

Summa Theologica Ia IIae q91. THE VARIOUS KINDS OF LAW

1. Is there an eternal law?
2. Is there a natural law?
3. Is there a human law?
4. Is there a Divine law?
5. Is there one Divine law, or several?
6. Is there a law of sin?

[From the *Summa Theologica* of Saint Thomas Aquinas as translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, and from the works of Blessed John Duns Scotus as selected and arranged by Jerome of Montefortino and as translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. Texts are taken from the *Opus Oxoniense*, the *Reportata Parisiensia*, the *Quodlibeta*, the *Quaestiones Miscellaneae*, and the commentary on the *Metaphysics* of the Wadding edition of Scotus' works.]

Article 1. Whether there is an eternal law?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no eternal law. Because every law is imposed on someone. But there was not someone from eternity on whom a law could be imposed: since God alone was from eternity. Therefore no law is eternal.

Objection 2. Further, promulgation is essential to law. But promulgation could not be from eternity: because there was no one to whom it could be promulgated from eternity. Therefore no law can be eternal.

Objection 3. Further, a law implies order to an end. But nothing ordained to an end is eternal: for the last end alone is eternal. Therefore no law is eternal.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i, 6): "That Law which is the Supreme Reason cannot be understood to be otherwise than unchangeable and eternal."

I answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 2; A3,4), a law is nothing else but a dictate of

Scotus

[For this article Jerome refers to q.19 a.4 "Whether the goodness of the will depends on the eternal law", and places here selections from Alexander of Hales instead. In the body of q.19 a.4 Jerome places the following:]

[*Oxon.* 1 d.3 q.4, d.43; *Quodlib.* q.18; *12 Metaph.* q.4] By the name of eternal law we understand the judgment of the divine intellect which, producing all things in intelligible being, gives to each thing thereby its proper and first intelligible being, and in these things all truths shine out, so much so that as the intellect goes through the terms it necessarily understands all the truths involved therein, whether speculative or practical. Therefore the divine intellect, seeing, from the nature of the terms, that the good is to be loved and that the highest good is to be highest loved, that lies are not to be told, that no one is to be afflicted with harm, and other things of the sort, judges them all together to be so; and it is on such immutable

practical reason emanating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, as was stated in the I, 22, A1,2, that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. Wherefore the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. And since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Proverbs 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Reply to Objection 1. Those things that are not in themselves, exist with God, inasmuch as they are foreknown and preordained by Him, according to Romans 4:17: "Who calls those things that are not, as those that are." Accordingly the eternal concept of the Divine law bears the character of an eternal law, in so far as it is ordained by God to the government of things foreknown by Him.

Reply to Objection 2. Promulgation is made by word of mouth or in writing; and in both ways the eternal law is promulgated: because both the Divine Word and the writing of the Book of Life are eternal. But the promulgation cannot be from eternity on the part of the creature that hears or reads.

Reply to Objection 3. The law implies order to the end actively, in so far as it directs certain things to the end; but not passively--that is to say, the law itself is not ordained to the end--except accidentally, in a governor whose end is extrinsic to him, and to which end his law must needs be ordained. But the end of the Divine government is God Himself, and His law is not distinct from Himself. Wherefore the eternal law is not ordained to another end.

judgment that the eternal law stands firm and immovable in the divine intellect, from which law those terms have, initially and effectively in their intelligible being, the aforesaid connection among themselves, although formally they have it from themselves. But the created intellect, which is a certain spiritual light derived from the uncreated light of the divine intellect, sees, upon apprehending the terms, the connection between them, which they have received from the first truth, and by reason of its participated light naturally understands that good is to be loved and evil fled from; for this is what right reason dictates by its natural virtue, and then positive laws make right reason more explicit, and prescribe these and those things to be done but forbid other things. For the divine intellect is the measure of the whole of nature, and nature is a certain making explicit of the divine art. Since [*Quodlib.* q.18 n.3] therefore the goodness of the act of will depends on the right dictate of reason as on its intrinsic and proximate rule, it ought more to depend on the eternal law, of which the law of nature imprinted on all is a certain participation, and from whose immobility it happens that the law of nature thereby always and infallibly indicates what is to be done or not done.

Article 2. Whether there is in us a natural law?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It would seem that there is no natural law in us. Because man is governed sufficiently by the eternal law: for Augustine says (*De Lib. Arb.* i) that “the eternal law is that by which it is right that all things should be most orderly.” But nature does not abound in superfluities as neither does she fail in necessities. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 2. Further, by the law man is directed, in his acts, to the end, as stated above (90, 2). But the directing of human acts to their end is not a function of nature, as is the case in irrational creatures, which act for an end solely by their natural appetite; whereas man acts for an end by his reason and will. Therefore no law is natural to man.

Objection 3. Further, the more a man is free, the less is he under the law. But man is freer than all the animals, on account of his free-will, with which he is endowed above all other animals. Since therefore other animals are not subject to a natural law, neither is man subject to a natural law.

On the contrary, A gloss on *Romans* 2:14: “When the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the law,” comments as follows: “Although they have no written law, yet they have the natural law, whereby each one knows, and is conscious of, what is good and what is evil.”

I answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 1), law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as

Scotus [*Oxon.* 4 d.17 q.3; d.37]

Objection 1. It seems that it is without any necessity that a natural law is laid down. For from what was said above, q.19 a.4, there is an eternal law fixed immobile and for ever permanent by the judgment of the divine intellect; this law therefore is enough for ruling the human race; therefore, further, no other superadded law of nature is to be laid down.

Objection 2. The institution of all laws is to direct man to his end by means of acts regulated by law; but man is not led to his end by nature but by reason and will; therefore a law is not to be superadded to his nature but to his reason and will, just as has admittedly been done with the positive law that is proposed to him.

On the contrary, [*Oxon.* 2 d.28 n.1] “When the nations, which do not have the law, naturally do what belongs to the law” (*Rom.* 2). Therefore, beyond the eternal and positive law, there is in addition present in nature its own law, which thereby is rightly called natural.

I answer that, in line with the premised authority of the Apostle, there is indeed a natural law altogether instilled in us. *Declaration:* [*Oxon.* 4 d.17 n.3; 3 d.37 n.5] for we call that natural law whose truth is known from the terms; and such is what a practical principle in the law of nature is, known from the terms as a principle in theoretical matters is, albeit far more principles occur and are found in the theoretical faculties than in the practical ones. Natural law therefore embraces the practical principles known from their terms, as that the good and honorable is to be

in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. Wherefore, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above (1); it is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. Wherefore it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (*Psalms* 4:6): “Offer up the sacrifice of justice,” as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: “Many say, Who showeth us good things?” in answer to which question he says: “The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us”: thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.

Reply to Objection 1. This argument would hold, if the natural law were something different from the eternal law: whereas it is nothing but a participation thereof, as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. Every act of reason and will in us is based on that which is according to nature, as stated above (10, 1): for every act of reasoning is based on

loved, the evil and base to be fled from; and embraces in addition the conclusions necessarily and evidently deduced therefrom. For if the good is to be loved, the highest loved is to be loved with all one’s might. Since God, therefore, is such a highest good, he is to be loved with all one’s strength. Therefore the natural law includes the command of the will, or includes the practical reason as moved by the will, dictating what needs to have been done; and it is not only located in the judgment of reason, which judgment is a participation in uncreated light or in the eternal law, but there is added moreover the command of the will establishing the law about things to be done. As therefore the natural law properly includes the idea of law, thus insofar as it is a participation in the eternal law the law of nature departs from the true idea of law, because it precedes the act of will. God, to be sure, [*Oxon. ib.* 1 d.43] by the simple intuition of his intellect attains, in the first moment, all possibilities and sees their terms and goes through the agreements of all of them, and the disagreements of all the terms of possibles, and judges them to be so; thence, further, laws and rules about things to be done are established when the approval of the will is added. Therefore the judgment of the divine intellect indicates to the will that the thing is so or is not so, which agreement or disagreement the terms carry, of themselves, formally on their face, and as established in their principles by the divine intellect; but the force of obligating they obtain from the divine will. Therefore, since the intellect is confronted with principles about things to be done that are known of themselves, or the conclusions inferred from them do, they have the force of natural law and properly bind rational nature. But the judgment of the intellect, as it is understood to be previous to the command of the will, has the force of

principles that are known naturally, and every act of appetite in respect of the means is derived from the natural appetite in respect of the last end. Accordingly the first direction of our acts to their end must needs be in virtue of the natural law.

Reply to Objection 3. Even irrational animals partake in their own way of the Eternal Reason, just as the rational creature does. But because the rational creature partakes thereof in an intellectual and rational manner, therefore the participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is properly called a law, since a law is something pertaining to reason, as stated above (90, 1). Irrational creatures, however, do not partake thereof in a rational manner, wherefore there is no participation of the eternal law in them, except by way of similitude.

indicating but not of binding.

Reply to Objection 1. [*Quodlib.* q.18 nn.12-18; *Oxon.* 2 d.37 q.1 n.8ff.] I reply that the judgment of the divine intellect, remaining immobile, is certainly the eternal law, instilled in intellectual and rational minds because of the fact that they are participations in the uncreated mind; but it is the feature of that law only to indicate, not to oblige, unless is added the command of the will ordering that those things are to be kept. Therefore, if the command of the will binding others to keeping the law is not understood, whatever things are represented as contrary to the judgment of reason would be regarded as evils, not moral or theological evils, but evils of nature and philosophical evils; for they would be contrary to the dictate of reason, but not contrary to the law prescribing or forbidding, and for that reason they would be evils of nature, not of morals.

Reply to Objection 2. This is apparent from what has been said; for because reason only indicates what accords with it according to the light derived to it from the uncreated light, a man who does the contrary commits an evil against nature, but the evil should not be reckoned to be one that earns demerit or that is an offense against God. Man therefore needs another natural law, revealed and human, so that he might rightly conduct himself both with respect to himself and in his ordering towards his neighbor and towards God, and be directed in his acts to his end, to which his very own nature is inclined.

Article 3. Whether there is a human law?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It would seem that there is not a human law. For the natural law is a participation of the eternal law, as stated above (2). Now through the eternal law “all things are most orderly,” as Augustine states (*De Lib. Arb.* i, 6). Therefore the natural law suffices for the ordering of all

Scotus [*Loc. infra cit.*]

Objection 1. There seems to be no necessity for human laws to be established. For, in line with the preceding article and q.19 a.4, the natural law that is instilled in all men is a certain participation in the eternal law. But through the eternal law all things are in their greatest order, according

human affairs. Consequently there is no need for a human law.

Objection 2. Further, a law bears the character of a measure, as stated above (90, 1). But human reason is not a measure of things, but vice versa, as stated in *Metaph.* x, text. 5. Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

Objection 3. Further, a measure should be most certain, as stated in *Metaph.* x, text. 3. But the dictates of human reason in matters of conduct are uncertain, according to Wisdom 9:14: "The thoughts of mortal men are fearful, and our counsels uncertain." Therefore no law can emanate from human reason.

On the contrary, Augustine (*De Lib. Arb.* i, 6) distinguishes two kinds of law, the one eternal, the other temporal, which he calls human.

I answer that, As stated above (90, 1, ad 2), a law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason: for each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above (*De Lib. Arb.* i, 6). Accordingly we conclude that just as, in the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason, so too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed, as stated above (90,

to Augustine (*De Lib. Arbit.* ch.6).

Therefore through the natural law man can order all things, and so it is superfluous to assert and to add human laws in addition.

Objection 2. [*10 Meta.* qq.1, 4 n.1] A measure ought to be most true, otherwise unknown things would not become known through it: the dictate of human reason about things to done is uncertain and doubtful; rather it often happens to err; and even when it is not erring, laws that have been thought to be useful are proved useless. Therefore it is altogether not necessary for any laws to be passed by men.

On the contrary, the opposite was declared in the previous question, aa.2, 3.

I answer that, it must be said that there ought to have been and to be human laws. *Declaration:* [*Oxon.* 3 d.37 n.5; 4 d.17 nn.3-5] although there be instilled in us a law that is natural and derived from the uncreated light of the divine mind, which is the eternal law; nevertheless through such a law we only know the first practical principles, as that the good is to be loved, the evil fled from, the honorable to be followed, the base to be held in hatred; along with the conclusions evidently and necessarily inferred from those principles. And strictly speaking there is nothing else to be said, as regards this natural law; however, by extension, sometimes that also is said to be of the law of nature which is a truth of practice consonant with the principles or conclusions of the law of nature. But as human nature has been vitiated by sin, and like a ship without a rudder is tossed about hither and thither by the storm of the passions, which proceed from the concupiscible and irascible affections and from reason thence clouded over and held down by the weight of

A2,3,4). Wherefore Tully says in his Rhetoric (*De Invent. Rhet.* ii) that “justice has its source in nature; thence certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which emanated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law.”

Reply to Objection 1. The human reason cannot have a full participation of the dictate of the Divine Reason, but according to its own mode, and imperfectly. Consequently, as on the part of the speculative reason, by a natural participation of Divine Wisdom, there is in us the knowledge of certain general principles, but not proper knowledge of each single truth, such as that contained in the Divine Wisdom; so too, on the part of the practical reason, man has a natural participation of the eternal law, according to certain general principles, but not as regards the particular determinations of individual cases, which are, however, contained in the eternal law. Hence the need for human reason to proceed further to sanction them by law.

Reply to Objection 2. Human reason is not, of itself, the rule of things: but the principles impressed on it by nature, are general rules and measures of all things relating to human conduct, whereof the natural reason is the rule and measure, although it is not the measure of things that are from nature.

Reply to Objection 3. The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singular and contingent: but not with necessary things, with which the speculative reason is concerned. Wherefore human laws cannot have that inerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sciences. Nor is it necessary for every

corruptible flesh; those things which become known to him by the natural light cannot be enough for living rightly and for directing his acts in civil life towards conducting life peacefully and securely. Hence it is [*Oxon.* 4 d.15 q.2 n.7; 3 d.40 n.6] that men were able come together and agree among themselves to hand over to a very few in the community, or to one man, political authority over everyone in that community, by whom they might be ruled and ordered to the public good. For in those things which are not contrary to the law of God anyone can justly submit himself to one person, or to a community, to be better directed through him in those matters where he can be ordered better than he can order himself. Further, with the authority or power that has been handed over to that one man, or to several, of directing them who justly handed over to him such power (the dictate of prudence, whether in himself or in his counselors, preceding), he is empowered to set up laws, to bind his subjects to the observance of them, whereby the end of having handed over authority to him is attained. Therefore to the extent it is necessary, after the fall, for there to be political authority among men for preserving the peace and for living quietly and securely, to that extent it was altogether necessary that human laws be and be passed as the public good and the times required.

Reply to Objection 1. The answer is in what was said in the solution, that the good and the tranquility of the republic can hardly subsist through the natural law alone.

Reply to Objection 2. It must be said that human laws ought not to rest on the same perpetuity and firmness as natural law. For since the morals and customs of cities can, for various causes and because of multiple

measure to be altogether unerring and certain, but according as it is possible in its own particular genus.

events, undergo change, it is thereby expedient for rulers of a republic to direct their subject peoples in ways and by dispositions consonant with the variation of the times; it is enough therefore for laws to

be passed by the dictate of prudence of him who has legitimate authority for the good of the community which he moderates. For [*Oxon.* 4 d.46 q.1 n.11] if laws, otherwise just, are, for the causes stated, proved from time to time to be to the detriment of the public good and to be less fitted to the movements of the citizens, then it is just not to keep those just laws and to set up other ones more useful to the community.

Article 4. Whether there was any need for a Divine law?

[Jerome places nothing here from Scotus for this article but refers to what he has collected under Ia q.1 a.1. from *Oxon.* q.1 *Prolog.* and *Report.* ib. q.3]

Article 5. Whether there is but one Divine law?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It would seem that there is but one Divine law. Because, where there is one king in one kingdom there is but one law. Now the whole of mankind is compared to God as to one king, according to *Psalms* 46:8: "God is the King of all the earth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 2. Further, every law is directed to the end which the lawgiver intends for those for whom he makes the law. But God intends one and the same thing for all men; since according to *1 Timothy* 2:4: "He will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth." Therefore there is but one Divine law.

Objection 3. Further, the Divine law seems to be more akin to the eternal law, which is one, than the natural law, according as the

Scotus [*Loc. infra cit.*]

Objection 1. There seems to be altogether one divine law. For as regards both the law handed down through Moses to the Israelites and the law of the Gospel instituted through Jesus Christ, there are altogether the same moral precepts, namely of the Decalogue, to which men are held to conform their acts for salvation; therefore [*Oxon.* 3 d.40 n.3] the Mosaic and Gospel law must be judged to be one and the same as regards essentials, although they would seem to differ in certain accidentals.

Objection 2. The unity of virtue is from the unity of the end; but of the Old and New Law there is one and the same end; therefore each law must also be judged to be altogether one. *Proof of the minor:* because God, when giving the law to the Hebrews through Moses and when promulgating the Gospel to all the nations

revelation of grace is of a higher order than natural knowledge. Therefore much more is the Divine law but one.

On the contrary, The Apostle says (*Hebrews 7:12*): “The priesthood being translated, it is necessary that a translation also be made of the law.” But the priesthood is twofold, as stated in the same passage, viz. the levitical priesthood, and the priesthood of Christ. Therefore the Divine law is twofold, namely the Old Law and the New Law.

I answer that, As stated in the I, 30, 3, distinction is the cause of number. Now things may be distinguished in two ways. First, as those things that are altogether specifically different, e.g. a horse and an ox. Secondly, as perfect and imperfect in the same species, e.g. a boy and a man: and in this way the Divine law is divided into Old and New. Hence the Apostle (*Galatians 3:24-25*) compares the state of man under the Old Law to that of a child “under a pedagogue”; but the state under the New Law, to that of a full grown man, who is “no longer under a pedagogue.”

Now the perfection and imperfection of these two laws is to be taken in connection with the three conditions pertaining to law, as stated above. For, in the first place, it belongs to law to be directed to the common good as to its end, as stated above (90, 2). This good may be twofold. It may be a sensible and earthly good; and to this, man was directly ordained by the Old Law: wherefore, at the very outset of the law, the people were invited to the earthly kingdom of the Chanaanians (*Exodus 3:8-17*). Again it may be an intelligible and heavenly good: and to this, man is ordained by the New Law. Wherefore, at the very beginning of His preaching, Christ invited men to the kingdom of heaven, saying

through his Son, was looking to the same end; and there is eternal salvation for believers and for keepers of the law; therefore the divine law is one and not multiple.

On the contrary, [*Oxon.* 3 d.30 n.1] the Gospel law adds many things to the Old Law; therefore it is not altogether one and the same law. *Proof of the assumption*: for the Savior says (*Matt. 5*): “It was said to those of old time: thou shalt not kill; but I say to you, he who is angry with his brother will be guilty of the judgment;” and so about other precepts; therefore the Mosaic law and the Gospel law are not one law.

I answer that it must be said that God gave law to the Israelite people through Moses and to all men through his Son united to our human nature; but these laws are distinguished as the perfect is distinguished from the imperfect, and as a disposition is distinguished from the form for which it is the preparation. For [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.3 n.8] a later law was always more perfect than an earlier, as is apparent about the law of nature and the Mosaic law. For God proceeds by acting in an orderly manner from the imperfect to the perfect: but the Gospel law is the most perfect of all the laws that God set up for men for life’s state; it is indeed the last, according to that statement of *Matthew 26*: “Of the new and eternal testament;” and after it there will, without doubt, be nothing else. But in a true process from the imperfect to the perfect the later are more perfect. – Next, [*Miscell.* q.6 n.3] the Old Law is a disposition to the New Law and to Christ, as the Apostle says (*Galat. 3*): “The law was our school teacher in Christ.” But although the disposition to a form and the form be from the same agent, they are not so in the same way; for sometimes the

(*Matthew* 4:17): “Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand.” Hence Augustine says (*Contra Faust.* iv) that “promises of temporal goods are contained in the Old Testament, for which reason it is called old; but the promise of eternal life belongs to the New Testament.”

Secondly, it belongs to the law to direct human acts according to the order of righteousness (4): wherein also the New Law surpasses the Old Law, since it directs our internal acts, according to *Matthew* 5:20: “Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Hence the saying that “the Old Law restrains the hand, but the New Law controls the mind” (*Sentent.* iii, D, xl).

Thirdly, it belongs to the law to induce men to observe its commandments. This the Old Law did by the fear of punishment: but the New Law, by love, which is poured into our hearts by the grace of Christ, bestowed in the New Law, but foreshadowed in the Old. Hence Augustine says (*Contra Adimant. Manich. discip.* xvii) that “there is little difference [The ‘little difference’ refers to the Latin words ‘timor’ and ‘amor’--’fear’ and ‘love.’] between the Law and the Gospel--fear and love.”

Reply to Objection 1. As the father of a family issues different commands to the children and to the adults, so also the one King, God, in His one kingdom, gave one law to men, while they were yet imperfect, and another more perfect law, when, by the preceding law, they had been led to a greater capacity for Divine things.

Reply to Objection 2. The salvation of man could not be achieved otherwise than through Christ, according to *Acts* 4:12: “There is no other name . . . given to men,

agent induces the disposition through another, but the form he impresses through himself; just as an architect disposes the material through an assistant and, when it has been got ready, attains the production of the form through himself. Thus God, when giving the Old Law, used the assistance of angels; the Gospel, however, he handed down through his Son, as the Apostle testifies (*Hebrews* 1): “Last of all, in these days he has spoken to us in his Son.” Therefore [*Oxon.* 3 d.40 n.7] as the form excels in perfection with respect to the disposition for it, so the Gospel law is more excellent than the Mosaic law. For this purpose it was fitting for this most perfect law to be adorned with the most perfect aids to grace, which has in fact been done. For there have been instituted in it efficacious sacraments, and more and easier ones than in the Old Law. In addition it contains a doctrine more explicative and declarative of the truth. And, finally, to those who observe the Gospel law is explicitly promised eternal life; but in the Old Law only temporal goods were promised: but never, certainly, do temporal goods as much attract the soul to keeping the law as eternal goods do. The Gospel law is therefore simply more perfect than the Old Law; and they are for that reason distinguished from each other as the imperfect is different from the perfect, and as a disposition is something other than the form to which it is a disposition and an ordering.

Reply to Objection 1. I respond [*Oxon.* 3 d.40 nn.3-7] that indeed the moral precepts of each law are the same; but in the Gospel law they are more exactly explicated, so much so that through them the interior motions of the mind are ordered and directed, which had not been done in the Old Law; and this is without doubt an evident argument of its greater perfection.

whereby we must be saved.” Consequently the law that brings all to salvation could not be given until after the coming of Christ. But before His coming it was necessary to give to the people, of whom Christ was to be born, a law containing certain rudiments of righteousness unto salvation, in order to prepare them to receive Him.

Reply to Objection 3. The natural law directs man by way of certain general precepts, common to both the perfect and the imperfect: wherefore it is one and the same for all. But the Divine law directs man also in certain particular matters, to which the perfect and imperfect do not stand in the same relation. Hence the necessity for the Divine law to be twofold, as already explained.

means and aids were prepared and given proportionate to each, this very fact declares that one of them more excelled and was more perfect than the other.

But although the same moral precepts for salvation were given in each law, nevertheless rarely is eternal life found promised in the Old Law to those who observe it, the opposite of which is in the Gospel, as was said. [But there will be a more explicit discussion of these things below in q.107, collected from *Oxon.* 4 dd.25, 33, 45, 46.]

Reply to Objection 2. We say [*Oxon.* 3 d.36 nn.18-20] that by the middle term in that argument the unity of the virtue of religion is more proved than the unity of the laws that ordain towards such virtue and piety towards God. And although the Legislator intended the same end, to wit the eternal salvation of those observing the Mosaic and the Gospel law, because, however, that end was being proposed more and less perfectly in the Old Law than it is expressed in the New, and because

Article 6. Whether there is a law in the fomes of sin?

[Jerome has nothing from Scotus on this article and quotes from Alexander of Hales instead.]