behalf of the opinion – from 83 *Questions* question 63 [n.91], one can say that *logos* (in Greek) is better translated through what is meant by ‘word’ than by what is meant by ‘reason’, because reason does not thus signify a respect to the Father as word does, nor does it thus connote a respect to what is declared as word does. But Augustine does not mean to say that word states essentially relation to the creature under the idea of what is declarative, because he says “so that not only is respect to the Father signified, but a respect to those things too that are made through the word by operative power;” but the word is not said to be ‘operative power’ of the Father save as it is said to be the wisdom and art of the Father, which are not the word’s save by appropriation. Or if Augustine intends this name ‘word’ to signify both respects, then it does not precisely signify the property of the second person but, along with this, another appropriated respect; and then the interpretation of *logos* as ‘word’ and not as ‘reason’ is fitting, because ‘reason’ does not thus signify either a proper or an appropriated respect. The interpretation as ‘word’ is indeed true (for that reason it asserts more than the property of a person), nor does Augustine say the interpretation is in something that signifies a property of the second person.

100. When the addition is made that it asserts a respect to creatures, proper to the word [n92], – this seems much more false than the opposite conclusion that I maintain

[nn.95, 98, 100], because not only is relation to creatures not included in the essential idea of any person, but it can also in no way pertain to any person without uniformly pertaining to the whole Trinity, because the whole Trinity is uniformly related to everything other than itself, according to any existence whatever, whether existence in reality or intelligible existence.

101. And when proof is given through the word's being 'declarative' [n.92], I say that the actual intellection of the Father is declarative. Nor is 'declarative' the proper idea of word, but what is declarative is concomitant to expressed knowledge, because the expression is of actual knowledge; and therefore what is declarative is appropriated to word, although it is not proper to it.

102. When proof is afterwards given that 'appropriation is not made save because of agreement with what is proper' [n.93], the inference does not hold – from this – that appropriated is proper, but the opposite holds; and I concede that what is proper to the Son – which is 'to be expressed' – has an agreement with wisdom and with what is declarative, and with art, because of the fact that this expression is of something by way of intellect and by virtue of intellect; and such expression is actual knowledge, to which it belongs to declare the habitual knowledge from which it is expressed [n.64].

E. A Doubt about the Expression of the Divine Word

103. Here, however, a difficulty arises (a better one than is that 'about the idea of declarative'), namely whether the word is expressed by virtue of the paternal intellect not only about the divine essence as object present to the intellect of the Father, but about other intelligibles, so that it should thus have a respect to creatures not as they are in themselves but as they have being first in origin in the paternal intellect (as it seems) before the word is expressed. And then it would have to them the relation of what is expressed; for then the word would be expressed not only about the essence as it is object of the intellect of the Father, but also about other intelligibles. – But about this difficulty elsewhere, in the question 'On the Uniform Relation of the Trinity to what is Other than Itself' [II d.1 q.1 nn.12-19].^a

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Whether by natural reason it can be known that the word is not an 'essential' in divine reality.

That it cannot be: for then the Trinity would be known by natural reason; again, in the creature the word is equally of any supposit in nature.

On the contrary: it is known that it is not necessary that the first person is word, – it is another person.

Solution:

To the negative answer the solution is plain, because the concept of the term – whether true in itself or not – shows that the negation can be proved about the positive. It cannot, on account of causing an effect, be a common term. It can be known that the not-impossible and anything contrary are solved.

Whether the idea of Word is prior to the idea of Son in the second person.

That it is: it is more of a per se term of the productive principle (on the contrary: there is no prior knowledge).

On the contrary: Augustine, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 ["He is Word by that by which he is Son"].

Opinion: intellectual nature. – On the contrary: nature thus states a mode of active principle.

Solution: the Son is a subsistent in intellectual nature, generated by virtue of a nature of the same idea, existing in the first person (Hilary, *On the Trinity* V n37 [“For he is not God by cutting or extension or derivation from God, but by virtue of nature he subsists by birth in the same nature.”]).

Twenty Eighth Distinction

Question One

Whether ‘Unbegotten’ is Property of the Father Himself

1. About the twenty eighth distinction I ask whether ‘unbegotten’ is property of the Father himself.

That it is not:

No property is formally asserted of the essence, because then it would not distinguish [sc. the persons], just as neither does the essence distinguish, which is not said to be formally begetter or begotten, or inspiriter or inspirited; but the essence, as it seems, is unbegotten; therefore ‘unbegotten’ is not a property of any person. – Also the Holy Spirit, as I will prove, is formally unbegotten; therefore etc.

Proof of the assumption, because the essence is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten (the consequence is plain from the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 10.2020-21: “On a negative proposition about a finite predicate follows an affirmative about the infinite predicate”), – and further, therefore it is unbegotten (this consequence is proved from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8 where he says that ‘unbegotten’ is the same as not-begotten). And the like can be argued about the Holy Spirit: ‘if he is not begotten then he is non-begotten’.

2. Further, every personal property is relative, because whatever is said to itself is common to the three (from *ibid.* V ch.8 n.9); but unbegotten does not state a relation, as I will prove; therefore etc.

Proof of the minor, because if it does [sc. state a relation], then everything begotten is a related thing. This proposition is true: ‘everything begotten is a related thing’; I convert this by contraposition: ‘therefore every non-related thing is non-begotten’. Then I argue: every non-begotten is a related thing, every non-related thing is non-begotten, therefore every non-related thing is related. The conclusion is impossible, therefore one of the premises is also impossible; not the one that follows from a true proposition by conversion through contraposition, therefore the other one.

3. Again, if not being able to be born were a property of the Father, then not being able to be inspirited would be a property of the Father and the Son, and so there would be six notions [sc. in divine reality], which is commonly denied.³⁴⁷

4. Further, Ambrose *On the Holy Spirit* IV [*On the Incarnation* ch.8 nn.79-80] did not want to use the name ‘unbegotten’, as the Master says in the text [I d.13 ch.4 n.117].

5. The opposite:

³⁴⁷ Tr. The five commonly accepted notions in divine reality are: being unable to be born (unbegotten), active generation (paternity), passive generation (being able to be born, filiation), active inspiring (common to Father and Son), and passive inspiring (procession, of the Holy Spirit).

Augustine to Orosius [Ps.-Augustine, *Dialogue of 65 Questions* q.2]: “Sure faith declares that there are not two unbegottens.”

Question Two

Whether Not Being Able to be Born is a Property Constitutive of the First Person in Divine Reality

6. Next after this I ask whether not being able to be born is a property constitutive of the first person in divine reality.

That it is:

Damascene ch.8 says that everything [sc. in divine reality] is one “besides non-generation and generation and inspiriting.” But it is clear that he is not excluding all the personal properties (because then in the Father there would only be the property of not being able to be born), therefore he is excluding ‘everything else’ in the idea of constitutive personal property; therefore all these, and only these, must be such relations; therefore non-generation is a property constitutive of the first person.

7. Again, wisdom is goodness; therefore not able to be born is paternity.

8. Again, Praepositinus [*Summa* I q.14] argues thus: “By that by which the Father is Father he is this person, – by that by which he is this person he is unable to be born.”

9. Again, it is more worthy to have something not from another than to communicate it to another.

10. The opposite:

As the second person is to filiation, so is the first person to paternity; but the second person is constituted by filiation; therefore the first person too is constituted by paternity.

I. To the First Question

11. To the first question there is need to see two things, – first how unbegotten agrees with the Father alone, and second how it can be a property since it seems to involve only a negation.

A. In What Way Unbegotten Agrees with the Father Alone

12. As to the first point I say I say that every name, composed of something with many senses and a privative particle [sc. as in ‘unbegotten’], is doubly many, both from the multiplicity of the opposite affirmation, and from the multiplicity of the privation – as is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.12.1019b19-23, ‘On Power’, where he distinguishes ‘impotence’ according to the multiplicity of potency, and, in addition to this, according to the multiplicity of privation, which is set down in ‘On Privation’, *ibid.*, 22.1022b22-31; thus this name ‘unbegotten’ will be multiple, from the multiplicity of what is meant by ‘begotten’ and from the multiplicity of the privative particle.

13. As to the first point, what is begotten is properly said to be ‘produced by generation’ as the first term; but by extension, what is begotten is said to be ‘communicated by generation’, which is the formal term of generation (as Hilary *On the Trinity* IV ch.10 says, because the Son has nothing “save being born”); in a third way

what is begotten is extended to what is produced or what pre-requires generation, although it is not per se the term of generation, whether first or formal.

14. Privation can also be multiply distinguished into privation properly said, namely when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, and when it is so, and as etc. [sc. e.g. a blind adult dog]; and into privation more commonly said, when something lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not according to the aforesaid conditions [sc. e.g. puppies born blind which acquire sight a few days later]; and still more commonly when it lacks that which it is of a nature to have, though not in itself but in its genus (as a mole is said to be blind, because vision – of which it is deprived by blindness – is not repugnant to the animal in its genus though it is repugnant to mole in itself). And in this way privation is said more generally the more the habit – of which it is the privation – is of a nature to belong to a more common thing agreeing with that privation; for example, something that would not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body would be called ‘deprived’ in a more general way than if it did not have what is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of animal – and in a still more general way if it did not have what it would be of a nature to have according to the idea of body – and in the most general way if it did not have what it is of a nature to have according to the idea of being.^{a b}

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Privation (namely lack of what is of a nature to be had): according to the idea of being, according to the idea of genus, according to the idea of species, most properly (when, as, etc.). The first privation exists in any created thing, because any created thing is limited, – the second is not, because it includes every perfection eminently. – But is the second privation of relation in God or in a divine person? That it is not: the essence in any person eminently includes it. – On the contrary: the Father is unbegotten [nn.5, 19].

b. [*Interpolation*] An example of the first: as a stone is said to be inanimate and deprived of the soul that is of a nature to belong to it according to the idea of body, of which ‘animated’ is a difference. Example of the second: as an angel is said to be incorporeal. Example of the third: as any creature is said to be imperfect, not because it is of a nature to have every perfection in its genus but because having every perfection is not repugnant to being.

15. Negation is also distinguished by negation outside the genus, which contradicts the affirmation, – and it is true of anything of which the affirmative is false, whether about being or non-being [e.g. non-man is true of a horse and a chimaera]; the other is ‘negation in the genus’ and it supposes the nature of the genus of which it is said, – and it can be understood in many ways, according to the multiplicity, more common and less common, of genus.

16. To the issue at hand, then, when speaking of the multiplicity involved in this particle ‘un-’: although there is dispute whether it implies negation in the genus or privation, yet it seems they are the same thing in the issue at hand, taking negation according to genus in the most general way and privation according to genus in the most general way, because negation in a something naturally fitted to have what is negated is privation (according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 4.2.1004a9-16), so that privation adds nothing to negation save that it requires something naturally fitted in which to exist. Therefore negation in a genus – however genus is taken – since it is in something naturally fitted in some way (although not fitted in itself), will be privation in some way in genus, though not properly in such a thing according to its being such.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Privation is nothing formally but negation, and therefore it is not in a subject otherwise than as negation is; fittingness is in a subject, but does not per se belong to privation unless privation involves two concepts, – but each concept is separable from the other, and each is indicated or connoted by the privative name.

17. And if you object against this that there is no privation in divine reality, because what is deprived is imperfect, I reply that this conclusion holds of privation according to the proper idea of a deprived subject; for if the thing that ‘lacks’ were of a nature in itself to have what it lacks it would be imperfect – but if it is of a nature to have it according to the idea of genus, it is not imperfect. But that many privations are taken in this way too is plain not only from what the Philosophe says about ‘mole’ [n.14] but also by the common division of ‘common’ into habit and privation – as ‘animal’ is divided into rational and irrational; ‘irrational’ indeed states in an ox a privation, not of what is of a nature to be had in an ox in its species, but of what would be of a nature to be had in ‘what it is to be animal’; for the genus, as common to the privation and the habit, is that to which the fitness for each belongs.

18. But in the issue at hand, by extending what it is to be a genus (whether we understand it for the privation or for the negation in genus, by both of which I understand the same thing), I can take ‘quasi genus’ here for that which is common to the three persons, namely person or subsistent; and then we may say that the Father is in some way deprived in genus – or that in the Father there is some negation in genus – of something that is of a nature to belong not only to being but to supposit, which is common to Father and Son.

19. And then this name ‘unbegotten’ will be able to be taken for the issue in hand in four ways:

In one way most properly, insofar as it signifies a proper lack of what is properly signified by the name ‘begotten’, which is the first thing produced by generation, – and in this way it does not exist in divine reality, because nothing there lacks what is of a nature to be present. In the second way, insofar as it signifies a lack commonly of what is signified properly by ‘begotten’, and then it connotes a subsistent or person, and it signifies a lack ‘in genus’ of begotten properly taken; and in this way it seems to belong – by virtue of the terms – to the Father and the Holy Spirit, each of whom is a subsistent and is not begotten (it does not thus belong to the essence, because although the essence is being and non-begotten, yet it is not per se subsistent and person). In the third way – as it seems – it states a lack in genus, and this of ‘begotten’ taken in the second way, namely for what is communicated by generation; and in this way the essence is not said to be ungenerable, by removal of aptitude for communication – but as the essence is in the Father it can be said to be non-communicated, and so unbegotten, if unbegotten is taken in this way. In the fourth way it signifies lack ‘in genus’ of what is begotten taken in the most common way, and then ‘unbegotten’ is the same as non-produced subsistent; and in this way it is taken by the saints, such that it is the same in divine reality as ‘unproduced’ properly taken; this is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* XV ch.26 n.47: “the Father alone is not from another, and therefore is alone called unbegotten,” and he means the same to Orosius [n.5].

20. I say therefore that ‘unbegotten’ in the usage of the saints, namely as it signifies the negation of begotten most commonly taken (that is of what is produced), by

connoting a subsistent in divine nature, belongs thus only to the Father, as is plain from the authority of Augustine already cited [n.19].

B. How Unbegotten can be a Property of the Father

1. First Opinion

21. About the second article [n.11] some say that since unbegotten states only a privation in the genus or only a negation, and so does not of its formal nature state any dignity nor anything pertaining to dignity, and since nothing can be posited as a property of a divine person unless it is something pertaining to dignity, therefore unbegotten must connote something positive, by reason of which connotation it is a property; now this positive thing is set down by them to be a fountain of fullness that exists in the Father alone, – in whom is all fecundity, both inwardly and outwardly.

22. But against this:

First because this fountain of fullness is not understood outwardly, because such fecundity is common to the three. But inwardly there is only in the Father a double fecundity, namely for generating and for inspiriting; but this fecundity is not any one positive thing in the Father save the essence, – but it does not connote the essence, so as for this reason to be called a property of the Father. But that this fountain of fullness is not any single positive relation in the Father is plain, because then there would be three positive relations in the Father, namely active generation and active inspiriting and the relation which by circumlocution is said to be what this ‘fountain of fullness’ of fecundity is, although it lacks a name; and then there would be six notions, which is not commonly conceded, – at any rate there are not conceded to be in the Father three relative and positive properties.

23. Further, unbegotten does not seem to connote that fountain of fullness, because it does not connote the first fecundity, – because according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7, “even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten;” therefore unbegotten can precede active generation. Much more too does it not connote the second fecundity, because if *per impossibile* there could not be a production by way of will, yet there would still be status in generation for some unbegotten person. Therefore it seems that the fountain of fullness, which states only a double fecundity, cannot be connoted by what is meant by ‘unbegotten’.

24. Third their reason [n.21] does not seem valid, because if a property of a person were to state a dignity simply, then the person that did not have it would not have every dignity simply, – which is unacceptable.

2. Second Opinion

25. In another way it is said that this positive thing is existence from itself (and it said to be the intention of Richard of St. Victor), and that ‘existence from itself’ is a proper positive element called by circumlocution ‘unbegotten’, and it precedes relation to the Son. For because it is something from itself, therefore all being and all existence – according to Richard [*On the Trinity* V ch.4] – ought to come from it.

26. On the contrary: ‘from itself’, if it is something positive, is either something absolute and will be common to the three; or it is something relative, and not relative to

what is prior (because there is only a negation of relation to what is prior), so it will be relative to the Son. Therefore ‘from itself’ either states filiation, if it is positive, or it states a disposition to what precedes and it will be a negation of relation, and so a negation the way ‘unbegotten’ is; therefore it is not a proper positive element of him [sc. the Father].

3. Scotus’ own Opinion

27. Therefore it seems one should say that unbegotten under its proper idea (as it signifies not having a begetter) is a personal property of the Father, and does sufficiently imply dignity, that is does not imply indignity, for this is enough for a personal property not to have indignity, in the way too that personal features in divine reality are not said to be imperfections (but not perfections simply, that is, perfections universally in anything).

28. And if there is altogether dispute that a property should altogether state dignity, not an absolute but a personal dignity, one can say that unbegotten, insofar as it denies ‘having a begetter’, states a personal dignity of the first person in divine reality, because just as it is a mark of dignity in the second person to have an originating principle, so it is a mark of dignity in the first person not to have one; and yet it is not necessary that this dignity be formally the dignity of some proper positive thing, connoted by what it means to be ‘unbegotten’. Hence negation can be said to be a mark of dignity in something insofar as it would be a mark of indignity if the affirmation were posited in him, – the way it is a mark of dignity in a king that he is not ribald.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* 57 q.1]: “As positive relations are founded on the essence from the nature of the thing, so this one too is negative; for from the nature of the essence comes the fact that in some person there is a reason by which he is not from another, and thus the substrate for this negation is only the divine essence, – so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’ that is ‘having divine essence not from another’. For to have formally from himself the divine essence and not from anything as principle is to have it freely (the way a king has a kingdom), – therefore it is a mark of dignity (the notion is precisely by reason of negation; it implies dignity from the fact that it is founded on such affirmation); hence to have deity from another simply is not a mark of dignity but only by reason of the noble mode of having it, namely through generation and inspiring.”

Ibid., ad 7: “Unbegotten strictly, namely ‘not produced by generation’, does not state dignity” (because a negation of dignity does not state dignity), “but unbegotten as it is a notion does; it does not belong to the Holy Spirit but only to the Father; thus it simply states: ‘being in no way from another’.”

Ibid. ad 2: “Therefore non-inspired does not state dignity, because inspired states it” (therefore it is not a sixth notion).

The first paragraph above is expounded *ibid.* ad 5: “Unbegotten is considered in one way simply and in itself, in another way as it is considered about such a nature. In the first way, the substrate is only the essence, so that if there were a hypostasis in the essence without a property it would be unbegotten. In the second way, something is a substrate of its negation in a triple way: namely either ‘as that on which it is founded’, or ‘as that by which it is founded on another’, or third ‘as that of which it is’; it indicates the idea of substance alone formally (on which it is founded), but only as it is under the property of the Father.”

On the contrary: one would say better ad 7 that [unbegotten] implies dignity by reason of the foundation only; nor does it follow that it does not state a proper dignity, because the essence is indifferent to several personal dignities.

The first argument that he posits [in 57 q.3] is confirmed by the fact that where there is a positive disposition to what is prior, it is to the prior before it is to the posterior; therefore so is the

negative too, – and this is what is said, that the idea of first precedes the idea of principle; and universally, in what is not constituted by an order to what follows, the negation of order to the prior precedes the order to the posterior, and never elsewhere. The absolute is prior to the relative, – ‘unbegotten’ in itself could belong to an absolute supposit, if there was one.

Gofrey [of Fontaines *Quodlibet* V q.3]: A notion indicates, the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; therefore what pertain to the origin are notions. The first person is indicated doubly by origin: because he is ‘from none’ and ‘another is from him’ (therefore there is another notion); by reason of negation it implies dignity (therefore it is a ‘negation in genus’), and it states dignity from the fact it is founded on an affirmation. This is the essence, which lies beneath all the divine notions, so that the sense is: ‘unbegotten’, that is ‘having divine essence not from another’ (this is mark of great dignity). Third, how dignity is proper to the Father: because it is considered in a double way, in itself and by reason of form, or by reason of matter (as being about such matter); in the first way only the essence lies beneath, whatever the supposit be, absolute or relative; in the second way, it is triply founded: ‘disposition to the foundation’, ‘as that in which’, ‘as that of which’ (in this way the supposit with its property lies beneath).

C. To the Principal Arguments

29. To the arguments of this question [nn.1-4].

To the first [n.1] I deny the minor. When it is proved from the Philosopher in *De Interpretatione*, I say that the consequence of the Philosopher holds on the basis of the truth of the first principle, namely this principle ‘what one contradictory is removed from, of that the other is asserted’; but as such, one cannot conclude that an affirmative about an infinite predicate follows from a negative about a finite predicate save as the infinite predicate signifies a negation outside the genus, contradictory to the affirmation (because ‘a negation in the genus’ does not contradict the affirmation), then the inference ‘it is not begotten, therefore it is non-begotten’ does not follow save about a negation outside the genus; and in this way non-begotten does not convert with begotten, although it would convert if one takes non-begotten in the sense of stating a negation in the genus, which is the way Augustine [n.1] understands it.

30. To the second [n.2] I concede that no property of a person – according to the common way [d.26 n.15] – states something that exists to itself. Yet one should not say that every property states a relation positively, but it is enough that it state a relation positively or negatively; for if the relation is personal and proper to some person, the negation of the relation will also be a personal feature proper to another person, and thus not existing to itself nor common to the three; and in this way – namely negatively – unbegotten states a relation, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.7 n.8. And then this proposition is false, ‘every non-begotten is a related thing’ [n.2], – and yet the inference does not follow, ‘therefore non-begotten states something existing to itself’, but what follows is that it either states something existing to itself or it states the negation of a proper relation or ‘a relation negatively’.

31. To the third [n.3] one response is that what is inspirit-able does not state any dignity, as unbegotten does, and so it is not a notion. – But this seems false in itself, because it is a mark of equal dignity in the Father and the Son not to be inspirited as it is in the Father not to be begotten; and also it does not seem valid as to the issue at hand, because it does not seem necessary for a property (or for a notion) to state a proper dignity [n.27].

32. One can say in another way that unbegotten states non-produced (as was expounded in the first article of this solution [nn.19-20]), and in this way non-inspirit-able – because it is contained in it – is not a different notion from it; for the inference ‘non-produced therefore non-inspirited’ follows, and not conversely; therefore it is not another notion.

33. On the contrary: unbegotten is only in the Father, non-inspirited is in the Father and Son, therefore this notion is not that one.

34. If this inference [n.33] is to be conceded, there will be six notions, unless another reason be assigned why non-inspirit-able is not a notion. Although it may seem absurd to posit six notions (because commonly there are not so many posited), one could say that an argument place from authority does not hold negatively: ‘this is not said, therefore this is not the case’. For in the time of Ambrose it does not seem that three notions in the Father were in use, because he did not wish to use this name ‘unbegotten’ [nn.4, 35]; in the time of Anselm also two positive notions in the Father do not seem to have been in use, because he himself does not use ‘inspiring force’, but takes ‘deity’ in its place, common to Father and Son. Although from the beginning only three properties were noted, namely paternity, filiation, and inspiring (and this from the word of the Savior in the Gospel, *Matthew* 28.19 and of John in his canonical letter, *I John* 5.7 [nn.26, 67]), yet afterwards other notions and properties became known by investigation, which were prior in the thing though not known first; and so, just as later thinkers conceded more notions than earlier ones did (although the earlier ones did not deny them, even if they did not state them), so this does not seem unacceptable about thinkers later than those doctors, while however they could conclude the point from what those said.

35. To the final argument [n.4] – from Ambrose – the answer is plain from the Master, that the word ‘unbegotten’ was not so known in his time, nor even was it so necessary for the expression of the faith that every Catholic ought to use it; and to express the first person with that property was also an occasion of error for the simple, because it seems to state something that exists to itself, because it does not as manifestly involve relation as ‘begotten’ does; and therefore caution was taken for the simple faithful not to use that word, because of malignant heretics, although the word in itself properly and first belongs to the Father.

II. To the Second Question

A. Opinion of Others

36. To the second question [n.6] it seems one can answer yes, – understanding it in this way, that the divine essence, before it is understood to have been communicated through production, seems to be understood to be non-communicated in act in something, as in the first person; not indeed to be incommunicable (because it is not incommunicable), but not actually communicated, because it does not seem possible for something to be communicated quasi-passively unless it is already possessed in something as not communicated to it quasi-passively. And in this first moment, in which only essence and this negation ‘non-communicated in act’ are understood, an understanding of something incommunicable seems to be had; for if essence ‘as non-communicated in act’ were not incommunicable then ‘as non-communicated’ it could exist in several things, – and then there could be several unbegottens, in which the

essence would exist equally primarily, and there would not be a stand in someone first; but if someone incommunicable is had, subsisting in the divine nature, then a person is had; therefore before any understanding of a positive property [sc. paternity], by understanding only essence and unbegotten (that is, non-communicated through production), some incommunicable subsistent in the divine nature is had, who is properly unbegotten, taking ‘unbegotten’ the way it can be taken in divine reality.

37. Again, essence, as prior to relation, is non-communicated and gives ‘per se existence’, – therefore it gives it to an unbegotten hypostasis. The proof of the antecedent: ‘as prior’ it is not communicated, therefore it is non-communicated; as such it gives ‘per se existence’ (*On the Trinity* VII ch.6 n.11). Proof of the consequence: ‘as non-communicated’ it is not common to several suppositis; therefore it is one only, and only in the unbegotten, because it is communicated in the case of the begotten.

38. To this returns the fact that the essence ‘per se being’ or ‘this God’ generates, insofar as it has the formal principle and per se existence; and nothing is pre-understood to generation save that it has the principle ‘by which’ not from another, and is as it were waiting for the consequent relation [sc. paternity], which rises up with the term [sc. Son] once it is posited.

39. On the contrary: then by generation there is a positive property in the Father as in the Son. – One can concede that it is in neither ‘as per se term’ (neither first nor formal), but is concomitant to the first term who is the Son, because mutual relations are concomitant to the same ‘per se term’, which is one extreme.

40. And this opinion is confirmed from Augustine *ibid.* V ch.6 n.7 when he means that “if the Father had not generated, nothing would prevent him from being unbegotten,” – therefore some ‘unbegotten’ can be understood before understanding that he has generated; but when unbegotten is understood, an incommunicable subsistent supposit is understood; therefore it seems that the person is there first constituted by ‘unbegotten’ before by any positive property.

41. Further, in every essential order the negation of order to a prior seems more immediately to follow the first thing than does its order to the second thing, because that negation seems to follow it immediately insofar as it is such; therefore likewise in the order of persons, the negation of order to a prior will more belong to the first person than his order to the second person; therefore he is first understood to be unbegotten before generating, and in that prior moment he is understood to be incommunicable in divine nature.

42. Further, if according to the imagination of the philosophers there were in divine reality only one absolute supposit, it would be constituted by the essence, without any positive property, – and if any property were to be concurrent, it would only be this negative one, which is ‘not being from another’; therefore it seems that – since origin when posited in divine reality takes nothing from the essence itself, neither does it take anything from this negative property ‘not being from another’ – it will now be possible for some person to be constituted by these two things [sc. ‘not being from another’ and essence].

43. And if it be objected ‘how will mere negation be able to constitute a divine person?’ – the response is that person includes essence, which is communicable, and along with this something by which it is incommunicable; by the fact, then, that it has the nature in itself, it has every positive perfection that can exist in it; but by the co-

understood negation it can have the idea of being incommunicable, and especially so if incommunicability only states some negation in genus.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

44. Against this way the argument is as follows:

No negation is of itself incommunicable, because just as it is not of itself one or indivisible by any division, so it is not of itself a this and incommunicable, but only by an affirmation to which being divided is first repugnant, – and it is by this that not being divided belongs to negation; and so too does it seem about being incommunicable, that to be communicated is not repugnant to negation of itself but only by some affirmation to which incommunicability first belongs; therefore negation will not be the first idea of incommunicability.^a

a. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] Response: negation of being from a principle in being is altogether incommunicable, because everything else from a unique being is from a principle.

Hence is ‘this negation’ incommunicable in being? – I say from the nature of being that this negation in its being communicated is repugnant to it.

On the contrary: therefore the positive thing is incommunicable first. This does not follow; rather, if there were not merely one principle, there would not be merely one thing without a principle.

An instance: non-animation, positing that the form of a mixed thing remains the same as before. – It is no instance, because although non-animation might be present in a thing so mixed, yet it is not proper to it, because animation was present in it.

45. Further, no negation is proper to any subject save by some affirmation proper to it on which such negation follows; therefore this negation ‘not being from another’ is not proper to the first person save because some prior affirmation is proper to him on which this negation follows; the ‘prior affirmation’ cannot be the essence, – therefore some positive property.

46. Further, if the first person is incommunicable formally by negation, and the second is incommunicable by positive relation (namely by filiation) and the third likewise (namely by passive inspiring), – then these persons are not uniformly disposed in idea of personality; nor are they equally positive, nor equally perfect (insofar as they are persons), because negation and some positive property are not equally perfect personality.

47. These reasons, although perhaps they may not convince an adversary that they cannot be solved, yet because it does not seem probable that the first person is formally a person by negation alone, therefore can the conclusion of these reasons be conceded.

C. To the Principal Argument

48. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say – as was said in distinction 26 [n.77] – that this exclusive word ‘besides’ does not exclude any personal features but does exclude essential features, and it includes in the included property all the personal being of the person; hence in ‘unbegotten-ness’ is included both paternity and active inspiring as it exists in the Father. The point is also proved by him [sc. Damascene] elsewhere when he names paternity and filiation and procession. – Therefore he was not intending in the first place that those three properties alone were personal ones (nor was

he intending that those three were personal constitutive properties), but he was intending by them all the others, and that all the essential features – which are excluded by the ‘besides’ – are one in the three persons.

D. To the Arguments for the Opinion of Others

49. To the arguments for the first opinion [nn.40-42].

When argument is made from Augustine about the priority of unbegotten to paternity [n.40], I reply: sometimes privation does not connote affirmation, and yet a privation is never present unless such a positive is formally present in the deprived thing; an example: being blind only connotes the eye (which is the common subject of blindness and sight), and yet it is never present in the eye by reason of the eye alone but through some positive entity which the privation follows, – to wit some mixture in the eye along with which there cannot be sight. So can it be said here that although unbegotten connotes some subsistent person in the divine essence, yet this affirmation is not the whole reason for the inherence of this negation ‘unbegotten’, but there must be in the thing some positive property that in some way precedes unbegotten by which it is present, although it not be connoted by ‘unbegotten’ as some proper subject. And in this respect, the statement of Augustine must be understood that insofar as it is about the per se idea of unbegotten it does not connote the Father; however it cannot be in the thing unless this affirmation (or some other, absolute or relative) is as it were the reason for its inherence.

50. To the second [n.41] one statement is that the proposition is true of the thing first in order, that it exists to itself, of which namely the ‘being’ is not ‘to be to another’.^a It is not so in an order of persons having the same nature in such a disposition or in the issue at hand, because here ‘to be the first person’ is an order to the second person; and therefore the order to the second person precedes as it were the negation of being from a principle, just as the formal constitutive feature of some positive entity precedes in it the negation of some entity repugnant to it.

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Or thus: [the proposition is true] where the nature of the first thing is not the same as the nature of the second; therefore negation of being from a principle at once follows the nature of the first before order to the second thing is understood. But where there is the same nature of the first thing and of the second, the negation of being from a principle does not follow the nature, but something proper; that can only be here – according to the common opinion – a relation [n.30].

51. To the third [n.42]. If things were there as they are according to the imagination of the gentile philosophers, then the divine essence would be determined of itself to this subsistence, and it would constitute ‘this’ not through some negation but through itself (according to them), because it would be in every way determined to this, as in the case of creatures ‘this nature’ is altogether limited to this supposit; but now by positing that there is origin there, the essence need not be in every way determined to one person, and therefore it need not by itself constitute some person. And when the argument says ‘to posit origin takes nothing from the essence, nor from that by which it is constituted’, – it is true that it takes nothing away; but it posits the opposite of the hypothesis by which the essence of itself would constitute a person, namely indetermination of the essence to a single subsistence, because the hypothesis would take

away perfection from the essence (because it would seem to posit a limitation), but the opposite of the hypothesis – positing an origin – does not take away perfection; but it does take away the impossible mode ‘constitutive of a person’ that would be true on the hypothesis.^a

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] For the first opinion ‘an incommunicable property constitutes this sort of unbegotten’:

On the Trinity V ch.6 n.7: “Even if he had not generated, nothing would prevent him being said to be ‘unbegotten’ – even if someone generates a son, not by that fact is he unbegotten, because men who are begotten beget others;” later ch.7 n.8: “Nor for this reason is someone a father because he is unbegotten, nor unbegotten because he is a father;” later: “There is one notion by which he is understood to be begetter, and another by which he is understood to be unbegotten;” later: “When the Father is called ‘unbegotten’, what is shown is not what he is but what he is not;” later; “When he is called ‘unbegotten’, he is not called so in relation to himself, but it is shown that he is not from a begetter.”

Again, about the respect to a prior.

Again, the absolute is prior; therefore the more it has of the idea of an absolute, the more it is prior.

Again, ‘not to have through production’ precedes being produced, because it pertains to the idea of the proximate power, or it is the removal of an impediment. – Response: the proximate power does not in any way precede generation in the thing, but only according to concepts absolute in idea (as was said in distinction 27 [of the *Reportatio*])

Mode: an essence is non-communicated in something before it is communicated (add if you will: ‘the essence in itself is not communicated’).

On the contrary:

Negation does not constitute the first person, because it does not constitute the second; ‘unbegotten’ is a negation. Proof of the minor, because the notion is different; and as such it does not state the essence only, nor a positive thing different from the two. – An instance: the conclusion is that it is not a notion. Response: Henry [of Ghent] (on the contrary: insofar as it is a notion it states a dignity; response: ‘personal dignity’, everything other than itself – above [note to n.28].

Confirmation from a similarity about the inspirit-able. – It is not similar, because it is in something not constituted by order to a posterior, the former is negation of order to a prior.

Again, negation is incommunicable and proper (because neither is it one, just as not a being either) only because of position.

Again, the first person is not without the second.

Again, Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.2 n.7: “Not because he is not begotten, but because he has begotten a single Son.”

Again, paternity is prior, – therefore it is a property of a person; otherwise it is a property of nature. – Proof of the antecedent: in the case of the same thing affirmation is the reason for the being of negation; not conversely, because although the negation infers it, yet it presupposes it. I concede the conclusion.

Mode: essence of itself determines for itself first its first production, such that essence is a principle of generating, not as with some property nor as under some property nor as in some person, (so that it retains something prior, in some way, in the thing), but it is only thus as it is of itself a principle (whereby it is principle), by which – that is – as it founds it actually; it founds it actually, because (distinction 28, last question) generation is altogether the first determination of essence, and it follows that what produces it is altogether unproduced (for he is truly father who does not have a father, – hence Damascene, ch.8).

To the arguments ‘for the opinion’:

Augustine makes a comparison three times: he asserts the third; he understands the second perhaps ‘because it is per se in the first mode’; the first is posited under an ‘if’, as the statement of heretics (Alexander in another way: “Augustine did not have regard to the nature of being but of understanding;” Praepositinus: “If you note the property of the word, the locution is

false;” Henry: “If the person were absolute;” otherwise: nothing prevents ‘unbegotten’, – it follows by reason of the form).

Question Three

Whether the First Divine Person is Constituted in Personal Being by some Positive Relation to the Second Person

52. Lastly I ask^a whether the first divine person is constituted in personal being by some positive relation to the second person.

That he is not:

Because the first person is pre-understood in personal being before he begets; for to act belongs to a supposit; therefore he is understood to be a supposit before he acts. But if he were constituted by a relation to the second person, the existence of the second person would be co-understood – along with his own existence – and consequently the second person would be pre-understood before the first person begets him, and so the second person would not be the term of generation.

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Whether the divine essence of itself determines first for itself active generation.

That it does not: then it would in anything; then it would not stand with its opposite; again, relations would be equally first in the essence.

On the contrary: if through something, the first person would not be constituted by it.

Solution: distinction about indeterminate and determinate, and to determine against contingency, against limitation. The essence determines, because it is first and aptitudinal, – therefore actually by something; not by relation, because it does not exist before it is founded, – not by something else, because of regress ad infinitum; therefore from itself first. Doubly: adequately, immediately. In the first way: according to intension yes (reason, example, corollary ‘Against Godfrey’), according to extension no. Immediately: whatever is related to several things having an order with respect to it, one has the ‘first’ thus and another thus (example ‘sun’, example ‘soul’); the essence then is immediately to the first, and through this to the second.

Doubt: in which respect of principle? – Henry: of matter. On the contrary: of the producer (by division); again, form is ‘per se entity’. The mode here, and congruence about threefold principle; on the contrary in three ways. Here the mode is other.

Afterwards to the arguments.

53. A confirmation of the reason is that as to all things that are simultaneous in nature, by whatever it is that one is prior the other is too; relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore if the first person is formally constituted in personal existence through a relation to the second, by whatever the first is prior in personal being by that the second is too. But by generation, which is an act of the first person, the first person seems to be prior in personal being, therefore the second is too; and as before [n.52], he will not then be the formal term of generation.

54. Further, in every order the first seems to be the most absolute, as is clear from running through the point in the case of any order whatever; therefore so will it be in the order of persons, that the first will be the most absolute, and so it would not be constituted by a relation to the second.

55. On the contrary:

The first person is not constituted in personal being by deity, because deity is not incommunicable, – nor by active inspiring, because this is common to him and the Son, – nor by being unable to be born, from the preceding question [n.47]; therefore, by way of division, by some relation to the second person.

I. To the Question

A. Opinions of those who Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Relations

56. Here the affirmative part of the question is commonly conceded, but because of the difficulty of the first argument [nn.52, 67], a distinction is made about the relation that constitutes the first person.

1. First Opinion

57. In one way [from Aquinas], that ‘it can be considered as a property or as a relation; as a property it precedes generation, – as a relation it follows’; and then, according to what it constitutes, the second person need not be simultaneous with the first, although according to its being a relation – consequent, as it were, to generation – the second should be simultaneous with it.

58. Against this:

A property ‘as property’ is some entity, otherwise it would not constitute any being. Either therefore it is a being to itself or to another or neither; that some entity is singular, that is neither an entity to itself nor to another, does not seem intelligible; therefore this entity should be formally to itself, and then it will constitute an absolute person – or to another, and that ‘as a property’ it will be a relation; and then the difficulty is not avoided, even though there is one way of considering it as a property and another as a relation.

And the reason can be confirmed by an example, because although whiteness can be considered as whiteness or as a quality (and if it be considered as whiteness, that is according to its proper specific reason, – but if as quality, this is according to the idea of an ‘imperfect’ instance in its genus), yet whatever is constituted by whiteness is not constituted by any entity that is not a quality, because whiteness even ‘as whiteness’ essentially includes quality and is essentially quality, so that whiteness cannot constitute anything save in qualitative being. So does it seem in the issue at hand, about a relative property considered in this way and in that [n.57].

60. Further, he [Aquinas, Roger Marston] says elsewhere that ‘in divine reality there cannot be order’ (because neither in the case of the essence to the relations, nor in the case of the relations among themselves), ‘because relatives are simultaneous in nature’. – But if a property can be considered in the way in which it would not be a relation (and in this way it need not have a correlative simultaneous in nature), their argument would not be valid.

2. Second Opinion

61. A distinction is drawn in another way about relation, as it is relation and as it is origin; and the position is that it constitutes as origin (but not as relation), because the

idea of origin in some way precedes and the relation is as it were founded in it; but the first person is constituted by the first relation there, by which it is distinguished [Roger Marston].

62. Against this it is objected that origin 'as origin' is not form; and not of the person to which it is, but as it were the way to it, – and then it is not of the first person as form but as it were presupposes it; but nothing constitutes anything in anything save insofar as it is its form.

63. But if this opinion is understood of distinguishing as it were by way of principle (corresponding to efficient cause in creatures, as was expounded in distinction 26 [n.58]), and not by way of formal principle, then this position could have truth, and this argument would not be against it.

3. Third Opinion

64. In another way it is said that just as the same action can be diversely understood – insofar as it is aptitudinal or insofar as it is potential, insofar as it is future, insofar as it is in act, insofar as it is past – so relations 'founded on action' can be diversely taken; so that relation is founded on generation as in some way past as it were, in other way as present as it were, in another way founded on it as future as it were, in another way founded on it as potential as it were, and further as aptitudinal.

65. But it is said that relation under the first idea constitutes a person; but the first idea is 'aptitudinal idea', because that follows on the other and not conversely; therefore generation in this sort of way constitutes the Father, and in this way it is signified by what is meant by 'generativity'.

66. Against this:

The first person is not constituted by a property having something positive less perfectly than what is constitutive of the second person has it, because then they would not seem to be equally perfect in personal being; but the second person is constituted – according to them – by filiation as it is filiation; therefore the first person is not constituted by potential relation, which has a less perfect being from the nature of relation than the property of the second person has it. But the relation of the generative to the generable – which they posit to be first and constitutive – is a potential relation; therefore it does not constitute as perfect an actual person as the second does.

Proof of the assumption: no actual being requires a potential being, because a potential being is less perfect than an actual one, provided they are of the same idea; but the relation of the generative requires the generable, because it states a potential relation on the part of the Son; therefore the relation of generative in the Father is not an actual relation.

67. Further, against this opinion (and against the two preceding:

Relation, if it constitutes a person there, is only according to what exists in reality, – otherwise it would not constitute a real person; but there exists in reality only a single relation of the first person to the second, and it is only there under the most actual idea, however diversely it can be taken; therefore under the most actual idea it will constitute that person, and under that idea a relation in the second person will correspond to it (there is not anything in the second person save what is most actual). In vain therefore is a quasi potential or aptitudinal distinction from the idea of what is active sought for, because this

distinction in conceivable modes does nothing for what is constitutive of the first person without the first person always requiring the second person along with it at the same time; and yet because of this difficulty, lest the first person be posited as having the second along with it at the same time, this distinction of actual and aptitudinal and potential relations is sought for, lest the Son be posited as preceding the generation of the Father. – In the same way one could argue against the first and second opinion, because the relation – however it is conceived – is there only a single one.

4. Against the Three Opinions together

68. Further, against all three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65]:

Because if the Father generates the Son by the fact that by the action of the Father the relation of the Son is in the divine essence, and if by his action – according to these opinions – paternity ‘as paternity’ is in the divine essence (because according to them paternity ‘as paternity’ then first exists when filiation exists as filiation, even if something first precede as origin, whether generativity or the property) then the Father will generate himself as Father by generation in just the way filiation is in the Son, which seems absurd.

69. Further, there is against all the opinions another difficulty; in what way will the essence be determined to the first person? For if from itself, then it does not seem common to the other persons, because whenever something is determined to something other than itself, whenever it does so, it has it, – and then the essence, whenever it exists, would have the personality of the first person; if it does so from another, this seems to be against the idea of the first person, because then he would seem to be originated, or seem in some way able to be posited in such subsistence by something.

70. Further, third: if it is determined of itself, I ask of what principle the essence has the reason when it determines itself to the first property? Not of matter (distinction 5 [nn.64-85]); not of form, because that which is the principle of form pre-requires that which is principle of the producer as from the formal and efficient cause; therefore the essence quasi productively determines itself, and so the first person will in some way be produced. Nor can it be said that the property is determined of itself, because it is impossible – in any way at all – for there to be two things altogether first, but every multitude comes to a stand at one thing; this here is only the essence as it is a sea; therefore there will be attributed to it the idea of some principle with respect to anything that is second.

71. If someone wants to say that the essence ‘as a this’ exists per se and thus acts per se (according to the first argument made in distinction 7 against Thomas [n.11]), he could say that ‘this essence’ communicates itself – quasi productively – to the first person, and in the first person communicates itself to the second, and in the first and second to the third, and thus there are three productions according to a triple principle, namely: essence as essence, as intellect, as will.

72. On the contrary:

Nothing produces itself – therefore there is a distinction between the essence and the first person. The reason is confirmed by the authority of the Master who – in distinction 5 [ch.1 n.58] – denies, because of this, that the essence generates or is generated; by parity of reason it seems one should deny that it produces ‘from itself’.

73. Again, this production is not generation, because ‘the Father is unbegotten’; nor is it inspiriting, as is plain, – and there are no others in divine reality.

74. Again, action is of a supposit; therefore the essence is a fourth supposit.

75. One could say that something belonging to the produced can well produce the whole, when that ‘something’ is first a per se being and in virtue possesses the rest of what concurs with it in the composite. There is no example, in the case of creatures, in substantial production (because there only matter pre-exists, which does not virtually have form), but there is very well an example in accidental production; wherever a subject has an accident actively, it produces the composite, – just as water, first made hot and afterwards left to itself, produces cold water. So one might say here that the essence, a ‘per se being’ in the altogether first moment – when relation is burgeoning – produces itself in a relative person, or more properly: communicates itself to it.

76. To the form of the reasoning [n.72]: the antecedent is conceded, insofar as ‘itself’ refers precisely to the same thing [sc. nothing produces itself], – and so the consequent is conceded, because ‘there is a distinction’ (that is, not a complete identity of essence with the related person, because it includes something in addition to the essence).

77. To the second [n.73]: this production can be called ‘generation’, and the production of the Word ‘saying’, – just as if fire were intelligent, it would generate by fireyness and would say by intellect.

78. To the third [n.74]: form as ‘per se being’, that is not inhering as an accident (whether substantial form or quiddity) in a supposit, can be an agent; however it is not a supposit, because it is not incommunicable.

Thus the three reasons seem to escape [nn.72-74].

79. But there remain two authorities unsolved: the first, confirming the first reason, namely the authority of the Master [n.72] – the other in the second reason, that Augustine says the Father is unbegotten [n.73].

80. Because of the first authority one can say that in altogether the first moment there is not only ‘deity, a per se being’, but ‘this God’, and he produces himself as Father; and then this – the logic – is avoided ‘the essence produces’, although it produce in something in which there is nothing but essence. Thus the first way [nn.70-71] is corrected as to its sum.

81. Because of the second authority from Augustine one could say that the saints who suppose there is a first property in the essence, from wherever it burgeons (because they were not then investigating that), had a first supposit and were not speaking save of production of supposit by supposit; therefore they said that that person is unproduced ‘which is not produced by a supposit’ [n.19]. Likewise they said that the opposed relations of origin ‘could only be in distinct supposits’, – which is true if each relation belongs to a supposit but not if one belongs to another singular ‘per se being’ and not to a supposit, namely ‘to this God’. And the reason is that ‘a singular non-supposit’ can communicate itself, and so is not distinguished from the product; for because it is ‘a singular per se being’, therefore it can act, – because it is not a supposit, therefore it can be communicated; but a supposit never communicates itself, and therefore if it produces a supposit, it produces a distinct one, nothing of which it is.

82. How is this phantasy to be refuted, so dissonant to the sayings of the saints [Augustine, Anselm, nn.79-81]?

Although in divine reality all priority in nature is denied and only a priority of origin is commonly conceded (or a priority according to natural intelligence), yet there must in every way be some priority given to essence in respect of relation; both because it is the foundation (according to everyone), and because it is formally infinite but relation is not, – and because however they are distinguished they are not equally altogether first, nor is relation prior. Rightly then is the question raised [n.69] of whence essence determines the first property for itself – and since no other determining factor is found (because there is always the same question of whence the essence has it, unless one proceeds ad infinitum), one must stand at the fact the essence of itself precisely determines the first relation in itself as in a foundation. False then is this root claim that ‘nothing undetermined of itself to certain things determines itself of itself to any of them’, as is well maintained here, about the double indeterminate and the double primacy, of adequation and immediacy [nn.100-107].

83. But a doubt remains: what circumstance of the principle is indicated by ‘from’ or ‘of’ when it is said that ‘the essence of itself determines the first property for itself’? And if you would escape, because it does not state there the idea of any principle but excludes a principle that is a joint participant, that is no obstacle; for I ask how the essence determines, or by reason of what principle is it in respect of the property?

And the way here [nn.70-71] says that it is by reason of the principle of the producer, because without it there is no idea of formal or material principle, and because active form as ‘per se being’ per se acts (about which proposition see distinction 7 n.74), and because of the congruence of the triple productive principle [n.71] (from which congruence an instance was made in distinction 2 in the question ‘On Two Productions’ [n.304]); but the correction is made that ‘this God’ produces the Father, but not the essence properly speaking [n.80].

84. But against this way three reasons and three authorities were here before brought forward. All seem to escape in some way [n.78]. But because it does not sound right that the first person is produced, one can say that the essence determines the first property for itself by reason of formal principle, not indeed as in-forming but as quiddity is said to be the form of the supposit, and that a non necessarily causable quiddity formally determines some supposit for itself (the way the pagans would posit it about an absolute supposit, but we about the first relative); and the reason is that such a quiddity itself stops itself and is itself the quiddity of something.

85. Then to the arguments for the other way [n.83]:

To the first I say that every in-forming form is preceded by an efficient cause (and so the first efficient cause does not thus have the form), but not every quidditative form ‘giving being to a supposit’ is preceded by an efficient or producing cause, because here there is not a cause and a cause intrinsic to the composite that need to be united by the agent but there is perfect entity, which itself belongs in itself to being.

86. But if you object that ‘either the essence in-forms the property or conversely’, – a response was given in distinction 5 n.137: “Neither is the case, but there is perfect identity,” which identity does not have an efficient principle, but it has the quiddity, in idea of formal principle, of that with which it is itself first identical.

87. As to the second [n.83], seek the response in distinction 7 n.75.

88. As to the third: this way [n.84] well preserves congruence, because the essence as essence and as prior to every idea of power exists to give being formally, and

thus it determines itself; but as it is such and such a power, to be principle belongs to it. Therefore there are two productive principles – a single one non-productive from itself alone, but giving of being formally to the first supposit.

B. Opinion of those who Wish to Hold that the Persons are Constituted by Absolutes

89. Another position is set down by holding a conclusion opposite to these three opinions [nn.57, 61, 65], – because the first person is not constituted by any relation to the second person (and this when speaking of what is first constitutive of that person in personal being), but by some absolute non-quidditative reality, as was touched on in the third opinion in distinction 26 nn.56-59.

90. For this opinion argument is given in particular about the first person, because unbegotten is pre-understood to paternity, and to unbegotten seems to be pre-understood some reality proper to the first person; therefore since it cannot be a relative reality, it will be some absolute one, proper to that person.

Proof of the assumption: both from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “if he had not generated, nothing would have prevented him from being unbegotten;” and because fecundity for some production in divine reality is not understood as ‘quasi proximate power’ save as it is in something that does not have that fecundity through an act of that fecundity, just as the will is not understood to be fecund for inspiriting ‘as it is in some person’ save in a person in whom it exists as non-communicated by fecundity of the will. And therefore it seems to be commonly conceded that it is pre-understood to the force of the inspiriting power in the Father and the Son that the will is not had through inspiriting; therefore by similarity here, being unable to be born seems to be pre-understood to the fecundity of generating ‘as it is a quasi proximate power’, and this being unable to be born indicates that it is not had by act of fecundity of the intellect, that is by act of generation. – Proof of the second assumption, from the rejection of the preceding opinion in the preceding question [nn.44-46].

91. Further, no relatives are first referred to each other, such that a related thing ‘as related’ is the first term of the relation (the thing is plain in creatures), because the related thing ‘as related’ requires that to which it is referred for its being and for its definition; therefore that to which it is referred is in some way prior to the related thing as related. Likewise conversely, it would be referred as being the term; therefore by parity of reasoning it would require that to which it is referred for its being and its definition. Therefore there would be a circle in joint requirement, from the fact that each would require the other as essentially prior to itself, as defining it; but a circle in essential priority is impossible; therefore it is impossible for a relative ‘as relative’ – by the fact it depends on its correlative as term – to be the term of dependence of the other correlative. And by similarity so does it seem in the issue at hand, that a relative is not first referred to the relative as to the term; therefore the second person, if he is referred to the first, should posit some absolute thing as the term of this relation; but that absolute thing is not the essence, because as the essence is not referred, so it is not the term of a relation, because it is not distinguished; therefore there is some personal absolute thing which can be distinguished from the second person.

92. Against this opinion [n.89] an argument is given that it is quasi heretical, but the arguments were touched on and responses given in distinction 26 [nn.60-64, 73-83], – now I pass them over.

C. Scotus' own Response

93. To this question [n.52] – for someone who does not like the last opinion about absolute persons [n.89] – one can say, by holding the common way (namely by supposing that the persons are relative), that the first person is constituted by a positive relation to the second, because by nothing else, as was argued for the opposite by way of division [n.55]. Nor is it necessary to distinguish how this relation may be considered as it is constitutive; for however it is may vary in consideration, it is the same in reality, – and according to what it is in reality, it constitutes a real person [n.67].

94. Nor is there any difficulty save how it requires the second person to be simultaneous with it, although however it precedes him [n.52].

In brief I say that the simultaneity of correlatives – whereby they are said to be ‘together by nature’ [n.53] – is this simultaneity, namely not to be able to be ‘without each other’ without contradiction, if they are mutual relatives; for one relation cannot be without its term, because if it could be without it, it would be a being to itself; by parity of reason neither can the other relation corresponding to it be without the former term, because then it would exist to itself; therefore these two relations, when they are mutual, cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction. But everything ‘prior in nature’ can exist without a posterior without contradiction, such that if the former be posited without the latter there would be no contradiction; the thing is plain from the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.11.1019a1-4, the chapter ‘On the Prior’.

95. In this way I concede that the first person and the second person cannot be ‘without each other’ without contradiction (and the contradiction is not from something extrinsic but from the formal idea of these persons), and yet there stands along with this a priority of origin, because one is from the other.

Which point is made clear first by the fact that if Socrates is father of Plato, Socrates is not understood as subject of paternity but as under paternity, and Plato is understood as under filiation; these exist together in nature, because they are thus understood as correlatives, – and yet as such Socrates is prior in origin to Plato, because he is understood thus under paternity, which is formally a priority of origin. Therefore it seems in the same way that what is prior in origin in creatures is also simultaneous in nature with the same thing, in the way that simultaneity of nature is required for correlatives.

96. The point is also made persuasive – secondly – by the fact that priority of nature is in one way priority according to perfection, such that prior things are said to be more perfect in nature, *Metaphysics* 9.8.1050a7-9. But now along with simultaneity of correlatives in nature it seems there can stand priority in perfection in one of them with respect to the other, – because if the genus of relation is divided through proper opposed differences as other genera are, one of the dividing differences will be more worthy and the other more unworthy (because two species are not equal, *Metaphysics* 8.3.1043b32-44a11), and consequently a species constituted by a less noble difference will be less noble; and since two species constituted from two opposed differences can be referred to

each other (because every relation of inequality is referred to something of a different species), therefore in the case of relations corresponding to each other one can be prior – that is more perfect – than the other, and yet simultaneous in nature, as far as what is meant by ‘not able to be without each other’. Therefore much more does it also seem that priority of origin – namely by which one extreme in nature does not exceed the other extreme but is ‘from which another is’ – can stand along with simultaneity of correlatives.

97. There is a confirmation from the remark of Augustine *On the Quantity of the Soul* ch.9 n.15: “you rightly put equality before inequality,” – and he is speaking not by reason of foundation, because from the nobility of equality he concludes that the foundation to which it belongs is more noble than the foundation to which it does not belong (the thing is plain there about circle and other figures); therefore a relation has a proper nobility in its genus. Thus one relation is nobler than another, and yet they are two correlative species, whenever there is a relation of inequality.

98. For this is also adduced Avicenna *Metaphysics* VI ch.2 (91vb-92ra), where he seems to intend the cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ to be prior to the caused insofar as it is caused, and yet a cause ‘insofar as it is cause’ is simultaneous with the caused, with the simultaneity required for correlatives. But this priority of nature, which is of the cause to the caused, seems more repugnant to the simultaneity in nature of correlatives than is the priority of origin alone!

99. Then briefly: the first person is constituted in personal being by a positive relation to the second, and conversely, and it is impossible for them to be without each other; and yet the first person himself, constituted in such being, is prior in origin to the second person (such that the first person, constituted in such being, is ‘from whom the second is originated’), and so priority of origin is not repugnant to simultaneity of relatives.

100. But there is another doubt (which was touched on against the three opinions [n.69]), namely: by what is essence determined to the first subsistence?

To this I say that whenever something is unlimited in some idea of cause, such that there correspond to it several things in the other extreme (or some one thing that contains many things), if there is some order among those several things, whether absolutely or in itself, having some respect to that unlimited thing, then what is ‘first’ with respect to such unlimited thing – and this when speaking of the primacy of adequacy – is not the same as what is ‘first’ with the primacy of immediacy.

101. An example of this – first in the efficient cause, where it is more manifest:

If the sun ‘as cause’ illumines the whole medium, and yet is a quasi unlimited agent to which many parts of the illumined medium correspond, and there is some order between these parts, because the first illumined part is closer than a more remote one, – the first thing corresponding to the sun as it illumines is the whole medium as it includes all the parts; first, I say, as adequate; however it is not first as immediate, but a part nearer the sun is more immediately illumined than a more remote part.

102. So in the case of form:

By taking the intellectual soul (which is in some way an unlimited form), the organic body corresponds to it as the first perfectible thing, including in itself many perfectible parts; so the first perfectible thing, that is adequate thing, for the intellectual soul is the whole organic body. But because in the parts of this whole there is an order of origin, either in itself or in having the soul (because the heart is first, then the other parts,

Generation of Animals 2.4.740a1-30, 5-6.741b15-31), therefore this form does not first – that is equally immediately – perfect the whole, but it thus first perfects the heart and through its mediation the other parts. If then the soul were the whole essence of heart and hand by identity, and yet it were to give them a distinct being of the sort it now gives (although within the whole), and if along with this the heart and hand were not parts of the same whole (because this would be a mark of imperfection) but they were distinct supposits, – still the soul would, because of its unlimitedness, have the organic body for adequate perfectible (or would then have all those as supposits, which are now parts of the body, for its one adequate object), and yet it would have one of them – namely the one that is first in origin – for first object, namely for immediately perfectible.

103. So can it be said universally in the case of every unlimited thing, to which there correspond several things between which there is some order, because of which order one of those things is more immediately regarded by that unlimited thing than another is.

104. So in the issue at hand: the divine essence does not have some one first subsistent, that is one that is adequate to itself (because then it could not be in another one), but three subsistents are in this way adequate to that nature; yet in those three there is an order in having the nature, and so the essence by one primacy – namely the primacy of immediacy – respects the first of those ordered things, such that just as the essence of itself would be first in the three if it were in them without order (and this both with the primacy of adequacy and with the primacy of immediacy), so now it is of itself in the three by primacy of adequacy – but not by primacy of immediacy, but thus it is in the first of them and by virtue of it in the others, to which it is communicated by that first one.

105. When therefore you ask ‘by what is the essence in the first person?’ [n.100], I say that it is so from itself. And if you still wish to say no, but that it is so through a determining property, there is the same question: ‘by what is it determined to the determining property?’, or ‘by what does that property first burgeon in the divine essence?’ And then either one must proceed *ad infinitum* or one must make a stand at the fact that the essence is of itself first (that is adequately) in the three, and that it is of itself immediately in the first of the three as they possess order.

106. And if you ask ‘by what is the essence determined to the first person, – and if it is determined of itself, then it cannot be in another’, I reply:

Determination is double, opposed to a double indetermination. One is indetermination ‘to contradictory opposites’ (as matter is indeterminate to form and privation), the other is indetermination ‘to diverse positives’, which however stand together with determination to one part of each contradiction (an example of the second: if the sun is indeterminate to producing a worm and a plant as to diverse positives, although however it is of itself determined to one part of the contradiction – both of the former and of the latter – just as if it were a particular agent only of a nature to produce one of them). Then I say in the case of the issue at hand that the essence is of itself determined to the first person by a determination opposed to the first indetermination, which is to contradictories; not however by a determination opposed to the second indetermination, because that does not stand along with unlimitedness to several things.

107. And hereby is plain the answer to the argument ‘if it is determined of itself then it cannot be in another person’ [n.106]. The consequence holds when speaking of the second determination, which is opposed to unlimitedness to several things, – and in this

way the essence is not determined to one subsistent but to three, because this determination is to an adequate ‘first’; but the consequence does not hold when speaking of determination in the first way, because that is to an immediate ‘first’ (not an adequate one),^a and it stands along with unlimitedness of such undetermined thing to several things.^b

a. [*Interpolation*] But this alone follows, ‘therefore it has no power for them’! By this determination too it is determined to three, because both the determination that is to the adequate ‘first’ and that which is to the immediate ‘first’ are necessary; when the addition is made ‘because it is to the immediate first (not the adequate one)’, this is false, understanding it precisely.

b. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] Godfrey [of Fontaines] *Quodlibet* VII qq.3: “The perfection of the divine nature requires that it be had by several in several ways, for these three (to have it thus and thus and thus, without order of duration, nature, dignity) concur to the constitution of the divine perfection (as far as it consists in the most perfect acts in intellect and will), just as three angles equally constitute the perfection of a triangle;” q.4: “The order ought to be in perfect acts, namely of saying and inspiring, by which are produced declarative knowledge and incentive love, in which are as it were perfected the divine beatific operations.”

II. To the Principal Arguments

108. To the first principal argument [n.52] the answer is plain from what has been said [nn.94-99], that the first supposit precedes the second in origin, and yet they are simultaneous in nature as is required for relatives.

109. And you argue that the first supposit precedes generation, therefore the second does too [n.52], – I reply that in the antecedent both active and passive generation can be understood. If active generation, I deny the antecedent, nay the first supposit is subsistent active generation; because, however this relation is understood, there is no difference in reality when saying ‘the Father subsists’ or ‘generation subsists’ or ‘generativity subsists’. But if in the antecedent the understanding is about passive generation, I concede that the first person, as he precedes the Son in origin, so he precedes passive generation in origin.

110. And when you argue ‘therefore the Son precedes the same passive generation because he is simultaneous with the Father’ [n.53], – this inference is not valid, because he is not simultaneous with the Father in the way in which the Father is prior to passive generation; for the Son is simultaneous in nature with the Father (as pertains to correlatives), but the Father precedes passive generation not in this way but in origin. But now this proposition ‘when certain things are simultaneous, in whatever way one of them is prior the other is too’ [n.53] is false, unless it be understood of simultaneity of the same idea as the priority and posteriority; just as this proposition is false ‘if certain things are simultaneous in time, whatever is prior in nature to one is prior in nature also to the other’; but this proposition is true ‘they are simultaneous in time, – therefore what is prior in time to one is prior in time also to the other’.

111. To the second argument [n.54] I say that the major is true in the order of essences, because there it is understood in quidditative perfections, and a stand is made at infinite quidditative perfection, which is absolute. But in persons that have the same nature, and are distinct only in origin (as one must understand in the issue at hand,

according to the common opinion), the major proposition is false, because there ‘first’ is precisely that which is formally precise in relation to the second.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] Whether there are only five notions. – That there are not: ‘from another’ is not, because it needs a correlative, – one, because it belongs to several; no ‘able to inspirit’ [sc. filiation and paternity are not notions because they need another; inspiring, active and passive, is not because it needs others (the Father and Son); able to inspirit, whether of Father or Son, is not; therefore only unable to be born is a notion]. – On the contrary: *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7 [“one notion is whereby begetter is understood, another whereby begotten is”]. – Solution: notion is fundamentally, formally, accidentally; ‘because of which’ is a notional person or also the idea of personality. In the first way all essential properties (or properties according to essence) are notions; we are speaking in the second way here (formally); third, because quiddity becomes a notion. In the second way, because the notions are ‘because of which’ the essence is. – A doubt about able to inspirit. A power for the second production.

Twenty Ninth Distinction

Single Question

Whether Principle is Said Univocally of Principles Inwardly and Outwardly in God

1. About the twenty ninth distinction I ask whether principle is said in one way of principle when taken personally and notionally and taken essentially.

That it is not:

Because if principle were of one idea when taken in this triple way, then things from the principle would be of one idea; this is false, because neither the Son nor the Holy Spirit are from a principle in a single way, nor are creatures from a principle in the same way as they are.

2. On the contrary:

This inference holds ‘creating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, and ‘inspiring, therefore being a principle’, – and not conversely; therefore the consequent is common to all the antecedents.

I. To the Question

3. To this question I say that principle is not said univocally of principle taken essentially and notionally, – and this when speaking of the relation that is per se signified by this name ‘principle’, and taking principle as it is a principle, for ‘that which is actually principle of something’ (or for the principle ‘which’ not ‘by which’). And the reason is that principle essentially taken only states a relation of reason (not a real relation, because there is no real relation of God to creatures, as will be plain from the following question [d.30 nn.48-51]), but as it is taken inwardly, notionally or personally, it does state a real relation; but to a real relation and a relation of reason there is nothing common that is the same, something that is common really in the one case and in reason in the other, because to that which is such in a certain respect and to that which is simply such, insofar as it is such, what is taken in them in a certain respect and simply is not a common univocal; but a real relation is simply a relation, and a relation of reason is a relation in a certain respect, because just as ‘to be in reason’ is to be in a certain respect,

so to be referred in reason or to be compared by reason is to be referred or compared in a certain respect; therefore there is no principle univocal to them.

4. Now if we speak of principle inwardly, as it is personal and notional, it does seem that there could for them be the idea of a common principle univocally; in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘a relation of origin’ to be univocally common to paternity and filiation, and in the way it is possible for what it means to be ‘production’ to be univocally common to generation and inspiring, as was touched on above in distinction 23 n.9 about what is univocally common to the persons insofar as they are persons.

II. To the Arguments

5. To the arguments [nn.1-2].

The first [n.1] proves that there is no principle there of a single idea for the notional and the personal.

I reply that in creatures two things ‘distinct in species’ are said to be of different idea, and yet there can be abstracted from them one common thing of one idea, as the genus. So it is in the issue at hand: these productions – generation and inspiring – are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas, and yet some single common thing can be abstracted from them; and in the same way about the common term ‘principle’, that it can be a common thing of one idea, although the things of which it is said are of different idea, speaking of their proper ideas.

6. And if you object to this that then there is a universal in divine reality – this was touched on in distinction 23 nn.12-13.

7. To the argument for the opposite [n.2], it proves the commonness of what it means to be ‘principle’ as to a principle of this sort and of that sort – just as it proves univocity as to principle inwardly and outwardly.

Therefore one can respond that these inferences do not follow ‘creating, therefore being a principle’ and ‘generating, therefore being a principle’, taking the being a principle, which is the conclusion inferred, for some common univocal simply – because the being a principle that is inferred for what it is to be ‘creating’ (as it is said of God), states only a relation of reason, but the being a principle that is inferred from ‘generating’, states a real relation.

Thirtieth Distinction

Question One

Whether Some Relation is Said of God from Time

1. About the thirtieth distinction I ask whether some relation is said of God from time.

That there is not:

Because whatever is said of God is God, – therefore it is eternal; therefore it is not new, nor from time.

2. Further, nothing eternal is said of the temporal; therefore not conversely either.

3. Further, making does not seem to be without change – therefore God, who is immutable, does not come to be anything; but if some new relation were said of God, he could be said to be come to be according to that relation.

4. The opposite is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [sc. God is said to be Lord of creatures from time]. And by relation, because relatives are simultaneous in nature; therefore to relations in creatures in time toward God there correspond relations in God from time.^a

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Whether a new relation of the creature of God necessarily co-requires a new relation of God to the creature.

That it does:

On the Trinity V ch.16 n.17: “As there cannot be a servant who does not have a master, so there cannot be a master who does not have a slave.”

Again, “relatives are simultaneous in nature.”

Again, *ibid.*: “If a coin – with no change of the whole of it – can be said relatively, how much more easily in the case of that substance?”

The contrary is argued here.

Opinion of Henry [of Ghent] IX: ‘These three things in God differ only according to reason and they are the same respect in reason, differing only in name, ‘creative’, ‘going to create’, and ‘creating’. The name ‘creating’ belongs to him from time, because the creature is referred to him, – yet ‘to create’ (actively) is rather the reason for ‘to be created’ than the reverse (by six principles). The relations that it is customary to say of God from are not properly relations, but new names of eternal relations.’

Whether every relation by which the creature is referred really to God, and by which God is referred according to reason to the creature, is the same in creatures as it is in God to creatures.

“It is one in reality, diverse in reason.”

First in God. New denomination, no new relation; and not as in the case of a column [sc. as a column is to the right of an animal because the animal is to the left of the column], before the passion by which the creature is created, is it new; hence there is from it a new name of action, as. – “Hence Augustine *ibid.*, names things of this sort rather new appellations than new relations: ‘Our Lord, only when he begins to have a servant, and it is a relative appellation from time; for the creature [is not eternal whose lord he is]’.”

Solution. Three things: in the creature there is a new relation to God, it does not co-require a new one in the other extreme, third according to what reason God is the term of the new relation.

Proof of the first: because the foundation is new, because ‘creation passively’ is a relation.

Second: the relation is not real, – not of reason, caused by the divine intellect.

On the contrary: he knows himself creating; either therefore he knows a new relation about himself or an eternal one. – I respond: neither; in another way: he knows the eternal relation of reason, because it is eternally related to a thing known, but not the same relation; and not by the creative intellect of the Father, when ‘this is created’ is removed.

Third: it is the term under no idea of relation (Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5, 9).

To the issue at hand, Augustine, the Master.

The false understanding is rejected and opposites at the same time: the foundation denominates as form.

Question Two

Whether there can be Some Real Relation of God to Creatures

5. Secondly I ask whether there can be some real relation of God to creatures.
That there can be:

Because God from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is omnipotent and omniscient (for these are posited in God as attributes stating in God a perfection simply, and everything such is there from the nature of the thing, according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.15); but these terms [sc. omnipotent, omniscient] state a respect to possible and knowable creatures; therefore etc.

6. Further, God from eternity willed everything needing to be created to exist for the time for which he created it; 'to will a creature' includes relation, and not a relation of reason (proof, because he could will a creature before he understood that he willed it; for he willed the creature, not because he knew it, but because he willed it); therefore that eternal relation of the will of God to the creature was real, because it is not in the will by act of some intellect comparing it to something.

7. Further, relations founded on quantity are real, from *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a8-14; therefore the inequality of God to creatures, founded on the quantity of virtue in God (namely on the infinity of his magnitude), and on the finite virtue of creatures, and on the magnitude of virtue in creatures (namely the finite magnitude of creatures), will be a real relation. – A confirmation is that magnitude in God is the foundation of equality, which is a real relation inwardly, and magnitude in creatures is the foundation of a real relation; therefore, by comparing this magnitude with that, it seems that the disposition founded on them is real.

8. Further, relations of the second mode of relatives (which namely are founded on action and passion, *Metaphysics* 5.15.1020b28-30, 21a14-29) are real relations; but such is the relation of God to creatures insofar as he is efficient cause; therefore etc. – If you say that this is not true save of agents acting naturally [sc. and not by will], on the contrary: then the created will will not have a real disposition to its effect.

9. Further, as a form is in something, so does it denominate it; therefore if there is not any relation in God to creatures really, God is not really lord of creatures (or he is not really creator), which seems absurd.

10. On the contrary:

A real relation is toward a term according to its real existence; but a term is necessarily required for a real relation; therefore if God is really referred to creatures, then creatures according to their real being have been eternal.

I. The Opinions of Others as to Each Question

A. First Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

11. To the first question [n.1] it is said [by Henry of Ghent] that there is no new relation in God, because just as his action is the same, although considered in diverse ways (as in aptitude, as in power, as present, as past, as future), so the relation founded on his action – as thus and thus considered – is the same relation; therefore it states the same relation in God, that he is creative and creating;^a but he was creative eternally; therefore when he is said to be 'creating' there is not in him a new relation but a new relative appellation. This is confirmed from Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17, where he seems rather to say new 'appellation' than new 'relation'.

a. [Interpolation] so what he [Henry] says elsewhere, that creative and creating are the same relation in idea, differing according to one or other way of naming (which is a minor difference), and this sort of 'other way of naming' is because of a new passion in creatures.

12. To the second question he [Henry] says no, because that which is really related is really ordered – just as whiteness, which is the reason for a reference really to another whiteness, is naturally and really ordered to it, because of the fact that it has some perfection from it insofar as there is in them a more perfect nature together than in either of them alone. But everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered (namely to the extent it waits for it, so that the relation to it may be founded in itself); and if it depends, then it is changeable, because dependence is not without potentiality for act; and if it is changeable, then it is imperfect, because lacking the perfection to which it changes; and if it is imperfect, then it is limited. Therefore, from first to last: if it is really related, then it is limited.

13. And because an instance could be made that then there would not be a real relation in divine reality, therefore the proposition 'about what is related to another in nature' [sc. everything naturally ordered depends on that to which it is naturally ordered; above] seems to need an exposition: for if it is really referred to something which is the same really with it in nature, there is no need for it to be dependent, because it does not wait for something other than itself in nature, in order for the relation to it to be founded on it.

14. Then to the issue at hand: since God is not an imperfect something, nor changeable, nor dependent, etc., – therefore he is not really related to anything other than himself; therefore not to creatures.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

15. Against this opinion, as to what it says to the first question [n.11]:

If actual and aptitudinal relation are the same thing, and because of this there is not any new actual relation of God to creatures, then by parity of reasoning there is not any new relation of creatures to God, because to the aptitudinal in God there will correspond an aptitudinal in creatures,^a just as actual corresponds to actual; and then, if the actual and aptitudinal are the same in God, by parity of reasoning the aptitudinal in creatures will be the same as the actual, and thus there will be no new relation in one extreme just as not in the other either.

a. [Interpolation] because as God was creative from eternity, so was the creature creatable.

16. This consequent seems in truth absurd, because then neither would there be a new essence nor would 'anything absolute' be new; for it is impossible that a foundation is new and the relation according to that foundation is eternal. And something impossible according to them follows, because then, since all things are 'what they are' with respect to God as to exemplar cause or efficient cause, it follows that all things are eternal and nothing is new (because if a respect is not new neither is the absolute [sc. on which it is founded] new), because a respect cannot be eternal without eternity of the foundation. It also seems especially unacceptable according to them that they say 'the being of existence states a respect to the efficient cause as it is efficient' (and it is a new

‘existence’,^a by creation), and yet this respect is in creatures in comparison to God; therefore notwithstanding the preceding aptitudinal relation as it is aptitudinal, there can be a new actual one, as being other than that aptitudinal one.

a. [*Interpolation*] or there will be nothing new.

17. Further, the same relation cannot exist save between the same extremes. But now the divine intellect not only from eternity understood the soul of Antichrist as possible for such and such a time, before it was created, but also understood it as actually existing for that instant of creation; but this ‘intelligible thing’ seems to be distinct from that intelligible thing, in idea of being intelligible, because the being ‘potential’ and being ‘actual’ of the soul seem to be different intelligibles;^a therefore divine intellection, which is single, can have them for distinct objects of its single act, distinct in reason, just as they can be distinct objects of two acts of our intellect; and consequently, the divine intellect when comparing itself to the first extreme ‘as creative to creatable’ and to the other extreme ‘as creating to created’ seems to produce as it were in its essence two relations of reason to distinct extremes, and so the relation of creative to creating is not one relation of reason, just as neither are the extremes – to which it is compared – the same.

a. [*Interpolation*] because there can be two acts of understanding about them, since each can be understood with the opposite of the other; therefore in respect of the divine intellect they are two intelligibles, according to two acts in reason.

18. There is a confirmation for this reason: in any genus, that which exists in potency is only such ‘in a certain respect’; therefore it is not simply the same as that which is actually such, – and consequently, if this thing be understood as such in potency and that thing as such in act, it will be ‘another intelligible’ simply.

19. Further, as to what is said about new appellation [n.11], it seems irrational, because anything in which the same form has the same being seems able to be named in the same way by it; for because such a form is in such a thing, therefore it is named such by it, and not conversely; therefore if the relation is the same and is uniform to creatures on the part of God, there seems no reason that God cannot always be uniformly named by it.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] For that a form is in something, and yet that it cannot be denominated by it as it is said to ‘have the form’, is a contradiction, because the concrete and abstract of a form do not differ save in denomination of the subject; therefore that creation-action is in God, and yet God cannot be denominated by it, is a contradiction.

20. Against what is said to the second question [n.12], it seems that the things posited as connected there [sc. real relation and dependence] are not connected.

First indeed, because if two things most white are posited, they will be perfectly alike (which is made clear by the fact that now there is perfect likeness and equality in the divine persons, and the perfection of likeness is not taken away because of the infinity of the foundation but rather is the more posited);^a therefore there would be the most perfect likeness there, and yet neither would be ordered to the other as that from which it had the perfection.

a. [Interpolation] and if *per impossibile* there were there two foundations, there would be a real likeness, because now a likeness is not posited to be one of reason save because of the intellect comparing the one magnitude.

21. If you say that a specific nature is more perfect in two than in either alone, – this is not ‘one of them being ordered to the other’, because one of them has no perfection by the fact that it is other, whether or not the nature exists more perfectly in both together than in one.

22. Further, a natural created agent does not act insofar as it is imperfect, because to act belongs to it insofar as it is in act (and ‘to act’ belongs supremely to God), and yet such an agent – insofar as it is thus agent – is posited to have a real relation to its effect; therefore there is no need that every related thing, insofar as it is such, depend really on that to which it is referred; for although a created agent depends on something, yet it does not seem to depend on something which is caused by it, nor insofar as it is potential and imperfect and changeable does it cause it, but insofar as it is in act.

23. Further, if *a*, insofar as it is referred to *b*, really depends on it, by parity of reasoning (if the relations are mutual) *b* will depend on *a* insofar as it is referred to *a*, and so the dependence will be circular, *a* on *b* and conversely – which seems impossible, because in no essential order is there a circle.

B. Second Opinion

1. Exposition of the Opinion

24. It is said in another way [Richard of Middleton] to the first question [n.1] that in God there is not any relation to creatures from time, but in the creature alone there is a relation to God from time, – and thus the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature is only in the creature, and not in God. Which seems to be taken from Augustine in the cited chapter [nn.11, 4] and from the Master here in the text.^a

And to the second question [n.5] it is said that no such relation can be real, because a real relation is not without order; God has no real order to creatures, because he is above order.

a. [Interpolation] There is a confirmation in that action is in the patient (from *Physics* 3.3.202b5-6), and yet it does not denominate the patient but the agent; thus too God is denominated by the relation that is in the creature.

2. Rejection of the Opinion

25. Against the first [n.24]:

Because then relation would be in that in which there is no foundation; for the foundation of the relation by which God is said with respect to the creature (if he is so said) is not in the creature^a but in God; therefore that relation will not be in the creature.

a. [Interpolation] because the power, which founds the relation, is not in the creature.

26. Further, the opposite relations of cause and caused cannot exist in the same thing, because they are more repugnant than the relations of producer and produced, – which however cannot exist in the same supposit, although they are in the same nature.

27. And if you say that here the opposite relations are in the same supposit but do not denominate it, – this seems altogether irrational, that some form is in some subject and the subject cannot be said to be of the sort that that is which is of a nature to be constituted by the form.

28. The response that is given to the second question [n.24] seems to beg the question and to be a fault in the consequent.

Proof of the first, that since God is prior to the creature with a multiple priority – extending the name of ‘order’ so that not only is a posterior said to be ordered to a prior but also a prior to a posterior (although in a different way), one must prove that this priority (which can be called order) is not a real relation in God; this point therefore is begged. Nor does it follow from the known fact ‘that God is above order’, taking order as it is of posterior things ordered to a prior; for from this there only follows ‘that he is not posterior’, and from this it does not follow that he has no order, taking order generally.

29. But that the argument is a fault in the consequent is proved by the fact that order is a certain relation; but not every relation is an order (because it is not the case ‘common relation, founded on one of them’, as with equivalent relations), but only non-equivalent relations state an order. Therefore by arguing from a negation of order to a negation of relation is to argue as if the antecedent were first denied and afterwards the consequent.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

30. I respond therefore to the first question [n1] that the relations of creatures to God are new and from time, nor is there need, because of them, insofar as they are related to God ‘as to their term’, to posit any relations in God from time to be their term.

I prove it thus:

First, because according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.15.1021a26-30 ‘About relation’, relatives in the third mode are called those that are said ‘to something’ because other things belong to them, – so that this is the per se difference of the two first modes from the third, that in the first two the relation is mutual, but in the third it is not mutual, but one of the relatives is referred precisely to the other and the other is not referred but is only something of it; but all relations of creatures to God pertain to the third mode of relatives; therefore of whatever sort those are which are in one extreme, there is no need for the other extreme – according to some relation in it – to be the term of those relations, but it can be the term precisely under the idea of an absolute.^a

a. [Note of Duns Scotus] Henry [of Ghent, *Summa* a.55 q.5 ad 4]: “Praepositinus responds saying that ‘not every relation has a correlation, for there is a relation of the creature with respect to the creator, yet there is not one in the creator with respect to the creature, – which is true as to the reality; yet it is present according to a consideration of the intellect.’”

32. And this is also proved from the intention of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he proves that ‘act is prior to power in definition, because power is defined by act’; but if act were referred to power, then – conversely – act would also be defined by power, as Porphyry says *Book of Predicables* ch.3 ‘About species’, because in mutual relatives “the ideas of both must be posited in the ideas of both.”

33. Then the argument goes: act defines power as it is the term of the relation; either then it is term of the relation as an absolute, and the intended conclusion is gained, – or as a correlative, and thus power will define act; therefore as act is ‘prior’ in definition it is ‘posterior’ in definition!

34. Therefore act so defines power that it is not conversely defined by it, and consequently act is not referred to power but is a pure absolute, and this under the idea under which it defines power; but it defines power insofar as power is to it as a relation to a term; therefore act, according as it is a pure absolute ‘something’, is the term of this relation, whatever the relation be, whether simply so or in a certain respect.

35. This is also more generally proved by all relatives, because no relative is referred first to the correlative as to a term in the case of creatures.

Proof: a relative, insofar as it is relative, is first defined by the term to which it is referred, – therefore the term ‘as term’ is prior in definition to the relative as relative. The inference is plain from *Metaphysics* 7.4.1030b4-7, where the Philosopher compares accident to substance – and from him *Metaphysics* 9.8.1049b12-17, where he compares potency to act.

36. If then the term, insofar as it is term, is referred to the related thing insofar as it was related, then ‘insofar as it is term’ it will have regard to the related thing for definition, and consequently for what is prior according to definition; therefore father would be prior to son in definition and conversely. But it is impossible for there to be a circle in any essential priority whatever, therefore it is impossible for father to be referred first to son insofar as son is referred to father. Therefore it is referred first to the absolute that is the proximate foundation of the relation (namely of filiation), and the absolute is prior to the father as father; and conversely, son ‘as son’ is referred to the absolute which is the proximate foundation of paternity, and the absolute is prior to filiation and to son insofar as it is son.

37. Nor is there because of this any circle, as that to the father ‘insofar as he is father’ *a* should be prior (which is an ‘absolute’ and the proximate foundation of filiation), and that to filiation ‘insofar as it is filiation’ *b* should be prior (which is the proximate foundation of the relation of paternity). For from this there only follows that these two absolutes are prior to two relations, and this is true; nay both absolutes are prior to each relation, because any relation pre-requires not only the foundation but also the term as it is term. Thus therefore is how things are when the relations are mutual; but it happens there to the term, as it is term, that it is conversely referred. It is possible therefore for something to be referred to an absolute, – and so it seems reasonable to posit this in God, who most of all has the idea of an absolute as creatures are related to him.

38. Further, although the intellect could busy itself about the term of some relation of the third mode [n.31] and cause a relation of reason in that term, yet that is not a reason for being the term; for although some intellect confer the squaring of the circle on science, causing in that absolute the relation of reason which is knowability, yet that is not a reason for terminating the relation of reason to it; for this relation of reason is not in this absolute save as actually considered by the intellect, but science is really referred to it, not merely as it is considered by the intellect; therefore the relation of reason in the knowable was not the reason for terminating the relation of the science.

39. This can also be made clear in the issue at hand about God, because although the divine essence can be compared to creatures, and this through an act both of the

created intellect and of the uncreated intellect, and so this act can cause in the essence a relation of reason, yet it will not be the reason for terminating the relation of creatures to it. Certainly not the one that is caused by act of the created intellect; proof, because then, when no created intellect was considering, by comparing God to a stone (if God were to produce a stone) there would not be in the stone a real relation to him, because neither is there a relation of reason in God which would be the reason for terminating the real relation of the stone to him; the consequent is false. Therefore also not that one either that the divine intellect causes in its own essence; proof, because if *per impossibile* God were not an intellectual nature (as some have said, positing that the sun is the first principle [Wisdom 13.1-2]) and he were to produce a stone, the stone would be really referred to God and yet then there would be no relation of reason in God to it.

40. Absolutely then I say that, because of the termination of relations in creatures from time to God, there is no need to posit any relation in God, neither new nor old, which might be the reason for terminating the relation of the creature.

41. Yet there can be posited in God some relation of reason, new indeed, as that which is caused in him by act of our intellect when considering him, but not any new one by act of his own intellect.

Which I prove because never is there passage from contradictory to contradictory without change; for if there were no change in anything, there would be no reason why one of the contradictories could now be true rather than the other, nor why one should be false rather than the other, and so both are false at the same time and true at the same time; but if in God there could be a new relation by act of his own intellect, one extreme of some contradiction would now be true about something which before was not true;^a therefore there is some change in something. Not in the divine essence as known, – nor in the object considered, because it does not yet exist. Nor in anything to which it is compared by his own intellect, unless change is posited in the intellect itself when comparing; because, as the object compared and that to which it is compared – insofar as they are such – do not have another being save in being understood, so they cannot have another being or exist in another way unless something else is understood of them or understood in another way; but if something different being understood of them or being differently understood is impossible without some change of the divine intellect, then no relation can be new in God by act of his own intellect comparing his essence to something temporal. But this is not for this reason, that an actual and a potential relation are one (as the first rejected opinion said [nn.11, 15-19]), but for this reason, that the divine intellect – whatever it compares its essence to – compares in eternity, although not for eternity; hence just as in eternity he compares his will ‘as creative’ to the soul of Antichrist as possible for a certain time, so he compares in eternity his will ‘as creating’ to the soul of Antichrist as actually existing for the now for which he wishes to create that soul; and these indeed are two relations of reason, as they are two extremes, – but each is eternal, although not for eternity.

a. [Interpolation] because now it is being considered under some idea under which it was not being before considered by the divine intellect.

42. From this is apparent the response to this objection: ‘If there can be no new relation in God by act of his own intellect, then if no created intellect were possible and God could create a stone, he could not understand himself creating a stone as a created

intellect can understand him now creating a stone, when he does create it; the consequent appears unacceptable, because whatever is knowable by us is much more knowable also by him'. – I reply: God could know himself creating a stone at time *a*; but he could not newly know himself creating a stone, but in eternity he would know himself creating a stone at time *a* just as in eternity he knows himself to be at some time creative of a stone. This is to say, in eternity he knows the actual relation of it to that at time *a*, just as he also knows the quasi potential relation of himself to it – a relation of reason, however – at some time.

43. In brief I say that it is plain there is no new relation in God, per se terminating a new relation of a creature; there is however some new relation by act of a created intellect, but none by act of his own intellect.

44. But then the first member [n.43] seems doubtful, as to how God is to be posited as lord, – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.16 n.17 [above, n.4].

I reply: by the sole new relation that is in the creature to him is he denominated 'lord'; not indeed that in creatures there are two opposite relations [sc. of lord and servant] (by one of which God is denominated [n.24]), but there is one relation only [sc. of servant], which is to God as he is absolute. And for this reason, because 'as absolute' he is the term of that relation, he is denominated as if there were in him a new relation, namely the corresponding one [sc. lord], – in the way that a work made by a man is called 'human', not because of something of humanity that is formally in the work, but because of the humanity that is formally in man, to whom the work has a disposition.

45. And this seems to be the intention of the Master expressly in the text [d.30 ch.1 n.264], when he concludes this from the words of Augustine. For he speaks thus: "The appellation by which a creature is said relatively to the creator is relative, and it indicates the relation that is in the creature itself; but the appellation by which the creator is said relatively to the creator is relative indeed, but it indicates no relation that is in the creator;" and this same thing is what Augustine seems to say *On the Trinity* V [nn.4, 11, 24, 44], as the Master adduces him: "That God begins in time to be called what he was not called before is manifestly relatively said, not however according to an accident of God (because something has happened to him), but plainly according to an accident of that to which God begins relatively to be said."

III. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

46. To the arguments [nn.1-3].

To the first [n.1]: I concede that whatever is in God is eternal by identity; but it is not necessary that whatever is predicated of God, by the fact that something else has a disposition to him, is eternal formally, because nothing else has an eternal disposition to him – just as if God is eternal and loved in time by a created will, he is indeed said to be loved by us but not 'loved eternally'.

47. To the second [n.2]: the consequence does not hold, because when extremes are of different ideas, then, on account of the fact that one extreme exceeds the other, there is no need for there to be a like coexistence of one with the other and conversely, – just as this inference does not hold, 'whatever is eternal is with the whole of time, therefore everything temporal is with the whole of eternity'; for the first part is true by reason of the immensity of eternity, and that is lacking in the other extreme, – and so

there is no need for concomitance conversely, of the sort there is in the above inference. So here, the eternal can be the term of a new disposition to it (because what eternally exists can produce something *de novo*), and some appellation can be said of him from time, but the temporal cannot thus have the disposition of something eternal to him; or one can concede that the temporal too can be denominated from the disposition of something eternal to him, – as a stone, not only as ideational but as existing, is eternally known by God.

48. To the third [n.3]: ‘to come to be’, not determined through anything (namely when it is predicated according to something added to it [sc. ‘comes to be white’]), does not indicate the making simply of that of which it is said, – as that, if it be said ‘man comes to be’, making is indicated to be simply present in man; but if an adjacent third thing is predicated, as ‘man comes to be white’, coming to be is not indicated save according to something of him, namely what specifies him. And so someone might perhaps concede that God comes to be lord by indicating a making ‘in a certain respect’, namely a making according to some relation of reason or according to the termination of some relation; what however is conceded rather is that he begins to be lord, because this does not signify imperfection as ‘comes to be’ does; however in no way, either ‘comes to be’ or ‘begins’, is it conceded absolutely.

IV. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

49. To the second question [n.5] I respond that in God there is not any real relation to creatures.

50. The reason for this is taken from the perfect simplicity and perfect necessity of God: for because God is perfectly simple, there is nothing in him which is not him (according to Augustine *City of God* XI ch.10: “God is simple, because he is what he has”); also his perfect necessity is of itself such, because his being will not vary whatever hypothesis is laid down – whether possible or impossible – about anything other than himself, because other things are not necessary except secondarily.

51. From this it follows that there is no reality in him which necessarily co-requires anything other than himself; for such a thing, necessarily co-requiring something other than God, would not exist if that co-required thing does not exist, and consequently something that was perfectly the same as God would not exist when something else – which was not necessary of itself – does not exist; but a real relation of necessity co-requires for its ‘being’ the term of the relation; therefore in God there is no relation to anything other than himself.

52. Against this reason instances are raised:

First, because although the creature is not necessary in actual being, yet it seems that ‘something other than God’ is necessary in possible being, because the ‘possible being’ is necessary (which is proved by the fact that something seems possible by its possibility in itself before there is a relation of God to it, for there is no power in anything save with respect to something possible in itself; therefore a relation to a creature ‘insofar as it is possible’ does not co-require anything that is not necessary under the idea under which it is its term); but a relation in God to a creature ‘as possible’ seems to be the same as his relation to a creature as actual, by the deduction set down for the first opinion to the first question [n.11]; therefore there can be in God – while his necessity stands –

some relation simply to creatures as possible, and the same relation as that which is to creatures as actual.

53. Again, if the creature has quidditative being insofar as it has exemplared being (according to one opinion), this being is necessary for the creature; therefore a respect to this being, as such, seems to be possible without possibility in that in which such respect is.

54. Again, if the philosophers were to posit certain things produced by God as formally necessary (as was said about the opinion of Aristotle and Avicenna in distinction 8 nn.251-253, 255, 248, 242), then the respect to those things could be the same as God and yet the necessity of the divine could still stand, because of the fact that the term of the relation, according to the opinion, would be necessary; therefore, by holding the position of the philosophers who yet denied a real relation in God, the reasoning already set down (from the simplicity and necessity of God) does not seem sufficient.

55. Again, fourth: in that case there should not be posited in a more necessary creature a real respect to a less necessary creature, and so in the celestial bodies there should be no real respect to generable and corruptible things.

56. To these objections [nn.52-55].

Although to the two first objections [nn.52-53] a response can be made in more or less a single way (to the first by the fact that possible being is only being in a certain respect,^a and therefore there is no relation to it simply but in a certain respect, – and to the second in like manner, that exemplared being is only being in a certain respect, and therefore the disposition to such term would not be real, just as neither is the term real), yet one can say with one general response to all these instances, that the necessary of itself – as was said [n.50] – will not change according to anything perfectly the same as itself, whatever possible position is constructed about what is other than it; but whatever is in the perfectly simple is the same as it perfectly; therefore the necessary of itself cannot be changed according to anything that is in it, whatever is posited about something else. But nothing other than God is as formally necessary as God, according to any position, because if something else formally necessary were posited, it would not be without all dependence on the first necessary, and so would not be of itself necessary; therefore no reality in the first will change because of any position about anything of such a sort that it is not of itself formally necessary; but some change could come to be in some reality in the first because of a change in something other than itself, if some reality in it necessarily required something other than itself.

a. [*Interpolation*] because this sort of being is not being simply, just as neither is 'being a dead man' being a man – nor does this possibility posit more in reality than blindness does in an eye.

57. And next to the two instances about potential and quidditative being (according to some) I reply [nn.52-54] that neither is the 'possible' of itself necessary in such being – even a necessary possible – in the way God is of himself necessary act; thus too neither are those quiddities of themselves necessary in their quidditative being, but they are necessary beings thus by participation; nor, third, would creatures – if they were necessary (according to the philosophers [n.54]) – be as necessary as the first, but they would have only a participated necessity. And so to posit that they do not exist would not be as impossible as that some reality in the first does not exist (because none of them is as

necessary as any reality in the first is necessary), and yet from positing ‘the less impossible’ something more impossible would seem to follow! Therefore there could not be as regard any of these things, although they are in some sense necessary (though not of themselves necessary), any reality in that which is necessary of itself.

58. To the fourth [n.55] I say that if something ‘more necessary’ were also simple (that is, not composite, nor combinable with any non-necessary reality), the more necessary would exist when it does not have a respect outside itself to the less necessary; but this supposition is false, because although some celestial body were posited to be in itself necessary, yet it is not a simple that could not receive any non-necessary reality other than itself; but God, just as he cannot be what exists in order to something not of itself necessary, so he cannot have any reality in order to such a thing, because that reality would be himself.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question

59. As to the arguments about omnipotence and omniscience [n.5], and about willing future things [n.6], there will be discussion in the questions specific to them [I d.43 nn.6-14, d.35 nn.27-34, d.45 n.7].

60. To the argument about action and passion [n.8]: the Philosopher does not say that those relations are real, but he says that they are mutual; and in this precisely are the relations in the first and second mode distinguished from the third mode of relation [n.31]. But however it may be with what he said, the position of the Philosopher is not of itself true when the agent is of itself necessary and perfectly simple, as was said when solving the point [nn.49-51].

61. But you ask: why then are the relations real that are founded on action and passion in creatures?

62. Although there is no need to speak to this point for the solution of the argument [n.8, 60], yet one can say that this is true in the case of a natural agent, because the form it has – whereby it is active – is naturally inclined to producing the effect; but a free agent is not naturally inclined to the effect from the form it has, – and then, since God is a free agent, it follows that on his action there is not founded a real relation.

63. On the contrary:

The philosophers, when conceding that God produces things by natural necessity, denied a real relation of him to them [n.54]; therefore that [n.62] is not the precise reason.

64. Likewise, a created will seems to have a real relation to its effect, although it is free.

65. Further, an effect does not by its absolute entity necessarily require a proximate cause (for the same absolute entity could be from a remote cause), and yet when it is produced by its proximate cause it has a real relation to it; therefore there is not required for a real relation that the absolute nature, on which it is founded, be necessarily inclined of itself to one of the two extremes.

66. Again, the likeness of two white things is a real relation in them, and yet one white thing, precisely considered insofar as it is the foundation of the relation, does not seem inclined of its entity (whereby it is the foundation) to one of the two extremes – especially a supreme whiteness, if it is posited in relation to another supreme whiteness, as was argued against his [Henry’s] first argument to this question [nn.12, 20].

67. Again, if it is always necessary, before there is a real relation, to posit in the foundation a natural inclination to the term, then there is a real relation before the real relation, because the inclination to another is a real relation!

68. Therefore in brief:

It does not seem necessary for a real relation that the absolute thing which is the foundation of the relation be inclined of itself to the remaining thing, but that it be such that, when the term is posited, there follow on it and on the term such disposition from the nature of the extremes,^a – and then that every created agent is such that, when some effect is posited to exist through it, the disposition of them follow on it as on the foundation and on the product as on the term.

a. [*Interpolation*] so that any relation that follows the extremes from the nature of the thing, without consideration of the intellect, is real.

69. But the reason why a real relation follows is only because this is this and that is that; just as the reason why a real relation (as ‘likeness’) follows on whiteness and whiteness – once posited – is only this whiteness and that whiteness; and there is no other reason why a real greater-ness follows on double and triple – once posited in existence – than that this is double and that is triple.

70. And yet the idea of potentiality in the foundation and the term can be assigned as the general cause, namely as to why a real disposition can follow:

For whatever things can be parts of some whole are potentials for the form of the whole, – and if they can be parts of something per se one, they can be potentials for the form by which it is per se one (as is plain about the parts of the organic body with respect to the intellective soul), and also, if they can be parts of something that is one with unity of order, they can be potentials for its form, by which form the ‘whole’ is one in order; and generally, the proposition about the potentiality of parts is plain, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.2.1013b19-21, where he means that parts are like matter with respect to the whole. All created things – because they are limited – are of a nature to be parts of the whole universe, which is ‘one’ with unity of order (as is plain in *Metaphysics* 12.10.1075a16-19), and therefore any of them is potential for this form which is ‘order’, so as namely to have an order to another part; and this either according to the eminence which is in diverse natures in the universe, or according to equality (because “order is of things equal and unequal,” according to Augustine *City of God* XIX ch.13 n.1), or according to action and passion, or according to causality. And therefore any created agent, when producing an effect, is potential such that on it and on its produced effect an order among them can follow.

But it cannot be thus as regard an unlimited agent and its effect, because the unlimited agent is potential neither to absolute form nor to relation, on account of its infinity.

71. One can reply through the same point to the argument about quantity [n.7] because every created quantity – whether in virtue or mass – even if it be posited to have a real relation to another quantity (because of the fact that the order, from which comes the unity of the universe, can exist between such quanta), yet there can be no real disposition of an infinite quantity to a finite one.

72. And when a confirmation for the argument is given through equality, which is a real relation in creatures and even in divine reality [n.7], – I reply that in divine reality it

is real because it is a disposition from the nature of the thing, and it stands together with the simplicity and necessity of the related thing in itself because it is not referred to another that is less necessary formally than the related thing itself; in creatures the relation is real because of the very potentiality of the related quantities. But when comparing the infinite quantity to this [finite] one, both reasons are destroyed, because then simplicity and necessity are taken away from one of the extremes, and potentiality and limitation are taken away from the other.

73. To the other argument [n.9] I say that reality sometimes determines the composition [of a proposition], and then it means nothing other than that it is so truly, – as when it is said ‘that proposition is really false’ that is, ‘it truly is false’. But if reality is taken as it adverbially determines the predicate, here ‘God is really lord’, – although this proposition can be denied, yet it can be conceded according as ‘lord’ does not indicate any relation in God but according as God is the term of a real relation of the creature, as was said in the preceding question [n.44].

Thirty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether Identity, Likeness, and Equality are Real Relations in God

1. About the thirty first distinction I ask whether identity, likeness, and equality are real relations in God.

That they are not:

Augustine *On the Trinity* V ch.6 n.7: “We ask, according to what is the Father equal to the Son? Not because he is said to be to the Father is the Son equal to the Father; it remains then that he is equal according to what he is said to be to himself;” and he concludes: “it remains then that he is equal according to substance.” Therefore equality is not said there according to relation.

2. Further, a form of the same species is not multiplied in number save through matter; proof: every form separate from matter has the whole species, according to some. Therefore equality in divine reality, since it is a form of the same idea without matter, is not multiplied or distinguished; therefore there is not a different equality in the Father and in the Son, and consequently it is not real in the Father, because then it would require a corresponding distinct relation in the Son.

3. Further, if equality in the Father is different from the equality that is in the Son, by parity of reasoning it is also different from the equality that is in the Holy Spirit – and then to the equality in the Son and to the equality in the Holy Spirit there will correspond different equalities in the Father, because correlatives are co-multiplied; therefore in the Father there will be two equalities, which seems unacceptable.

4. Further, if these relations are real, then they are as equally distinct as are the relations of origin – and consequently they could thus constitute distinct persons just as do the relations of origin; and if they can so constitute, they do so constitute, because there is no potency there without act.

5. The opposite:

Hilary *On the Trinity* III n.23: "There is no likeness to oneself."

I. To the Question

6. To the question:

It seems one must say that the three are sufficient for a real relation; first, because the foundation is real and the term is real; and second, because there is a real distinction between the extremes; and third, because, from the nature of the extremes, such a relation follows without the work of any other power comparing one extreme to the other.

A. As to the First Condition for Relation

1. Opinion of Others

7. As to the first condition for real relation [n.6], it is denied [by Henry of Ghent etc.] that there is here a foundation, because it is said that magnitude passes over into the essence (according to Augustine, in many places), and so it does not remain under the idea of magnitude save in reason.

8. But against this:

The divine essence as it is the first object of the divine intellect, seen in the first intuitive cognition, is, before any busying of the intellect, the beatific object of that intellect, because the intellect is not beatified by a busying act; therefore it is of itself, without any busying of the intellect, formally infinite, because nothing beatifies save what is formally infinite. So there is magnitude of virtue there – nay an infinity of magnitude – from the nature of the thing.

9. Again, the intellect, before it understands that it is understanding something or is busy about something, has a comprehensive grasp of the essence as first object, and from this – that it busies itself about it – it is possible to reduce to act all the ideas that can be considered in the essence; therefore from the nature of the thing the intellect is infinite, – therefore the essence too, on which it is founded.

10. Further, their reasoning [n.7] is not valid, because although a quantity of bulk states something added to the nature of the subject, and therefore it cannot remain under its formal idea and also pass over into the essence by identity, – yet magnitude of virtue in every being passes over into that which it by identity belongs to, even in the case of creatures. – Proof: for if an angel has some magnitude of virtue (about which Augustine speaks in *ibid.* VI ch.8 n.9: "In things that are not great by bulk, what it is to be greater is to be better"), and if its perfectible magnitude is not the same as its essence, let it be removed from the essence. With the essence then remaining, I ask what grade of perfection it has among beings? For it will be nothing unless it has some determinate grade of perfection among beings; therefore there still remains in the essence a magnitude of virtue, whereby it is said to be thus or thus perfect. Therefore the quantity in everything passes over by identity, and remains in everything in its proper idea, because the nature of such quantity is to state the intrinsic mode of the perfection it belongs to; and from the fact that it states 'mode', it remains – but from the fact that it states 'intrinsic', it passes by identity into the essence it belongs to.

2. Scotus' own Opinion

11. I say, therefore, that there is here a foundation or equality that is real and from the nature of the thing, not only a remote one, which is the essence, – but a proximate one, which is magnitude or specifically ‘infinity’. And this is proved by all the reasons that are given to show that the essence of the first thing is infinite; they do all indeed conclude that from the nature of the thing it is infinite; for all things that depend on it – whether on it as it is first in idea of effective principle, or in idea of final principle, or in idea of being eminent and measuring and participated (which ways were touched on in distinction 2 nn.111-144) – all these things, I say, depend on it according to what it is from the nature of the thing, after removing every act of intellect, because no dependence of a finite effect rests on something under the formal idea of a being of reason, as can be proved by the reasons given in distinction 13 against the sixth opinion [nn.31-42]). There is also here from the nature of the thing what is posited as the proximate foundation of equality, or the idea of founding it, namely unity, because according to Damascene ch.8: “In him” (namely in God) “common and one are considered to be in the thing;” it is not so in the case of creatures, but the common there is ‘one’ by intellect only.

B. As to the Second Condition for Relation

12. In this way, namely that the relation requires extremes really distinct [n.6]: The thing is clear from Hilary, as said in his opposing point [n.5].

13. And from Augustine, *ibid.* VI ch.10 n.11: “In the Son,” he says, “is the first equality.” Which would not be true if some person could be said to be equal to himself; for then the Father would be the first equal. But because equality cannot be understood without distinction, and the first distinction is in the produced Son, so the ‘first equality’ is there in him, – taking as term or as quasi subject the equality by which the Son is equal to the Father.

14. This is also proved by the fact that the relations of origin are posited as real, and they do not pre-require a distinction of the extremes, but as it were formally cause it; for the relations in question here presuppose the distinction ‘as caused by relations of origin’, just as the common position is that they cannot burgeon in the essence unless the relations or origin are pre-existing in it [d.26 n.96]; therefore they seem more to require distinct extremes than the relations of origin, or at any rate not less.

15. And if you object that they are not of different ideas as the relations of origin are, – this is not conclusive unless because they are not distinct in species; but in the case of creatures not only are the relations of supposition and superposition real, where the extremes differ in species, – but also the common relations are real, where the extremes differ only in number; therefore a real numerical distinction in the extremes is here sufficient for the reality of the common relations, just as for the distinction of the relations of origin, which differ as it were in species.

C. As to the Third Condition for Relation

16. As to the third article [n.6] – it seems that this relation [sc. equality etc.] is consequent to the persons from the nature of the thing, without any comparison by some extrinsic power comparing them.

For because the Father by generating communicates his essence perfectly to the Son, therefore he communicates the same infinite magnitude – as Augustine says *Against Maximinus* II ch.18 n.3: “If,” he says, “you say ‘the Father is by his very self greater than the Son, because he generates’, I quickly reply: no, therefore the Father is not greater than the Son, because he generates an equal.” Therefore there does not seem to be any reason why the equality of the Father with the Son should not be posited as a real relation.

17. One can speak similarly about likeness. And – just as in creatures – there is a double likeness, namely essential, according to specific difference, and accidental, according to some accidental quality. And even if the first be denied in the issue at hand (because God does not have any specific difference), yet because – if the fact ‘there is a specific difference in creatures’ were the whole essence of the individual – there would no less be a form in respect of the individual (therefore no less a relation of likeness than there is now), therefore it seems that likeness can properly be conceded there (not insofar as it is ‘what’, but insofar as it is act and quasi form, by which the persons are God), and also a likeness as to all the attributes, which are as it were properties of this nature (as Damascene says ch.4: “Things that concern the nature state the nature”): and then, just as there is from the nature of the thing a foundation of equality and a real distinction between the extremes (and this relation is without any operation of the intellect [nn.11-13, 16]), so also in the case of likeness.

18. About identity too one can say that it is taken in two ways in divine reality; in one way of the same person to himself, as the Father is the same as himself, – in another way of one person with another, as the Father is the same as the Son and conversely. About the first identity, see elsewhere [II d.1 qq.4-5 n.24].^a About the second one can say – as also about the others [equality, likeness] – that it is real, because there is there a true unity from the nature of the thing and a sufficient distinction between the extremes, nor does a comparison by the intellect seem necessary for the being of this identity. And if the identity of the same supposit with itself in the case of creatures is a relation of reason only, then there is never a true and perfect identity save in God alone; for Socrates is not a perfect identity with himself, because it is a relation of reason only, – and so every such relation is in a certain respect; nor is there a perfect identity of Socrates with Plato, because it is not founded on perfect unity. But here there is a perfect identity of the Father with the Son as to foundation, because there is a perfect unity of the Father with the Son, – and a real identity, because there is a real distinction and a sufficient one between the extremes.

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] Response.

In distinction 19 to the ultimate: it is a mark of imperfection in creatures that the foundation is distinguished; there is only required a distinction of supposits.

There, at the bottom: the passion of the quantity of virtue as also of bulk.

Again, here in this distinction question 1: it does not only state negation, as neither does unity of essence and the distinction of persons which it follows.

Here in question 2: the respect formally in its reason, causally and of the person and unity of essence, – just as in creatures there is a respect of the supposit to supposit according to one form.

But what he [Bonaventure] does not understand, that they are distinct in reason, is not only proved in 19 ('passion') and in the first question here ('it follows'), but because he never adds the distracting thing (in distinction 30, 'About the relation of God to the creature').

II. Doubts about Equality

19. But about equality there are two doubts:

For first it seems it is not a distinct relation from identity and likeness because (as was said elsewhere [I d.8 nn.192, 220-221, d.10 n.30, d.13 nn.72, 80]) 'infinite' is not a special attribute but states a mode intrinsic to any attribute, – and by parity of reasoning 'great' does too, which as it were states indistinctly what 'infinite' states distinctly; therefore the magnitude of the essence is not distinct from the essence (and not by the distinction either that is between the attributes), and then equality according to this magnitude is not distinct from identity, which is according to the essence; likewise, magnitude is not distinct from wisdom, by the distinction that is between the attributes, – therefore equality in magnitude of wisdom is not distinct from likeness in wisdom. But every magnitude is either of the essence, according to which there is identity, – or of an attribute, according to which there is likeness; therefore no equality in divine reality seems to be distinct from identity and likeness.

20. Further, if also any attribute has its own proper magnitude, then equality seems to be founded in accord with any one of them; therefore there will be as many equalities of the persons as there are attributes.

21. As to the first [n.19], one can concede that – as in the case of creatures – there can be likeness without equality (as a weak white is like an intense white, although not perfectly), but not conversely, as to the form by which certain things are of a nature to be likened; and in this respect, by comparing certain things in the form according to which likeness is of a nature to exist, equality seems to quasi determine likeness and a foundation of likeness. So one can concede here that equality is not so distinct from identity and likeness as they are from each other, but it states a proper mode of the foundation of each of those two relations, and as it were also a mode proper to each relation, – because namely both identity and likeness are perfect; because if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater deity and the Son a lesser deity, there would be some identity, but because the foundation of the identity would not have the same magnitude, it would not be perfect identity, nor go along with equality; likewise, if *per impossibile* the Father had a greater knowledge and the Son a lesser one, they would be in some way alike, but because the mode of the foundation would be deficient – namely perfect magnitude – there would therefore not be a perfect likeness. But now the magnitude, which is as it were the mode of the foundation of identity and likeness, founds equality, which is as it were the mode of likeness and identity, – because it asserts each of them as perfect.

22. To the second [n.20] one can concede that there are as many perfections in God simply as there are also magnitudes and equalities; however just as all of them are simply one thing, so too 'the equalities in accord with them' are simply one thing. And from this is plain how the Master – distinction 19 ch.1 n.168 – well assigned 'a perfect equality' in the three (according to Augustine [Fulgentius] *On the Faith to Peter* ch.1 n.4), namely 'in magnitude, in power, and in eternity'; by magnitude indeed is understood

equality in all attributes (taking magnitude not for any distinct attribute, but as it is common to the magnitude of any attribute at all), and by power they are indicated to be equal as to objects outside, and by eternity equality is indicated to be in them as it were in duration. But equality according to discrete quantity is not looked for there, but to continuous quantities in creatures – which are permanent and successive quantity – there correspond there magnitude and eternity.

III. To the Principal Argument

23. [To the first principal argument] – To the first argument [n.1] I say that a white things and a white thing are said to be alike according to whiteness, and this insofar as the ‘according to’ indicates that its determinable is the proximate foundation for the relation; but they are said to be alike by likeness formally. So I say that the Father and Son are equal according to essence as according to proximate foundation [nn.11, 35], because the common relations are founded on something as it is common; but nothing is one in the persons save the essence as essential.

24. Against this solution there are multiple arguments:

First, because by parity of reasoning there seems to be a single equality in God, just as also a single paternity; both (1) because each relation is equally adequate to its foundation; and (2) because anything in God of one idea is single, – otherwise he would not be of himself supremely one, but by one thing he would be ‘being according to quiddity’ and by another ‘this being’ and so there would be potentiality and composition; and (3) because infinity in all of them seems to follow in the same way, because it will not be possible to give what a plural thing is determined by to a definite plurality; and (4) because what has a cause of one idea and a single receptive idea is single, because it is not distinguished by agent or by matter, *Metaphysics* 8.4.1044a25-32 (likeness is of this sort).

25. Again, not only will it follow that there are six equalities in three persons, nay any person is equal to two persons and conversely, – and not by the same equality by which they are one, because the extreme is not the same; indeed any person is equal to the three, because *On the Trinity* VIII ch.1 n.2: “The three are not a greater thing than one is” (nor a lesser, as is plain; therefore they are equal). And this last point seems to show sufficiently that equality is not real, because it is of the same thing to itself, provided not to itself precisely but along with others; it is never real to itself, however much it may be communicated to others. But as to why it is not to itself precisely, – one can say, not because it states a relation, but it only states the unity of quantity; yet it connotes a distinction of supposits, and therefore it is to another. – Further, this equality is equal to that equality, and so *ad infinitum*; this person is also like that one, and the same as it in species, and so again *ad infinitum*.

26. To these objections:

To the first [n.24 (1)] it is said that no relation there is adequate to the foundation, because the essence is the immediate foundation of them all; for since a relation does not found a relation, and there is only essence and relation there, the conclusion follows. – To this it is said that the distinct attributes are the proximate foundations of the relations of origin, as memory is of ‘active saying’ and actual knowing is of ‘passive saying’; with this proximate foundation one relation of origin is equated.

27. In another way it is said to the first [n.24 (1)] that in creatures disquiparant [sc. correlates that are denoted by different names, as father and son] relations require distinct foundations (because they differ in species), but common relations do not; therefore the first is thus adequate to what is disquiparant because it is not the same foundation for the opposite relation; things are not so in the case of the common relations. How this relates to the issue at hand is plain [sc. paternity is adequate and unique, equality is not adequate nor unique].

28. But given this response, why is there only a single paternity? Because although its proximate foundation is not the foundation of the opposite relation (which as it were differs in species), yet why is 'this paternity' adequate to its foundation and 'this equality' not adequate to its? – Response: no unique common relation can be adequate, because the opposite has to have the same foundation; some relation can be adequate to what is disquiparant.

29. On the contrary: why is 'this paternity' necessarily adequate? – Response: nothing of one idea is multiplied unless some things of another idea are pre-understood that are causally necessarily required for the multiplication of it; therefore paternity cannot be multiplied because it does not pre-require such things of a different idea (which would be as it were the cause of its multiplication), – equality can be, because it pre-requires relations that constitute persons, by which distinction of persons the equalities are distinguished. Proof [sc. that in something of one idea multiplication is made by something of another idea]: by what is *a* other than *b*? If by something of a different idea in them, or causally, the intended conclusion is gained; if not, but only by something of the same idea, I ask again by what it is distinguished, and so *ad infinitum*. – However it may be with this general proof, there is a special proof in God; because otherwise [sc. if multiplication were not made by something of a different idea] there would be an infinity, because nothing there is determined to a definite multitude by any prior cause; therefore only by something of a different idea, because 'anything of one idea that is related to several things does not determine to how many such things it extends itself' (it is got from distinction 2 above, question 7, in the solution, addition, sub n.303).

30. Through this is plain the response to the third point [n.24 (3)]; why there is a certain plurality of equalities but there would not be of paternities.

31. To the second [n.24 (2)]: that whatever is of one idea in the thing – not only in concept – is unique, I concede. To the proof I say that, in concept, 'equality' and 'this' are not by the same thing, but anything in the thing is 'equality' and 'this' by the same thing – as is replied in distinction 8 nn.137-150 about a concept common to God and creatures, or a common thing (so too in distinction 29 nn.3-4 about principle and in distinction 23 n.^{9a} about several relations having a common concept).

a. *A blank space was left here by Scotus.*

32. To the fourth [n.24 (4)]: the proposition can be conceded, and it is true when 'receptive' is only in one recipient and is an absolute form; in relations several things are in one thing, and necessarily several things are in opposite extremes.

33. To the other [n.25]: it is conceded that there are six other equalities, between any person and two others; but between one and three, or two and two, it is conceded as a quasi numeral part to a quasi numeral whole – then the proposition 'it is never real to itself etc.' is denied. It is denied to be real in another way, when the same person is in

each extreme: the inference does not follow ‘not greater nor lesser therefore equal’, because the premise is true of the Father with respect to the Father, the conclusion false.

34. To the last one, about an infinity of equalities [n.25], a response is given in book II distinction 1 question 4 nn.23-24,^a about which relations are referred to others, which to themselves.

a. *A blank space was left here by Scotus.*

35. And if you object that then the Father could be said according to essence, because the essence is foundation of paternity (which however is not conceded), although I have made this argument elsewhere to prove that a relation of origin is not an act of the essence [I d.5 n.137], yet by holding to the common way [sc. opposite to the objection here, that the Father is not said according to essence] a reason can be assigned as to why according to essence the Father is said to be equal to the Son but not Father of the Son; because although the essence is foundation of both, and is not distinguished (neither by the former nor by the latter), yet it is the foundation of the common relation insofar as it is one – but not insofar as it is ‘one’ is it foundation of a relation of origin, although it is one; and because essence ‘as essence’ is not taken there save as it is one formally in the three, therefore the Father is said to be equal according to essence, because of the fact that the essence as ‘one’ is the proximate foundation of this relation [sc. equality]. But Father is not said according to deity, because deity as ‘one’ is not ‘the idea of the foundation’ of this relation [sc. paternity], such that unity be the idea of the foundation, as would be indicated if Father were said according to deity; because wherever a relation is the act of a foundation, there a supposit can be said relatively to another according to that foundation (as Socrates according to whiteness is like, fire by heat heats, a stone according to the quiddity of stone is the measure of knowledge about a stone); but this is not conceded ‘the Father is Father by deity, or according to deity’; therefore etc.

36. But in this way it seems one can argue that neither is he equal according to deity, because this relation is not the act of the foundation. – Response: where a relation is an act of the foundation, there something can according to the foundation be said relatively to another (this I have accepted), but I do not concede conversely that wherever something is said relatively to another according to the foundation that there the relation is an act of the foundation – because universally such ‘according to’ is a mark of the cause of inherence per se in the second mode, not the first. And well does ‘actuation of the foundation through relation’ entail that the foundation is the cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit (cause per se in the second mode, I say), but not conversely, because ‘to be per se the foundation’ sometimes suffices for being a per se cause of the inherence of the relation in the supposit without the fact that the relation actuates, although sometimes it may not be sufficient, because then the Father according to essence would be Father.

37. But at any rate, what is the reason for the dissimilarity here, that a common relation is said to be present [sc. in a supposit] according to essence, a proper relation or a relation of origin not, – since neither is more act than the other? In creatures each is an act, and each is said to be present according to the foundation; for ‘hot’ is both capable of heating according to heat and is like according to heat!

38. [To the second principal argument] – To the second [n.8] I say that the major proposition is false; nay when a form is distinguished in matter and with matter, the mater

is not the principal reason for this distinction, because in any distinction the principal reason of the distinction is that which is the principal reason of being in that existence (about this elsewhere, in the question ‘On individuation’ [II d.3 p.1 qq.5-6 nn.9, 15, 20]).

39. [To the third principal argument] To the third [n.3]; it seems one must concede that in the Father there is one equality to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit, just as if the Father had generated the Holy Spirit there would be in him one paternity to the Son and another to the Holy Spirit – and about this statement there will be general discussion in book III d.8 q. un. n.6-11, 21-22, ‘whether in one thing, related to several, there are several relations’.

40. [To the fourth principal argument] – To the fourth [n.4]; the argument seems difficult to those who posit that the persons are relative (as was argued against them in distinction 26 n.96, for the third opinion), yet by holding to the common way [sc. that the persons are relative] one must say that relations of origin burgeon in the essence before the common ones do, and those ‘first burgeoning’ ones distinguish and constitute the persons, – but not the common ones, because they are as it were adventitious to the persons [n.14] (as it was posited that active-inspiring does not constitute a person because it is understood to happen as it were to the Father and the Son once they have been constituted in personal being); for the first things burgeoning there that can distinguish personally do distinguish personally and constitute persons.

Thirty Second Distinction

Question One

Whether the Father and the Son Love Each Themselves by the Holy Spirit

1. About the thirty second distinction I ask whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit.

That they do not:

Because to love is taken either essentially or notionally; not essentially, because anything essential is present in any person not through another person; if notionally, therefore the Father and the Son inspire by the Holy Spirit, – which is false.

2. The same thing is proved secondly, because no notional act converts to the same agent form which it is or proceeds, because of the distinction which such notional act requires between the agent and the term; therefore, if this act converts, it is not taken notionally.

3. Further, if Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit, then the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, because the Father seems to love himself and the Son by the same thing; but the conclusion seems unacceptable, because the Father loves himself in the first moment of origin, in which the Holy Spirit is not understood to have been inspired.

4. Further, they love themselves and creatures by the same thing; but the Holy Spirit does not seem to be ‘what they love the creature by’, because then just as the Holy Spirit from the necessity of his production is love, so love of creatures would be from necessity – and so God would necessarily love the creature.

5. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.5 n.7: the Holy Spirit is “that by which the begotten is loved by the begetter and loves his begetter.”

Question Two

Whether the Father is Wise by Generated Wisdom

6. Second I ask whether the Father is wise by generated wisdom.

That he is:

‘The Father speaks by the Word’, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1; but according to Anselm *Monologion* ch.63, “to speak by supreme spirit is nothing else than to intuit as it were by thinking;” therefore the Father intuits by the Word, and so he is wise by the Word.

7. On the contrary:

Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1: “He exists by that by which he is wise, because for him to be wise and to be are the same;” therefore if he were wise by the Word he would exist by the Word.

I. Opinion of Others to the First Question

8. The first question is held to be difficult by the Master [I d.32 ch.1 n.283] and he dismisses it unsolved.

A. First Opinion

9. Some have denied the proposition ‘the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit’, and have said it was retracted by Augustine in a similar case, *Retractions* I ch.26, where he retracts this proposition ‘the Father is wise by generated wisdom’, to which the former seems to be similar, – and therefore they say the former is retracted in the latter.

10. On the contrary:

Not only does Augustine separately retract matters that need to be retracted, but he even retracts the same matter – which is spoken off in diverse books (though it needs to be retracted) – several times, namely when he makes mention of those diverse books; therefore much more would he separately retract this one, if it was to be retracted.

11. Also Augustine does not retract the sayings of other saints who seem to concede this proposition, – as Jerome *On the Psalms* [Ps.-Jerome, 17.1]

B. Second Opinion

12. Others have said that the proposition needs to be interpreted, so that the ‘by the Holy Spirit’ is to be taken in the idea of sign, – so that the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit as by a sign of common love.

13. On the contrary:

In this way it could be said that they love themselves by a creature, because a creature is a sign of their love.

C. Third Opinion

14. Others say that they love themselves with a love appropriated to the Holy Spirit, and so they are said to love themselves by the Holy Spirit through appropriation, not properly.

15. On the contrary:

In this way they would be good by the Holy Spirit, because goodness is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.

D. Fourth Opinion

16. In another way it is said that “the ablative [sc. ‘by’] is to be construed by way of formal effect.”

17. This is made clear first by the fact that, although not every thing is a form, yet “all that by which something is denominated – as far as this goes – has the disposition of a form; so that, if I should say ‘he is clothed in clothing’, the ablative ‘in clothing’ is construed by way of disposition of a form, although it is not the form of man.”

18. “But it happens that something is denominated by that which proceeds from it, as an agent is not only by the action but also as by the term of the action, which is the effect, when the effect is included in the understanding of the action; for we say that ‘fire is a heater by heating’, although heating is not heat (which is the form of fire) but an action that proceeds from fire; and we also say that ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, although the flowers are not the form of the tree but certain effects proceeding from it.”

19. “According to this, then, one must say that since we may take ‘to love’ in two ways in divine reality, namely essentially and notionally – as to the way it is taken essentially, the Father and the Son do not love themselves in this way by the Holy Spirit but by their essence; hence Augustine says *On the Trinity* XI ch.7 n.12: ‘Who dares say that neither Father nor Son nor Holy Spirit love save through the Holy Spirit?’”

20. On the contrary [n.18]:

‘To build’ distinctly includes the term which is ‘a building’, yet it is not conceded that ‘a builder builds by a building’; and in the issue at hand too, ‘to inspirit’ more distinctly includes the Holy Spirit than it includes ‘to love’, and yet it is not conceded that ‘the Father and the Son inspirit by the Holy Spirit’.

21. Again, even if such predication were conceded, yet it is not referable back to the agent – because something that would be a term for the fire by something it produces is not conceded to be said of fire.

22. Further, in a transitive construction never is the effect ‘as effect’ construed in the ablative; but to love is a transitive verb. Hence the example – on which they rely [who adopt this opinion] – is not to the purpose; for ‘to flower’ is a neutral verb and does not formally state the production of anything.

Every neutral verb indeed signifies the same as an adjectival name (if a name were imposed), save that this name signifies by way of having and rest, but the verb signifies it in becoming, – as ‘to be hot’ signifies the same thing in rest as ‘to heat’ signifies it as it were in becoming. And just as such a denominative name could be said of something with the ablative, indicating that by which the subject is denominated with such denominative, so a neutral verb could be construed with the ablative in the same

disposition of denominating form; for as fire ‘heats by heat’ so it is ‘hot by heat’, and both are in the idea of the form from which the denomination comes, by way of rest in the one case and by way of becoming in the other. But the form is sometimes inherent, as a quality, – and sometimes it is disposed by way of a form from without of the denominating thing, as in the case of the category of having [sc. being clad] or by way of it (in both ways the denomination can be made); and just as something is denominated not only by the form but by something extrinsic, sometimes, so what denominates can be said of it with the extrinsic thing taken in the ablative, and this whether what denominates signifies nominally or verbally; for just as one can say ‘he is adorned with a garment’ (insofar as ‘adorned’ signifies something in the category of having), so one can say ‘he is glowing with a garment’ (or by some other neutral verb that would signify the same as the denominative ‘is adorned’), – and so it is in the issue at hand, because ‘the tree is flowering’ does not formally signify that the tree is producing a flower. For if an active verb is posited, which would signify in this way, namely ‘to florificate’ (if it were in use), this proposition would be false ‘the tree is florificating with flowers’; but this proposition is true ‘the tree is flowering with flowers’, because by this neutral verb is signified that it denominates the subject as it were by way of having, because although having [sc. being clad] does not properly exist in inanimate things, yet they can be denominated by something next to them, which – insofar as it is in some way an ornament or covering for them – can be reduced to the category of having; and then, just as one would say ‘the tree is flowery with flowers’ and the ablative would be construed in idea of that by which the subject is denominated according to such a denomination, in this way too is the ‘with flowers’ construed with this verb ‘to flower’. The example, then, is to the opposite, when we are speaking of an active verb, and is nothing to the purpose – the way it is true – when we are speaking of a neutral verb.

II. Scotus’ own Response to the Second Question

23. To solve this question [n.1] (because things in the intellect are more manifest [sc. than those in the will]), one must first reply to the second question [n.6].

And first let us look at our own intellect:

For there memory generates actual knowledge, which has a double relation to memory; namely ‘of generated to generating’ and this relation belongs to the second mode of relatives and is mutual – and the other ‘of declaring to declared’, and this belongs to the third mode of relatives and is not mutual [d.30 n.31]. But just as generated knowledge declares formally the object that lies in the memory, so that which produces actual knowledge and gives it this power of declaring can be said ‘to declare by this knowledge’ as if by way of efficient cause; for if someone produces a mirror and images appearing in it, although the mirror formally declares those appearing images, yet the ‘one producing the mirror’ declares them by efficient causality. And this is more evident if acts of the soul, which are not truly makings, were signified by neutral, non active verbs (but now they are signified by active verbs, because of the disposition they have to the object into which they pass as into their term, although they cause nothing in the object); for then, if they were neutral verbs, they would signify formally that the reality is in the subject from which they are imposed, and then active verbs of this sort could be imposed by the same forms, which would signify the production of them; and then

‘generated knowledge’ would be formally declarative of the object, but ‘the one producing’ would be said to be efficient cause of the form (just as was said elsewhere that likeness can be in that on which the relation of active and passive is founded, so that ‘making like’ is a giving of likeness [I d.19 n.28]), and then ‘declaring’ – taken actively – would be efficient cause of the formal declaration in the act of the soul or in the subject of that act.

24. To the issue at hand:

The divine Word is expressed by the Father, and this expression is a relation of origin; but to this expressed word is communicated by force of its production infinite knowledge, which – from this fact – is declarative of everything declarable. It has therefore a real relation to what expresses it, from which it is born, but the other relation – namely of the declarer – it has not only to itself but, because it is infinite, it has this respect of ‘declarative’ to itself and to it and to everything else; and this is only a relation of reason, because it is not only to creatures but also to itself; and if there is no real relation to creatures (from distinction 30 nn.49-51), much more then is there not a real relation of the same thing to itself.^a But this ‘to declare’ belongs formally to the Word, but it belongs by way of principal to the producer (just as in us it belonged to the memory as efficient cause), – and then the Word formally declares everything declarable; but the Father declares by the Word not formally but by way of principal, insofar as he communicates to him infinite actual knowledge, by which the Word actually declares.

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] The word declares the object, ‘saying’ it clarifies the object by the word, by which is indicated that the word has the idea of the sub-authentic principle with respect to that which agrees with itself formally and with another by way of being principle; just as the Father creates by the Word by which the Word is indicated to have sub-authority with respect to action, because the action belongs to each as agent.

25. Applying this reality then to this verb which is ‘to say’, I say that ‘to say’^a can signify the relation of origin which is ‘of generating to generated’ and in this way only the Father says, – not indeed by the Word but he says the Word; and in this way Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* VI ch.12 that “only the Father says,” and as Augustine said “the Word, by which he has disposed all things.” In another way, ‘to say’ can signify the disposition of reason which is ‘to declare’, and this insofar as ‘to declare’ belongs to something formally, – and in this way the Word says all declarable things and by himself formally; and about this Augustine speaks *ibid.*, VII ch.3 n.4: “For if this word is our temporal word etc.”^b In the third way it can signify the same disposition of the declarer, insofar as it belongs to it not formally but by way of principal, and in this way it is said of the Father that ‘he says by the Word’, – and in this third way Augustine says *ibid.* that ‘the Father says by the Word’; in this way too he says *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23 that “the Father saying himself generated the Son equal to himself,” where he takes ‘to say’ for ‘to declare by way of principal’, although he does not add there the principle by which the Father says.^{c d}

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] in one way it is taken essentially, as is plain from Anselm *Monologion* ch.63 (and Augustine does not speak thus, *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.1); because according to Anselm the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one sayers, and any person says formally and with no other person in the ablative. In another way it is taken personally, and thus.

b. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] And thus it is an essential and is appropriated to one person; for any person declares his own intelligibles that are in him, – yet it is appropriated to the Son, as is plain from the following doubt.

c. [*Interpolation*] and thus the principal signified thing is an essential feature of it, but it connotes a notional feature, as was said above about gift [*Reportatio* IA d.32 n.35] – With what disposition is it construed? I say that if it were the same as ‘to create’ it would denote that it has the idea of authentic formal principle, and it is construed with the disposition of such principle.

d. [*Note by Duns Scotus*] To say is purely an essential (*Monologion* 64 [nn.6, 30]). Purely a personal (‘to verbalize’): thus does the Father say the Son, not ‘by the Word’ unless it is dative (‘for the Word’) and by taking ‘to say’ as ‘to communicate by expressing’. In the third way, to declare formally: thus it is an essential (as in the first way), and thus does any of them here say by his own actual knowledge, as in the first way any of them says by his own intelligence; but in the third way it is appropriated to the Word, and first of the Father. In the fourth way, to declare by way of principle; which connotes a personal by the ‘by way of principle’, and it signifies an essential by ‘to declare’.

26. But then there is a doubt, whether to declare formally everything declarable is proper to the Word.

27. Some say that it is, because this belongs to him by force of his production.

28. But this was discussed above, in distinction 27 question 1 nn.100-101; and generally, since this verb ‘to declare’ states a relation of reason, and no such relation is proper to any person nor is included in what is proper to any person, it will not be the ‘to declare’ that is proper to the Word, but it is only appropriated to him by the fact that the Word, by force of his production, has actual knowledge communicated to him; but the Father, although he has it, yet, by the force by which he produces, he is memory, and he does not produce insofar as he is actual knowledge; but to actual knowledge – whereby it is actual – it belongs to declare, and therefore ‘to declare’ more belongs with a property of the Son than with a property of the other persons, and so it is more appropriated to him. But it truly is in every other person, because any person has actual declaration insofar as it is actual knowledge, and has it as equally declarative really as the actual knowledge is which is ‘word’. Therefore the Father formally declares everything by himself, just as the Son and the Holy Spirit formally declare everything each by himself. Therefore the Father and Son declare by the Holy Spirit by way of principle, although these ways of taking ‘to declare’ – formally and by way of principle – are not as much in use as those by which the Word is said to declare formally and the Father to do so by the Son by way of principle; and the reason for the greater use of these words is the appropriation of actual knowledge to the Word.

29. To the second question, then, I concede the negative part of the question, because of the reason of Augustine *ibid.* [n.2].^a

a. [*Interpolation*] The declaration of this is as follows: an essential act cannot belong to any supposit by mediation of any principle as a ‘by which’, unless it is to such person the formal principle of existence (as the Father is wise by ungenerated wisdom), or the originating principle for it of existence (in which way the Master concedes [I d.32 ch.2 n.287] that the Son is wise by ungenerated wisdom, from which he has the fact that he is wise), or the sub-authentic principle with respect to such act (in which way it is conceded that the Father creates by the Word); but the Son – or generated wisdom – is not for the Father the formal principle of existence, nor the originating principle, nor the sub-authentic active principle, with respect to his essential act, – because he does not produce that act in himself (but it is communicated to him and to [from?] the

Son), and the sub-authentic active principle has the idea of producer with respect to the act with respect to which it is called such a principle. But to be wise is an essential act, therefore the Father is not wise with generated wisdom. – But this he [sc. Scotus] said at first [*Reportatio* IA d.32 n.27], and then, so that the solution of the question may be better seen, one must first see it as it is contained above [nn.23.25] etc.

III. To the Principal Argument of the Second Question

30. To the argument for the opposite [n.6] I say that Anselm takes ‘to say’ there purely essentially for ‘actually to understand’, as he expressly intends in that chapter, where he says that they are ‘one sayer as they are one understander, and although each says and says each, yet they are one in idea of saying and of said just as they one understanding and one intellect’. This way extends considerably what it is ‘to say’, because it neither signifies the relation of origin nor connotes it, just as neither do ‘to understand’ and ‘to be wise’; and Augustine does not in this way say that the Father says by the Word [nn.6, 25].

31. But how is it conceded that the Holy Spirit says the Word? – I reply: in the same way as he understands the Word [sc. purely essentially]. But it is not conceded for ‘to express’; nor for ‘to declare’, unless it is taken formally, because the Holy Spirit declares formally everything declarable; but not for ‘to declare by way of principle’, save perhaps in respect of creatures, because when we speak of the manifestation of creatures, the whole Trinity effects that. And because the Holy Spirit does not have any idea of principle absolutely over the formal manifestation of the Word – not when comparing it to creatures – (because he does not give to the Word that by which he is formally manifestive), therefore this seems in no way to be conceded. Nor does Anselm say that ‘the Holy Spirit says by the Word’, although he sees everything in the Word; so too any of the blessed sees everything in the Word, and any person sees in any person (according to Augustine *ibid.* XV ch.14 n.23), but ‘to say by the Word’ seems to involve some authority of ‘saying by the Word’ with respect to the Word insofar as the Word is declarative formally.

IV. Scotus’ own Response to the First Question

32. As to the first question, about the Holy Spirit [n.1], one must proceed in the same way as was done in the preceding question [nn.23-25].

And first about our will:

Here I say that will in us, as it is produced, has a relation of the second mode to the will as producer, and the relation is perhaps mutual. It also has another relation, to the object, pertaining to the third mode of relatives, – and it is not mutual, because just as science is referred to the knowable and conversely [d.30 n.38], so love is referred to the lovable and not conversely; and just as love has formally some disposition to the object, so that which produces love can be denominated from that disposition, if a word were imposed signifying it actively.

33. So I say in divine reality that the Holy Spirit, by the force of his production – not indeed properly but by appropriation – is love of everything necessarily loved, and therefore he has some relation of reason formally to what is thus loved; but the producer of him can be denominated from the same disposition, as if by way of principle, and this

disposition, as denominating by way of principle, is introduced by this word ‘to love’, when the Father and the Son are said ‘to love themselves by the Holy Spirit’; this indeed is for ‘the Father and the Son to produce the Love’ which is of the Father and the Son, just as for ‘the Father to say himself by the Word’ is to produce the Word, which is what declares the Father himself.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

34. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it is held neither purely essentially nor purely notionally, but it connotes the notion (namely the production of the Holy Spirit), and it signifies the disposition that follows the Holy Spirit to that loved thing (not indeed formally but by way of being principle); and by reason of this following disposition it is an ‘essential’ as to the term of the disposition, because the term is not only the Holy Spirit but everything necessarily lovable, – and to this extent there is conversion, but not as to the connoted notional feature (the answer to the second argument [n.2] is plain from this). And this can be made clear in the example of ‘to say’, that, in the way in which it is conceded that the Father says by the Word, ‘to say’ is neither merely essential nor merely notional, but connotes the notional (namely generation), and it introduces the disposition of what is declarative, which disposition is to everything declarable; something similar to this (although not so perfectly) can be found in what it is ‘to be sent’, which connotes process in divine reality, although it signifies principally a temporal effect; and as to what it signifies, the whole Trinity works the effect, – as to the notion, it does not respect the whole Trinity in the idea of principle (for the Son can be sent, though he is not from the Holy Spirit).

35. To the third [n.5]. Although some force can be give to this proposition [sc. the Father and Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit], because the ‘themselves’ can be understood reflexively or reciprocally (discussion of this double construal is found in Peter Elias *On Priscian on Construal* – and it is plain in the sophism ‘they are fighting so that they may themselves conquer’ [sc. either: conquer over themselves, or: be themselves conquerors]), and according to some the proposition would seem more needing to be conceded to the extent the ‘themselves’ is construed reflexively than reciprocally, because the Holy Spirit according to them is inspirited by the Father and the Son by concordant will (insofar namely as the Father bestows love on the Son and the Son bestows it back, according to Richard *On the Trinity* [I d.12 n.10]), yet when speaking in accordance with what was said in distinction 12 n.36 on this matter, that the Father and Son inspirit formally by will insofar as it is one (but the relation of concord of Father with Son and conversely is not the formal reason for inspiriting, because it does not seem that the Father and Son, insofar as they have a respect of origin to the Holy Spirit, have a mutual relation to each other; for then they would not have only a mutual relation of origin of paternity and filiation; and this, I repeat, when saying that although by having one will they agree in it formally yet the concord is not per se the reason but the one will is – and that the fecundity is complete in one just as it is in two; therefore, however, two inspirit, because the fecundity is pre-understood to be one in the two before they have the term), it can be conceded that the truth is the same when taking the ‘themselves’ in this way or in that way; and then I concede the consequent [n.3], that ‘the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit’. And when you say ‘he loves himself in the first

moment of origin' [n.3], it is true, – but then he loves himself by the will as it is in him formally; but by inspiring the Holy Spirit, who is necessarily love of him, he loves himself by the Holy Spirit as it were by way of being principle – in which way too the Son loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

36. To the final argument [n.4] I say that one should not concede that the Father and Son love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way they love themselves by the Holy Spirit, because this way of loving – as taken by way of being principle – seems to belong first to that term of love to which love itself belongs formally, from the fact that it is from a principle; for thus to love the object is to be principle of love, which – as from a principle – is formally of that object; but the Holy Spirit, by the force of his being from a principle, is neither first nor concomitantly love of the creature, because the creature is only contingently loved by God. But although from the force of his production he is first love of essence, yet concomitantly he can be called love of the Son, because those persons are 'in nature first loved' from necessity of the nature; and therefore it can be conceded that the Father does not love the creature by the Holy Spirit in the way that he loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, because he does not produce a love which by the force of its production is love of the creature, nay with a complete necessary production of the love there is still contingency in the love as it is of the creature – and this is in the power not only of producing this love but of the love produced, because the Holy Spirit as contingently loves the creature as the Father and Son do.^a

a. [Note by Duns Scotus] The will in love formally takes or values the object; but if it were not informed with love but only inspirited it (as now, insofar as it inspirits it), it accepts or values it by way of being principle, that is, it renders the object accepted or valued by its love, as that which from it is what formally accepts. Thus can it be expounded of the formal effect, that is of the product, which has from the production that it is the formal 'by which' with respect to another.

But to whom is it accepted? – Response: just as to whom it is declared, because 'to everyone who sees the word'; so here, to everyone loving love.

But does it then hold that every will loving the essence as it is the object of love (which is the Holy Spirit) loves it by the Holy Spirit, – and seeing the essence in the Word as it is the object of knowledge in the Word knows it by the Word? But if so, not for this reason does it say the Word, and consequently neither does it love by the Holy Spirit – as it corresponds by way of being principle in this case in that case, because it is not the principle of the Word or the Holy Spirit.

Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions Questions One to Three

*Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence,
and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence*

1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask – without arguments – whether the property is the same as the essence;^a and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.

a. [Interpolation, from Appendix A] That the answer is no: *On the Trinity* V ch.5; one and many; in the essence; things the same as one thing, infinite; paternity, perfection simply; really; “he is wise not by that by which he is Word;” per se or per accidens.

On the contrary: there is something or nothing (something created?); again, in the person with the essence; again, four things (on the contrary: Extra: “We condemn”).

Simplicity entails identity (*City of God* XI ch.10). Many contradictions imply some difference (*Topics* 7.1.152b34-35: “If one can be without the other it will not be the same”).

Aquinas *ST I* q.28 a.2: “Relation is the same as the essence in reality,” because it is not an accident but has the same being as the divine essence, – “and does not differ save by a reason of intelligence, insofar as in relation is involved a respect to the opposite that is not included in the name of essence.” To the second: “In a creature, besides what is contained under the signification of the relative name, there is found another thing; in God not so, but one and the same, which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as if comprehended under the signification of such a name.” To the third: “Just as in the perfection of the divine essence more is contained than what is signified by the name of wisdom,” nay “than what can be comprehended under the signification of any name.”

On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above the common element. – I respond in another way: *a*, *b*, *c*, where there is a greater distinction than among the attributes (‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’, as ‘good’, Augustine, *ibid.*, VII ch.4 n.9).

Henry [of Ghent] *Summa* 56.4: “Reality of relation, as it regards the essence, it is different only in reason from that, and therefore the essence is not simpler than the person. Insofar, however, as relation is compared to opposite relation it posits a diversity of reality of the relation, not of reality of the substance; and thus they are in person and person, that is as something related to the opposite, both – essence and relation – as two things; essence as absolute thing, by which it is not distinguished, – relation as a thing of respect, by which it is distinguished. And thus although essence and relation, as they are compared among themselves, do not differ save in reason alone, yet as compared to opposites they differ in reality, but not simply but with the determination ‘by reality of substance and by reality of relation’, without any composition, because the difference of certain things in something does not make a composition unless it be of things compared among themselves in constituting one thing, in the way matter and form differ in constituting a natural composite.”

On the contrary. Relation as it regards the essence or is compared to the opposite; and thus it differs in reality in both ways or not; then the relation is not compared. Again, relation as it constitutes regards the essence as what it is in; and because it is real, and thus it regards the foundation, for you; and because a third is not constituted unless as one thing in another; and as it constitutes it regards the opposite of the preceding term, because a person is formally relative, – therefore it is distinguished really and regards the essence under the same idea as that by which it constitutes; therefore composition!

Solution. Some distinction, not merely made by the intellect (*a*, *b*, *c*). How? Is it real? Henry concedes it. And Bonaventure [*I Sent.* d.33 a. un. q.2: “By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way of having it; in comparison with the opposite it states the thing;” to the second: “The property distinguishes in that it differs not in essence but in mode; which mode makes no composition, because it passes over into the substance, – nor does it only state an understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object.”

It is shown in another way: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine *ibid.* VII ch.4 n.9), and a double predication; example: the identity non-adequate, not precise; ‘this is that’ (it is from the nature of the thing; not in potency, save only in virtue; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). Further, the distinction adds non-identity; and it is stated both virtually and non-formally.

2. There is no need to dwell on these questions, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, in distinction 2 nn.388-410, the question ‘whether along with unity of essence there may stand a plurality of persons’, – where it was shown

how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in distinction 26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what others distinguish about them, that they differ only in reason, was rejected in distinction 2 nn.389-395, and distinction 8 nn.177-190 (in a similar case, about the attributes), and in distinction 13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of the emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere.

3. And yet along with the fact that this is not formally that, there stands the fact that it is truly and simply the same as it; nay this is necessary because of the perfect divine simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of that essence, – because of which simplicity and infinity that essence cannot exist along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as itself. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded that many predications were true in divine reality by identity, non-formal identities; which does not seem intelligible unless by the fact that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from the fact that an affirmative proposition was true by identity and yet the predicate was not formally the same as the subject – and for this reason the predication there was not formal. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in distinction 8 (in the question ‘on the attributes’ nn.191-122) and frequently elsewhere [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], – so now I pass it over.

Thirty Third and Thirty Fourth Distinctions Questions One to Three

*Whether the Property is the Same as the Person, whether it is the Same as the Essence,
and whether the Person is the Same as the Essence*

1. About the thirty third distinction, without arguments, I ask first whether the property is the same as the person; second, about the same thirty third distinction, I ask – without arguments – whether the property is the same as the essence;^a and about the thirty fourth distinction, without arguments, I ask whether the person is the same as the essence.

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of the relative name, there is found another thing; in God not so, but one and the same, which is not perfectly expressed by the name of relation, as if comprehended under the signification of such a name.” To the third: “Just as in the perfection of the divine essence more is contained than what is signified by the name of wisdom,” nay “than what can be comprehended under the signification of any name.”

On the contrary: what is not by the sole idea by which it belongs, and is distinguished; they are distinguished by what they add above the common element. – I respond in another way: *a*, *b*, *c*, where there is a greater distinction than among the attributes (‘he is not Father by that by which he is God’, as ‘good’, Augustine, *ibid.*, VII ch.4 n.9).

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On the contrary. Relation as it regards the essence or is compared to the opposite; and thus it differs in reality in both ways or not; then the relation is not compared. Again, relation as it constitutes regards the essence as what it is in; and because it is real, and thus it regards the foundation, for you; and because a third is not constituted unless as one thing in another; and as it constitutes it regards the opposite of the preceding term, because a person is formally relative, – therefore it is distinguished really and regards the essence under the same idea as that by which it constitutes; therefore composition!

Solution. Some distinction, not merely made by the intellect (*a*, *b*, *c*). How? Is it real? Henry concedes it. And Bonaventure [*I Sent.* d.33 a. un. q.2: “By reason of comparison to the opposite it remains; and it differs from the essence, not because it states another essence but another way of having it; in comparison with the opposite it states the thing;” to the second: “The property distinguishes in that it differs not in essence but in mode; which mode makes no composition, because it passes over into the substance, – nor does it only state an understanding, because it is a thing and remains with respect to the object.”

It is shown in another way: virtual distinction and non-formal identity (for this Augustine *ibid.* VII ch.4 n.9), and a double predication; example: the identity non-adequate, not precise; ‘this is that’ (it is from the nature of the thing; not in potency, save only in virtue; not confusedly, but under its proper idea). Further, the distinction adds non-identity; and it is stated both virtually and non-formally.

2. There is no need to dwell on these questions, because their solution is plain from what has been said elsewhere, in distinction 2 nn.388-410, the question ‘whether along with unity of essence there may stand a plurality of persons’, – where it was shown how the personal property is not the same formally as the essence; also in distinction 26 nn.9-12, against Praepositinus it was shown how the property is not the same formally as the person; that too which was said about the formal non-identity of the property with the essence entails that the person is not the same first formally as the essence. And what others distinguish about them, that they differ only in reason, was rejected in distinction 2 nn.389-395, and distinction 8 nn.177-190 (in a similar case, about the attributes), and in distinction 13 nn.31-42, 64-67 (about the distinction of the emanations in divine reality), and elsewhere.

3. And yet along with the fact that this is not formally that, there stands the fact that it is truly and simply the same as it; nay this is necessary because of the perfect divine simplicity, which follows from the perfect infinity of that essence, – because of which simplicity and infinity that essence cannot exist along with anything in the same reality in the same thing unless that reality is perfectly the same as itself. And this statement is confirmed by the common statement of the ancients, who conceded that many predications were true in divine reality by identity, non-formal identities; which does not seem intelligible unless by the fact that the predicate was truly the same as the subject, and from the fact that an affirmative proposition was true by identity and yet the predicate was not formally the same as the subject – and for this reason the predication there was not formal. And what the distinction is between identity simply and formal identity was touched on in distinction 8 (in the question ‘on the attributes’ nn.191-122) and frequently elsewhere [d.5 nn.17-24, 32-34, 43-45, 115-118, 137-138; d.2 nn.402-403, 407-408, 410], – so now I pass it over.

Thirty Fifth Distinction Single Question

Whether in God there are Eternal Relations to all Knowables as Quidditatively Known

1. About the thirty fifth distinction I ask first whether in God there are eternal relations to all knowables as quidditatively known.

That there are:

Augustine 83 *Questions* q.46 n.2: “Ideas are eternal and immutable forms in the divine mind;” not absolute forms, so respective ones, – and only to things other than himself as quidditatively known; which is why they are distinguished according to the distinction of these other things.

2. Again, Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7 (100vb-101rb) concedes that in God there is a relation of God, as intellecting, to the understood forms.

3. Again, God knows distinctly things other than himself, therefore through some distinct principles of knowing; and these cannot be absolute, therefore relative.

4. Again, according to Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.14 n.31: “All things in God are life;” and thus does he seem to say *On John* tr.1 nn.16-17: “All things in him were life,” and this, “eternal life, not created but creative.” This is not true when speaking of these objects formally in themselves, – therefore of the very formal reasons by which they are known.

5. On the contrary:

Then those relations would be real, which is contrary to what was said in distinction 30 nn.49-51. Proof of the consequence [n.1], because God understands things other than himself before he understands that he understands them, because the reflex act presupposes the direct act; therefore the relations that would be in God to other things would be in God from the nature of the thing and not by act of the intellect considering that intellection; but what is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the object as it is known, is real.

6. Further, a reason by which eternal relations to all known things would exist in God would be as equal reason for eternal relations to all willed things as willed, and then those relations would be real, because he wills things other than himself before he understands that he wills them, – and thus the relation of his will to other things will be real, because not in the object as it is known.

I. To the Question

7. On the supposition that God is a thing that understands (from distinction 2 nn.75-78), and that his own essence is the first object in his reason (from the question ‘About the subject of theology’ [*Prolog.* nn.152, 200-201]), and that his intellect is of all intelligibles, not quasi in potency but in act and all at once (from distinction 2 nn.98-101), and this distinctly (because to understand confusedly is a mark of imperfection in a thing that understands, *ibid.* nn.105-110), – one must note about this question that for the intellection of something three things seem to come together, namely the knowable object, the intellect itself, and the reason of knowing.

8. But in the intellect as it is a power there is no need to posit a distinction that it understand distinctly, because our intellect – altogether indistinct according to idea of power – can understand many things. Therefore if there is a distinction [sc. in God’s intellect for understanding many things], let it be looked for in the object, or in the reason of knowing the object, or in the intellection itself.

A. Opinions of Others

1. First Opinion

9. The position then is that the relations to things other than himself are eternal in God, known by simple intelligence, and that the relations are in the essence as it is the reason of knowing, because of the fact that nothing is a reason of knowing several things save as that reason is appropriated in some way to those several known objects.

10. There is also a confirmation, that knowledge happens by likeness; therefore the reason of knowing should have some proper reason of likeness to the thing known.

11. So because of this determination and this assimilation of the reason of knowing to the object, eternal relations are posited as reasons determining the essence as it is a reason of understanding, and by these the essence is distinctly like the known objects.

2. Second Opinion

12. Another position is that these relations are in the divine essence as it is the altogether first known object; the divine essence indeed is understood ‘by an intellection altogether first’ as completely without distinction, but so that creatures may be understood the intellect first compares the essence – known first – to creatures under the idea of its being imitable, and then, by understanding the essence as imitable, it understands creatures through that first object, thus considered under such a relation of reason.

13. And this opinion differs from the first [n.9] as the two ways of speaking differ, one of which would posit ‘the same species’ to be the reason of knowing both the principle and the conclusion, only however as under distinct relations of reason corresponding to those known things under their proper ideas – but the other would say that ‘the known principle itself’ is the reason of knowing the conclusion, and this not as a principle absolutely understood, but in comparison or relation to the conclusion.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] A third opinion posits almost the same, and it posits ideas or ideal reasons in the act of understanding. And they [proponents of this opinion] have the following reasoning.

Our understanding, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 5.6.1016b18-21, has a respect to the intelligible as measured to measure; therefore if it were infinite as the divine intellect is, it would have a respect to infinite intelligibles, and so there would in our intellect be infinite respects to infinite intelligibles; but because it is finite, it has respect to one intelligible; therefore since the divine understanding is infinite, there will in its ability for understanding be infinite relations to infinite intelligibles.

B. Rejection of the Opinions

1. Against the Common Conclusion

14. Against these opinions, – and first against the conclusion in which the opinions agree, namely that these relations of reason must necessarily be posited in God so that creatures be understood distinctly, according to reason, by God, in idea of objects.

The first argument is as follows: these [ideal] reasons are knowable by the divine intellect. I ask, by what reason of knowing? If by other reasons, determining the essence as it is the reason of knowing [n.9] or determining the essence as it is the first object with respect to secondary objects [n.12], there will be a process *ad infinitum*, because other reasons will again precede for understanding those reasons, and thus those other reasons are never intelligible by God because he will have to understand other infinite reasons an infinite number of times before those reasons. Therefore a stand must be made that those reasons can be understood by God through his essence as it is taken bare, either as it is understood through reason [n.9] or as they are understood through the essence as through the first known object absolutely [n.12]; and the reason by which they will be able to be known by the essence whereby it is essence bare will be as equally reason whereby those other secondary objects will be able to be known, because those reasons thus seem to have the natures of distinct objects just as also do the other things.

15. But if you say that these reasons of knowing are known by the divine intellect through the objects themselves toward which they are, so that the essence under those reasons is the reason for knowing other objects, and they – known together with the essence under diverse reasons – are the reason of knowing those reasons, as the extremes of a relation seem to be the reason of knowing the relation. – This seems to cheapen the divine intellect, because then it will be passive with respect to the other objects known through those reasons by which it will be actuated for knowledge of those reasons.

16. Further, second: any object of which there is ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that can be a thing limited to it, can have ‘some reason of knowing determinately’ that is a thing unlimited to that and to that; but if the essence were limited with respect to some one determinate knowable, it would be the reason of knowing that object determinately without any respect real or of reason; therefore if it is posited as an

unlimited reason with respect to several knowables it can be of itself the reason of knowing any and all of them, without any relation real or of reason.

17. Proof of the major: unlimitedness does not take perfection away from anything, but, with the perfection that was to something remaining in place, it posits as it were a similar perfection to it; and therefore, as was said in distinction 7 nn.20-21 and distinction 28 nn.106-107, a thing indeterminate out of unlimitedness (namely which is indeterminate to several positive things) is of itself determinate to each of them, with determination being repugnant to indetermination to contradictories.

18. Proof of the minor: the essence is posited as the proper reason for knowing itself, and this whether as first object or as reason of knowing the object. And this belongs to the essence purely under an absolute reason, without any real respect, because a real respect does not exist in the same person to itself. Also without any respect of reason, proof: because the intellection is not collative or comparative or negotiative; therefore no relation of reason is caused by it in anything.

19. Further, third: to one operation should be given a principle 'by which' that is per se one and an object that is per se one, and this especially in the simply first operation, of which sort is the divine intellection; but a relation of reason and a real being make nothing 'per se one', because they cannot even have the unity of the second mode of per se (*Metaphysics* 5.6.1015b36-16b3), which is less than essential unity is (for a relation of reason cannot follow a thing from the nature of the thing, and therefore it cannot be a property of it); therefore the essence – whether as object or as reason of understanding – and the relation of reason are not 'one per se' object, nor one reason of understanding. Therefore one must grant a second thing precisely in reason of first object or as reason 'by which'. Not precisely the relation of reason, because this is not the first object known by which, when known, something else is known to which the respect is; nor even is it the reason by which the divine intellect may have intellection of this sort of object, because to understand a stone is a perfection simply, so that the divine intellect would not be altogether a perfect intellect if it did not understand a stone; but no relation of reason seems to be a reason of inherence of any perfection simply. Therefore one must grant precisely the essence – which is under this relation – to be as it were the first object, which, when known, a stone would be known, or to be as it were the formal reason of understanding a stone.

20. And from this further: in vain is such a relation determining the divine essence itself posited; for under a respect of reason it is an infinite form, because the intellect, however it compares the essence and thereby causes in it a relation of reason, does not compare it save as it is formally infinite, and so as it is under such reason it is formally infinite – and consequently it is, as it is under that reason, as indeterminate as it is in itself; and it can, as it is under the first reason, found another (because of its infinity) just as it can in itself; therefore it is not determined by a relation of reason.

2. Against the First Opinion

21. Again, against the first opinion [n.9] specifically, it seems to follow that the relations are real, because the reason of understanding as it is reason naturally precedes intellection, – and consequently as to nothing of it as it is the reason of understanding is it caused by intellection, nor does it follow intellection; if then the reason of understanding

a stone is under a relation of reason, that relation of reason is not produced in the essence by intellection of a stone, because it naturally precedes the intellection. Therefore the relation is produced by some other intellection. But only that which is essence as essence precedes it; but by this it is not produced (which they concede – where it seems less to be so – ‘about the divine persons and about the principles of producing them’); therefore the relation will be in the essence as it is reason, and not by some action of the intellect.

22. Further, according to some of them [sc. of those who hold the two opinions, nn.9, 12], a distinction of reason in the principles suffices for a real distinction in what is from the principles; therefore this distinction of reason as it is the reason of understanding *a* and *b* will suffice for a real distinction between *a* and *b* (and conversely), so that one reason will suffice for the distinction of *a* and another for the distinction of *b*.

23. Further, an external thing is immediately understood [sc. according to the first opinion], because the whole distinction that is posited precedes intellection; nothing internal then as it is a secondary object is term of intellection.

3. Against the Second Opinion

24. Against the second opinion [n.12]:

Every relation of reason, which is in the object from the fact that it is compared by the intellect to something, is in the object precisely as a diminished entity, have being in the intellect as a known in a knower; and it could be in the object if *per impossibile* it did not have the being of existence, provided however it have being in a like way in the comparing intellect. Therefore those relations would be or will be in the divine essence precisely as it has diminished being in the intellect, as it compares it to the creature, and not as the essence is something in itself; and further, they would be in the essence if *per impossibile* the essence did not exist, provided however it be compared to those terms by some thinking intellect; and further, if *per impossibile* there were two Gods, the relations would be in the intellect of this God comparing that God to the creature, and not in that God in himself.

25. In addition, God is naturally imitable by the creature before he is understood to be imitable; for because he is imitable, therefore he is truly compared as imitable by creatures, as it seems, and not conversely; therefore, before the comparison of the essence as imitable is made by the intellect, there is imitability in the essence. But according to some of those who follow this way [n.12], aptitudinal relation is the same as actual (because of which identity in God they say that there is no new relation, nor another old one, of the creative and the creating [n.11]); therefore these relations in the essence as in the compared object will not be first outwardly directed, but there will be other and prior relations, as it seems, because they will be before any act of the comparing intellect.

26. Besides, although the essence ‘as known’ is the reason of coming to the knowledge of a stone, yet it seems afterwards that the divine intellect could know a stone in itself and not precisely by the fact that it compares its essence to a stone, because thus can we, without such comparison of something else to it, understand a stone. In the case of this understanding of a stone, I ask what the relation of reason to a stone is in? Not in the essence as in the object compared, because in this object as such ‘to understand’ does not exist as compared object; therefore one has to look for the relation of reason in

intellection [sc. the third opinion] or in the reason of understanding [sc. the first opinion], and then return will be made to one of the other opinions [sc. the first or third].

C. Scotus' own Response

27. One can say to the question [n.1] that relations of the third mode differ per se from the others of the other two modes, because in the third mode there is no mutuality as there is in the other two modes, – and from this follows (as was deduced in distinction 3 question 1 n.31) that the term of the relation is something absolute as absolute. As therefore the object of our intellect is the term of the relation of the intellect insofar as it is purely absolute, and thus the intellect is measured by it, so – it seems – since the divine intellect simply is measure of all understood things other than itself, it follows that the other things are referred precisely to divine intellection, and this will be the term of the relation under the idea of a pure absolute; this is confirmed by the fact that the altogether first divine intellection, which is beatific, is of the essence as it is essence, without any respect real or of reason, and this because of the perfect real identity of the intellect with the essence as object.

28. One need not then, because of the intellection of any object precisely, look for a relation, either in both extremes or in one of them, – therefore one must, because of the fact that a relation exists in both or one of them, add something else; but that addition seems to be only either a mutual co-requirement, if the relation is mutual, – or a dependence in one of the extremes, if it is not mutual; but here, when God understands something other than himself, no mutual co-requirement can be posited in either extreme, as it seems, – therefore it is enough precisely to posit a relation in one of the extremes, where there is dependence; that is the object as known.

29. In addition, the will when loving or enjoying the end, does not produce something other than itself in willed being by loving the end in an order to something else or by comparing it to another lovable thing, but rather by comparing another thing to the end, so that the relation caused by the comparison of the will seems to exist in another thing 'willed for the end'; but no comparison by the will seems to be in the willed end; therefore, by similarity, there does not seem to be in the intellect knowing the first object, and knowing, from that knowledge, a secondary object, a relation produced in that first object to the secondary object, but conversely.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] Besides, this first intellection is direct and has a real mode, the second is of reason; for if I understand man absolutely, this intellection is real and has a real mode; but if I understand humanity afterwards by comparing it to Socrates, this is a comparative intellection and is of reason. So if these dispositions are understood by non-reflex intellection, then they are real.

30. Besides, as was argued [nn.18-19], it does not seem one can lay down what the act of intellect is by which the relation would be produced; not by first act, because of the absolute perfection of that act; if by second act, then the relation is not the principle of that second act, and in that second act the creature is perfectly known; therefore in no act will such relation be as it were a reason prior to the creature in idea of object.

31. The conclusion of the three reasons given can be conceded against both common opinions reported above [nn.14, 16, 19], and the reasons now given here can be conceded [nn.27-30]; and in this respect one can concede that there are eternal relations in God to known things, but not naturally prior to those known things in idea of objects.

32. Things can be set down as follows: God in the first instant understands his essence under a purely absolute reason; in the second instant he produces a stone in intelligible being and understands a stone, so that there is there a relation in the understood stone to the divine intellection, but no relation yet in the divine intellection to the stone, but the divine intellection is the term of the relation to it 'of stone as understood'; in the third instant, perhaps, the divine intellect can compare its own intellection to any intelligible which we can compare to, and then by comparing itself to the understood stone the divine intellect can cause in itself a relation of reason; and in the fourth instant there can be as it were reflection on the relation caused in the third instant, and then the relation of reason will be known. Thus no relation of reason therefore is necessary for understanding a stone – as if prior to the stone – as object, nay this relation 'as caused' is posterior (in the third instant), and it will still be posterior as known, because in the fourth instant.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] According to this way [nn.31-32] it is plain of what the idea is; because it is of every secondary object (whether it be producible or co-producible), and one is singular and universal, and the others (universally) of an inferior and superior, – as you advance from the intellect [sc. the process described in n.32].

33. And this fourth way [nn.31-32] can hold the proposition – which seems probable – that 'a relation is not naturally known save when the term is known' (but neither does the intellect make comparison with anything, save when the term is naturally first known), which proposition cannot be held by the other way [the second, [n.12], because it must say that by the relation by which it compares this intellection, it compares the essence to something not naturally first known.

34. This opinion 'about the relations to the divine intellect as absolute of things other than God as these are understood' is confirmed and understood in a similar way to the one above – in distinction 30 nn.31-39 – 'about the relations to God of understood creatures'.

D. Instances against Scotus' own Solution

35. There is argument against this view [nn.31-32], and it does seem to destroy Augustine's intention 83 *Questions* question 46 n.1, where he says that "there is so much force in the ideas that, unless they were understood, no one could be wise;" but according to the present position [n.32] the perfect wisdom of God to creatures will be in the second instant and it will naturally precede both the being of the ideas and the being known of them. In the same place too Augustine says that "by the vision of the ideas the soul is made most blessed;" which would not be true about the first beatitude, which is in the Creator, – nor of the second beatitude, which is in creatures.

36. There is further this argument: things which are divided among inferiors that are of the same idea are not reduced to something one in the superior; just as, although the cognitive powers in us be reduced to one cognitive power in angels, because of the

unity of idea of all the cognitive powers, – yet the intellect and will, which in us are of different ideas, are not reduced to one power in an angel. Therefore there will be in God an intellect under the idea of such power distinct from the will under the idea of such power, and the intellect ‘as it is in God’ will be passive; therefore one must give it some form before it is operative in act, and consequently, so that it may have a distinct operation, one will have to give it a distinct form; no distinct form can be given to it if the ideas are posited as following the understanding of creatures.

37. Further, if, because of the unlimitedness of the divine essence, it is posited to be ‘as altogether absolute’ the reason of knowing all creatures, since it is thus unlimited insofar as it is object just as it is insofar as it is reason, the consequence is that it alone will be known under the idea of object; or if a plurality on the part of the objects is posited (notwithstanding the infinity of the one object), by parity of reasoning it seems one can posit a plurality on the part of the reason of understanding.

38. To these instances [nn.35-37]:

The opinion of Augustine, in that question [n.35], can be collected from his description of the idea: “an idea is an eternal reason in the divine mind, according to which something is formable as it is according to its proper reason.”

39. Proof of the first part: God causes or can cause everything, – not irrationally, therefore rationally; therefore he has a reason according to which he forms things. But not the same form for everything, – therefore he forms individual things by their proper reasons; but not by reasons outside himself (because he does not in his effecting need anything other than himself), therefore by reasons in his mind. But there is nothing in his mind save what is immutable; therefore he can form every formable thing according to a reason proper to it, eternal in his mind; such is posited as an idea.

40. But according to this description it seems that ‘an understood stone’ can be called an idea; for an understood stone itself has all those conditions, because it is the proper reason of ‘something extrinsically makeable’ – just as ‘a box in the mind’ can be called the reason according to which ‘the box in matter’ is formed. And this ‘eternal reason’ is in the divine mind as a known in the knower, by act of the divine intellect; but whatever is in God, according to any existence (whether real or of reason) through act of the divine intellect, is eternal, as was made clear in distinction 30 nn.41-43, because no relation can be new in God by act of the divine intellect.

41. This also seems to agree with a saying of Plato’s (from whom Augustine takes the name of idea). For he himself posited the ideas to be the quiddities of things; per se existing indeed, and badly posited, according to Aristotle – in the divine mind, according to Augustine, and well posited; hence Augustine sometimes speaks of the intelligible world according to him. Just as, therefore, the ideas would be posited as the quiddities of things, according to the imposition of Aristotle, so they are, according to Plato, posited as they state quiddities with cognized being in the divine intellect.

42. On the basis of this position, one should not labor over any relations formally (whether in the essence as object, or in the essence as reason, or in the essence as divine understanding [nn.12, 9, 26]), as that to which relations are called ideas; rather the known object itself is the idea, according to this view.

43. And then the authorities adduced from Augustine can be conceded [n.35]:

That “save when the ideas are known, no one can be wise,” namely as to all fullness of wisdom. For although God principally is wise by the wisdom of his essence as

object, yet he is not so in every way if he does not know the creature – which creature ‘as understood by him’ is an idea, and so when the ideas are not understood he cannot be completely wise; for he is posited as being wise most perfectly in the first instant, but not ‘altogether wise’ in the first instant without the second [n.32]. But if the ideas were posited as certain relations of reason in God, it does not seem that he is formally wise by intellection of them, because they would also be there as reasons of understanding before they were understood.

44. Likewise the other authority of Augustine, “by vision of these the soul becomes most blessed” [n.35]: if the ideas are posited to be quiddities as known, the authority must be interpreted about the beatitude that can be had in creatures as objects, because it is certain that there is only most perfect beatitude in the absolute essence (according to him in *Confessions* V ch.4 n.7: “blessed is he who knows you and them, but he is not more blessed because of them”). But ‘most blessed’ needs to be understood, that the soul is blessed by total possible beatitude; not indeed formally blessed in them, but in the object (knowledge of which is presupposed to ‘knowing’ them), and as it were concomitantly in them, in which there is some beatitude, though not first.

45. And if Augustine speaks otherwise elsewhere about the ideas, as if they were reasons of knowing something, since however he says only that they are reasons ‘according to which the things which are formed are formed’ [n.1], that saying of his (if it is said elsewhere) can – I say – be interpreted: ‘according to which’, not that the ‘according to’ indicates the formal reason of understanding, but ‘according to which’ as according to the objects; not first, not moving the intellect, but according to secondary objects, which are terms of the intellect.

46. To the second [n.36]:

How the intellect is passive in itself and how it is passive with respect to its own intellection was stated in distinction 3 nn.537-542. But when it is posited that the intellect is passive in us and quasi passive in God, and that a form or quasi form, as that by which the intellect operates, needs to be assigned here, – one can say that it is the essence under the reason by which it is essence, which is, under the absolute reason, the reason of knowing not only itself but everything else, under whatever reason it is knowable.

47. And understanding it in this way: for by the fact that the divine intellect is in act through its essence as the essence is the reason of understanding, it has a sufficient first act for producing everything else in known being, and, by producing it in known being, it produces it as having dependence on itself as intelligence [n.32] (and by this it is intellection of the fact that that other thing depends on this intellection as something absolute), as will be said in the case of other things, that the cause under a purely absolute reason is the first act from which the effect proceeds, and the produced effect has a relation to the cause – sometimes as to what is absolute, but sometimes there is a mutual relation of effect to cause and cause to effect; however never on the part of the cause is there required a relation before the effect is posited in being.

48. This is now in brief made plausible by the fact that nothing which has a more perfect being in any genus depends on that which has a less perfect being (in anything of that sort); therefore the actual relation does not depend on anything that is only a potential being and not an actual one, – therefore every actual term of a relation is some being in act. In whatever instant of nature, then, that the cause is referred in act to the effect, it is then actual being in the term; but that ‘absolute’ can be the term without a

respect to it [sc. without a relation of the absolute to the effect], – therefore it is thus simultaneous with the respect because it is naturally prior to it; therefore there cannot be any relation in the cause naturally before the ‘absolute’ exists to which this relation must exist.

49. And so [according to n.48] I understand that in the first instant there is *a* under the reason of the absolute; in the second there is *b* under the reason of the absolute, possessing being through *a*; in the third *b* is referred to ‘*a* under the idea of the absolute’, if the relation is not mutual – or *a* and *b* are [mutually] referred when the relations are mutual. Here, then, in the first instant the intellect is in act through the essence as purely absolute, as if in first act, sufficient for producing anything in intelligible being; in the second instant it produces a stone in understood being, so that it is the term and has a respect to the divine intellection; but there is no respect back the other way in the divine intellect, because the respect is not mutual.

50. What has been said, that the relation cannot be in the cause before it is in the caused [nn.48-49], has objections to it, about which elsewhere [II d.1 q.2 nn.1, 8].

51. According to this view [nn.48-49] one can say that infinite intellect itself alone, without any respect of it to anything else or conversely, is of all objects, – just as the absolute has being first through the absolute before a relation is understood from this side and from that; which is proved by the fact that in the moment of nature in which* *a* is posited to be understood through the understood essence, the essence is posited to understand the being of *a*, and yet no relation – even of *a* itself – is then understood, because the absolute precedes relation; therefore this proposition is false ‘intellection is not distinctly of this object unless simultaneously in nature there is some relation of the intellection to this object, or conversely’ (yet it is true of ‘simultaneously in duration’, if this existed), nor must one posit a relation in the intellection or in the object.³⁴⁸ The proof of this is that ‘intellection of itself’ is without all relation (as was concluded in the solution [n.18]), therefore no relation is required because ‘intellection is of this’; if a relation is required because of something else, then either relation either of co-requirement or of dependence. God’s understanding does not have a co-requirement for a stone (as is plain), nor dependence on it, nor conversely. Proof: the object is nothing; again, it does not have a real relation (as is plain), nor a relation of reason, because it is understood before it is compared to anything else; again, if it has a relation of reason (or being in a relation, as is possessed here [sc. above at *]), it is understood under the absolute reason before it is understood under any reason of respect to understanding. Therefore just as, when an ass is posited, not for this reason does my intellection have any real being or being of reason (absolute or relative), but only in potency, – so, when this intellection is posited, not for this reason does the object have any being save in potency; nor is there any difference save that the intellection is said now to be actually of this object, but the object is not said now to be the object of my intellection. What is the reason for the difference? – Response.³⁴⁹

³⁴⁸ Text cancelled by Scotus: “at any rate simultaneous in nature with that which is ‘intellection of this’. What does this help, if the relation is simultaneous in duration – because there are the same difficulties (of what it is and to what) which there would also be if it was posited as being simultaneous in nature!”

³⁴⁹ No response is given by Scotus.

52. To the third, about unlimited object [n.37], I reply: the object insofar as it moves and insofar as it is first term (and this doubly, necessarily required or co-required for act) is equally unlimited, – therefore nothing else is thus object; yet something else is an object as secondary term. Nor need ‘the unlimited object’ be precisely term in whatever way it is act, as it is precisely mover and reason of the act, because something can follow the first term and be the second term. Nothing can be secondarily mover to act; the reason is that however much it precedes act, it does not precede in whatever way it is term, nor is it co-required for act; but ‘what is secondarily term’ follows act, as being measured and caused by it, – the way intellection in us follows the object.

II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the principal arguments [nn.1-4].

To that from 83 *Questions* [n.1], it is plain how Augustine speaks about the idea [n.38].

54. To Avicenna [n.2]: I concede that in God there can be a relation of understanding, either as what it is ‘to understand’ is the term of the relation of the intellect (as ‘to be lord’ is a new appellation), or as ‘to understand’ states a relation of reason, but then it is not this in the first instant, nor in the second, but in the third.

55. To the other³⁵⁰ the answer is plain from what has been said, that the same ‘unlimited reason of understanding’ can be the proper reason of understanding any of the them – to which it is unlimited – just as if it were limited to that one alone, and especially in respect of the act which is ‘to understand’, in which there is not always required a reason univocal with the thing known (otherwise nothing could be known by a cause, nor a conclusion by the principle), but a more eminent reason suffices, containing perfectly a virtual likeness of the thing known.

III. To the Arguments for the First Opinion

56. And as to what is argued for the first opinion, that the indeterminate reason needs to be made determinate [n.11], – I say that it is determinate of itself, with a determination opposite ‘to the indetermination which is to contradictories’ [n.17], although it is not of itself determinate with a determination of limitation; nor is this necessary so that by it the object may be determinately understood.

57. And if you say ‘whatever exceeds the middle term is not a reason for understanding this thing in particular unless it is determined to it by something else’, – I reply that always, when arguing from the antecedent to the consequent along with distribution [sc. of the terms], there is a fallacy of the consequent, from the form of arguing. But it holds by reason of the matter when the consequent cannot exist unless it is counted up in several things; and, because of this, the form of arguing by Augustine in *On the Trinity* VII ch.4 n.7 ‘if two men, then two animals’ holds, but this is from the imperfection and limitation of the consequent to the antecedent. Hence this inference does not follow ‘if the Father, then God, – if the Son, then God, – therefore if the Father and the Son are two, then two Gods’. So I say that to the intellection of ‘this thing’ one

³⁵⁰ Actually a response to an argument found in *Rep.* IA d.36 nn.3, 87. No response is given here by Scotus to the arguments stated above in nn.3-4.

must give a reason by which it is understood, and a reason that is proper (either formally, or eminently containing whatever there is of perfection in the proper reason), and for understanding ‘that thing’ one must have a proper and determinate reason; but to infer ‘therefore for understanding one thing and another thing one must have one determinate reason and another determinate reason’ is a fallacy of the consequent, because this consequent – namely to have a determinate reason of understanding – is unlimited as to other antecedents [sc. so it is not distributed, or counted up, as they are]

58. As to what is added there for the first opinion, that the reason of understanding is an ‘intelligible’ likeness [n.10], – I reply: not a formal likeness, but either that or something else analogically alike, that is, containing the formal likeness perfectly, according to everything of perfection that is in it as it is the relation or reason of understanding – and so it is in the issue at hand.

Thirty Sixth Distinction

Questions One to Three

Whether the Foundation of an Eternal Relation to God as Knower has truly the Being of Essence from the Fact it is under this Sort of Respect

1. About the thirty sixth distinction I ask whether the foundation of an eternal relation to God as knower [sc. the relation of the creature to God in the second instant, d.35 nn.32, 49] has truly the being of essence from the fact it is under this sort of respect.

That it does:

Man is not of himself a true or valid being [*ens ratum*] (because then he would be God), therefore he is formally valid through something; only through a respect to what is valid first of itself; but not by respect to it as to efficient cause, because since the definition is of a definite being, and an efficient cause ‘insofar as it is efficient’ produces something existing in act, if man had valid being from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient, the definition would only be of him as existing, and so the definition would answer the question ‘whether he is’, which is unacceptable; therefore he is a valid being insofar as he participates the first thing as exemplar; but this is insofar as he has an eternal relation to God as knower and exemplar, – therefore etc.

2. Further, correlatives are simultaneous in nature, – therefore simultaneous in nature are God understanding a stone and a stone understood by him; therefore since a stone understood by the divine intellect is understood insofar as it is other than the divine essence, and this knowledge was real and metaphysical (not logical), then that which was the term of this intellection was a true thing; therefore etc.

3. The opposite is stated by the Master in the text (d.36 ch.1 n.326). When expounding the authority of Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36 (namely the authority “they were in the knowledge of God, they were not in their own nature”), he says as follows: “God had them” (namely the elect) “with him from eternity, not in their nature (that is the nature of them, who did not yet exist), but in his fore-knowledge, because he knew them as if they existed.”

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Others

4. [Reasons for the opinion] – Here look at the opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about the eternity of essences, and specifically in *Summa* 21 q.4

a. [Interpolation] Here some say [sc. Henry] that being taken most commonly – or thing – can be said to be from ‘think’ [Latin *reor*, thing in Latin is *res*], and thus it is common to figments and many other things. In another way, proceeding further, a thing is said to be from ‘ratitude’, as it is a ratified or valid thing and distinct from a fictitious thing; and this is double: for it is distinguished as thing to which being can belong or as thing to which being does belong, – and prior there is ‘to which being can belong’; and this thing, as it is by relation to the exemplar, is thus the essence, because just as God as efficient cause produces the thing in being of existence, so he produces it as exemplar in being of essence.

5. For this opinion the strongest argument is from what was touched on in the second principal argument, about the knowledge of God and the real eternal object [n.2].

6. There is added to this [n.5] that proportion is a property of being; but the proportion of an object known in eternity is something related to the knower, and the sort of thing that is ‘impossible to be’ is not so proportioned.

7. Further, as being is to non-being, so is possible to impossible – therefore by permutation [sc. being is to possible as non-being to impossible]; but every being is possible; therefore everything that is a pure non-being is impossible.

8. And there is a confirmation, because if some pure non-being (or a nothing) were possible, and some pure non-being (or a nothing) were impossible, one nothing would be more nothing than the other, which seems absurd; therefore a ‘possible’ is not altogether nothing but some being.

9. Further, Augustine *On the Nature of the Good* ch.18: “If good is some form, something not non-good is capacity for form;” therefore something not non-good is a possibility for actual goodness.

10. Again, *On John* homily 18 n.8: “Heart and mind form the same letters, but in different ways;” therefore they are made by the heart before they are by the hand.

11. And Avicenna *Metaphysics* VIII ch.7, about the double flow of things from God [sc. according to the being of essence and the being of existence].

12. It is also added by them [sc. Henry etc.] that the distinction of the being of essence from the being of existence [n.4] suffices for composition, because of the fact that essence (understood as having the being of essence) is still in potency to the being of existence, which it receives from the efficient cause insofar as it is efficient – and then “it is composed of potency and act.”

13. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against these points the arguments are:

First, that creation is production from nothing; but if a stone pre-had from eternity true real being, then, when it is produced by the efficient cause, it is not produced from nothing simply.

14. Secondly as follows: if it is not produced save only according to a new respect to the efficient cause, it does not seem to be produced in being simply, but only in being in a certain respect – and the creation will be less ‘a production simply’ than is alteration, where there is production (at least of something) as to absolute being.

15. Third (according to the same way) it is argued that it posits the same actual and aptitudinal relation on the part of God, and that because of this there cannot, on

account of the old aptitudinal relation, be a new actual relation in God [d.35 n.35]; therefore likewise on the part of what is referred to God there is the same actual and aptitudinal relation, and it will, on account of the old aptitudinal relation, not be an actual new one; therefore since the aptitudinal relation to the being of existence was always in a being having the being of essence, there will be no new actual relation in it insofar as it is existent.

16. Fourth (according to the same way), because in the same immutable foundation there cannot be a new respect; here the foundation is the same, namely the being of essence, – and an immutable term, namely God; therefore there is no new respect to such a term, of the sort of respect that is posited as ‘being of existence’.

17. Again, fifth (according to the same middle term, about creation [sc. creation from nothing, n.13]), because the production of a thing according to the being of essence is most truly creation (for it is purely from nothing as from the term from which, and to a true being as to the term to which); and this production according to them is eternal [n.12]; therefore the creation is eternal, – the opposite of which he [sc. Henry] tries to show and says he has demonstrations for.

18. Sixth (according to the same way, through the opposite about annihilation), it follows that nothing can be annihilated; for just as it is produced from a being in essence, so it seems to return to a being in essence, – not to nothing.

19. Further, second principally [sc. after the arguments in nn.13-18]: the reasons – which were touched on in distinction 8 nn.263, 269 against Avicenna – that ‘nothing other than God is formally necessary’, can be made against this opinion [sc. the opinion about the being of essence from eternity, n.4], because these reasons are as conclusive about quidditative being (if it is true being) as about the being of existence; for the will does not more necessarily will ‘something other than itself’ in quidditative being than it wills ‘something other than itself’ in being of existence, because there is the same reason in both cases [d.8 nn.270, 272] – and so about the other middle terms there [d.8 nn.271, 273-274].

20. Further, third: a thing according to being of essence is either the term of a relation of the idea (which they posit in God) or it is not but is according to some other known being. If in the second way, then things are posited in vain in the former being; for essences do not seem to be posited because of anything other than as they are terms of the ideal relations that are eternally in God. If in the first way, then there is in God by act of the divine intellect something according to which God can be otherwise or change, the opposite of which was proved in distinction 30 n.41. – The proof of this last inference is that every ‘being’ other than God is formally non-necessary of itself; therefore let this ‘being’ (although *per impossibile*) be posited to be quidditatively otherwise, it follows that the entity in God – whether it is real or of reason –, which has this ‘being’ for term, will be otherwise, and thus from the positing of something about what is other than God something that is in God by act of his intellect will be able to be changed, which is impossible.

21. Further, when a cause is perfect and naturally independent in causing and it acts naturally, it seems that it can cause the things more immediate to it to be more perfect, because it produces according to the ultimate of its power; the divine intellect as intellect precisely – according to this way – produces in God ideal reasons and the essences themselves in reason of essence, and produces ideal reasons as it were first in

itself before these essences in this being (for they exist by the fact they are of the exemplars); therefore the ideas have a truer being – since the divine intellect is naturally acting – than the things patterned after them; but the divine intellect does not cause ideas save as ‘beings of reason’ and not in any real being – therefore neither does he give any real being to the things patterned after the ideas, which things are more remote ‘caused things’ as it were.

22. Besides, fifth: it produces these essences in being either knowingly or not. If knowingly, then they are in the knower before they are in this being, and so in vain are these entities [sc. ideas] posited on account of God’s eternal knowledge. If not knowingly, then he produces them merely naturally (as fire heats), which seems absurd about any produced thing that is other than himself in nature; nay he even produces the Son as he is intellect, although not as understanding formally, as was expounded elsewhere [d.2 nn.290-296].

23. In addition, that he [sc. Henry] attributes one effect to the exemplar cause and another to the efficient cause does not seem probable, because the exemplar cause is only a certain efficient cause; for the efficient cause is divided into efficient cause by intellect or intention and efficient cause by nature, according to the Philosopher *Physics* 2.5.196b17-22. Just as therefore a natural producer is not a different cause from the efficient cause, so neither is the exemplar cause or the exemplar producer – and so ‘what is effected’ will be the same as ‘what is produced as exemplified’ by any understanding that produces artificially, insofar as it is understanding and insofar as it is exemplar.

24. Also as to what he adds ‘that composition exists in creatures through this potentiality to act’ [n.12] does not seem rational, because there seems to be nothing there that may be compared with something else; for if the whole of whiteness pre-exists in potency as the term of power, and afterwards it comes to be in act, not for this reason is there any composition of thing and thing; therefore if a thing pre-exists in being of essence and it is produced in being of existence (which is not different – according to them – from the essence, just as neither generally is a relation different from its foundation, for which reason they do not posit that relation and foundation make a composition), there will not be a composite being because of these two.

25. And this might be the seventh argument (according to the first way [nn.13-18]) for rejecting creation, because of the identity of relation with the foundation [n.24]; because the same thing cannot be really new and not new; therefore if being of existence states a relation that is the same as essence, no creature will be simply new.

B. Scotus’ own Response

26. I concede the conclusion of these reasons [nn.13-18, 25], namely the negative part of the question [n.24].

27. As to which, this result seems specifically to hold, that not only does the being of essence found this sort of relation to God but so also does the being of existence, because according to Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36: “he knows things made no otherwise than he knows things to be made;” he foreknew then the being of existence just as he foreknew the being of essence – and yet not because of this founded relation does someone conclude that the ‘being of existence’ was a true such being, namely true being

of existence from eternity; therefore by parity of reason, it should not be conceded of the being of essence.

28. Also all the motives that are adduced about the divine intellect seem able to be adduced about our intellect:

Because if something does not exist, it can be understood by us (and this as to either its essence or its existence), and yet not because of our intellection does one posit that it has true being of essence or of existence; nor is there any difference – as it seems – between the divine intellect and ours in this respect, save that the divine intellect produces those intelligibles in their intelligible being, and ours does not produce them first. But if this being is not of itself such that it requires being simply, then ‘to produce it in such being’ is not to produce it in any being simply; and therefore it seems that if this intelligible being – when comparing it to our intellect – does not require being simply, then when comparing it also to the intellect ‘producing it in this being’ there will not be being simply, because if being white is only qualitative being, then ‘to produce it in being white’ is not to produce in being substance but in that qualitative being.

29. Likewise, our agent intellect produces a thing in intelligible being, although it was produced beforehand – and yet not because of this producing of our agent intellect is the thing ‘so produced’ posited to have being simply.

C. Objections against Scotus’ own Response

30. [Exposition of the objections] – Against this solution it is objected that the foundation of a relation, when it founds a relation, exists according to the being according to which it founds, – otherwise it would not found according to that being; but a stone according to true being of essence founds the eternal relation to God as knower, and this in eternity; therefore the stone exists in eternity according to this being. Proof of the minor: it founds the relation to God as knower according to the being according to which its being as object is known by God; but it is known by God under the idea of true essence, not under the idea of diminished essence, because the first intellection of a stone by God is not reflexive.

31. Further, production is not of some relation merely, because relation only exists in something absolute; therefore since it was conceded in the preceding question [d.35 nn.31-32, 40, 42] that God produces things in intelligible being ‘according as the known thing is said to be an idea’, it follows that in the second instant [*ibid.*, nn.32, 49] one must posit some absolute entity of the produced thing, so that on the absolute being having such entity the relation to the producer may be founded.

32. [Response to the objections] – To the first [n.30] I say that an alienated term is not alienated with respect to the alienating term but with respect to a third to which it is compared under the reason of what alienates, – because according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 11.21a21-24, when predicating of someone that he is ‘a dead man’ there is an opposition in the adjective, on which contradiction follows [sc. a dead man is not in fact a man]; therefore when comparing a determinable precisely to the determination, the determinable is not alienated with respect to the determination but includes a contradiction to it; but with respect to the third term – about which ‘dead’ is said – there is an alienating determination and that which is determined by it is alienated, so that it is

only said to be it 'in a certain respect' [sc. a dead man is not a man simply but a man in a certain respect, as a body that was a man].

33. Thus I say that a diminished thing is not diminished with respect to the diminishing term but with respect to a third, to which it is compared under the diminishing determination; just as when I say 'he is white as to his teeth', the white is not diminished but is taken for white simply with respect to this determination (otherwise it would be frivolous); but, as it is taken under the determination, it is said of a third thing – as of an Ethiopian – as diminished.

34. Now this determination 'to be in opinion' is a diminishing one (according to the Philosopher, *ibid.* 21a24-33), and the way being in opinion is, so being in intellection also is or being from an exemplar or being known or represented, – all which are equivalent. Although therefore what is compared to any one of these, as it is compared to it, is not diminished – yet as it is under any of these compared to a third, it is diminished; for the being of man simply – and not diminished being – is the object of opinion, but the 'being simply' as it exists in opinion is being 'in a certain respect'; and therefore the inference does not follow 'Homer is in opinion, therefore Homer is', nor even 'Homer is existing in opinion, therefore Homer is existing' – but there is a fallacy of simply and in a certain respect.

35. So here: when comparing to divine intellection a stone in eternity, the stone is indeed simply compared to the intellection (and this according to the being not only of essence of the stone, but also of existence), and anything comparable is so compared – yet as it is taken under this comparison to the knowledge of God it is diminished; it is not indeed alienated, as if 'being simply' could not stand with this sort of respect, but it is diminished so that such respect does not necessarily posit that 'its determinable' is a being simply.

36. Next to the form of the argument [n.30]: 'the foundation of a relation is according to the being according to which it founds the relation' is true when the founded relation is not simply diminishing the being of the foundation. And the real reason for the 'in a certain respect and simply' seems to be this, that the first distinction of being seems to be into being outside the soul and being in the soul, – and the 'outside the soul' can be distinguished into act and potency (of essence and of existence), and any of these beings 'outside the soul' can have being in the soul, and the being 'in the soul' is other than every 'being outside the soul' and therefore about no entity nor about any being does it follow that, if it has diminished being in the soul, it has because of this being simply – because the being is in a certain respect, absolutely, which however is taken 'simply' insofar as it is compared to the soul as foundation of the being in the soul.

37. Argument [sc. against nn.35-36]:

A stone is not of itself a necessary existence in any existence;³⁵¹ therefore in being known it is caused; only by an efficient cause – whose term is only being simply.

38. Again what is only in something virtually is never formally such save through actual causation; a stone 'as known' is only virtually in the divine essence; therefore it does not become actually known without causation – and then as before [n.37].

39. In response to these [nn.37-38]:

³⁵¹ [Text canceled by Scotus] This does not follow, if it is a true being, and not divisible into necessary and possible.

One can respond otherwise than is responded here above [nn.35-36], namely that the intellection of God, although it is not absolutely caused, yet as it is of this secondary object (to wit, a stone) does as it were have a principle, and this from the essence as an equivocal objective formal nature – and so it is more from a principle then when it is of the first object because in this latter way it is from a principle as from a univocal objective formal nature. And to be an intellection, as it is ‘of this’, as from a principle equivocally is for the ‘this’ to have a principle in diminished being, just as for an intelligible species to be from a principle in the intellect is for the object ‘in a certain respect’ to be from a principle as it is actually intelligible, or – a better example for the purpose – in the way that through the species of the subject ‘the intellection of the property is from a principle’ is for the property as actually understood to be from a principle; therefore this example is fitting, because a stone does not have a principle equivocally from the essence as intelligible first before it does so as understood; for nothing has formal being in the memory before it does so in intelligence, but only virtual being. Nor does it seem unacceptable to concede that the divine intellect has as it were a principle (not in itself, but as it is of this object), because one must posit this about volition (as it seems), since volition is contingently of this object, and nothing contingent is altogether uncaused.

40. Thus there will be an order between the altogether without a principle (as the essence) and the from a principle univocally (as the intellection of the essence) and the as it were from a principle equivocally but necessarily (as the intellection of a stone) and the as it were from a principle equivocally and contingently (as the willing of a stone).

41. This way well says, in this regard, that the essence as ‘moving reason’ is altogether without distinction, univocally as it were when moving to itself as to first term of act, and equivocally as it were when moving to a secondary object as to second term of act; such that neither in the intellect (as is plain) nor in motive reason nor in understanding nor in the first term must one posit any distinction. But when it is said ‘the act is as it were equivocally from a principle as it is of a secondary object’ [n.39], this is nothing other than that it is extended – as if beyond the first object – to the second in virtue of an objective principle that is equivocal to the second term.

42. But what is it for an act to be thus extended? Not to be a relation in act, nor to be a relation in the first object to the second, – for you [sc. Scotus himself]; therefore it is for the second object to be referred to the act or the first object; this object is only of what possesses some being [sc. diminished being], – and then follows what is had there [nn.35-36].

43. So the imagination is false that ‘to understand’ is distinguished (so that it might be of many things) as if into many ‘to understands’; nay there is no need for any difference in it, as it is a sort of mean between reason and the first term, which secondary objects follow; therefore it is false that the secondary objects are the immediate term of ‘to understand’, just as neither do they move – for in no way are they necessarily required for act, but they are required in idea of term, to the act as it is of this; this only asserts a relation in the second mode.^a

a. [*Note of Duns Scotus*] God: intellect, essence as reason; to understand: essence as first term, – stone, angel etc., secondary objects.

44. To the second [n.31] I say that this production is in the being of a reason different from all being simply, – and it is not being of reason simply, but also of the foundation; not indeed according to the being of essence or existence, but according to diminished being (which is ‘to be’ true), which is a to be in a certain respect also of absolute being, which ‘absolute being’, however, according to this diminished being has a relation of reason as concomitant.

45. An example of this: if Caesar were annihilated and yet there were a statue of Caesar, Caesar would be represented by the statue. This ‘being represented’ is of a reason different from all being simply (whether of essence or existence), nor is it a diminished being of Caesar, as if something of Caesar had this being and something of him did not – as an Ethiopian is diminished white because something of him is truly white and something not [n.33]. But of the whole Caesar ‘the being of him from a cause’ is true being of essence and of existence, and to that whole – according to such being of his – this being in a certain respect belongs, and in him, according to this being in a certain respect, there can be some relation to the statue.

46. And although one could suppose there to be calumny in the example, it cannot thus be said in the issue at hand about intellection and the object without the whole object, and in accord with its whole being, having ‘diminished being’ in act. And if you wish to look for some true being of this object as such, there is none to look for save ‘in a certain respect’, save that this ‘being in a certain respect’ is reduced to some being simply, which is the being of the intellection itself; but this ‘being simply’ is not formally the being of that which is called the ‘being in a certain respect’, because it is of it as term or principle, so that to this ‘true being in a certain respect’ is thus reduced the fact that without this true being of it there would not be this ‘being in a certain respect’ of it.

47. Now from this becomes clear something said above in distinction 3 nn.265-267 (‘About knowledge in the eternal rules’), namely that the moving of our intellect ‘by intelligible quiddities’ is reduced to the divine intellect, through whose ‘being simply’ those objects have being in a certain respect, namely objective being (which is the being that moves our intellect to know genuine truths), and because of their motion the intellect is said to move, just as too they have ‘their own being in a certain respect’ because of the being simply of it.

II. To the Principal Arguments

48. To the first principal argument [n.1] I say that ‘valid being’ is either called so because it has of itself firm and true being, whether of essence or existence (because one is not without the other, however they are distinguished), or ‘valid being’ is called so because it is what is first distinguished from figments, namely to which the true being of essence or of existence is not repugnant.

49. If valid being is taken in the first way, I say that man is not of himself a valid being but from his efficient cause – from which he has all true being, both of essence and of existence. And when you say that then there is never a valid being unless it has been efficiently caused, – I do in this way concede it: and when it has been efficiently caused it is existent, therefore there is never a valid being save an existent one, – I concede it; therefore there is no definition of it save as it is existent, – I deny this inference, because definition is a distinct knowledge of the defined thing according to all its essential parts.

But there can be distinct knowledge of something although it is not a valid being; for it is only necessary that a valid being be the term of a definitive cognition, and then the inference does not follow ‘a valid being is definitively understood, therefore the valid being exists’.

50. If valid being is understood in the second way, I say that man is of himself a valid being, because being is not formally of itself repugnant to him; for just as whatever something is repugnant to, it is repugnant to it formally from its nature, so what it is not repugnant to formally it is not repugnant to because of its nature; and if being were of itself repugnant to man, it could not be repugnant to him because of some additional respect. And if from this you infer ‘man is of himself a valid being in this way, therefore he is God’, the inference is not valid, because God is not only he to whom being is not repugnant but he is of himself being itself.

51. As to what is said here that man is formally a valid being by some relation, which is the validity of him [n.1], it was rejected in distinction 3 in the question ‘On the vestige’ nn.310-323. And it seems very absurd because – according to Augustine *On the Trinity* VII ch.1 n.2 – if nothing exists to itself, nothing exists to another; and this they themselves concede, because a relation cannot be founded in a relation but in an absolute.

52. I ask then about the foundation of such relation, which is said to be the validity; let it be called *a*. If it is to itself, then it does not essentially include in its understanding a per se respect, because nothing that essentially includes a respect is to itself formally. This *a* insofar as it is to itself is either valid, and then I have the intended conclusion, – or it is not valid, and then the respect will be founded in a non-valid being; and a respect for them is the same as the foundation, therefore the respect is the same as a non-valid being. And the consequent is very much unacceptable, if ‘valid’ is taken for that which being is not repugnant to, because it would follow that the validity will not be founded on a non-valid thing, which is ‘nothing’ – and so the respect will be a ‘nothing’, and then a valid being will be from two nothings.

53. To the second argument [n.2] I concede that from eternity God has understood stone, and not as the same as himself, – and this intellection was real and metaphysical, not logical. Yet it does not more follow – from this – about the stone that it is essence rather than existence, nor when comparing it to the divine intellect rather than to mine; the inference does indeed follow ‘therefore the thing was always understood’, but to argue ‘therefore the thing was in some real being’ is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply.

III. To the Reasons for the Opinion of Others

54. Using the same point in response to what is adduced for the opinion, about proportion to intellect [n.6] – I say that this proportion is a relation of the thing known to the knower, and this relation is the diminished being on which it is founded, as has been made clear [nn.34-35]; but it is not necessary that the ‘diminished being’ relation require along with it the entity simply of the being which it determines. And when you say there is no such proportion ‘of the impossible’ to the divine intellect [n.6], – I say that it can well be that the altogether black is not white, and yet not for this reason is ‘a man white in teeth’ simply white; so it can be that an im-proportion in every way is ‘impossible’ to

the divine intellect, and yet that some proportion is 'possible' to his intellect, but not through being simply.

55. To the point about permutation of proportion [n.7], I say that that way of arguing takes its rise from Euclid, in the sixteenth conclusion of the fifth book: "If," he says, "four quantities were proportional, they will be proportional by permutation;" which is proved by the fifteenth, preceding conclusion: "The proportion of multiples and of sub-multiples is the same."

56. And this permutation, certain and known in the case of quantities, is used by some people in arguments. Now the Philosopher used it in *Prior Analytics* 2.22.68a3-8, 11-16 (in two rules): 'If a is converse of b and c of d , and if a and c contradict, then b and d will contradict' and conversely. The consequence is necessary because about anything one or other of a pair of contradictories is said; and because what is convertible with one contradictory does not receive the predication of the other (nor conversely), therefore it is the converse of the other contradictory. And generally whenever some true proportion (corresponding to the fifteenth conclusion of Euclid) can be got through which a permutation holds (corresponding to the sixteenth conclusion), then the permutation is good, – and when not, not.

57. To the issue at hand then: generally such a permutation never holds when comparing extremes to an inferior and superior; nay there is a fallacy of the consequent, because the extremes of two contradictions when compared with each other have a converse proportion in inferences and not the same one (for the opposite of the consequent entails the opposite of the antecedent and not conversely), and therefore to argue 'as the first is to the third, so the second is to the fourth' commits the fallacy of the consequent. But one should argue conversely (when drawing inferences), and so argue thus, 'as the first is to the third, so the fourth is to the second', – and so in the issue at hand, 'as every being is possible, so every impossible is a non-being'.

58. And as to what is added there, that then 'one nothing would be more nothing than another nothing' [n.8], – I reply:

A negation is present in something in three ways. Sometimes not because of repugnance of the positive to the affirmation of the negative of it, but only because of the negation of the cause that posits the effect – just as if some surface were neither [sc. neither black nor white], it would indeed be non-white not because of the repugnance of the surface to the affirmation opposite to this negation, but only because of the negation of the cause, not positing whiteness to be present on the surface. But sometimes there is a negation in a positive because of its repugnance to the affirmation and to the opposite of that negation, and this in two ways: for sometimes there is precisely such a repugnance because of some one thing that belongs to the understanding of both – just as in the ultimate species of the same proximate genus their negations are said mutually of each other, because of their repugnance, which repugnance is however because of one thing included in the understanding of both, namely because of the ultimate embracing difference; but sometimes because of several things included in the understanding of both or of one of them, – just as, if the most special species be taken of two most general genera, the affirmations are indeed repugnant to each other because of the many things included in them, namely as many as are the predicates stated in the 'what' of each one in its own genus; for nothing is said in the 'what' of white which is not a middle term for showing this proposition 'man is not whiteness', also nothing is said of man in the 'what'

which is not a middle term for showing the same proposition – and therefore this proposition ‘man is not whiteness’ is true because of the repugnance of the terms simply, or because of the many things included in the understanding of the repugnant things, each of which would be on either side a sufficient reason for such repugnance.

59. And yet in all these inherences in negations, although they are present from diverse causes, nothing is said to be more or less negated, but that each simply is ‘not such’; for flavor is simply as much nothing of whiteness as man is, and likewise a surface has nothing of whiteness, in the case posited above [n.58]; and the reason why this one is not more a negation than that one is because any negation negates the whole of the affirmation opposed to it, for whatever reason it is ‘such’, and whether because of one reason or several.

60. So in the issue at hand: in man in eternity there is present that ‘he is not anything’, and in chimaera there is present that ‘it is not anything’; but the affirmation ‘he is something’ is not repugnant to man but there is only negation because of negation of the cause, not positing it – but the affirmation is repugnant to a chimaera, because no cause could cause in it that ‘it is something’. And the reason that this is not repugnant to man and is repugnant to chimaera is that this is this and that is that, and this for any intellect conceiving them, because – as was said [n.50] – whatever is repugnant to something formally of itself is repugnant to it, and what is not repugnant formally of itself is not repugnant.

61. Nor is it necessary to imagine here that it is not repugnant to man because he is a being in potency and is repugnant to a chimaera because it is not a being in potency, – nay rather conversely, because it is not repugnant to man therefore he is a possible with logical potency and because it is repugnant to a chimaera therefore a chimaera is impossible with the opposite impossibility; and this possibility is followed by objective possibility, and that on the supposition of God’s omnipotence which has regard to everything possible (provided it is other than himself), yet that logical possibility can stand – by reason of itself – absolutely, although *per impossibile* no omnipotence were to have regard to it.

62. Therefore the reason altogether first and irreducible to another as to why ‘being’ is not repugnant to man is that man is formally man (and this whether really in itself or intelligibly in the intellect), and the first reason why ‘being’ is repugnant to a chimaera is the chimaera insofar as it is a chimaera. Therefore the negation ‘nothingness’ is present in different ways in eternity in man and in a chimaera, and yet not for this reason is one more a nothing than the other.

63. Or it could also be said that from man is removed only being and nothing else consequent on being (of the sort that ‘possible to be’ is), but from chimaera is removed being and its consequent; and therefore ‘being’ is negated of a chimaera for more reasons than it is negated of man, but this negation is not more in one than in the other. But the first response [nn.61-62] seems more real.

64. To Augustine [n.9]: capacity for form – according to him – is matter, because it has some true entity, and not only some such entity as the soul of Antichrist has before it is created. About this in the second book, distinction 12 q. un. nn.1-9.

65. To the remark from *On John* [n.9]: I concede that, when there are two ordered causes, both cause the effect, – and in different ways because the higher one causes more; and so if the heart is the higher cause and the hand a lower one with respect to letters,

each causes (both the heart and the hand), but it is not the case that the heart produces the letters in some true being before the hand does and that the hand later adds to them some respect!

66. To the last one from Avicenna [n.11]: he is speaking of the flowing of forms from God insofar as these are understood, and of the flowing of everything that exists (that is, the flow of things in true being); and I concede that just as the ‘being’ of something understood insofar as it is understood is different from true being (which is of essences outside the soul), so ‘this and that’ flowing are different, and things flow from God by each flowing. It is not so in us because the things pre-exist outside the soul – or in the cause – so that they may then move our intellect to an act of understanding. But Avicenna does not say that the flow ‘in understood being’ is the flow in quidditative being, because ‘understood being’ is a distinct being from all real being, both quidditative and of existence.

Thirty Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether God’s Omnipotence necessarily entails his Greatness

1. About the thirty seventh distinction I ask whether the fact that God is present everywhere by his power entails that he is everywhere by his essence, – that is, whether omnipotence necessarily entails greatness.

That it does:

Every agent is present to what it acts on (according to the *Physics* 7.1.242b24-27, 2.243a3-6), and this immediately, if it can immediately act on it, – or mediately, if it acts on it mediately; but an omnipotent thing can act on anything immediately; therefore it is present to anything immediately.

2. The opposite:

It can cause anything outside the universe, and yet it is not there by its essence.

I. To the Question

3. Response.

A created agent can act where it is not; yet commonly it must be immediate to any affected thing next to it that it acts on, although sometimes it does not act on the affected thing by an action of the same idea as the action by which it acts on a remote thing – just as a fish [in a net] that kills the hand of the fisherman does not kill the net.

4. But sometimes it does not act on the proximate affected thing with the same active power as it acts on a remote thing, although it acts by some active power, – just as the celestial body, generating a mineral in the bowels of the earth (or some mixed thing, animate or inanimate, here below), acts by its substantial form, because a non-substance cannot generate a substance, nor can any accident in between be the reason for generating substance.

5. The form then of a celestial body is an active power on a remote object, without the body acting on what is next to it by the same active power as it acts on a remote

object, although it act on what is next to it by some other active power. But this happens either because of the conjunction of these two active powers in the same thing, each of which is active (and one has the proximate thing for proportionate affected thing, and the other active form has the remote thing for proximate affected thing), or this happens because of the imperfection of the agent, in which there is a defect of active virtue, because of which defect it acts according to the more imperfect form before according to the more perfect one – as that which generates something corruptible causes alteration before it generates, because of the imperfection of the agent, from which fact the ‘prior in origin’ is more imperfect.

6. If we take away first the coming together of two such powers from the created agent, and if we take away second the imperfection from it (that it need not first produce a more imperfect thing), there seems no reason why it will not be present by its power to something remote according to the way it is now present to itself in idea of active power; and yet it will not act on a thing nearby either with that power (just as it does not now) or with another power, and this above all if the power according to which it acts on a remote thing is a simply perfect active power; for the more perfect the form is in creatures, the more remote the thing to which the principle of acting seems to extend.

7. From these results to the issue at hand: it seems that omnipotence – which is an active power simply perfectly – does not require, either because of diverse powers coming together in the agent or because of a prior generation of something more imperfect, that there be action on one thing before action on another thing. Such omnipotence seems to be a principle of acting on anything and of producing anything possible, although *per impossibile* it not be everywhere – and in this respect the negative side of the question [n.1] seems it needs to be held.

8. There is a confirmation too: for if omnipotence is a will on whose willing the being of a thing follows, since the will can will a distant thing as equally as a proximate one, it seems that if the omnipotent being were *per impossibile* present in some determinate place and not everywhere, it could will something – in another place – to exist, to which thing existence was not repugnant, and consequently by its willing it would have ‘being’ in that place, – and consequently the thing would be made by the omnipotent being without the omnipotent being having presence there by its essence.

9. There is another confirmation, that one should not imagine there was an infinite empty space before the creation of the world, as if God was present there in his essence before he produced the world; nay, it is not as being present anywhere in his essence that God was able to make the world. So just as the presence of his greatness was not there pre-required for the presence of his power, as it is power (nay as power it had its term before he was present in his essence), so it seems that there is no need now to pre-understand God existing in any part of the universe so as to cause something, but rather – quasi conversely – he is there by his power first so as to cause something there; and then, even if *per impossibile* he were not present there in his essence, yet he could there cause something.

II. To the Principal Argument

10. To the argument for the opposite [n.1] one can say that that statement of the Philosopher is true about natural agents, which act through natural qualities or active

natural forms, and these are only principles of acting on something remote if there are other concurrent forms that are principles of acting on something nearby; but it is not so about the will by which an omnipotent being acts.

Thirty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God's Knowledge with respect to Makeable things is Practical

1. About the thirty eighth distinction I ask whether God's knowledge with respect to makeable things is practical.

That it is not:

Metaphysics 2.1.993b210-21: "The end of practical science is a work;" but nothing outside God is his end.

2. On the contrary:

On the Trinity VI ch.10 n.11: "Art belongs to the wise God, etc.;" art is a practical habit; therefore etc.

3. Likewise *83 Questions* q.46: "Ideas are the reasons according to which everything formable is formed."

I. To the Question

4. Above in the question 'On theology, whether it is practical' [*Prol.* nn.217-366], much was said there about practical and speculative knowledge. Briefly applying some of these to the issue at hand, one can say that two things belong to the nature of a practical habit, namely conformity to praxis (which conformity it has from the object about which it is) and its natural priority to the same praxis, because praxis –as practical operation is named from it – is an operation that is distinguished from speculation; but no operation, different from speculation, is in the power of the speculator unless it is or can be naturally posterior to speculation; but knowledge is not posited as practical in anyone, as it belongs to him, save by respect to the praxis that is in his power.

5. From this one needs to know further that practical knowledge – the most practical and closest to praxis – is some opinion about eliciting some praxis (to wit, a judgment about the conclusion of a practical syllogism), which 'knowledge' is the end of the movement of the intellect, but operation begins from it (and not only is the knowledge practical that is thus proximately practical, but also the knowledge of practical principles that virtually include it, and also the quidditative knowledge of the terms that includes the practical principles, as was said there [*Prol.* nn.26-263, 276-277, 314]), therefore any intellect that cannot have some such knowledge giving commands about operating naturally prior to the praxis which such knowledge regards (and that cannot have knowledge of the principles from which to infer such knowledge giving commands about things to be done, and cannot have quidditative knowledge of the terms in which are included such principles), such an intellect does not seem able to have practical knowledge most properly taken according to the two conditions before stated, namely conformity to the object and priority [n.4]; but the divine intellect – comparing his

knowledge to the act of his will – does not pre-have any knowledge giving commands about anything to be made (nor knowledge of any principle nor quidditative knowledge of the term) which includes a practical principle; therefore it does not have any knowledge that is conform and prior to such praxis.

6. Proof of the minor [sc. about the divine intellect, n.5]: if prior to an act of the divine will the divine intellect could have any such knowledge, it would have it purely naturally and necessarily, because all knowledge preceding there the act of will is purely natural, and the intellect would have it through the essence as the essence is purely the natural principle of understanding; so of necessity the intellect would know that this is to be made, and then the will – to which it would present it – would not be able not to will it, because then it could fail to be right, able to be discordant with practical right reason, and so it could be non-right. Of necessity, therefore, the divine will would will anything that was to be done, because the same reason would hold of one thing as of another.

7. Here an objection is first raised that for this reason [n.6] the divine intellect would not have any speculative knowledge; for either the will would necessarily will the intellect to speculate, and then liberty would not be first on the part of the will, – or the will would be able not to will the intellect to speculate, and then it could be non-right.

8. And further, if there is first presented to the divine intellect some universal law (to wit, that there needs to be glorification, needs to be gratification), and the divine will accepts it (and from this a law of wisdom is laid down), and if second the intellect offer to the will that Peter is to be beatified, – if the will accept this, thereby the intellect seems to know that Peter is to be glorified, and this by a dictating knowledge that has not been accepted in itself formally by the will, although the will would have verified the premises from which the intellect has it.

9. To the first of these [n.7]: the divine intellect by the necessity of nature is speculative, and there is no liberty formally for this, although it is not without the will being pleased therewith; for God is necessarily knowing, but he is not properly a knower by the will in the way that by necessity – not by will – he is God. When therefore you argue ‘if the will is not able not to will the intellect to speculate, then it is not supremely free’ [n.7], the inference does not hold, because the will’s freedom is not to things intrinsic (things which precede its act), but its freedom is to all makeable things, and therefore the first determination in the will must be posited in respect of makeable things; but it would not be thus if the practical intellect were to determine beforehand, nay liberty could not properly be preserved in the will with respect to makeable things (but neither would any contingency be preserved), because the intellect would necessarily determine it beforehand with pure natural necessity and the will would be necessarily conformed to the intellect; but what is necessarily – even by the necessity of consequence – conform ‘necessarily’ cannot be contingent.

10. To the second [n.8] I say that the divine intellect does not know things in this way, that is discursively, as the argument proceeds; but, by distinguishing the moments of nature, it apprehends in the first moment any doable thing whatever (as much the things that are principles of doable thing as the particular doable things), and in the second moment it presents them all to the will (from all of which the will accepts some, both from all the practical principles and from the particular doable things), and then in the third moment the intellect knows as equally immediately the particulars as the universals, and so it does not acquire its knowledge of the particulars from principles pre-determined

by the will. This point will be more evident in the question ‘About the knowledge of God with respect to future contingents’.³⁵²

II. To the Principal Arguments

11. To the authority from Augustine [n.2] I say that art is “a habit of making along with true reason” (*Ethics* 6.4.1140a20-21); and, to the extent the definition of art is taken completely, ‘right reason’ is understood, that is, reason which directs and makes right the power to which operation according to art belongs; but in a diminished way art is ‘a habit with true reason’, when it is only a habit that apprehends the rightness of things to be done and is not a habit that directs or makes right in things to be done. In this second way art can be conceded to exist in God because, when a determination of the will with respect to certain things to be done has been posited, his intellect knows this order of things to be done; and then there is ‘right reason’ there, that is reason knowing rightness – there is not there however a ‘right reason’ that, namely, is directive of the power of the one who operates, and this above all if the power ‘operating extrinsically’ is the will and not some executive power; but if some executive power is posited other than the will, then a ‘right reason’ in the second way seems able to be preserved, which is disposed with respect to the power of the one who operates according to that right reason, and it can be now preserved with respect to the will.

12. The same point makes plain the answer to the other argument from Augustine [n.3], that the ideas are secondary known objects (as was said before [d.35 nn.40, 42]), according to which things outside are made – but these secondary objects do not include any knowledge giving commands about operating or non-operating, although they represent doable things; but knowledge ‘of a doable’ is precisely not practical knowledge, unless it virtually includes a practical principle or conclusion; but there is no such inclusion in the case of the ideas in the divine intellect.^a

a. [An empty space for the second part of d.38 and for d.39 was left here by Scotus. The following *Interpolation* is found in its place, from Appendix A.]

Thirty Eighth Distinction, Part Two, and Thirty Ninth Distinction Questions One to Five: *On the Infallibility and Immutability of Divine Knowledge*

In the second part of the thirty eighth distinction the Master [Lombard] treats of the infallibility of divine knowledge, and in the thirty ninth distinction he treats of the immutability of divine knowledge [*Sent.* I d.38 ch.2, d.39 chs.1-4]. As to this material, then, to the extent divine knowledge has regard simply to the existences of things, I raise five questions:

First, whether God has determinate knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; second, whether he has certain and infallible knowledge of all things as to all conditions of existence; third, whether he has immutable knowledge of all things as to every condition of existence; fourth, whether he necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything; and fifth, whether, along with the determinateness and certitude of his knowledge, there can stand

³⁵² In d.39, which is lacking in the *Ordinatio*. See the *Interpolation* that follows at the end of distinction 38.

some contingency on the part of the things in existence.³⁵³ And these questions can be asked together, because they are solved together by the same things.

As to the first question I argue for the negative:

Because, according to the Philosopher *De Interpretatione* 9.18a28-19b4, in the case of future contingents there is no determinate truth, – therefore neither is there determinate knowledge; therefore neither does the intellect have determinate knowledge about them.

This reason is confirmed by his proof in the same place, that then we need not bother about things or deliberate because, whether we deliberate or not, they will happen.

Further, if God's power were limited to one side [sc. of opposed possibilities] it would be imperfect, because if God had power for this thing such that he did not have power for the opposite, he would have limited power and not be omnipotent; therefore, in the same way, if he knows one side such that he does not know the other, he will be limited in knowledge and not omniscient.

As to the second question I argue for the negative:

Because this inference holds, 'God knows that I will sit down tomorrow, and I will not sit down tomorrow, therefore God is deceived', – therefore by similarity this inference holds, 'God knows I will sit down tomorrow, and I am able not to sit down tomorrow, therefore God can be deceived'. The first inference is manifest, because he who believes what is not in reality so is deceived; I prove – from this – that the further inference holds, because just as a conclusion about what is the case follows from two premises about what is the case, so a conclusion about what is possible follows from a premise about what is the case and a second premise about what is possible.

Further, if God knows I will sit down tomorrow and it is possible for me not to sit down tomorrow, – let the proposition 'I will not sit down tomorrow' be the case, and the result is that God is deceived; but from the positing of what is possible the impossible does not follow; therefore the proposition 'God is deceived' will not be impossible.

As to the third question I argue for the negative:

There can be no passage from a contradictory to a contradictory without some change; but if there is altogether no change, then in no way does it seem that what was true before should now be false. Therefore if God, while knowing *a*, is able not to know *a*, then this seems to be because of some possible change; but only in *a* as it is known by God, because nothing has being save within God's knowledge, and consequently the change of *a* cannot be without a change in God's knowledge, – which is the conclusion intended.

Further: anything that is not *a* and can be *a* can begin to be *a*, – because it does not seem intelligible that the affirmation of a negation that is the case can be the case if it does not begin to be; therefore if God does not know *a* and he can know *a* then he can begin to know *a*; therefore he can change to knowing *a*.

Further, third: if God does not know *a* and can know *a*, – I ask what this 'can be' is? Either it is passive, and then it is to a form, and change results. Or it is active, and plainly it is natural, because the intellect 'as it is intellect' is not free but acts naturally; such a power cannot act after it has not acted unless it changes; therefore, as before, change results.

As to the fourth question I argue for the affirmative:

Because God immutably knows *a*, therefore he necessarily knows *a* (let *a* be understood as the proposition 'Antichrist will be').

Proof of the inference:

First, because no necessity is posited in God save the necessity of immutability; therefore whatever is in him immutably is in him necessarily.

Second, because everything immutable seems to be formally necessary, just as everything possible – to which 'necessarily' is repugnant – seems to be mutable; for no 'such possible' exists of itself and it can exist from another. But what is able to be after not being (whether in order of duration or order of nature) does not seem able to be without some mutability; therefore etc.

³⁵³ The Vatican editors report that the text of the questions interpolated here is put together from the *Lectura* I d.39 qq.1-5 (whose order it generally follows) and the *Reportatio* IA d.38 qq.1-2, d.39 qq.1-3.

Further, whatever can be in God can be the same as God, and consequently can be God; but whatever can be God, of necessity is God, because God is immutable; therefore whatever can be in God, of necessity is God. But knowing *a* can be in God; therefore of necessity it is God, and therefore he simply necessarily knows *a*.

In addition, every perfection simply – absolute perfection – is of necessity in God; to know *a* is a perfection simply, because otherwise God would not be perfect if he did not know *a* formally, because he is not imperfect save by lacking some perfection simply.

As to the fifth question I argue for the negative:

Because this inference holds, ‘God knows *a*, therefore *a* will necessarily be’.

The antecedent is necessary. – Proof of the consequence, because a rational act is not canceled on account of the matter it passes over to, just as ‘to say’ is not canceled if it passes over to this, that ‘I am saying nothing’: for this inference holds, ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I am saying something’; therefore, by similarity, ‘to know’ is not canceled on account of the matter it passes over to. Therefore since the ‘to know’ of God is simply necessary, it is not canceled or deprived of having this necessity by the fact it passes over to a contingent thing.

Besides, everything that God knows will be, will necessarily be; God knows *a* will be; therefore etc. – The major is true to the extent it is of what is necessary, because the predicate is of necessity in the subject; and the minor is about what is in a subject simply, because it is true for eternity; therefore a conclusion about the necessary follows.

To the opposite [sc. against the arguments adduced for the first three questions]:

Epistle to the Hebrews 4.13: “All things are naked and open to his eyes;” and look at the *Glossa* there [*Glossa Ordinaria*, “because they are fully seen from every side”]. Therefore he has determinate and certain knowledge of all things as to everything knowable in them; and immutable knowledge, as is plain, because nothing in him is mutable (from distinction 8 n.293).

To the opposite of the fourth question:

If God necessarily knew *a*, then *a* would be necessarily known – and if necessarily known then necessarily true. The consequent is false, so the antecedent is too.

To the opposite of the fifth question:

Being is divided into necessary being and contingent being; therefore the intellect, when understanding these according to their proper ideas, understands this thing as necessary and that thing as contingent (otherwise it would not understand them as they are such beings), and consequently the knowledge does not take away contingency as to the thing known.

I. The Opinions of Others

A. First Opinion

As to these questions one position holds the certitude of divine knowledge – with respect to all things as to all conditions of existence – on account of the ideas that are posited in the divine intellect, and this on account of their perfection in representing, because they represent ‘the things of which they are’ not only in themselves but in every reason and relation of the extremes; and so they are in the divine intellect a sufficient reason, not only for simply apprehending the things patterned after the ideas, but also for apprehending every union of them and every mode of the patterned things pertaining to their existence.³⁵⁴

On the contrary:

The reasons of knowing the terms of some proposition that combines them are only a sufficient cause of knowing the combination if the combination is of a nature to be known from the terms; a contingent combination is not of a nature to be known from the terms, because it would then not only be necessary but also first and immediate; therefore the reasons of knowing the terms, however perfectly these reasons represent them, are not sufficient causes of knowing the contingent combination.

In addition, the ideas purely naturally represent what they represent, and under the reason under which they represent anything; the proof of the fact is that the ideas are in the divine intellect before any act of the divine will, so that in no way are they there by act of the will; but whatever precedes the act of the will is purely natural. I take then the two ideas of the extremes

³⁵⁴ The Vatican editors were unable to find any author of this opinion.

that are represented in those ideas, for example the ideas of man and of white; I ask whether of themselves they represent the combination of the extremes, or the division of them, or both? If only the combination, then the divine intellect naturally knows it (and so knows in a necessary way), and consequently in no way does it know the division. And I raise a question in the same manner if the ideas only represent the division. If they represent both, then God knows nothing by them, because to know contradictories to be true simultaneously is to know nothing.

In addition, the ideas are of possible things in the same way as they are of future things, because the difference between 'non-future possibles and future possibles' is only by act of the divine will; therefore an idea of a future thing does not more represent that thing to be of necessity future than an idea of a possible thing does.

Further, an idea of a future thing will not represent it more by positing it to exist in this 'now' than by positing it to exist in that.

B. Second Opinion

Another position is that God has certain knowledge of future contingents by the fact that the whole flow of time, and all things that are in time, are present to eternity.³⁵⁵

The proof for this is from the fact that eternity is immense and infinite, and consequently, just as the immense is present at once to every place, so the eternal is present at once to the whole of time.³⁵⁶

And the point is made clear through examples, and one example indeed is 'about the stick fixed in water', that although the whole stream flows past the stick (and so the stick is present successively to all the parts of the stream), yet the stick is not immense with respect to the stream, because it is not present to the whole; therefore in the same way, if eternity were something standing (like the stick), past which time flowed, such that there was never present to it at once save a single instant of time (just as there is not present at once to the stick save one part of the stream), eternity would not be immense with respect to time.

There is also the confirmation that the 'now' of eternity is together with the 'now' of time, not coequal with it; therefore as it is together with this latter 'now' it exceeds it; but it would not exceed it unless – as it is together with this 'now' – it were together with another 'now'.

There is also this confirmation, that if the whole of time could exist at once extrinsically, the 'now' of eternity would be at once present to the whole of time; but although it is repugnant to time – because of its succession – to exist at once, nothing of perfection is, because of this, taken away from eternity; therefore eternity itself is now equally present to the whole of time and to anything existing in time.

This is confirmed by another example 'about the center in a circle', because if 'time flowing' were posited to be the circumference of a circle and the 'now' of eternity were posited to be the center, then, however much of flux there was in time, the whole flux and any part of it would always be present to the center. Thus therefore all things that have to exist in any part of time (whether they are in this 'now' of time, or whether they are past or future), all of them are present with respect to the 'now' of eternity, – and thus what exists in eternity sees them as present because of such co-existence, just as I can see as present what in this instant I am seeing.

Against this opinion I argue:

First, by bringing back against them what they themselves adduce about immensity [sc. in the first proof for this opinion] – because once it is posited that space can continually increase to infinity (so that just as time is in continual flux so God continually expands space by its coming to be), yet the immensity of God would not be a reason for him to co-exist with any place (in any 'now') unless the place is existent; for God by his immensity does not co-exist with anything save what is in him, although he could create space outside the universe, and then by his immensity he would co-exist with it. If then immensity is not a reason for co-existing with a place save an actual one and not a potential one (because a potential one does not exist), then by parity of reasoning eternity will not be a reason for co-existing with anything save what is existent; and this is what is

³⁵⁵ The Vatican editors refer to St. Thomas Aquinas, e.g. *ST* Ia q.14 a.13, *Sent.* I d.38 q.1 a.5, *De Veritate* q.2 a.12, *CG* I ch.66.

³⁵⁶ The Vatican Editors refer this argument to Richard of Middleton, *Sent* I d.39 princ.1 q.1.

argued, that ‘that which does not exist cannot co-exist with anything’, because ‘to co-exist’ states a real relation, but a relation is not real whose foundation is not real.

Again, if an effect has being in itself with respect to the first cause, it is simply in itself, because with respect to nothing does it have a truer being; hence that which is said to be such with respect to the first cause can be said simply to be such. If then something future is in act with respect to God, then it is simply in act; therefore it is impossible for it to be posited in act later.

Further, if my future sitting down (not only as to the entity which it has in knowable being but also as to that which it has in being of existence) is now present to eternity, then it has now been produced in that being by God, for nothing has from God existence in the flow of time unless it have been produced by God according to that being; but let God produce this sitting down (or the soul of Antichrist, which is the equivalent); then that which has already been produced by him will again be produced in being, and so it will be produced in being twice.

Further, this position does not seem to be of help for what it is posited for, namely for having certain knowledge of future things:

And first indeed because this sitting down, beside the fact that it is present to eternity according to its being in some part of time, is yet future in itself because of the fact it is future and needs to be produced by God. So I ask whether God has certain knowledge of it. If he does, then this is not from the fact that it already exists, but according to the fact that it is future, – and this certitude must be posited to come through something else, and this suffices for all certain knowledge of the existence of this thing. If he does not know it will be future with certitude, then he produces it without foreknowing it; but he will know it with certitude when he has produced it; therefore he knows in different ways things made and things to be made, which is against Augustine *On Genesis* V ch.18 n.36.

Second, because the divine intellect receives no certitude from any object other than its own essence; for then it would be cheapened. Hence now too the divine intellect does not have certitude about my making, which is posited to be in act, in such a way that the making causes about itself certitude in the divine intellect; for it does not move God’s intellect. Therefore, in the same way, all temporal things – if they are in their own existence present to eternity according to those existences of theirs – fail to cause certitude about them in the divine intellect, but the divine intellect must have certain knowledge of them through something else about them, and that something else suffices for us.

Besides, they posit that angelic time (the ‘aevum’) is altogether simple, co-existent with the whole of time;³⁵⁷ therefore an angel, who is in angelic time, is present to the whole flow of time and to all the parts of time; therefore an angel, it seems – according to this reason of theirs –, could naturally know future contingents.

C. Third Opinion

A third position says that although some things be necessary with respect to divine knowledge, yet it does not follow that with respect to proximate causes they cannot be contingent.³⁵⁸

And it is confirmed from Boethius *Consolation of Philosophy* V prose 6, where he speaks thus: “If you say, ‘that which God sees will come to be cannot not happen, – but that which cannot not happen happens of necessity’, and if you constrict me to this term of ‘necessity’, I will reply: the same future thing, when it is referred to divine knowledge, is necessary – but when it is considered in its own nature, it is altogether free, etc.”

In favor of this view the argument is also made that there can be imperfection in an effect from the proximate cause, although not from a remote or prior cause, – just as there is deformity in an act from a created will but not insofar as it is from the divine will; therefore sin is not reduced to God as to the cause, but it is imputed only to the created will. Although therefore there were, as far as concerns the part of God – who is the remote cause –, a necessity in things, yet there can, from their proximate causes, be contingency in them.

³⁵⁷ The Vatican Editors refer to Aquinas *ST I* q.10 a.5, *Sent.* II d.2 q.1 a.1.

³⁵⁸ An opinion the Vatican Editors also attribute to Aquinas, *Sent I* d.38 q.1 a.5, *ST I* q.14 a.13, *SG I* ch.67.

Against this an argument was given in distinction 2 nn.80, 85-86, where it was proved from the contingency of things that 'God is understanding and willing', because there can be no contingency in the causation of any cause with respect to its effect unless the first cause is contingently disposed to the cause next to it or to its own effect. Which proof, briefly, is from the fact that a moving cause – to the extent it is moved – is, if it is necessarily moved, necessarily a mover; therefore any second cause that produces insofar as it is moved by a first cause, if it is necessarily moved by the first cause, necessarily moves what is next to it or it necessarily produces its effect. The whole ordering of causes, then, right up to the ultimate effect, will produce necessarily if the disposition of the first cause to the cause next to it is necessary.

Further, a prior cause has respect to its effect naturally prior to a later cause [d.8 n.287]; therefore in that prior stage, if it have a necessary disposition to the effect, it will give it necessary existence. But in the second instant of nature the proximate cause cannot give it contingent existence, because it is already pre-understood to have from the first cause an existence repugnant to contingency; nor can you say that in the same instant of nature the two causes give existence to the caused thing, because the cannot be founded on that existence a necessary disposition to a cause perfectly giving existence and a contingent disposition to some other cause.

In addition, whatever is produced by posterior causes could be produced immediately by the first cause – and then it would have the same entity as it has now, and then it would be contingent as it is contingent now; therefore it has its own contingency even now from the first cause, and not only from the proximate cause.

Besides, God has produced many things immediately (as he created the world and now creates souls), and he has produced them all contingently.

II. Scotus' own Response to the Questions

As to the solution to these questions one must proceed as follows: one must see first how there is contingency in things, and second how there stands along with this the certitude and immutability of divine knowledge about them.

A. How there is Contingency in Things

1. Contingency in things is Evident and Manifest

As to the first point I say that the disjunction 'necessary or possible' is a property of being, speaking of convertible property [sc. property convertible with or true of being as such], just as there are many such unlimited properties in things [d.8 n.115]. But properties convertible with being – as more common – are said immediately of being, because being has a concept simply simple; and therefore there cannot be a middle term between being and its property, because there is no definition of either that could be the middle term. Also, if there is some non-first property of being, it is difficult to see by what prior thing, as by a middle term, it could be proved of being, because it is not easy to see an order in the properties of being; nor, if that order were known, would the propositions taken from the properties as premises seem to be much more evident than the conclusions.

But in the disjunct properties, although the whole disjunct cannot be demonstrated of being, yet – commonly – when the extreme that is less noble is supposed about some being, one can prove about some being some extreme that is more noble; just as this inference holds 'if some being is finite, then some being is infinite' and 'if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary', because in such cases a more imperfect extreme could not be in a being in particular unless the more perfect extreme, on which it would depend, were present in some other being.

But it does not in this way seem possible to demonstrate the more imperfect extreme of such a disjunction; for it is not the case that, if the more perfect extreme is in some being, therefore the more imperfect one is in some being (and this unless the disjunct extremes are correlatives, as cause and caused); so therefore one cannot demonstrate of being – through some prior middle term – the disjunction 'necessary or contingent'. Nor even can this part of the disjunction – the part that is 'contingent' – be demonstrated of anything if 'necessary' is supposed of something; and so it seems that the proposition 'some being is contingent' is true first and not demonstrable by a demonstration 'why'.

Hence the Philosopher, when arguing against necessity in the case of future events, does not make a deduction to something more impossible than the hypothesis, but to something impossible more manifest to us, namely that we need not bother about things or deliberate [see the opening arguments above].

And so those who deny such things need punishment or perception, because – according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* I ch.9 (74vab) – those who deny a first principle need to be flogged or exposed to fire until they admit that to be burned and not to be burned, to be flogged and not to be flogged, are not the same thing.³⁵⁹ So too, those who deny that some being is ‘contingent’ should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented.

2. The Contingency in Things is because of the Contingent Causation of God

On the supposition, then, of this as it were manifest truth, that some being is contingent, – one must ask how contingency can be preserved in beings.

And I say – because of the first reason made against the third opinion (which is made more plain in distinction 2 in the question ‘On the existence of God’ [nn.80, 85-86]) – that no causation of any cause can be preserved as ‘contingent’ unless the first cause is posited as immediately causing contingently, and this by positing perfect causality in the first cause, the way Catholics do [d.42 n.9].

3. The Cause of Contingency in Beings is on the Part of the Divine Will

Now the first thing is a causer by intellect and will, and if a third executive power (different from these) is posited, it does not help the issue at hand, because if the first thing necessarily understands and wills, it necessarily produces. One must then look for this contingency in the divine intellect or in the divine will. But not in the intellect as it has first act before every act of will, because whatever the intellect understands in this way it understands purely naturally and by natural necessity, – and so no contingency can be something in his knowing, or something in his understanding, which he does not know and does not understand by such first intellection.

The first contingency, then, must be looked for in the divine will, – and in order to see how it should be posited, one must first look in our own will, and at three things there: first, at what things there is liberty for in our will; second how possibility or contingency follows this liberty; and third, about the logical possibility of propositions, as to how possibility for opposites is expressed.

a. How our Will can be Cause of Contingency in Things

[What things there is liberty for in our will] – As to the first point, I say that the will, as to its first act, is free for opposite acts; it is also, by means of those opposite acts, free for opposite objects to which it tends, – and, further, to opposite effects which it produces.

The first liberty necessarily possesses some imperfection annexed to it, because it possesses passive potentiality and mutability in the will. The third liberty is not the second, because even if, *per impossibile*, it were to effect nothing outwardly, still – insofar as it is will – it could tend freely to objects. But the middle reason of liberty [sc. the second liberty] is without imperfection (nay it is necessary for perfection), because every perfect power can tend to everything that is of a nature to be object of such power; therefore a perfect will can tend to everything that is of a nature to be will-able. Therefore liberty without imperfection – insofar as it is free – is for opposite objects to which it tends, and accidental to this liberty as such is that it produce opposite effects.

³⁵⁹ The Vatican Editors suitably quote Avicenna thus: “We must dismiss the obtuse to the flames, as long they hold that fire and not-fire are one – and we must make them suffer the pain of beatings, as long as they hold that to be pained and not to be pained are one... This principle, then, which we defend against those who falsify it, is the first of the principles of demonstration; but the philosopher should be the first to guard them.”

[How contingency follows the liberty of our will] – About the second point I say that concomitant to this liberty is a single manifest power to opposites. For although there is not in it a power to will and not will at the same time (because this is a nothing), yet there is in it a power to will after not willing, or a power for a succession of opposite acts; and this power is manifest in all mutable things, on the succession of opposites in them [sc. a white thing in moment *a* can be black in moment *b*].

Yet there is also another power (not as manifest) without any succession. For by positing that a created will only has being in one instant, and that in that instant it has this volition, it does not then necessarily have it. Proof: for if in that instant it did necessarily have it, then, since it is not a cause save in the instant when it would cause it, the will simply – when it is causing – would necessarily cause; for it is not a contingent cause now because it was pre-existent to the instant in which it causes (and then ‘as pre-existing’ it was able to cause or not cause), because just as this being, when it is, is necessary or contingent, so a cause, when it causes, causes then necessarily or contingently. So from the fact that in this instant it causes this willing, and not necessarily, then for that reason it causes contingently. This power, then, of the cause ‘for the opposite of what it causes’ is without succession.

Also this power, a real one, is a power of what is naturally prior (as first acts) to opposites that are naturally posterior (as second acts); for a first act, considered in the instant in which it is naturally prior to a second act, so posits the second in being – as its own contingent effect – that, as naturally prior, it could equally posit some other opposite in being.

Also concomitant to this real active power (naturally prior to what it produces) is logical power, which is non-repugnance of the terms. For to the will as first act, even when it is producing this willing, the opposite willing is not repugnant; both because the will is a contingent cause with respect to its effect, and so the opposite in idea of effect is not repugnant to it; and also because it is, as it is a subject, contingently disposed to this act as this act informs it, because to the subject the opposite of its ‘accident *per accidens*’ is not repugnant.

Concomitant to the liberty of our will, therefore, insofar as it is for opposite acts, is a power both to opposites successively and to opposites at the same instant, – that is, that either of the two can be present without the other, and so the second power is a real cause for act as it is naturally prior to logical power; but the fourth power – namely to opposites simultaneously – is not concomitant to it, because this fourth power is a nothing.

[About the logical distinction of propositions] – From this second point the third is plain, namely the distinguishing of this proposition ‘a will that is willing *a* is able not to will *a*’. For this is false in the composite sense, so as to signify the possibility of this proposition ‘a will that is willing *a* is not willing *a*’; it is true in the divided sense, so as to signify a possibility for opposites successively, because a will that is willing for moment *a* is able not to will for moment *b*.

But if we also take a proposition about the possible which unites extremes for the same instant, to wit this one, ‘a will that is not willing something for moment *a* is able to will it for moment *a*’, this proposition too must be distinguished according to composite and divided senses; and in the composite sense it is false, namely that there is a possibility that the will is simultaneously willing for moment *a* and not willing for moment *a*; the divided sense is true, namely so as to signify that in the will in which ‘willing for moment *a*’ is present there can be present ‘not willing for moment *a*’ – but it will not thus stand simultaneously, but ‘not willing’ will stand in this way, namely that then the ‘willing’ is not present.

And to understand this second distinction – which is more obscure – I say that in the composite sense there is a single categorical proposition, whose subject is this ‘a will not willing for moment *a*’ and whose predicate is ‘willing for moment *a*’; and then this predicate is being attributed as possible to a subject it is repugnant to, and consequently what is being indicated as possible to the subject is impossible to the subject. In the divided sense there are two categorical propositions, asserting of the will two predicates; in one proposition, about actual presence in the subject, there is asserted of the will the predicate ‘not willing *a*’ (which categorical proposition is understood by implicit composition of the terms); in the other categorical proposition, about possible presence in the subject, there is asserted as possible of the will the predicate ‘willing *a*’. And these two propositions are verified, because they are signified as attributing to the subjects their own predicates for the same instant; and this indeed is true, for to this will there does in the

same instant belong not willing *a*, along with the possibility of the opposite, willing *a*, just as actual presence is signified along with possible presence.

An example of this distinction is found in the proposition ‘all men who are white run’ – which, once the case is posited that all the white men are running (and none of the black men or the men colored in between), is true in the composite sense and false in the divided sense; in the composite sense there is one proposition, possessing one subject, which is determined by the term ‘white’ [sc. ‘all the white men’]; in the divided sense there are two propositions, asserting two predicates of the same subject [sc. ‘all men are white’ and ‘all men run’]. Similarly in this case ‘man who is white is necessarily an animal’; which in the composite sense is false, because the predicate does not belong necessarily to the whole of this subject [sc. ‘white man’³⁶⁰]; in the divided sense it is true, because two predicates are indicated as said of the same subject (one necessarily [sc. ‘man is necessarily an animal’] and the other absolutely, without necessity [sc. ‘man is white’], and both predicates belong and both these categorical propositions are true.

But against this second distinction there is argument in three ways, that it is not a logical one and that it is not the case that some power is for any instant for the opposite of what is in it at that instant.

The first argument is from the proposition in *De Interpretatione* 9.91a23-24: “Everything that is, when it is, necessarily is.”

The second is from this rule of the art of disputation [‘ars obligatoria’]: “When a false contingent is posited of the present instant, one must deny that it is.” Which rule he proves [Giles of Sherwood] by the fact that what is posited must be maintained as true; therefore it must be maintained for any instant for which it is possible; but it is not ‘a true possible’ for the instant for which it is posited, because if it were possible for that instant then it would be able to be true by motion or by change; but in neither way, because motion is not in an instant, and change is not in any instant for the opposite of what is then in it, because change and the end of change would be simultaneous.

Further, third: if for any instant there is power for something whose opposite is present, that power is either along with act or prior to act; not along with act, as is plain – nor prior to act, because then it would be for act in a different instant from that in which the power is present in it.

To the first of these I reply that that proposition of Aristotle can be categorical or hypothetical, just as also this one, ‘that an animal runs, if a man runs, is necessary’. This proposition, indeed, according as it is conditional, is to be distinguished according as ‘necessary’ can state the necessity of the consequence [sc. the whole ‘if...then...’ conditional] or the necessity of the consequent [sc. the ‘then...’]; in the first way it is true, in the second way it is false. According as it is categorical, the whole remark ‘...runs if man runs’ is predicated of animal along with the mode of necessity, – and this categorical [sc. ‘that an animal runs if man runs is necessary’] is true, because a predicate so determined [sc. ‘...runs if man runs’] is necessarily present in the subject, although it is not a predicate absolutely; and therefore to argue in that case from the predicate so determined to the predicate taken absolutely is the fallacy of in a certain respect and simply [sc. to argue: ‘that an animal runs if man runs is necessary, therefore that an animal runs is necessary’].

I say the same here, that if this proposition [sc. of Aristotle’s above] is taken as it is a hypothetical of time, the term ‘necessity’ indicates either the necessity of concomitance or the necessity of the concomitant; as it indicates the necessity of concomitance it is true [sc. ‘it is necessary that everything is when it is’], – as of the concomitant it is false [sc. ‘everything that is is necessary when it is’]. But if the proposition is taken as it is a categorical then the phrase ‘when it is’ does not determine the combination implicit in the phrase ‘[everything] that is’ but it determines the principal composition, which is signified by the phrase ‘is [necessary]’ – and then the predicate ‘is when it is’ is denoted as being said of the subject ‘that is’ along with the mode of necessity, and thus the proposition is true [sc. ‘it is necessary that everything that is is when it is’]; nor does the inference follow ‘therefore it is necessary’ [sc. ‘everything that is is necessary when it is’], but there is a fallacy of in a certain respect and simply in the other part [sc. from ‘is necessary

³⁶⁰ Tr. ‘Animal’ does necessarily belong to man, but to man qua man and not to man qua white.

when it is' to 'is necessary'.³⁶¹ No true sense of this proposition, then, denotes that the being of something – in the instant in which it is – is necessary, but only that it is necessary in a certain respect, namely when it is; along with this there stands the fact that, in the instant in which it is, it is simply contingent, and consequently that in that instant the opposite of it could be present.

To the second: that rule [of the art of disputation or 'ars obligatoria'] is false and the proof is not valid, for although what is posited should be maintained as true, yet it can be maintained for that instant without denying that the instant is one for which it is false, because this inference does not hold, 'it is false for that instant, therefore it is impossible', as the proof insinuates; and when it says 'if it can be true for the instant for which it is false, it can be made true for that instant either[by motion or change], etc.', I say that neither by this way nor by that, because the possibility for its truth is not a possibility along with succession (as one thing after another thing), but it is power for the opposite of that which is in something insofar as the power is naturally prior to the act.

To the third I say that there is power before the act; not 'before' in duration but 'before' in order of nature – because that which naturally precedes the act, as it naturally precedes the act, could be with the opposite of the act. And one must deny that every power is 'with act or before act', understanding the 'before' of priority in duration; but it is true when understanding by the 'before' priority of nature.

A fourth objection is raised against this [sc. the second distinction]:

That 'if it is able to will *a* for this instant and it does not will *a* for this instant, then it is able not to will *a* for this instant', because on a proposition about presence of the predicate in the subject there follows a proposition about possible presence; and then it seems to follow that it could will *a* and not will *a* at the same instant simultaneously.

To this I reply – according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5.1048a21-24 – that what has a power for opposites will do as it has the power to do; but not as it has a power of doing such that the mode is referred to the term of the power and not to the power itself, because I have a power at the same time for opposites but not for opposites at the same time.

Then I say that this inference does not hold '[a power] is able to will this in moment *a* and able not to will this in moment *a*, therefore it is able to will and not will this in moment *a*', because the power has ability for either of the opposites disjunctively at any instant, though not for both of them simultaneously; for just as there is a possibility for one of them, so there is for the not being of the other of them – and conversely, as it is for the latter so it is for the not being of the former. So it is not simultaneously for the being of this opposite and for the being of that, because a possibility for simultaneity would only exist if it were for both concurrently in the same instant, which is not got by the power's being for each divisively at the same instant.

An example of this is plain in permanent things: the inference 'this body can be in this place at instant *a*, and that body can be in the same place at instant *a*, therefore these two bodies can be together at instant *a*' is a non sequitur; for this body is able to be there in the way that that body is able not to be there (and conversely), and so the inference 'if there is a power for each at the same instant or place, then for both' does not hold, but it is fallacious whenever any one of the two excludes the other. For in this way too the inference 'I am able to carry this stone all day (let it be something portable, proportionate to my strength), and I am able to carry that stone all day, therefore I am able simultaneously to carry both' is a non sequitur; it is a non sequitur because here either of the two for which there is power divisively excludes the other. But simultaneity can never be inferred solely from the identity of this one instant or place, but there is need along with this for the two things said to be simultaneous to be conjoined with respect to a third.

b. How the Divine Will is Cause of Contingency in Things

Following on from what has just been said about our will, one must look at certain things about the divine will; and first, what it has liberty for; second what is the contingency with respect

³⁶¹ Nowadays logicians would explain this point by talking of the scope of the modal term 'necessary', that either it takes the whole proposition for its scope, so that it means: "the proposition 'everything is when it is' is necessary;" or it takes only the predicate for its scope, so that it means in effect: "everything that exists with necessary existence when it exists."

to willed things (the third, namely as to logical distinction of propositions, is the same here as there).

[What the divine will has liberty for] – As to the first point I say that the divine will is not indifferent as to diverse acts of willing and not willing, because this in our will was not without imperfection of will. Our will also was free for opposite acts so that it might be for opposite objects, because of the limitation of each act with respect to its object; therefore, once unlimitedness of the same volition to diverse objects is posited, there is no need, on account of liberty for opposite objects, to posit liberty for opposite acts. The divine will is also free for opposite effects, but this is not the first liberty, just as it is not the first in us either.

There remains then the liberty that is per se a matter of perfection without imperfection, namely to opposite objects such that, just as our will can, by diverse volitions, tend to diverse willed things, so the divine will can, by a single, unlimited, simple volition tend to any willed thing whatever, – so that, if the will or the volition were for only one will-able thing and could not be of the opposite (which is, however, of itself something will-able), this would be a mark of imperfection in the will, as was proved earlier about our will.

And although one can distinguish in us the will as it is receptive and as it is operative and as it is productive (for it is productive of acts, and by what it has it operates formally by willing, and it is receptive of its own volition), yet it seems to have liberty insofar as it is operative, namely insofar as ‘having freedom formally’ it can thereby tend to the object; so let liberty be thus posited in the divine will per se and first, insofar as it is an operative power, although it is not receptive nor productive of its own volition. And yet some freedom insofar as it is productive can be preserved in it; for although production in being of existence is not necessarily concomitant with its operation (because operation is in eternity and production of being is in time), yet production in willed being is necessarily concomitant to its operation; and this power of the divine will does not then indeed produce first as it is productive, but produces in a certain respect (namely in willed being), and this production is concomitant with it as it is operative.

[What the contingency of willed things is] – As to the second article, I say that the divine will has respect to nothing else as object than to its own essence; and this when considering it as it is a naturally prior tendency to the opposite. And not only is it naturally prior to its own act (as to its volition), but also insofar as it is willing, because just as our will, as naturally prior to its own act, elicits the act in such a way that it could in the same instant elicit the opposite, – so the divine will, insofar as it is naturally prior by volition alone, tends with such a tendency to the object contingently that it could in the same instant tend to the opposite object; and this both by logical potency, which is the non-repugnance of the terms (as was said of our will), and by real power, which is naturally prior to its act.

B. How along with the Contingency of Things there stands the Certainty of Divine Knowledge

Having looked at the contingency of things as to existence, and this when considering it with respect to the divine will – it remains to look at the second principal point, how the certitude of knowledge stands along with it.

This can be posited in two ways:

In one way by the fact that the divine intellect, when seeing the determination of the divine will, sees that this thing will be at time *a*, because the will determines it will be at that time; for it knows the will is immutable and cannot be prevented.

Or in a second way. Because the former way seems to posit a certain discursiveness in the divine intellect (as if it concludes from intuiting the determination of the will and its immutability that this thing will be), one can posit in a second way that the divine intellect either offers [sc. to the will] the simple terms of which the union is contingent in reality, or – if it offers the proposition uniting them – if offers it as neutral to itself; and the will, by choosing one side, namely the conjunction of these terms for some ‘now’ in reality, makes the following to be determinately true: ‘this will exist at moment *a*’. But when this ‘determinately true’ is in existence, the essence is the reason for the divine intellect of understanding this truth, and this naturally (as far as it is on the part of the essence), so that, just as the divine intellect naturally understands all necessary principles in advance as it were of an act of the divine will (because the truth of them does not depend on the intellect’s act and because they would be known by the divine intellect if,

per impossibile, there was not something willing them), so the divine essence is the reason of knowing them in that prior stage, because they are then true; not indeed that the truths – nor even their terms – move the divine intellect to apprehend such truth (because then the divine intellect would be cheap, because then the truth would be revealed by something other than its own essence), but the divine essence is the reason of knowing the terms just as also for knowing the sort of propositions that join them; but then they are not true contingents, because there is then nothing by which they may have determinate truth; but when the determination of the divine will has been posited, they are then true in that instant, and the same thing – the same as was in the first moment – will be the reason for the divine intellect of knowing the things that are now true in the second instant and that would have been known in the first instant, if they had then been in the first instant.

An example: it is just as if ‘a single act always in place’ in my seeing power is the reason of seeing the object, if now this color is present by another thing presenting it and now that color, – my eye will see now this, now that, and yet there will, through the same vision, be only a difference in priority and posteriority of seeing, because it is of the object that is first or later presented; and if one color were made present naturally and the other freely, there would be no difference formally in my vision so to prevent the eye, for its part, from seeing both naturally, yet it could see one contingently and the other naturally, insofar as one is made present to it contingently and the other necessarily.

In whichever of these ways the divine intellect is posited as knowing the existence of things, it is plain that – according to each of them – there is a determination of the divine intellect to the existent thing to which the divine will is determined, and that there is a certitude of infallibility (because the will cannot be determined without the intellect determinately apprehending what the will determines), and also an immutability (because both the will and the intellect are immutable, from distinction 8 n.293), – and this in response to the first three questions [at the beginning]. And yet along with these [sc. determination, infallibility, immutability] there stands contingency of the known object, because the will, when it determinately wills this, contingently wills it – from the first article [sc. of Scotus’ own response to the questions].

As to the fourth question [sc. whether God necessarily knows every condition of existence of everything], it seems one should perhaps distinguish this proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ according to a composite and a divided sense – as that in the composite sense necessity of knowledge is indicated as it passes over to the object, and in the divided sense necessity of knowledge is indicated absolutely, which knowledge however does pass over to this object; in the first way it is false, in the second way true.

However such a distinction does not seem a logical one, because, when the act passes over to the object, there seems to be no distinction as to the act absolutely or as to it as it passes over to the object, – to wit, if I say ‘I see Socrates’, because there may be a distinction either as to sight as it passes over to Socrates or as to sight absolutely, which sight is however of Socrates; and just as there is in the former case [sc. in the proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’] no distinction in a proposition about mere assertion [sc. ‘God knows *a*’], so neither does there seem to be a distinction when the modal term is appended [sc. ‘(God) necessarily (knows *a*)’], but a distinction only seems necessary if the act passes over to the object necessarily; and so this proposition ‘God necessarily knows *a*’ should, it seems, simply be denied, because of the fact that the predicate as so determined [sc. ‘necessarily knows’] does not necessarily belong to the subject, although the non-determined predicate [sc. ‘knows’, without the ‘necessarily’] does belong to it.

An objection against this is that a rational act is not canceled by the matter it passes over to; for a ‘to say’ which passes over to ‘[I say] that I am saying nothing’ is as simply a ‘to say’ as when it passes over to ‘[I say] that I am saying something’; and therefore the inference ‘I say that I am saying nothing, therefore I say [something]’ follows just as does the inference ‘I say that I am sitting, therefore I say [something]’. Therefore, in the case of God, ‘to know’ is not so canceled by the matter it passes over to that it prevents an equal necessity [sc. that it prevents adding ‘necessarily’ to ‘God knows’].

In response to this objection. Although the proposition [about God’s knowledge] is not so canceled that it stands only in a certain respect, yet it can fail to have necessity as it is signified to pass over to the matter (although it has necessity in itself), and this if an act that is most powerful in itself has respect to diverse objects; it is just as if I had an act of speaking that was the same as a

motive power, and if the act could pass over to diverse objects contingently – although I would have the act necessarily (just as I would also have the power necessarily), yet I would not necessarily have the act as it is a passing over to such an object; nor does the inference hold ‘I am speaking necessarily, therefore I am necessarily saying this’, nay there could be a necessity of the speaking in itself along with a contingency in respect of the object; yet saying this object would be a saying simply, such that it would not be a saying in a certain respect.

III. To the Principal Arguments

To the principal arguments, in order.

To the first one for the first question, I say that there is not a like truth in propositions about the future as about those of the present and the past. In present and past ones, indeed, there is determinate truth, such that one extreme has been posited, – and, as understood to be posited, it is not in the power of the cause that it be posited or not posited, because although it is in the power of the cause ‘as it is naturally prior to the effect’ to posit or not to posit the effect, yet not as the effect is understood to have already been posited in existence. But there is no such determination on the part of the future, because even if one side is determinately true for some intellect (and even if one side is true in itself, determinately, although no intellect should apprehend it), yet not in such a way that it is not in the power of the cause at that instant to posit the opposite. And this lack of determination suffices for deliberating and bothering about things; if neither side were future, there would be no need to bother or deliberate – therefore, the fact that one side is future, while yet the other side could happen, does not impede deliberation and bothering about things.

To the second argument I say that for knowledge to be of one part such that it could not be of the other does posit imperfection in it – and similarly in the case of will, if one posit that it is of one will-able object such that it could not be of another will-able object; yet for knowledge to be of one side such that it is not in fact of the other (and likewise in the case of the will) posits no imperfection, the way a power in act is determinately of one opposite – which it produces – and not of the other. But a power is dissimilar to knowledge and will in this respect, that a power seems to be asserted of one opposite only because it only has power for it, and knowledge and will [are asserted of one opposite] such that they only know it or will it; but if things are taken in like manner on each side, there is equal determination on each side, because each of them in act is of one opposite and not both. Any of them can also be of each, but that the power is of one, this seems to signify a potential disposition of the power to it, – that knowledge or will are of it, seems to signify an actual disposition of them to it; but nothing bad seems to follow if things are taken in like way both here and there, because then, just as ‘to know’ is to knowledge and ‘to will’ is to will, so is ‘to produce’ to power (but not ‘able to produce’), and just as ‘able to produce’ is to power so is ‘able to know’ to knowledge and ‘able to will’ to will.

To the second argument for the second question I say that although on the two propositions about presence of the predicate in the subject the conclusion about the presence of the predicate follows (not indeed syllogistically, because the discussion is not syllogistic, reducible to many syllogisms), yet from the one proposition about presence and from the other about possibility a conclusion about presence follows neither syllogistically nor necessarily; the reason is that ‘to be deceived’ is to think a thing other than it is, at the time when it is believed to be. Now this is included in the two premises about presence, one of which signifies that he believes this and the other denies that this is the case, and this at the same instant, – and therefore the conclusion about being deceived follows. But it is not so on the other side, because the premise about presence affirms one opposite for that instant, and the other about possibility affirms a potential for the other opposite, not at the same instant conjointly but divisively, – and so it does not follow that at any instant there can be a conjunction in reality of the opposite of what is believed; and therefore a possibility of deception, which includes this conclusion, does not follow. The same reasoning holds of a mixed argument of a premise about a contingent and one about presence, that it does not hold unless the major is about presence simply.

This response is also plain, because if an argument is made from the opposite of the conclusion and from the premise about possibility, the opposite is not inferred save of something of necessity, and so the major should be really the same as that about the necessary in order for the conclusion to be inferred; for this inference does not hold ‘God cannot be deceived, and it is

possible that *a* will be, therefore God does not know that *a* will be', but what follows is 'therefore he does not know necessarily that *a* will be'; the point is clear, because if my intellect always followed change in the thing, such that when you are sitting I believe you are sitting and when you rise up I believe you rise up, I could not be deceived, and yet from these premises 'you are sitting at moment *a*' and 'I cannot be deceived' all that follows is 'therefore I do not know necessarily you are sitting at moment *a*'. So it is in the issue at hand: although the divine intellect does not follow the thing as an effect the cause, yet there is concomitance there, because just as it is possible for the thing not to be, so it is possible for the divine intellect not to know it – and so the conclusion never follows that the divine intellect knows the thing other than it is; and therefore the things required for deception can never stand together at the same time, but just as the known thing is able not to be, so God is able not to know it, – and if it will not be, he will not know it.

As to the second, about the positing of the possible in actual presence, I say that from this positing in itself nothing impossible ever follows; yet the proposition about presence, insofar as the one about the possible is posited, can be repugnant to something to which the one about the possible, when posited in existence, is not repugnant, because the antecedent can be repugnant to something to which the consequent is not repugnant – and then from the antecedent and from what is repugnant to it something impossible can follow that does not follow from the consequent and from that same repugnant one, because this is not impossible with it. Nor is it surprising that the impossible may follow from impossibles, because according to the Philosopher *Prior Analytics* 2.15.64b7-10, 15-16, in the case of a syllogism 'from opposites' an impossible conclusion does follow.

I say then that when the proposition 'it is possible for me not to be sitting' is posited, nothing impossible follows from it alone; but from it and another one – namely 'God knows that I will be sitting' – the impossible does follow, namely that God is deceived; and this impossible does not follow from the impossibility of what is posited in being, nor even from any impossibility that is absolute in it, but from itself and from something else at the same time, which is impossible. Nor is it unacceptable for what is impossible to follow from a proposition about presence, insofar as one about possibility and one about presence are posited – because along with 'I am sitting' there stands 'it is possible for me to be standing'; but the former one about presence, to the extent the latter [about possibility] is posited, is repugnant to the one about presence [sc. 'I am standing'] – and from two propositions about presence something impossible does follow, namely 'someone standing is sitting'. Nor yet does the inference follow 'therefore the one that was posited about possibility in being was false', but either it was false or the other (along with which the first's about presence [sc. 'I am standing'] is taken) is impossible with the first's about presence.

As to the first argument for the third question, I concede the major, because there is no transition without change – but in the minor I say that here there is no transition (nor can there be), because transition is impossible without succession, such that opposite succeed to opposite; but such succession is impossible in the issue at hand; for just as it is impossible to know and not know at the same time, so too that [God] sometimes knows and sometimes does not know cannot stand together, – without which transition successively from opposite to opposite there is no change.

And if you ask 'if it is at any rate possible for him not to know *b*, which he does know, he would be differently disposed, – what is that?', I say that it is *b* in known being; yet he is not differently disposed than he was before, but differently than he now is disposed, such that the 'differently' would not be of some opposite succeeding to opposite, but it would be of the other of the opposites which can be present in the same instant in which its opposite is present, – and this does not suffice for change.

To the second: the inference 'he does not know *a*, he can know *a*, therefore he can begin to know *a*' is not valid, and this when there is power precisely for something naturally prior to the opposite of the posterior, at the same instant at which and in which this 'posterior' has contingent being, as in the issue at hand; only it holds because of matter in creatures, where there is potentiality for opposites successively – but although it is not the case, yet there is still a possibility for each of them in the same instant.

To the third, one can concede, as concerns this argument, that this power for opposites is an active power, – namely that the divine intellect, insofar as it is in act by its essence and by

actual infinite intellection, is an active power with respect to any objects that it produces in understood being.

And when it says ‘therefore it cannot act about anything about which it did not act before unless it changes’, I say that the consequence is not valid when it requires an object about which to act; just as in the case of created agents, it is not necessary that the agent – which acts *de novo* – be changed if the passive thing on which it acts comes to be *de novo* next to it. So it is in the issue at hand. The divine will, determining a ‘will be’ for something shown by the intellect, makes a proposition stating it to be true and so intelligible; from this it is present to the intellect in idea of object. And just as the will can make and not make the willed object, so can it be true and not true, and so can it be known and not known by the natural intellect; not indeed because of some contingency that is prior in the natural agent, but because of contingency on the part of the object, which is contingently true by act of the will that verifies it.

And if you object that still it cannot be without change, at least in the understood object (just as neither can a passive natural object come near to a natural agent without change in the passive object, and perhaps in the agent that brings it near) – I reply that this object is not changed in this being, because it cannot be under opposites successively; yet it is contingently in this being, and this contingency is on the part of the will producing it in such being, as was made clear in the first article of the solution.

To the arguments for the fourth question.

As to the first, I deny the consequence.

As to the first proof, I say that if there is in God no necessity but that of immutability (that is, no other mode of necessity among those posited by the Philosopher, *Metaphysics* 5.5.1015a33-35, than the fourth one, according to which it is a ‘not happening to be otherwise disposed’, – because the other modes of necessity require imperfection, as the necessity of coercion etc.), yet there is not there only a necessity of immutability such that the immutability is of itself necessary, because immutability only takes away a possible succession of opposite to opposite; but necessity simply takes away absolutely the possibility of this opposite and the non-succession of the opposite to it, – and the inference does not hold ‘the opposite cannot succeed to the opposite, therefore the opposite cannot be present’.

To the second proof, I say that although every being of existence ‘able to come to be’ is changeable, when positing that creation according to the understanding of Avicenna – even from eternity – is change, yet in understood being or willed being (which is to be in a certain respect) there is no need for every possibility that is repugnant to ‘necessity of itself’ formally to entail mutability, because this being is not real being but is reduced to the real being of something in itself necessary, because of which other’s necessity there cannot here be mutability, although the ‘necessity of itself’ of this other does not formally belong to the former; and so it is not of itself necessary formally, because it does not have the being of the extreme which it has regard to really – nor yet is it changeable, because it has, according to that ‘diminished being’, regard to the immutable extreme, and change in something according to which it has regard to another cannot exist without change in it.

As to the second argument, I say that something can be present in God in two ways: either formally, – or present subjectively, the way logically any predicate is said to be present in its subject. I concede the major in the first way, because everything such is God and is necessarily the same as God; in the second way I do not concede it, because a relative appellation can be in God according as God is said to be ‘Lord’ from time, and yet this appellation does not signify anything the same as God (such that it is necessarily the same as God or is God himself), because then it would not be from time. Now I say that for God to know *b*, by reason of the fact that it is a ‘to know absolutely’, is to know formally – but, by reason of ‘to know’ as it is of this term, it is only in God in the second way; for it is of this term because this known thing has a regard to divine knowledge, and hereby some relative appellation is in God as a predicate in a subject.

To the third I say that no ‘perfection simply’ in God depends on a creature, nor does it even necessarily simply co-require a creature, in any being whatever; and so for God to know *b*, as he is understood not only ‘to know’ absolutely but also insofar as he passes over to the *b*, is not a perfection simply. Then I say that the major of the argument is true of the perfection of that knowledge when the perfection is taken absolutely; but in this way the minor is false and its proof only proves that on a perfection simply follows necessarily that it is of such an object, because it

follows necessarily that it have such a respect to such a perfection simply – although however neither from such respect of something else to it, nor from a relative appellation of it, is there a perfection simply in it.

To the arguments for the fifth question.

As to the first, I say that the antecedent is not necessary simply. And when the proof is given that ‘a rational act is not canceled by the matter’, the response to that proof is in the argument made against the solution to this question.

As to the second. The mixed argument is not valid unless the minor is about presence simply, and this not only in that it is true for all time, but in that it is necessarily true; and perhaps it must be that it signify that what is taken ‘under’ is per se contained under the middle term (it is enough for the issue at hand that it should be necessarily true). And that this is required is plain in this instance ‘everything at rest is of necessity not in motion – a stone at the center of the earth is at rest, therefore of necessity it is not in motion’; the conclusion does not follow, and yet the minor is always true, – not however necessarily true. So it is in the issue at hand: for although the minor about presence is always true, it is not however necessarily true; for God can know *a* as he cannot will *a*, because of the contingency that is first in the will to secondary objects and is, from this, concomitantly in the intellect, as was expounded above.

IV. To the Arguments for the Second Opinion

To the arguments for the second opinion.

To the first I concede that immensity is present to every place, but not to every place actual and potential (as is argued in the first reason against this opinion), and so neither will eternity because of its infinity be present to any non-existent time.

And from this is plain the example about the stick and the stream. For because the stick does not have that whereby it can be present to all parts of the water, therefore it cannot be immense with respect to them; but the ‘now’ of eternity does have this, as far as concerns its own part, because it would be present to all parts of time if these parts existed.

The other example ‘about circle and circumference’ is like the opposite one [sc. about the stick and stream]. Because if we imagine a straight line having two end points *a* and *b*, let point *a* be stationary and point *b* be moved round in a circle (as in the case of a compass where one leg is stationary and the other moves), and let *b* when moved around cause a circumference as imagined by geometers, who imagine that a moving point causes a line; on this supposition, if nothing were to remain of the circumference from the moving of *b*, but there is only this point *b* in the circumference (so that whenever the point ceases to be anywhere there is then nothing of the circumference there), then the circumference is never simultaneously present to the center, but only some point of the circumference would be present to the center; but if the whole circumference were simultaneous, the whole would be present to the center. So here: since time is not a standing but a flowing circumference, of which circumference there is nothing but an instant in act – so nothing of it will be present to eternity (which is as it were the center) save the instant which is as it were the present; and yet if *per impossibile* one were to posit that the whole of time were standing simultaneously, the whole would be present to eternity as to the center.

From this is plain an answer to the other argument. When it is said that the ‘now’ of eternity, as it co-exists, does not equal the ‘now’ of time – this is true, because the ‘now’ of eternity is formally infinite, and therefore it formally exceeds the ‘now’ of time; not however by co-existing with another ‘now’. Just as: the immensity of God – present to this universe – is not co-equal with this universe, and so exceeds it formally; but yet it is not anywhere save in this universe.

From the same point is plain a response to the next: because if the whole of time were simultaneous, eternity would embrace it, – and so I concede that eternity, as it is of itself, has infinity enough for embracing the whole of time if the whole were simultaneous; but however much immensity is posited on the part of one extreme, because of which it could co-exist with however much in the other extreme, since co-existence states a relation between two extremes (and so it requires both), one cannot, because of the immensity of one extreme, conclude to co-existence with the other extreme save only with what exists of the other extreme.

[Additional note: Hence there is in the argument a fallacy of the consequent, since the argument goes ‘nothing is lost to eternity from the fact that the whole of time is not simultaneous, therefore it can, because of its infinity, be simultaneous with all the parts of time’. For that it is not present to every part of time can be understood for two causes: either because the whole of time is not, or because something is lost to eternity; and in the antecedent one cause is denied – therefore the fallacy follows. Example: although nothing is lost to someone who is white when there is someone else who is white, yet he is never alike unless there is someone else who is white.]

And therefore all these arguments proceed from what is insufficient, namely from the immensity of eternity, – from which there does not follow a co-existence that states a relation to the other extreme unless something is had in the other extreme that could be the term of co-existence with this foundation; and such cannot be a non-being, of the sort that all time is save the present.

V. To the Authorities of the Saints

All the authorities of the saints, that seem to signify that all things are present to eternity, must be understood of presence in the idea of knowable; and not merely ‘knowable’ as by abstractive knowledge (as a non-existent rose is present to my intellect through an image), but by true intuitive knowledge, because God does not know made things differently from to be made things, and so things to be made are perfectly presently known by the divine intellect just as made things are.

VI. To the Arguments for the Third Opinion

To the first argument for the third opinion: Boethius expounds himself in the same place directly; for there he at once immediately distinguishes between the necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence, and from this I concede that contingent things ‘related to divine knowledge’ are necessary by the necessity of the consequence (that is, this consequence is necessary, ‘if God knows that these things will be, these things will be’); but they are not necessary with absolute necessity, nor with the necessity of the consequent.

To the other one for the third opinion, I say that contingency is not only a privation or defect of entity (as deformity is in the act that is a sin), rather contingency is a positive mode of being (as necessity is another mode), and a positive being – which is in the effect – is more principally from the prior cause; and therefore this inference does not hold ‘just as deformity is in the act itself from the second cause, not from the first cause, so also is contingency;’ nay, contingency is from the first cause more originally than from the second, – for which reason no caused thing would be formally contingent unless it was contingently caused by the first cause, as was shown above.

Fortieth Distinction

Single Question

Whether a Predestined Person can be Damned

1. About the fortieth distinction I ask whether a predestined person can be damned. That he cannot be:

Everything past is simply necessary, because – according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 6.2.1139b9-11 – “God is deprived of this alone, to make undone what has been done;” but the predestination of this predestined person has transitioned into the past, because God predestined him from eternity; therefore it is simply necessary. Therefore God cannot not predestinate him, and consequently he cannot be damned.

2. Further, if a predestined person could be damned, this would only be through his own act; therefore by an act of a created will an act of the divine will could be impeded, which is impossible

3. On the contrary:

If a predestined person cannot be damned, then no one need take care to observe the precepts and the counsels, because however he acts he will be saved, if he is predestined – and however he acted, if he is fore-known, he would be damned. The whole divine law then is set down in vain!

I. To the Question

4. To this question.

‘Predestination’ properly states an act of the divine will, namely ordination by the divine will of a choice of some intellectual or rational creature for grace and glory, although it can be taken for the act of intellect concomitant with that choice. Therefore, as has been said in general about liberty and contingency in the divine will with respect to certain special secondary objects [see preceding interpolation for dd. 38-39], so should one say with respect to this secondary object, that is ‘to will for this person grace and glory’.

5. And from this I say (because of what was said in the preceding question [sc. the preceding interpolation]) that God contingently predestines him whom he has predestined, and he is able not to predestine him, – not both at the same time or successively, but each divisively, in the instant of eternity.

6. I say likewise to the question in itself, that he who is predestined could be damned; for his will is not confirmed because of his predestination, – and thus he can sin, and thus by parity of reason he can stand finally in sin and so be justly damned; but just as he is able to be damned so he is able not to be predestined.

7. But as to the logic of the proposed proposition, one must distinguish it according to composition and division; and in the composite sense the *per se* extreme is a man or person predestined, under the determination ‘predestined’, – and this sense is false; and in the divided sense too there are two categoricals, and of a person able to be beatified is asserted in one categorical ‘to be predestined’ and in the other ‘able to be damned’, – and these two are true of the same subject. They are not for this reason true, that opposites can be simultaneous, nor even because one can succeed the other (because each exists in eternity), but they are true simultaneously insofar as the divine volition is considered as naturally prior to its passage over this object, which is ‘glory for this person’; in that prior stage there is naturally no repugnance for the divine will to be of the opposite object, nay, it could be of the opposite equally, though not of both simultaneously.

II. To the Principal Arguments

8. To the first argument [n.1] I say that it proceeds from a false imagination, the understanding of which imagination helps to understand the truth of the proposed question; for if *per impossibile* we were to understand that God had still not determined his will to one of the two sides, but was as it were deliberating whether he wished to

predestine this person or not, our intellect could well grasp that he would contingently predestine or not predestine him, as is plain in an act of our will; but because we always go back to an act of the divine will as if it were past, for that reason we do not as it were conceive the liberty in the divine will for an act that has as it were already been posited by the will. But this imagination is false; for the ‘now’ of eternity, in which the act exists, is always present; and so one must have an understanding of the divine will or its volition, as it is of this object, the way one would if *per impossibile* God were now to begin to have a will in this ‘now’, – and thus God can in the ‘now’ of eternity freely will what he wills, as if his will were not determined to anything.

9. Then I say to the form of the argument [n.1] that predestination of this sort does not transition into the past. For although it co-existed with the past, which has transitioned, yet it itself is not past, – but the other things are past which co-existed with it. Hence, as was said in distinction 9 n.17, verbs of diverse times when said of God – to the extent they most truly belong to him – do not signify parts of time measuring the act, but they co-signify the ‘now’ of eternity as if measuring the act insofar as it co-exists with those many parts of time; and so, for God it is the same thing to predestine, to have predestined, and to be about to predestine, and so one of these is as contingent as the other, because there is nothing save the ‘now’ of eternity measuring the act, – which is neither present nor past nor future, but co-existent with all of these.

10. To the second [n.2] I say that a created will cannot impede the ordination of the divine will, because there would be no ‘to impede’ unless the purpose of the divine will stood and the opposite came about through another will; but this is impossible, because just as a created will can merit damnation, so too can there concomitantly follow that the divine will would not pre-ordain it to glory. Hence it was said in the preceding distinction (in the solution of the first argument to the second question [in the interpolation above]) that God cannot be deceived, because his intellection with respect to something cannot stand with the opposite of it; so too his will cannot be impeded, because the ordination of it cannot stand with the opposite of what it has ordained.

Forty First Distinction

Single Question

Whether there is any Merit of Predestination or Reprobation

1. About the forty first distinction I ask whether there is any merit of predestination or reprobation.

That there is:

Because if by his will alone – without any reason – God were to predestine this person and reprobate that one, then he would seem not to be supremely good, because not supremely generous and communicative; for he could equally communicate his good to him whom he does not predestine; by the fact that – without any reason in something else – he has by his sole generosity predestined that person, so he could predestine this one.

2. Further, if two people, equal in natural endowments, are apprehended by his intellect, and by sole act of will – without any reason on their part – he reprobates this one and predestines that one, then there seems to be acceptance of persons; because although they are equal as concerns their own part and equally capable of being ordered to the end, he does not equally love them for that end; for ‘to have acceptance of persons’ seems to be to prefer this person to that one for the end for which he is not of himself more to be preferred. But the consequent is impossible, and contrary to Peter in *Acts* 10.34: “In truth,” he says, “I find that there is no acceptance of persons with God.”

3. On the contrary:

Romans 9.11-13: “Although they were not yet born, or had done anything good or bad, so that the election of grace might remain according to his purpose,” – look there.

4. Further, 9.21: he gives an example about a potter, who from the same mass of clay can form one vessel for honor and one for contempt – from which he seems to argue by similarity about the predestination of one and the reprobation of another.

I. To the Question

A. First Opinion, Proposed and Retracted by Augustine

5. About this question Augustine once thought that although good works in the fore-knowledge of God are not the reason of predestining, yet faith is in his fore-knowledge the reason for predestining – as is plain from him *On the Epistle to the Romans* (the one namely where he intends that because of the faith – which God fore-knew – by which Jacob would believe and because of the infidelity of Esau God preferred Jacob and not Esau), and is contained in the text [of Lombard]. But Augustine retracts this in *Retractions* I ch.23, indicating his reason against it ‘because faith is a gift of God just as are also other good works’ (which is proved by the Apostle *1 Corinthians* 7.25); hence Augustine says that ‘I would not have said that, if I had known to number faith among the gifts of the Holy Spirit’.

B. Second Opinion, Proposed by Peter Lombard

6. The master seems to think that there is altogether no merit of predestination or reprobation; and he seems to rely precisely on the authority of the Apostle [n.3] and on the statement of Augustine *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38: “Not because,” he says, “he knew that we would be such did he choose us, but so that we might become such through his choice.”

7. And the Master adduces the authority of Augustine against himself [n.6] saying in *83 Diverse Questions* q.68 n.4: “On whom he wills,” he says, “he has mercy, and whom he wills he hardens” [cf. *Romans* 9.18]; but this will of God cannot be unjust; for it comes from very hidden merits, because although sinners themselves, because of general sin, have made one mass, yet there is some diversity between them; for something precedes in sinners by which, although they are not yet justified, they are made worthy of justification – and again, there precedes in other sinners that whereby they are worthy of being dulled.”

8. The Master replies that this authority [n.7] seems to have been retracted by Augustine by similarity when what he said on *Romans* was retracted [n.5]; and the

Master confirms this by the fact Augustine retracts certain things he added in the same question [n.7], as is plain in *Retractions* I ch.26, – and what he added seems to agree with this opinion [n.7], from which it also seems he retracted this opinion.

9. But against this response of the Master – about the retraction of his authority on *Romans* [n.8] – an objection might be made that Augustine published the book on *Romans* when he was priest, but the book *83 Questions* he did not have compiled before he was bishop; therefore it does not seem that when he retracts something from the first book he is retracting something from the second, because to retract something said before – when he knew less – is not to retract something said later, when he knew more.

10. But this argument [n.9] is not compelling, because although he wrote one book before another, yet he produced the *Retractions* at one time (and at that time he had had both those books published), and an opinion stated in one book he could retract in other books, whether earlier or later published. For it appears that all those books – about which he makes mention – he had published before the book of *Retractions*, and yet if in the first chapter of the first book of the *Retractions* he had retracted another opinion which he had stated in some other book, published later indeed and retracted, he would not again have to repeat the retraction of the opinion in some chapter assigned to another book later published. Hence he says in book 1 chapter 3 retracting the opinion ‘God, whom sense does not know’: “An addition should have been made,” he says, “so that it would say ‘whom the sense of the mortal body’ does not know;” and he subjoins: “Nor need I continuously repeat what I also already said above, but this is to be recalled wherever this opinion is found in my writings.” Therefore when the opinion was asserted in a book retracted and published before, he retracts the same opinion as asserted in books published later rather than the reverse.

11. But one can in another way argue against the exposition of the Master, – because no place is found where Augustine retracts those words; because, as the Master himself admits (and as is true), after the words he adduces [n.8] there are other words that follow that he retracts (from that question 68) in *Retractions* I ch.25 – and these other words he does not retract; but it seems that if he did intend those words to be retracted, he would not begin from the following words while omitting those.

C. Third Opinion

12. [Exposition of the opinion] – In another way “it is said that whatever God does with respect to creatures, he does only by the good pleasure of his will, and for this no reason or cause needs to be sought.”

13. “The point is confirmed by what is said in *Romans* 9.11-2 about Jacob and Esau: “When they were not yet born, or had done anything bad or good, so that the purpose of God by election might stand, – not from works;”³⁶² the Gloss: ‘just as not for preceding merits, so not for future ones, because good and bad merits were not future without grace added or removed’.”

14. “Which also the Apostle makes clear when he subjoins, 9.21: “Or does not the potter have power from the same lump, etc.” Hence just as the will alone of the potter is the reason that from this part of the lump he makes an honorable vessel and from that part a vessel of contempt, while no difference exists in the lump (just as neither in prime

³⁶² The Vatican editors refer to Aquinas *ST I* q.23 a.5.

matter, which however the agent cause clothes in one part with a nobler form but in another with a less noble one), thus the good pleasure alone of God is the reason that from the same mass – equally vitiated in our first parent – he chose this one for glory, but that one he leaves for condemnation; or even if the lump had not been vitiated but all were equal, he would only gratuitously choose one, while another he would leave – in both cases giving grace to him whom he chose (but a greater grace than for one chosen from the vitiated lump), and justice to him whom he did not choose from the damned mass, but not injustice to him whom, though existing in a state of innocence, he did not choose” [from Henry of Ghent].

15. Further, “this position [n.12] says that there happens to be an extrinsic reason assigned that God from the whole lost lump wanted in mercy to free some and not others, but there is no reason that he chose this one rather than that.”

16. “A reason is posited for the first, namely so that his goodness – existing simple in himself – might be manifested in manifold ways in diverse things at the same time, by the fact that in no one thing can the whole be manifested, because it does not reach the divine perfection; so just as for the perfection of the universe are required diverse grades of things in material reality (even from the same matter, equally disposed to all forms), so too for manifesting the same goodness diverse grades in moral reality are required for perfection, because in this his goodness as to any supernatural degree would be manifested; for in justly punishing the reprobate the goodness of his justice is manifested, as the goodness of his mercy is manifested in the glorified.”

17. “For thus does God permit these evils to come to be, so that goods not be impeded (but that they may happen), and this both in moral reality, as in the issue at hand – and in natural reality, as in the man born blind (*John* 9.3), in whom Christ showed that the sole reason was that the glory of God might be manifest in him; but this is not from the defect of sight in the blindness, but from the marvelous illumining of him by the Lord.”

18. “And it seems that this reason is assigned by the Apostle in *Romans* 9.22-23 when he says: “God wishing to show the anger of his justice etc.,” with which the example of the potter agrees, who makes from the same clay one vessel for honor and another for contempt [n.14], about which in *2 Timothy* 2.20 the Apostle says: ‘Now in a large house not only gold and silver vessels, but also earthenware’.” [Henry of Ghent]

19. About the second [n.15] – namely in particular – “it is said that (as in natural reality), since the whole of prime matter is uniform, an intrinsic reason that one part is under the form of fire and another under the form of earth can be assigned (namely the perfection of the universe), and an extrinsic one (namely the manifestation of the power and goodness of God), but no reason can be assigned that this part of matter is under this form, and that part under that form and not conversely, save the sole will of the artificer who so determines things; just as in human works, that this stone is so fashioned as to be placed in an altar but another placed in a privy (according to what the Philosopher says *Physics* 26.197b9-11, that some stones are fortunate but others not), this depends on the mere choice of the artificer; so do they say in the issue at hand, that there is no reason in particular that he prefers this person and not that.” And this “is confirmed by Augustine on *John* 6.44: ‘No one comes to me unless my Father draw him etc.’, where Augustine says: ‘Why he draws this one and not that one, do not wish to judge if you do not wish to err’.” [from Aquinas].

20. “And they say from this that the fact God thus makes inequality for equal things is not iniquity – because in things that happen by grace, without debt, the giver can without any iniquity give as he wishes, according to the remark of *Matthew* 20.14-15: ‘Take what is your own, and depart; am I not permitted to do what I wish?’ But it would then be iniquity if it were given from debt.” [Henry of Ghent]

21. [Rejection of the opinion] – Against this opinion, someone argues – first against the reason that is assigned in general [n.16]:

For no defect of guilt or penalty belongs of itself to the perfection of the universe; therefore neither is it per se required for the manifestation of divine goodness. And from this it is plain that the differences of things in natural and moral being are not similar, because all the species of things – distinct in natural being – belong to the perfection of the universe; it is not so, as to moral being, between good and bad or between the blessed and the miserable.

22. Again, he argues that if the damnation of some is necessary for the manifestation of divine justice, the damnation of demons seems sufficient for this; for men and demons, and guilt and penalty, do not seem to differ by species in moral being; but a plurality of individuals does not per se belong to the perfection of the universe. Or if you say that in some way divine justice is manifested in these and those when punished – on the contrary: so would divine mercy be manifested in several ways, if God had glorified some men (or if he had beatified some, either men or angels) without merits, which he did not do; however it would seem to belong to the perfection of divine goodness for God’s mercy rather to be manifested in many ways than God’s justice.

23. In addition, he argues that it does not seem God intentionally permits sins to come to be so that he may later punish them, because it does not seem that by anyone’s intention ‘evils done’ are more to be permitted to come to be than evils to be done, because no evil of guilt or penalty can be intended per se insofar as it is evil. – And if it be said that “the will in giving permission is in no way borne to evil but only to permission, so as to intend to permit evil by reason of a part,” he argues that at any rate “it is not manifest how God by intention would wish one and not the other.” Hence it does not seem that God by intention permits evil, but only so that good may happen; this is plain in the man born blind, whom God permitted to be born blind, not so as to be glorified in the man’s blindness but in the marvelous illumining; this is also plain in natural things; for God does not intend defect, but if second causes are impotent, he permits the effect be of the sort that the causes can produce; in the case of men, too, we see that he who permits someone to sin himself sins if he could prohibit or impede it. Therefore this is not to be posited in God.

24. In addition, against the second member (namely that there is no reason in the special case [nn.15, 19]), – because the example is not similar; for in matter as it is bare, there cannot be a difference why it should be thus disposed to such or such a form (as neither in a lump of clay with respect to diverse vessels [n.14]), but in the case of men it seems possible for some diverse disposition to be found why being predestined should fit this person and not that person, just as in the case of matter ‘not as bare matter’ there is a proximate disposition for it to be under another form (as is plain about wine and vinegar), but it would not have been proximately disposed to the later form if it had not been under the prior form.

25. And as to the fact that they adduce Apostle [n.18] for themselves, he says (according to the Gloss there) that the Apostle says this “not because of wanting means for giving a reason but to repress the rashness of the incapable;” “nor is the case similar in the Apostle’s example” – about the lump of clay and the potter – “save on the part of the end, but not on the part of the subject,” because in the case of the end in choice there can be a difference of the subject, but not in the case of the subject; and as far as this is concerned, there is a more fitting example from the Apostle in *2 Timothy* which he posits about silver and gold vessels [n.18], “because there is a difference there in the subject whereby earthen vessels are made for greater contempt, wooden vessels for lesser contempt, gold vessels for greater honor and silver vessels for lesser honor.”

D. Fourth Opinion

26. [Exposition of the opinion] – He [Henry] rejects this opinion [nn.21-25] and speaks in another way, and this as follows:

A divine act can be considered as it is from God the agent or as it is received in some passive thing or as it has a term in some object.

27. In the first way there is no reason for the divine action; neither as end, save his goodness – nor as efficient cause, save his will.

28. In the second way, however, it is possible to assign some reason, namely for which the existence that the action concerns – as an entity for the end – agrees with the end.

29. And that there is some such reason on the part of the entity for the end is shown by him in three ways:

First, because in things altogether equal choice cannot be talked of; therefore if God chooses some things, there is some difference in the thing chosen, – or there is no choice.

30. Second, because in all the works of divine mercy it seems that justice concurs; therefore there is some congruence on the part of the thing he does mercifully.

31. And third (as if in like way): there seems not to be or to be a merit of choice and reprobation, and so although malice on the part of him who receives [sc. damnation] is not the cause of damning on the part of God (because “then God would be passive” and “the temporal would be cause of the eternal”), yet it is well conceded that on the part of the act of damning there is a motive reason for the act’s receiving in itself this action and its being about this person; therefore by similarity it seems – on the other side [sc. choice] – that without imperfection of God in acting there could be posited some reason on the part of the person predestined. And it rests on this conclusion, the authority of Augustine cited before [n.7], *83 Questions*, which does not seem to have been retracted.

32. Further, in particular he says what this reason is: that it is the good use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the elect person – and the bad use, foreseen, of freewill on the part of the reprobate.

33. And this is made clear as follows: although grace operates principally in good acts yet freewill cooperates; this is proved from Augustine “on the remark of *Psalms* ‘Help us, God, our savior’ [On *Psalms* 78, 9 n.12] where Augustine says, “When he wants us to be helped, he is neither ungrateful nor does he take away freewill; for he who is helped also does something of himself.” When grace, then, is offered to the wayfarer, if

he receives the offered grace and cooperates with it well in accord with his use of freewill, he merits grace according to a further degree – as he exemplifies in many intermediate degrees, from the state of mortal sin up to the state of glory, all which it is not necessary for us now to enumerate; and so it seems that the whole use of freewill, foreseen for all its states, can be the reason for eternal election of him who will use freewill well, and so on the other side about evil use and reprobation.

34. And if it is objected against this that the good use of freewill is by grace, therefore it pertains to the effect of predestination and so is not a reason for election – the response is that the good use “is in a certain way included under predestination, but not under its effect (although it is not without its effect), nor is that which belongs to predestination distinct from that which belongs to freewill.”

35. Thus, therefore, according to him, and in general, good use and bad use can be assigned for the whole human race, and about any man a reason can be assigned on his part (not “because of which it is so” but “without which it is not so”); yet in particular, about a definite man, “it is not for man to investigate the reason, although it is not lacking and could be multiple.” However “in particular” – according to him – “the Apostle labored under a want of means for giving a reason, when he said (*Romans* 11) ‘O the depth of the riches’,” because in this “consists a great abyss of God’s judgments.”

36. [Rejection of the opinion] – But against this I argue:

First, that God does not foresee that this man will use freewill well, save because he wills or pre-ordains him to use it well, because – as was said in distinction 39 [in the interpolation above] – definite foreseeing of future contingents is from the determination of his will. If therefore two equal persons are offered to the divine will, I ask why he pre-ordains this to use freewill well and not that one; it is not possible, as it seems, to assign a reason for this other than the divine will; and this is the first distinction among them, which for you [Henry] election or reprobation has to follow; therefore in the first distinction, pertaining to predestination or reprobation, the only reason is the divine will.

37. Besides, the reason that he posits [n.32], does not seem common to all the predestined and reprobate:

First indeed because not for children, in whom God does not foresee good or bad use of freewill.

38. And if you say that, although he does not foresee such use, yet he foresees that this one would have used it well had he survived, and that one would have used it badly if he had survived (and therefore he leads the former to baptism and the latter not, and the former is saved and the latter damned), – this he himself thus rejects, because on account of the foreseen good use by someone, if he had survived, he is not accepted or reprobated; for then – according to him – an adult dying in grace would not pre-merit according to the merits he already has, but according to those that he is foreseen to have, if he had survived.

39. Let us speak likewise of the predestined and non-predestined angels; which use of freewill does God foresee in this one – if grace is offered – which he does not foresee in that one, because of which he predestines this one and reprobates that one?

E. Scotus’ own Opinion

40. [Exposition of the opinion] – One can say in a different way that there is no reason of predestination, even on the part of the predestined, that is in anyway prior to the predestination itself; but some reason is prior to reprobation, not indeed a reason for which God by efficient causality reprobates, insofar as the action is from God (as was argued in the previous opinion, because then ‘God would be passive’ [n.31]), but a reason for which this action thus has this object as term and not that one.

41. The proof of the first point is that he who in ordered way wills the end and what is for the end wills the end first before any of the things for the end, and he wills other things for the end; therefore since, in the whole process by which a creature capable of beatification is led to the perfect end, the ultimate end is perfect beatitude, God – willing something of this order for this person – first wills the end for this creature capable of beatification and as it were afterwards wills him other things, which are in the order of things that pertain to the end. But grace, faith, merits and good use of freewill, all these things are for the end (although some more remotely and others more near to it). Therefore God wills beatitude for this person first before any of the other things; and he wills for him each of these others first before he foresees that he will have each of them, therefore not because of foreseeing any of these does he will him beatitude.

42. The proof of the second point is that damnation does not seem to be good save because it is just, for – according to Augustine *On Genesis* XI ch.17 n.22 – ‘God is not avenger before someone is sinner’ (for it seems to be cruelty to punish someone when there is no guilt pre-existing in him); therefore by similarity, God does not wish to punish before he sees someone to be a sinner. Therefore the first act of the divine will about Judas is not to will to damn Judas as Judas is presented in his purely natural state (because then God seems to damn without guilt), but he sees that Judas must be presented to the divine will under the idea of sinner before he wills to damn him. Therefore reprobation has its reason on the part of the object, namely foreseen final sin.

43. This is confirmed by the authority of Augustine in his book *On the Predestination of the Saints* ch.19 n.38 and it is put in the text.

44. [Objections against the opinion] – Against this [n.41]. Peter and Judas, equal in natural state, willed by God in being of existence, in the instant in which they are presented to the divine will in natural existence and equal: God – for you [sc. Scotus] – first wills beatitude for Peter; why then did he will what for Judas? If damnation I have the conclusion intended ‘therefore he reprobates without any reason’, – if beatitude, then he predestines Judas.

45. One can say that in that instant God wishes nothing for Judas; there is only a negation there of volition for glory. And likewise, as if in the second instant of nature, when he wills grace for Peter, there is still no positive act of the divine will about Judas, but only a negative one. In the third instant, when he wills to permit Peter to be of the mass of perdition or worthy of perdition (and this either because of original sin or actual sin), then he wishes Judas in a like way to be a son of perdition; and here is the first positive act – a uniform one indeed – about Peter and Judas, but by this act this statement is true ‘Judas will be finally a sinner’, with the negations in place, namely that God does not will to give him grace or glory. In the fourth instant, then, Judas is presented to the

divine will as finally a sinner, and then God wills to punish him justly and reprobate Judas.³⁶³

46. Nor is it surprising that a like process for predestination and reprobation is not posited, because all goods are attributed to God principally, but evils to us; and thus, that God ‘predestines without reason’ agrees with his goodness, but that ‘he wills to damn’ does not seem able immediately to be attributed to him with respect to the object as known in its pure natural state, but only in respect of the object as known in final mortal sin.

47. This response can be confirmed by a likeness: let us posit two people, equally graced on their own part, one of whom I love and the other of whom I do not, – and him whom I love I pre-ordain to some good through which he can please me, but him whom I do not love I do not pre-ordain to such good. If things were so that it was in my power to permit them to offend, I could will to permit both to offend – and from the fact that I do not will to lead the latter to that by which he could please me, I would fore-know that his offense would be perpetual (and thus that I could justly punish him), but I would fore-know that the offense of the other was to be remitted or committed to what I will.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, from Appendix A] From these points there follow four corollaries:

The first, that the number of the elect is complete before anyone is reprobated, because in the first instant one person is fore-ordained, another fore-known.

The second is that the predestined, insofar as they are predestined, are objects of the first divine act after their pure natural existence; in the second instant God foresees their final justice, namely their damnation and impenitence (which is perseverance in sin). From this there follows that none of the blessed can or should rejoice in the damnation of someone on the ground he himself was elected in his place, because the blessed have been predestined before the others were reprobate – and thus that good would never have belonged to the damned, even had they stood.

The third follows, that no one is predestined because of the fall of another, nor is anyone saved by occasion; nor was Christ by occasion of sin made incarnate or thus supreme in merit and reward, because this would have happened if no one had ever sinned.

Again, fourth, it follows that they alone who were to be saved would have been saved if Adam had not sinned, because they were all predestined or foreseen and guilty of sin before Adam had sinned

48. But still there is an instance against this:

³⁶³ Tr. This explanation is no doubt compatible with orthodoxy but it seems wholly unconvincing that God should make creatures whose perfect end is glory and yet not choose to give them the grace to reach glory (this criticism would apply to Aquinas’ position too, of course, but not perhaps to Henry’s, as Scotus reports it nn.26-35). Better, then, perhaps to focus on the fact of free choice (also necessary for glory) and say that while God chooses to give grace to everyone yet some, like Peter, do not choose to resist the gift while others, like Judas as it seems, do so choose. The gift is free and precedes all merit; the resistance comes, not from God, but from the creature. And if it be said that grace is irresistible, or that God also gives the grace not to resist grace, the answer will be that free choice is precisely free and so can resist any grace, including the grace not to resist grace. If it be said, further, that then God is passive with respect to who resists or does not resist grace, let it be conceded. But the passivity is not with respect to the possibility (God knows all possibilities by his eternal essence); it is only with respect to this possibility being actual in creatures and that other one not. But the relation of God’s knowledge to creatures is real on the part of creatures and not on the part of God, and so no change is undergone by God because of anything that happens in creatures. Thus there is no real passivity on God’s part either. But this proposal is made under correction.

Because God does not with certitude see that Judas is bad according to this way [n.47] – for the sole permission of some act and certitude about the permission do not make for certitude about this act, because it has to have some efficient cause; therefore from the sole fact that God fore-knows he wishes to permit Judas to sin, it is not certain that Judas will sin; or let us speak of a good and bad angel (who were not in original sin): from this fact alone – I say – it does not seem God knows that Lucifer sins, and from this (as it seems) Lucifer is not presented to him as sinner.

49. In addition, what is this ‘will to permit Lucifer to sin’? If this is some positive act of the will with respect to the sin, then it seems God wills him to sin. If it is not a positive act with respect to the act of sin but with respect to the act of permission, then it will be a reflex act, – and then it will be necessary to ask, as to the permission, what act it is; if a positive act of will, then it still seems God has a positive act with respect to the sin that he permits.

50. The first of these [n.48] is solved by the fact God fore-knows that he will co-operate with Lucifer in the substance of the act that will be a sin (but he fore-knows this, because he wills to co-operate with him if it is a sin of commission), or he fore-knows that he will not co-operate in some act if he does not will it (and this if that first act is a sin of omission); and knowing that he will co-operate in such substance of the act (without the due circumstances), or will not co-operate with Lucifer in a negative act (and consequently in an act he will omit), he knows that he will sin; such that he knows ‘this one will sin’ not only because he knows he himself will permit it, but because he knows he will co-operate with him in the substance of an act that is lacking in due circumstances, and consequently that the latter would commit it – or he knows that he will not co-operate with him in a negative act, and consequently that the latter will omit it.

51. The second argument [n.49] raises a difficulty touching on the divine will, – about which I will speak not here but elsewhere [d.47 nn.8-9].

F. Conclusion about the Five Opinions

52. About all these opinions [nn.5-6, 12-20, 26-35, 40-43]: because the Apostle, when disputing about this matter in *Romans* 11.33-34, seems to leave the whole thing as it were inscrutable (‘O depth’, he says, ‘of the riches of the wisdom and the knowledge of God,’ and ‘who has known the mind of the Lord, or who has been his counselor?’), therefore lest by investigating the depths – according to the opinion of the Master – one should fall into the depths, let that be chosen which pleases more, provided however that the divine liberty (without any injustice) be preserved, as well as the other things that must be preserved about God as freely choosing; and he who holds another opinion, let him respond to the things touched on above against him.

II. To the Principal Arguments

53. To the first principal argument [n.1] I reply: the supreme goodness can stand with free communication, although it not be equal for everyone. For someone ‘supremely good’ can with generosity freely communicate himself, and in order to show that he is not generous by necessity but is generous as ‘freely communicative’ he can for two persons –

apprehended as equal – will ‘to communicate a good non-equally’; nor is any injustice committed in this (as the third opinion asserts [n.20]), because nothing is due.

54. To the second [n.2]: when two things are equally will-able for some end, and they have on their own part the reason for which they are to be willed by some will, a will that prefers one of them to the other for that end sins by acceptance of persons; such is every created will, because with respect to it the lovable good is the reason for right loving. The uncreated will is not so with respect to any good other than its own essence; for no other good thing is, because it is good, loved for that reason by that will, but conversely; and it cannot accept persons, because the good that is the reason for loving is not in them.

55. To the first argument for the opposite [not nn.3-4 but *Rep* IA d.41 nn.7, 81]. He who wants to hold another way [sc. other than Scotus’, nn.40-42] can say as the fourth way says [nn.25, 35] that the Apostle in this passage [*Romans* 11.33] is rebuking the presumptuous who inquire into things they have no capacity for, – not because of being in want of a reason to give, at any rate in general, although it not be known in particular the evil that God foresees in someone for which he reprobates him; and in these special sins, that are foreseen, there is ‘a depth of riches’ and that ‘the judgments are past finding out’. – With which agrees that word ‘judgment’, because judgment is about particular doables; for we do not usually say, when speaking of practical principle – or about established laws –, that they are ‘judgments’, but we do so when a judgment is made about some particular in accord with the practical principles or the established laws; and so notwithstanding that there is a practical principle, established by the divine will, that ‘everyone foreseen to be finally evil will be damned’, yet about the particulars to be assumed under it (‘this person is foreseen to be finally evil in this way, that one in that’, and as it were for this reason the former is reprobate for that evil and the latter for that other one), these judgments are inscrutable; for man does not know, nor can know, into what sin God wills to permit him to fall with respect to which there is a non-volition to confer grace, so that thus he be presented as finally a sinner in that sin and thus because of that foreseen sin he will be reprobated. But about the good it can be posited that there is no reason, as was said in the fifth opinion [nn.40-41].

56. And if you argue against this that at any rate about the good the judgments will not be inscrutable (for it is easy to say about them that ‘because he wills, therefore he saves’), – it can be said about them, insofar as he predestines, that there is no judgment, neither of the fact in existence nor of it in divine foreknowledge as it were; for judgment is about something done or foreseen. But about the evil, although there is no judgment about the fact (because they have not sinned), yet condemnation can be said to be a judgment about them in God’s foreknowledge (when they are called ‘evil’), and then the inscrutability of the judgments can be referred to the evil on whose part some reason is posited, although those reasons on the part of diverse things – because of which the judgments are as it were on their part passed – are inscrutable and for this reason the judgments are inscrutable.

57. To the other one [nn.6, 43]: Augustine responds to it for the fifth opinion [n.43], because he proves that on the part of the predestined there is no reason.

Forty Second Distinction

Single Question

Whether it can be Proved by Natural Reason that God is Omnipotent

1. About the forty second distinction I ask whether it can be proved by natural reason that God is omnipotent.

That it can be:

Richard [of St. Victor] *On the Trinity* I ch.4: “For everything we hold by faith [sc. there are probable, even necessary arguments].”

2. Besides, it is proved by reason that God is of infinite power (as is proved in *Physics* 8.10.266a10-24 and *Metaphysics* 12.7.1073a3-13); but infinite power is known to be omnipotence; therefore etc.

3. Proof of the minor, because it is known that no greater power than infinite power can be thought of without contradiction; but a greater power than any power that is not omnipotence can be thought of without contradiction (proof: one can without contradiction think of omnipotence under the idea of omnipotence; but it is thought of as greater than any other power that would not be omnipotence).

4. If you say that it is not possible to prove naturally that omnipotence is thinkable without contradiction – on the contrary: that omnipotence exists among beings is true, therefore any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical; every sophistical reason can be solved by the intellect through purely natural means; therefore such an intellect can through purely natural means know that nothing impossible follows from omnipotence, and knows that that is possible on which nothing impossible follows; therefore it knows that the omnipotence of God is possible.

5. But from this a reason per se can be given, because if it can naturally be proved that omnipotence is possible (because it is not impossible [n.4]), then it can naturally be proved that it is necessary, because it cannot be unless it could be necessary; and what can be necessary, is necessary; therefore etc.

6. On the contrary:

No philosopher by the use of natural reason, however perfectly he would consider God under the idea of efficient cause, has conceded that he is omnipotent according to the Catholic sense [nn.9-13].

7. There is also a confirmation, because there is an article of faith, in the *Apostles' Creed*: “I believe in God, the Father almighty etc.”

I. To the Question

8. One can respond here by drawing a distinction that in one way the ‘omnipotent’ can be said to be an agent that has power for everything possible, mediately or immediately – and in this way the active power of the first efficient cause is omnipotence, insofar as it extends itself to every effect in idea of proximate or remote cause; and thus, since it can be naturally concluded that there is a first efficient cause (as was shown

above in distinction 2 [nn.43-59]), it can be naturally concluded that it is omnipotent, in this way of speaking.

9. In another way ‘omnipotent’ is taken in a properly theological sense, insofar as he is called omnipotent who has power for all effects and for everything possible (that is, for everything that is not per se necessary or does not include a contradiction), and thus immediately – I say – because without the co-operation of any other agent cause; and in this way it seems that omnipotence is a thing believed about the first efficient cause, and not something demonstrated, because although the first efficient cause has in itself a more eminent efficient power than the power of any other efficient cause, it also has in itself eminently the effective power of any other cause whatever (as was proved in distinction 2 [nn.117-120] and is proved by the fact that it has infinite power), and this is as it were the ultimate that natural reason can attain to as to be known about God, although from this it does not seem one can prove omnipotence according to the second sense, because although it is true, yet it is not manifest by natural reason that what has a more eminent causality in itself – and even the causality of a second cause more eminently than that cause has with respect to its own effect – has power immediately for the immediate effect of a second cause; for the order of inferior and superior causes does not allow this, because although the sun has in itself a more eminent causality than an ox (or than any animal), yet the sun is not conceded to be able immediately to generate an ox the way it can do so through the medium of an ox-cause.

10. And this above all would philosophers posit, because they did not posit the second – necessarily concurrent – cause on account of adding some perfection to the effect, but on account of adding some imperfection; but further, the causality of the first cause is immediately perfect, and so they posited that it could not immediately be the cause of any imperfect effect. And therefore some other agent cause (a more imperfect one) had to concur, so that the first cause would not produce according to the utmost of its power but would, along with that second agent cause, produce a diminished and imperfect effect – that is, it would not produce as perfect an effect by means of an imperfect second cause as it would if it produced it immediately.

11. In addition, the philosophers were not able by natural reason to conclude that God is able to cause contingently, how much more could they not conclude that it had power immediately for any effect at all or for anything that can be produced by means of other second causes?

12. Further, if they had for principle as it were that ‘nothing comes from nothing’ (at any rate in generable and corruptible things), it does not seem that God was so omnipotent that he could totally produce any effect without any other joint causing cause.

13. Besides, if the philosophers posited that God acted necessarily (as many of them seem to have thought and posited), and if along with this they posited that he was omnipotent according to the second sense [n.9], they would have to deny all causality to every second cause (which is especially unacceptable for them); for a cause that ‘necessarily causes’, in whatever instant it is compared to its effect, necessarily in that instant ‘causes and acts necessarily’; therefore since the superior cause is compared to its effect before an inferior cause is, and since in that case it is for you [sc. someone who thinks omnipotence can be proved by natural reason] necessarily omnipotent, then in that instant it produces every effect; then in the second instant, in which the second cause is

compared to the same effect, nothing is then understood as causing, – and so a second cause or a second agent can cause nothing

14. And from this is plain that this proposition ‘whatever the first efficient cause can cause along with a second cause, it can per se cause immediately’ is not known from the terms, nor known by natural reason, but is only a thing believed; because if omnipotence itself – on which the proposition depends – were known by natural reason, it would be easy for those philosophers to prove many truths and propositions that they deny, and easy for them to prove at least the possibility of many things that we believe and that they deny.

15. Omnipotence, however, taken in this way [sc. the second way], although it not be sufficiently proved, can however be proved probably as true and necessary – and more probably than certain other believed things, because it is not unacceptable for some ‘believed things’ to be more evident than others.

II. To the Principal Arguments

16. To the authority of Richard [n.1] I say that although there are necessary reasons for proving omnipotence, and any other believed things, they are not however evidently necessary and true; just as is true of the reason that proves the Trinity, because of the double production inwardly in divine reality [d.2 nn.300-303, 353-358, 370]) – because although the reason is from necessary things, yet the premises are not necessarily evident, because they are not known to us from the terms; nor is it possible from things immediately known to us to infer this, as was said in d.2 nn.26-29.

17. To the second [n.2] I say that the infinite power of God, although it can be concluded about God by natural reason, is yet not omnipotence in the way it is properly taken.

18. And when you say that ‘no power can be thought of greater than infinite power’ [n.3], this is true intensively; but there seems no contradiction in thinking of a greater power that extends itself to more things extensively. Or one might say that although it is not a contradiction for an omnipotence to be thought of, which – as such – in some way exceeds infinite power ‘not understood as omnipotent’, yet it is not naturally known that a power so understood is omnipotent.

19. And when you say [n.3] it is known that omnipotence properly taken can be thought of without contradiction, this is denied.

20. And when proof is given ‘any reason proving the impossibility of omnipotence is sophistical’ [n.3], – to this the response is it is indeed sophistical; but it cannot be solved by natural reason, because insofar as it is sophistical it errs in the matter and has a false premise; and it cannot be solved save by taking away that premise, which however cannot be known by natural reason as needing to be taken away, just as it cannot be known to be true by natural reason.

21. But against these points I argue thus:

The proposition that appears true, and does not from natural reason appear that it should be taken away, either appears to be true from the terms as if immediate, or appears to be deduced from immediate premises. If in the first way then our intellect cannot be certain about the immediate propositions, which are true and which not; for things appear to them to be true as immediate propositions which however are simply false, and so

there will not be any propositions as certain ‘as doors in a house’ (against the Philosopher and the Commentator *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b4-5, Averroes ad loc.), about which it is not possible to err. If it appear true in the second way (that is as deduced from immediate terms), then I argue about this syllogism as about the former one, – either it errs in matter or in form; if in matter then it can be solved, because the false premise, ‘erring in matter’, can be taken away; if in form, still it can be solved by the art of logic. But if it be said that it errs in form and yet cannot be solved by natural reason, – this seems absurd, because as the intellect ‘contained in its natural conditions’ hands on the whole art about apparent syllogism, unformed and defective, thus could the argument be solved by the art for dissolving every such syllogism, by applying that art to that paralogism.

22. Therefore I say in another way that although any paralogism, which apparently concludes to something impossible from a premise signifying that God is omnipotent, can be solved by the intellect and natural reason (whether it errs in matter or in form), and the intellect can know that any such paralogism ‘stated divisively’ is soluble, yet the conclusion does not follow that the intellect knows it to be impossible; for the opposite stands, namely either because the intellect doubts it to be a primary opposite from the repugnance of the terms (from which however something manifestly impossible cannot follow), or because it doubts whether something else impossible can be inferred from whatever is inferred, and the argument ‘entailing that impossible thing’ is insoluble, although it not be of any things that are done about which the intellect knows ‘one must solve them’.

23. Or generally one can reply to the argument [n.4] (and this can be done generally for any believed thing) that it is necessary for anything possible or believable.

Forty Third Distinction

Single Question

Whether the First Reason for the Impossibility of a Thing to be Made is on the Part of God or of the Makeable Thing

1. About the forty third distinction – where the Master rejects the opinions of others – I ask whether the first reason for the impossibility of a thing to be made is on the part of God or on that of the makeable thing.

Proof that it is on the part of God:

The Master argues [d.43 ch.1 nn.390-398] that the universe could be made better: ‘because if not, this would either be because of the fact no good is lacking to it, and then it would be God’, ‘or because something is lacking to it but it is not capable of receiving it’, and then he argues that ‘it would become better if capacity for it were given to it by God’. So I argue in the issue at hand: if something is un-makeable, then if capacity were given it by God, it could be made; therefore in this way can it not be made, that capacity is not given to it; therefore this impossibility seems to be first on the part of God, not being able to give it the capacity.

2. On the contrary:

Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.2: 'Because God gave perseverance to the good angel, that is why the good angel had it – and it is not because God did not give it to the bad angel that the bad angel did not have it, but because he was bad he did not take it', because he was not capable of it [n.19].

I. To the Question

A. The Opinion of Henry of Ghent

3. This is said by Henry *Quodlibet* VI q.3 – for the opposite, manifestly, of which see *Quodlibet* VIII q.3.³⁶⁴

4. Against this second opinion [sc. that the first reason is on the part of God], either it was said with retraction from that article of the first opinion or it was itself retracted by the first opinion, – but one should not argue against him save from his own words, which manifestly imply opposites.

5. However, I specifically argue against him thus: nothing is simply impossible save because being is simply repugnant to it; but what being is repugnant to, to that it is repugnant of itself first and not because of any affirmative or negative respect of it to something else first. For any repugnance is of the extremes by their formal and per se essential idea, with removal of any other respect of either extreme – positive or negative – to anything else, just as white and black are contraries and have a formal repugnance by their own formal ideas, with removal, *per impossibile*, of any respect to anything else. That thing is then simply impossible for which being is per se impossible, which is of itself first such that being is repugnant to it, – and not because of any respect to God, affirmative or negative; nay being would be repugnant to it if *per impossibile* God did not exist. Therefore it seems the first opinion is more probable than the second [sc. that the first reason is on the part of the thing and not of God].

6. But against this first opinion I argue first as follows:

The active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not formally the intellect but presupposes as it were the action of the intellect, whether the omnipotence is will or some executive power; but a stone is possible of itself formally; therefore too by reducing it to the first extrinsic principle as it were, the divine intellect will be that from which comes the first idea of possibility in a stone. Therefore the active power by which God is said to be omnipotent is not the first idea of possibility in a stone.

7. Proof of the assumption: the possible, according as it is the term or object of omnipotence, is that to which being is not repugnant and that which cannot of itself exist necessarily; a stone, produced in intelligible being by the divine intellect, has these features of itself formally and from the intellect as principle; therefore it is of itself formally possible and is from the divine intellect as it were from a principle.

8. The first opinion [n.3] seems badly to posit that 'omnipotence in God is the power that is active power, from which comes first possibility in a creature', and this if we speak of the active power by which God is called omnipotent and with respect to which passive power in a creature is spoken of.

9. Confirmation of the reason [n.6]: the active power 'which is omnipotence' does not give any being to anything save by producing it, because it is a power productive of a

³⁶⁴ Vatican editors: in the first reference Henry holds that the first reason for something not being makeable is the thing, in the second that it is God.

thing outwardly; but before any production of a thing outwardly, the thing has possible being, because – as was proved in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 36 – that a thing is produced in intelligible being is not that it is produced in being simply, and if it were, it would not be by the power by which God is called omnipotent; a thing is not first possible, then, by the power ‘that is omnipotence’.

10. Again, in precise causes if affirmation is cause of affirmation and negation is cause of negation (according to what the Philosopher says *Posterior Analytics* 1.13.78b20-21), just as if having lungs is cause of breathing and not having lungs is cause of not breathing, then if the active power, which is omnipotence in God, were the precise cause of possibility in a creature, negation of active power in God would be cause of the negation of ‘possible being’ in a creature, which he himself [Henry] denies (and well to this extent [sc. as concerns impossibility on the part of the makeable thing], that the impossibility in a creature is because of the formal repugnance of the parts [nn.5, 15-17]).

11. Further, the respect that follows active power in the fourth instant, is either real or not. If real and outward, this was rejected in distinction 30 nn.49-51. If it is a respect of reason then in the third instant the possibility has God as term under an absolute idea – which I do not infer as in itself unacceptable, but as to be conceded by many people (if it be granted), and at any rate as not to be held as unacceptable by those who hold the opinion of this doctor [Henry], because it follows on that opinion.

12. Likewise, for the same reason I infer from this position another conclusion, namely that there is no respect on the part of the cause prior to one on the part of the caused; nay from the cause itself under the idea of an absolute it is caused under an absolute idea, and later – third – a respect follows in the caused, and fourth a respect in the cause to the caused. This order of absolutes and of respects, then, which he concedes, must never and nowhere be held as unacceptable by those who hold it.

13. Third I infer likewise that omnipotence as it is a divine attribute and states a perfection simply, does not state any respect to a creature (which he himself proves in the first opinion, *Quodlibet* VI q.3), because no divine perfection simply depends on a creature (Anselm proves this in *Monologion* ch.15). Since that ‘relation to a creature’ does not state a perfection simply even in God, because then God would not be such if the creature did not exist (but God is something perfect with all perfection simply, of himself and of his nature, and not by any respect to a creature), this inference then – which I think to be true (as also the other two inferences [nn.11-12]) – should not be rejected by any who hold to his opinion [sc. Henry’s].

B. Scotus’ own Opinion

14. I speak in a way different from the first opinion (as to what the two arguments prove [nn.6, 9]), that although the power of God to himself – that is any absolute perfection by which God is formally powerful – is in God in the first instant of nature, as is also any perfection simply (just as being a power for heating is consequent to heat, which heat however is an absolute form), yet by the power itself ‘under the idea in which it is omnipotence’ it does not have an object that is first possible save through the divine intellect producing it first in intelligible being, and the intellect is not formally the active power by which God is called omnipotent; and then the thing produced in such being by the divine intellect in the first moment of nature – namely intelligible being – has itself to

be possible in the second instant of nature, because being is not formally repugnant to it, and having necessary being of itself is formally repugnant to it (on which two points stands the whole idea of omnipotence, corresponding to these ideas of active power). Therefore possibility is not in the object in any way before omnipotence is in God, taking omnipotence for an absolute perfection in God, just as the creature is not prior to anything absolute in God. If however a thing is understood to be possible before God by his omnipotence produces it, this understanding is in this way true, but the thing is not simply prior in that possibility but is produced by the divine intellect.

15. But as to impossibility, I say that it cannot be first on the part of God but on the part of the thing (as the first opinion says), and this for the reason given against the second opinion, because the thing is impossible for the reason that coming to be is repugnant to it.

16. Which point I understand thus: 'impossible simply' includes impossibles that, by their formal ideas, are impossible, and they are impossible from that thing as principle from which as principle they have their formal ideas. So there is here this process, that as God by his intellect produces a possible in possible being, so he also produces two entities formally (each in possible being), and these 'produced' things are of themselves formally impossible, so that they cannot be together one thing nor can any third thing come from them; but the impossibility that they have, they have formally from themselves, and from him as from a principle – in some way – who produced them. And on this impossibility of theirs there follows the impossibility of the whole imagined construct that includes them, and from the impossibility of the imagined construct in itself and from the impossibility of their parts there comes its impossibility with respect to any agent; and from this must the whole process of the impossibility of the thing be completed, as if the ultimate degree of impossibility or impossibility is the negation of a respect to any agent. Nor does it need to have any negative respect on the part of God, nor on the part of anything else (nor is there, perhaps, any negative respect in the nature of the thing), although the intellect can compare God – or any agent – to it under the negation of respect.

17. So in this way the first impossibility is on the part of the impossible thing and in God as in the principle; and if it is reduced to anything as a principle, yet it is not reduced to a negation of possibility in God; rather it is reduced to the divine intellect as principle, which is the principle of it in that being in which the parts are formally repugnant, because of which formal repugnance the whole composed of those parts is simply impossible.

18. And from this is clear that the imagination of those is false who look for the impossibility of anything in some one thing, as if some one thing – whether an intelligible or any sort of being – is of itself formally impossible as God is of himself formally necessary being. For nothing is such first in the being of non-entity, nor even is the divine intellect the reason for the opposite possibility of the entity that is opposed to such a non-entity; nor even is the divine intellect the precise reason for the opposite possibility about nothing, because then the argument 'about precise causes in affirmation and negation' [n.10] would hold. But everything 'simply nothing' includes in itself the idea of many things, such that it is not first nothing by its own idea but by the ideas of the things that it is understood to include, because of the formal repugnance of those several included

things; and this reason for repugnance comes from the formal reasons, which repugnance they have first from the divine intellect.

II. To the Principal Argument

19. To the first argument [n.1]: the Master's reason holds, on the supposition that the universe is capable of a greater perfection, because, if that capacity were given to it, it would be made to be better than it is made to be without that capacity, – as if it were capable of many additional things; but absolutely the Master's reason does not hold if that supposition is denied, namely the supposition that it could become better, – just as neither does it follow that 'what remains as fire' could become better if it were made capable of intellect or will, because it is not capable of those things. I say then to the form of the argument, that God cannot give capacity to what is not receptive of being made; but the first reason for this is not this fact but rather that such a thing cannot have such a capacity – and this reason is reduced to the formal repugnance of the parts, and beyond this to the divine intellect.

Forty Fourth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God could Make Things other than He has Ordained them to be Made

1. About the forty fourth distinction – where the Master deals with the question 'whether God could have made things better than he did' – I ask this question: whether God could make things other than he has ordained them to be made.

And it seems not:

Because then he could make things in a disordered way. The consequent is false, therefore the antecedent too.

On the contrary:

Things being made other than they have been made does not include a contradiction; nor is the universe necessary; therefore etc.

I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In everyone acting by intellect and will, who is able to act in conformity with right law and yet not by necessity in conformity with right law, one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; and the reason for this is that he can act in conformity with that right law and so according to ordained power (for the power is ordained insofar as it is the principle of carrying things out in conformity with right law), and he can act without that law or against it, and here there is absolute power, exceeding ordained power. And therefore not only in God but in any agent acting freely – who can act according to the dictate of right law and without that law or against it – one must distinguish between ordained power and absolute power; therefore the jurists say that

someone can do something *de facto*, that is by his absolute power – or *de iure*, that is by ordained power according to right.

4. But when that right law – according to which one must act in ordered way – is not in the power of the agent, then his absolute power cannot exceed his ordained power about any object unless he acts about it in disordered way; for it is necessary that such law stand – comparing it to such agent – and yet that an action ‘not conformed to that right law’ is not right nor ordered, because such an agent is held to act according to the law he is subject to. Hence all those subject to the divine law, if they do not act according to it, act in disordered way.

5. But when the law and the rightness or law are in the power of the agent, so that it is only right because it is established, then an agent acting from his own freedom can ordain otherwise than that right law directs; and yet along with this he can act rightly, because he can establish another right law according to which he may act in ordered fashion. Nor does his absolute power then simply exceed his ordained power, because it would be according to some law ordained, just as it was according to the prior law; yet it exceeds ordained power precisely according to the prior law, against which or without which it acts. This can be exemplified in a prince and his subjects, and in positive law.

6. Applying this to the issue at hand, then, I say that some general laws, giving direction rightly, have been pre-established by the divine will and not indeed by the divine intellect as it precedes the act of the divine will, as was said in distinction 38 nn.5-6, 9-10;^a but when the intellect presents some such law to the divine will, namely that ‘everyone who is to be glorified must first be endowed with grace’, this law, if it please his will – which is free – is right, and so it is about other laws.

a. [Interpolation]: because there is found no necessity from the terms in these laws (as that every sinner will be damned), but only from the divine will accepting them, which will operates according to laws of this sort that it has made; or enough for the issue at hand to say that the laws are established by divine wisdom.

7. God then, being able to act according to those right laws as they have been pre-established by him, is said to act according to his ordained power; but as he can do many things that are not according to but without the laws already pre-established, he is said to act by his absolute power; for because God can do anything that does not include a contradiction, and can act in every way that does not include a contradiction (and many other ways are such), therefore he is then said to act according to ordained power.

8. Hence I say that he can do many other things in ordered way; and the fact that many other things can be done in ordered way, other than those which are made in conformity with the laws, does not include a contradiction when the rectitude of this sort of law – according to which someone is said to act rightly and in ordered way – is in the power of the agent. Therefore just as God can act otherwise, so he can establish another right law, – which, if it were established by God, would be right, because no law is right save as it is established by the divine will accepting it; and then his absolute power for something does not extend itself to something other than that which would be done in ordered fashion, if it were done; it would not indeed be done in ordered fashion according to the existing law, but if would be done in ordered fashion according to another order, which other order the divine will could establish, just as it has power to act.

9. One must note too that something's being ordained and being done in ordered fashion can happen in two ways:

In one way by universal order – which pertains to the common law, as is ordained according to the common law that 'everyone finally a sinner is to be damned' (just as when a king establishes that every murderer is to die). In a second way in particular order – according to the judgment that the law in universal does not pertain to, because law is about universal cases; but about a particular case there is no law, but there is judgment according to law of that which is against the law (as that this murderer is to die).

10. I say then that God can act not only otherwise than has been ordained by particular order, but he can also act in ordered fashion otherwise than has been ordained by universal order – or according to the laws of justice, – because both the things that are without that order and the things contrary to it, can be done in ordered fashion by God by absolute power.^a

a. [*Interpolation*, Appendix A] Again, one must know that a distinction is to be made in the case of this proposition, 'God can produce things otherwise than he has disposed'. In the composite sense it is false; for what is signified is that this proposition is true, 'God produces things otherwise than according to his disposition'; in the divided sense it is true, and there are two categorical propositions, and the sense is: 'God can make things in this way', 'he did not dispose to make them in this way'. And yet it does not follow that he acts in disordered way, as is plain from what has been said.

11. However ordered power is not spoken of save as in accord with the order of universal law, and not in accord with the order of right law about some particular. The point is plain from this, that it is possible for God to save someone whom he does not save and who however will die in sin finally and be damned – but it is not conceded that he can save Judas already damned (though this is not impossible by God's absolute power, because it does not include a contradiction), therefore this thing, namely 'to save Judas', is impossible in the way in which it is possible to save him [sc. possible according to existing ordained power]; therefore God can by ordained power save this person (which is true) and not save that one. Not indeed by particular order (which is as it were about this particular doable and workable thing only), but by universal order, because if he saved him, it would now stand with right laws – which he truly pre-fixed – about the salvation and damnation of particular individuals. For it would stand with the proposition that 'he who is finally evil will be damned' (which is the pre-fixed law about those to be damned), because this person is still not finally a sinner but can be a non-sinner (especially when a wayfarer), because God can prevent him by his grace; just as, if a king were to prevent someone from committing murder, then, if he does not damn him, he does not act against his universal law about murderers. But it would not stand with that particular law that he would save Judas; for he can fore-know that Judas is to be saved by ordained power, though not ordained in the existing way but in a way absolute from this way, and this other way is ordained according to some other order, because established according to another possible way.^a

a. [*Interpolation*] Absolute power then can save Judas, – but ordained power can save this sinner, although he will not be saved; but a stone can be beatified neither by absolute nor ordained power. And in this regard, it is plain as to what it is in respect of that there is said to be absolute power in God, that is insofar as he has power against universal law but not particular.

12. But how the divine will has power about particulars and about establishing right laws, by not willing the opposite of what he now wills, was stated above in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question above].

II. To the Principal Arguments on Both Sides

13. To the argument [n.1] it is plain that the consequence is not valid, because if God were to make things in a way other than he has ordained them to be made, they are not for this reason made in disordered way, because if he established other laws according to which they were made, they would by that very fact be made in ordered way.

14. To the argument for the opposite [n.2] I concede what it proves about absolute power – which, however, if it was the principle of anything, would by that fact be ordained, but not according to a pre-fixed order of God that was the same as he had before.

Forty Fifth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God from Eternity willed Things Other than Himself

1. About the forty fifth distinction I ask whether God from eternity willed things other than himself.

That he did not

Because then in the divine will there would have been a real relation to creatures. The consequent is false (as is plain from distinction 30 nn.49-51), therefore the antecedent is too.

2. Proof of the consequence: God first wills something before he understands that he wills it (let that thing be *a*), because – as was said in distinction 39 [see interpolation for that distinction] – the certitude of the divine intellect about future contingents is not without the certitude and rectitude of the will; therefore the relation, which is in the divine will first to *a*, itself precedes all consideration by the intellect about that volition; therefore it is not in the will or in volition as it is known but as it is in itself, – and consequently it is there from the nature of the thing, and not in the known as it is known.

3. On the contrary:

If he did not will from eternity, then neither does he will now *de novo*, because then he would be mutable; therefore he wills nothing.

I. To the Question

4. I reply:

Every perfect operative power can be the power of operating about any object that is of a nature to have a respect to such power, – just as a perfect intellect can be the principle of understanding anything intelligible and perfect sight of seeing anything visible; therefore since in God there is will formally (from distinction 2 nn.75-88), and

even will supremely perfect 'because infinite' (from the same distinction nn.94, 101, 117-118, 234-235, 300-303), the result is that it can be the principle of willing anything will-able.

5. But it cannot be a principle of willing anything from time, because this could not be without the change of something; and not of the willed object, because the willed object only has being because it is willed and because it is in the divine will; therefore this change would be in the will itself, as was deduced in distinction 30 n.41 about the idea of the will itself. Therefore the divine will can in its own eternity be the principle of willing anything will-able.

6. But it is not the idea of willing both opposites at the same time, because opposites cannot be at the same time with respect to anything; nor is the idea of willing neither of them, because then nothing in creatures would be willed by God, – and consequently he would cause nothing in creatures, because contingency can only be in God on the part of the will, as was deduced in distinction 39 [in the interpolation for that question]. Therefore there is in eternity the idea of willing any other object in anything other than himself.

II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the arguments [nn.1-2] I reply that as was said before in distinction 30 n.31 about relations from time that have God as their term under a purely absolute idea, and in like manner about the ideas in distinction 35 n.27, and in like manner about omnipotence in distinction 43 nn.11, 14 (and omnipotence is purely absolute as it is a divine attribute, and thus is it the term of the relation of a possible creature to God), – so I say here that the divine will under a purely absolute idea is the term of the respect of the will-able thing to God himself, because indeed the divine will produces things in eternity in willed being as the intellect produces in known or understood being; and in like manner one must say that this willed being is present as being in itself in the will, as was said about the being of being known in distinction 36 nn.26-29, 34-35.

8. But then you will argue: if the willed thing has a relation to the divine will, – either then a real relation or a relation of reason only. If real then its foundation is real; therefore the thing has real being from eternity. If a relation of reason only, – on the contrary: the relation does not come from an act of the divine intellect comparing the object to his intellect, – therefore there is in it no relation of reason; for although the divine intellect compare the object as known to his intellect before the object is willed by him, and although in that prior stage he cause a relation of reason of the object itself as known to his intellect, yet he does not seem to cause any relation of it to the will.

9. Although one could here [n.8] respond that this relation of the willed thing to the will is from an act of the divine intellect comparing the willed object to his own will (because he compares his will to the object before he compares it to his intellect), yet if the same 'being' were posited as sufficient in the object of the intellect as it is a known object and in the object of the will as it is willed, and if this would in no way be present to the will save because it was present to the intellect, – yet I reply in another way that in the willed object there is a relation to the divine will other than the relation in it which is as of the understood object to the divine intellect; and that other relation is not a real

relation, – nor yet is it a relation of reason, speaking strictly of a relation of reason, namely one of the intellect.

10. Nor is the division sufficient that every relation ‘is either real or of reason’, taking relation of reason strictly, because every power that can have an act about an existing object but not as it is existent, and that can by its act compare that object to another to which such object is not compared from the nature of the thing – every such power can cause in the object, as it is object, a relation of reason between itself and something else; which relation is not real, because it is not from the nature of the object in itself, – nor yet is it strictly of reason, because the comparing power is not always only reason or a ratiocinative power.

11. For the will, when using some object for an end, can cause in the object a relation of reason to the end; and it is not a real relation, because it is not in the object from the nature of the thing but from the comparison made by the comparing will (for it can use God in relation to the creature); nor is it a relation of reason, because the power ‘causing the comparison’ is not reason, – whether intellect or imagination is said to be such a comparing power, or anything else; for it is certain that the will is such a comparing and conferring power (and the imaginative power likewise), just as well as the intellective power is; and therefore it is certain that each of these powers [sc. intellective and volitional] can compare its own object and can cause a relation in its own object; not a real relation, because it would thus be there, in such object, from the nature of the thing without any comparison, – nor a relation of reason taken strictly as a relation caused by the intellect, although sometimes it be accompanied by a relation of reason caused by the intellect. But the divine will, and even any will (whatever may be true of imagination, about which we will not speak now), can compare itself to the object in willed being from eternity (and conversely), and so it can cause in the object a relation of reason to itself.

Forty Sixth Distinction

Single Question

Whether God’s Will of Being Well-Pleased is always Fulfilled

1. About the forty sixth distinction I ask whether God’s will of being well-pleased is always fulfilled.

And it seems that it is not:

I Timothy 2.4: “God wills all men to be saved;” but not all will be saved; therefore etc.

2. In addition *Matthew* 23.37 the Savior says to the children of Jerusalem: “How often have I wanted to gather your children as a hen gathers her chicks, and ye would not;” therefore as before.

3. On the contrary:

Romans 9.19: “Who hath resisted his will?”

4. And *Psalms* 113.11: “Everything that he willed he did.”

I. To the Question

5. I reply:

The will of God^a must, as to all things, always be fulfilled, – because as the Almighty can do everything possible, so, when the divine will is determinate with final determination to posit something in being, that thing will be; but to will that thing with the will of being well-pleased is to will it with the ultimate determination that can be posited on the part of an almighty will that wills the effect into existence; therefore as regard every effect for which God is thus willing, that effect will be.

a. [*Interpolation*] will is double, will of being well-pleased and of sign or notification; the first is double, namely antecedent and consequent. Antecedent will of being well-pleased is that by which God wills conditionally (as far as concerns himself) and antecedently that all men be saved, and this will is not always fulfilled [cf. nn.7-8]; the will of being well-pleased that is absolute is also consequent. [See also the *Interpolation* after n.6]

6. And the reason can be confirmed, because if a cause, determinate with ultimate determination to something, were not to posit the effect in being, this would seem to be because of its lack of power – as for example that it was not sufficient of itself or was impeded by something else, or because of its capability of changing before the effect is understood to be posited in being; but the Almighty is not lacking in power, nor is he mutable; therefore etc.a

a. [*Interpolation*] But the will of sign or notification is distinguished in five ways: into prohibition, precept, counsel, fulfillment, and permission [see below d.47 n.6]. The first three are reduced to conditional will of being well-pleased, because God's precept or prohibition or counsel is not always fulfilled; fulfillment and permission are reduced to absolute will of being well-pleased, and in this way nothing is done against this sign or notification.

II. To the Principal Arguments

7. To the first argument [n.1] I say that although the saying of the Apostle could be expounded with an appropriate distribution of terms, to mean all those who will be saved – yet it could be better expounded of antecedent will as follows: 'he wills to save all men and that all men be saved', namely as far as concerns his own part – and by his antecedent will he has, to this extent, given them the natural gifts and right laws and common aids that are sufficient for salvation.

8. Just as, in the case of a king who establishes good laws and appoints ministers to guard those laws, one could say that he wills all his subjects to live peaceably and quietly, as far as in him, and yet, if he see someone being unjustly treated, there would be no need for the king at once to intervene to ensure that he lives quietly unless the matter were delivered to him by a complaint of fact (he does indeed antecedently will anyone to live peaceably and quietly, but he does not will anyone immediately to live thus), – so I say in the issue at hand, that although God not have a will of being well-pleased for saving this particular man, yet he wills for him the common aids of salvation, by which aids even that particular man can live well and be saved; for which reason one can say that, as far as concerns his own part, he wills all to be saved.

9. To the second [n.2]: the Master expounds (and well expounds, d.46 ch.2 n.414), that it was not that he willed all to fulfill the will of Christ, but that he gathered by his will all whom he gathered. See and note the exposition of the Master.

Forty Seventh Distinction

Single Question

Whether Divine Permission is some Act of the Divine Will

1. About the forty seventh distinction I ask whether divine permission is some act of the divine will.

That it is:

Because otherwise it does not seem that God knows with certitude that this man will sin (for he does not know future contingents without determination of his will); but it does not seem that he has about a sinner any act save that of permitting him to sin (for neither does he, with respect to him, have acts of willing and refusing); therefore if 'to permit' is not some act, God will not be certain about the future sin of this man, because there will be no determination of his will for making that future contingent to be known with certitude.

2. On the contrary:

Permission is enumerated along with the other signs or notifications of the divine will; but precept is not any elicited act of the divine will; therefore much more forcefully is permission not so either.

I. To the Question

3. I reply:

In us a double act of will can be distinguished, namely to will and to refuse, and each is a positive act; and if they are about the same act, they are contrary acts – which acts are also expressed by other words, which are 'to love' and 'to hate'.

4. And each of these can in us be distinguished, as that willing is distinguished into efficacious willing and weak willing; so that 'efficacious willing' is said to be that by which the being of the willed thing is not merely pleasing to the will but, if the will can at once posit the willed thing in being, it at once posits it; so too 'efficacious refusing' is said to be that by which the refuser not only impedes something but, if he can, he altogether destroys it. 'Weak will' is that by which the willed thing pleases such that the will does not, however, posit it in being, although it could posit it in being; 'weak refusing' is that by which the refused thing displeases such that the will does not prevent the refused thing from being although it could.

5. In us, therefore, weak refusing – properly stated – seems to be the permission of something bad which I know; for I am not said to permit that about which I know nothing, or that which is so done by another that it pleases me – but I permit that which I know is being done badly by another but which I do not prevent.

6. A sign of efficacious will is that, if the thing may be immediately done by the will, there is fulfillment of it – if it may be done by another, there is precept of it; and

perhaps the sign of weak will – in us – is counsel, or persuasion or warning. And the sign of weak refusal is permission or dissuasion, and the sign of efficacious refusal is prohibition.

7. But this distinction could be posited in God such that, just as willing and refusing are one act of his (and this without contrariety or dissimilarity in the act in itself), so ‘efficacious willing’ would be assigned to some of the objects willed by him, and likewise efficacious refusing to some of the objects refused by him, – and not assigned to others. And then one could say that God’s refusal is weak with respect to those objects that he refuses in such a way that he refuses to prohibit them; and this refusing by God can be called his permission – and thus the act in God, as it passes over to the object, is related in this way to the divine will.

8. But if this answer does not please (because of the fact that the refusal of anything that has been posited in being would seem to go along with some sadness and with some imperfection in the volition itself and in the will), then it can be said that permission outwardly (or the sign or notification) is that the effect exist, although however it is against the divine precept – and this is the permission that is a sign or notification of divine will; but to this nothing in the divine will corresponds itself save that the will does not will to prevent something from coming to be, or does not refuse it, which refusing is the negation of a divine positive act and consequently is not a positive act.

9. And as to the remark that ‘he who wills allows’, this can be understood to mean, not that he wills to have a direct act about what he permits, but rather a reflex act; for there is offered to the divine will that this man will sin or is sinning, and first God’s will does not have about this man an act of willing (for he cannot will him to have sin); secondly his will can be understood not to be willing this thing, and then his will can will ‘not to will this thing’, – and in this way the one who wills is said to allow and allow voluntarily, namely willing to permit and to permit voluntarily. Just as, on the other side, when Judas is presented to God: first God has a not willing of glory to him, and not first a refusing of it to him (according to the final position in distinction 41 n.45); and he can then secondly reflect on this negation of act and will it – and so he willingly (or voluntarily) chooses, not Judas’ going to be finally a sinner and refusal of glory, but a non willing of glory.

II. To the Principal Argument

10. As to the first argument [n.1], it was explained in distinction 41 [n.50] how there is no foreseeing in God of a future sin by the fact that he knows he will permit this man to sin finally (and so to need to be finally damned), but there is required along with this that he knows he will co-operate with him in the act of sinning, and will not co-operate in the act whose omission is a sin of omission; yet concomitant with each of these permissions is that God foresees that he does not will this man to sin, – and thus it is plain how divine permission is an act of will and how it is not.

Forty Eighth Distinction

Single Question

Whether a Created Will is Morally Good whenever it Conforms to the Uncreated Will

1. About the forty eighth distinction I ask whether the human will – or more generally – whether a created will is morally good whenever it conforms to the uncreated will.

That it is:

The truth of a created intellect is when it is conformed to the uncreated intellect; therefore by similarity about a created will, that it is then good when it is conformed to the uncreated will.

2. On the contrary:

The Jews wanted Christ to suffer and to die, which Christ also wanted – and yet they sinned (“Forgive them, Father,” he says, “because they know not what they do,” *Luke* 23.34); therefore etc.

I. To the Question

3. I reply:

According to [Ps.-]Dionysius *On the Divine Names* ch.4 n.30, good is from a complete cause, and according to the Philosopher *Ethics* 2.2.1104b24-28 all the circumstances must come together in any moral act in order for the act to be morally good; yet the lack of a single or of any circumstance suffices for the act to be morally bad.

4. A created will, therefore, conform to the divine will in the substance of the act, whether conform in the substance as possessed of any one circumstance, or conform in all circumstances pertaining to moral goodness (and perhaps if it were conform in all circumstances, namely that it is willed for the same reason and in the same way, and so in the case of all other circumstances), – yet such a will need not be good in the way the uncreated will is good, because the same circumstances do not agree with the act as it is from diverse agents. For it does not agree with a created will to will some good with the same intensity as agrees with the uncreated will, – and the intensity of an act as regard the object in the created and uncreated agent differs greatly in these agents; and at any rate, however it may be with the conformity of the created and uncreated will in all circumstances, – conformity in goodness of act and object is not enough, because there can be lack of conformity in other circumstances that are necessarily required for the goodness of an act of will.

II. To the Principal Argument

5. To the argument for the opposite [n.1] I say that the case is not the same, because the truth of the intellect depends only on the object by itself, because if the object is disposed in the way it is understood then the intellect is true; but the goodness of the will does not depend on the object by itself, but on all the other circumstances, and most especially on the end; for which reason one must note that our whole volition is most especially ordered to the ultimate end, who is “the alpha and the omega, the beginning

and the end,” – to whom “be honor and glory for ages of ages” [*Revelation* 1.8, *Romans* 16.27]. Amen.

Appendix. Distinction 3 from the Commentary on the Sentences by Antonius Andreas

Question One: *Whether God can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer*

Question Two: *Whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer*

Response to Questions One and Two

To Question One

To Question Two

Question Three: *Whether God is the sufficient object of our intellect*

Question Four: *Whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light*

Question Five: *Whether a trace or footprint of the Trinity is found in all creatures*

Question Six: *Whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is, an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding*

Question Seven: *Whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge*

Question Eight: *Whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species, or the intellective part of the soul*

Question Nine: *Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly*

Third Distinction

Question One

Whether God can be naturally known by the intellect of the wayfarer

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.1 q.2 sect.1 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.12 a.12

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. About the third distinction I ask first whether God can be known naturally by the intellect of the wayfarer.

2. That he is not. From Aristotle as follows. *On the Soul* 3: We understand nothing without phantasms, for just as sensibles are to the senses so intelligibles are to the intellect; but God is not a phantasm because he is not sensible; therefore etc.

3. Again, *Metaphysics* 2: Our intellect is related to what is most manifest in nature as the eye of the owl to the sun; but there is impossibility here; therefore etc.

4. Again, *Physics* 1: The infinite qua infinite is unknowable; but God qua God is infinite; therefore etc.
5. Again, Gregory on *Ezekiel*: However much my mind has advanced in contemplation of God, I have reached not to what he is but to what is beneath him, etc.
6. On the contrary. *Metaphysics* 6: Science or theology is about God; but the science of metaphysics is naturally attainable; therefore.

Question Two

Whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The question next asked along with the first is whether God is the first thing naturally known by the wayfarer.
2. That he is, from *Metaphysics* 2: As things are to existence so are they to being known; but God is the first being; therefore he is the first known.
3. On the contrary: All natural knowledge arises from the senses, *Metaphysics* 1, *Posterior Analytics* 2; but God is furthest removed from the senses; therefore he is not naturally first known.

Response to Questions One and Two To Question One

1. The first question is not asking about whether God exists, because this question was discussed above [d.2 qq.1-2]. Rather it is asking whether the intellect of the wayfarer can have some simple concept in which God is in some way known as to what he is.
2. To this question some say (Thomas, *Summa* Ia q.12 a.12) that God is known by the wayfarer only negatively. But this does not hold, because negations are known only through affirmations, *Metaphysics* 4, *De Interpretatione* 2. For the reason that something is removed from something is because something else, with which the thing removed was impossible, is affirmatively attributed to it. So we remove composition from God because we attribute simplicity to him.
3. An alternative answer is that God is not known in himself by the wayfarer but in creatures, wherein he shines forth. But this too does not hold. For let purely a creature be known: and then God is not known, or God himself, who is in the creature, is known, and then he is known in himself through creatures.
4. Or in this way: God is known by discursive reason; if there is this discursive reasoning, then, either it is discursive to God, and so the conclusion is obtained; or it is discursive to the creature, and so the beginning and end of the reasoning is the same and consequently nothing is known – or God is at least thus known in the creature.
5. Another way is to say that God is known by creatures not per se but as it were per accidens, because he is not conceived in the proper idea of deity but in some attributal idea, which is a quasi accidental according to Damascene bk.1, where he says that

attributes do not state the nature of God but something about the nature; and in knowing that God is wise and the like, creatures known him as it were per accidens, because through some quasi accidental idea.

6. On the contrary. When creatures know that God is wise, they know that wisdom is in him, in a quasi second mode of statement per se [sc. a statement when the subject enters into the definition of the predicate]; and so they know the underlying quiddity to which they adequately attribute in the second mode the quasi accidental perfection.

7. Accordingly I state five articles in solution of this first question [q.1]. First I say that the wayfarer can naturally have of God some quidditative concept in which God himself will be known in some way, albeit imperfectly. For the wayfarer can naturally know that God is wise; therefore he attributes wisdom to the divine nature; therefore he in some way knows the divine nature quidditatively.

8. I say second that the wayfarer cannot naturally have a concept of this divine essence as it is this essence, the reason for which is that the essence is in this way not a natural object of our intellect, only of the divine intellect; but of other intellects the essence is in this way the moving and beatific object.

9. I say third that the wayfarer can attain knowledge of many concepts proper to God, of which sort are all concepts in their supreme degree, as when he conceives God to be supremely wise, supremely good, and other things of this sort. However, the more perfect among these concepts is the concept of infinity, for infinity is not as it were an attribute but a degree intrinsic to the divine essence, just as intense whiteness is not something quasi accidentally added to whiteness but is an intrinsic degree of it, etc. Note that 'supreme' taken in relation to another states a respect but taken absolutely it states, for me, something purely simple; and in this way is the infinite made more explicit.

10. I say fourth that all the naturally possible knowledge that can be had by a wayfarer is because of the hopes creatures have and is as it were by way of argument; and it proceeds in this way: I possess the species of wisdom and the species of act and the species of a supreme stone; I then put these three species together and form one concept, which is supreme actual wisdom; and I then argue that such is the wisdom of God and so on as to other attributes; and this can be done by an argument *a minori*. For the imaginative faculty does this when it imagines a golden mountain, by putting together at the same time the species of gold and the species of mountain. Hereby is it plain that the natural knowledge that can be had of God is not knowledge of this essence under its proper idea of essence; etc.

11. I say fifth that, because the knowledge that can naturally be had of God comes through species of creatures, it must necessarily be the case that a concept common to God and creatures is univocal. And I mean by a univocal concept a concept that is single with as much oneness as suffices for the extremes of contradiction and for a middle term, without fallacy of equivocation, in a syllogism.

12. Now I prove this in three ways. First as follows: Knowledge is not natural unless it is naturally caused; knowledge is not naturally caused unless it is caused by what naturally moves the possible intellect; the possible intellect is not naturally moved save by an object that is translucent in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; but every such object is something sensible; therefore God cannot be naturally known save through species of sensible things; but a sensible species cannot lead to knowledge of God and of spiritual things save in the way stated; but a sensible species, as of a stone, causes

knowledge of the stone and of all its higher genera, as body, substance, and being; and it causes the concept of being, which is got through the species of the stone, by attributing concepts to being, or by putting being together with other concepts, as was said in the fourth article [n.10]. For I say that God is like this, and so I have of God a concept of being; but this could not be done unless, as is plain, the concept of being were univocal to God and stone, for otherwise I could not attribute to God the concept of being that the species of stone causes in me; etc.

13. Secondly thus: The intellect, when conceiving created wisdom, conceives it as it states imperfection; and then, by removing the imperfection (namely limitation and the like) and preserving the formal idea of wisdom, the intellect attributes it to God; but this could not be done unless the concept of wisdom were univocal to created and uncreated wisdom; instead the whole of it would have to be taken away, and so nothing we received from creatures could we attribute to God.

14. Thirdly thus: The concept that the philosophers had of God, or of the first principle, which concept was being, was a created concept; but such a concept did not give certainty as to whether being was created or uncreated; therefore the concept of being was neutral as to both such concepts; and consequently it was univocal to them.

To the Arguments

15. To the arguments. To the first [q.1 n.2] the answer is plain from what was said in the fourth and fifth articles [nn.10, 11 supra].

16. To the second [q.1 n.3] I say that, according to the Commentator [Averroes, *Metaphysics* 2 com.1], there is no impossibility but a difficulty, the reason for which is that nature would have uselessly made separate substances if they could not be understood by any intellect. But this does not hold, because being understood by us is not the goal of separate substances. Hence, if they are not understood by us, they would not for this reason have been made uselessly; etc.

17. Further, that they cannot be understood by us does not entail that they cannot be understood by themselves.

18. One must therefore say that the eye of an owl only has intuitive vision, as is plain, and I then say that, just as it is impossible for the eye of an owl to see the sun, so it is impossible for God to be intuitively seen by the wayfarer naturally.

19. It can also be said in another way that the eye of an owl does see the sun at twilight, and just as its eye then sees the sun imperfectly so do we understand separate substances imperfectly.

20. To the third [n.4] I say that Aristotle is speaking there of an infinite in possibility, and such a thing, as far as it is infinite, is unknown; but God is an infinite in act; therefore etc.

21. To Gregory [n.5] I say that however much the mind of the wayfarer may advance in contemplation of God, yet it will not be able to reach distinct knowledge, but it can well reach some natural knowledge of God – not however of his essence as it is this essence, but to a knowledge of God, or of his essence, under the idea of being. This sort of knowledge is called inferior, however, because it is not a perfect and distinct knowledge as of the essence as it is this essence; wherefore etc.

To Question Two

22. Now in answer to the second question I say that there is a triple order to intelligible things: the first order is that of origin or generation; the next is the order of perfection; the third is the order of adequacy or of causality in the precise sense.

23. Of the first two priorities the Philosopher speaks in *Metaphysics* 9.15; of the third he speaks in *Posterior Analytics* 1.11, about the definition of the universal, because it states precision and adequacy first.

24. To being with, then, we must look at habitual cognition. As concerns this I say that concepts are twofold: one is simply simple, namely that which is not resolvable into other prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of being and its ultimate differences; the other is a simple concept but not simply simple, namely that which is resolvable into other prior concepts, of which sort is the concept of a thing defined (which is resolvable into the concepts of the parts of the definition), and so of other like terms.

25. Secondly I say that the second concept here [n.24] is knowledge, one being actual knowledge and another habitual knowledge; etc.

26. Third I say that actual knowledge is double: one is distinct, whereby a whole thing is actually known and actually in its totality; the other is confused, whereby a thing is not known actually in its totality because not all the things that are knowable about it are actually known. An example: it would be a contradiction to understand man actually without understanding all the things that are included in him essentially; yet it is not necessary for all these things to be understood actually, but only habitually. Accordingly, when all of them were understood actually, the thing would then be said to be known distinctly, because the whole of it would be known actually and totally; but when the things included in it are understood not actually but habitually, then the thing is said to be known confusedly.

27. Fourth I say that to know confusedly and distinctly are one thing and that to know a confused thing and a distinct thing are another; for in the former the confusion and distinctness are on the part of the knowledge and in the latter on the part of the thing, as is plain.

28. On the basis of these premises I say that when speaking of actual knowledge, which is here at issue, the first naturally known thing, naturally confused with confused knowledge, is the most specific species; but the first thing naturally known with distinct knowledge is being. But there is clarification of this as follows:

29. The first thing by which the possible intellect is naturally moved is the representative object in a phantasm together with the agent intellect, and, according to the common opinion, it does not immediately and directly represent the particular but the universal, namely the specific nature; therefore the specific nature is naturally first known; and because many things are included in it, of which included things the first is being, which is supreme, therefore, if the nature is to be distinctly known, there is need to start from being, and from the fact that being has a concept simply simple so that it includes nothing else. Therefore being can be only known distinctly, and thus it is plain that the first distinctly known thing is being, and the first confusedly known thing is the most specific species. But because the more universal things are the more confused things, therefore is it said in *Physics* 1 that the more confused things are known first by us. But this 'known first' must be understood of distinct knowledge, because we are now

beginning from it, as was said [just above]; and what in such knowledge is more distinct is what is last known, as is plain; etc.

30. One must note here, however, that, as Scotus seems to think, no particular is, in our present state, known in its proper idea either by the intellect or by the senses. The reason is that, if the particular could be known in its proper idea, it could be distinguished from everything that is not it, and yet it cannot be. For suppose that there is here a single whiteness and it is present as an object to your senses, and suppose that God by his own power were to annihilate it and immediately replace it with a whiteness that was not numerically the same but very similar to it, you will think it is the same and yet it will not be the same; but if you knew the first whiteness in its own proper and singular nature, you would immediately notice that it was not the same. This would also be clear of many other cases that, whether by the senses or in any other way, you cannot distinguish between, and yet they are really distinct. The particular and singular, therefore, are, in our present state, not known by the intellect or the senses in their proper idea of singularity, but they are known by aggregation of many accidents, namely size, shape, color, and many such things.

To the Arguments

31. To the first argument for the opposite [q.2 n.2] I say that the proposition is in all cases true only in respect of the divine intellect, which knows things according to the degrees of their entity; and so what is first and most being is first and most known by it. But because our knowledge begins from the senses, therefore are sensible things first known to us, yet they do not have existence first. So it is true that the first being is of itself the first knowable, but it is the first known only to the most perfect intellect, which also knows things in all their degrees, etc.

Question Three

Whether God is the sufficient object of our intellect

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.85 a.1

Francis of Meyronne, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.2

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1

1. The second question³⁶⁵ is whether God is the first sufficient object of a wayfarer's intellect.

2. That he is. Just as there is no participated being unless there is being by essence, so participated being is not known unless unparticipated being is first known; therefore God, who is being by essence, is the first sufficient object of any intellect whatever, etc.

3. Also, the first thing in any genus is the cause of everything in that genus, from *Metaphysics* 2 text.4; but God is the first and most perfect of all knowables; therefore etc.

³⁶⁵ 'Second' because questions one and two above were really parts of one question, or because this question begins the second part of distinction 3 (see footnote 10, to q.5 n.1 below).

4. Further, things are related to being known as they are related to being; but God is the first being; therefore etc.

5. On the contrary. The first object of a power, by the primacy of its sufficiency, is predicated of everything that can be known by that power, as visible is said of everything that the eye can see; but God is not predicated of everything that the wayfarer's intellect understands; therefore etc.

6. Further, no power can apprehend or understand any object under an idea more common than the idea of its first object; but the intellect understands things under an idea more common than God; therefore God is not the first object of the intellect.

To the Question

7. I reply by saying that Thomas [*ST* Ia q.12 a.4, q.85 a.1] posits that – just as powers are threefold: one altogether separate from matter in its being and in its operating, another altogether material in its being and in its operating, a third separate from matter in its operating but not in its being (the first is a separate intellect, the second is a material organic power, the third is a conjoined intellect which perfects matter in existing but does not use a material organ in operating) – so there are three objects proportionally corresponding to them. For immaterial quiddity corresponds to the first power as its first object; the material particular corresponds thus to the second power; the quiddity of a material thing corresponds thus to the third power, which quiddity, despite being in matter, is yet not known in the material singular, for it is purified by the irradiating of the agent intellect.

8. On the contrary. While a power remains the same power it cannot, by any habit added to it, exercise its act about an object that is not conceived under the formal idea of the first sufficient object of that power; but an intellect when blessed and when not blessed is numerically the same intellect; therefore, however much the habit of glory is added to the intellect when blessed yet, since such habit does not make the intellect not to be the same power as it was before, the intellect will when blessed not exercise its act about separate substances, which is absurd. The proof of the minor is that the first object of a habit either is contained under the first object of the power or at least does not go beyond it; otherwise it would not be a habit of the power.

9. Now Henry of Ghent says [*Quodlibet* 15 q.9 and 13 q.9] that the naturally first object of the intellect and of the will is God, the reason for which is that, just as the first object is naturally first simply, so it naturally first moves the intellect and the will, and whatever else moves them moves them by virtue of it, etc.

10. Against this is the argument brought against the first argument at the beginning [n.5]. On the supposition, therefore, of the univocity of being (which was proved supra, d.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), I say that the first sufficient natural object of the intellect and of the will is being. However I will first state what the univocity of being extends to and what it does not extend to. Second I will demonstrate the proposed conclusion.

11. About the first point I say that being is not said univocally and quidditatively of the ultimate differences or properties of being. I first give a twofold proof. The first proof is that if being is thus univocally said, then two ultimate differences, labeled *a* and *b*, will

not be in their totality primarily *diverse* but will be *different*,³⁶⁶ because they will be ‘some other being’, that is, they will be one in being by the fact that they include ‘some other being’, namely the concept of being. And then I will take precisely the reasons by which they [*a* and *b*] differ, and so either there will be an infinite regress or some ultimate differences will be found that will then be so diverse in their totality that they include nothing common; and consequently, since being states a single concept (as was proved, q.3 response to q.1 nn.11-14), these ultimate differences do not quidditatively include it.

12. The second proof is as follows: Just as a composite thing is composed of act and potency, so a composite concept is composed of an actual and formal concept; and just as act does not include potency, so an actual concept does not include a potential one; and just as the concept of being, which is potential, is simply simple, so an ultimate simple complex (at which ultimate resolution stops) is simply simple; and thus being, which states something potential, will not be predicated of difference, which states something actual.

13. Second [second of the twofold proof, n.11] I prove it following the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4 text 5 as follows: Being qua being has properties, and (following the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* 1 text 9) properties are predicated of the subject in the second and not the first mode of statement per se. Therefore, just as a property does not include the subject quidditatively, so the properties of being do not include being quidditatively.

14. I say that although being is not contained quidditatively in everything intelligible (for it is not thus contained in the properties and ultimate differences of being, as was said), and although, as a result, being is not common, with the commonness of quidditative predication, to all intelligibles, yet it is in some way common to everything as to virtual containment. And this virtual containment suffices for being to be called the natural first and adequate object of the intellect and of the will, and common to all intelligibles. And although it follows from this that the reason adduced against the first argument at the beginning [n.5] and against Henry’s opinion [n.10] is not in itself a good argument, yet it is valid against Henry, because God is not predicated quidditatively of everything intelligible, nor is he contained in everything the way intelligible is so contained, as is plain.

15. But against what was said in the first article [n.11], and against the univocity of being that it posited, argument is made in another way from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3 text 10, where he says that being is not a genus, for then its difference would not be a per se being. And if you say that it would be, the result is that being is a genus, because it is, according to you, univocally predicated of its logical inferiors, and, according to you, something can be outside the idea [of being], and then this something will be able to be a true difference.

16. Again against the univocity of being: The Philosopher says in *Metaphysics* 4 that being is said of all beings the way health is said of all healthy things, and so not logically [sc. but analogically].

17. Again in the same place he says that everything metaphysics is about is not a one but related to a one; therefore being, which is the subject there, is not univocal but analogical, etc.

³⁶⁶ Things are said to be ‘diverse’ if they are in another genus but ‘different’ if they are other in the same genus. So white and red are different but white and square are diverse.

18. Again in *Metaphysics* 7 text 14 & 15, accidents are not beings but *of* beings, etc.

19. Again Porphyry says [*Predicables*, on species] that if anyone speaks of all beings he will call them beings equivocally and non-univocally, etc.

20. These arguments notwithstanding, I bring forward yet another sort of reason in favor of univocity:

21. Whatever things are properly matched together in respect of some third thing are named with one name univocally in respect to it; but substance and accident, created being and uncreated being, are properly matched in respect of being; therefore etc. The major is plain from *Physics* 7 text 26. It is also plain in an example, for this proposition is not true: whiteness is more a color than sound is; the reason for this is that color has no unity in respect of whiteness and sound, but only in respect of whiteness. The minor is plain because substance is properly more a being than accident is, and uncreated being than created being; and the point is plain from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 7 text 5, where he says that substance excels more than accident; but his meaning cannot be that substance is more substance than accident is, because then accident will be a substance; nor can his meaning be that accident is less accident; etc.

22. In reply to the objections that were brought forward [nn.15-19], I say to the first part of the first objection [n.15] that, in the case of many differences, being is said quidditatively; but only in the case of the ultimate differences and properties of being is it not predicated quidditatively; the point has been explained [nn.11-13]. However, the idea of genus requires that all differences, both immediate and remote, be outside the idea of the genus, etc.

23. And for this reason does Aristotle say there [n.15] that if being were a genus all the differences would be per se non-being, which is unacceptable; but it is not unacceptable, rather it is necessary, as to the ultimate differences and properties, as has been shown.

24. Hereby is plain the solution to the second part of the first objection [n.15], that, because not all differences exclude being quidditatively, being cannot be a genus.

25. To the second, third, and fourth objections, and to all the authorities taken from the Philosopher that could be adduced for the purpose [nn.16-18], I say that, speaking naturally and metaphysically, it is true that being is analogical insofar it does not state any real unity outside the intellect and as to the same things it is said of. But nevertheless, logically speaking, it is univocal, because the concept of being is truly abstracted from them and is truly one concept, as has been said and made clear.

26. I confirm the fact, for the Philosopher says, *Physics* 7, that equivocations are latent in a genus; and he means it to the extent that not every genus has a real unity in respect of its species; indeed sometimes the idea of a genus is taken, in reality, from some other form, a form from which the difference is taken, as is plain according to those who posit a plurality of forms; and yet, despite this fact, the genus is a true logical genus, because one concept can be naturally abstracted from things really diverse; therefore it is plain that, notwithstanding the fact an accident is a being by way of attribution to substance, that also a concept of being abstracted from other things is logically a univocal concept, and it has a certain unity, as was made clear above. For it was not to be imagined that being as said of God and creatures would have a real unity outside the intellect, because then such being would naturally precede God himself, and so God will not be the first principle.

27. To Porphyry [n.19] I say that Aristotle, whom he cites there, does not say in his *Logic* that being is equivocal; but if he says it in his *Physics* or *Metaphysics*, the thing has just been expounded, etc.

28. I come now to the second article [n.10], which is about the principal matter at issue; and I say that the adequate natural first object of the intellect and the will is being.

29. I prove this about the intellect in two ways, and first as follows: The object of a habit does not exceed the object of the power of the habit, because then it would not be the object of the power; but the object of the habit that is metaphysics is being, as is plain in *Metaphysics* 6 text 1; and that habit is an intellectual one; therefore nothing inferior to being can be set down as the adequate object of the intellect; and nothing is superior to being; therefore being is the object.

30. Second as follows: The adequate first object of a power ought to contain under it quidditatively or virtually everything to which the power extends, otherwise it would not be the adequate object; but there is nothing that may contain everything intelligible save being, for being (as explained above) contains everything by quidditative or virtual containment (according to what was expounded above). I prove that truth, or the true, is not the object in question, because although the true is transcendent as being is, it cannot be posited as the adequate first object because it does not contain all intelligibles. For the true, as a property of being, does not contain being, nor the things that are per se being, whether quidditatively or virtually; but on the other hand the subject does contain the property virtually, albeit not quidditatively, etc.

31. Now, that being is the adequate first object of the will is plain from this, that whatever the intellect can understand the will, since it is free, can will, provided however the thing understood has the idea of being; for the intellect is of itself proportioned to the will. Many however do not concede that the will can will whatever the intellect can understand, etc.

32. Against this article [n.28] there is argument as follows: distinct powers have formally distinct objects, from *On the Soul* 2 text 33; but will and intellect are formally distinct powers, and sense and intellect are formally distinct powers, and yet the sensible is not formally distinct from being; on the contrary it formally includes being as its superior.

33. Again: Because then the intellect will naturally be able to understand separate substances per se, since they are contained per se under being.

34. To the first of these [n.32] I say that disparate powers of the sort that sight and hearing are have also formally distinct objects, just as they are formally distinct powers; but subordinate powers in the same genus, of which sort are the sensitive cognitive power and the intellective power that is also cognitive, need to have subordinate objects, just as they themselves are subordinate; and just as is plain about the particular sense and the common sense, so the sensible does not have to be distinct from the intellect but may be contained under it. Powers, however, that have an order between them but are not of the same genus, of which sort the intellect and will are, do not need to possess formally distinct objects because of the fact they have an order, for everything willed is known first, etc.

35. To the second [n.33] I say that, just as was said above, the intellect in this present state only naturally understands what it is naturally moved by; but it is only naturally moved by the object that shines forth in a phantasm along with the agent intellect; and

everything such is sensible. And therefore the quiddity of sensible things is the first natural mover of the intellect in this present state; but nevertheless, that which the intellect is capable of should be assigned to it as its adequate first object. Hence the intellect, and the like, is the whole of being. For the conjoined and non-conjoined intellect are numerically the same intellect; indeed every blessed conjoined intellect has power for every intelligible and every being. But the fact that in this present state the intellect cannot be moved naturally save by sensible things is a result either of the natural connection of the powers of inferiors, or of superiors, or because of the sin of our first Parent, as Augustine seems to mean in *On the Trinity* 15 last chapter; and Augustine's view is perhaps more likely, because the blessed intellect would be conjoined with the same body after glorification, and consequently the connection would be the same; and yet the blessed intellect would understand sensible substances.

To the Arguments

36. As to the first argument, then, at the beginning [n.2], namely that there is no participated being unless there is being by essence and so participated being is not known unless it is a being through being by essence. However, the following inference does not hold, namely that just as being is from unparticipated being, so being is not known unless unparticipated being is known and unless being is known through the idea of being by essence. An example: A stone is not a being unless there is being by essence. Let there be being by essence. Yet the inference does not hold: the stone is not formally white or hard unless being by essence is white or hard.

32. Hereby is plain the solution to Henry's argument [n.9]. For although God is simply the first being and is of himself the first knowable, yet he is not naturally for us the first known or the first knowable. Such he is for his own true intellect, which is a purely simple intellect.³⁶⁷

Question Four

Whether some sound and certain truth can be known by the intellect of the wayfarer without special illumination from the uncreated light

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.44 a.3

1. The fourth question is whether the wayfarer can possess some sound and certain truth without special illumination from the uncreated light.

2. And it seems that he cannot. For Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.8 says that we gaze on inviolable truth, and by state by means of it what sort of mind should belong with reasons to eternal man.

³⁶⁷ This response to Henry will serve also as a response to the remaining two arguments at the beginning, nn.3, 4 (which are not expressly addressed); for they both turn on the same idea, namely that since God is first therefore he is first known.

3. And in the same place, in the truth by which all temporal things are made we behold the form; therefrom do we get, as a word within ourselves, the conception of true knowledge.

4. And in *Confessions* 12 chs.2 & 3 Augustine says that if both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me or I in you, but we both see it with a changeless truth as far as possible above the intellect.

5. On the contrary, in *Romans* 1 it is said that the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are understood by the mind through the things that are made. These, the invisible things of God, are eternal ideas. Therefore they are known from creatures, and so, before they are seen, a sure knowledge of creatures is attained.

To the Question Henry of Ghent's Answer

6. The question here is about the knowledge of truth, which is known by the intellect as it combines and divides; the question is not about the first truth or being, but about the idea, etc.

7. The opinion of Henry [of Ghent] about this question is in the negative. Here one must note that, just as there is a twofold exemplar, namely created and uncreated (the uncreated the idea, and the created the impressed intelligible species), so there is a twofold conformity corresponding to them. But Henry says that through the created exemplar, or the acquired one within us, there cannot be had an altogether sound and certain truth; in fact it is fallible, which he proves as follows:

8. The object from which the created exemplar (that is the true species posited above) is abstracted is changeable; therefore it cannot be the cause of anything unchangeable, but the sound and certain knowledge of any truth about anything is had about it under the idea of changeability; therefore it is not had from such an eternal exemplar. Hence Augustine in 83 *Questions* q.9 says that sound truth is not to be expected from sensible things, because they are changeable, etc.

9. Further, the soul is not ruled or perfected by anything more changeable than itself; but the sort of created exemplar posited above is more changeable than the soul; therefore etc. The major is from Augustine *On True Religion*, etc.

10. Further, he who has such eternal truth should have wherewith to discern the true from the untrue or from the seeming true, which the wayfarer does not have (for the created exemplar or species cannot do it). And the proof is that this species either represents itself as it is, and then it is a true understanding, or represents itself as the object, and then it is a false understanding; therefore it can err, as is plain in dreams. From these premises the conclusion is drawn that sure knowledge cannot be had by looking at the created exemplar.

11. His way of putting this is as follows: for he says that God does not have the idea of exemplar as a known thing by which, when looked at, sound truth is known; so God is known in some general attribute. But he is the reason for knowing as naked exemplar and as proper idea of uncreated essence. Hence Henry says that the uncreated light illumines the intellect of an angel by direct vision, as it were, and this light, as seen, is the reason for an angel's seeing in himself other things. But the uncreated light illumines our

intellect as by reflected vision in this present state, and therefore it is the reason of seeing for our intellect and is not seen.

12. I argue against this opinion, and first by turning Henry's reasons in the opposite direction. For if the object too in the containing mind changes [n.8], no certitude can be had about it under an unchangeable idea; indeed in no light at all can certitude about it be had, because there is no certitude when the object can be known in a way other than how the subject is. There is no certitude then in knowing the changeable as unchangeable. It is plain too that the antecedent of this reasoning is false, for it imposes the view of Heraclitus, that sensibles are continually changing, *Metaphysics* 4 text 23. It also follows that if, because of the changeability of the exemplar in our soul, there can be no certitude (since anything posited subjectively in the soul is changeable, including the act of understanding itself), then it follows that by nothing in the soul will the soul be set right so as not to err.

13. Likewise, according to this opinion [n.9], the created species is inherent with this species alone³⁶⁸ apart from the being; but when something is known that is repugnant to certitude, no certitude can be had; for, just as from one contingent premise joined to another contingent premise a contingent conclusion follows [*Prior Analytics* ch.21], so from an uncertain thing and a certain thing (when they come together for some piece of knowledge) no certain conclusion follows, etc.

14. Again, the same is plain about the third reason [n.10], for if the species abstracted from the thing is concurrent with all knowledge and if it is not possible to judge when the species represents itself as itself and when it represents itself as the object, then, however much something else is concurrent with it, no certitude can be had whereby to discriminate the true from the seeming true etc.

15. Now, that this opinion is not, as some mean to say, the opinion of Augustine, is plain from Augustine when he says [*Soliloquies* 2] that for no reason does anyone concede that the speculations of the sciences to be the truest. And Boethius says [*De Hebdomadibus*] that the common conceptions of the soul are those that, when heard, everyone approves. The Philosopher too in *Metaphysics* 2 com.1 says that the first principles are certain and known to everyone, like the doors in a house.

16. From these three authorities the argument goes as follows: Whatever agrees with everything of some species is consequent to the specific nature; therefore since everyone has sure knowledge of the first principles, and since knowledge of the conclusions depends on knowledge of the principles, it follows that sure knowledge of the conclusion can be known by anyone. And elsewhere Augustine says *On the Trinity* 15.13, "Far be it that we should doubt to be true and certain the things we have learnt through the senses of the body."

17. I now solve Henry's arguments etc. As to the first [n.8], about the changeability of the object, I say that the antecedent is false. Nor is it the opinion of Augustine but of Heraclitus [rather Cratylus], who did not want to speak but to move his finger, as is said in *Metaphysics* 4. And given that the antecedent were true, sure knowledge could still, according to Aristotle, be had about the fact that everything is moved contingently; and from the fact that everything is moveable contingently, sure and sound and unchangeable knowledge is had that everything changeable was changeable. For the following consequence does not hold: the object is changeable; therefore whatever is generated by

³⁶⁸ The text prints 'absente' but, to make sense, it should be 'abs ente'.

it does not represent anything under the idea of being unchangeable. For the changeability of the object is not the reason for knowledge, but rather the nature of the changeable object is; what is generated by it, then, represents the nature per se; therefore if the nature has some unchangeable relation to something else, this something else is represented by its exemplar as being unchangeably united to it and thus through two exemplars.

18. To the second [n.9] I say that a double changeability can be understood in the soul: one is from affirmation to negation and conversely, namely from non-intellection to intellection and conversely; the other is as it were from contraries to contrary, namely from correctness to error and conversely. The soul is changeable in the first way as to any object whatever, and such changeableness is not removed from it by anything existing formally in the soul. But the soul is not changeable in the second way until it reaches propositions that are not evident from the terms. But about propositions that are evident from the terms the soul cannot change in this second way of being changeable, because the apprehended terms are a necessary cause of the conformity of the composition with the terms. Therefore if the soul is capable of absolute changeability from rightness to error, then there is nothing by which it can set itself right; at least it cannot set itself right as to the objects that the intellect, once the terms are grasped, cannot be in error about.

19. To the third [n.10] I say that, when the intelligible species or the exemplar is said not to represent itself as the object in dreams, then it is a phantasm and not an intelligible species; therefore if the intellect is using only a phantasm in which the object is present to it and is not using another intelligible species, then it does not seem able to discern the true from the seeming true by anything that the object is manifest in; but positing an impressed species in the intellect is not valid reasoning, because the intellect cannot use that species itself for the object, because in fact it does not use it in sleep.

20. And if answer be made that because a phantasm can represent an object the intellect can at least err and can even be impeded from operating correctly, as is plain of the mad and people asleep – I say that the intellect does not then err because it does not then act.

21. And so the response to Henry's arguments is plain, etc.

22. What remains now is to argue against the conclusion of Henry's opinion. Hence I ask what he means by sound truth. For either he means certain and infallible truth, without any doubt or deception, and this can be had by purely natural power. Or he means by truth a property of being; but since being can be naturally known, so too can its property, namely the true; consequently, by abstraction, truth can be known, for any form that can be understood in something can also be understood in itself by abstraction. Or he means by sound truth conformity with the exemplar, and then I ask whether the conformity is with the created exemplar (and then the proposed conclusion is gained) or with the uncreated exemplar; and if with the uncreated exemplar then, since conformity cannot be known unless what the conformity is with is known, it follows that the uncreated exemplar is known in the created exemplar, which is contrary to how he posits things.

23. Further, when the intellect understands something confusedly it can grasp it definitively by investigating its definition through a process of division. This knowledge is the most perfect kind and belongs to simple understanding, and from this most perfect

kind of knowledge of terms the intellect can understand principles, and from principles conclusions, and in this way its knowledge becomes complete, etc.

Andreas' own Answer

24. To the question I say that, because of Augustine's words [nn.2-4],³⁶⁹ one must concede the fact that infallible truths are seen in eternal patterns. But here the 'in' can be taken as meaning the object and in four ways: as in the proximate object, or as in what contains the proximate object, or as in that by virtue of which the proximate object moves, or as in the remote object.

25. To understand the first of these I say that all intelligibles have intelligible being by act of the divine intellect, and all truths about these intelligibles are visible in them; and the intellect, understanding them as intellect and the necessary truths about them by virtue of them, sees the necessary truths in them as in its objects. Now these are truths insofar as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect, because they are conformed to their exemplar, namely to the divine intellect; they are also light because they make things manifest and are unchangeable and necessary; they are also eternal, but in a certain respect, because eternity is a condition of what exists in a certain respect, and these things only have existence in a certain respect. Thus we can in a first way say that the intellect sees things in the eternal light, that is, in a secondary object of the divine intellect, which, in the way just expounded, is the truth or the eternal light.

26. The second way is plain from the fact that the divine intellect contains the truths as a sort of book, after the manner stated by Augustine [*On the Trinity* chs.14-15], that the eternal patterns are written in the book of eternal light, that is, in the divine intellect insofar as it contains these truths. And although the book is not something seen, yet the things written in it are seen to be the quiddities of things; and the intellect could be said to see truths in the light, that is, in the book as it contains the object (and this is the second way), or to see them also in the truths that are in a certain respect eternal light, as we see truths in objects (and this according to the first way). The latter of these ways seems to be of Augustine's mind, because the idea of square body remains incorruptible and unchangeable but the body itself does not remain so, save as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect, etc.

27. But there is a doubt here; for if we do not see the truths as they are in the divine intellect (for we do not see that intellect), then we will be said to see them in the uncreated light, and that because what we see in such eternal light (eternal in a certain respect) are things that have being in the uncreated light as in the intellect that knows them. Here the second way replies that things as they are the secondary object of the divine intellect have being only in a certain respect. But real operation does not belong to any being by that being's power as it precisely is a being in a certain respect; but if operation does in any way belong to it then it must do so by the power of another thing that has being simply. These objects, then are, according to Aristotle, only able strictly speaking to move the intellect by virtue of the being of the divine intellect, which is being simply and through which the objects have being in a certain respect. Thus it is, then, that we see things in the eternal light (eternal in a certain respect eternal) as in the proximate

³⁶⁹ Note that because Andreas accepts the arguments at the beginning he has no need to give an answer to them; so no section responding to such arguments is found in this question.

object; but we see them in the uncreated light as in the proximate cause, by virtue of which the proximate object moves the intellect, etc.

28. Alongside this can be said that, as to the third way [n.24], we see things in the eternal light as in the proximate cause of the object in itself. For the divine intellect produces things by its own indwelling intelligible act, and by this act it gives to each object, to this object and to that, this or that sort of being; consequently to each is given the idea of the kind of thing it is, and through these ideas do things first move the intellect to sure knowledge. But the fact that one can indeed say the understanding of the matter is to see things in the eternal light (because the light is the cause of the object) is apparent from a likeness: for we are properly said to understand in the light of the agent intellect – although however this light is but the active cause, either as being what makes the object actual, or as that by virtue of which the object moves, or as both. So this double causality of the divine intellect (namely that it is the true uncreated light which produces secondary objects in intelligible being and is that by virtue of which produced secondary objects also actually move the intellect) can as it were integrally include the third member (the one about the cause [n.24], because of which we are said to see truly in the eternal light).

29. But if you object against these two ways (which integrally include the third one about the cause) that then it seems rather to be the case that we are said to see in God's will, or in God as will, than in God as he is light, because the divine will is the immediate principle of any extrinsic act of God etc. – I reply that the divine intellect produces objects in intelligible being insofar as it is in some way prior to the divine will, and so it seems to be a merely natural power with respect to them, because God is only a free cause with respect to something if the supposition is first made that some willing or act of will in some way precedes it; and so the intellect, as prior to the act of will, produces intelligible objects such that a prior cause seems to cooperate naturally with the intelligibles for their effect, namely in the way terms, when apprehended and joined together, cause apprehension of the conformity [of the proposition] to themselves. There seems, then, to be a contradiction in the intellect forming some such composition of terms and the composition not being in conformity in the terms – though it is possible that the terms not be conceived; for although God voluntarily acts along with the intellect in putting or not putting terms together, nevertheless, when the intellect has put them together, the conformity of the composition with the terms seems to follow necessarily the intelligible nature of the terms, which nature they have from the intellect of God as this intellect naturally brings the terms about in intelligible being.

30. Thus it is apparent how no special illumination is necessary for seeing things in the eternal patterns. For Augustine posits those truths alone to be seen in them that are, by the force of the terms, necessary extremes, and in such cases there is the maximum of necessity, that is, in both the proximate and the remote causes with respect to the effect, namely, in both the divine intellect with respect to the objects that move the intellect, and in the objects in relation to the truth of the proposition about them. But if it is posited that God cooperates as to the effect with a general influence but not with natural necessity, I say that, whether there is a general influence here or a natural necessity, plainly no special illumination is necessarily required.

31. The assumption from Augustine [n.30] is plain from *On the Trinity* 4.15 when he speaks about these matters: "Some are able to raise the sharpness of their mind above every creature to attain in some way or other to the light of incommunicable truth, which

they mockingly say Christians who live by faith alone are not yet able to do.” Therefore he maintains that Christians do not see the things of faith in the eternal patterns. But philosophers see many necessary things in those patterns according to Augustine when he says [*On the Trinity* 9.6] “the mind must not be of the sort it is in just any man,” as if he were to say, “contingent things are not seen there but necessary ones;” therefore he means the necessary ones are seen through eternal patterns, because contingent things, which are only known through the senses are or believed from histories, are not known; and yet a special illumination is more required in the case of believing contingent things than in knowing necessary ones, where a special illumination is furthest removed and the general illumination is alone sufficient.

32. On the contrary: Why then does Augustine say [*On the Trinity* 12.14] that few are able by sharpness of mind to attain to the intelligible ideas, and that only pure souls reach them?

33. I reply that the purity in question here should not be understood as purity from vices, because Augustine maintains [83 *Questions* q.46, *On the Trinity* 14.15] that an unjust man may see in the eternal patterns what in them one should think. But the purity must be understood as an elevating of the intellect to understanding truths as they are manifest in themselves, and not only as they are manifest in phantasms. Here one needs to note that a sensible thing causes a single confused phantasm representing in the imaginative power something per accidens one, namely the thing in its size, shape, color, and other sensible accidents. And just as the phantasm represents the thing only confusedly and per accidens, so many people perceive only a per accidens thing. But pure truths are precisely what they are through the proper nature of the terms, to the extent the terms are abstracted from everything joined per accidens with them. For the proposition, ‘every whole is greater than its part’, is true not only as it is a whole of stone or wood, but as it is a whole abstracted from everything to which it is per accidens conjoined. Therefore when the intellect understands a whole as it is in wood or stone, it does not have sound truth about it; and in this way Augustine says that few are able thus to understand, for few have so subtle a sort of mind; and he who understands with a confused and per accidens sort of concept is in the valley and surrounded by fog. But he who understands truths purely, and understands them as, from the idea of their terms, they precisely are, is on a broad mountain, having the valley and fog below.³⁷⁰

33. One can, then, in this way concede that sound truths are known in uncreated light as in a remote known object [n.24]; for the uncreated light is the first principle of theoretical matters and the ultimate end of practical ones, and the principles of theory and practice are taken up in this way. Therefore knowledge of beings through such principles is nobler, and such knowledge belongs to theologians. Yet, notwithstanding, Augustine says that sound truth can be had without special illumination, etc.

Question Five

³⁷⁰ The printed text has ‘sincerum’ or ‘sound’ which makes no sense in the context. It may be a misprint for ‘inferius’ or ‘sub pedem’ or the like, which is what is translated here.

Whether a trace or footprint of the Trinity is found in all creatures

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.5

Thomas, *ST Ia* q.45 a.7

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.1

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The question asked in the third place³⁷¹ is whether there is a trace or footprint of the Trinity in creatures.
2. That there is not, because a footprint leads to knowledge of what imprinted it, and so we could know the Trinity, which is false.
3. Again, in intellectual nature there is an image of the Trinity, so there is no footprint; for image and footprint have opposite ways of representing something.
4. Again, intellectual nature, because it is nobler, has a higher way of representing than lower substances do, namely by way of image; but there are many natures in intellectual nature that have a less perfect rank, just as animate things rank above inanimate things and, after that, above simple things; so these natures will have different ways of representing, because the idea of trace or footprint will not be common to them all, etc.
5. To the contrary is Augustine, *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter, who says that we should be able, by looking at the creator through the things that are made, to understand the Trinity, whose footprint, as has been said, is posited to exist in creatures.

To the Question

6. I reply that, according to the Philosopher *Topics* 6.2, all transferred senses are transferred according to some likeness.
7. First, then, one must note what in creatures a trace or footprint is, and second in what consists that whereby the footprint is transferred to divine realities, and third whether the footprint is found in any creature whatever.
8. As to the first point, a trace or footprint is said to be an impression left by the foot of an animal as it passes by, if there is something that yields to the foot. Footprints do not represent what they belong to perfectly but by way of inference, and not as to the proper form of the individual (the way an image does) but rather as to the form of the nature. An example: If I see the footprint of a horse in the ground, I argue that a horse has been there; not however that this or that particular horse has but absolutely that some horse has; and even this could be wrong, because the foot could have been cut off from the whole horse, etc.
9. As to the second point [n.7], any creature at all is said to be referred back to God in three respects: as an example back to its exemplar cause, as a product back to the

³⁷¹ 'Third' because it looks to be the third part of the distinction, although the fifth question overall. The first two or three questions are the first part (about the knowability of God), the fourth question (or the third and fourth question together) is the second part (about creaturely knowledge in general in its dependence on God), the fifth question is the third part (about the trace or footprint of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the second part), the sixth to ninth questions are the fourth part (about the image of the Trinity – although the printed text calls it the third part).

producing cause, and as a thing ordered back to its final cause; and all three respects are parts of a footprint. However, it seems one should speak in another way in accord with Augustine *On the Trinity* 6 last chapter [n.5] last chapter; for he maintains that the parts of the footprint are units, species, and order, the first two of which are absolutes, as is plain.

10. On the third point [n.7], any creature at all is said to have its proper unity whereby it is distinguished from everything that is not of the same sort; and it has its own species, whereby it imitates its own proper idea; and it has its proper order, whereby it has a certain rank among beings; and so there is a divine footprint in every creature whatever.

To the Arguments

11. To the first argument for the contrary [n.2] I say that from the fact a footprint leads by way of argument and imperfectly to a knowledge of that of which it is the footprint, it does not follow that a Trinity of distinct persons can be known by such created footprint, etc.

12. To the second argument [n.3] I say that, although a created essence, insofar as it is such an exemplar, is created according to some determinate exemplar (so any creature represents God under the idea of footprint), yet, insofar as intellectual nature has in it one essence and several operations possessing an order of origin between them, it represents the Trinity by reason of all the operations found in such nature; to this extent an intellectual nature is not a footprint and an image in the same way, as will be plain below, etc.

13. To the last argument [n.4] I say that there are different ways of representing in creaturely essences, that is, different ways of being a footprint; but because there is a material subject in which many things representing unity and trinity come together, therefore such a nature has the idea of image, as intellectual nature does. But such coming together is not found in any nature lower than intellectual nature; and for this reason all other natures have precisely just the idea of footprint, etc.

Question Six

Whether in intellectual nature taken properly there is memory properly, that is an intellect possessing an intelligible species naturally prior to the act of understanding

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.6

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.79 a.6

1. The question asked in fourth place³⁷² is whether some species impressed on the possible intellect necessarily precedes all intellection by nature.

2. That it does not. A species is only posited because of the presence of the object; but the object present to the intellect is prior in nature to the impressed species; therefore

³⁷² 'Fourth' because the fourth part of distinction 3, but the particular question is number 6 overall (see footnote 10 to q.5 n.1 above).

positing a species is otiose. The proof of the major is that a species is only caused or impressed when the object is present; and here is confirmation, because the object that is in the phantasm, together with the agent intellect, can cause and impress a species on the possible intellect (according to you); thus the natural phantasm can cause simple intellection,³⁷³ so the species would be impressed to no purpose.

3. Again, because it would then follow that the possible intellect would not be moved immediately to understanding by the intelligible object but would first suffer from it some real effect, namely by receiving in impression the real species; so the impression would be impressed to no purpose.

4. On the contrary. The possible intellect is sometimes in essential potency for understanding and sometimes in actual potency etc. But it only moves from essential potency to accidental potency by some real change in it, as is plain of all like cases. Now such real change is nothing but the impression of the species; therefore etc.

To the Question

5. Reply. Henry of Ghent denies, for the reasons just given, there is any impressed species in the possible intellect, and he posits only an impressed species such that the object evident in the phantasm when illumined by the agent intellect is by impression in the imaginative power, and such that in the possible intellect there is by expression only act and habit of understanding.

6. On the contrary. The same thing cannot represent diverse things in diverse ways; but the phantasm, qua phantasm, represents the singular; therefore it does not represent the universal; therefore the universal cannot be understood unless one posits an intelligible species that is impressed on the possible intellect; etc.

7. I reply. The same thing can represent diverse things under different lights. So the phantasm represents the particular in the light of imagination and the universal in the light of the agent intellect. There is a confirmation, because, according to you, the separated soul understands the universal and the singular and everything else through the same species and in the same and not different light. So this objection does not seem cogent against Henry.

8. I therefore argue against Henry in a different way, and first as follows: The agent intellect is active and not receptive; but its action is real; therefore the term of its action is real; but such term cannot be intellection, because the object, as object, precedes intellection by natural order; now the object, as object, is a universal and it is only made a universal by the agent intellect; therefore the first and immediate term of the action of the agent intellect is the universal or universality; and universality is not intellection but a condition of the object on the part of the object; but this real term of the action of the agent intellect is not in the agent intellect itself (because the agent intellect is not receptive, as was said), nor is it in the imagination, because, first, it is not posited as being there, second because the agent intellect impresses nothing positive on the phantasm, and third because an agent does not extend to more things actively than the passive or possible thing extends to passively, and every active action received from an agent is received passively. Therefore it is impossible for the universal, which is the first

³⁷³ The printed text has no nouns qualified by the adjectives 'natural' and 'simple', so what look to be the appropriate nouns are added in the translation (rightly or wrongly) from the context.

term of the action of the agent intellect, to be received by impression in the possible intellect in advance of all intellection [sc. in advance of the agent intellect making the universal]; and this is nothing other than that the intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect representatively is first and per se the universal, etc.

9. There is a confirmation because, in everyone's view, the first operation of the agent intellect is to make actually intelligible what is potentially intelligible – and this is everyone's view as was said; the term of this action is only in the possible intellect, for as the agent intellect is that which makes everything so the possible intellect is that which becomes everything; but being actually intelligible is on the part the object and not on that of the act; therefore etc.

10. Again, the possible intellect, qua distinct from the sensitive part of the soul, is said to possess the object present to it under its idea as object; but the possible intellect will not have this if there be impressed on it no intelligible species that is representative of the object; therefore etc.

11. I say, therefore, that because of these reasons (one on the part of the agent intellect [nn.8-9] and the other on the part of the possible intellect [n.10]) there is an intelligible species impressed on the possible intellect prior in order of nature to all intellection; and indeed the object, as present in the species of the object, is made manifest in this species and receives in it its being known, etc.

To the Arguments

12. To the first argument at the beginning [n.2] I say that, as is plain from what has been said, the natural order requires that the first and immediate term of the action of the agent intellect is not intellection but the species that is naturally representative and that does represent the object as actually intelligible etc.

14. And hereby is plain the answer to the second argument [n.3]. For the natural order requires that the possible intellect be moved to an impression of the intelligible species before it is moved to intellection; it is of course, however, moved to understanding immediately by the intellect representing the species, but it is moved first to an impression of the species, as was said.

Question Seven

Whether the intellective part of the soul taken properly, or some part of it, is the whole cause, or the whole principle of generating, which generates actual knowledge

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.7

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.85 a.2

1. The question asked fifth³⁷⁴ is whether the possible intellect is purely passive with respect to generated knowledge.

³⁷⁴ 'Fifth' perhaps because, although this question belongs to the general discussion of image (the fourth part of d.3), it here takes a diversion through the details of how the created mind knows, and then the question of image proper is returned to in question nine below.

2. That it is, from Aristotle *On the Soul* 3 text 18, who says that the agent intellect is what makes everything and the possible intellect what becomes everything; therefore, just as the agent intellect is purely active with respect to intellection, so the possible intellect is purely passive, etc.

3. On the contrary: Sometimes the possible intellect is in essential potency to understanding, and sometimes in accidental potency; but this distinction cannot be taken properly in something purely passive; therefore etc.

To the Question

4. Some say that, because the possible intellect is purely active, therefore understanding is an act merely of life; so it comes from a principle of life, and consequently it is not from an object but from the power, etc.

5. Again, the more perfect a form is the more actual it is; since therefore the intellect is a perfect form among other lower forms it is purely active.

6. Again, from *On the Soul* 3, intellection is an immanent action, so it is not the effect of an object, because then there would be an influence from outside the agent, for the act of understanding is in the possible intellect as in its subject.

7. Again, intellection is an action, and action is distinguished from passion; but action of this sort is in an agent and is its perfection (*Physics* 3, *Ethics* 2, *Metaphysics* 9); therefore, since the possible intellect is perfected by itself, the perfection comes actively from itself; this is said to be Augustine's meaning *On the Trinity* 4.5, *On Genesis* 28 etc.

8. On the contrary, from *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, where Augustine says that knowledge is from both, that is, both knower and known; and *ibid.* 2.2 & 5 where he says that vision is generated by seeing; and *ibid.* 15.10 & 24 where he says that the word comes from the thing we know; therefore the object contributes some activity, etc.

9. Again by argument thus: the efficient and material causes are sufficient for the effect when they are disposed and proximate to each other and not impeded – necessarily so if the efficient cause is a natural one, or, if it is a voluntary one, the effect can follow; for the effect essentially depends on the efficient and material causes; but the possible intellect is a sufficient continuing matter for intellection; therefore, if it is sufficient matter in respect of some same intellection and is purely active, then intellection follows even when everything else is removed; and so there will be intellection without an object, which is impossible, etc.

10. Others assert the opposite extreme [Averroes *On the Soul* com.17 & 18, Godfrey of Fontaines *Quodlibet* 7 q.7], namely that the possible intellect is purely passive. The reason is that it is susceptible of intellection as being the matter of it; so, if it were able to effect intellection, then material and efficient cause would coincide in numerically the same thing, which is contrary to Aristotle *Physics* 2 text 70 where he says they do not coincide.

11. Again, it would then follow that the same thing was active and passive with respect to the same thing, which is against the first principle [sc. the principle: 'the same thing cannot both be and not be'], etc.

12. Again, it would follow that the extreme terms of a real completion, namely of producer and produced, would be in the same foundation, which seems impossible.

13. Hence these others say [n.10] that, since the agent intellect is the same really as the possible intellect, it does not do or cause anything in the possible intellect but only makes the object that is manifest in the phantasm to be actually intelligible and actually able to move the possible intellect to understand. But intellection and volition are, they say, caused precisely by the intellectual object; namely intellection by the object manifest in the phantasm (when this is actually imagined and illumined by the agent intellect), and volition by the object made actually intellectual, etc.

14. On the contrary: The sensitive soul is the same really as the intellectual soul, so the reason they give for the agent intellect's being unable to cause or do anything in the possible intellect is a reason for its being unable to be in the sensitive soul. Therefore either the agent intellect causes something positively in the phantasm (which is contrary to what they say); or it removes something from it, namely the material conditions and that sort of thing, and then the same problem arises, that by acting it removes something or it does nothing, and then the phantasm alone will cause intellection – which is false, however, because the effect would be nobler than its cause, and because a less noble thing would act on what is more noble, etc.

15. Again, acts of discursion and composing and denying could not be in the sensitive soul, as is plain, and likewise neither reflexive acts or relations of reason or logical intentions, and yet all these are intellections.

16. Again mental acts could not be in the sensitive soul etc.

17. Henry of Ghent [*Quodlibet* 5 q.14] holds a different view, that the possible intellect is not active or passive with respect to the impression of the species because, as he says, there is no impressed species. But with respect to simple knowledge the possible intellect, because there is no impressed species, is purely passive, for it is instead caused by the object manifest in the phantasm, and the same is expressive in the intellect. But with respect to the further knowledge, which is the word, the possible intellect is active by means of the simple knowledge that it is informed by first.

18. On the contrary: Although this opinion, which does not posit an impressed species, was argued against in another question above [d.3 q.4], yet to the extent it has regard to the present matter it is argued against here again as follows:

19. The first knowledge, which is called simple, is confused and imperfect with respect to second knowledge, according to Henry, and can be of the same species as the first, because it can be about the same object; but the formal principle of causing an effective object cannot be more imperfect than the effect that it causes of the same species; therefore an intellect informed by simple knowledge cannot be made active by it for causing a second effect if, in the person, it was purely passive, etc.

20. The Thomists and Giles of Rome say in a different way that the object in the memory (if it is per se there primarily), or the species of the object in the memory, causes another intellectual species, and this second species is generated knowledge while the first is not (and here they differ from the second power that Henry posits), because nothing is impressed on the intellect absolutely before knowledge is; and here they agree with Henry. But he posits that, in respect of all knowledge, both first and second knowledge, the intellect is purely passive, and all knowledge is caused by the object; and here they differ from Henry. They posit instead that the intellect is indeed purely passive in respect of all knowledge but, when the object is not present per se, the first impression of the species in the memory is not intellect but second intelligence.

21. To the contrary: I say about discursive, vital, reflex acts, and the like what I said against the second opinion [nn.14-16], that intellection does not come precisely from the object or the species of the object, both because of the arguments made against this sort of opinion, and also because then the idea of image is not preserved in the mind when it is mind, for nothing of the mind would have the idea of parent by way of intellection.

22. I also say that intellection is not entirely from the power, both for the reasons made against the first opinion [nn.8-12] and for two other reasons:

23. First that intellection would not be a likeness of the object but of the power, because it would not be caused by the object save by the power; but this is unacceptable because understanding is about the object not about the power, for the object is what is understood.

24. Second because the power would have to have non-successively an active and infinite power – it can understand an infinity of intelligible things differing in species; but the intellect does not gain for itself any power from the fact it actually understands, but must have the power first so that it can understand; therefore it must pre-possess as much power as can understand infinities, though it understands this specifically diverse intelligible species through one power and that specifically diverse intelligible species through another power, but it can understand several things of the same species through the same power; therefore since two powers are more than one, powers infinite extensively would be infinite intensively. And if you say that fire can successively burn an infinity of combustible things and yet does not have infinite power, I say that the case is not the same, because all the combustibles are of the same species in idea of combusting, and therefore the fire burns all of them by the same power. But intelligibles are not so, because the intellect understands one intelligible as it is specifically distinct from another.

25. I say therefore that both the power and the object, or the species, are each per se partial causes, and both together integrally constitute one total cause. This is confirmed by Augustine *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter, as cited above [n.8].

26. But note that when several causes in the genus of efficient cause come together for causing the same effect, sometimes they come together as several men for dragging a weight, sometimes as subordinate but such that a lower receives power from a higher (as the cause in a creature receives power from the uncreated cause), sometimes as essentially ordered but such that one does not receive power from the other (though one is more excellent than the other, as in the case of father and mother in generating offspring, according to those who posit that a mother has active power in generating). The causes above listed [n.25] do not come together in the first way, because just as a stronger person could come along there who would by himself drag as much as two persons were dragging, so there could be a single more powerful intellect here which would cause intellection by itself without the object, which however is impossible. Nor do the causes above listed [n.25] come together in the second way [as is evident].

27. I raise the question about the comparison of the two partial causes [n.25] that cause generated knowledge.

Question Eight

Whether the more principal cause of generated knowledge is the object in itself or present in the species or the intellective part of the soul

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.8

1. But then the question arises as to which of these two causes [q.7 n.25] is more principal.
2. It seems, to begin with, that the object itself moves without being moved (*On the Soul* 3 text 54); while the intellect does not move to intellection unless moved, first because it is moved by the species impressed by the object, and second because its effect, namely intellection, is more like the object than like the power.
3. On the contrary. The cause that is more actual with respect to the same effect is more principal than the cause that is less actual; but the intellective power is more of this sort, especially when the object has a diminished being.
4. Again the object works along with the power and not conversely, because we can understand when we wish (from Aristotle), which would not be the case if the object was the principal cause.
5. Again, the object is determined to this intellection alone, that is, only to an intellection about itself; but the power is determined to intellection as such and so is a cause more universal and more indeterminate with a universality and indetermination that state perfection (as is plain); and so it follows that the power is more principal.
6. So for these three reasons, especially the last, I concede this conclusion, etc.

To the Arguments

7. As to the solutions of the arguments: To the first argument of the first opinion [q.7 n.4] I say that although a non-living thing cannot be the total cause of a living effect, it can yet be a partial cause, as is plain of the sun in the generation of man, etc.
8. As to the second [q.7 n.5] I say that, because the infinite is perfect, its not being totally active is not repugnant to it, but that it have some activity is sufficient for it, etc.
9. To the third [q.7 n.6] I say that, for an action to be immanent, it is enough that it not pass beyond the supposit of the agent, or beyond its own total cause, and that, even if it pass beyond a less principal partial cause, it yet remain within its principal partial cause – which is sufficient for action properly speaking. And hereby is plain the answer to the fourth argument [q.7 n.7].
10. As for the quote from Augustine [q.7 n.8] I say that his intention was not this [sc. that the object contributes some activity] but what has been said [sc. that the intellect is the principal cause], as is plain from the places there cited.
11. As to the first argument of the second question [rather second opinion, q.7 n.10] I say that it is true about matter properly speaking that it is pure potency, but this is not true of the subject of an accidental form, which is matter in a certain respect; for such a subject states in itself an act, and so there is no repugnance to its being an efficient cause, etc.
12. To the second argument [q.7 n.11] I say that the same thing cannot be active and passive with respect to the same thing in the same way, namely that it be formally such both in act and in potency; but it can be virtually such in act and formally such in potency,

and this when it is an equivocal agent. In fact all change toward a non-active form is from an equivocal agent, because the formal principle of acting is always an active form (otherwise it would not be the principle of acting); therefore change that is to a non-active form is change to a form dissimilar to the principle of acting and so dissimilar to the equivocal active cause. I then say that that this can sometimes fail to hold, though not always, in the case of equivocal agents, just as change can also be from an equivocal agent and yet to an active form; but what is sufficient for the idea of an equivocal cause is that the formal term of the change be of a different idea from the formal principle of the acting. There is an example of this from those who posit that a substance is actively causing in itself its proper accident at the prior moment when the substance precedes its proper accident: the subject in this case is, with respect to the same thing, virtually such in act and formally such in potency.

13. To the third [q.7 n.12] I say that some relations cannot go together in the same nature and the same supposit, as the relations of cause to caused. The reason is that then the same thing would depend essentially on itself, for the caused depends essentially on the cause. Some relations cannot go together in the same supposit but can in the same nature, when the nature is communicable without division to several supposits, of which sort is the divine nature; and these are relations of motion to moved. The reason is that, as the divine nature is of itself unlimited to the extremes of this relation, so a supposit or nature can in some way be unlimited as to the extremes of the relation; thus it is in the issue at hand, that the intellect and will are of themselves unlimited as to their power and understanding and willing being virtually informed by such acts, etc.

14. To the first principal argument [q.7 n.2] I say that the soul, by reason of the agent intellect, can activate any intellection, and, by reason of the possible intellect, can receive any intellection; and you may understand this of the intellection that is about an object naturally moving the power, otherwise the agent intellect would not be able to activate it; however I say that the activity of the agent intellect is not immediately directed to understanding but to illumining, and this illumination is necessarily prior to natural intellection; and therefore the activity of intellection must be immediately from both the object and the power, as was said above etc.

15. Nevertheless, the soul's intellection of itself might well be totally from itself, because it would be both thing understanding and thing understood; however, according to Scotus, it cannot be had by the wayfarer save only by inference through the species of different sensible things; the reason is that only the species of sensible things are in the phantasm and illumined by the agent intellect.

16. Next, to the first argument of the first question [q.8 n.2] I say that a moved mover is a less principal cause than an unmoved mover, unless the moved becomes mover in such a way that it receives the power of moving from the motion by which it is itself moved; but so it is here, because the intellect receives no power of understanding into itself from the impression of the species, but the species must be impressed in such a way that it and the intellect are simultaneous, as being two partial causes integrally forming one total cause. Hence I say that the agent intellect with respect to the impression of the species, and the phantasm with which the intellect integrally forms one total cause, and the possible intellect with respect to intellection are all a more principal cause than the object or the species etc.

17. To the second [sc. the second reason given in q.8 n.2 and/or n.3] I say that the cause that makes the effect more like what it should be like is more principal, and not necessarily the cause that the effect itself is more like. An example: a like effect caused by God and by a second cause is more like the second cause, and yet God is the more principal cause. Hence a less principal cause does not actively make the effects more like itself, though it is indeed more like the effects. But such likeness is more brought about actively by the more principal cause. For it is certain that the intelligible species is more like the phantasm than like the agent intellect, and yet the agent intellect is the more principal cause; otherwise a less noble thing would, as if principal agent, act on a more noble thing, etc.

Question Nine

Whether the image of the Trinity exists in the mind distinctly

Bonaventure, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

Alexander of Hales, *Summa* Ia q.61 p.3 a.1

Scotus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.9

Thomas, *ST* Ia q.93 aa.5-6

Richard of St. Victor, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.1 a.2

Durandus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

Francis of Meyronnes, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.4

John Baconitanus, *Sent.* 1 d.3 q.3

1. The final question in this distinction is whether there is in the soul distinctly an image of the Trinity.

2. That there is not: Because then we could naturally come to a distinct knowledge of the Trinity through it. The proof of the consequence is as follows: an image is per se reflective of that of which it is the image, etc.

3. Further, the mind represents one [divine] person in the mind no more than it represents another, as is plain from Augustine *On the Trinity* 15.7, 14 when he says that the Father is intellectual memory – will as also memory – and the Son likewise; therefore the memory represents the Father no more distinctly than it represents the Son, and conversely.

4. Further, in the Trinity there are two produced persons in image, namely Son and the Holy Spirit; but no person is produced in memory, and consequently memory does not represent any production, and so neither is it the Trinity. The proof that no person is produced in the memory is that the acts themselves are the things exemplified in the soul, and not the second acts [see n.8 *infra*]; for there is no action of action since there would then be an infinite regress in the action, etc.

5. On the contrary: Augustine in *On the Trinity* 14 says that an image of the Trinity must be looked for, and it must be found where our nature possesses nothing better in itself, etc.

To the Question

6. The first thing that needs to be stated is what in creatures the idea of image is taken from. About this I say that an image represents the whole per se (just as I say that a trace or footprint represents a part per se [e.g. a horse's foot] and represents the whole inferentially [e.g. a horse] as to the idea of the species of the whole [e.g. some horse or other and not this particular horse]); and I say that an image is naturally fit to imitate and to express that of which it is the image. Therefore, although a thing may be altogether like another thing, yet, because it does not imitate that other thing, it should not be called an image of it. Hence the impression of a foot in the ground is an image truly of the foot but it is a trace or footprint of the whole animal, etc.

7. The second thing that must be stated is in respect of what in God the idea of image in us is taken. About this I say that it is in respect of the three persons and of the one essence and of the procession of the persons. Here one must note that the concept of one person is a concept that is partial in respect of the whole Trinity. As to creatures, which lead us by way of image to a knowledge of the whole Trinity, they will represent the whole Trinity as to the total concept that our intellect can have of it; so they will represent the distinction of the persons, the unity of the essence, and the order of origin; for the real distinction that exists in divine reality by relations of origin will have an essential imitation in respect of the Trinity that creatures represent.

8. I reply that what needs to be stated is where in us the image is. Here one must note that in the mind there are first acts, namely intellect and will, and second acts, namely intellection and volition;³⁷⁵ and the principles of these second acts are principles distinct in respect of their formal ideas, which formal ideas are act and will in the presence of their objects. Because of this the acts are of diverse ideas, for the cognitive act and the other volitional act will have distinct principles, etc.

9. Now one must note that the image does not consist only in acts of paternity, first because there are only two such acts (and so the image would be only of a duality and not also of a trinity); and second because between these acts there is no real distinction of thing and thing, nor is there an order of origin either (though there is consubstantiality because a unity, albeit an essential unity, is communicated to the soul); and third because one of these acts is not produced by the other – not even in the case of individual acts, first because the acts are not essentially the same, and second because of the other two reasons just stated, namely that there are only two acts and that one does not originate from the other, etc.

10. I then say that the image consists in first and second acts in the following way, that the soul, qua having in itself the perfection of understanding and willing in idea of second act (namely in respect of knowledge generated along with the object present to it in idea of object), has the idea of memory and of parent (as of a father). However, to the extent that the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive generated knowledge in itself, it has the idea of a word; and to the extent the soul has in itself the perfection of being able to receive produced love, it thus has the idea of something spirated. And in this way the soul will be a trinity, of which the first part will be the parent, the second the thing generated, and the third the thing spirated, etc.

³⁷⁵ First act is the existence in the soul of the powers of intellect and will; second act is the exercising of these powers in acts of understanding and willing.

11. However there are here two doubts. The first is that there seems here to be a quaternarity, because knowledge is produced from one memory and love is produced from another memory, etc.

12. On this point note that the first act in respect of volition, as namely the will, does not go together in the image with any of the three [n.10]: not with the third part because the same thing is not the principle of itself; and not with the second part because actual intelligence is not will; and not with the first part because memory is said properly to be the productive principle of generated knowledge; therefore the will is a fourth with them, etc.

13. The second doubt is that generated knowledge does not go together with the production of love the way that, in divine reality, the first person by nature originates the second person, and the first and second person originate the third. It is not like this in the image, because neither is the first the cause of the second nor are the first and second the cause of the third, etc.

14. I reply by saying that Augustine assigns or gives two ideas of image. The first is in *On the Trinity* 9, and it is mind, knowledge, and love. The other he gives in *On the Trinity* 10 as follows: memory, intelligence, and will. When dealing with these two in *On the Trinity* 15 he says that what is said in the case of the fourth in the listing [sc. memory] is more evident to the extent that memory expresses the idea of parent more than mind does.

15. To make clear the first part of the image [sc. mind and memory], note that mind can be taken in two ways: either we can understand by mind a first and perfect act with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity in generating a son and fecundity in spirating a holy spirit). In this way mind possesses the perfect idea of parent, because it includes both fecundities. And between these acts, namely knowledge and love, there are two objects produced in a certain order, and so there will not be a quaternarity, because in a parent that has the idea of parent perfectly there occurs a double first act. And this is the way it is in divine reality, because there is in the Father a fecundity for generating and also for spirating, and the Father has this fecundity from himself and not as derived from something else, namely from the production of the Son (as some say). The proof of this is that it would then follow that the Father never had the fecundity in question; for the Father does not in any way have from production of the Son any reality whether absolute or relative, and so he will never have any reality that he does not have in the first moment of origin (namely insofar as he is pre-understood in order of origin to the Son); therefore he does not have this sort of fecundity of generating and spirating from production of the Son.

16. In another way mind can be taken precisely for first act alone, namely as it has only a fecundity for generating or a fecundity in respect of generated knowledge (which is the same thing). And in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned to it, and in this way too mind does not have perfectly the idea of parent.

17. Thus, about the way image is assigned when memory is posited, I say, neither more nor less, that if memory is taken precisely as first act in respect of generated knowledge, or in respect of being generator, then in this way the idea of image is imperfectly assigned. But if memory is taken as it states first act as first act is perfect with respect to both second acts (namely fecundity for generating and for spirating), then

memory has perfectly the idea of parent. And thus is the idea of image assigned perfectly by Augustine, etc.

18. I then say that mind or memory should be taken as it has the perfect idea of parent; but it is not perfectly parent save as it is taken in respect of knowledge and love – as is plain, because the Father in divine reality has in himself fecundity for both. Therefore, in the case of the mind in the first way of assigning image, or in the case of memory in the second way (or for the first part of the image) [n.14], the soul must be taken as it means the idea of the first act of the intellect, along with its object present to it in idea of object, and the idea of the first act of the will, along with its object present to it in idea of object, etc.

19. In the case of the second part of the image, generated knowledge, or the word, is taken for it; and in the case of the third part produced love is taken for it; and so it is plain that there is no quaternity there, because a double relation of fecundity is combined in the parent, if it is perfectly parent.

20. To the second doubt [n.13] I say that, because generated knowledge is an accident in the case of the soul and because an accident cannot have the idea of a producer, therefore, when memory generates knowledge, it does not communicate to it a fecundity of spirating the way this happens in divine reality (where generated knowledge is subsistent and has the same communicated nature as in the generator); and so, to this extent, and also as to real identity in absolute thingness according to distinction of relation, there is not a total similarity between the image and the Trinity, as is plain; yet the second and third part of the image have, even if not an order of origin, yet some natural order properly, because volition naturally and necessarily presupposes intellection, and an origin can in some way be assigned to them, because intellection goes together with the idea of parent of love. For the object of the will is necessarily actually known, just as the object of the intellect is formally actually in the phantasm; and thereby one can see how the agent intellect belongs to the image, etc.

To the Arguments

21. To the first principal argument [n.2] I say that the assigning of an image of the Trinity in the soul only avails for someone who believes the Trinity, to enable him to investigate it in some way; but it does not do so for the sake of the Trinity becoming naturally known, first because the soul is not created by God as he is a Trinity, and second because the things mentioned [sc. in the image] are all primary together, as is plain.

22. To the second [n.3] I say that the major premise would be effective if the Father were posited as generating insofar as he understands (as some say) – and badly posited, as was proved above, because the Father does not generate in this way; rather, as I said, the Father has the divine essence by a second distinction present to himself under the idea of being actually intelligible (which belongs to the Father as he is memory) and in this way does he generate; but, as was made clear above, he does not generate insofar as he understands. And therefore I say that the antecedent is false, because the memory does not represent the Father more than the Son by the fact that memory alone exists in the Father, or that intelligence alone exists in the Son, but by the fact that the Father

generates the Son insofar as he has the idea of memory and not as he has the idea of intelligence or will, etc.

23. To the third [n.4] I say that second acts are produced. The argument is *pro se*. Hence when it is said then there is no action of action, or action is not the term of action, and this [sc. some production] truly terminates action, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 9 last chapter that knowledge is generated, and in *On the Trinity* 15.27 that volition proceeds – then these are not actions in the genus of action but are absolute forms in the genus of quality.

24. When you prove [n.4] that they are properly actions because they are second acts, I say that there are certain forms which have a fixed and permanent being not dependent on their cause (as heat in wood), and that there are certain forms which have a communicated dependence on their cause, as light in the medium depends on the sun; and about this Augustine says, *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 8.9, that the air has not been made bright but is being made bright; thus the first forms, because they are independent of their cause in existing, are not actions and are not called actions; but the second forms, because of their independence,³⁷⁶ seem to have their existence rather in becoming than in being, which is why they seem to be actions; and yet in truth they are not actions, because they have their parts together all at once, which is something repugnant to action, and they are not in a passive thing either, because they have existence at once in the whole and part is not acquired after part; and intellection and volition are forms of this sort, for they have a continuing dependence on the presence of their cause, etc.

25. Intellection and volition pass over into something other as to their term. It is unintelligible that volition and intellection exist and are not *of* something (I care not what that something is). It seems that they are called second acts because of this continuing dependence and because they pass over to a term; but in fact they are immanent forms, being whole all at once and not as things acquired part after part, etc.

³⁷⁶ The printed text says 'independence', but it may be a misprint for 'dependence'.