This translation of the *Prologue* of the *Ordinatio* (aka *Opus Oxoniense*) of Blessed John Duns Scotus is complete. It is based on volume one of the critical edition of the text by the Scotus Commission in Rome and published by Frati Quaracchi.

Scotus’ Latin is tight and not seldom elliptical, exploiting to the full the grammatical resources of the language to make his meaning clear (especially the backward references of his pronouns). In English this ellipsis must, for the sake of intelligibility, often be translated with a fuller repetition of words and phrases than Scotus himself gives. The possibility of mistake thus arises if the wrong word or phrase is chosen for repetition. The only check to remove error is to ensure that the resulting English makes the sense intended by Scotus. Whether this sense has always been captured in the translation that follows must be judged by the reader. So comments and notice of errors are most welcome.

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THE ORDINATIO OF BLESSED JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

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Prologue
First Part
Single Question: On the Necessity of Revealed Doctrine

Whether it was necessary for man in this present state that some doctrine be
supernaturally inspired.

1. The question⁠¹ is whether it was necessary for man in this present state that
some special doctrine, namely one which he could not reach by the natural light of the
intellect, be supernaturally inspired.

And that it was not necessary I argue thus:

Every⁠² power having something common for its prime object is naturally capable
of whatever is contained under that object just as it is capable of the per se natural object.
This is proved by the example of the prime object of sight and of the other things
contained under it, and thus by induction it is proved in the case of other prime objects
and powers.

It is also proved by reason, because the prime object is said to be that which is
commensurate with the power; but if its nature, that is, the nature of the prime object,
were in something about which the power was unable to be active, the power would not

¹ Interpolation: “Desiring something etc. [quoting Peter Lombard ad loc.]. Concerning the prologue of
the first book there are five questions. The first is about the necessity of this doctrine: whether it is
necessary for man in this present state that there be some supernaturally inspired doctrine for him.
The second concerns the genus of the formal cause of the same, and it is: whether the supernatural
knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed down in Sacred Scripture. The third
pertains to the genus of the material cause, and it is: whether theology is about God as about its first
subject. The fourth and fifth pertain to the genus of final cause, and the fourth is: whether theology is
practical; the fifth: whether a practical science is so called per se from order to praxis and end.”
² Text marked by Scotus with the sign a.
be commensurate but the object would exceed the power. The major premise, then, is
plain. But the prime natural object of our intellect is being insofar as it is being; therefore
our intellect is naturally able to be active about any being whatever, and thus about any
intelligible non-being, because the negative term is known through the affirmative term.
Therefore, etc. The proof of the minor is in Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.6 (72rb): “Being and
reality are imprinted in the soul on first impression, and these cannot be made manifest
by other things;” but if there were some prime object other than them, they could be
made manifest by the idea of that prime object; but this is impossible.³

2. In addition,⁴ the senses do not need, for this present life, any supernatural
cognition; therefore neither does the intellect. The antecedent is plain. The proof of the
consequence is: “Nature does not fail in things necessary,” *On the Soul*, 3.9.432b21-22;
but if it does not fail in things that are imperfect, much more does it not fail in those that
are perfect; therefore if it does not fail in the inferior powers as to what is necessary for
them to accomplish their acts and attain their end, much more does it not fail in what is
necessary for the higher power to attain their act and end. Therefore etc.

3. In addition, if some such doctrine is necessary, it is because the power in its
pure natural state is not commensurate with the knowable object as such; therefore it
must be made commensurate by something other than itself. But this something other is
either natural or supernatural; if it is natural then the whole thing is incommensurate with
the prime object; if it is supernatural, then the power is incommensurate with that
supernatural thing, and thus the power must be made commensurate to it by something

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³ Note by Scotus: “In this question note a, b, c for the principle; next, for the difficulties, d, e, f, g; they
are done in the second question [n.95]. Note, a is valid for distinction 3 [I d.3 p.1], and c for question
1 [ibid., qq.1-2]; b and the following are common in supernatural matters; d, e for the question about
the science of theology for us [n.124].”

⁴ Text marked by Scotus with the sign b.
else, and so on *ad infinitum*. Therefore, since an infinite process is impossible, *Metaphysics* 2.2.994a1-b31, one must stop at the first stage by saying that the intellective power is commensurate with everything knowable and in every way of its being knowable. Therefore, etc.

4. To the opposite:

2 *Timothy* 3.16: “All doctrine divinely inspired is useful for reproof…”

In addition, in *Baruch* 3.31-32 it is said of wisdom: “There is none who knows her ways, but he who knows all things knows her;” therefore no one else can have wisdom except from him who knows all things. This, then, as to the necessity for it. But about the fact he subjoins, v.37: “He handed it on to Jacob his son and to Israel his beloved,” as to the *Old Testament*; and then follows, v.38: “After this he is seen on earth and conversed with men,” as to the *New Testament*.

I. Controversy between Philosophers and Theologians

5. On this question there seems to be a controversy between philosophers and theologians. And the philosophers maintain the perfection of nature and deny a supernatural perfection; but the theologians acknowledge a defect of nature and a necessity of grace and a supernatural perfection.⁵

A. Opinion of the Philosophers

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⁵ Interpolation: “and so they honor it more.”
A philosopher might say, then, that no supernatural knowledge is necessary for man in this present life, but that he can acquire all knowledge necessary for himself from the activity of natural causes. Adduced for this are both the authority and also the reasoning of the Philosopher in diverse places.

6. First, *On the Soul 3.5.430a14-15*, where he says that “the agent intellect is that whereby it makes all things and the possible intellect that whereby it becomes all things.” From this I thus argue: when that which is naturally active and that which is naturally passive are brought together and are not impeded, action necessarily follows, because action depends essentially on these alone as on prior causes; but the active element with respect to every intelligible is the agent intellect, and the passive element the possible intellect, and these are naturally in the soul and are not impeded. The thing is plain. Therefore, by the natural virtue of these two, the act of understanding can ensue with respect to any intelligible whatever.

7. There is a confirmation by reason: to every natural passive power there corresponds something naturally active, otherwise the passive power would in nature be in vain if it could be reduced to act by nothing in nature; but the possible intellect is the passive power with respect to any intelligible whatever; so to it there corresponds some natural active power. The proposed conclusion then follows. The minor premise is plain, because the possible intellect naturally desires knowledge of any knowable thing whatever; it is also naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever; therefore it is naturally receptive of any understanding whatever.

\[^{6}\text{Text marked by Scotus with the sign c.}\]
8. In addition,\(^7\) in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a18-19, there is a distinction of theoretical habits into the mathematical, the physical, and the metaphysical; and from the proof of this in the same place it does not seem possible for there to be more theoretical habits, because in those habits the whole of being, both in itself and in its parts, is considered. But just as there could not be any theoretical science other than these, so neither could there be any practical science other than the acquired active and productive sciences. Therefore the acquired practical sciences are sufficient for perfecting the practical intellect, and the acquired theoretical sciences sufficient for perfecting the theoretical intellect.

9. In addition,\(^8\) that which is naturally able to understand the principle can naturally know the conclusions contained in the principle. I prove this conclusion from the fact that the knowledge of the conclusions depends only on the understanding of the principle and on the deduction of the conclusions from the principle, as is plain from the definition of ‘know’ in *Posterior Analytics* 1.2.71b9-12; but a deduction is manifest of itself, as is plain from the definition of the perfect syllogism, *Prior Analytics* 1.1.24b22-24, because “it is in need of nothing for being or appearing clearly necessary;” therefore if the principles are understood, there is possession of everything that is necessary for knowledge of the conclusion. And thus the major is plain.

10. But we naturally understand the first principles, and in these principles all the conclusions are contained; therefore we can naturally know all knowable conclusions.

Proof of the first part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common terms, therefore we can naturally understand them, because from *Physics*

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\(^7\) Text marked by Scotus with the sign \(f\).

\(^8\) Text marked by Scotus with the sign \(d\).
1.1.184a21-22 the most common things are understood first;⁹ “but we know and understand the principles insofar as we know the terms,” Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b23-25; therefore we can naturally know the first principles.

11. Proof of the second part of the minor: because the terms of the first principles are the most common, therefore, when they are distributed, they are distributed for all the subordinate concepts; now, such terms are taken universally in the first principles and thus they extend to all particular concepts, and so as a result to the extremes of all special conclusions.¹⁰

B. Rejection of the Opinion of the Philosophers

12. Against this position one can argue in three ways.¹¹

Note: it cannot be shown by natural reason that something supernatural exists in the wayfarer, nor that it is required necessarily for his perfection. Therefore it impossible to use natural reason here against Aristotle; if one argues from things believed, it is not a reason against the philosopher, because he will not concede the believed premise. Hence the reasons given against him here possess one or other premise as something believed, or as proved from something believed; therefore they are only persuasive theologically, from things believed to a thing believed.

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⁹ Interpolation (in place of “therefore...understood first”): “therefore we can naturally understand them, because, from Physics 1, the most common things are understood first by us, and also because they are as it were the doorways into the house, Metaphysics 2.1.993b4-5.”

¹⁰ Interpolation: “And thus is this second part of the minor proved.”

¹¹ These arguments are derived variously from Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent, though primarily from the latter.
13. [First principal reason] – First thus: everything that acts through knowledge has need of distinct knowledge of its end. I prove this because everything that acts for an end acts from desire of the end; everything that per se acts, acts for an end; therefore everything that per se acts desires the end in its own particular way. Therefore, just as a natural agent needs desire of the end for which it must act, so a thing that acts by knowledge – which is also a per se agent, from Physics 2.5.196b17-22 – needs desire of the end for which it must act. The major then is plain.

But man cannot from his natural powers distinctly know his end; therefore he needs some supernatural knowledge of it.

14. The minor is plain: first, because the Philosopher, following natural reason, lays down that happiness is perfected in the acquired knowledge of separate substances, as he seems to mean in the Ethics 1.6.1097b22-98a20, 10.7.1177a12-b1, 10.8.1178b7-32, 10.9.1179a22-32, or, if he does not determinately assert that it is the supreme perfection possible for us, he does not conclude anything else by natural reason, so that, by relying on natural reason alone, he will either be in error or remain in doubt about the end in its particular nature;¹² hence in the Ethics 1.10.1099b11-13 he says hesitatingly “if any gift is from the gods, it is reasonable that happiness is.”

15. Second, the same minor is proved through reason, because the proper end of any substance is not known to us save from the acts of it that are manifest to us, from which acts is shown that such an end is fitting for such a nature;¹³ in this present life we do not experience or know that any acts are present in our nature from which we might

¹² Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.”
¹³ Interpolation: “This is plain from the descent of a heavy object downward, which descent is an act of the heavy object with respect to the center and end.”
know that the vision of separate substances is fitting for us; therefore we cannot naturally know distinctly that that end is fitting for our nature.

16. From this it is at least certain that some conditions of the end, on whose account it is more desirable and more fervently to be sought, cannot be determinately known by natural reason. For even if it were granted that reason was sufficient to prove that the end of man is the pure vision and enjoyment of God, yet the conclusion will not follow that these fittingly belong in perpetuity to the man perfect in soul and body, the way it will be said in 4 d.43 q.2 n.32. And yet the perpetuity of a good of this sort is a condition that renders the end more desirable than it would if it were transitory. For to obtain this good in a perfect nature is more desirable than to obtain it in a separated soul, as is plain from Augustine *The Literal Meaning of Genesis* bk. 12. ch. 35 n.68. These and the like conditions of the end must be known, then, if the end is to be efficaciously sought, and yet natural reason is not sufficient for them; therefore a doctrine delivered supernaturally is required.

17. [Second Principal Reason] – Second, thus:¹⁴ every knower that acts for an end needs knowledge of how and in what way such an end may be acquired; and also he needs knowledge of all the things that are necessary for the end; and, third, he needs knowledge that all those things are sufficient for such an end. The first condition is plain, because if he does not know how and in what way the end may be acquired, he will not know how to dispose himself so as to obtain it. The second condition is proved because if he does not know everything necessary for the end, he could, because of ignorance of some act necessary for it, fail of the end. Also, as to the third condition, if those necessary

¹⁴ Note by Scotus: “This proceeds of contingent things; therefore it does not proceed of knowable things.”
things are not known to be sufficient, he will, from doubt that he is ignorant of something necessary, not pursue what is necessary in an effective way.

18. But these three conditions cannot be known to the wayfarer by natural reason. The proof of the first is that beatitude is conferred as a reward for the merits that God accepts as worthy of such a reward, and so as a result beatitude does not follow by natural necessity on any acts whatever of our own, but it is a contingent gift of God, who accepts some acts in their order to him as meritorious.\textsuperscript{15} This fact, as it seems, is not naturally knowable, because here too the philosophers erred, laying down that everything that is from God proceeds from him by necessity. The other two conditions, at any rate, are manifest: for the acceptance by the divine will, insofar as it contingently accepts such and such things as worthy of eternal life, cannot be known by natural reason, nor too that these things are sufficient; it all depends on the divine will in respect of those things the divine will is in a contingent way related to; therefore, etc.

19. [Instances against the two Principal Reasons] – Against these two reasons an instance is given. Against the first thus: every created nature depends essentially on any per se cause of it at all and, on account of such dependence, knowledge can be had from the thing caused by a ‘proof-that’,\textsuperscript{16} and any per se cause of it at all can be known; therefore, since the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, because it is not incommensurate with his cognitive power, the conclusion follows that the end of the nature can be naturally known from knowledge of the nature.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Note by Scotus: “This is something believed.”
\textsuperscript{16} A proof from effects to cause, \textit{Posterior Analytics} 1.13.78a22-b34, as opposed to a ‘proof-why’, which is from causes to effects.
\textsuperscript{17} Note by Scotus: “I concede that the end which is the final cause is known, and this in the respect in which it is final cause, and that it is known in like manner as the efficient cause is known in the respect in which it must necessarily be the first efficient cause” [n.29].
20. Confirmation of the reason: for if the end of a lower nature is known from knowledge of that nature, no less is this possible in the proposed case, because there is in the proposed case no lesser dependence of a determinate thing on its end than in other cases.

21. From this reason too it seems that the proposition ‘the end of a substance is not known save from its acts’, which was assumed in the proof of the minor, is false, because the end of a nature can from the knowledge of that nature in itself be known by a ‘proof-that’.

22. But if it be said the reason concludes that man can naturally know his natural end but not his supernatural end, on the contrary Augustine says, On Predestination Sanctorum ch.5 n.10: “Being able to have faith, like being able to have charity, belongs to the nature of men, although having faith, like having charity, belongs to the grace of the faithful.” If, therefore, the nature of man is naturally knowable to man, then that ability as belonging to such a nature, and consequently such a nature’s directability to the end for which faith and charity dispose it, are also naturally knowable to him.

23. Again, man naturally desires the end which you say is supernatural; therefore he is naturally directed to that end; therefore that end can be concluded from such directedness as from knowledge of the nature directed to it.

24. Again, that the prime object of the intellect is being is naturally knowable, according to Avicenna Metaphysics 1.6 (72rb), and naturally knowable is that the nature of being is most perfectly realized in God; but the end of any power is the best of the things that are contained under its prime object, because in that alone is there perfect rest
and delight, from the *Ethics* 10.4.1174b14-23; therefore it is naturally knowable to man that he is in respect of his intellect directed to God as to his end.

25. The reason is confirmed, because what the prime object is of some power is naturally knowable to him to whom the power is naturally knowable, and, further, he can know what the nature of that prime object is realized in and that the most perfect such thing is the end of the power; but the mind is known to itself, according to Augustine *On the Trinity* bk.11 chs.11-12, nn.16, 18; therefore what is its prime object is known to it. Also known to it is that God is not transcended by the nature of that prime object, because then God would be in no way intelligible by the mind; therefore it knows that God is the best thing in which the nature of its object is realized, and so it knows that he is the end of the power.

26. Against the second reason [nn.17-18] the argument runs as follows: if through one extreme the other extreme is known, therefore the means in between are known; but the means between the nature and the end of it that is to be obtained are necessary for obtaining the end; therefore, since, according to what was proved above [n.19], the end can be known from knowledge of the nature, it seems that the means necessary for the end can in like manner be known.

27. The reason is confirmed: for it thus seems that the connection of the things to the end is just as necessary in the proposed case as it is in other cases; but on account of this sort of connection in other cases other things are known from the end, as that from the nature of health is deduced that such and such things are required for health; therefore etc.
28 [Response to the Instances] – To the first of these instances [nn.19-21] I say that, although the process of reasoning is from the end which is the final cause and not from the end that must be attained by operation – the distinction between these ends will be stated below (1 d.1 p.1 q.1 n.5) – yet with a single response it can be said to the instance, and to the next one about Augustine, and to the third one about the power and the prime object, that all of these accept that our nature or intellective power is naturally knowable to us; but this is false in that proper and special respect under which our nature or intellective power is ordered to this sort of end and is capable of complete grace and has God for its most perfect object. For our soul and our nature are only known to us in this present life under some general reason that is capable of being abstracted from sensible things, as will appear below in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 n.24. And according to such a general reason it does not fittingly belong to our soul or nature to be ordered to that end, or to be capable of receiving grace, or to have God for most perfect object.

29. Next to the form. When it is said [n.19] that from a thing that exists for an end the end can be demonstrated by a ‘proof-that’, I say that it is not true unless the thing that exists for an end is known under the proper reason under which it has that end. Thus the minor is false. – And when proof is given by commensuration [n.19], I say that the mind, although it is the same as itself, is yet not in this present life capable of being commensurate as an object with itself save in accord with the general reasons that are abstractable from sensible things.

30. To the confirmation [n.20] I say that the proper ends of other substances are not known either, namely the ends that belong to them according to their proper reasons,
unless some acts are manifest from which the order of those substances to such end may be deduced.

31. And from this the response to what is added [n.21] against the proof of the minor is clear, because the proposition ‘the proper end of a substance is not known to us save by a manifest act of it’ [n.15] is not false; for the proposition does not suppose that the end could not be known in some other way. For the truth very much is that if a substance were known under its proper nature, from this knowledge of it the per se cause of it might be known. But no substance is now thus known to us, and therefore we can conclude to no end proper to a substance save through an evident act of the substance as that substance is known universally and confusedly. Both these ways are lacking in the proposed case; but the proof of the minor [n.15] touches on one of them, that about ignorance of the act, and it supposes the other, namely that about the ignorance of the nature in itself.

32. To the second instance about Augustine [n.22] I say that the power to have charity, as it is a disposition under the proper idea of love with respect to God in himself, is fitting to man’s nature in accord with a special reason, not with a reason common to himself and to sensible things; therefore the potentiality is not naturally knowable about man in this present life, just as man too is not known under the reason in which this power belongs to him.18 Such is my reply to the instance insofar as it can be adduced for the principal conclusion [nn.19-20], namely the one opposite to the minor of the first reason [nn.14-15]. But insofar as it is adduced against the response about the supernatural and natural end [n.22] my reply is: I concede that God is the natural end of man, but as

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18 Interpolation: "Or Augustine means that in nature it is a power for receiving. But it cannot be reduced to act by nature."
obtainable supernaturally and not naturally. And this is proved by the subsequent reason about natural desire [n.23], which I concede.

33. To the other argument [n.24], one must deny what it assumes, namely that it is naturally known that being is the prime object of our intellect, and that it is so in respect of the total indeterminacy of being to sensible and non-sensible things; and this is what Avicenna says is naturally known. For he has mixed his sect – which was the sect of Mohammed – together with philosophical matters, and some things he has said that are philosophical and proved by reason, others that are in conformity with his sect; he expressly lays down in his Metaphysics 9.7 (107ra)\(^{19}\) that the separated soul knows immaterial substance in itself, and therefore he had to lay down that immaterial substance was included under the prime object of the intellect. Not thus Aristotle [On the Soul 3.6.430b27-29], but according to him the prime object of our intellect is or seems to be sensible quiddity, and this either sensible in itself or in its inferior; and this is the quiddity that is abstractable from sensible things.\(^{20}\)

34. But as to what is said in confirmation of the reason from Augustine [n.25] my reply is: I say that the statement of Augustine must be understood of first act, which is altogether sufficient of itself as to second act but is now however impeded; and because of this impediment the second act is not now elicited from the first act. But of this more below [1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.24-25].

\(^{19}\)Scotus left the space for ‘9.7’ blank.

\(^{20}\)Interpolation: “But if one opposes to this that, if material quiddity is the first and adequate object of the intellective power, then the intellect will not be able to understand anything about separate substance, because an adequate object includes virtually or formally everything that the power can be made to bear on – but material quiddity contains separate substances neither virtually nor formally, therefore etc. – I say that the assumption is not true, because the five common sensibles, namely number, figure, etc., are sensed per se by the sense of sight, which sensibles are not included either virtually or formally under color or light; for it is enough that some things are contents of concomitance.”
35. If it is objected to this that man in the state of nature, when that state was established, could, by the deduction of the first reason [n.19], know his nature and therefore the end of his nature; therefore that knowledge is not supernatural.

36. Again, if it is objected to the response to the final reason [n.33]: if what the prime object is of the intellect is for this reason not known that the intellect is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to the object, then it cannot be known about anything at all that it is intelligible, because the power is not known in every proper respect in which it has regard to anything at all as to an intelligible object.

37. I reply: to the first objection [n.35] one would need to say of what sort the knowledge of man was when he was established, which may be put off to another occasion [4 d.1 p.2 q.2 n.7]. However at least in respect of the wayfarer in this present life the said knowledge is supernatural, because it exceeds his natural faculty; natural, I say, in the sense of in accord with the state of fallen nature.

38. To the second [n.36] I concede that knowledge of the soul now, or of any of its powers, is not had so distinctly that from it could be known that some intelligible object corresponds to it; but we deduce from the act itself which we experience that the power and nature of which it is the act have respect to the object as to the object which we perceive to be attained by the act, such that we do not deduce the object of the power from knowledge of the power in itself but from knowledge of the act which we experience. But we can have neither of these knowledges about a supernatural object; and for this reason both ways of knowing the proper end of that nature are there lacking.

39. To the argument [n.26] against the second reason, it is plain that it supposes something [n.19] already denied [nn.28-29]. – To the confirmation [n.27] for the reason I
say that when the end naturally follows the things that are for the end, and naturally
requires them in advance, then the things that are for the end can be deduced from the end;
here, however, the attainment is not natural but is only an acceptance by the divine will
that rewards the merits as worthy of such end.

40. [Third Principal Reason] – Again,\textsuperscript{21} there is a third principal argument against
the opinion of the philosophers. \textit{Metaphysics} 6.1.1026a21-23: the knowledge of separate
substances is the most noble because it is about the noblest kind of being; therefore
knowledge of their characteristic properties is most noble and necessary, for those
properties are more perfect knowables than are the ones they share with sensibles. But we
cannot know those properties from pure natural powers alone. First, because if some
science taught that it finds those properties in a way that is possible way, it would be the
science of metaphysics; but a metaphysics about the characteristic features of those
separate substances cannot be naturally had by us, as is plain.\textsuperscript{22} And this is what the
Philosopher says in \textit{Metaphysics} 1.2.982a8-10, that the wise man must know all things
somehow and not in particular; and he subjoins: “For he who knows the universals
somehow knows all the things under them.” He there calls the metaphysician ‘the wise
man’, just as he there calls metaphysics ‘wisdom’.

41. Second, I prove the same because those properties are not known by a
‘knowledge-why’ unless the proper subjects are known, which alone include the proper
‘why’; but their proper subjects are not naturally knowable to us; therefore etc.

Nor do we know their properties by a ‘demonstration-that’ and from the effects.
Here is the proof; for the effects either leave the intellect in doubt as to those properties,

\textsuperscript{21} Text marked by Scotus with the sign $g$ [n.27].
\textsuperscript{22} Addition cancelled by Scotus: “because they are not included virtually in the prime object of
metaphysics, namely in being,”
or lead them away into error. And this is clear from the properties of the first immaterial substance in itself; for a property of it is that it is communicable to three; but the effects do not show this property, because these do not come from it insofar as it is three. And if an argument is made from the effects to the cause, the effects lead rather to the opposite and to error, because in no effect is there found one nature save in one supposit. It is also a property of that nature to be a contingent cause of things outside it; and the effects lead rather to the opposite of this, to error, as is plain from the opinion of the philosophers who posit that the first thing causes necessarily whatever it causes. About the properties of other substances too the same is plain, because the effects, according to the philosophers, lead rather to the eternity and necessity of those properties than to their contingency and newness. Likewise, the philosophers also seem to conclude from the celestial motions that the number of those separate substances accords with the number of the motions. Likewise, that those substances are naturally blessed and incapable of sin. All which things are absurd.

42. [Instance against the Third Principal Reason] – Against this reason I argue that any necessary property at all of separate substances that is now known to us by faith or common revelation could be known by natural knowledge. And this as follows: those necessary properties of which we naturally know the terms we can also naturally comprehend; but we naturally know the terms of all the necessary things that have been revealed; therefore etc.

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23 Interpolation: “A philosopher might say to this reason that what it is impossible for us to know it is not necessary for us to know; but it is impossible for us to have of the properties of separate substances any knowledge, whether by nature or infused, save as we now have it – and therefore it is not necessary that knowledge be infused for knowledge of the properties of separate substances.”

24 Interpolation: “Again, from the motion of the heaven it turns out that the angels are always moving it, nor could the heaven be greater, on account of the labor of the angel doing the moving – so that if one star be added, the angel could not move it etc” [Aristotle De Caelo 2.1.284a14-18].

25 Text marked by Scotus with the sign e.
43. Proof of the major: those necessary things are either mediate or immediate; if they are immediate, then they are known when the terms are known, *Posterior Analytics* 1.3.72b23-25; if they are mediate, then when we are able to know the extremes we are able to conceive the mean between them. And by conjoining the mean with either extreme, we get either mediate or immediate premises; if the premises are immediate, the same as before; if mediate, the process continues by knowing the mean between the extremes and by conjoining it with the extremes, until we come to things immediate. Therefore ultimately we will come down to immediate necessities that we understand from the terms, from which all the mediate necessities follow; therefore we will be able naturally to know those mediates through the immediates.

44. Proof of the principal minor, because to have and not to have faith, being contradictories to each other, are not contradictory in words only but in concepts, as is plain when a philosopher and a theologian contradict each other over ‘God is triune,’ where one of them denies and the other affirms not only the same name but the same concept; therefore every simple concept that the one has the other has.

45. [Response to the Instance] – To this instance I reply: There exist some immediate truths about separate substances. I take then some such first and immediate truth, and let it be \( a \). In it are included many mediate truths, as for instance all those that in particular assert things common to the predicate of things common to the subject; let them be called \( b, c \). Those true mediate assertions do not have their truth save from something immediate. Therefore they are not naturally known save from the understanding of that something immediate. If therefore some intellect could understand the terms in \( b \) and combine them with each other, but could not understand the terms in \( a \)
nor consequently a itself, b will be indeterminate for his intellect, because it will not be
known either from itself or from an immediate proposition, because this latter is, by
supposition, not known. Such is how it is with us, because we have certain common
concepts about material and immaterial substances, and we can combine them with each
other; but the complexes we thus form are not evident save from the true immediate
propositions that are about those essences in their proper and special idea; but we do not
conceive those essences under this idea, and so we do not know those general truths
about the general concepts.

46. An example: if it were impossible for someone to conceive a triangle in its
proper idea, although he could abstract and conceive the idea of the figure from a
quadrilateral, it would also be impossible for him to conceive a triangle’s primacy as this
primacy is a proper quality of a triangle, because it is not in this way conceived except
when it is abstracted from triangle; yet he could abstract primacy from other primacies, as
for instance primacy in numbers. Although this intellect could form this composite ‘some
figure is primary’, because it can apprehend its terms, yet the composite when formed
will be indeterminate for it, because it is a mediate one included in the immediate
proposition ‘the triangle is primary in this way’; and because he cannot understand this
immediate proposition, because he cannot understand its terms either, therefore he cannot
know the mediate proposition, which only has its evidence from the immediate one.

47. Hereby to the argument [n.42]: I deny the major; to the proof [n.43] I say that
those necessary things are mediate. – And when you say ‘therefore we can conceive the
mean between the extremes’, I deny the consequence, because the mean between the
extremes is sometimes ordered essentially between them, for example the definition of
one or other extreme, or a property that is prior in respect of a later property; and such is
a mean for universally proving the extreme of the extreme. I therefore concede that
whoever can understand the extremes can understand such a mean between the extremes,
because the understanding of it is included in one or other extreme, or is the same as one
or other extreme. But if the mean is a particular, contained under one or other extreme
and not essentially between the extremes, then it is not necessary that he who can
understand the general extremes can conceive the mean that is particular to the extremes.
Thus it is here. For a whatness that has in its proper and particular idea some property
immediately inhering in it, is a mean inferior to the common concept about which the
property in the common concept is asserted; and so it is not a mean for proving the
property of the common term universally, but only particularly. This is plain in the
example [n.46], because it is not necessary that he who is able to conceive figure in
general and primacy in general could conceive triangle in particular, because triangle is a
mean contained under ‘figure’; a mean, I say, for proving primacy of a figure in
particular.

48. This third reason [n.40] is especially conclusive about the first immaterial
substance, because knowledge of it as the beatific object is especially necessary. And
then the response to the objection [n.42] against it: namely the supposition is that we do
not now naturally conceive God save in a concept common to him and to sensibles,
which point will be expounded below, in 1 d.3 p.1 q.1 nn.5-10. Even if that supposition is
denied, one must still say that the concept which can be made about God by virtue of a
creature is imperfect; but the concept that might be made by virtue of the very essence in
itself would be perfect. So, just as we spoke about general and special concept [n.47], let us thus in another way speak about perfect and imperfect concept.

49. [Fourth Principal Reason]. Fourth it is argued thus: a thing that is ordered to some end for which it is not disposed must be little by little moved to the disposition for that end; man is ordered to a supernatural end for which he is not of himself disposed; therefore he needs to be disposed little by little for possessing that end. This is done through some supernatural imperfect knowledge of the sort set down as necessary.

50. But if it be instanced that a perfect agent can remove an imperfection and act at once, I reply: although this might be possible by absolute power, yet it is more perfect to communicate activity to the creature with respect to obtaining its own perfection than not to communicate it; but man can have some activity with respect to his own final perfection; therefore it is more perfect that this be communicated to him. But this would not be possible without some imperfect knowledge preceding the perfect knowledge toward which it is finally directed.

51. [Fifth Principal Reason]. Fifth, it is argued thus: every agent using an instrument in its acting has through that instrument no power for any action that exceeds the nature of the instrument; but the light of the agent intellect is the instrument which the soul now uses in its natural understanding; therefore it has through that light no power for any action that exceeds that light. But that light is of itself limited to acquiring knowledge in a sensitive way through means of the senses; therefore the soul has no power for any knowledge that cannot be had by means of sense. But knowledge of many other things is necessary for this present life; therefore etc.
52. This reason seems to produce a conclusion contrary to him who has made it. For, according to this deduction, the uncreated light will not be able to use the agent intellect as an instrument for knowledge of any pure truth, because, according to him, such cannot be had by means of the senses without special illumination. And thus it follows that in the knowledge of pure truth the light of the agent intellect does not in any way perform any action; but this seems problematic, because this action is more perfect than any understanding; and consequently that which is more perfect in the soul insofar as the soul is intellective ought to contribute in some way to the action.

53. [To the Fourth and Fifth Reason]. These two final reasons [nn.49, 51] do not seem as effective as they could be. For the first would be effective if it had been proved that man is ordered finally to supernatural knowledge (the proof of which pertains to the question about beatitude, 4 Suppl. d.49 q.7 nn.2-7), and if along with this it were shown that natural knowledge does not in this present life sufficiently dispose for attaining supernatural knowledge. The second reason begs two questions, namely that there is need for knowledge of certain things that cannot be known by means of the senses, and that the light of the agent intellect is limited to knowables of that sort.

54. The first three reasons [nn. 13, 17, 40] appear more probable. However, that no such knowledge is necessary for salvation I prove:26

Suppose there is someone who is not baptized; although he is an adult, has no one to teach him, he has the sort of good motions in conformity with right reason that he is capable of having, and he avoids the things that natural reason shows him to be bad.

26 Note by Scotus: “’Suppose there is someone non-baptized’ etc. see above at the sign o≠o.” Interpolation: “But against the principal conclusion, namely that supernatural knowledge is not necessary for man for salvation, one could argue thus.”
Although God by common law would visit such a person and teach him through a man or an angel – in the way he visited Cornelius, *Acts* 10.1-48 – nevertheless suppose him not taught by anyone, he will be saved. Likewise, although he were taught later, yet he was just before and so worthy of eternal life, because by willing the good things that precede teaching he merits the grace whereby he is just; and yet he does not have theological knowledge, even as to the first objects of faith, but only natural knowledge. Therefore nothing of theology is simply necessary for salvation.

55. One could say that by meriting things good in their kind he merits by congruity to be justified from original sin, and God does not deny the gift of his liberality; therefore he gives the first grace without a sacrament, because he is not bound by the sacraments; grace is not given without the habit of faith; therefore that person has the habit of theology, although he is not able to activate it, just as neither is he baptized unless he is instructed. And although there is no contradiction in grace being given without faith, since the habits are distinct and exist in different powers, nevertheless just as in baptism the supposition is that these are infused simultaneously, so for the same reason simultaneity can be supposed in this case. For God is not less gracious to him whom without a sacrament he justifies because of his merit by congruity, than to him whom he justifies in the reception of the sacrament without any merit of his own. Therefore it is possible for God by his absolute power to save anyone he likes, and also to bring it about that the latter deserves glory without infused faith, if, in the absence of it, he gives the grace which the possessor uses well as far as to willing what he is able to acquire in accord with natural reason and acquired faith, or without any acquired faith if a teacher is lacking; although by his ordained power God does not give grace without the
preceding habit of faith, because grace is supposed not to be infused without it; not because of any need, as if grace without it would not be sufficient, but because of divine liberality, which reforms the whole man; also a man would, without infused faith, be less perfectly disposed as to assenting to certain truths.

56. And as in this case, so analogously about the habit of theology I say that the perfectly existing habit includes infused and acquired faith of the articles and other things revealed by God in Scripture, such that it is not infused faith alone nor acquired faith alone but both together. Theology is therefore necessary, but it is so when speaking of ordained power and when speaking of the more principal or prior habit that pertains to theology, namely the one which is infused faith, and this in general as far as concerns everyone; it is not so as far as concerns the second habit that it includes, which is acquired faith, although perhaps it is by ordained power necessary in an adult who is able to have a teacher and can understand him, and can do so as far as concerns acquired faith of certain general things.

II. Solution of the Question

57. To the question, then, I reply by first distinguishing how something may be said to be supernatural.\(^{27}\) For a receptive power is compared with the act that it receives

\(^{27}\) Interpolation [from Appendix A]: “Against the things said, by responding to the question: for he seems to want the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ to be taken chiefly by comparing the receptive power with the act and the form and in no way by comparing it with the agent; he seems also second to want the distinction of natural and supernatural to be taken chiefly by comparing the passive power with the agent and not by comparing it with the act and the form.

Therefore, as to these points, I proceed thus against him: I will show first that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ should be taken by comparison with the agent; second that it should not be taken chiefly by comparison with the act; third that the distinction of natural and supernatural
or with the agent from which it receives it. In the first way it is a natural power, or a
violent one, or neither. It is called natural if it is naturally inclined to receive what it
receives, violent if it does so against nature, neither if it is naturally inclined neither to the
form which it receives nor to the opposite form. But when the comparison is taken in this
way there is nothing supernatural in it. But if the receiver is compared with the agent
from which it receives the form, then the case is natural when the receiver is compared
with such an agent as has the nature of naturally impressing such a form on such a
receiver, but supernatural when the receiver is compared with an agent that does not
naturally impress the form on that receiver.

Before this distinction is applied to the proposed case, there is a multiple
argument against it; both that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘violent’ is taken from the
comparison of the receiver to the agent and not only from the comparison of it to the
form, and that the distinction of ‘natural’ and ‘supernatural’ is taken from the comparison
of the receiver to the form and not only from its respect to the agent. But these arguments
are not set down here [they are set down in 4 d.43 q.4 nn.4-5].

59. However, a reasonable solution is apparent, because that thing is the per se
cause of something on which, when it is posited, and when any other thing has been

should be taken by comparison with the act and the form and the second causes; fourth I will solve
the reasons he has on his behalf.

The first is proved in this way, by the Commentator on De Anima 2 com.26: “Demonstrative
definitions are naturally fitted to give causes for everything in the thing defined;” but the violent is
defined by comparing the passive power with the agent; therefore the distinction of ‘natural’ and
‘violent’ has its place by comparison with the agent. The minor is plain, because “the violent is that
whose principle is extrinsic, with the thing suffering the violence contributing nothing” Ethics
3.3.1.110b15-17; but the extrinsic principle is the agent; therefore etc.

Secondly, the same thing is argued thus: that by which certain things differ formally from
each other seems to be the formal principle of the distinction between them; but the natural and the
violent differ formally by having their principle within and without; therefore etc. The minor is
proved by Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b20-23 where, in expounding the definition of nature, he says
about the same thing; ‘in that in which it is’.”
excluded or varied, the effect follows. But in the present case, although the form against which the receiver is inclined is not introduced except by an agent acting violently on the receiver, and although a supernatural agent does not act supernaturally except by introducing a form, yet the per se idea of ‘violent’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the form, and the per se idea of ‘supernatural’ is taken from the relation of the receiver to the agent. The proof is that when the receiver and the form remain in their own nature (for example, that the form can be received but against the inclination of the receiver), then, however the agent is varied, the receiver receives it violently; likewise, when the receiver and the agent are so disposed that only an agent not acting naturally changes the receiver (‘only’ I say in the sense that a natural agent does not dispose it), then whatever form the agent introduces will be supernatural with respect to the receiver.

This is proved secondly in this way, that the form is supernatural not only in ‘being introduced’ but also in ‘persisting’; in one way a form persists without extrinsic action in a receiver violently, although not for a long time, in another it persists naturally and for a long time; in one way it remains natural, in another supernatural, on account of the agent only, such that, by excluding the agent by which the thing is done, it could not be said to be supernatural; but it could be said to be natural, because the perfection, when the comparison is of the form to the receiver only, is natural.

60. Applying this then to the proposed case, I say that when comparing the possible intellect with the actual knowledge in itself there is no supernatural knowledge, because the possible intellect is naturally perfected by any knowledge whatever and it naturally inclines to any knowledge whatever. But speaking in the second way [n.57], it
is supernatural in this sense, that it is generated by an agent that does not have the nature
to move the possible intellect naturally to such knowledge.

61. Now for this present life, according to the Philosopher [On the Soul
3.4.429a13-18, 5.430a14-17, 7.431a14-17, 8.432a8-10], the possible intellect has the
nature to be moved to knowledge by the agent intellect and by a sensible phantasm,
therefore only that knowledge is natural to it which is impressed on it by those agents.

Now by virtue of those agents all knowledge that is had of a concept by a
wayfarer in accord with ordinary law can be had, as is plain in the instance [n.42] against
the third principal reason. And therefore, although God could, by a special revelation,
cause knowledge of some concept, as in the case of rapture, yet such supernatural
knowledge is not of ordinary law necessary.

63. But as to propositional truths it is otherwise because, as was shown by the
three first reasons adduced against the first opinion [nn.13-18, 40-41], after the whole
action of the agent intellect and of sensible phantasms has been put in place, many
propositions will remain unknown to us and neutral to us of which the knowledge is
necessary for us. Therefore knowledge of these things must be delivered to us
supernaturally, because no one can naturally discover the knowledge of them and deliver
it to others by teaching, because since they were by natural powers neutral for one person
so were they neutral for anyone else. But whether, after the first handing down of
teaching about such things, someone else could, by natural powers, assent to the doctrine
handed down, see 3. Suppl. d.23 q.un. nn.4-5. Now this first handing down of such
doctrine is called revelation, which is for this reason supernatural, that it is from an agent
which is, for this present life, not naturally a mover of the intellect.
63. In another way too an action or knowledge could be said to be supernatural because it is from an agent supplying the place of the supernatural object. For an object having the nature to cause knowledge of this truth ‘God is triune’, and of similar ones, is the divine essence known under its proper idea; it is, as knowable under this idea, a supernatural object. Any agent, then, which causes some knowledge of the truths that have the nature to be evident through such an object thus known, that agent is in this respect supplying the place of the object. But if the agent were to cause of those truths a perfect knowledge of the sort that the object in itself would cause, then the agent would perfectly supply the place of the object; to the extent the knowledge it causes is imperfect this knowledge is virtually contained in the perfect knowledge of which the object would be in itself the cause.

64. So it is in the proposed case. For he who reveals ‘God is triune’ causes in the mind some knowledge, though an obscure knowledge, of this truth, because it is about an object not known under its proper idea, which object, if it were thus known, would naturally cause a perfect and clear knowledge of that truth. To the extent, then, that this knowledge is obscure and is included eminently in the clear knowledge, as the imperfect in the perfect, to that same extent the revealer or causer of this obscure truth supplies the place of the object which is the cause of the clear knowledge, especially since it cannot cause knowledge of any truth except by supplying the place of some object; nor could it cause about this object knowledge of such truths in the way it supplies the place of some lesser object which is naturally mover of our intellect, because no such object virtually includes any knowledge of those truths, neither clear even nor obscure; therefore it must,
in causing even that obscure knowledge, supply in some way the place of the supernatural object.

65. The difference between these two ways of positing the supernaturality of revealed knowledge is plain by separating one from the other. For example, if a supernatural agent were to cause knowledge of a natural object, as suppose it were to infuse geometry into someone, it would be supernatural in the first way [n.60], not in the second [n.63] (I mean, in both ways, because the second involves the first, though not conversely). But where only the first is, there it is not necessary that it be supernatural such that it not be capable of being possessed naturally; where the second way is, the necessity is that it be possessed supernaturally, because it cannot be possessed naturally.

III. About the Three Principal Reasons against the Philosophers

66. The three reasons on which this solution rests are confirmed by authorities. The first [nn.13-16] by the authority of Augustine City of God XVII ch.41 n.3: “The philosophers, not knowing to what end those things were to be referred, were able, among the false things they said, to see something true” etc.

67. The second reason [nn.17-18] is confirmed by Augustine City of God XI ch.2: “What advantage is it to know whither one should go if the way by which one should go is not known?” On this point the philosophers were in error who, although they handed on some truths about the virtues, yet mixed in falsehoods, according to the preceding authority of Augustine [n.66], and it is plain from their books. For Aristotle blames the

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28 Interpolation: “but if there is any supernatural knowledge in the second way, it is supernatural”, or: “if it were to infuse knowledge of this, ‘God is Triune’ or the like, this knowledge would be supernatural.”
polities arranged by many others, *Politics* 2. But neither is the polity itself of Aristotle free of blame: in the *Politics*, 7.9.1329a29-32, he teaches that the gods are to be honored (“For it is fitting,” he says, “to give honor to the gods”), and in the same place, 7.16.1335b19-25, he hands on a law “not to nourish anything defective”!

68. The third reason is confirmed by Augustine *City of God* XI ch.3: “As to things that are remote from our senses, since we cannot know them by our own testimony, we require the testimony of others.” And this confirms the whole of the principal solution. For because the propositions about which our argument is [nn.40-41] are in themselves neutral, no one can believe them on his own testimony, but a supernatural testimony must be required of someone who is above the whole human race.

69. Now in what way the first handing down or revelation of such doctrine could be done or was done is doubtful – whether, that is, it was by interior locution or exterior, along with the use of some signs sufficient to cause assent; but it suffices for the proposed case that such doctrine could have been supernaturally revealed in either way, although it could in neither way have been first handed down by a man without error.

70. Against these three reasons it is at once instanced that they destroy themselves, because a thing that is shown as requiring necessarily to be known is shown to be true, because nothing is known except truth; therefore whatever those reasons show as necessary to be known (namely, that the enjoyment of God in himself is the end of man as to the first reason [nn.13-16], – the way to reach it is through the merits that God accepts as worthy of such reward as to the second reason [nn.17-18], – that God is triune and causes contingently, and the like, as to the third reason [nn.40-41]), all this is shown
to be true. Either, then, those reasons only rest on faith, or from them is concluded the opposite of what they prove.

71. I reply: by natural reason it is shown that there is need to know determinately one part of this contradiction, ‘enjoyment is the end, enjoyment is not the end’, that is, that the intellect is not merely doubtful or neutral about this problem, ‘whether enjoyment is the end’, because such doubt or ignorance would impede search for the end; but by natural reason it is not shown that this part needs to be known necessarily. And in this way the aforesaid reasons, insofar as they are natural, conclude to one side of the contradiction, this or that; not about it determinately except only from things believed [cf. n.12].

IV. To the Arguments of the Philosophers

72. To the arguments [n.6-11] for the opinion of Aristotle. To the first [n.6] I say that knowledge depends on the soul that knows and the object that is known [nn.6-11], because according to Augustine On the Trinity IX ch.12 n.18 “knowledge is born from knower and known.” Although, therefore, the soul may have within a sufficient active and passive element to the extent an action with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, yet it does not have within itself a sufficient active element to the extent the action agrees with the object, because it is thus a blank tablet, as is said at On the Soul 3.4.429b30-30a2. The intellect then is an agent by which it makes everything, but it is so insofar as ‘making’ with respect to knowledge agrees with the soul, not insofar as the object is active.
73. To the confirmation for the reason [n.7]. To the major I say that nature is sometimes taken for the intrinsic principle of motion and rest – as it is described in the *Physics* 2.1.192b20-23 – sometimes for the naturally active principle, insofar as nature is distinguished from art or from choice on account of their opposite modes of being a principle, whether it is intrinsic or not, provided it be natural. In the first way the major is not true, because there does not naturally correspond to every passive element an active intrinsic principle that is nature, because many things are naturally receptive of some act for which they do not have an active intrinsic principle. In the second way too the major proposition is false in certain cases, namely when a nature, because of its excellence, is naturally ordered to receiving a perfection so eminent that it cannot fall under the causality of an agent that is natural in the second way. Thus it is in the proposed case.

74. When the major is proved [n.7], I say that the passive power is not in vain in nature, because although it cannot by a natural agent be principally reduced to act, yet the disposition for it can be introduced by such an agent, and can by some agent in nature – that is, in the whole system of being and beings – to wit, by the first or supernatural agent, be completely reduced to act.

75. And if it be objected that that cheapens nature because it cannot attain its perfection from its natural powers, although nature fails less in nobler things, from *On the Heavens* 2.8.290a29-35, I reply: if our happiness consisted in a supreme contemplation of the sort to which we can now naturally attain, the Philosopher would not say [*On the Soul* 3.9.432b21-22] that nature fails in necessary things. But now I concede that that happiness can be had naturally, and further I say that another more eminent one can be received naturally. Therefore nature is in this respect made more dignified than if that
natural one were posited as the supreme one possible for it; nor is it to be wondered at
that there is a passive capacity in some nature for a greater perfection than its active
causality can extend itself to.

76. What is adduced from the *On the Heavens* is not relevant to the case, because
the Philosopher is speaking there of instruments corresponding to the motive power if it
is in the stars. And I concede that universally to a thing to which a power is given that is
naturally organic, to it is by nature given an organ, I mean in non-defective things. But in
the proposed case a power is given but it is not organic; yet not all the other things have
been given that, besides the power, concur in an act. From the Philosopher, then, can be
there had that a nature orderable to some act or object naturally has a power for it, and an
organ if the power is organic; but of the later things required for act it is not so.

77. It can be said otherwise to the major [n.7] that it is true speaking of a natural
passive power as it is a passive power in contrast to an active one, but not as it is a
passive power in contrast to a received act. The difference between these two is plain at
the beginning of the solution to this question [n.57].

78. The minor [n.7] however is true in the second way, not the first [n.57]. It
might also in a third way be easily replied to the minor by denying it, because although
absolutely the possible intellect is naturally receptive of such understanding, not however
for this present life. But the cause of this will be spoken about below, 1 d.3 p.1 q.2 n.16;
q.3 n.2.

79. To the third reason [n.8] examine the response of Thomas in *ST* Ia q.1 a.1 ad 2,
where he responds thus, that “the diverse nature of the knowable introduces a diversity of
sciences. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astrologer through a
mathematical middle term, that is, one abstracted from matter (to wit, the conclusion that the earth is round), and by the natural philosopher through a middle term that is considered in matter. Hence nothing prevents the same things which the philosophical sciences treat of according to how they are knowable by the light of natural reason from being treated of by another science according to how they are known by the light of divine revelation.”

On the contrary: if knowledge of things knowable in theology is handed on or can be handed on in other sciences, although in another light, then theological science about the same things is not necessary. The consequence is clear in his example, because he who knows that the earth is round by a physical middle term does not need the knowledge by a mathematical middle term as if this knowledge were simply necessary.

80. The said response, however, to the third argument is thus expounded, namely that a habit is both a habit and a form; insofar as it is a habit it gets its distinction from the object, but insofar as it is a form it can be distinguished by the active principle. Now with respect to the habit of science principles are efficient causes. Although, therefore, where there is the same knowable (for example, that the earth is round) no distinction is drawn through the objects, yet a distinction is drawn through the principles by which the mathematician and the natural philosopher show this; and thus there will be a distinction of habits insofar as they are forms and not insofar as they are habits.

81. On the contrary: the form is common to the habits; but it is impossible for anything to be distinct from other things under the idea of what is superior but not to be thus distinct under the idea of what is inferior; therefore it is impossible for anything to be distinct under the idea of the form whereby it is a form and yet not distinct under the
idea of habits (for this would be as if some things were distinct from other things under the idea of ‘animal’ and not distinct from them under the idea of ‘man’). Besides, it supposes too that the principles distinguish the habits in some other genus of cause than as efficient principles, which is false, because if the principles possess some idea of cause that makes distinctions in respect of habits they possess only the idea of efficient cause. Besides, the reason is still in place that, however much one can posit distinct cognitive habits, yet one does not preserve the need for one of them, as though the knowledge would otherwise be impossible, when one posits the possibility of a second habit that is for any reason distinct.

82. Therefore to the argument I reply that in those speculative sciences, although all objects of speculation are treated of, yet not as to everything that is knowable about them, because not as to their properties, in the way it was made clear in the third reason [nn.40-47] against the first opinion.

83. To the fourth [n.9] the response is thus, that the first principles cannot be applied to any conclusions save those of sense; both because their terms are abstracted from sensibles and thus reflect the nature of them, and because the agent intellect, by which the application must be made, is limited to sensibles.

84. On the contrary: it is certain to the intellect that those first principles are true not only in sensibles but also in non-sensibles; for the intellect has no more doubt in the case of immaterial things than in the case of material ones that contradistinctions are not both true. And as to the remark that the term of the first principle is being as divided into the ten categories, and that this does not extend itself to the object of theology, it is of no
force; for we are not more in doubt about God that contradictories are not both true (as
that God is blessed and not blessed and the like) than about something white.

85. Another response is given, that conclusions do not follow from major
premises alone but with the minor premises added; but the minors that should be added to
them are not now naturally manifest.

On the contrary: the minors to be assumed under the first principles make
assertions about things assumed ‘under’ the terms that are the subjects of the first
principles; but it is known that the terms of the first principles are said of anything
whatever, because they are most common; therefore etc.

86. For this reason I respond that the second part of the minor is false, namely this,
that in the first principles ‘all knowable conclusions are virtually included’ [n.10]. In
proof I say that just as the subject terms are common, so also are the predicate terms.
When, therefore, the subject terms, because they are distributed, are taken to cover
everything, they are not taken to cover everything except in respect of the predicate terms
that are most common, and consequently, by virtue of such principles, only the most
common predicates are known about lower things.

87. This is clear in the reason, because the middle term cannot be the ‘why’ in
respect of any property save of one that is virtually included in the idea of the middle
term; but in the idea of the subject of the most common principle the ‘why’ of any
particular property is not included, but only of the most common property; therefore the
subject cannot be the middle term or reason for knowing anything save under the most
common idea. But there are in addition to the most common properties many other
knowable properties for which the properties of the first principles cannot be the middle
terms, because they do not include them. Therefore there are many knowable truths that are not included in the first principles.

This is clear in the example, because the statement ‘every whole is greater than its part’, although it includes the statement ‘four is greater than two’, and other like statements about the same predicate, yet it does not include the following: ‘four is double in respect of two’, ‘three is in the relation of one and a half to two’, for there would be need that these predicates have special middle terms which include them.

88. The third proof [the first proof is n.86, the second n.87], a logical one, is that although it may be possible to descend under the subject of a universal affirmative, yet not under the predicate; but many predicates contained under the predicates of the first principles are knowable of things inferior to the subjects of the principles; therefore these predicates are not known of these subjects through the first principles.

89. An objection against this: ‘affirmation or negation about a thing are also both about the same not-thing’; the consequence follows, ‘therefore about this white or non-white’, in such a way that it is licit to descend there under the predicate and under the subject.

I reply that the principle ‘affirmation or negative about a thing’ etc. is equivalent to the principle ‘one side of any contradiction about anything is true and the other false’, where there are two distributed terms and it is licit to descend under either distributed term to ‘therefore about this part of this contradiction’ etc.; but under a predicate that only stands confusedly it is not licit to descend, because this does not follow, ‘one side of any contradiction about anything, therefore this side’. Thus it is in other principles; the
predicate of a universal affirmative always only stands confusedly, whether there are two
distributed terms there in the subject or one.

And in the proposed example the proposed case is also plain. Just because it is
knowable about man that he is capable of laughter, never can more be inferred by the
principle ‘one side of any contradiction’ etc. than that ‘therefore about man he is either
capable or not capable of laughter’. One or other part, then, of the predicated disjunction
will never be known of the subject by this principle, but some other special principle is
required, as the definition of the subject or the property, which is indeed the middle term
and the reason for knowing ‘capable of laughter’ determinately of man.

V. To the Principal Arguments

90. To the principal arguments. – To the first [n.1] I draw a distinction about the
natural object. For ‘natural object’ can be taken either for that which can naturally or by
the action of causes naturally active be attained, or for that to which the power is
naturally inclined, whether it can naturally attain the object or not. The major, then, might
be denied by denying ‘natural’ in the first way, because the first object is something
adequate to the power and is therefore abstracted from all those things that the power is
able to operate on; however it is not necessary that the intellect, if it could naturally
understand some such common thing, could naturally understand whatever is contained
under it, because the understanding of something contained is much more excellent than a
confused understanding of such a common thing; thus, although the minor is in each
sense conceded, the intended conclusion is not gained, namely the conclusion about something naturally attainable, because the major in this way was false.

91. Against this response I reply that it destroys itself. For the first object is by itself something adequate to the power and is true, namely because the power has regard to nothing as object except what has in it the nature of the first object, and whatever has in it the nature of the first object the power has regard to it as to its object; therefore it is impossible for something to be naturally first without anything whatever that is contained in it being thus per se naturally the object. For grant the opposite, and then it is not naturally adequate but exceeds, and something inferior to it is adequate, and thus is first.

Now the reason that is adduced for the response [n.90] is the fallacy of figure of speech. For although being, insofar as it is something intelligible in one act (as man is intelligible in one understanding), is naturally intelligible (for the one understanding of being as of a single object is natural), yet being cannot be posited as the first object naturally attainable, because it is the first object as it is included in all per se objects, and as such only whatever among them is naturally intelligible is naturally attainable. Therefore the phrase ‘this thing’ is altered to ‘this thing as qualified’ when it is argued ‘being is naturally intelligible, therefore being as it is the first object of the intellect is the adequate object and naturally attainable,’ for the antecedent is true of being as it is one intelligible, the way white is, but the consequent draws a conclusion about being as it is included in all intelligibles, not as it is intelligible apart from them.

92. To the argument [n.1], then, there is another response, a real one, namely because the minor is false about the natural object, that it is naturally attainable, – it is true in the other way, namely as that to which the power is naturally inclined or ordained
[n.90]. And in this way should the authority of Avicenna be understood. But as to what should be set down as the first object naturally attainable, 1 d.3 p.1 q.3 nn.8-12 below is about it. The response is confirmed by Anselm On Free Choice of the Will ch.3, ‘We have, as I think, no ability,’ he says, ‘that is sufficient of itself for act.’ He calls ability what we commonly call power; it is clear from his example about sight. It is not therefore inappropriate for a power to be naturally ordained to an object which it cannot naturally attain by natural causes, after the manner of anything that is directed of itself alone to something and yet cannot on its own attain that something.

93. To the second argument [n.2] I deny the consequence. – To the proof [n.2] the thing is clear from what was said [nn.73-78] in the response given to the second argument for the opinion of the Philosopher, that higher things are ordered to the passive reception of a higher perfection than they themselves can actively produce, and consequently their perfection cannot be produced except by some supernatural agent. It is not so with the perfection of inferior things, whose final perfection can be subject to the action of inferior agents.

94. To the third argument [n.3] I say that the possible intellect is not commensurate with firm possession of every propositional truth, that is, it is not commensurate with being moved by the sort of agents that it cannot get to know from phantasms and the natural light of the agent intellect.

When you argue ‘therefore it is made commensurate by something else’ I concede the point – both as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a mover’, because the possible intellect assents to the truth through a mover that reveals supernaturally, and as to ‘by something else’ in the sense of ‘by a form’, because it assents by the assent that is
made in the possible intellect, which assent is a sort of inclination in the intellect toward that object, making it commensurate with the object.

When about that ‘something else’ you ask further ‘whether it is natural or supernatural’, I say that it is supernatural, whether you understand the question of the agent or of the form.

When you infer ‘therefore the intellect is not commensurate with it, and is by something else made commensurate with it’, I say that it is of itself in a state of obediential potency with respect to the agent [cf. 3 d.1 q.2 n.7, q.4 n.2], and thus it is sufficiently commensurate with it for the purpose of being moved by it. Likewise, it is of itself capable of the assent caused by such an agent, even naturally capable; it is not necessary, therefore, that it be by something else made commensurate for receiving the very assent.

A stand, then, is made at the second stage, not the first [n.3], because the revealed truth does not sufficiently incline the intellect to assent to it, and thus the agent is not commensurate and the recipient is not commensurate to it; but a supernatural agent does sufficiently incline the intellect to the truth, by causing in it an assent whereby it is commensurate with this truth, such that there is no need for the intellect to be by something else made commensurate to such an agent or to the form it impresses, as there is need that it be by something else made commensurate in the two aforesaid ways to such an object [n.94].
Prologue

Second Part

Sole Question

On the Sufficiency of Revealed Doctrine

Whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

95. The question is whether the supernatural knowledge necessary for the wayfarer is sufficiently handed on in Sacred Scripture.

That it is not:

Because necessary knowledge was never lacking to the human race; Sacred Scripture was not in the law of nature, because the Pentateuch was first written by Moses, nor was the whole of Sacred Scripture in the Mosaic law, but only the Old Testament; therefore etc.

96. Again, the more acute in intellect any author of human sciences is, the more he avoids superfluity in handing them on; but in Sacred Scripture there seem to be many superfluous things contained, as the many ceremonies and histories, knowledge of which does not seem necessary for salvation; therefore etc.

97. Again, there are many things that one does not with certitude know from Scripture whether they are sins or not; however knowledge of these things is necessary for salvation, because he who does not know that something is a mortal sin will not avoid it sufficiently; therefore etc.

98. To the contrary:
Augustine in *City of God* XI ch.3 says, speaking of canonical Scripture: “We have faith in it for things that ignorance of is not expedient and that we are not fit to recognize by ourselves.”

I. On the Truth of Sacred Scripture

99. [Diverse Heresies] – There are on this question innumerable heresies that condemn Sacred Scripture, in whole or in part, as is clear from the books of Augustine and Damascene *On Heresies*. Some heretics accept nothing of Scripture. Some reject the *Old Testament* in particular, like the Manicheans, as is clear in Augustine’s book *On the Utility of Believing* ch.2 n.4, who say that the *Old Testament* is from the bad principle. Some accept only the *Old Testament*, like the Jews. Some, like the Saracens, accept something of both, into which impure Mohammed mixed innumerable other impurities. But some accept up to a point what is said in the *New Testament*, to wit the diverse heretics who, holding for their foundations diverse statements of Scripture badly understood, have neglected others; for example *Romans* 14.2: “He who is weak will eat herbs,” and the like. Again *James* 5.16: “Confess your sins one to another,” if from this the error about the sacrament of penance has arisen, that it can be dispensed by any non-priest, – relying on bad understandings of these sorts of authorities of Sacred Scripture.

100. [Various Ways of Convicting Heretics] – Against all these together there are eight ways of rationally convicting them, which are: prophetic foretelling, the agreement of the Scriptures, the authority of the writers, the carefulness of the recipients, the
rationality of the contents and the irrationality of the separate errors, the firmness of the Church, the clear evidence of miracles.

101. [On Prophetic Foretelling] – About the first the matter is clear. Since only God naturally and not from someone else foresees future contingents with certitude, therefore only he, or someone instructed by him, can predict them with certitude. Now many such things, foretold in Scripture, have been fulfilled (it is clear to anyone who considers the prophetic books), of which “the few that remain there is no doubt but that they will follow,” according to Gregory in a certain homily *On the Advent of the Lord.* [40 Homilies on the Gospels I hom.1 n.1]. The same way is touched on by Augustine *City of God* XII ch.10: “That what he said in the past is true he shows from the future things he foretold when these with so much truth are fulfilled.”

102. [On the Agreement of the Scriptures] – On the second, namely the agreement of the Scriptures, the matter is clear thus: in things that are not evident from the terms, nor have principles thus evident from the terms, there is no firm and infallible agreement among many persons diversely disposed unless they receive inclination to assent from a cause superior to their intellect itself; but the writers of the Sacred Canon, being variously disposed and existing at different times, were on such inevident things altogether in agreement. This way is dealt with by Augustine *City of God* XVIII ch.42 n.1: “Our authors needed to be few lest, by their great numbers, they should be rendered cheap; and they are not so few that their agreement is not marvelous; for neither might one find in a great number of philosophers that all they thought was in agreement among them,” and Augustine proves the fact there by examples.
For the assumed major premise is not only proved by the example of the philosophers, as Augustine seems to prove it, but also by reason; because since the intellect is, as far as assent is concerned, naturally moved by an object evident in itself or in another, nothing else besides the object seems able to cause such assent unless it virtually includes the evidence of the object; for if nothing of this sort moves the intellect, theology will remain neutral for it. Now there is nothing of this sort in respect of things not evident from the terms save an intellect superior to our own; but nothing intelligent superior to man can effectively move man save God.

103. If it be said here that the later writers, although differently disposed than the earlier ones and existing at different times, did yet possess the doctrine of their predecessors in their writings and acquiesced in believing them, as disciples acquiesce in the teaching of their masters, and in this way wrote nothing that was discordant with the earlier writers, although God did not teach either the latter or the former, – Augustine in the earlier place seems to bring an objection against this when he says about the philosophers: “they left in their literary labor memorials of their doctrines,” which memorials their disciples read, and although in some things they, as disciples, assented to their predecessors, yet other things they rejected. The thing is clear in the same place [of Augustine] about Aristippus and Antisthenes, who were both Socratics, yet in some things they contradicted each other; and disciples have sometimes even contradicted their master, as Aristotle did Plato. How then did our later writers not contradict the earlier ones in some things if they had not had a common teacher inclining their intellect to the same in evident things?
104. Response: because the earlier writers handed on inevident things, therefore the later ones were not able to reject them by reason, and, if they were not able to get a cogent reason for themselves, they did not wish to disbelieve them, reverencing them as truthful masters; but the philosopher disciples were able by reason to reject their masters, because the matter about which they were disputing was capable of receiving reasons taken from the terms. – An example: a disciple in historiography does not contradict his master in historiography in the way that a philosopher contradicts a philosopher, because histories are not capable of being evident about the past, enough to turn a disciple from the master, in the way that philosophical reasons can do.

Contrary to this is at least the fact of Ezekiel prophesying in Babylon at the time that Jeremiah prophesied in Judea.\(^{29}\) Since they both said not only the things that they could have had from Moses, their common master as it were, but also many other things, they would have been able to disagree in these things, since these were not evident from the terms, unless they had had some common teacher superior to the human intellect.

105. [On the Authority of the Writers] – On the third, namely the authority of the writers, the thing is clear thus: the books of Scripture either belong or do not belong to the authors whose books they are said to be. If they do belong, since they condemn lying, especially in faith and morals, how is it likely that, if the Lord had not spoken, the authors lied and said ‘thus saith the Lord’? Or if you say they were deceived, and not lying or wanting to lie for the sake of gain, – to the contrary, and first against the first, namely that they were not deceived. For the Blessed Apostle Paul says, 2 Corinthians 12.2: “I knew a man in Christ above fourteen years ago etc.,’ and he adds there that he heard, v.4:

\(^{29}\) They were prophesying simultaneously during the space of five years (592-587 AD) at the time of the Babylonian captivity.
“unspeakable words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter.” Which assertions do not seem to have been without lie if the assertor was not certain, because to assert a doubtful thing as if it were a certain truth is a lie, or not far from a lie. From this revelation of Paul, and from many others made to diverse saints, the conclusion is drawn that their intellect could not have been induced to assent, as firmly as they did assent, to things of which they could not by natural resources have had knowledge, save by a supernatural agent. – Against the second, namely that they lied for the sake of gain; the answer is that they endured on behalf of the things they wanted to induce men to believe the greatest tribulations.

106. If the books do not belong to them but to others, this seems an inconsistent thing to say, because in this way any book at all will be denied to belong to the author whose book it is said to be. For why have these books alone been falsely ascribed to authors whose books they were not? – Besides, those who ascribed the books to them either were or were not Christians. If they were not, it does not seem that their wish was to write down such books and ascribe them to others and magnify a sect whose contrary they maintained. If they were Christians, how then did those Christians deceitfully ascribe such books to them since their law condemns lying, as noted before [n.105]? And for the same reason, how do they assert that God said the many things that are there narrated, and this to the persons whose names the books bear, if such things did not happen to such persons? How too would these books in this way have become authentic and widely published as belonging to such authors if they were in fact not theirs and the authors not genuine? On this point Richard [of St. Victor] says *On the Trinity* bk.1 ch.2: “By men of the greatest sanctity have they been delivered to us.” Again Augustine *City of
God XI ch.3, speaking of Christ says: “Having spoken first through the prophets, then through himself, afterwards through the apostles, as much as he judged sufficient, he established a Scripture, which is called canonical, of the most eminent authority.” This in that place. And in his first epistle to Jerome [Epist. 40 ch.3 n.3] (and it is contained in On Consecration [Gratian, Decretum p.1 d.9 ch.7]) he writes: “If even useful lies have been admitted into the Sacred Scriptures, what authority will remain to them?” And the same to the same in the same epistle [Epist. 82 ch.1 n.3]: “Only in those books of the Scriptures, etc.” (and Henry of Ghent, Summa a.7 q.7 in corp.).

107. [The Carefulness of the Recipients] – On the fourth, namely the carefulness of the recipients, the thing is clear thus: either you do not believe anyone about a contingent thing you have not seen, and so you do not believe that the world was made before you, or that there is a place in the world where you have not been, or that he there is your father and she here your mother; and this refusal to believe destroys the whole of political life. If then you wish to believe someone about a contingent thing that is not and was not evident to you, you should most of all believe the community, or those things that the whole community approves, and especially the things that a noteworthy and reputable community has taught with the greatest care should be approved. Such is the Canon of Scripture. For so great was the care of the Jews for the books to be kept in the Canon, and so great was the care of the Christians for the books to be received as authentic, that so great care about any writing to be held as authentic has not been found, especially since very solemn communities have cared for those Scriptures as for things containing what is necessary for salvation. About this Augustine City of God XVIII ch.38 says: “How is it that the writing of Enoch, of which Jude makes mention in his epistle, is
not contained in the Canon, nor many other writings of which mention is made in the books of Kings?” where he indicates that only the writing that the authors wrote, not as men, but as prophets, by divine inspiration, was received into the Canon. And in the same place ch.41 n.3 he says: “The Israelites to whom were entrusted the sayings of God did not in any way confound the false prophets with the true in equality of knowledge, but they are in agreement among themselves and dissent in nothing; they recognized and held the authors of the Sacred Letters to be truthful.”

108. [On the Rationality of the Contents] – On the fifth, namely the rationality of the contents, the thing is clear thus: what is more rational than that God as ultimate end “should be loved above all things, and one’s neighbor as oneself”? – that is, “as to what one wants for oneself” according to Blessed Gregory [40 Homilies on the Gospels, 2 hom.27 n.1]; “on these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets,” Matthew 22.40. Again Matthew 7.12: “this do ye even so to others etc.” From these practical principles, as it were, follow other practical principles handed on in the Scriptures, principles honorable and consonant with reason, as can be seen as to their rationality by anybody who one by one examines the precepts, the counsels, and the sacraments; because in all of these there seems to be, as it were, a sort of explication of the law of nature, which “is written in our hearts” [Romans 2.15]. This about morals. On this point Augustine says, City of God II ch.28: “Nothing base or shameful is proposed for consideration and imitation when of the True God either precepts are insinuated or miracles narrated or gifts praised or benefits requested.”

About things for belief it is plain that we believe nothing about God which imports any imperfection; nay rather, if there is anything we believe to be true, it attests
more to the divine perfection than to the opposite. The thing is plain about the Trinity of persons, about the incarnation of the Word, and the like. For we believe nothing incredible, because then it would be incredible that the word believes them, as Augustine concludes in *City of God* XXII ch.5; yet that the world believes them is not incredible, because we see it.

This law and integrity of Christians are clear in Augustine *On the Utility of Believing* ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.”

109. [The Irrationality of Errors] – On the sixth, namely the irrationality of the separate errors, the thing is plain thus. What will the pagans introduce for their idolatry, worshipping as they do the works of their own hands, wherein there is nothing of the divine, as is shown sufficiently by philosophers [e.g. Aristotle *Metaphysics* 12.8.1084a38-b10]? What will the Saracens, disciples of that most worthless swine Mohammed, allege for their scriptures, expecting for beatitude, as they do, what befits swine and asses, namely sated gullet and coitus [e.g. *Koran*, sura 37 vv.42-50]? Which promise Avicenna, who was as though of that sect, despises in his *Metaphysics* IX ch.7 106vb, and he sets down another end as more perfect and more fitting to man when he says: “Our law, which Mohammed gave us, displays the disposition for a happiness and a misery that are in accord with the body, and there is another promise that is apprehended by the intellect.” And there follows there: “The eagerness of the wise was much more to obtain this felicity than that of bodies, which, although it were given them, yet did they not attend to it, nor did they value it in comparison with the felicity that is conjoined to

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30 “Do you not judge too ill-advisedly of human affairs? The fact that nothing of earth, nothing of fire, nothing finally that reaches the senses of the body, is to be worshipped as God, but one must seek after him with the intellect alone, is not a thing of dispute for a few of the very learned, but is believed and preached even by an unskilled crowd of males and females in as many nations and as diverse.”
the first truth.” What of the Jews who condemn the *New Testament*, which is promised in their *Old Testament* as the Apostle shows in his epistle to the *Hebrews*? And how tasteless are their ceremonies without Christ [*Hebrews 9.1-28]*! Again, that Christ has come and that thus the New Testament he promulgated as authentic would be something one should accept is shown by their prophecies: “The scepter,” says Jacob, “shall not depart from Judah…and for him shall the Gentiles wait” *Genesis 49.10*; likewise the verse of *Daniel 9.24*: “When the Holy of holies has come, your anointing will cease.”

What also of the asinine Manicheans who invent the fable of an ‘evil first principle’, although even they themselves, while not a ‘first’, were yet very evil! Surely they saw that every being, insofar as it is, is good? Surely too they could have seen in the *New Testament* that the *Old Testament* is authentic and approved?

110. What of the other individual heretics who have understood one word of Scripture badly, according to Augustine *38 Questions q.69 n.1*: “An error cloaked under the Christian name cannot arise except from Scriptures badly understood;” and for this reason, that they did not collect the antecedents and the consequents. Hence in the same place [*q.69 n.2*] Augustine says: “The circumstance in the Scriptures is wont to throw light on the meaning.” Nor did they even collect the other places of Scripture. Hence things read on their own gave rise to heresies that when read together repulsed them, because those collecting the diverse statements brought together the things that were, by their mutual interconnection, able to disclose how those statements were to be understood. Against them is the word of Augustine in his book *Against the Letter of Fundamentus* ch.5 n.6: “I would not believe the Gospel,” he says, “save because I believe the Catholic

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31 Actually a quote from Ps.-Augustine *Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians* ch.12, which paraphrases the verse of *Daniel*. 
Church.” Therefore it is irrational to accept one part of the Canon and not another, since the Catholic Church, by belief in which I accept the Canon, accepts as certain the whole equally. – Again, the doctrines of the philosophers contain something irrational, as is proved by Aristotle in Politics bk. 2 about the diverse polities arranged by diverse philosophers. But even his own polity too is in certain things irrational, as is clear from the solution of the previous question [n.67].

111. [On the Firmness of the Church] – On the seventh, namely the firmness of the Church, the thing is clear as to the Head of it from the remark of Augustine On the Utility of Believing ch.17 n.35: “Will we doubt to trust to the bosom of the same Church which has, in the continuous confession of the human race, obtained by the Apostolic See the summit of authority through its succession of bishops, though the heretics bark around it in vain,?” And a little later: “What else is displeasing to the face of God than to want to resist with so much effort his authority foretold?” Hence Gamaliel said, Acts 5.38-39: “If this counsel or this work be of men, it will come to nought; but if it be of God, ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found even to fight against God.” And in Luke 22.32 the Lord says to Peter: “I have prayed for thee, that thy faith fail not; and when thou are converted, strengthen thy brethren.” – The firmness of the Church in its members is clear from the remark of Augustine On the Utility of Believing ch.17 n.35: “A crowd of males and females, etc.” [cf. n.108]. Augustine states a like opinion in Against

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32 Interpolation: “For when handing on his own polity he said: ‘It is expedient for temperance that the more aged have intercourse’ (Politics 7.16.1335a22-23). Again he says that nothing orphaned [deformed] should be nourished (ibid. 1335b20-21). Again he says that, if anyone has generated children beyond what wealth is sufficient for, abortion should be performed before life is perceived, etc. (ibid. 1335b22-25). Tully, De Natura Deorum 1.7.28.”
the Letter of Fundamentus ch.4 n.5. For what save God might induce so great a multitude, prone to sin, to keep a law contrary to flesh and blood?

112. There is confirmation in that the sect of the Jews does not remain in vigor, as Augustine objects against them in the sermon [Ps.-Augustine, Sermon against Jews, Pagans, and Arians ch.11]: “Against you, I say, O Jews, I bring my charge!”

If an objection be made about the permanence of the sect of Mohammed, I reply: that sect began more than six hundred years after the law of Christ, and in a short time, if the Lord will, it shall end, because it was much weakened in the 1300th year of Christ, and many of its worshippers are dead and very many put to flight; and a prophecy is said to exist among them that their sect must end.34

113. [On the clear Evidence of Miracles] – On the eighth, namely the clearness and evidence of miracles, the thing is plain thus: God cannot be a false witness; but God himself, when invoked by a preacher of the Scripture to show that its doctrine was true, performed some work proper to himself, and thereby bore witness that what he preached was true. There is a confirmation from Richard [of St. Victor] in On the Trinity I ch.2: “Lord, if it is an error, we have been by you deceived, for your deeds have been confirmed by signs so great that they can only have been done by you.”

114. But if it be said that miracles have not been performed, or also that they do not testify to the truth, because even Antichrist will perform miracles, – against the first point can be stated the opinion of Augustine City of God XXII ch.5: “If they do not

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33 “For in the Catholic Church, setting aside the purest wisdom to the knowledge of which a few spiritual people in this life attain ...the rest of the crowd, to be sure, is made most safe not by the vivacity of their understanding but by the simplicity of their belief,...many other things there are that most justly hold me in her bosom; the agreement of peoples and nations holds me...”

34 Scotus may be thinking of the third battle of Homs that took place in 1299 between the Muslim Mamluks and the Mongols. The prophecy he mentions is also mentioned by others, as by Roger Bacon and William Vorillon.
believe that these miracles were done, this one great miracle is sufficient for us, that now without any miracles the whole world believes.”

Note well the miracle and the chapter, because if what we believe is said to be incredible, no less incredible, he says, is that “men of low birth, weak, few in numbers, unskilled, were able so effectively to persuade the world, and even the learned in the world, of a thing so incredible,” such that the world does believe it, as now we see it has believed [cf. n.108], unless it was that some miracles were done by those men, whereby the world was induced to believe. Hence he there subjoins: “For this reason did the world believe a tiny number of low-born, weak, unskilled men, because more marvelously in such contemptible witnesses did divinity itself persuade them.” For what is more incredible than that a few teachers, poor and uneducated, should convert many powerful and wise men to a law opposed to flesh and blood? Which fact is especially clear in the case of the many very prudent men, first fighting against the faith, afterwards converts; as about Paul, first a persecutor, afterwards teacher of the Gentiles; about Augustine, first in some way seduced by the Manicheans, afterwards a Catholic doctor; of Dionysius, first a philosopher, afterwards a disciple of Paul; of Cyprian, first a magician, afterwards a most Christian bishop, and about many others.

Against the same can be said, second, the remark of Augustine The City of God X ch.18: “Or will someone say that these miracles were not done? He can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”35 And in the same place on the same point, “If

35 More fully: “Or will someone say that these miracles are false and were not done or were deceitfully written down? Whoever says this, if he denies that in these respects any writings are to be believed, he can also say that the gods care nothing for mortal things etc.”
they believe magical or theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which…?"\textsuperscript{36}

Against the same, third, is that some of the things done cannot be denied save by the most shameless, as are the miracles performed by Sylvester in the presence of Constantine, both in curing his leprosy and afterwards in his disputation against the Jews, which deeds, being famous, have not been hid from the world.

115. Against the second point it can be said that if anyone, after being summoned as a witness, should permit some customary sign of bearing witness to be adduced and, although present, should not contradict it, such silence does not cohere with perfect truthfulness; but a miracle is such a sign of God as witness; therefore if he should permit miracles to be performed by demons and not contradict them, namely by declaring that they are not his testimonies, he does not seem to be perfectly truthful, which is impossible. And hereby is the response to what is said of Antichrist, because God predicted that the miracles to be done were not testimonies of the truth, as is clear in Matthew 24.24 and 2 Thessalonians 2.8-9.

Again, against the same point is the difference in the miracles performed by God and those performed by the devil, which difference Augustine treats of in his book \textit{On the Utility of Believing} ch.16 n.34: “I call a marvel [miracle],” he says, “anything that appears difficult beyond the hope or capacity of the one who marvels; some marvels only cause admiration, others unite great grace and goodwill,” of which sort were the miracles of Christ; and he deals with the matter there extensively.

\textsuperscript{36} More fully: “Further if the worshippers of many gods believe magical books, or as they more honorably think, theurgical books, why do they refuse to trust the Writings which say that these things were done, to which books the more trust is due the more he is great above all to whom alone they command that sacrifice should be given?”
116. Again, against both points it can be said that there are some miracles, performed in the Christian law, wherein there can be no deceit whether they have been performed, nor that they are testimonies of truth, because they were performed by God; like the rapture of Paul and the revelation of future contingents.

The first claim is clear: because it is impossible for anyone to be deceived about his seeing the essence of God, therefore it was impossible for Paul to believe he saw the divine essence unless he did see it; but this he asserts of himself in 2 Corinthians 12.2-4, according to the exposition of the saints;\(^{37}\) therefore it happened truly and not in appearance only.

The proof of the first antecedent is that no one can be deceived about some first principle – by believing he understands such a principle when he does not understand it – because it would not be clear from the apprehended terms what was a principle and what was not;\(^{38}\) therefore much more can one not be deceived about seeing God. The consequence is plain, because the vision of God is more distant from the understanding of any object at all, even as to the perception of the intellect of the wayfarer, than is the understanding of a propositional principle distant from the understanding of any non-principle. Again, how would the intellect believe it was at rest if it was not at rest [cf. 1 d.2 p.2 q.2 n.31]? Surely he would be able to recognize that he had an inclination toward a truth that he does not see? If he believes he sees God, he believes he is at rest in God; if he does not see, he is not at rest. “Nothing more stupid,” says Augustine, “can be said than that a soul with a false opinion might be blessed,” \textit{City of God} XI ch.4 n.2. A second

\(^{37}\) As in particular St. Augustine, \textit{Epistle to Paulina, On Seeing God}, bk.13 n.31.

\(^{38}\) Interpolation: “provided it be clear from the terms that something such is principle.”
point, namely that this could only be done by God, is manifest, because no creature can
beatify the soul, either simply or for a time [cf. 1 d. 35 q. un. n.13].

The second claim [n.116, miracles as testimonies of truth, like the revelation of
future contingents] is plain from many prophecies in both Testaments. Hence against the
false miracles of Antichrist an objection, at least as to these two miracles, can be made to
him in this way: if you are God, make me to see bare the divine essence, and to have,
after the vision, a sure memory of the vision and a certitude that it was the vision bare of
the divine essence, and then I will believe you; again, if you are God, tell me what I will
do or what I will think or desire on such a day or at such an hour.

And the efficacy of this sort of way, the way of miracles, is indicated by the
Savior in John 5. 36: “The works that I do bear witness of me,” 10.38: “if you do not
wish to believe me, believe the works.”

118. [On the Testimony of Non-believers] – In ninth place too can be adduced the
testimony of those who were without [sc. the Church]. Josephus in Antiquities of the Jews
XVIII ch.4 n.3 sets down a very beautiful testimony about Christ, where among other
things written about Christ he says: “This man was Christ;” where he also confesses his
ture doctrine and resurrection from the dead.39 Again, about the prophecy of the Sibyl; it
is noted in Augustine City of God XVIII ch.23 n.1. Again, Against the Letter of

39 The so called Testimonium Flavianum, whose authenticity has been much disputed, though it is
attested in all mss. and is twice cited by Eusebius (AD 263-339); see the Loeb edition of the
Antiquities, vol. IX p.49. An interpolation here contains the relevant passage: “But there was in those
same times Jesus, a wise man, if however it is right to call him a man. For he was a worker of
marvelous deeds, and a teacher of men, of those who gladly hear things that are true; and many
indeed of the Jews, many also of the Gentiles, he joined to himself. This man was Christ. Who,
although Pilate, on the accusation of the first men of our nation, decreed he should be crucified, was
not deserted by those who from the beginning loved him. For he appeared to them on the third day
alive again, in accord with what divinely inspired prophets had foretold, whether this miracle or
other innumerable miracles about him. But even to the present day the name and race of Christians,
who are named after him, perseveres.”
**Fundamentus** ch.4 n.5, note how individual heretics send inquirers about Catholics, not to their own people, but to true Catholics, as though they alone indeed are by everyone called Catholics, including by heretics.

119. [On the Efficacy of Promises] – Tenth and last can be added that God does not fail those who seek salvation with all their heart. For many most diligent inquirers after salvation have been converted to this sect [the Catholic]; and the more fervent they became in inquiry, the more confirmed they were in this sect, and the more suddenly therein have they been changed, in repenting of their malice, to goodness of life; third, too, many have in great exultation of spirit suffered sorrows on its behalf. Which things do not seem probable did not God especially approve this sect, resting as it does on Sacred Scripture, and ordain it for salvation.

II. Principal Response to the Question

120. Having established, then, against heretics that the doctrine of the Canon is true, one must see second whether it is necessary and sufficient to the wayfarer for attaining his end.

I say that the Canon hands on what is the end of man in particular, that it is the vision and enjoyment of God, and this as far as concerns the circumstances of its desirability; to wit, that it will be possessed after the resurrection by man immortal in soul as well as in body, endlessly. The Canon also determines the things necessary for the end, and that these are sufficient because commanded, “If thou wilt enter into life,” says our Lord, *Matthew* 19.17, “keep the commandments,” about which there is the statement in
Exodus 20.1-17; explication is given also of these, as to what to believe and what to do, in diverse places of Scripture. The properties too of immaterial substances are handed on in the Canon, to the extent it is possible and useful for the wayfarer to know them.40

III. To the Principal Arguments

121. To the principal reasons. To the first reason [n.95]. To the minor I reply that the law of nature was content with fewer things, which were passed down by memory from fathers to sons. Those men were also more endowed in natural powers, and therefore a modicum of inspired doctrine was able to suffice them. Or it should otherwise be said to this instance, and to the one about the law of Moses, that the ordered progress of Scripture showed the fittingness of it. The thing is made plain by Augustine 83 Questions q.53 n.4.

122. To the second reason [n.96] I say that one grasps more delightfully a thing that lies hid under some literal statement than if it were said expressly; and for this reason the fact that what is express in the New Testament was veiled under figures in the Old contributes to devotion; and this as to the ceremonies; but as to the histories, both these and the ceremonies are examples declarative of the law. Likewise, from the whole progress of Scripture is made plain an ordered government with respect to man and the whole creation.

123. To the third reason [n.97], Origen in his homily On Noah’s Ark [Homilies on Genesis, hom. 2 n.1]: “In Scripture silence seems to have been considered appropriate on

40 Interpolation: “Comparing these with the three reasons on which the solution of the preceding question depends [nn.13-18, 40-41], it is plain that Scripture adequately contains the doctrine necessary for the wayfarer.”
this point, which would be sufficiently taught by the nature of the consequence itself."\textsuperscript{41}

Hence many necessary truths are not express in Sacred Scripture, although they are virtually contained there as conclusions in the principles; the labor of doctors and expositors has been useful for the investigation of these things.

If you object that about many things in human acts it is doubtful whether they are mortal sins or not, even after one supposes all the teachings of the doctors and expositors, – I reply: the way of salvation is not in doubt, because a man ought to guard himself from such doubtful things as from things dangerous, lest, while he is exposing himself to the danger, he fall into sin. But if someone wants to seek salvation yet carelessly\textsuperscript{42} exposes himself to the danger, although there would perhaps, by the nature of the act, be no mortal sin, nevertheless he will sin mortally by exposing himself to such danger, as will be touched on elsewhere [4 d.5 q.3 n.2; d.30 q.1 nn.4-5].

\textsuperscript{41} Origen’s authentic text reads: “No science explains everything that needs to be known, but that from which the other things can be sufficiently drawn.”

\textsuperscript{42} Interpolation: “[without caring] even if [he exposes...]”
Prologue

Third Part

On the Object of Theology

Question 1

*Whether theology is about God as about its first object.*

124. The question is whether theology is about God as about its first object.

And that it is not is argued in two ways:

[Argument in the First Way] – The first way is that something else is the subject of theology, therefore this is not.

The antecedent is proved in several ways:

125. First thus, from Augustine *On Christian Doctrine* 1 ch.2 n.2: “All Scripture is of things or of signs;” therefore things or signs are the subject.

126. Again, Scripture has four senses: the anagogical, the tropological, the allegorical, and the historical or literal; but to each of these senses there corresponds some first subject, just as to any other science having one sense there corresponds a subject in accord with that sense; therefore here there are four subjects.

127. Again, that man is the subject is proved by the authority of the Commentator on *Ethics* bk.1 in the prologue, because, according to him there, moral science is of man as to his soul, medical science is of man as to his body. From this is received the
proposition: ‘every practical science has for first object that for which the end of the practical science is acquired and not the end itself’; but the end of this science is acquired for man, not God; therefore man is the subject of this science.

128. Again in another way, though it comes back to the same: the end of a science is to attain through its act the first object by introducing into the act the form principally intended by the science, to wit: as in the case of speculative science, to introduce into it ‘being known’, because knowledge is principally there intended; in the case of practical science, to introduce the form to which its action is ordered; but the end here intended is moral goodness, and the intention is not to introduce it in God but in man; therefore man is its first object.

129. [Argument in the Second Way] – The second way to the proposed conclusion is to show that God is not theology’s first object.

This is proved first by the authority of Boethius *On the Trinity* ch.2: “The form,” he says, “cannot be a simple subject.”

130. Again, the matter does not coincide with the other causes in the same thing, whether in number or in kind (*Physics* 2.7.198a24-27); but God is the end and efficient cause of this science; therefore he is not the matter of it.

131. Again, from *Posterior Analytics* 1.28.87a38-39, the subject of a science has parts: principles and properties. But God does not have integral parts, since he is altogether simple, nor subjective parts, since he is singular of himself; nor does he have principles, since he is the first principle, nor properties, because a property is present in a subject in such a way that it is outside the subject’s essence; nothing is present in God in this way.
132: To the Contrary:

Augustine *City of God* VIII ch.1: “Theology is discussion or reasoning about God.”

**Question 2**

*Whether Theology is about God under some special Idea*

133. The question second is whether theology is about God under some special idea.

That it is so is argued thus:

Hugh [of St. Victor] in *On Sacraments* at the beginning wants the subject to be “the works of restoration;” therefore if God is this subject, this will be under some special idea of it, namely insofar as he is restorer.

134. Cassiodorus in *On the Psalter* pref. ch.13 wants the subject to be Christ, the head with his members; therefore he will be the subject specifically as incarnate or as head of the Church.

135. Again, God absolutely is the subject of metaphysics; therefore if he is the subject here, this will be under some special idea. The proof of the consequence is that the subject in this case and in that is not taken under wholly the same idea. The proof of the antecedent is from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1026a21-23: “The most
honorable science should be about the most honorable subject;” metaphysics according to him is the most honorable science. A confirmation for this indeed is that he there calls metaphysics theology [1026a18-19].

136. Again, Averroes on Physics 1, final comment [com.83], says that Avicenna was greatly at fault for laying down that metaphysics proves that there is a first cause, since the class of separate substances is there the subject and no science proves that its subject exists; but Averroes’ reason would not be valid unless he understood God there to be the first subject; therefore etc.

137. Again, this science is most honorable, therefore it is about the noblest subject under its noblest idea; of this sort is the idea of end and good. The proof, as to the end, is in Avicenna Metaphysics 6 ch.5 (95rb): “If the science is about causes, the one that is about the end would be noblest.”\footnote{More properly: “But if there is a science per se of each of the causes, certainly the science about the final cause would be the nobler among them.”} From this the conclusion about the good follows, because – according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 2.2.994b12-13 – he who posits an infinity in respect of ends destroys the idea of good, because he destroys the idea of end. From this is taken the conclusion that the idea of good is the idea of end.

138. On the contrary:

Knowledge with a restriction presupposes knowledge without a restriction, or absolute knowledge. But absolute knowledge is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a21-23, 25-28; therefore if this science is of God under some special idea, there will be some other science, prior and more certain, about God taken absolutely; but no such science is posited; therefore etc.
Question 3

*Whether Theology is about Everything by Way of Attribution of them to its First Subject*

139. The question is whether theology is about everything by way of attribution of them to its first subject.

That it is:

*Metaphysics* 4.1.1003a21-22: the science about a thing and about the attributes of the thing is the same, as is shown there by the example of health; but all other things are attributed essentially to the first subject of this science; therefore etc.

140. [Augustine] *On the Trinity* 14 ch.1 n.3: “And must not be attributed to this science etc.”

I. Preliminary Remarks

141. As to the solution of this question [nn.124-140] I proceed thus: first I distinguish between theology in itself and theology in us; second I will designate the idea of its first subject; third I will distinguish theology into its parts.

[About theology in itself and in us] – On the first point I say that any science taken in itself is that which is naturally had of the object of the science in accord with the way the object naturally manifests itself to an intellect commensurate with it; now doctrine for us is what is naturally had in our intellect about the object. Therefore

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44 More fully: “Certainly I do not attribute to this science everything that can be known about man in human affairs, but only that whereby most salutary faith, which leads to true beatitude, is generated, nourished, defended, strengthened.”
theology in itself is the sort of knowledge that the object of theology naturally produces in an intellect commensurate with itself; but theology in us is the sort of knowledge that our intellect naturally has about the object. – An example: if some intellect could not understand geometrical matters yet could believe someone else about geometrical matters, geometry for it would be faith, not science; however geometry in itself would be a science, because the object of geometry naturally produces science of itself in an intellect commensurate with it.

142. [On the Idea of the First Object] – On the second point I say that the nature of the first object is to be what first contains virtually in itself all the truths of the habit of the science. Which I prove thus: first, that the first object contains the immediate propositions, because the subject of those propositions contains the predicate, and thus it contains the evidence for the whole proposition; now immediate propositions contain the conclusions; therefore the subject of the immediate propositions contains all the truths of the habit of the science.

143. I make the same clear in a second way thus, that ‘firstness’ is here taken from *Posterior Analytics* 1 ch.4 73b32-33, from the definition of ‘universal’ in the sense in which ‘universal’ indicates adequacy: the object would not be adequate to the habit unless it virtually contained everything that such a habit inclines one to consider, because, if it did not, the habit would exceed the object.

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45 Note by Scotus added before ‘the object’: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object, and, as this is omitted here, say…”

46 [A note that Scotus cancelled here reads: “but the object is related to the habit as cause to effect; now a cause is not adequate unless it virtually contains the whole effect; therefore etc.” The note was cancelled by Scotus because of the addition just made: “He proceeds to a difficulty about the causality of the object…”]
144. By the phrase ‘first…virtually’ [n.142], I mean that it is first in the sense that it does not depend on another but other things depend on it; in this sense, then, ‘first contains’ means that, in its containing, it does not depend on other things but other things depend on it, that is, that if, per impossibile, all other things in the idea of the object were removed and only it remained understood, it would still objectively contain them. But it does not contain anything else save through its idea.

145. That its essence, once known with the habit of science, contains ‘first virtually’ the knowledge of all the truths of the habit:

The habit that is called science is an intelligible likeness (species) of the first object; it regards immediate truths and mediate ones, not formally, but by implication, and its formally adequate object is the quiddity of which it is the likeness. What wonder, then, if the first object, qua known, contains the knowledge of the things which its intelligible species moves one, although mediately, to consider? Nay rather, it is the same thing for the intelligible species of $A$ to contain virtually knowledge of $B$, and for the $A$ itself, as known with the habit of science, to contain it, that is, that the intelligible species of the $A$ itself in memory is able to generate knowledge of $B$ in the intelligence. In this way, then, the first object of the intellect and of the science are the same; and then the first object distinguishes, not them, but what proximately follows them, which is immediate and mediate truth, and the first object of the two of them is related in a certain order to the proximate objects and to the habit of science of the proximate objects. In this way it is impossible to use the habit of the science save by using first in nature, and also in time, the habit of intellect, because I never contemplate anything in scientific knowledge save by considering it as true, evident to me because of some other truth.
Either, then, they are the same habit, and I first use the habit about the object to which it first inclines me (nay rather, according to Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* 9 q.4, both are the same as the habit which is the quiddity of the first simple object, which habit you say is called science by Aristotle in his distinction of sciences);\(^{47}\) or they are more than one habit – nay rather, any truth at all has its own habit, and, in addition to it, there is the habit of the quiddity of the first object, which you say is the intelligible likeness, and it virtually includes all of the habits – and then he who uses the later habit must at the same time be using all the prior ones.

Can it be, then, that a habit, when compared with many acts or with one act, has an act proper to both of what it is compared with? And, besides this, an act of comparing it as well with that chief act of discursive reasoning? – My own proper act is set down as that whereby I am inclined to perform a demonstration, that is, to infer this from that; for which extremes I have two acts; look for the passage with the triangular mark below, against Henry of Ghent and Richard of St. Victor [1 d.2 p.2 q1.4 nn.35, 36] – If a plurality of habits may be made sense of, a fewness of them should be preferred.

146. On the contrary, namely against the designation of the above posited idea of the first object [nn.142-145], there are two arguments. First thus: as the first object is to the power, so is the first object to the habit; but the first object of the power is something common to all the per se objects of that power; therefore the first object of the habit is something common to all its objects, and not something that virtually contains other things.

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\(^{47}\)This opinion of Henry's is discussed and rejected by Scotus in *Metaphysics* 6 q.1 nn.3-7.
147. Again second: because what is commonly designated for first object in the sciences is something that is common to all the things that are considered in that science, as line is in geometry, number in arithmetic, being in metaphysics.

148. To the first argument [n.146] I reply and say that the way the object is commensurate with the power is the way the mover is commensurate with the thing moved, or the way the active thing is commensurate with the passive; the way the object is commensurate with the habit is the way the cause is commensurate with the effect. Now whenever some agent acts on some patient, any agent also of the same nature can act on any patient of the same nature. Therefore the first extremes of the commensurate relation of the active thing to the passive thing are common to all the per se extremes of that relation; for among those most common things is adequacy, because anything that the nature of one is in has regard to anything that the nature of the other is in. But the first extremes of the commensurate relation of cause to effect are not most common, because there is no adequacy between them; for not anything contained under what is common has respect to the habit as to its effect, but only some first object or content does, which virtually respects or contains everything that the habit extends itself to.

149. To the second argument [n.147] I reply that, in the case of many habits differing in species, there can be some common object in the way that from their objects an object that is common can be extracted; and in this way there is a common object designated in the sciences that gives rise to a habit, not one in species, but only one in genus.

150. [On the Parts of Theology] – On the third [n.141] I say that theology not only contains things that are necessary but also things that are contingent. The matter is plain,
because all the truths about God relating to what is extrinsic to him, whether they are about him as triune or about any of the divine persons, are contingent, as that God creates, that the Son is incarnate, and the like; but all the truths about God as triune or as a determinate person are theological, because they have regard to no human science; therefore the first integral parts of theology are two, namely truths necessary and truths contingent.

II. About the Necessary Part of Theology

A. To the First Question, speaking of Theology in itself

151. On the basis of what has been said I give my reply to the first question. And first, speaking of theology in itself as to its necessary truths, I say that the first object of theology in itself cannot be anything but God; which I prove with three reasons. The first is taken from the idea of first object, and I argue thus: the first object contains virtually all the truths of the habit of science of which it is the first object; nothing contains virtually all the theological truths except God; therefore etc. – Proof of the minor: nothing else contains those truths as cause, or as that to which they are attributed, except God, because God is attributed to no other thing; nor does anything contain those truths as an effect does by way of ‘proof that’, for no effect proves that God is triune [cf. n.41], which is the greatest theological truth, or the like truths; therefore etc.48

48 Note by Scotus: “This is valid against the opinion about Christ;” cf. n.134 above and n.173 below.
152. Secondly thus: theology is of things that are naturally known only to the divine intellect, therefore it is of an object naturally known only to God; but only God is naturally known to himself; therefore etc. – Proof of the first proposition: if this science is about things naturally known to another intellect, then there are, in addition to these things, some other things naturally knowable only to the divine intellect, because the divine intellect is infinite and therefore has cognition of more things than a finite intellect; therefore there will still be another science superior to the one that is about things naturally known to a created intellect. – Proof of the minor: every created essence can be naturally known by some created intellect; therefore only an uncreated essence can be known only by the uncreated intellect.

153. Third thus: in no science is as distinct a cognition or knowledge handed down about any other thing that is not the first object of that science as would be handed down in the science that is about that other thing as about its first object, because in no science is as distinct a cognition handed down about what is not its per se object as about what is its per se object; for then there would be no reason for that subject rather than something else to be its subject. Therefore if God is not here the subject, there is not handed down here as distinct a cognition of him as would be handed down in some other science in which he could be the subject; but he can be the subject in some other science; therefore the latter science would be prior to the former.49

154. Besides these three reasons there are other persuasive considerations.

The first is as follows: theology according to Augustine On the Trinity13 ch.1 n.2 and 14 ch.1 n.3 is in one part of itself wisdom and in another part of itself science; but if it was formally about anything non-eternal, science would be formally about that thing,

49 Note by Scotus: “Note: valid against the opinion about Christ.”
and wisdom would not in any way be about it, because eternal things are not attributed to temporal things.

155. The second one is that the superior part of reason has some perfection corresponding to itself. But if this perfection is about a non-eternal subject as about its first object, since the eternal is not attributed to the non-eternal, the result is that in no way is it about eternal things, and thus neither does it perfect the superior part of reason. Therefore there would be some other intellectual habit nobler than it perfecting that part of reason, which is inappropriate.

156. The third is that, according to Augustine On the Trinity 13 ch.9 n.12 or 14 ch.1 n.3, this science is about things whereby faith is “generated, defended, and strengthened” [cf. n.140], therefore it is about the object which is the same as the first object of faith; but faith is about the first truth; therefore etc.

157. The fourth is that “the most noble science is about the most noble kind of thing,” from Metaphysics 61.1026a21-23 and On the Soul 1.1.402a1-4; but it is conceded that this science is most noble; therefore it ought to be about God as about its object [cf. nn.40, 135].

B. To the Second Question, speaking of Theology in itself

158. From these statements I make reply to the second question [nn.133, 141]. To make it intelligible I posit an example: man is understood as rational animal, as substance, as tame, as noblest of animals. In the first sense he is understood according to his proper quidditative idea, in the second in a general way, in the third per accidens in a property,

50 Interpolation: “But if it is not about eternal things, it does not perfect the superior part of reason.”
in the fourth in relation to something else. But the most perfect knowledge of man cannot
be in relation to something else, because knowledge of relation presupposes knowledge
of what is non-relational or absolute; nor can the most perfect knowledge be about man
under the idea of a property, because knowledge of a property presupposes knowledge of
the subject; nor can it be about man in general or universally, because that is confused or
unspecific knowledge. Therefore the noblest cognition of man is according to his
quidditative idea. Thus one could posit some science of God under the idea of relation to
something extrinsic, in the way that some posit knowledge of him under the idea of
repairer [cf. n.133], or of glorifier, or head of the Church [cf. n. 134]; or one could posit
some science of God under the idea of some attribute, which is a sort of property, in the
way that some posit that knowledge of God under the idea of good [cf. n.137] is this
science; or one could posit some science of him under a general or universal idea [cf.
n.146-147], as under that of being, or infinite being, or necessary being, or some such thing.

159. Argument against all these positions.

First against the one about general idea, for no general concept asserted of God
contains virtually all the properly theological truths that pertain to the plurality of persons;
for if it did, since those general concepts are naturally conceived by us, then the
immediate propositions about those concepts can be naturally known and understood by
us, and through those immediate propositions we would be able to know the conclusions,
and so acquire naturally the whole of theology.

160. Second, because since general concepts are not naturally known only to God,
then neither are the truths included in those general concepts naturally known only to
God; therefore theology, if it was of God under such a general concept, would not be naturally known only to God, the opposite of which was shown in the first question [n.152].

161. Against the other position about the idea of attribute [n.158] one could argue through the same reasons, but I argue nevertheless through certain special reasons.

First, because cognition of a thing according to its essence is the most perfect cognition, according to the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 7.1.1028a36-b2; therefore knowledge of God’s essence is a more perfect cognition of God than is knowledge of any attributable property which is related to his nature as a characteristic of it, according to Damascene *On the Orthodox Faith* 1 ch.4.

162. Second, because if those properties differ really from God’s essence, his essence would be really cause of them; therefore, just as they differ in idea from the essence, so the essence in its idea has the idea of being uncaused but these other properties, although, because of their identity with the essence, they are uncaused, yet, in their formal idea, do not include as a primary datum their own being uncaused.

163. Third, because that thing, according to its own proper idea, seems to be more actual in itself which has a greater repugnance to being communicable with many things extrinsic to it; but communicability with many things extrinsic to it is repugnant to essence in itself and not to any attributable property, except insofar as the property is of the essence, or is the same as that essence as infinite.

If it be said that any property is infinite and therefore incommunicable, on the contrary: its infinity is because of an infinity and identity with the essence as with the root source and foundation of every intrinsic perfection.
164. Against the way also about relations to what is extrinsic [n.158] one can make the same arguments as against the other two ways, but I have special reasons.

First, because relation to what is extrinsic is a relation of reason; but a science that does not consider its subject under its idea as real is not a science of real things, just as neither is logic a science of real things, although it considers things as having second intentions attributed to them; therefore theology would not be a science of real things, which is false.

165. Second, because what is absolute and what is relational do not form a concept that is per se one; therefore a concept that gathers these two into itself is a concept that is per accidens one. But no primary science is of a concept that is per accidens one, because such a concept presupposes the sciences of both its parts; and therefore, if a subalternate science is about anything that is per accidens one, it presupposes the two sciences that separately treat of the parts of the whole. Therefore if theology were of such a per accidens unity, there could be another science prior to it, which would be of a concept that is one per se.

166. Third, no relation to what is extrinsic is shown to belong necessarily to God; therefore nothing theological will belong necessarily to God as he is the subject of theology, which is false. – Proof of the consequence: that which belongs to anything under a reason for inherence that is not necessary does not belong to it necessarily; but every relation to what is extrinsic is of this sort; therefore etc. And thus no theological truth is necessary. And this conclusion is proved by the first and second reasons set down for the first question, namely about the idea of the first subject and about what is naturally known only by God.
167. I concede, therefore, the fourth member [n.158], that is, that theology is of God under the idea by which namely he is this essence, just as the most perfect science of man would be of man if it were of him as he is man, but not if it were of him under some universal or accidental idea.

C. To the First Question, speaking of Our Theology

168. To the first question about our theology [nn.124, 141] I say that when a habit exists in an intellect which gets evidence from the object, then the first object of that habit, as it belongs to the habit, does not only contain the habit virtually but, as known to the intellect, it contains the habit in such a way that the knowledge of the object in the intellect contains, as it is in the intellect, the evidence of the habit. But in a habit that does not get evidence from the object, but gets it caused in some other way, one must not grant that its first object has the two conditions just stated; nay rather one should not grant either condition, because it is just like a habit that would in this respect be about things contingent, which contingent things do not have the first object in either way. To such a habit, then, which does not get evidence from the object, there is given a first subject about some first known thing, that is, some most perfectly first thing, that is, in which the first truths of the habit immediately inhere. – Our theology is a habit which does not get evidence from the object; and also the theology that is in us about necessary theological matters, as it exists in us, does not more get evidence from the known object

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51 Interpolation: “because the intellect knowing such an object can draw out every conclusion or concept of that habit.”
than the theology that is about contingent theological matters does;\textsuperscript{52} therefore to our
theology, as it is ours, one should only give a first known object that has first truths
immediately known about it. That first object is infinite being, because this is the most
perfect concept which we can have about what is in itself the first subject, which subject,
however, has neither foresaid condition, because it does not virtually contain our habit in
itself, and much less does it, as known to us, contain the habit itself. Yet because our
theology about necessary things is about the same as what theology in itself is about,
therefore to it is assigned an object that is first to the extent of containing the truths in
itself, and this object is the same as the first subject of theology in itself; but because it is
not evident to us, therefore it does not contain those truths as it is known to us, indeed
rather it is not known to us.

When you argue, then, that “therefore it is not the first object of our habit” [n.146],
I reply: it is true that it is not a first object that gives evidence to us, but it is a first object
that contains all the truths in itself, naturally fit or capable of sufficiently giving evidence,
were it known.

These things are said to the question, or to the two questions, about the theology
of necessary things [nn.124, 133, 141, 151-168].

III. On Contingent Theology

\textsuperscript{52} Interpolation: “to wit, the fact that God is three and One does not have evidence from the object
known, because we do not know God under the idea of God, but from elsewhere; we believe it
because we find it written. Therefore if you then find a written science of geometry, the object of
geometry would not then contain the written properties as they are seen by my intellect, because it
would not be known to me under the idea of first object; therefore a first object of such a sort should,
with respect to such habit, be assigned as the intellect would assign first those truths to.”
169. But now we must see in the case of contingent theological truths [n.150] what the prime subject is here. And as to these truths I say that no subject contains anything but necessary truths about itself; because, as to contingent truths about itself, it is of itself related to them and to their opposites equally. There is, however, an order in contingent truths, and some contingent truth is true first; and thus that can be posited as first subject of many contingent truths about which is stated first, that is immediately, the predicate of the first contingent truth (which truth is as it were the principle in the order of contingent truths), or the predicates of several first contingent truths, if several are first. But the first subject of the first contingent truth is said to be that which, when seen as such, is naturally seen first to be conjoined with the predicate of that truth, because the first thing known in contingent truths is only known through intuition of the extremes; therefore the first thing one can intuit in which the predicate of the first contingent truth inheres, that is the first subject of all the contingent truths in order.

170. On the basis of these statements I say to the issue in question that the divine essence is the first subject of contingent theology and that, when taken in the very same way as was said before, it is the first subject of necessary theology [n.167]; – and this holds as much of contingent theology in itself the way it is in the divine intellect as it also does of it the way it is in the intellect of the blessed. Of the whole of theology in itself, then, both of God and of the blessed, the first subject is his essence as this essence, the vision of which by the blessed is like what the cognition of being is in metaphysics; and for that reason blissful vision is not theology but a sort of perfect simple apprehension of the subject, which apprehension naturally precedes the science.
171. Of our contingent theology the first subject seems to be the same as it is also of necessary theology, and in the way expounded above [n.168], because it is not the subject as containing – even if it is seen in intuition – but as knowable by us, proximate to that in which, when known in intuition, the predicate of the first evident contingent truth naturally inheres [n.169].

On the contrary: it seems that the Word is the adequate object of contingent theology, both of that theology as it is in itself and of it as it is in the divine intellect, because it is the first subject of all the articles about our reparation.

I reply: some other contingent thing can be first said of the Word, and some other contingent thing of the Holy Spirit, and some other contingent thing of the triune God, namely ‘to create’; therefore the persons will be as it were parts of the subject, just as some necessary things are also first true of the diverse persons.

IV. On Christ as First Object

172. [The Opinion of Bonaventure] From what has been said the refutation of the opinion that posits Christ as first subject\(^{53}\) is plain, because then the necessary truths about the Father and the Holy Spirit – to wit, ‘the Father generates’, ‘the Holy Spirit proceeds’ – would not be theological truths, nor would the contingent truths about them be, to wit ‘the Father creates through the Son’, ‘the Holy Spirit is sent in time visibly and

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\(^{53}\) Bonaventure *On the Sentences* 1 prologue q.1 in corp. (1 7b): “The subject too, to which, as to ‘the integral whole’, all the things determined in this book are reduced is Christ, insofar as he embraces the divine and human nature, or the created and the uncreated, about which are the two first books; and as he is head and members, about which are the two following books. And I take ‘integral whole' in a broad sense, because it embraces many things not only in composition but in union and in order.”
invisibly’; nor the necessary truths about the triune God, as that he is omnipotent, boundless, nor the contingent truths, as that God creates, God governs the world, remits sins,punishes, rewards, and the like. – The proof of all these consequences is that no truth belongs per se to any science unless it be about its first subject, or about a part of it, whether integral or essential, or about something essentially attributed to the subject. It is plain that the Father or the Trinity is not Christ, nor part of him in any of the stated ways, nor anything essentially attributed to Christ; both because since Christ signifies two natures – and that insofar as he is subject, according to those who posit him as subject – it follows that, as having a created nature, he will be essentially prior to the Father and to the Trinity (because an essential attribution is only made to what is essentially prior), which is false; and because Christ even in his divinity does not have any such priority according to which the Father or the Trinity could be attributed to him.

173. Against this opinion too are the reasons placed last in the solution of the second question against the position about relation to what is extrinsic [nn.164-166]. – Against the same is the first reason set down for the solution of the first question [n.151], because the necessary truths about the Father, about the Holy Spirit, and about the Trinity cannot be virtually contained first in Christ, because if the Word had not been made incarnate, those truths would not have been necessary, which is false. The third reason too in the same place [n.153] is valid here, because no knowledge would have been handed down about God except as it is included in Christ; this knowledge is about the Word only and thus is not the most distinct knowledge that could be handed down; therefore some other knowledge prior to it would have to be required.
174. The same point is shown by some of the persuasive reasons there set down [nn.154-156], because the unity which belongs to Christ as he is one supposit in two natures is not an eternal unity; but it would be necessary to assert that formal unity of the first subject; therefore the first subject as first is not something eternal only.

The persuasive reason about faith seems also to be conclusive; for it is not a theological belief or truth that this man was crucified, as it does not in the subject term implicate the Word, because the Jews were able naturally to see this man on the cross. But it is a theological belief and truth that the Word was a man born of a Virgin, that the Word was a man crucified, that the Word was a man rising from the dead, and so on about the articles pertaining to his humanity; but as for those that pertain to his divinity, it is plain that they do not belong first to Christ as he is Christ, but some to the other persons, some to the Trinity.

Therefore the adequate object of theology is not Christ but something that is as it were common both to the Word, about whom primarily are believed the articles pertaining to reparation, and to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, about whom are some other theological truths.

175. It seems then that one must say that things are like the way they are in medicine, on the supposition that the human body is the first subject about which health and sickness are there considered as the property: if the kinds of human body were body mixed thus and so, to wit blooded body, phlegmatic body, etc., this whole thing, healthy blooded body, would not there be the first subject, both because it is too particular and also because it includes the need to consider a property about the subject, and a property

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54 In the position of Bonaventure, see the previous footnote
55 Again in the position of Bonaventure.
cannot be the nature of the subject, because a subject, as it is subject, is naturally prior to its property, and thus a property would be prior to itself. And in brief, whatever might be said about any medicine handed down that was about such a subject, although this subject was a particular and a per accidens being, it would at any rate be impossible for the first science of the body of man to be about a healthy blooded body. Nay rather, if there were a science about it, some other science would be prior: either about the body of man in general, because it has in its generality certain knowable properties that belong to it in its general nature, in the way it is prior to the things that come under it; or about blooded body, whose nature is naturally prior to healthy blooded body, and this prior nature virtually contains the other properties; or about the healthy body of man, because its nature precedes healthy blooded body. Thus also is it in the proposed case. Christ signifies the Word-man, according to Damascene [De Fide Orthodoxa 3 ch.4]; therefore before knowledge about Christ as about the first subject there would naturally be another prior knowledge about the Word, if there are things present in Christ by reason of the fact he is the Word, and there would, before that knowledge, be another knowledge about God as to what is present in him by reason of God as God is common to the three persons.

176. Therefore, if we hold theology to be in itself a first knowledge, it will not be first about Christ; and if it is equally about truths common and proper to the three persons, it would not be about any person as about some adequate subject, but about God as God is common to the three persons. And then the thesis will be saved that either every theological truth is about the first subject, to wit any truth that is in God by reason of God, or is about a subjective part, as it were, of the first subject, to wit any truth that is properly in one of the persons, or is about what is attributed to the first subject or to a part
as it were of the subject, to wit about the creature as to the relation it has to God as he is God, and about the assumed nature as to the relation it has to the Word who sustains it [n.172].

177. [The Opinion of Lincoln]56 – However Christ is in another way posited as the prime subject according to Lincoln in his The Work of Six Days, and this way is that in which Christ is one by a triple unity, of which the first is unity with the Father and the Holy Spirit, the second the unity of the Word with the assumed nature, the third the unity of Christ the head with his members.

And on behalf of this opinion about Christ seems to be the first reason and the second to last reason set down for the first question [nn.151, 156], because the seven articles of the faith that pertain to Christ’s humanity57 are not contained in God as subject, because they do not belong to him by nature of his divinity. However that subject does contain the property by whose form the property is present in him. But Christ does contain those articles, because they are present in him according to his humanity, and really so present; he also contains the other articles pertaining to his divinity,58 because they are seen to be present in him according to his divinity.

56 Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln, The Work of Six Days ch.1: “...And this is the one subject of this wisdom [theology] which the Savior expresses in John when he says: ‘And that they too may be one in us’... Consider what is said, how the ‘one’ by which we are one with the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit – which is also expressed in John when he says ‘And that they too may be one in us’ – seems to bind together in itself the ‘one’ of the substance of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and the ‘one’ of the union of the two natures in the person of Christ, and the ‘one’ whereby we are one in Christ, and ‘one’ by the renewal of the Spirit of our mind with the Supreme Trinity!”

57 These seven (from the Creed) are: conceived by the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, descended into hell, rose again from the dead on the third day, ascended into heaven, will come again to judge the living and the dead.

58 These seven articles are: I believe in one God, Father Almighty, and in Jesus Christ his only Son our Lord, I believe in the Holy Spirit, creator of heaven and earth, forgiveness of sins, resurrection of the body and life everlasting.
178. A confirmation is that the subjects of the parts of the doctrine should be contained under the subject of the whole of it, either as subjective parts or as integral parts; the subjects of the parts of Scripture are not thus contained under God. The thing is proved by many glosses at the beginnings of books, assigning as their material causes certain things that are not anything in God, to wit, a gloss on Hosea says that the matter of Hosea is ‘the ten tribes’.

179. Again, third: in some places of Scripture nothing proper to God is narrated, because no fact is there narrated where anything is required on the part of God save only his general influence; therefore such a book is not about God.

180. To the first argument [n.177] I say that the contingent truths asserted of Christ are not contained virtually in any subject in the way a subject is said to contain a property, because then those truths would be necessary; yet they do have a subject of which they are immediately and primarily said, and that subject is the Word, for the theological truths about the incarnation, nativity, passion, etc. are these: ‘The Word became man’, ‘the Word was born a man’, ‘the Word suffered as man’ etc.

When you say that ‘the property is present according to his human nature’, I reply that humanity is not the first idea in the subject wherein the resolution of the property rests, but is as it were a prior property, which mediates between the first subject of those truths, which is the Word, and the other later properties, as ‘born’ etc. It is plain that humanity cannot be the idea of the subject in its relation to the first property, which is ‘was incarnate’, because that property is said of the Word without humanity being pre-understood as present in it as in a subject; this is the first reason.
181. To the second [n.178] I say that it would be enough if the attribution of the parts of the science to the first subject is of the sort that the attribution to God can be saved in respect of any matter assigned by the glosses. Otherwise put: God is the matter of any book at all that narrates there about him how he governed the human race; the race or person governed, however, is the remote matter. The glosses are to be understood in this way.

182. Hereby is clear the response to the third [n.179], that although there be some book containing no miracle of God, yet any book contains God’s providence and government of man in general or of a determinate race or person, so much so that if Moses writes about Pharaoh in Exodus the same history as some Egyptian writes in the Egyptian Chronicles, the subject of Moses’ history is God, whose government of man is treated of there, in his merciful liberation of the oppressed Hebrews, in his just punishment of the Egyptian oppressors, in his wise ordering of an appropriate form of liberation, and in his performing, with a view to making the liberated people receive the law with joy, so many signs proper to himself. But the subject of the Egyptian historiographer’s history would be the kingdom, or the king, or the Egyptian people, whose actions and the events that happen to them he intends to write, such that what God did is incidental to him, but what the race did or suffered is principal. For Moses the principal thing is what God did or permitted, and the matter in which it happened is for him as it were incidental. And granted that in some places no miracle is narrated, yet that which God permitted, by giving assistance through his ordinary influence and not preventing, is what is principally intended in that book insofar as it is part of Scripture; and the way this thing was fittingly ordered to some good, if it was capable of being so
ordered, or the way it was punished, if it was made, is frequently added in the same or
another book; or if the thing was permitted and not in this place punished, Scripture is not
silent in other places about it in general that it will be punished somewhere else.

V. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question

183. [To the Arguments from the First Way] – To the first argument of the first
question [n.125] I say that the authority states that the matter of this science, not the first
and formal subject of it, is things and signs and the like.

184. To the second [n.126] I say that whatever sense is not literal in one part of
Scripture, is literal in another part of Scripture; therefore, although any part of Scripture
may have diverse senses, yet Scripture as a whole takes all those senses for the literal
sense.

185. To the third [n.127] I say that the argument is to the opposite conclusion, in
two ways. First, because in moral science and medical science man is posited as subject
for that which contains virtually all the truths of the science. For the human body contains
the idea of health virtually; for that is why the health of man is the sort it is, because the
human body is the sort of complex it is. Likewise, the soul of man contains the idea of
natural felicity virtually, as is clear in *Ethics* 1.9.1097b22-98a20, where the idea of the
natural felicity of man is deduced from the soul, or from the idea of the soul. It is not in
this way that man contains the idea of the end of this science (of theology), because
supernatural felicity or the object of this science is not included in the idea of man; and
therefore man cannot be the first object of this science; therefore etc.
186. Second thus: man is the final end of the sciences just mentioned, and to this end both health and natural felicity are ordered. The proof is that all love of concupiscence presupposes love of friendship [2 d.6 q.2 n.3]; but health and felicity are loved with love of concupiscence; therefore what is loved with love of friendship by him who has love of concupiscence is a further end beyond any of these ends. Such a further end is the body, on one side, and the soul, on the other. Therefore if man in his body or soul is the subject of this science, it follows that his end is the subject of this science.

187. To the fourth [n.128] I say that the first proposition is false, because the fact that nothing else is the end of a science except what, by its own act, attains the object of the science is not because it induces some form in the object by its act, for science is not a quality for making things.

188. [To the Arguments from the Second Way] – To Boethius [n.129] I say that he is speaking of subject in the sense of subject of an accident, not in the sense of subject of study.

To the text from the Physics [n.130] I say that it means matter in the sense of matter ‘from-which’, for this matter and the efficient cause do not coincide, and not that it means the matter ‘of-which’ or ‘about-which’. Or better, one should say that the subject of a science with respect to truth does not belong to the genus of material cause but to the genus of efficient cause; yet the subject of a science is said to be its matter by a certain likeness to the act of making, where the idea of the object ‘about-which’ comes together with the idea of the susceptible matter, because the act of making is a doing that passes over to something outside it. Things are not like this in the case of the proper act of a science; still, a science is understood to pass over, because it does not terminate in itself.
but in that about which it is, although it is not received in the ‘about-which’ but remains in the knower. And on account of this one property of matter, namely ‘to be that about which’, the object is said to be the matter in relation to the science and to its act.  

189. To the text of the Posterior Analytics [n.131] I say that the object of any science naturally discovered is something universal; therefore the subject of such a science should have subjective parts. But of this science (of theology) the object is this essence here (sc. God) as a singular, because it is a mark of imperfection in universal created nature that it is divided among many singulars; once this imperfection has been removed, the result is that this essence is knowable without divisibility of it into subjective parts. Yet it could be said that the divine persons are a sort of subjective parts of the divine essence itself; but the essence itself is not numerically multiplied in them the way it is in other and imperfect things, where the subject is divisible into many parts.  

190. As to the point that is added about properties [n.131], some say that the attributes are a sort of properties of the essence itself. But this does not hold, because any attribute as this can properly be known of God theologically, while any attribute as known confusedly is known of him metaphysically. For just as God taken in this way and in that, that is, as this and as confusedly known, pertains to the theologian on the one hand and to the metaphysician on the other, so too does any attribute pertain to them when taken in this way and when taken in that.  

As to what is added about the property being outside the essence of the subject [n.131], this is true when the property is really

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59 Interpolation: “because the artisan works on something, and in that same thing his making is received; by reason of the first is the object said to be the matter in a science, not by reason of the second, because the act of a science does not pass over [sc. into something else].”

60 Text canceled by Scotus: “because a consideration of attributes naturally known to us is a metaphysical consideration, save when there are some attributes that belong per se only to this essence as this and not to it as it is now naturally known by us, namely confusedly.”
caused by the object; but in the deity that which has the nature of a property is not caused, because it passes over into essence by way of identity; yet, as far as its knowability is concerned, it is known through the idea of the essence as if it were really distinct from the essence.

191. As to what, third, is said about the principle of the subject [n.131], I say that it is not necessary that the principles of the subject as knowable be principles of the subject as it is in itself, because in the case of being qua being, which is set down as the subject of metaphysics, there are no principles, because then they would be principles of any being whatever; but what is necessary is that in the case of any subject whatever there are principles by which its properties are demonstrated of it, and from these principles, as from the means of demonstration, propositional principles are formed, such as are the self-evident principles. In this way there can be principles of any subject whatever, insofar as the subject is the principle-without-principle in relation to its properties. 61

VI. To the principal Arguments of the Second Question

192. To the first argument of the second question, when the argument through Hugh of St. Victor and Cassiodorus is made [nn.133-134], the response is that they are speaking here, not of the formal object, but of the proximate matter which is more

61 Interpolation: "On the contrary, the principles of being and of knowing are the same, Metaphysics 2.1.993b30-31; if therefore something has principles of knowing then it has principles of being. The principles of being are said not to be complex but in-complex, and from these are formed the propositions which are the principles of knowing; but the first cause lacks a principle of being, though not of knowing, because some things belong to it in a prior way and through these are posterior things known."
extensively dealt with in Scripture, because of the more immediate order to the end they are holding to.

193. To the second [n.135] I say that metaphysics is not about God as about its first subject. The proof is that, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science in which are proved all the things that are common to the special ones; therefore, in addition to the special sciences, there needs to be some common science about being, in which the knowledge of the properties of being are dealt with, which knowledge is presupposed in the special sciences; if then there is some science about God there is, in addition to it, some naturally known science about being insofar as it is being.

But when it is proved through the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics* [n.135] that the science of metaphysics is about God, I say that his argument thus concludes: ‘the noblest science is about the noblest class of things’, whether as first subject or as considered in that science in the most perfect way in which, in any naturally acquired science, it can be considered.62

194. To the Commentator on the *Physics* [n.136] I say that Avicenna – whom the Commentator contradicts – spoke well and the Commentator badly. The proof is: first, that if the existence of any separate substances were a presupposition in the science of metaphysics and a conclusion in natural science, then physics would be simply prior to the whole of metaphysics, because physics would show the ‘whether it exists’ about the subject of metaphysics, which fact is presupposed to the whole knowledge of the science

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62 Interpolation: “because the properties of being that are convertible with being are known supremely about any being, then knowledge of the more nobly distinct properties of a being, which knowledge divides them to the same supreme belonging, is the most noble that can naturally be had of God; but all this knowledge is metaphysics, because that which has the job of considering a property in general about a subject in general has the job of knowing the same property supremely about the same subject in particular.”
of metaphysics. – Second, that a proof can be given about the existence of a cause through any condition of the effect that could not exist in the effect unless the cause existed; but many properties are considered in metaphysics that can only be present in beings from some first cause of such beings; therefore, on the basis of such properties, metaphysics can demonstrate that there is some first cause of those beings. The proof of the minor is that the multitude of beings, their dependence, composition, and the like – which are the properties of metaphysics – show that there is something that is simple in its actuality, altogether independent, and necessarily existent. Also, the existence of a first cause is much more perfectly shown from the properties of caused things considered in metaphysics than from the natural properties by which is shown that there is a first mover; also it is a more perfect and more immediate knowledge of the first being to know it as first being, or as necessarily existent, than to know it as first mover.

195. To the other citation [n.137] I say that relation to an end is not the noblest idea of knowledge but that which the end is – as being the idea of the foundation of that relation – is the noblest idea; but the deity is the founding idea of the relation of end for creatures; therefore the deity will be the first object, which I concede. And thus proceeds the argument to the opposite.

But when the proof from the *Metaphysics* about the good is given [n.137], I say that if the good, by a certain appropriateness, is foundation of the end, still the deity is the root and first foundation of it. But the consequence is good: ‘if there is no final end, then there is no good’, because if there is no perfect good there is no good; but no good is perfect which is ordered to some further good, because a good of this sort has a diminished goodness. However it is not necessary that goodness be the proper idea of end
itself, but essence is more proper and fundamental. Hereby is it clear, in respect of the remark of Avicenna on the *Metaphysics* [n.137], that the remark must be understood, not of the end, but of the fundamental idea in respect of the end.

VI. To the Third Question

A. Opinion of Others

196. To the third question [n.139] it seems that it can probably be said that theology is not about all knowables, because quiddities distinct from the divine essence as it is this singular essence contain first many truths virtually about themselves. The proof is that, after everything else per impossibile has been removed, these quiddities, if they were uncreated, would still contain such truths, as is clear of line and number with respect to the immediate propositions about them. And, accordingly, one could set down that in the divine intellect there were habits distinct in idea, I mean habits of science, namely: theology would be the one that the divine essence as this essence would cause in the divine intellect, while geometry in his intellect would be the one that was in his intellect by virtue of line, and arithmetic in this way by virtue of number, and so on about others.

197. Against this in three ways:

First, because the divine intellect would be cheapened by reason of the fact that it would be opened up by an object other than its essence; for in the instant of nature in

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63 The opinion of Henry of Ghent.
64 Again the opinion of Henry of Ghent.
which it understood line, it would still be in a state of potentiality with respect to knowing the truths that exist in line – and it recognizes those truths by virtue of the quiddity of line – , therefore line would as it were be the efficient cause imprinting the knowledge of those truths on the divine intellect, and so line will be the mover of the divine intellect.

198. Second thus: the first object of every power that is made actual by diverse objects through their per se proper virtue is something that is common to those objects; but if line, by virtue of itself, caused truth in the divine intellect, by equal reason other things too will cause truth in God’s intellect, and so the first object of the divine intellect will be common being, not his own singular essence. Nor is it an objection here that other objects are attributed to his essence; for thus are other beings attributed to substance, and yet the first object of our intellect is being.

Third, because if his essence is the first object, it is clear that it is not first by commonness of predication; therefore it will be first by virtual-ness. But it would not be the first object virtually if anything else were to effect, in accord with its own virtue, a change in his intellect.

B. Scotus’ own Response

200. [About divine theology] – Therefore I say differently that divine theology is about all knowables, because the first object of God’s theology makes everything else actually to be known in his intellect, such that, if in the first moment of nature his essence is known first in his intellect, and in the second moment of nature the quiddities are
known that contain virtually their own truths, in the third moment are known to him the truths that are virtually contained in those quiddities; if this is so, the order of the second to the third is not according to causality, as if those quiddities caused something in his intellect, but there is only an order of effects ordered in respect of the same cause, to wit, that his own essence causes those quiddities to be known first in nature, as it were, before the truths about them are known [cf. 1 d.3 p.1 q.4 nn.18-19].

An example: if the sun illuminated some part near itself, and another part more distant from the sun was only capable, on account of its opacity, of being illuminated by the sun, the sun, and not the part first illuminated, would illuminate that distant part; the order, however, between the near and distant part would be like the order of effects of the same cause, and yet it would not be an order of the cause to the effect, because the illuminated part performs no action on the dark distant part.

So it is in the proposal. The essence of God in his own intellect makes other quiddities to be actually known, and later as it were it naturally makes the truths contained in them to be known to his intellect; yet those quiddities have no virtue in respect of effecting a change in God’s intellect, because God’s intellect is not of the nature to be perfected by those quiddities, because it is infinite and those quiddities are finite, and the infinite is in no way perfected by the finite.

201. In this way, then, does God have only theological knowledge about all knowables, because he has knowledge only by virtue of the theological object actuating his intellect, such that the theology of God is not only about all things but is also the whole knowledge possible for God about them, and it is absolutely about anything about which there is any knowledge that does not of itself include some imperfection, because
it alone includes no limitation about any knowable at all; but any other knowledge, because it is limited by a cause, necessarily includes a limitation.

202. [On the theology of the blessed] – But as to the created intellects of the blessed things are otherwise, because their intellects are of the nature to be changed by the created quiddities so as to know the truths included in them; and therefore, in addition to the theological truth, which they have about those quiddities as displayed in the divine essence, they can have a natural knowledge of the same things by the proper movement of those things. Therefore the theology of the blessed about certain created things is not the whole knowledge about them which is possible for such intellects.

203. But there is a doubt whether their theology is about everything, although they have some other knowledge about some of the knowables. Here a distinction must be drawn about theology in itself and as it is a habit perfecting the blessed created intellect. In the first way it is about all knowables, because these are all of a nature to be known by virtue of the first theological object; in the second way I say that it is possible for it to be about any knowable, because it is about all knowables, for all the knowables are not infinite. De facto, however, it has no limitation save from the will of God displaying something in his essence; and therefore the knowledge of the blessed is in actuality about all the things that God voluntarily displays in his essence.

204. [On our theology] – About our theology I say that is not about all things, because, just as the theology of the blessed has a limit, so also does ours, from the will of God revealing. But the limit fixed by the divine will as to general revelation is the things that are in divine Scripture, because – as is contained in the last chapter of Revelation –

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65 Interpolation: “because it alone does not include limitation about any object; but any other one, because it is from a limited cause, necessarily includes limitation.”
“he who adds to these things, to him will God add the plagues that are set down in this book.” Therefore our knowledge is de facto only of the things contained in Scripture and of the things that can be elicited from them.

205. About the power of our theology I say that it cannot be about everything, both because of the defect of our intellect, which is not able to conceive specifically many quiddities, – but revelation according to ordinary law is only of things whose terms can commonly be conceived by us naturally, – and because of the defect of our theology, because it cannot stand with evident knowledge of the same knowables, in the opinion of some, and consequently our revealed theology cannot stand with evident knowledge of some things naturally known to us.66

206. [On theology taken all together] – However all theology, whether God’s or the blessed’s or ours, is about all beings as to some things that are knowable about them, namely as to the relations they have to the divine essence as it is this essence, because a relation cannot be known without knowledge of both extremes; and in this way the relation that is to this essence as this cannot be known without knowledge of this essence as it is this.

Thus, then, to speak truly, theology is about everything, and it is all knowledge that does not include imperfection. Therefore to the intellect of God, who cannot have any imperfect knowledge, it is all knowledge, but it is not simply all knowledge, because in addition to it another knowledge can be had about some special quiddity that is moving the created intellect. Also it alone is knowledge of all things as to some knowables, namely as to their relation to this essence as this, provided however this essence as this

66 Possibly a reference to the teaching of, for example, St. Thomas Aquinas that one cannot have knowledge and faith at the same time about the same thing, as say about the existence of God.
terminates some relation of a creature and not under the idea of some attribute naturally intelligible to us. And this perhaps is the reason that we cannot know about the created intellect that it is ordered to this end as it is this, because we cannot know the relation founded in intellectual nature to this essence as to its proper end, because neither can we know the extreme to which it is the relation, and therefore we cannot know the relation of the image of this nature in itself, in the way the saints speak about the image.\textsuperscript{67}

VII. To the principal Arguments of the Third Question

207. To the first argument [n.140] I say that it concludes about theology not in itself but as it is handed down in Sacred Scripture.

\textsuperscript{67} The reference is to man as made in the image of God, as spoken of in particular by Augustine \textit{On the Trinity} 14 ch.8 n.11, 15 ch.27 n.50.
Prologue

Fourth Part

On Theology as a Science

Questions 1 and 2

Whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it is subaltern-ing or subaltern-ed

208. On this matter I examine whether theology in itself is a science, and whether it has toward any other science the relation of making it subaltern to itself or of being subaltern to it.

I. To the First Question

[On theology in itself and in God] – To the first question I say that science taken strictly includes four things, namely: that it be certain knowledge, without deception or doubt; second, that it be about a necessary known thing; third, that it be caused by a cause evident to the intellect; fourth, that it be applied to the thing known by a syllogism or syllogistic discursion.

These things are clear from the definition of ‘know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b9-12. The last condition, namely that science is caused discursively from the cause to the thing known, includes imperfection and also potentiality in the receiving intellect. Therefore theology in itself is not a science as to this last condition of science; but as to the other three conditions it is a science in itself and in the divine intellect.

Interpolation: “on the part of the science, because it is an equivocal effect.”
209. [On the theology of the blessed as it is a science] – But whether as to the fourth condition it is a science as it is in the intellect of the blessed is matter for doubt.

And it seems that it is not, from Augustine On the Trinity XV ch.16 n.26:

“Perhaps there they will not be changeable,” etc., “but we will see our whole science in a single intuition;” therefore the intellect of the blessed is not discursive, and so they will not have science as to that fourth condition of science.

But the opposite seems to be the case, because the quiddity of the subject, in whatever light it is seen, contains of itself virtually the truths that it can make known to the intellect, namely to an intellect that is passive in respect of such an object. Therefore, if the quiddity of line seen in the natural light can make known to our intellect the truths included in itself, it will, by parity of reasoning, also do the same when seen in the divine essence; but every truth caused in our intellect by something that is naturally first known is caused in it discursively, because discursion does not require succession of time or the order of time, but the order of nature, namely that the principle of the discursion is naturally known first, and that in this way it is causative with respect to the second term of the discursion.69

This can be conceded, namely that the blessed can truly have theological science as to all the conditions of science, because all the conditions of science truly concur in the knowledge of it.

The authority of Augustine in On the Trinity [n.209] is not cogent, because he speaks hesitantly with a ‘perhaps’; nor does he intend to assert that point, but that our word will not be equal to the divine Word, however perfect our word may also be. In like

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69 Interpolation: “On the contrary: in this way God knows other things through his own essence previously first known.”
way can be expounded Augustine’s authority about the blessed vision [n.209], which only has respect to the essentialities that are in God.\footnote{Interpolation: “The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.”}

210. [On the science of contingents as a science] – But there is another doubt in that question, because contingent things pertain to theology just as do necessary things \footnote{Interpolation: “because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, \textit{Metaphysics} 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of he necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit ‘God is creative’, ‘God is capable of assuming our nature”; similarly in the case of practical things, ‘God is to be believed’, ‘God is to be loved’, ‘God is to be worshipped’. But of these practical necessities – besides the third – the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as ‘God is Triune’, others are naturally known.”} [n.150]. The thing is clear about our theology, because all the articles about the incarnation are about contingents, even in the theology of the blessed, because everything knowable about God in respect of creatures extrinsically are about contingents. But it does not seem possible for there to be science about contingents, as is clear from the definition of science \footnote{Interpolation: “The argument is made that God would in that case know discursively, since he understands line and the properties that are virtually included in line. Let it be that God understands line according to the requirements of line; but it is not the case that, because line has such requirement, therefore he has such understanding of it, but rather, because he has such understanding, therefore line requires to be so understood, because his science is cause and measure of the thing. However it is not so with the blessed, because the thing, whether in itself or in the Word, is always the cause of our knowledge.”} [n.208]; therefore it seems that the whole of theology, in the way it extends itself to all its contents, cannot have the nature of science, whether it is discursive or not.

211. On this point I say that what belongs to perfection in science is that the knowledge is certain and evident;\footnote{Interpolation: “because science is a necessarily true habit, thus what remains the same cannot be sometimes true and sometimes false, just as neither can it be sometimes science and sometimes not science, \textit{Metaphysics} 7.15.1039b31-40a5; therefore it is necessarily of a necessary object, such that necessity is not only the condition of he necessary object, but is rather intrinsic to the habit itself; not indeed that the habit cannot be destroyed by forgetfulness, but that it cannot not be true, just as a statement cannot be false when it remains the same as what was true before. Therefore absolutely there is no science of what is contingent; but there is most perfect knowledge, because vision remains determinately veridical, which vision does not remain when the object is not present in itself the way science remains, wherefore vision does not have the pre-eminence. I say, therefore, that theology is of necessities about a possible, to wit ‘God is creative’, ‘God is capable of assuming our nature”; similarly in the case of practical things, ‘God is to be believed’, ‘God is to be loved’, ‘God is to be worshipped’. But of these practical necessities – besides the third – the conclusions are purely theological, the third is in some way not necessary; just as some matters of speculation are necessary and purely theological, as ‘God is Triune’, others are naturally known.”} but as to its being about a necessary object, this is a condition of the object, not of the knowledge, because science, to the extent it is of a
necessary object, can be in itself contingent and can be destroyed by being forgotten. If therefore some other knowledge is certain and evident and, as far as concerns itself, perpetual, it seems that it is formally in itself more perfect than a science that requires necessity in its object. But contingents, as they pertain to theology, naturally have a knowledge that is certain and evident and, on the part of the evidence, so far perpetual. The thing is clear, because all theological contingents are naturally seen in the first theological object, and the connection of those contingent truths in that object is naturally seen. But the vision of the extremes of a contingent truth and of their union necessarily causes evident certitude about such an evident truth. As to what concerns also the part of the theological object which displays them, such truths are naturally seen in such a perpetual object, as far as depends on itself. Therefore contingent things, as they pertain to theology, are of a nature to be more perfectly known than an acquired science about necessary things.

212. But can knowledge of them be a science? I say that according to the idea of science posited in the *Posterior Analytics* [n.208], which requires necessity of the object, there cannot be science of them, because to know a contingent thing as necessary is not to know it as contingent; yet, according to the way the Philosopher takes science in *Ethics* 6.3.1139b15-18, as divided against opinion and suspicion, there can very well be a science of them, because it also is a habit whereby we say something determinately true.

213. [On science as it is wisdom] – More properly, however, it can be said that theology is wisdom in itself, because it has evidence and necessity and certitude about the necessary things contained in it, and its object is most perfect and highest and noblest. But, as to contingent things, it has manifest evidence about the contingent things that are
seen in themselves as they exist in the theological object, and it does not have evidence begged from other things prior to them; hence the knowledge of contingents, as it is possessed in theology, is assimilated rather to the understanding of principles than to the science of conclusions.

II. To the Second Question

214. To the second question [n.208] I say that this science is not subaltern to any science, because although its subject is in some way under the subject of metaphysics, yet it does not receive any of its principles from metaphysics, because no theological property is demonstrable in metaphysics through the principles of being or through reasoning taken from the idea of being.

Nor does this science make any other science subaltern to it, because no other science takes from it its principles, for anything else in the genus of natural knowledge has its resolution ultimately to some immediate principles that are naturally known.

215. On the contrary: resolution does not stop at knowables unless the knowable is the most perfect, nor does it stop there unless that knowable is most perfectly known; line is more perfectly known in the Word than by way of its own movement; therefore the resolution of conclusions about line does not stop save at the quiddity of line, or at the principles about it, as these are seen in the Word. But that resolution is had by seeing the Word. Therefore the resolution of any conclusions and principles whatever stops at the vision of the Word. Therefore that vision makes the other knowledges, to all of which it gives evidence, subaltern to itself.
216. To this I reply that although a metaphysician who knows distinctly the quiddity of line or of whole may more perfectly know some immediate principle about line or about whole than a geometer does, who only knows line and whole confusedly, yet that immediate proposition is known per se to the geometer. Nor is his proof made through the metaphysician’s proposition, provided that the truth of the combination or connection of the terms is from his confused concept evident; the only thing is that the metaphysician has a more perfect knowledge of that same per se known truth; this would be all the more so if it was only through diverse motives that line was known from diverse things and from the side of the object with equal distinctness albeit not with equal clarity.

So it is in the proposed case. An immediate principle about line can be evident to an intellect that is moved by line, and more clearly evident to an intellect moved by the Word to knowledge of line as line is more clearly seen; yet a principle known in one way does not prove itself to be known in another way, but it is known ‘by itself’ in both ways, although more clearly thus or thus. But subalternation requires that the knowledge of the principles of the higher science be the cause of knowing the principles of the lower science, etc.  

Interpolation: “This about theology in itself. But what about theology of the way? Would it be subalternate if such knowledge were to be given to someone or if it has been given? – To this some say [Aquinas, Henry of Ghent] that it is subalternate; for it is subalternate to the science of God and the blessed. – Against this it is argued first in this way: these people say elsewhere that science cannot stand with faith; but, as they say, because it is subalternate, it does stand with faith; therefore, according to them, it stands and does not stand, so they contradict themselves. – Besides, the science of God can only be single; therefore none can be subalternate. – Besides, science, according to the idea of its cause, depends only on the object or the subject or the light; but the vision of the blessed possesses no idea of cause with respect to the intellect of the wayfarer; therefore etc. – Besides, a subalternating science is not first about the same truths or the aforesaid known things, because a subalternated science begins there where the subalternating science ends; but this science can be of the same things as is the science of the blessed; therefore etc. – Besides, he who has the subalternated science is capable of having the subalternating science; in the proposed case neither of these is possible; therefore etc. The major is plain as to both parts: first, because he who has the
principles about a conclusion can know the conclusion; the second is likewise plain, because the
principles of the subalternating science are more universal and thus, in the order of intellectual
cognition, they are known first, because there a second of this sort does not proceed from things
more known but from sense. The minor is also plain as to both members: just as the wayfarer cannot
see clearly, so neither can the blessed have sense.”
Prologue

Fifth Part

On Theology insofar as it is a Practical Science

Question 1

Whether theology is a practical or a speculative science

217. The question is whether theology is a practical or a speculative science.

Proof that it is not practical:

Because in John 20.23 it is said: “These things are written that you might believe;” to believe is something speculative, because on it vision follows; therefore etc.

218. Besides, practical science is set down as being about the contingent, On the Soul 3.10.433a26-30 and Ethics 1.2.1094b7, 21-22; but the object of this science is not contingent, but necessary; therefore etc.

219. Again, Boethius On the Trinity ch. 2 assigns three parts to speculative science, one of which is theology according to him; and it seems he is speaking about theology in the present sense, because about its subject he there adds that its subject is the first substance, of which he says that “God’s substance lacks matter.”

220. Again, nobler than any practical science is some speculative science; but no science is nobler than this science [of theology]; therefore etc. The proof of the first proposition is both that speculative science is for its own sake while practical is for the sake of use, and that speculative science is more certain, from Metaphysics 1.2.982a14-16, 25-28.
221. Again, after all necessary sciences were in existence, this science was invented for escaping ignorance, as is clear because concern with necessities is an impediment to the investigation of this doctrine; therefore it is a speculative science. For in this way does the Philosopher argue in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a19-25, that metaphysics is speculative.

222. On the contrary:

*Romans* 13.10: “The end of the law is love.”

Again, Matthew 22.40: “On these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets.”

Again, Augustine *On the Praise of Charity, Sermon* 350 n.2: “He who keeps charity in morals possesses whatever is hidden and whatever is plain in the divine words.”

But these authorities prove that this science is not precisely for speculation, but speculative science seeks nothing beyond speculation, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 1.1 (70ra) (examine him there).

**Question 2**

*Whether a science is called practical per se from order to action as to its end*

223. Second, the question is whether a science is called practical *per se* from order to action [praxis] as to its end.
I argue that it is:

In *On the Soul* 3.10 433a14-15 the Philosopher says: “The intellect becomes practical by extension, and differs from the speculative in its end.”

224. Again in *Metaphysics* 1.2.982a14-16 he says: “The practical is less noble than the speculative, because it is for the sake of use.” This argument would not hold unless use was the end *per se* of that habit.

225. Again in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 he says: “The end of the speculative is truth, but the end of the practical is work.”

226. On the contrary:

In *Metaphysics* 6.1.10225b18-28 the Philosopher distinguishes practical sciences from speculative by their objects, as is plain; for he there distinguishes practical science, both active and productive, from speculative by its object and not by its end.

Again, in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a3-15 he distinguishes the calculative from the scientific by the necessary and contingent object; therefore science is practical *per se* from its object; therefore not from action as from its end.

Again, in *On the Soul* 3.10.433a26-30 he assigns good as the object of the practical, not any good but doable and contingent good; therefore science is practical *per se* from its object; not therefore from action as from its end.

227. To solve these questions I take one general thing that is conceded by everyone, namely that the practical habit is in some way extended to action. One must consider therefore in particular: first, what the action is to which practical knowledge is said to be extended; second, in what way practical knowledge is extended to that action; third, by what thing knowledge has such extension.
I. What Action [Praxis] is

228. I say first, then, that the action to which practical knowledge is extended is the act of some power other than the intellect, naturally posterior to the intellect, of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right intellect so as to be right.

The first condition is clear, because when one stops precisely at acts of the intellect there is no extension of the intellect, because it does not tend beyond itself unless its act has regard to the act of another power.

And if you say that one act of the intellect is extended to another, being directed by it, the second act is not for this reason action as we are now speaking of action, nor is the first knowledge practical, because then logic would be practical, because it directs in acts of discursive thought.

229. The second condition is plain, because acts not having an order to the intellect, of which sort are vegetative acts, and acts naturally preceding the intellect, as sense acts, are not called actions, nor is practical knowledge said to be extended to them in the way these are prior to understanding. Similarly, the act of the power of sense appetite, insofar as it precedes the act of the intellect, is not action; for it is in this way common to us and to the brutes. Nor is any knowledge practical in respect of these acts, unless it in some way moderates them and these acts follow the understanding moderating them qua being moderated by it.

230. From these two conditions follows a corollary, namely that the action to which the practical habit is extended is only an elicited or commanded act of the will, for
no other act coming from understanding or beside understanding is essentially posterior to understanding, for any other given act, which is of the same nature as it is, could be prior to it, as is plain by running through the acts of all the powers.

231. This fact is plain, second, in this way, that action is an act that is in the power of the knower. The proof is from *Ethics* 6.5.1140b22, that the artisan needs a virtue for acting rightly; but he does not need a virtue with respect to what is not in his power; therefore the artisan has the act of making in his power; much more does the prudent man have action in his power, because he is virtuous in his very form. From this follows further: if all action is in the power of the knower, and if nothing is in the power of the will save either an elicited or commanded act, the proposition intended follows as before [n.230].

232. Against this condition is that the consequence seems to be that then any intellection will be action, because any intellection can be an act commanded by the will the way the act of other powers is commanded by the will. And in that case it follows further that therefore the first condition is false, namely that action is the operation of a power other than the intellect. – I reply: although speculation is a certain operation and so, in an extended sense, is an action, yet, in the way action is said to be only the operation to which the intellect can be extended, no understanding is action; and this is the way action is taken when practical knowledge is said to be extended to action. When, therefore, it is argued that ‘understanding is commanded by the will, therefore it is action’, the consequence does not hold, but what holds is ‘therefore it is action or practical’; for it has the nature to be denominated practical accidentally, as it were, because of the action to which it can be extended; but it cannot be the term of such extension. Yet, on the other
hand, I do well concede that all action is an elicited or commanded act of the will. Hence, to infer from this second condition the opposite of the first condition is to commit the fallacy of the consequent, by asserting the consequent.\textsuperscript{73} \textsuperscript{74}

233. Proof of the third condition. First from the remark of the Philosopher in \textit{Ethics} 6.2.1139a22-25, that right choice necessarily requires right reason. This remark is not only true of choice taken strictly but, by parity of reason, of any right volition, because it requires the right reason in conformity with which it is elicited; but all action either is volition or follows volition, from the preceding corollary [n.230]; therefore all action, for the purpose of being right, is naturally elicited in conformity with right reason. Second from the remark of Augustine \textit{On the Trinity} XV ch.5 n.10, ch.7 n.13, that the intellect performs acts of understanding for itself and for the other powers. Therefore, just as it can pass judgment on its own act, so it can on the acts of the others; therefore on an act naturally posterior to its own act it can naturally pass judgment before that posterior act is elicited; and consequently, if the intellect judges rightly, that act, if it has to be right, must be elicited in conformity with that judgment.

From the two final conditions of action [nn.228, 229, 233] it follows that an act commanded by the will is not primarily but as it were \textit{per accidens} action, because it is not primarily posterior to understanding nor is it primarily of a nature to be elicited in conformity with right reason. Some other act, then, must be primarily action; this act is

\textsuperscript{73} That is, from ‘if an act is action, then it is an elicited or commanded act of the will’ one asserts ‘understanding is a commanded act of the will’ and then concludes ‘therefore understanding is action’, which is the fallacy of the consequent.

\textsuperscript{74} Interpolation: “Note, intellection is either commanded by the will or is directive or not; if it is not, then it is purely speculative; if it is, either it is directive as a logical intention directs an act of discoursing or of denominating (which is an act of the intellect following an act of simple intelligence and an act of forming complexes, which is to combine and divide), and such is still speculative; or it is directive of an act of will, and then it is practical; but it is not praxis in the way it is being taken here, namely not for any operation whatever but for such an operation as the intellect is of a nature to be extended to by taking extension properly.”
nothing but volition, because through volition the commanded act has the said conditions; therefore the first idea of action is found in an elicited act of the will.

And then further: whenever something that is conjoined to another is primarily of a certain sort, it would still be of that sort if it could be separated from that other; therefore if the act of will can be separated from the act of the other power, it will be action when separated from that posterior act. But it is separate with respect to whatever can be the object of an act of will with respect to which there cannot be an act of another power, and of this sort are all immaterial things; therefore an act of will is about every such thing, and it alone is action.

235. Second, the same is proved from the intention of the Philosopher On the Soul 3.10.433a17-18, where, in his inquiry about the first mover, after he has concluded that there are two movers, namely will or appetite and reason, he subjoins: “The intellect does not move without appetite, for will is appetite.” And next he says that two appetites are sometimes contrary to each other; therefore he is positing as it were one species of mover, because common to the two appetites is the nature of the species that mediates between them, namely the nature of appetite. His meaning expressly, then, is that just as the sense appetite has the nature of a mover along with sense and imagination, so the will has the nature of a moving principle along with intellect and reason. Therefore, just as an act of sensitive appetite without any transition to what is extrinsic is truly action when it follows an act of intellect, so the act of will that is posited as equally a moving principle will truly be action, for it always follows an act of intellect; and it is action even if it is on its own without a commanded act, nay even if it is with an act in sense appetite opposed to the act
which it commands, because, although it has that sometimes opposed appetite, it is itself a moving and operating principle, whose operation is action.

II. How Practical Knowledge is Extended to Action

236. From this article [nn.228-235] the second [n.227] is plain, for this extension consists in a double aptitudinal relation, namely of conformity and of natural priority; as to priority, it is plain from what has already been adduced from the Ethics [nn.231, 233]; about conformity there is what is contained in the same place, when he says: “truth in practical consideration is conformity to correct appetite.”

237. I said ‘aptitudinal’ because neither relation is required to be actual. For the fact that an action in conformity with consideration actually follows the consideration is altogether accidental to the consideration and is contingent;\(^75\) for if it were called action from actual extension, no action would necessarily be practical, but the same action would sometimes be practical, sometimes theoretical, which nothing is; therefore a double aptitudinal extension or aptitude for extension is enough.\(^76\)

A clarification of this is that practical knowledge is commonly conceded to be extended to action as director to directed or as regulator to regulated. But knowledge’s being naturally prior to action and conformed to it is not its being conformed to action as

\(^75\) Interpolation: “On the contrary: of necessity an act of intellect is prior to an act of will actually, which you set down as the first action. – True, but it does not necessarily follow thereon about the act of will actually that is action.”

\(^76\) Interpolation: “On the contrary: in that case any knowledge would be practical, because on any knowledge there is aptitudinally apt to follow in the will the right volition conform to them which you set down as first action. – One must say that it is not true of volition of a knowable, but of volition of knowledge, and this idea is action. – On the contrary: an aptitude that agrees with one nature and is repugnant to another is not seen save through something intrinsic to it; therefore it is necessary to explain why this conformity to action agrees with this habit and is repugnant to a second. – One must say that this is from its object” [n.252].
to something prior but its making action to be conformed to it as something posterior, or its being what action is to be conformed to, which is what it is for knowledge to direct and rule in action. But as to whether directing and conforming action to itself like this is a certain efficacy in knowledge with respect to action, see 2 Suppl. 25 q. un.

238. From this second article it is plain that the practical and speculative are not essential differences of habit or science or knowledge in general, because ‘practical’ asserts a double aptitudinal respect of knowledge, which knowledge is as it were something absolute, being toward action as toward its term, and the speculative takes away this double respect; but neither the respect nor its privation are of the essence of what is absolute, but are as it were a division of the genus through the proper features of the species, as would be the case if number were divided into odd and even and line into curved and straight. For to one of the knowledges the practical per se belongs in the second mode of per se, from the predicate’s intrinsic cause in the subject, and to the other knowledge the speculative so belongs. 77

III. From what Source Knowledge gets its Extension to Action

239. [First opinion] – About the third article [n.227] there exist opinions one of which is of this sort, that the intellect is called practical from one thing, and the act or habit is called practical from another. It is as follows: truth that is doable and that is not

77 Text cancelled by Scotus: “A confirmation of this reason is that some practical knowledge agrees more by essential agreement with some speculative knowledge than one speculative knowledge agrees with another. – On the contrary: the distinction of knowledges by their objects is essential. – I reply: the first distinction, which is according to essential differences, is essential and from the objects as from extrinsic causes, but there can from the same differences be some posterior non-essential distinction.”
doable are specific objects, formally diverse, and so they distinguish _per se_ the things that have a _per se_ respect to them, namely act and habit, which are called practical because they concern something doable; but the intellect is only called practical if it is operative, and only the intellect that apprehends an order toward doing is of this sort. But it does not apprehend this order unless it is moved by appetite for the end, so that the practical intellect includes in its act, not formally by the essence of the act but by connotation, an order that is necessarily toward desire, a desire explicitly of the end and implicitly of the things for the end; wherefore, since the ordering of an object of speculation toward doing is accidental to that object (although the object’s being capable of being so ordered is not accidental to it), the difference, which flows from this, between the speculative and the practical intellect will be accidental and in respect of something extrinsic to the intellect, although the difference of the habits and acts is formal in accord with the formal difference of doable and non-doable objects. Hence in _On the Soul_ 3.10.433a14-15 it is said that the speculative and practical intellect differ in their end, and in _Ethics_ 6.3.1139a29-31 that: “The good of the practical intellect is truth in conformity with correct appetite.”

240. An example: the speculative intellect apprehends health as a fitting good, the appetite desires it, and there follows in another way the consideration of the practical intellect that health is to be acquired. With the desire for the end in place, then, the practical intellect proceeds discursively from the principle ‘that by which health can be better acquired is to be procured’, and its discursive process ends at the final conclusion of deliberation; and the whole discursive process, just as it takes its principle from apprehension of the desired end, which is the first object of the practical intellect, so it
does what has been discovered in view of the end, and hence it presupposes will for the end and is ordered to the choice that follows deliberation.

241. Against this opinion – which, to speak briefly, consists in this that it puts the distinction of the practical and speculative intellect in an end that is accidental to the object, but the speculative and practical habit differ and are distinguished by the formal difference of their special objects – the argument is that it is said of the habits in *Metaphysics* 2.1.993b20-21 that: “The end of speculative science is truth, but of the practical it is doing.”

242. Likewise, the practical habit will in that case be in the speculative intellect, and the intellect will not be called practical by that habit, which seems discordant, because every habit denominates its possessor according to the nature of the habit.

243. They reply to the first argument [n.241] that the end of practical science is work potentially and in aptitude, insofar as its object is *per se* doable; but the doable object is considered according to the habit in general, which consideration is not enough for it to be subject to operation in actuality and in particular; because in goods act is better than potency, and so such particular and actual consideration is required; now the consideration is by a habit different from practical science, and that habit alone is in the practical intellect.

To the second argument [n.242] the response is that the habit can be said to be by denomination practical, not simply, but by understanding the denomination to be made from the habit
244. To the contrary: therefore the practical habit and act can exist in the speculative intellect, because a habit and act that are of their nature practical can exist in the intellect without such reference to an act of will of the sort posited.

The consequent would be conceded, but another habit would be posited as capable of being possessed in the practical intellect, a habit generated not only by practical acts but also by acts of the practical intellect.

245. To the contrary: a practical habit generated from practical acts would be enough for the same things as the other habit would be enough for that is generated by acts of the practical intellect, because the will commanding consideration for the sake of such an end does not give any other reason for consideration in acts of directing, nor consequently for a habit generated by considerations.

246. Again, in that case many accidents of the same species will exist in the same thing. For one cannot, on account of order or non-order of the will, posit a specific distinction between this act and that, nor similarly between this habit and that.

247. Again, third, against the opinion in itself [nn.239-240] I argue thus: a subject is denominated more from a per se and essential condition of its accident than from an accidental condition of it; therefore, if the intellect can be called practical from an accidental condition of its habit, to wit from the order of the will ordering its act to something else, much more can it be called practical from the essential order of the act by which the act is said to be essentially practical. Therefore, the intellect seems to be called practical from the same thing as that from which the habit and act are called practical, although of the habit and act it is not said as accidentally as it is said of the intellect, where it has the respect of an accident per accidens.
248. [Second opinion] – Alternatively, it is said that the thing from which habit and act are said to be practical is the end and the extension of practical knowledge to action, which is extension to an end.

On behalf of this opinion are the authorities set down earlier [nn.223-225].

249. There is also argument by reason. First thus: that a habit is said to be practical either from the object or from the end. Not from the proper object because the intellect ‘is made practical by extension’, \(^{78}\) which is only true of the same speculative intellect that is also afterwards practical when extended to work; therefore there can be a speculative and a practical consideration of the same object.

250. Second thus: that medicine is divided into speculative and practical, and yet it is about some object that is the same, as about health or the body capable of health.

251. Again, an act is said to be practical because it is morally good or bad; goodness and badness in morals belongs to an act by its circumstances; but first and chief among the circumstances is the circumstance of the end; therefore etc.

252. Against this position I argue thus: I ask, are habit and act said to be practical because of actual extension to work or are they so only because of an aptitudinal or relational extension to work? Not because of actual extension (as is contained in the second article [nn.236-238] and as they concede), because in that case the workman who is not intending to work would not have practical knowledge; therefore because of aptitudinal extension. But an aptitude which is repugnant to one nature does not belong to another save because of something absolute in such nature; for because this nature is such, therefore such aptitude belongs to it; therefore in its very consideration it presupposes some intrinsic condition by which such aptitude belongs to it. This condition of

\(^{78}\) Interpolation: “with respect to the same object.”
consideration in itself is from another cause prior to it; but the prior causes of it are intellect and the object; therefore the condition belongs to it from the intellect or from some object.

253. If it be said that the end is the prior cause, or rather is the first among all causes, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 6 ch.5 (94va), and so from it can arise the consideration of such a nature so that such an aptitude befits it, on the contrary: the end is not a cause save insofar as, being loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to cause its effect. But the said aptitude belongs to such a consideration whether the end is loved or not. For the said knowledge can exist in the intellect however the will is disposed, even were the will not conjoined with the intellect. And so it is not from the end as from the final cause that the aptitude belongs to the knowledge; for no cause makes a thing to be present that is present when the cause is not causing.

If you say that the end is apt to be loved before the aptitude is present in knowledge, on the contrary: this does not save the intended proposition, because an effect does not get anything causally from a thing on the ground that the thing has the nature to cause if the thing is not actually causing; therefore knowledge does not get an aptitude, or the nature that such aptitude is consequent upon, from an end that is apt to cause if it is not actually causing; nor does it actually cause as a final cause unless, being actually loved and desired, it moves the efficient cause to act; therefore etc

254. Besides, either the end as extrinsically elicited or possessed makes the habit to be practical, or it does so as considered and intended. Not as extrinsically elicited because in this way it is posterior to the habit and is in a way its effect; but an effect does not cause distinctions in a cause. If as considered, in this way it has the nature of the
object; therefore the object causes the distinction. If as intended, this has already been refuted [n.253], because such knowledge exists before the end is naturally intended.\textsuperscript{79}

255. Besides, not every end of practical knowledge is action. For some practical understanding has regard to the action of a lower power, as for example the action of sensitive appetite or of the power of movement; but no act of a lower power is the end of an act of intellect, because nothing less noble is \textit{per se} the end of something more noble; the act of understanding is nobler and more perfect than any act at all of any lower sensitive power at all.

256. It is said that, although understanding is nobler in its natural being than the operation of a lower power, yet it is not so in the genus of morals, because to act bravely is morally better than to think of acting bravely.

257. Against this there is a twofold objection. First, that it supposes something false, for the act of a lower power is not morally good unless it is conformed to right reason as to its rule; therefore rightness of reason is the cause of such goodness in that act and not conversely; but the act of reason being in this way right is for it to be morally good, just as understanding can be morally good. – The reasoning is confirmed because prudence is simply better than moral virtue as moral virtue exists in the sensitive appetite;

\textsuperscript{79} Text cancelled by Scotus: “if science's being practical is convertible with science's being ordered to action as to its end, then moral science is not practical. The consequent is contrary to the Philosopher in \textit{Ethics} 1.1.1095a5-6, 2.2.1103b26-30. The proof of the consequence is that the end of moral science is happiness, which, according to him in \textit{Ethics} 10.7.1177a12-b1, 8.1178b7-32, 9.1179a22-32, consists in speculation, not action. – If it be said that happiness is its remote end but that its proximate end is action, namely to direct to acts of virtue for the sake of happiness, on the contrary: it is not necessarily ordered to giving direction except aptitudinally; but it is necessarily practical; therefore it will be this, according to the said response [nn.253-254], because it is aptitudinally ordered to giving direction. But to be practical and to be directive are the same, from the second article [n.237]; therefore from the said response [nn.253-254] it follows that it is practical because it is practical. Again, to direct is an act of intellect, because it is its habit that the act is elicited from; but no act of the intellect is practical, from the first article [nn.228, 232]. Therefore one would be saying in another way that the end of moral science, to which it is ordered, is the act of virtue, just as the end of prudence is as well, – and this act is action.”
therefore the act of the former as it is the former’s act is better than the act of the latter as it is the latter’s act; therefore the former as practical, in the way that understanding can be practical, is better than the latter as practical or as good morally. Hence it is plain that the proof about thinking is not valid; for when one is looking for the excellence of one thing over another, one should not compare the best to the worst, but one should compare the best to the best or the simply so to the simply so. Therefore, just as the best is taken there, namely to act bravely in fact, so one should take the best in the intellect, namely ‘to command brave action in accordance with prudence’. This second is better even morally, because, as being the rule, it has formal goodness, which is rightness proper; the other is only good materially, because, when one removes from it its order to the rule and to the will as commanding, it is not of itself morally good.

258. Second, the first response [n.256] does not seem relevant to what is proposed: for one does not look for the source of understanding’s being practical by supposing it to be practical, especially since one is not presupposing its first condition, namely the condition of the end, but one is inquiring into that condition [n.248]; therefore, since one is looking for practical understanding and for the first circumstance that will make it practical, one only takes understanding as to what it is in its natural being; therefore to distinguish it according to moral and natural goodness like this is nothing other than to assume what is being sought for and to distinguish the thing as the thing is considered in its precision under one member of the distinction.

259. Therefore this opinion [n.248] is corrected by others and it is said that a habit is called practical from the end, which is practical consideration; for the proper end of any habit is its act. – But against this: If this consideration, which is the end of the habit,
is practical, then it has a cause for being called practical; either then the cause it has is the end of that consideration, and this has already been refuted [nn.252-255]; or it is the object, and then it follows that the object is the cause, prior to the consideration itself, whereby the habit is said to be practical, and one has what is proposed, that it is from the object that both the habit, though mediately, and the act are said to be practical.

260. [Scotus’ own opinion] – I concede, then, that the habit is not called practical from the act proper, because the act too is practical from a prior cause. Nor is any habitual or actual knowledge practical _per se_ because it is ordered to action as to an end; yet it can sometimes get its first extension, namely conformity to action [n.236], from the very end of the action, not however from it insofar as it is end but insofar as it is object.

261. The first point here [about first extension] is plain. For sometimes the first practical principles are taken from the end of action, and so the end, as first cause of action, includes virtually all the knowledge in the genus, and so the knowledge itself gets from it its quiddity and aptitude.

262. The second point [about the end as object] is plain. For practice gives the aptitude, or the sort of nature possessing an aptitude, for this reason, that as the first object includes the principles and, by means of them, the conclusions, so it includes the whole of practical knowledge; but not insofar as it is end, first because no nature or natural aptitude is got from the end, unless the end is loved and desired and so is moving the efficient cause [n.253]; but before it is naturally loved it includes the said principles and conclusions; for the truth of a necessary practical principle does not depend more on the will than does the truth of a speculative principle, and neither do the conclusions necessarily inferred from such a principle; – second because anything else that may
virtually include such knowledge would give such conformity to the knowledge in the same way, to wit if the action itself, or that which the operation is about, were first in the genus to include such knowledge, as sometimes happens and as was touched on in the response to the third argument in the first question about the subject of theology [n.185]; for man is perhaps the subject of both moral and medical science – but not happiness or health – because the idea of the end of each is included in the idea of what the action is about.

263. If it be said that the first practical principles are always taken from the end, therefore the end always first includes the knowledge of them virtually, – if this conclusion were conceded, it would hold nevertheless that the end did so, not insofar as it was end, but insofar as it was object, and it could then be said that man is the end both of health and of natural happiness, as was touched on in the preceding response [n.262]; but man is not at any rate the proximate end of the action, because, if the conclusion were denied, the antecedent taken universally would have to be denied, for taken particularly it is true, namely when the idea of the end is not deduced from anything pertaining to practical knowledge [n.314].

264. Or the antecedent could be expounded in another way thus: ‘the first principles are always taken from the end’ is true in the case of those principles that, once an act good in its kind has been presupposed, are taken from the moral circumstances, because in this way the object is not a circumstance. In another way, when the act is taken bare, the object is also a circumstance; and by this the antecedent seems to be refuted; for that from which the first circumstance of the act considered bare is altogether taken seems to be prior to anything else, and so the object from which the act is first
specified so as to be called good in kind of act, being qualifiable by the other circumstances so as to be fully moral, seems to be altogether first in practical knowledge. But it is not necessary now to pursue the question whether this conclusion holds or not, because its place is in the third book (3 Suppl. d.26 q. un. n.10; d.38 q. un. nn.4-5; also 2 d.7 q. un. nn.11-13, 24-28; d.40 q. un. n.3) [cf. n.362 below].

Briefly then to this article [nn.239, 227] I say that practical knowledge does not first get its appropriate extension from the end insofar as it is end, for the reasons adduced above [n.262].

IV. To the Second Question

265. From this the solution to the second question posed is plain [n.223]. I hold to the negative part of it [sc. science is not said to be practical from its order to the end], but the first relation, namely conformity [n.236], is had by practical science per se from the object, which is either rectitude of practice or something virtually including that rectitude, and therefore action is conformable to that knowledge so as to be right, because the knowledge is of such a known thing.

266. But as to the other relation, namely priority [n.236], it is doubtful whether it belongs to the knowledge. I say that necessarily some understanding naturally precedes action, as is plain from the first article [nn.229-233]; and in this respect posteriority belongs to action and priority to knowledge from the nature of the powers that are ordered naturally in acting, namely intellect and will. But that prior understanding is not always practical, but only when it is determinative of the rectitude or of the determinate
rectitude of the action itself, and that either virtually or formally. But when there is in the preceding apprehension no virtual or formal determination of the rectitude of the action, although there is priority in it, yet conformity in it is lacking, because it is not the knowledge to which action should be conformed in order to be right, because it points out nothing determinate about the rectitude of the action.80

It can be said then that, although absolutely from the nature of the intellect and of the will knowledge is prior, yet the fact that conform knowledge, namely knowledge that makes conform, is prior comes from the object and at the same time from the order of the powers and of the power of the actor, for although the object determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude naturally before the will wills, and although the will in some way receives its rule from something else, yet not apprehension alone but conform apprehension precedes action. But this happens whenever the determinate rectitude of action is a necessary knowable, either as a principle through the intellect or as a conclusion through science.

267. The things that have just been said, namely about the source from which the double relation, that is of conformity and of priority, belongs to practical knowledge, are to be understood in a general way, unless one should add something on behalf of the divine intellect, namely that the acting power, to whose action the conform knowledge is prior, is in some way determinable, or conformable to another as to a rule in its acting, from somewhere else; but whether this is required for knowledge or not will be touched on in response to the fourth objection that will be made against the principal solution to the question [nn.324-331].

80 Interpolation: “Now when in a previous apprehension there is determination about the rectitude of an action, but when the power of which it is the action is not in any way determinable from elsewhere, then the knowledge, although it is determinate, does not make conform.”
268. But when determinate rectitude belongs contingently to action, then there is no object determining the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude before the will wills, and this when speaking of intellect and will in general, for the contingent thing is not determined to either part in advance of all acts of the will. But when making comparison specifically to this intellect and this will, the conform knowledge, which determinate knowledge of rectitude precedes, can precede the action, and the one which it does not precede cannot; but it can precede in all and only the intelligence whose will is not the first determinant of rectitude for the action.

269. An example of what has been said:

The rectitude of this act ‘to love God’ is necessary and is included virtually in the idea of God; this action is also not only naturally preceded in everyone by apprehension but also by conform apprehension, namely the apprehension to which the action must be conformed so as to be right; so it is from the object which of itself primarily determines the intellect to know the determinate rectitude of the action, and from the order of the intellect and the will in acting, that this knowledge is obtained which is prior to action and conform, and likewise in the case of any other action that determinate rectitude necessarily belongs to.

But the rectitude of this action ‘to worship God in the sacrifice of the altar’ is contingent; for sometimes the act is right, as it is now, and sometimes not, as it was in the Old Testament; and therefore there is not an object determinative of the intellect to knowledge of this rectitude in advance of every act of the will, and so the knowledge does not precede, as conform knowledge, every act of the will. Yet it does precede the act of some will, to wit of that will alone which does not first determine rectitude for this
V. To the First Question

A. The Opinion of Others

270. Now that these points have been made visible, we must respond to the first question [n.217], where there are five ways of holding the negative side of the question [sc. that theology is not a practical science].

[First way] – One way speaks like this, declaring that there is a double act of the will, one perfecting the will, the other being perfected by it, as is maintained by Henry of Ghent in his Summa a.8 q.3 ad 3.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{81} Interpolation: “First act is with respect to the end and is the perfect operation which the will forms within itself and unites itself to the last end; second act is with respect to things that are for the end, hence a good action is that by which the will tends to something else outside itself, just as is any action directive to the end. In the first act the will does not need a directive act but mere showing of the end is sufficient; for there is speculation in it only so as to show perfectly to the will the object of its operation so that it may at once tend to it with a perfect operation. Now such act simply concerns speculative knowledge. In the second act the will needs a directive act, and this pertains to practical knowledge, because there is in it speculation so as to direct action, which is proper to practical knowledge. But the act that is perfected by the will is not the end of this knowledge (unless the end is under an end) but there is another act which perfects the will; and from this fact does this knowledge have its being most perfectly speculative, because the act principally intended in this knowledge is the act of the will about the end, in which it does not need a directive act but only a showing of the object. Therefore it is not practical knowledge, but only simply speculative knowledge, since in its own principal act it does not need a directive act.’ So Henry of Ghent. ‘For this way’ etc. [n.271].”
271. For this way there is the authority of Augustine in his sermon *On Jacob and Esau* (Sermon 88 ch.5 n.6): “All our works,” he says, “are for the purpose of purifying the eye whereby God is seen.”

272. Again, it can be argued thus: an act of direction is not required except where there can be error; practical science is directive, therefore the science of the blessed is not practical, because the blessed cannot err; therefore neither is our science practical, because it is the same as that of the blessed.

273. Again, it can be argued according to how the understanding of this science exists elsewhere: God does not have practical science; but he most of all or alone has this science; therefore etc.

274. I argue against it, and first I reduce the idea of these people’s position to the opposite in four ways. First thus: although the will cannot err about the end displayed in a universal way, yet it can err about the end displayed in a particular way; therefore, in order for it to act rightly about the end displayed in a particular way, there is need of direction. The end is displayed in theology not in a universal but a particular way, because displaying it in a universal way belongs to metaphysics. \(^{82}\)

275. Further, a directive habit is not posited for the substance of an act but for its circumstance, as temperance is not posited for the substance of the act of eating, or of the other act of the sort, but for its circumstance; therefore, although the will is determined to the substance of an act that tends to the end in particular, direction would still be required as to the circumstances of the act, to which circumstances direction about the substance of the act does not extend. – From these two reasons the argument is taken that wherever

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\(^{82}\) Text canceled by Scotus: “The blessed cannot err in any act concerning the theological object; therefore they naturally have directive knowledge in respect of any act concerning the theological object.”
it is possible to err or to act rightly in action, there practical knowledge is needed for
giving direction; in the action that is love of the end, as it pertains to theology, error is
possible in two ways, as the reasons show, both by reason of the object in particular and
by reason of the circumstances of the act; therefore etc.

276. Further, third: where the love of something is what outside the genus of
knowledge is principally intended, there the knowledge of that thing is what inside the
genus of knowledge is principally intended; but love of the end, according to them, is
what outside the genus of knowledge is principally intended, therefore knowledge of the
end is what within the genus of knowledge is principally intended. But in any science
what is principally intended is knowledge of the first subject, therefore the end is the
principal subject of this science. From the end practical principles are taken; but practical
principles entail practical conclusions; therefore this science [of theology], which first
intends love of the end outside the genus of knowledge, is practical.

277. Further, principles and conclusions belong to the same genus, whether as
regard action or as regard speculation; for practical conclusions are resolved to practical
principles, not speculative ones; therefore when knowledge of the end is directive in the
case of acts that concern what is for the end, and when knowledge of what is for the end
is a sort of conclusion included in knowledge of the end as a sort of principle, then if
knowledge of what is for the end is knowledge of practical conclusions, the knowledge of
the end will be practical knowledge because of a practical principle.

Thus the response to this position’s first reason [n.270] is plain, because it
assumes what is false, as if the will were determined from itself, the falsity of which is
proved by the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. Likewise, if the will were determined,
nevertheless the knowledge would still be practical, as the two final reasons prove [nn.276-277].

278. To the authority they appeal to [n.271] (it seems to conclude that the vision of God is the end of this science, which they do not concede) I reply that the authority is speaking of those external actions that are fastings, vigils, and prayers; yet any external act is of a nature to be conformed to any interior act from which it gets its goodness, and also of a nature to be ordered to some interior act, and ultimately to an act of willing.

279. To the third [n.272] I reply: an agent intends per se to introduce a form and does not intend the removal of the opposite except per accidens. Thus a habit per se directs, but it per accidens excludes error; and if the habit is perfect it is not compatible with error, nay if it is compatible it is not perfect. Therefore although the blessed cannot err, it does not follow that they do not have also a directive habit, because, if that were per impossibile removed, they could err, but, once it is posited, because of its perfection, all error is excluded.

280. Discussion of the fourth [n.273] will be given below, after the solution of this first question, by solving the fourth objection against it [nn.324-331].

281. [Second way (n.270)] – The second way, although it might be rightly and not rightly coaxed out, nevertheless denies that love of the end is action because it is not about a contingent object. For the Commentator says on the Ethics [Eustratius Explanations of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics 1 ch.1 3E] that action is operation according to choice; choice is only about the contingent, Ethics 3.4.1111b29-30, because it is deliberative appetite; deliberation is only about the contingent (Ethics 3.5.1112a21-22, 30-31). From this too is proved that the description of action posited in the first article
of the solution [n.228] is insufficient, because it omits the precise object. As a result this way asserts that no knowledge is practical that is extended to a willing of the final end alone, because this end is not a true contingent.

282. Against this way is the fourth reason set down against the preceding way [n.277].

Again, in truth action is that operation to which appetitive virtue inclines, because any such virtue is a habit of choice, from *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, and choice is action, as will be shown against the third way directly [nn.287-289]; but not only is charity inclined to love of the end but also acquired love, which is appetitive virtue, because the acquired habit or appetite is in agreement with right reason.

The motive for this way will be solved in the solution to the second principal reason for the first question [nn.346-351].

283. [Third way (n.270)] – The third way posits that either volition is not properly action but only the act posterior to it is, or, if it is action, it is not so save in order to some act of a lower power that it commands, to wit of the appetitive power or of the motive power or the like.

284. An argument for this way is that all action follows choice. The proof is from the Philosopher in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a31-32: “The beginning of action is choice, not choice for the sake of which, but choice that is the source of motion,” that is, not the final cause but the efficient cause; the efficient cause naturally precedes the effect; therefore etc.

285. Further, a practical habit is generated from actions; but a practical habit is generated from acts that follow choice; therefore these are actions.
286. Again, the Commentator on the *Ethics* [Eustratius, *id.* 1 ch.1 3E] says: “Action is operation according to choice;” therefore action follows choice.

287. Against this is the proof that not only an act which follows choice is action, because in *Ethics* 6.2.1139a33-34 the Philosopher says that choice is not right without right reason and the habit of virtue; therefore virtue is *per se* required for right choice; but it would not be required if it were a habit generated from acts posterior to choice, because it would not then incline *per se* to any acts save those posterior to choice. For this reason the argument proceeds under another form, that a habit is generated by the same acts as those to which it inclines, from *Ethics* 2.1.1103b21-23; but moral virtue *per se* inclines to right choice, because, as is clear from its definition in *Ethics* 2.6.1106b36-7a2, virtue is “a habit of choice” etc.; therefore moral virtue is *per se* generated by choices, and as a result it is not only acts which follow choice that are actions.

288. Further, not only is it false to deny that choice is action, as argued by the reason just given, but also, as was proved in the first article [nn.230, 234], an elicited act of the will is action first, and a commanded act is so only because of it; therefore if a choice exists on its own, without order to a commanded act, to wit because of lack of matter of the external act, it alone will be truly action. This is made clear thus: someone without money, to whom however money is presented in imagination, before the choice of any action becomes a principle moving to or commanding some action, if he chooses to distribute the money liberally should he have it, then, as far as the act and habit of virtue is concerned, no further prosecution of the act or distribution is required, because when some object has been presented in imagination about which an act of liberality can be done, the choice from which liberality is generated, or which is elicited from liberality,
is possessed in its completeness; nor is there required any further prosecution of the act, or anything external, or any order to what is external, if the matter of the external act is lacking.

289. Further, this order can only be of a cause to a causing ‘that’ of the effect;\textsuperscript{83} but that a cause in itself is not of itself such as to be prior to the effect, but is so only because it is actually ordered to bringing about the effect, seems discordant, since a cause gets nothing from the effect, nor from its order to the effect.

290. Then, as to the authority from the \textit{Ethics} [n.284], I say that in the same place the Philosopher at once adds: “But of choice (supply: the principles are) appetite and reason for the sake of something” (that is, practical reason). Also, in order for choice to be right, virtue is required in the appetite; hence there follows: “Choice (namely right choice) is not without moral habit.” Therefore virtue has an elicited act more immediate to it than the act which choice is the principle of by commanding it; for the elicited act of the will, which is choice, is a good act before the external act, which is commanded by good choice, is good. The proof is given by the Philosopher; for he immediately adds (after the remark ‘nor is choice without habit’): “For a good action is not without custom.” But if this is the major premise to prove what he said just before about choice, this minor premise will be assumed under it, ‘good choice is good action’. I concede, therefore, the authority that affirms choice to be the principle of action in the sense of the source of action, because an act commanded by choice is also a moral act; but from this it

\textsuperscript{83} Sc. as opposed to a causing ‘why’. A cause ‘that’ merely makes the effect to exist; a cause ‘why’ gives the effect the nature it has as well. The argument of this paragraph seems to be that since the third way supposes that choice is only action because the effect it causes is action, then the cause is getting its nature from the effect, which is contrary to the relation of cause and effect.
does not follow that only this latter is an act or action, nay rather choice is a prior action, on account of which that act too is a good action.

291. To the second [n.285], if the major is true, I say that a practical habit is generated from the choices, as was said above about the person who frequently chooses to give liberally [n.288]; even without the commanded act, should the means not be available, liberality can be generated in him. But because, when the commanded acts are impossible, the will does not in general make frequent right choice about the matter of these acts – for what someone does not believe to be possible for him he either does not will or wills weakly, according to Augustine – therefore in general the practical habit which is virtue is not generated without the commanded actions that are subsequent to the choices; it is not, however, generated from these subsequent actions but from the choices, where moral goodness exists formally; in the commanded actions it only exists materially.

292. To the third [n.286], in response to the Commentator, it is necessary that the ‘according to’ there not be an indication of the efficient cause, if the description must be convertible with the thing described, as was already proved by Aristotle in the Ethics [n.290]; but the ‘according to’ must be understood effectively or formally, or let choice there be taken for liberality or for the controlling power, or let it be taken for the eliciting of an act of will which is not a choice or a volition. But all action is action in the genus of action in accord with that choice, as though in accord with its active principle, or let every action be choice or what follows choice, because action in the genus of action is reduced to the effective principle.

293. These three ways [nn.270, 281, 283] lay down that theology is purely speculative, notwithstanding the fact that it is extended to love of the end – whether the
will is as it were naturally determined to the end previously shown to it, or whether the will is freely and contingently related to it, although the object the will concerns is not contingent and doable [n.281], or, third, whether the will is related in any way at all to any object at all, not however by doing it, that is, not however in its order to the commanded act, but by stopping at the first elicited act [n.283].

294. But that such extension does not include the practical is proved because then any knowledge would be practical, because some delight or love accompanies any knowledge at all.

295. Likewise in *Ethics* 10.9.1179a22-24 it is said that “the happy man is most dear to God,” and yet the Philosopher sets down this happiness as speculative and not practical.

296. Against this conclusion, common to these ways, is that it seems to follow that there is some operation in the power of man such that it is truly a human act and yet is not properly speculation or action, namely love of the end; the consequent seems discordant.

297. Further, that directive knowledge in any volition is not practical seems, since ‘truth is agreement with right appetite’, to be discordant, because such truth is the proper work of the practical mind, from *Ethics* 6.3.1139a29-31.

298. What is added about delight [n.294] is nothing to the purpose, because since delight is a passion naturally consequent to perfect activity, whether it be of speculation or of the thing speculated about, no practical knowledge is, because of extension to delight, posited from this fact, because neither is it action properly speaking; this will be touched on at 3 Suppl. d.15 q. un. But to love and desire a known object, and one with
such or such circumstances, is truly action, nor does it follow apprehension naturally but is free – being rightly or not rightly elicited.

299. What is added about the happy contemplative, that he is most dear to God [n.295], is not the conclusion compelled by the authority, for it speaks passively, as though the happy man ‘is most loved by God’, not actively, as is clear in that place; for it adds: “if the gods have any care for human things, it is reasonable that they (that is, the gods) take joy in what is best and most like them; but this is the intellect,” and then: “to those therefore who love this (that is, the intellect) it will be reasonable for the gods to give reward, as to their friends,” etc.

300. But, setting that authority aside, is it the case that the happy contemplative is most dear according to Aristotle in the way that to love is distinguished from to be delighted, whether about the object speculated on or about the speculation? – I reply: in *Metaphysics* 12.7.1072b3 he wants the first mover to move as being loved; therefore a lower intelligence loves the first mover, and yet he would place its happiness in speculation, as is clear from *Ethics* 10.8.1178b7-32; therefore he himself includes under speculation not only delight but loving. Therefore neither will there be, according to him, practical knowledge because of extension to it, but speculative knowledge.

301. But why then is he not held to this result, since the idea of practical and of speculative science is adopted by him? – and so the first two ways, in rejecting that view [sc. that theology is practical], are, even according to the Philosopher, right to set down theology as speculative. – I reply: the ‘to love’ that he would posit in the intelligence he would posit to be in the will by natural necessity, so that it would not be a contingent matter there that it errs and acts rightly, so that, with respect to it, the knowledge is
ostensive only, and not directive, whether as regards the object in particular or as regards any condition of it or any circumstance of the act of willing.

302. The theologians would not speak in this way about the loving of intelligible creatures with respect of God in the particular case and as regards the circumstances of the act, as was argued against the first way in the first two reasons [nn.274-275]. If therefore he [= the Philosopher] had agreed with us in positing that love of the end can freely and rightly and not rightly be elicited, and that it cannot be rightly elicited unless it is elicited in conformity with a right reason not only showing the object but also bidding it to be thus elicited, perhaps he would have posited a practical knowledge with respect to such love that was in agreement with right appetite. Therefore it is better for the theologian, who must disagree with him in the minor premise, to say that he disagrees as a result in the conclusion than to agree in a conclusion he himself [= the Philosopher] would not posit if, with the theologian, he did not hold the minor.

When, therefore, you say that we get from him the idea of practical and speculative, it is true, and we agree in the major premise that it [= theology] is speculative, which although it is, as pointing out the object, extended to love, yet in no way is it directive in act of an object as subject to circumstances and as of this object in particular; but the minor which he himself assumes under the major we have to deny in the proposed case.  

303. [Fourth way] – And therefore there is a fourth way, which says that theology is affective. Which can be understood in a good way if affective is set down as something

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84 Text cancelled by Scotus: “And given that such necessity is posited in the intellect from the nature of the will that loves God, would he posit necessity thus in the will of the wise man whom he himself posited as naturally happy? If not, then the wise man can be directed in such an act. – I reply: he only denied the practical to such a man because he said his happiness was speculative.”
practical; but if it is set down as a third member, distinct from the practical and speculative, it is in this way contrary to what was said in the first article, where it was shown that love is truly action [nn.228-235], and also against many authorities that believe precisely that science is divided into the practical and the speculative, and there is no third member.

304. [Fifth way] – The fifth way says that theology is contemplative. For this way Augustine is adduced in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.14 n.22, where his meaning is that wisdom is in respect of contemplation, science in respect of action; since, therefore, theology is properly wisdom and not science, it will not be practical but contemplative.

I reply that Augustine in *On the Trinity* 12 ch.4 n.4 says that the two parts of the soul, the superior and the inferior, are only distinguished according to their functions; and in both there is a trinity (but in the superior the image of the Trinity), and yet only the superior is contemplative, because it has regard to things eternal. Therefore the contemplation of which he speaks is not distinguished from speculation within the genus of science; for the contemplative contains memory, intelligence, and will, and so in the contemplative there can be extension outside the genus of science, just as there can be in the active, that is, in the inferior part, which regards temporal things, and it too contains a trinity. If then it is contemplative as Augustine speaks there, it is not for this reason prevented from being practical if it is extended to practice in the superior part.

305. [Another opinion] There is another opinion, discordant from the preceding ones in its conclusion that science is speculative and practical. The proof for it is twofold. One way is as follows: just as a teaching in which there are some things written about law and other things about philosophy would be speculative and practical, whether they were
written in separate books or intertwined and mixed, so too in this teaching [of theology] speculative and practical things are treated of together, not in separate books and chapters but intertwined and mixed; therefore it is speculative and practical.

306. Again it is proved in this way, that no speculative knowledge treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, nor does any practical science treat more distinctly of things to speculate than is required by the knowledge of them for the action it is extended to; this science treats more distinctly of doable things than is needed for speculation by the knowledge of them, and more distinctly of things to speculate than is required for practical knowledge by the knowledge of them; therefore it is speculative and practical. – The major is plain, because things to speculate are considered in a practical science only on account of practical consideration, and doable things are considered in speculative science only on account of speculative consideration. The minor is plain, because this science treats of doable things as distinctly as if it were precisely about them, and of things to speculate as distinctly as if it were precisely about them.

307. Against this it is argued thus: a habit that does not have evidence from its object is not distinguished according to distinction of objects (for then it would be necessary to posit two infused faiths); this habit [of theology] does not have evidence from its object, therefore it is not distinguished according to distinction of objects; therefore it is not two habits on account of the distinction between things to do and things to speculate.

308. Further, although the said opinion about two habits could have some probability about theology as it is handed down in Scripture, yet about theology in itself,
whose subject is the divine essence as this essence (in the way said about the subject of theology [n.167]), it does not seem probable; for as to that object, since it is most truly a single knowable, some knowledge truly one is of a nature to be first had about it; if there were some other knowledge which was not about it but about some other first thing, that other knowledge will not be theology in itself. Therefore theology is a habit simply one, although perhaps there could along with it exist in Scripture some knowledge that was about some other subject.

309. Again, it is plain that the order of sciences with respect to eminence is in relation to one thing alone, because there cannot be two sciences simply first; that single and sole eminence I say is theology, which alone is first about the first subject of theology.

310. Further, I reduce the reason for it [n.306] to the opposite conclusion: that knowledge is practical in which the determination of things to speculate on is no greater than pertains, on the part of knowledge of them, to practice or practical knowledge; this knowledge [of theology] does not treat of things to speculate on more distinctly than knowledge of them requires for directing practical knowledge and practice; therefore etc.

– Proof of the minor: any knowledge at all of the conditions of the desirability of the end, and of the conditions of what is for the end insofar as it is for the end, and third of the conditions of anything of the sort or of other things, about which conditions the operative power can err unless it is directed, is necessary for practical knowledge; no knowledge here treats of the end or of what is for the end without being of this sort; therefore etc. Or
at any rate it is possible for an ignorant will to err about them, as will be said in the
solution of the third objection [n.322] against the principal solution of the question.\textsuperscript{85}

311. The assumption is plain, because any conditions handed down about the end
are of a nature to show more the desirability of the end, and the conditions of the things
that are for the end are of a nature to show more the things ordered to the end.

312. To the argument [n.306], it is plain that the minor is false. In proof I say that
the end and the things for the end could not be treated so distinctly without the whole
knowledge being practical for a created intellect, because the whole knowledge is of a
nature to show the end under the idea of desirability and to show the things that are for
the end under the idea of their order to the end, or in respect of whatever an undirected
will could err about.

313. [Another opinion] – Another opinion holds the same conclusion, but posits
along with this that theology is one habit simply.\textsuperscript{86}

\textsuperscript{85} Text cancelled by Scotus: “For although the Trinity of persons does not show the end to be more
desirable than if they were not three (because the Trinity is the end insofar as they are one God, not
insofar as they are three), yet a will ignorant of the Trinity can err in loving or desiring the end by
desiring to enjoy one person only. Likewise, a will ignorant that God made the world can err by not
repaying the sort of love that gratitude would require for so great a communication of his goodness
made for our utility. Thus, by being ignorant of the articles pertaining to reparation it is possible to
be ungrateful, by not repaying the love due for so great a benefit. So too of other theological articles.”

\textsuperscript{86} Interpolation: “and this because of its one subject, which is God, in which come together all the
things that are considered in this science. For all of them fall under the consideration of this science
insofar as they participate in something divine, and therefore whether it consider them by
comparison to work or not, as in the case of purely speculative science, but because of the formal
unity of the subject this science is single. – Against this opinion thus: whenever something common is
divided first through certain opposite differences, it is impossible for both differences to be found
under some one thing contained under that common thing; but science in common is divided first
into practical and speculative; therefore it is impossible for these differences to be found together in
some one science. The major is manifest, because if differences that jointly divide some common
thing could be compatible with each other in something contained in common, then the same body
could be corporeal and incorporeal, and the same animal sensible and non-sensible, and the same
man rational and irrational, which is absurd. The minor is plain from Avicenna at the beginning of his
\textit{Metaphysics} 1 ch.1 (70ra), and from the Commentator in his first comment on \textit{Ethics} 1 [Eustratius, I
preface (1A)]. Again, a contradiction about one and the same thing would follow, namely that it is
extended and not extended, and many other disagreeable results follow. – An addition.”
B. Scotus’ own Opinion

314. [On the theology of necessary things] – To the question [n.217], therefore, I reply that since an elicited act of will is most truly action, even if no commanded act accompanies it (as is plain from the first article [nn.230, 232, 234-235]), and since extension of practical knowledge consists in conformity to action and in aptitudinal priority (this is plain from the second article [nn.236-237]), it follows that that knowledge is practical which is aptitudinally conform to right volition and is naturally prior to it; but the whole of theology necessary for a created intellect is thus conform to the act of the created will and prior to it; therefore etc. – The proof of the minor is that the first object of theology is virtually conform to right volition, because from the idea of it are taken the principles of rectitude in the will; it also determines the created intellect to knowledge of the determinate rectitude of action itself, with respect to all the necessary elements of theology, naturally before any created will wills them, otherwise they would not be necessary; therefore from the first object there follow both the conformity and the priority of theology to volition, and thus extension to action, from which extension knowledge itself must be called practical. A confirmation of this reason is that the first object of theology is the ultimate end, and the principles in the created intellect taken from the ultimate end are practical principles, therefore the principles of theology are practical; therefore the conclusions too are practical.

315. If an objection be made against this from what was said in the preceding question, where it is said that God is not the first subject here as he is the end but as he is
this essence [nn.167, 195]; but the principles taken from the end as it is end are practical; therefore etc.

316. Again, knowledge of the ultimate end is not immediately conform to, nor is it of a nature to be conform to, the eliciting of action; therefore it is not proximately practical.

317. Again, the first object virtually includes conformity to right action, but it does not include only the knowledge that is thus conform; otherwise there could not be speculative science about it, which seems discordant. For how is this truth practical ‘God is triune’ or ‘the Father generates the Son’? Therefore the first object includes some speculative knowledge. Therefore from the virtual conformity of the first object to action it does not follow that theology is practical, since the truths that are most theological insofar as theology is distinguished from metaphysics are speculative.

318. Again, the science of God, which is about the same first subject, would in that case be practical, and it seems that the reason for the solution to the question [n.314] could be applied to the divine intellect just as to the created intellect.

319. To the first [n.315] I say that the respect of the end is not what the principles are taken from in any science, but the absolute subject is on which the respect is founded; that subject is ‘this essence’.

320. To the second [n.316] I say that what virtually contains conform knowledge is virtually conform, and thus is practical knowledge, because practical conclusions have practical principles; but the knowledge proximate to the one which is about the end is knowledge of enjoyment of the end, and it is of the nature to be formally conform to the action of enjoyment.
321. To the third [n.317] I say that the first object includes only knowledge that is conform to right volition, because by virtue of it nothing is known about the will that is not either rectitude of some will or virtually includes knowledge of such rectitude. And I concede what is inferred as a discordance in the consequent, that there can be about it no speculative science; for necessarily knowledge of it and of anything intrinsic known through it is aptitudinally conform to action and prior, if what is known is necessary.

322. When an instance is drawn from the truths, which seem to be most truly theological and not metaphysical, ‘God is triune’, ‘the Father generates the Son’ [n.317], I say that those truths are practical. The first indeed virtually includes knowledge of the rectitude of love tending toward the three persons, such that if the act were elicited about one of them alone by excluding another (as an unbeliever would elicit it), the act would not be right; the second includes knowledge of the rectitude of the act which is about two persons one of whom is thus from the other.

323. And if it be objected against this that only what is essential is the reason for terminating the act of love; but theology is more properly about the personals than about the essentials, because several essentials can be known by the metaphysician; therefore theology, as it is distinguished from metaphysics, is not practical as to what is most proper to it. The proof of the first proposition is that otherwise there would be some reason of lovability in one person that was not in another, which is false, because then no person would be blessed in itself.

I reply: an essential is absolutely a reason for terminating the act of love as the ‘that because of which’, but the persons terminate the act of loving as what are loved. For it is not sufficient for rectitude of the act that it have the formal reason that is fitting to the
object, but there is also required that it have the fitting object in which such formal reason exists. So, over and above the knowledge of rectitude which the essential includes in the act of loving God, the personals include the further proper knowledge of the required rectitude.

324. To the fourth [n.318], one could concede that the theology of God about necessary things is practical, because in his intellect the first theological object is of a nature to generate, as it were, the knowledge conform to right volition that is naturally prior to the volition itself. That it is conform is plain. That it is also prior is proved because the intellect naturally understands the first object before the will wills it; therefore it can naturally have, prior to the will, all the knowledge sufficient for it virtually included in the understanding of the first object; of such sort is any necessary knowledge whatever of the first object. The assumed consequence is plain, both because, if all will were per impossibile excluded, the intellect could have all sufficient knowledge virtually included in the understanding of the first object, since that understanding precedes volition; – also because the divine intellect is not discursive; therefore it does not naturally understand the first object before it understands anything as to knowledge that is virtually included in the object; therefore, if it understands the first object before the will wills anything, it understands anything as to knowledge that is included in the first object before the will wills (this second proof of the consequence is less strong).

325. If it be objected that the divine will will not be the first rule of itself in its act if its act is preceded by the knowledge it should be conformed to so as to act rightly; the consequent seems discordant, because the supreme freedom of the divine will is taken away if this will is determined by another and not first by itself to its first act. But if all its
acts are preceded by practical knowledge, it will be determined to its first act by the intellect, because it cannot dissent from it; for then it could commit sin.

326. Again, it was said above that the Philosopher consequently speaks well if intelligence naturally loves God when seen; therefore a knowledge that shows God is not practical. Let there be a like consequence about God naturally loving himself.

327. Again, something that directs is a cause in respect of something directed, so there is a real distinction between them; but there is no such distinction of God’s intellection to his willing. A confirmation of the reason is that, if one understands an act of will to have already been elicited, the intellect is not directing, for its direction only concerns something to be elicited as being prior to it; but in God his willing does not follow the being of the will, so his willing there is never something to be elicited, as it were, but is always as it were elicited; therefore etc.

328. It seems here that, in consequence of what has been said [nn.274-277, 310-312, 314, 319-320, 322-323], one must say that, when one takes the rule for what gives right guidance in action, the first rule is the ultimate end, which virtually includes the knowledge of the rectitude necessary to any action, just as the first object of speculative science first includes knowledge of truths of speculation. But this first rule, which is the end, gives right guidance to the intellect and the will according to the order that those powers naturally have in acting, such that it generates knowledge conform to right action as it were before right action or before it makes action right; and in this way there will be another power that is right prior to the power that acts, so that it seems that the consequent deduced in the first reason [n.325] must be conceded. Although it is criticized [n.325], one could say that, just as freedom is universally consistent with previous
apprehension, so supreme freedom is consistent with the most perfect previous
apprehension; but the most perfect apprehension of action includes the knowledge of
conformity when it necessarily agrees with action.

329. When it is further argued that it would then be determined by something else
[n.325], one must deny this by speaking of the determination that is done by a sufficient
agent. For although it could not disagree with knowledge that is right and prior to action,
yet it is not as if the intellect is by its knowledge a sufficient cause actively determining
the will to act, but this is from the perfection of the will, which is of a nature only to act
in conformity with the prior power in acting, when that prior power acts perfectly about
its object, that is, when it knows in advance as much as it can know. But I say this about
contingent things, of which the divine intellect does not have all the knowledge possible
to it before any act of the will; therefore, as to those contingent things, I say that it is not
necessary for it to act in conformity with the prior power, because it does not itself have
in advance conform knowledge of such object. But it is otherwise as regards knowables
that are of themselves necessary, because these contain the most perfect account of
themselves without any act of will.87

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87 Interpolation: “To the second [n.326] it can be said that it is not similar, because there is there
simple being pleased, but here there circumstanced efficacious willing. Likewise, the divine will is not
merely ostensive, but it is at least equivalently directive, because it is an objectual, though not
potential, regulation and determination, which the Philosopher did not posit. – To the third [n.327] I
say that, if it was conclusive, it would follow that there was neither any intellection nor any volition
in God, since the divine essence is the moving object for both, and thus, along with the concurring
part, it is a vital power as joint cause; I say therefore that there is only an order of quasi-effects of the
same quasi-cause in the proposed case, which order however is not distinct from the quasi-effects,
because these effects are neither properly caused nor produced, nor do they have a principle, nor are
they elicited, but they simply flow out; the causality therefore is metaphorical, as commonly happens
in divine reality. Or in another way, when upholding that the intellect in some way or other directs,
the assumption is denied when speaking properly of cause. To the confirmation [n.327] I say that the
order of nature suffices, which order stands along with simultaneity in duration of the knowledge for
action and of the will for willing, and thus the answer is plain to the arguments, when one upholds
the first way.”
330. Now although this response seems to avoid the argument [n.325], and although the subsequent arguments might be avoided [n.326-327], yet one must respond otherwise and say that necessary theology in the divine intellect is not practical, because there is no natural priority of conformative or directive intellection to the will to make it conform or to direct anything; because once any knowledge whatever of the rectitude of action has been posited, although it could of itself conform a conformable or directable power from without, yet it could not conform the divine will with respect to its own first object, because the will is rectified by itself alone with respect to that object, for either it naturally tends toward it or, if it tends freely, it is not of itself in any way as it were indifferent to rectitude or in any way from without as it were possessed of that rectitude, and so determinate knowledge of rectitude is not necessarily prior to volition as though the will required it in order to be rightly elicited; but all that is required in advance is the showing of the object; and the knowledge that is of itself directive it does not require in advance as directive but only as ostensive, and so if the mere showing of the object could precede the will and if knowledge of the rectitude necessary for action could follow (in the way that will be said of action about contingent things [n.333]), volition would be rightly elicited equally in this case as in that. Therefore intellection is not now prior and conformative or regulative.

331. To the argument, therefore, that proves the priority of knowledge of rectitude to right action [n.324], one can reply that although there is some priority of intellection to volition, yet it is not prior such that it requires right cognition to be prior to action, because such priority is priority of the rule to the thing ruled, which is not the sort there can be when the will is in every way its own rule in acting.
The sum of this controversy about the science God has with respect to himself, whether it is practical or not, consists in this: whether the knowledge which of itself would be directive in action, if it were granted that the power in the knower which is right or is active were directable in its acting, is practical from the fact alone that it is directive, or is not practical from the fact that the power in the knower which is active is not directable. He who holds one side or the other will answer accordingly.

332. [About the theology of contingent things] – From this is introduced the second article of the question, namely about the theology of contingent things, whether it is practical or not [nn.314, 324, 330; 1 d.38 q. un. nn.1-4]. I say that the theology of contingent things can be practical only in that intellect which can have determinate knowledge of the rectitude of action prior to all volition of the one who has the intellect, or prior to the elicited action itself, because only there is this theology of contingent things able to be or is conform to action and prior to it. Of such sort is every created intellect, because in the case of no created intelligence does the will first determine the contingent rectitude that is fitting to its action.

333. But in the divine intellect contingent theology cannot be practical if one holds onto these two points, namely that practical knowledge and the action to which it is extended ought necessarily to belong to the same supposit, and that of God as an actor there is no action save volition (if one does not posit in him a third power other than intellect and will), for no knowledge conform to action or to a right contingent will precedes in the divine intellect its right action or God’s volition itself, because such rectitude is first determined by the will for that action.

88 Interpolation: “and if of another supposit, then it would be practical, because it would be of the directible or determinable power of the other supposit, namely of the power of some created supposit or other.”
334. The first point is true, for if any knowledge at all about someone else’s action is practical, then my knowledge of the fact that God creates the world or that an intelligence moves the heavens, will be practical. This at least seems to be conclusive, because the practical knowledge cannot belong to a lower intelligence or understanding when something else is acting according to the action in question, nor, by parity of reasoning, to a higher or equal intelligence if it is contributing nothing to the action of the doer; but if it does contribute something, the higher intelligence does now have its own action with respect to which its knowledge would be practical.

335. Again, if practical knowledge has any causality with respect to the action to which it is extended, and if it only naturally has such causality in the first respect of action in the one who understands, the thing proposed [n.333] seems to follow.

336. To the contrary: therefore about the same thing one intellect would have practical knowledge and another speculative, if action were possible to one intellect and not to the other.

One can say that perfect rectitude of action includes the circumstance of the doer just as it does the other circumstances as well, so that without it there is no rectitude. For if one takes ‘God is to be loved’ and does not add by what, namely by the will, it is not a practical truth completely, because God is not to be loved by a brute; therefore this perfect truth ‘God is to be loved by God’ is practical in any intellect whatever; thus too this truth ‘man should sometimes fast’ is practical not only to the man who knows it but also to an angel and to God; so also this truth is practical to man and to God ‘the heaven is to be moved by an angel’, – and I concede as something discordant what the first proof infers [n.334].
337. And if it be objected that the priority of practical knowledge to action is not preserved – for love with respect to himself is right before a man or an angel could understand ‘God is to be loved by God’ – I reply: this priority ought to be from the object and the intellect, that is, that it naturally determine the intellect to knowledge of determinate rectitude of action, namely as far as it is of itself in advance of action; in this way this object is of a nature to determine any intellect whatever to the knowledge ‘God is to be loved by God’ as far as it is of itself in advance of action, although some intellect, because of its own imperfection, is not determined before the acting power, because of its own perfection, acts.

338. To the other objection [n.336] I say that just as the will can be a superior cause with respect to the action of the moving power, not however any will at all with respect to any power at all, for example, not my will with respect to the moving power of an angel, but when it is in the same subject, so that if it is a practical cause with respect to action, this is in the same knower and the same doer; nor is it necessary that in someone else it be non-practical, unless one takes practical strictly for what is immediately applicable to a work to the extent it depends on the identity of subject in knower and doer, which immediacy is denoted [in Latin] by the infinitive that signifies the action when it is construed with the verb ‘to know’ – for in this way it is conceded that only God knows that he loves himself [Latin infinitive: ‘to love himself’] infinitely although an angel might know that he is to be infinitely loved by himself.

339. Someone who thus responds must from the beginning concede that every truth about the action of created agents is known by some acting intellect, because all these truths are of a nature to be conform to action, or to determine the rectitude of action
(whether from the object if they are necessary, or from something else if they are contingent), before the action is elicited. But all truths about divine volition are practical if necessary but not practical if contingent, because these, in advance of the action’s being elicited to which they are extended, do not have conformity, for they do not have any determination of rectitude; for example, God knows practically that man should repent and that the angel should move, but not that God should wish a holy man to repent and an angel to move.

340. If you ask of what sort theology of contingents is in itself when not compared with this intellect or with that, one can say that it is in itself the sort it is from its object; but from its object it is not conform to action in advance of every action, because no determinate knowledge of contingent rectitude is of a nature to be had from the object; therefore from its object it is not practical, therefore it is speculative, if knowledge is sufficiently divided between these [n.303]. Congruent with this is that in the divine intellect it is denied to be practical [n.333]; for a thing seems to be such in itself as it is in a perfect instance in that genus and not as it is in an imperfect one.

341. If it be objected that then knowledge in itself speculative is for someone practical, to wit for a created intellect, therefore the practical is not repugnant to the speculative, I reply: to be speculative from the object is to be speculative per se; so, to be practical from an object that sufficiently determines the intellect to knowledge of rectitude – and if sufficiently then prior to volition – is to be practical per se. It is in this way that these two are opposed, as are also these ‘not-extendable to action’ and ‘extendable to action’. But to be practical from something other than the object, to wit from an extrinsic cause, as from the will determining the intellect to knowledge of action,
is to be accidentally practical; thus I concede that the theology of contingent things is practical for us, though in itself it is speculative.

342. Against this: that to which one opposite *per se* belongs the other opposite belongs neither *per se* nor *per accidens*; therefore knowledge in itself speculative is not practical either *per se* or *per accidens*.

I reply: although the antecedent might be expounded of *per se* in the first or in the second way, not however in the third way, the way in which it signifies the same as the solitary [*Posterior Analytics* 1.4.73a-34-b10], yet I concede that in no way of inhering does the opposite of this predicate inhere which is ‘*per se* practical’ or of this predicate ‘*per se* speculative’, because contingent theology *per se* in the second way is *per se* practical or speculative, so that the inherence is both *per se* and the predicate is determined by the ‘*per se*’. But to be *per accidens* practical is *per accidens* not opposed to that inherence, just as to be black simply and to be white in some respect are not opposed; for ‘in some respect’ and ‘simply’ determine predicates as they are denominative. If it is argued ‘it is *per se* to be *per se* speculative, therefore it is *per se* speculative’, I concede the point, but to this predicate the predicate ‘*per accidens* practical’ is not opposed.

343. But if the one of these two [n.333] that is held by that response is not held, then it can be conceded that contingent theology, although it is not in itself practical because not so from its object, yet in every intellect created and uncreated it would be practical *per accidens*, because in the divine intellect it can be conform to action before the action is elicited by a created will; for the intellect of God knew that the adult sinner in the New Law should be punished before the sinner is punished. And by not holding to
the first of the two above mentioned, the knowledge of God about the action of some other actor is practical; also by not holding to the second of them, to wit by positing the action of God extrinsically to be an action of his formally different from the will of God, although the divine intellect does not know by any ‘it must be created’ before his will wills it, yet he knows before he creates, and so conform knowledge precedes the extrinsic action, although it is not conform from the object but from something else.

344. This at any rate I hold to, that the theology of contingents is not practical per se or from its object; yet for a created intellect it can be practical per accidens, and that in the intelligence to whom it belongs to act according to the action for which rectitude is determined by the divine will. But as to whether it is practical to the divine will, by holding those two positions [n.333] or the opposites [n.343] it is plain what should be said as a consequence. These three things, however, seem to be probable: first, that the practical is regulative in the action of the contingent, and second that it is regulative of the power of the doer who is set right by something other than himself, and third that in God the only power that acts is will. From the first and third it follows that if divine knowledge is practical, it is rectificatory or regulative in divine volition; but this is false from the second of those things that were said [n.333], because the will of itself first rightly elicits willing with respect to the first object, but with respect to the second objects, which it is contingently related to, it is determined by itself alone, not by any preceding knowledge of rectitude.
VI. To the Principal Arguments of the First Question.

345. To the principal arguments of the first question. To the first [n.217] I say that faith is not a speculative habit and that to believe is not a speculative act, nor is the vision that follows believing speculative, but practical; for the vision is of a nature to be conform to enjoyment and it is first naturally had in the intellect so that right fruition may be elicited in conformity with it.

346. To the second [n.218] one must say that the contingent thing that practical science is about is the end or what is for the end; but in doable things action is the ultimate end according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6.2.1139b3-4; therefore the contingency of action suffices for the object of practical science.

347. Against this is argued, first, that science is of necessary things; therefore there is no science about contingent things. The antecedent is plain from the definition of ‘to know’ in Posterior Analytics 1.2.71b15-16.

348. Likewise from Ethics 6.2.1139a3-15, the scientific is distinguished from the calculative by reference to the necessary and the contingent [n.226], therefore all the habits of the scientific part are about the necessary; but science is a habit of that part; therefore etc.

349. Further, if theology is about the contingent doable, therefore it is a habit of action along with true reason; but, as is said in Ethics 6.5.1140b20-21, this is the definition of prudence; therefore theology is prudence, not science.

350. To the first [nn.347-348] I reply: there are many necessary truths about contingent things, because it is a necessary conclusion that an act that is contingently
elicited should be such as to be right; about it, then, there is science as far as concerns the conclusion necessarily deduced, although it is in itself contingent as far as it is elicited by its proper power.

The response is then plain to the authority of the Philosopher in the *Posterior Analytics* [n.347]: science is of something necessary that is said about the contingent, and so necessary truths are included in the understanding of the contingent, or they are deduced about something that is contingent by reason of some prior necessary thing [*Posterior Analytics* 1.8.75b24-25, 33-36; n.212].

The same point provides the response to the authority of the Philosopher in the *Ethics* [n.348], that the habit of the calculative part is about the act insofar as it is contingently elicited; but the scientific habit or science is about the same thing insofar as something about it is necessarily deduced. If it be objected that there is not the same object for a scientific habit as for a calculative one, we will speak about this next [n.351], how there can be the same object for several habits, although not the same habit for several objects.

351. To the second [n.349] I say that it would prove that moral science is prudence, for moral science is a habit of action along with true reason. Therefore I say that the definition of prudence must be understood of the proximate habit of action, such as is the habit acquired from acts. Hence, just as art is related, in respect of things to be made, to the habit of the man of experience, so is moral science related, in respect of things to be done, to the habit of prudence, because the habits of art and of moral science are as it were remote givers of direction, since they are universal; but the habits of prudence and of the man of experience, because they are generated from acts, are
particular and proximate givers of direction. This exposition is necessary, otherwise there would be no practical science, because any practical science is a habit of doing or of making; but the conclusion is discordant and contrary to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 6.1.1025b25, as it seems, and against Avicenna in *Metaphysics* 1 ch.1 (70ra), and against other authors.

352. To the third reason [n.219] that Boethius understands by theology metaphysics. And as to what he says about the substance of God, I say that God is considered in that science insofar as it is possible in acquired sciences to consider him.

353. To the next [n.220] I say that it is a mark of nobility in an inferior that it reaches what is superior, according to the Philosopher in *Politics* 7.14.1333a21-22. Hence the sensitive power in man is nobler than the sensitive power of a brute, because in man it is ordered to the intellective power. It is therefore a mark of nobility in science that it is ordered to the act of a nobler power. But the Philosopher does not posit any science to be conform to the action of the will about the end, because he did not posit the will to have action about the end but as it were a certain simple natural motion, and therefore he did not posit that there could be any nobler science through conformity to the end; if however he had posited some action about the end, he would not have denied, as it seems, that practical science in respect to that action was nobler than speculative science about the same thing, for example, if there were some speculative science about what moral science is about, he would not say that the speculative science was nobler than the moral science. But we do posit that there is true action about the end, to which knowledge is of a nature to be conform, and therefore that practical knowledge about the end is nobler than any speculative knowledge. Therefore the first proposition of the argument [n.220],
which it seems could be taken from the *Metaphysics*, although the Philosopher does not expressly say it, is to be denied.

354. To the first proof of it [n.220] I say that what is for its own sake is nobler than what is for the sake of some act inferior to it; but whatever he posits as practical is for the sake of something lower than speculative consideration, because it is at any rate about some object inferior to what he posits as the object of speculative consideration; and therefore whatever he posits as practical is less noble than something speculative. Now what is for the sake of some other act, nobler than its own act, is not, because of such order, less noble; for then our sensitive power would be less noble than the sensitive power of the brute.

To the second proof of the denied proposition, when the discussion is about certitude [n.220], I say that any scientific knowledge with respect to its object is equally certain proportionally, because any science makes resolution to its immediate principles; but it is not equally certain in quantity, because these knowables are more certain than those. Thus everything that the Philosopher posits practical science about is a less certain and perfect knowable in itself than what he posits some speculative science about; therefore some speculative science according to him is set down as more certain in quantity than any practical science. But we posit the doable knowable, that is, what is attainable by doing, which is truly action, to be in itself most knowable, and therefore the science of it is not exceeded by any other science either in quantity or in proportion of certitude.

355. To the other reason about necessary existents [n.221] I say that this science was not invented for the sake of extrinsic necessities but for intrinsic ones (as namely for
the order and moderation of passions and actions), just as moral science, if it were invented after all extrinsic necessities had been possessed, would no less be practical. Now this science was not invented ‘for escaping ignorance’, because many more knowables could be handed down in so great a quantity of doctrine than have here been handed down; but here the same things are frequently repeated, so that the listener may more efficaciously be induced to the doing of the things that are here proved.

VII. To the Principal Arguments of the Second Question.

356. To the arguments of the second question. To the authority of the Philosopher in On the Soul [n.223] I say that he is speaking there of the end as known; for the intellect that is calculating for the sake of something is calculating for the sake of the end as known and as principle of demonstration.

357. To the second authority from the Metaphysics [n.224] I say the practical is not for the sake of use as for its per se end; yet it does have some relation to use, such that use is its per se object, or something that virtually includes use, of which sort the only being the Philosopher posited was being for an end; and every such object is less noble than the object of speculation; and therefore such order to action proves the ignobility of the practical in respect of the speculative.

358. To the third authority from the Metaphysics [n.225] I say that the speculative and practical have diverse ends speaking of ends per se within the genus of knowledge, but those ends do not first distinguish them, but there is a prior distinction from the objects, as was said before [nn.252-255, 259, 265-266].
359. To the reasons for the opposite position when argument is given against making distinction by objects:

To the first [n.249] I say that a speculative habit and a practical habit cannot be about the same object. – But when the opposite is proved through the remark of the Philosopher in *On the Soul* that “the intellect is made practical by extension,” I say that the Philosopher does not say the following, namely that the speculative intellect is made practical by extension; but Aristotle, when he posits three grades of intellect, of which the first considers speculables only, the second considers doables, not by commanding to pursue or flee, he says that “by extending itself further it intends to pursue or flee,” so that this extension is of intellect imperfectly practical to consideration perfectly practical, for example from apprehension of things terrible to a complete command about them, prescribing flight or pursuit. A concession, however, that the speculative intellect is made practical is not to the purpose, because ‘speculative’ and ‘practical’ are accidental differences of the intellect, although they are essential differences of habits and acts, and therefore habits and acts are not extended.

360. To the other about medicine [n.250], some say that the universal habit is speculative but when from it the particular habit is acquired it becomes practical. – On the contrary: then from speculative principles a practical conclusion would follow, which is discordant.

361. Therefore one must speak otherwise and say that when there are extreme opposites, the more something departs from one of the opposites, so much the more does it approach the other; the consideration that most has the idea of the practical is the one that is of a nature to be immediately conform formally to the action to be elicited;
therefore the more something departs from that, so much the more does it approach the speculative; therefore the universal habit, which is not of a nature to be immediately conform to action, can be said to be in a way speculative with respect to a habit that is immediately of a nature to be conform to the action to be elicited. In this way art could be set down as a speculative habit with respect to the habit of the man of experience, because art, as being a more universal habit, is not thus immediately directive, as appears from *Metaphysics* 1.1.981a14-24, “the one with the art will err, the one with experience will not err.” In this way medicine can be distinguished into the speculative, namely the one that is about universal causes and cures, which is a knowledge more remote from the action to be elicited, and into the practical, which is about particulars and things closer to action and more immediately conform to the action to be elicited. However, in truth that more universal knowledge, which is called speculative comparatively, is simply and most truly practical, because it virtually includes the particular knowledge that is formally conform to action.

362. To the next one about moral goodness and badness [n.251] I say that not every good act is good first from the circumstance of the end as end, nay some act is good from the circumstance of the object, to wit when the end is the object, and there the circumstance of the end as object first gives rectitude to the act [nn.263-264]; for the act is from the object alone simply good, as the act ‘to love God’ is simply good without any other circumstances. So it is false that the first goodness of the moral act is taken from the end as the end is contradistinguished from the object, nay it is false in a second way, because, although an act about what is for the end has the end for its first circumstance, yet there is from the object a prior goodness, the goodness by which an act is said to be
good in its kind; the third response, directly to the purpose, is that although the circumstance formally circumscribes the action so as to make it good, yet it does not formally circumscribe practical understanding; for the intellect does not command an act moderately or in a middling way, such that it is circumscribed by this circumstance to command moderately, but the intellect commands the act according to the utmost of its power; but the ‘commanding’ is right from the principle, and the principle is taken from the first object.

363. Against this is that the distinction is not through the objects. The proof is that everything formally of a certain sort is of that sort by something intrinsic to it, therefore, if a habit is formally practical, this is by something intrinsic to it; but this is not the object; therefore etc. Example: the sun is not formally hot although it is virtually hot.

364. Further, the object only distinguishes the habit as an efficient cause; efficient causes do not distinguish the effect into species, because an effect the same in species can come from causes diverse in species, as a hot thing the same in species is generated equivocally and univocally by fire and by the sun.

365. To the first [n.363] I say that being practical means intrinsic to knowledge just as aptitudinal respect means intrinsic to the foundation, and that some knowledge is naturally apt to be referred [sc. to something else], that is by a nature intrinsic to the knowledge, which nature it has from the object as from its extrinsic cause. I say then that a habit is practical by what is intrinsic as by the formal cause, but by the object, which is extrinsic, as by the efficient cause.

366. To the second [n.364] I say that although from essentially ordered causes, one of which is univocal and the other equivocal, there can result, when each is causing,
an effect one and the same in nature, as in the example of heat, however, when proximate
causes of the same order to the effect cause something insofar as these causes are distinct,
especially if each is univocal with the effect (whether the univocity is complete or
diminished), there cannot result from such distinct causes an effect of the same nature. I
say univocity is complete when there is likeness in form and in the mode of being of the
form; I say univocity is diminished when there is likeness in form although the likeness
has another mode of being, in the way that the real house outside comes from the house
in the mind of the builder (hence the Philosopher calls this generation ‘in some way’
univocal, *Metaphysics* 7.9.1034a21-25). Because therefore the object is the proximate
cause with respect to knowledge and is univocal, although in a diminished way, it follows
that the formal distinction of objects, since these cause knowledges insofar as they are
distinct, necessarily includes a formal distinction of knowledges.