

William De La Mare (died c. 1290) was an English philosopher and theologian and critic of Thomas Aquinas. As a Franciscan friar he became a master of theology at the University of Paris c. 1275. Returning to England he wrote his work *Correctorium fratris Thomae* (1278, “Corrective of Brother Thomas”). The *Correctorium* was itself subjected to a corrective by Thomists, notably the English Dominicans Richard Knapwell and Thomas Sutton and the French Dominican John of Paris, who entitled their response *Correctorium corruptorii fratris Thomae* (“Corrective of the Corruptive of Brother Thomas”). William’s *Correctorium* was approved for the entire Franciscan order in 1282, when the Franciscan Chapter forbade the study of Aquinas unless accompanied by William’s *Correctorium*. Duns Scotus must therefore have first met Thomas’ thought through William’s work.

[Editorial note: As the Thomistic response to William (not translated here) makes clear, and as is evident, William sometimes misunderstands Thomas. Sometimes his argument fails in itself. Sometimes indeed he makes a good point but a point to which there are Thomistic answers. The Thomistic answers do work, as far as one can tell, but not always in such a way as to rule out William’s alternative, or not always in such a way as to show that Thomas’ answer is better or that there is not an interesting puzzle deserving of further and different thought – of the kind indeed that Scotus himself afterwards pursued. At all events William presents an intriguing set of non-Thomistic opinions.]

The Latin text of William’s *Correctorium* is contained in P. Glorieux, *Le Correctorium Corruptorii ‘Quare’*, (Les Premières Polémiques Thomistes, I. Bibliothèque Thomiste, IX), Kain: Le Saulchoir, 1927. This text is the version composed between 1277 and 1282 (and not the later version of 1284), as Bob Pasnau has kindly informed me (July 2022). To whom my thanks.

The translation is complete, but note that the paragraph numbering and the subheadings are not in the printed Latin text but are added in the translation for ease of reference.

Comments and notice of errors from readers are most welcome.

Peter L.P. Simpson
January, 2016

CORRECTIVE OF BROTHER THOMAS
by
WILLIAM DE LA MARE

[The article titles state the position William rejects, not the position he accepts. The numbers in brackets after the titles of some articles refer to others of the articles where William deals with the same question.]

On the First Part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica*

Article One: <i>That in the fatherland God is seen in his essence and not in a created species</i>	11
Article Two: <i>That our intellect does not know singulars [aa.33, 95]</i>	13
Article Three: <i>That God knows future contingents as they exist in actuality [a.78]</i>	15
Article Four: <i>That some things do not have in God their own proper ideas [aa.27, 32, 79, 80, 81, 97]</i>	17
Article Five: <i>On the perfection of the universe: that the universe, given the things that exist, cannot be better</i>	18
Article Six: <i>That the beginning of the world cannot be demonstrated [a.109]</i>	21
Article Seven: <i>That, if God is the active cause of the world, it does not follow that he is prior to the world in time</i>	21
Article Eight: <i>That in the case of incorruptible things there is only one individual for one species [a.11]</i>	23
Article Nine: <i>That there cannot be another earth besides this one</i>	24
Article Ten: <i>That an angel is not composed of matter and form [aa.11, 12, 28, 91, 100, 113]</i>	25
Article Eleven: <i>That it is impossible for there to be two angels of the same species [aa.8, 11, 29, 30, 86, 88, 115]</i>	27
Article Twelve: <i>That genus and difference are taken according to considerations of determinate and indeterminate [a.10]</i>	28
Article Thirteen: <i>That since an angel is a subsistent form he is necessarily incorruptible [a.10]</i>	29

Article Fourteen: <i>That a multitude materially is not intended by an agent, since it can be increased to infinity</i>	30
Article Fifteen: <i>That after the resurrection Christ had a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it</i>	31
Article Sixteen: <i>That an angel can go from one extreme to another without going through the middle [aa.101, 116]</i>	31
Article Seventeen: <i>That it is not possible for something to be in one term in the whole of a preceding time and to be in the other term in the last instant of that time</i>	33
Article Eighteen: <i>That all the species through which the angels have knowledge are connatural to them</i>	33
Article Nineteen: <i>That the intellect cannot reduce material forms to intelligible reality unless it first reduces them to the reality of imagined forms</i>	35
Article Twenty: <i>That a higher angel understands through fewer species [a.92]</i>	36
Article Twenty One: <i>That angels are given grace and glory according to their natural rank [aa.22, 44, 118]</i>	37
Article Twenty Two: <i>That good angels do not merit any accidental reward [a.21]</i>	39
Article Twenty Three: <i>That the devil sinned at once, immediately after the first instant of his creation [a.25]</i>	41
Article Twenty Four: <i>That the appetitive power is proportioned to apprehension, by which it is moved as movable by mover</i>	43
Article Twenty Five: <i>That the will of an angel clings immovably to what it has willed [a.23]</i>	43
Article Twenty Six: <i>That place is not penal to angels or souls as affecting them by altering their nature but as affecting them by distressing their will [a.83]</i>	44
Article Twenty Seven: <i>That matter cannot precede its form in time [aa.4, 31, 108]</i>	45
Article Twenty Eight: <i>That the soul is not composed of matter and form [aa.10, 31, 91, 100, 113]</i>	48
Article Twenty Nine: <i>That in separate substances there is no diversity in number without diversity in species [a.10, 11, 30, 86, 88, 115]</i>	50

Article Thirty: <i>That rational souls are numbered by numbering bodies [aa.11, 86]</i>	51
Article Thirty One: <i>That in man there is only one substantial form [aa.32, 48, 52, 90, 98, 102]</i>	52
Article Thirty Two: <i>That no accidental disposition pre-exists in matter before the substantial form is introduced [a.31]</i>	57
Article Thirty Three: <i>That memory as it exists in the intellective part of the soul does not have regard to the past as past [aa.2, 95]</i>	63
Article Thirty Four: <i>That the intellect is a simply higher power than the will [a.50]</i>	65
Article Thirty Five: <i>That the better the body the better the soul it is allotted</i>	67
Article Thirty Six: <i>That the separated soul understands through species participated in through influence from the divine light [aa.26, 33]</i>	68
Article Thirty Seven: <i>That the separated soul knows itself through itself [a.1]</i>	69
Article Thirty Eight: <i>That spatial distance does not impede the knowing of the separated soul [aa.36, 42, 95]</i>	69
Article Thirty Nine: <i>That essential reward responds to quantity of love only and not to quantity of work</i>	71
Article Forty: <i>That nothing is reduced wholly to nothing</i>	71
Article Forty One: <i>That higher angels pass on to those subject to them whatever they receive from God</i>	72
Article Forty Two: <i>That spatial distance is no impediment to the locution of the angels [aa.38, 95]</i>	73
Article Forty Three: <i>That all angels are unequal</i>	75
Article Forty Four: <i>That angels who are on the margin between two orders agree more with each other as to nearness of nature than any of them does with those of his own order [aa.11, 21, 118]</i>	76
Article Forty Five: <i>That a per accidens being does not have a cause</i>	76
Article Forty Six: <i>That all human intellects are of the same rank</i>	77

Article Forty Seven: *That a perfection added to the substantial form changes the species [a.46]* 78

Article Forty Eight: *That there is only one substantial form in man [aa.31, 52, 90, 98, 102]* 78

On the First Part of the Second Part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica*

Article One/Forty Nine: *That the essence of blessedness consists in an act of intellect and not in the very act of will* 80

Article Two/Fifty: *That the intellect is best power [a.34]* 82

Article Three/Fifty One: *That rightness of will is required antecedently and concomitantly for blessedness [a.49]* 83

Article Four/Fifty Two: *That the soul of man has, when separated, the being of the composite [aa.31, 48, 86, 114]* 83

Article Five/Fifty Three: *That blessedness does not increase intensively but extensively when the body is taken up again* 84

Article Six/Fifty Four: *That man is lord of his acts because he has deliberation about his acts* 85

Article Seven/Fifty Five: *That man determines himself by reason to will this or that* 86

Article Eight/Fifty Six: *That to command is an act of reason* 87

Article Nine/Fifty Seven: *That the first mover in the powers of the soul for carrying out an act is the will* 88

Article Ten/Fifty Eight: *That reason is the cause of freedom* 88

Article Eleven/Fifty Nine: *That reason is the proper principle of evil acts [a.82]* 90

Article Twelve/Sixty: *That matrimony in the old law was instituted to serve nature and not as a sacrament of the union of Christ and the Church* 90

On the Second Part of the Second Part of Thomas' *Summa
Theologica*

Article One/Sixty One: <i>That charity is not increased by addition</i>	92
Article Two/Sixty Two: <i>That charity can be increased infinitely</i>	93
Article Three/Sixty Three: <i>That one should not obey a superior against divine precept [a.104]</i>	95
Article Four/Sixty Four: <i>That subordinates are not bound to obey superiors in everything</i>	97
Article Five/Sixty Five: <i>That not every lie is a mortal sin</i>	98
Article Six/Sixty Six: <i>That the Holy Spirit moves the mind of someone to do something the significance of which he does not know, as in the case of the soldiers casting lots for the garments of the Lord</i>	101
Article Seven/Sixty Seven: <i>That in prophets there is an alienation of the senses without any disorder of nature</i>	101
Article Eight/Sixty Eight: <i>That it is possible to continue longer in the work of the contemplative than of the active life</i>	102
Article Nine/Sixty Nine: <i>That the perfection of the Christian life consists in the counsels and precepts [a.71]</i>	104
Article Ten/Seventy: <i>That bishops are simply more perfect than religious</i>	107
Article Eleven/Seventy One: <i>That the perfection of Christian life does not consist essentially in voluntary poverty [a.69]</i>	108
Article Twelve/Seventy Two: <i>That the words of the Lord, 'Take no gold or silver or any money in your purse' are to be expounded so as to mean they were said by way not of prescription but of permission [a.96]</i>	110
Article Thirteen/Seventy Three: <i>That poverty, continence, and obedience pertain to perfection instrumentally [aa.69, 71]</i>	111
Article Fourteen/Seventy Four: <i>That he who professes the rule does not vow to keep all that is contained in the rule but to keep a regular life [a.106]</i>	113
Article Fifteen/Seventy Five: <i>That the having in common of moderate wealth,</i>	

<i>necessary for human life and procured at fitting time, is not repugnant to perfection, and does not take anything from perfection</i>	115
Article Sixteen/Seventy Six: <i>That monks can transfer to the order of canons</i>	122

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Truth*

Article One/Seventy Seven: <i>That God can make an actual infinite</i>	124
Article Two/Seventy Eight: <i>That eternity is present to every distinction of time [a.3]</i>	124
Article Three/Seventy Nine: <i>That matter does not have in God its own proper idea [aa.4, 80, 81, 97]</i>	125
Article Four/Eighty: <i>That accidents do not have in God their own proper idea [aa.4, 79, 81, 87]</i>	126
Article Five/Eighty One: <i>That there is one idea corresponding to genus and species and individual [aa.4, 79, 80, 97]</i>	127
Article Six/Eighty Two: <i>That a defect in reason precedes sin in a movement of the will [a.59]</i>	128
Article Seven/Eighty Three: <i>That a separated soul suffers from corporeal fire insofar as it is hindered from its proper operation or from something belonging to it [aa.26, 36]</i>	130
Article Eight/Eighty Four: <i>That material fire does not act as an instrument of divine justice save insofar as it exercises some action [a.83]</i>	134
Article Nine/Eighty Five: <i>That there are no active powers in matter</i>	135

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on the Soul*

Article One/Eighty Six: <i>That the being of the soul is communicated to the body [aa.11, 30, 31, 48, 52, 114]</i>	137
Article Two/Eighty Seven: <i>That in separate beings there is only a distinction in species [aa.11, 29]</i>	138
Article Three/Eighty Eight: <i>That angels differ in species [aa.11, 29, 3, 86, 115]</i>	138

Article Four/Eighty Nine: <i>That the heavens according to the philosophers are ensouled [a.111]</i>	140
Article Five/Ninety: <i>That the soul is united to corporeal matter without an intermediary [aa.31, 32, 48, 52, 98, 102]</i>	142
Article Six/Ninety One: <i>That the soul is not a composite of matter and form [aa.10, 28, 100, 113]</i>	144
Article Seven/Ninety Two: <i>That the higher spiritual substances understand through fewer species [a.20]</i>	146
Article Eight/Ninety Three: <i>That a soul in the wayfarer state cannot understand without phantasms</i>	147
Article Nine/Ninety Four: <i>That the soul's knowledge is, as to some things, confused and universal</i>	147
Article Ten/Ninety Five: <i>That our intellect does not know material singulars first [aa.2, 33, 38, 42]</i>	148

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Virtues*

Article One/Ninety Six: <i>That the words, 'Take nothing on the way,' do not relate to perfection [a.72]</i>	150
--	-----

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Power*

Article One/Ninety Seven: <i>That matter properly speaking does not have an idea in God [aa.4, 79, 80, 81]</i>	153
Article Two/Ninety Eight: <i>That the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul are one substance in man [aa.31, 32, 48, 52, 90, 102]</i>	153
Article Three/Ninety Nine: <i>That God produces things in being by no other operation than that by which he conserves them</i>	154
Article Four/One Hundred: <i>That separate substances are not composed of matter and form [aa.10, 28, 91, 113]</i>	154

On Thomas' *Quodlibetal Questions*

Article One/One Hundred and One: <i>That an angel is in place by application of power [aa.16, 116]</i>	156
Article Two/One Hundred and Two: <i>That it is impossible for there to be several substantial forms in the same thing [aa.31,32, 48, 52, 90, 98]</i>	156
Article Three/One Hundred and Three: <i>That religious are not on occasion bound to reveal to their superior a secret committed to them</i>	158
Article Four/One Hundred and Four: <i>That a subordinate is not bound to reveal the hidden guilt of a brother to a superior, even when the superior commands, without an admonition first [a.63]</i>	159
Article Five/One Hundred and Five: <i>That perjury is a greater sin than Murder</i>	161
Article Six/One Hundred and Six: <i>That he who vows everything that is in a rule sins mortally by transgressing them [a.74]</i>	162
Article Seven/One Hundred and Seven: <i>That the body of Christ during the three day triduum was in some respect not the same as it was before [a.31]</i>	163
Article Eight/One Hundred and Eight: <i>That God cannot make matter to be without form [a.27]</i>	165
Article Nine/One Hundred and Nine: <i>That it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world is not eternal [a.6]</i>	166

On Thomas' *Commentary on Sentences I*

Article One/One Hundred and Ten: <i>That the powers of the soul are accidents</i>	168
Article Two/One Hundred and Eleven: <i>That the first movable sphere is composed of mover and moved [a.89]</i>	168
Article Three/One Hundred and Twelve: <i>That the first moved sphere is the cause of all corporeal motion</i>	169
Article Four/One Hundred and Thirteen: <i>That the soul is not composed of matter and form [aa.10, 28, 91, 100]</i>	170

Article Five/One Hundred and Fourteen: <i>That a conjoined thing has no other being than the being of the form [aa.31, 48, 52, 86, 113]</i>	171
Article Six/One Hundred and Fifteen: <i>That the soul is individuated by the body, and cannot be created before it is infused [aa.8, 11, 29, 30, 86, 88]</i>	172
Article Seven/One Hundred and Sixteen: <i>That place is not due to anything simple save through the relation it has with a body [aa.16, 101]</i>	173
Article Eight/One Hundred and Seventeen: <i>That the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by virtue of one nature</i>	173
Article Nine/One Hundred and Eighteen: <i>That he who has better natural faculties receives more grace [aa.21, 44]</i>	174

Corrective of Brother Thomas

On the First Part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica*

Article One

That in the fatherland God is seen through his essence and not through a created species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In *ST Ia q.12 a.2*, when asking whether the divine essence is seen by a created intellect through some intermediary likeness, he [Brother Thomas] says that some likeness of God is required on the part of the seeing power, namely the light of glory, to strengthen the intellect for seeing God, as he himself says there a little later at the end of his reply; but, on the part of the seen thing (which needs to be united in some way to the seer), the essence of God cannot be seen through any created likeness. And he seems to introduce it with four arguments.

2. The first argument that he introduces, though not expressly, is as follows: a likeness is necessary for any sensitive or intellective knowledge where the thing itself cannot be in the senses or the intellect, for the knowable thing needs to be in the knower. Now what cannot be in the knower by its essence must be there by its likeness; but God is in the intellect by his essence; therefore he cannot be there by his likeness.

3. The second argument is that, as Dionysius says in *Divine Names* ch.1, higher things cannot in any way be known through likenesses of things of a lower order, just as the essence of a non-bodily thing cannot in any way be known through a species of the body. Much less, therefore, can the divine essence be known by any created species.

4. The third argument is that the essence of God, as was shown above, is his very existence, and this cannot belong to any created form. No created form, therefore, can be a likeness that represents to the seer the essence of God.

5. The fourth argument is that the divine essence is something uncircumscribed that contains supremely in itself whatever can be signified or understood by a created intellect. And this can in no way be represented by any created species, because every created form is limited to some notion of wisdom, or truth, or existence, or something of the sort. Hence to say that God is seen through a likeness is to say that the divine essence is not seen.

6. These in brief are the words of Brother Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

7. This position seems to us false and contrary to the authority of the saints. For Augustine says *On the Trinity* 9.11, "when we know God, we are made ever so much better than we were before we knew, and a word exists with that same knowledge, especially when the knowledge is also pleasing and is worthily loved; and the knowledge is made to be a likeness of God, though it is inferior because it exists in an inferior nature

– the mind of course is a creature and God the creator.” Here Augustine says expressly that a likeness of God inferior to God comes to be in the mind of someone knowing God. From this it is plain that the essence itself does not indicate the likeness, because it is plain that the divine essence is not inferior to itself. If you say, as Thomas himself says, that Augustine is speaking of the knowledge of God had by the wayfarer, this is for us enough for the purpose, because we at least have the fact that, where the divine essence is present in itself, it can become a likeness and be known through a likeness.

8. Further, Anselm *Monologion* ch.33 says that although the mind desires to know a thing truly, it tries, as much as it is able, to express in its thinking a likeness of it, whether through a bodily image or through reason; and the truer it makes this the truer it knows the thing.

9. Further, this position does not seem to agree with itself. For we see that at least two things are required for understanding anything created, namely a likeness of the understood thing informing the intellect and an intelligible light under which and in which the thing is seen through its likeness. Thomas posits the reverse and says that no likeness is required on the part of the seen thing for seeing the essence of God, since the divine essence cannot be seen through any likeness, but a likeness is required on the part of seeing power, namely the light of glory strengthening the intellect for seeing. It seems, however, that the reason that the divine essence can be a form of the intellect per se informing it for understanding is equally a reason that it can be per se a light illumining and strengthening the intellect for seeing. And if the natural light, which is not God, can of itself generate or make an intentional light as a species of itself to be seen in, why cannot the divine essence in the same way generate or make a likeness of itself to be seen in?

10. Further, in the case of colors and other visible intentions, the species through which they are seen and the light under which and in which they are seen; but in the case of visible light the species of light and the ray of light do not differ, but the ray is itself the very species of the light. So it seems to be, by similarity, in the case of the intelligible light that is God. Therefore the intellectual ray that is the ray of glory is the very species of the increated light that is God, through which and in which he is seen. Therefore, to posit that the divine essence is not seen by the intermediary of its species or likeness, and that it is seen by the intermediary of a ray that is its likeness, is to posit contraries.

To the Arguments

11. A response must be made to the arguments. To the first [n.2], where he says that a likeness of the thing, when the thing is present, is not necessary for understanding, I say that this is false. For it is clear that the soul is most present to itself and yet it only understands itself through a likeness. Hence Anselm says in *Monologion* ch.33 that the rational mind possesses along with itself an image born of itself when it understands itself in its knowing, that is, it has its own knowledge formed to its own likeness by its own quasi impression, and this image is its word. And the Commentator in *On the Soul* 3, on the phrase, “and the soul is intelligible like other things,” says that Aristotle had a doubt about the understood material thing, whether the thing understood from it was the intellect or was something else in some other way, and he says that Aristotle went on to determine that it is understood in it through intention, as are other understood things. Or

it can be said that, although a thing is present to the intellect, yet it is not present to it in its nature as knowable unless it moves the intellect; but this could not be done save by a flowing form and not by a resting one, just as we see that an innate hectic fever, which turns into a habit and rests there as it were, is felt little or not at all by the patient, but a tertian fever, which is lesser, is very sensible, because it is in a state of becoming and change. Wherefore, since the divine essence can in no way be in the intellect as a form, it cannot be there in becoming and change; but a likeness of the divine essence could be disposed thus. Hence, the divine essence does not suffice for understanding, even if it be present to the intellect, but a likeness of it is required. This is the doctrine of Avicenna, *Naturalia* 6 pt.2 ch.3, pt.4 ch.5.

12. To the second argument [n.3] about Dionysius, when he says that higher things cannot be known through a likeness of things of lower order, one must say that these words are not found in our translation; yet supposing them to be found in another translation, one must say that Blessed Dionysius does not understand by a likeness of things of lower order the likeness generated or expressed by the thing, but the properties of material things insofar as the properties are likenesses symbolic of the properties of immaterial things, just as the properties of fire or lion or sun are likenesses symbolic of the properties of God; and about such likenesses Dionysius says what is true, but it is nothing to the matter at issue.

13. To the third [n.4], when Thomas says that the divine essence is its existence, which belongs to no created form, I say that the species represents God both as to his essence and as to his existence, and this is possible although the form itself is not its own existence; for proportion is not required in every respect between the likeness and the thing of which it is the likeness. For the species or likeness of a bodily thing in the soul is not bodily, just as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 13.2, 5, that “the species of a living thing is not itself a living thing and yet it represents that the thing is alive.” Likewise I say in the matter at issue that the species or likeness of the divine essence, even though it is not its own existence, yet does represent the divine essence, and represents that the essence is its own existence.

14. To the fourth [n.5], when Thomas says that the divine essence is uncircumscribed and infinite, one must say that it does not follow from this that the divine essence cannot be known through a created and finite essence; but what follows is that it cannot be known perfectly through such a species, namely known to the extent it is knowable; for the divine essence is not knowable by the creature nor through the creature but only by itself and through itself.

Article Two

That our intellect does not know singulars

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in *ST* q.14 a.11 ad 1 he says that our intellect does not know singulars; for our intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the individuating principles, and so the intelligible species of our intellect cannot be a likeness of the individuating principles. So from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

2. This gives occasion for error because, according to it, separated souls and angels would not know Christ in the fatherland by intellectual cognition, which is contrary to *John* 17.3, “And this is eternal life, to know you the only true God and Jesus Christ whom you have sent.”

3. Again, it is contrary to Augustine *City of God* 22.29 when he says, “The reasoning of the philosophers, who dispute that intelligible things are thus seen by the sight of the mind and bodily things by the senses of the body, so that the mind is not able to gaze at intelligible things through the body nor bodily things through itself, is mocked by true reason and philosophical authority.”

4. Further, as Seneca says, sin is a voluntary action; but actions are of singulars; therefore sin is a singular act, and sometimes it is about objects that can be grasped not by any of the senses but by the intellect. So if the intellect does not know singulars, as Thomas says, and what a man does not know he cannot repent of or correct himself about, as Seneca says to Lucilius, “the beginning of salvation is the knowledge of sin; for he who does not know his sin does not want to be corrected, nor is he able to correct such sins or repent of them” – but since this is erroneous, so also is what it follows from, namely that the intellect does not understand singulars.

5. Further, this is contrary to philosophy; because if the intellect does not know singulars then it will not be able to form any proposition in which there is a singular term and so not be able to syllogize about it either

6. Again, the intellect could not then collect or abstract the universal from many singulars; for someone who does not know cannot, on the basis of what he does not know, abstract a knowable intention.

7. Again, according to this, our intellect would look in vain at phantasms of a singular thing, the contrary of which is stated by the Philosopher, that without phantasms man understands nothing.

8. Again, according to this, the intellect could not discover or determine the right reason of what is to be done, for every action is a singular and about singulars; and so counsel and deliberation would be vain, which is a very stupid thing to say.

To the Argument

9. In answer to the argument [n.1] one can say that the intellect not only knows or understands through universal species abstracted from material and individuating conditions (as he supposes, and falsely), but it also understands through singular species and intentions, and through such it understands singulars. For how would the intellect form these sorts of propositions, ‘Peter is Peter’ and ‘Peter is not John’, unless it first received the simple intentions of Peter and John? In no way, in truth. Hence the argument proceeds from a false supposition, namely that the intellect understands through universal species alone.

Article Three

That God knows future contingents as they exist in actuality

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again in a.13 of the same q.14, where the question is asked whether God has science of future contingents, Thomas says, in the response to the question, that a contingent event can be considered in two ways. In one way in itself as it actually is, and in this way it is not considered as future but as present, and not contingent to either eventuality but as determined to one of them; and for this reason sure knowledge can infallibly be had of it, as when by the sense of sight I see Socrates sitting. In another way a contingent event can be considered as it is in its cause, and in this way it is considered as future and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one result, because a contingent cause is disposed to opposite possibilities; and no certainty of knowledge can be had of a contingent thing in this sense. Hence whoever knows a contingent effect only in its cause only has conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingents not only as they are in their causes but also as each is actually in itself. But Thomas' reason is given a little later, that divine knowledge is measured by eternity as also is divine existence, and eternity, existing as a whole all at once, embraces the totality of time. Hence everything that is in time is present to God from eternity, not only for the reason that he has the ideas of things present to himself (as some say), but because his gaze from eternity ranges over everything as it is in its present existence. So it is manifest that contingent things are known infallibly by God.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position contains a manifest error, indeed several errors, for Thomas does not mean to say that God knows future contingents with as much certainty as if they were present in reality and were determinate (for this is true). Rather he means that, because eternity is present to every difference of time and every difference of time is present to eternity, therefore contingents that do not yet really and actually exist in time are now really and actually in eternity in their own natures and thus fall under the divine vision. This is manifestly expressed by his words when he says that everything in time is present to God from eternity, not only for the reason that he has the ideas of things present to himself (as some say), but because his gaze from eternity ranges over everything as it is in its present existence. For this is simply false and erroneous, because this is to put all contingents, and much more all necessities, eternally in eternity, even though they are produced in time from not being to being. For it is clear that things can be said to be present to God only in two ways, either in their causal principle or in their actual existence. So if everything that is in time is, as he himself says, present eternally to God *not* on the ground that he has the ideas of things present in himself, then necessarily everything has been in actual existence eternally from eternity just the way it was afterwards in time; and this is to posit that everything is eternally in eternity, which is contrary to our faith.

4. This is also contrary to manifest reason. For it is certain that the philosophers and saints posit that God had eternally in himself the causal principles and ideas of the things to be made, and that through these principles and according to them he made and makes whatever he made and makes. But this would be an otiose thing to posit if everything existed eternally from eternity in its proper nature and as thus open to divine sight. For the things themselves as actually existing in eternity were sufficient for knowing and making everything in time; and so it would be superfluous to posit causal reasons in God, and this is contrary to the saints and philosophers.

5. Thomas' reasoning also proceeds from a false understanding. For when he says that eternity embraces the whole of time and that every difference of time is present to eternity, his meaning is not that eternity embraces time and temporal things in their very natures while they do not exist, or that time and temporal things, which are nothing in their own nature, are present to eternity; but what is said is only to the effect that the causal principles and ideas of all times and all temporal things are present to God eternally. And this meaning seems to be explained by Augustine *Confessions* 11.18 who says as follows: "When the future is said to be seen, the things themselves that not yet are, namely things in the future, are not seen but the causes or perhaps signs of them are seen, and these already are. So it is not future things but present things that people see, and from these they predict the future things that they conceive in their mind; and these conceptions again already are, and those who predict the future gaze on conceptions they have within themselves." In this same sense is everything said to be life in God, namely because the principles of all things live in God. Hence Augustine, in his homily on the words 'That which was made was in him life' of *John* 1.4, says, "The earth itself which was made is not life, but there is in God a certain spiritual principle through which the earth was made, and this is life." Certainly if things in their proper kind, or in their natural existence, were eternally from eternity, then the Evangelist would not have said universally that what was made was life in him, or at least Augustine would not have passed over it in his exposition without making a distinction.

6. Further, what is said in this preceding argument, that all who know a contingent effect in its cause alone have only a conjectural knowledge of it, is clearly false and against the idea of prophecy. For we believe that the prophets saw with certitude what they announced with unchangeable truth, according to what is said in the definition of prophecy. Yet it is certain that they did not see future things in their own nature; therefore they saw them in their causal principles. But if someone wants to deny this of some or all the prophets, then at least it cannot be denied of the holy angels, because they foresaw in the Word and in the causal principles many future things with certitude and not conjecturally, and these things are what is revealed to the prophets and saints according to the good pleasure and disposition of God.

7. The third false and erroneous thing that the aforesaid position lays down is that God knows all contingent and temporal things in a way different from that in which he knows them as they are in their causes and from that in which he knows them in the principles that he possesses within himself, namely by gazing upon them as they are actually present to him eternally. This view of Thomas' is taken from his express words; for he says in the aforesaid response: God knows all contingents not only as they are in their causes but also as each exists actually in itself. And a little later he adds: All things that are in time are present eternally to God not only for the reason that he has the ideas

of things present to him (as some say) but also because his gaze ranges over all things eternally as they are in his presence, that is God's presence. These are Thomas' words. From this it follows that God knows creatures through reception. For if he knows them in a way other than through the ideas he has of them in himself, and other than they are in their causes, by casting his gaze upon the very things themselves, this cannot be understood or at least imagined to be other than by reception. But that God knows something by reception is impossible both according to the saints and according to the philosophers, all of whom agree that God's knowledge is the cause of things and is not caused by the things as our knowledge is. But clearly, if God knew through reception, his knowledge would be caused by things. Again from this it follows that his knowledge would not be his substance, which is impossible; and from this would follow that he was not pure act but would be a knower in potentiality and that his potentiality to know would be perfected in him by creatures; all which things are most absurd.

Article Four

That some things do not have in God their own proper ideas

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again in q.15 a.3 Thomas asks whether there are ideas in God of everything that God knows, and he argues as follows: "God knows prime matter, which can have no idea since it has no form. Further, God knows not only species but also genera and singulars and accidents, but there are no ideas of these according to Plato's position." And in his response to objection three he speaks thus about matter: "Because we posit that matter was created by God, but not without form, matter does indeed have an idea in God but not an idea other than the idea of the composite; for matter in itself neither has existence nor is knowable."

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This view seems erroneous because God has ideas of everything he can make, because nothing can be made by someone who does not know; but, as has been determined by the masters, he can make matter without form, just as in the sacrament of the altar he makes accidents to exist without a subject, which accidents depend more on a subject than matter depends on form. Therefore matter has a distinct idea in God even according as an idea is a principle of operation and of making things and is called an exemplar, which Thomas denies.

4. Again it seems one should posit rather that God has distinct ideas of matter and form than of the composite, the contrary of which he asserts. For the Commentator says on *Physics* 1 ch.2 text 3 that the causes in the case of artificial things are more known to the artisan than the composite is, because from the causes, as from matter and form, the artisan makes the composite thing. Hence, if we were to make natural things, then their causes would be more known to us. So says the Commentator. Therefore matter and form are more known to God, who is the maker of all natural things, than the composite is,

because God makes the composite from these causes, namely from matter and form; so, according to the nature of understanding, God has the ideas of them first in himself and more expressly or more distinctly

5. Further, in his reply to the fourth argument, Thomas says about genus and accidents that genera cannot have an idea other than the idea of the species (in the sense in which idea means exemplar), because the genus never comes to be save in some species. And it is similar in the case of accidents that follow their subject inseparably, because these accidents come to be together with the subject; but accidents that supervene on the subject, as pictures, do have a special idea. But what he says about the idea of the genus seems to be false, because (as is said in *De Generatione Animalium* 2.3) an embryo is an animal before it is a man or a horse, and likewise it is an animal before it is a man. And it is plain that the individual that is in the process of generation to being a man or a horse is an individual of a genus and is not yet an individual of a species, and that the form of the genus actually and per se exists in itself before the form of any species; therefore the genus must be known and produced by God through an idea different from any idea of a species.

6. Similarly Thomas' statement that accidents inseparable from subjects cannot have an idea different from the idea of the subject is false. For all those things that can be per se distinctly produced and exist have distinct ideas; but accidents of this sort can distinctly exist without a subject, as we most firmly believe of the sacrament of the altar. Therefore they must have distinct ideas.

Article Five

On the perfection of the universe: that the universe, given the things that exist, cannot be better

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.25 a.6, in response to the third argument, Thomas says that the universe, given the things that exist, cannot be better, because the most fitting order, in which the good of the universe consists, has been bestowed on these things by God, and if one of these things could be better the proportion of order would be destroyed, just as the harmony of the lyre is destroyed if one string is tightened more than it should be.

2. These are the assertions of Thomas.

3. This is contrary to the truth of the faith, which posits that, after the judgment, not only could the universe be better but also it will be better, when the heavenly bodies are changed for the better by a change being made in their qualities and in the substances of things, as the Gloss says on *I Corinthians* 7.31, 'The form of this world is passing away'.

4. As to his statement that proportion and fitness of order is corrupted if any one thing is made better, we say that proportion and fitness of order with each other of the parts of the universe is not understood only as to one determinate time and as to parts that exist in one signified time, but also as to the course of the whole of time and of all the parts from the beginning of the world to its end. Hence the proportion and fitness of order in the universe does not concern things persisting in one way and at one time only, but concerns things disposed in succession in the whole of time. Again his example about a

string tighter than it should be is not valid, because when the universe is made better no part will be enlarged in goodness more than it should, for as one is made better so will the others in proportion; and thus, just as the same universe and the same parts will remain made better, so will the same proportion remain but made better.

Article Six

That the beginning of the world cannot be demonstrated

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Next, in q.46 a.2 in the main response to the question, Thomas says that the world's having a beginning is an article of faith and belongs to belief not knowledge, just as that a Trinity is found in divine reality is an article of faith. His first proof is that faith is about things that do not appear, *Hebrews* 11.1, but things that do not appear are not known but believed. Now that the creation had a beginning is an article of faith, for we say [in the Creed]: I believe in God, the Father almighty, maker of heaven and earth.

2. Again, that the world had a beginning is held by revelation and prophecy, according to Gregory's first homily on *Ezekiel*, and Moses says (*Genesis* 1.1), 'In the beginning God made the heavens and the earth.' So this is not known by demonstration.

3. Again, this cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world, because the beginning of demonstration is the essence of the thing; but everything abstracts from the here and now in its specific idea; hence that man or stone did not always exist cannot be demonstrated.

4. Again, the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the cause of the agent, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason in respect to things that there is no necessity for him to will absolutely; but of such sort are things he wills in the case of creatures. However, the will of God can be made manifest to man by revelation, on which faith rests. And so it is a thing for belief, not knowledge, that the world began to be. This, Thomas says, is a useful thing to consider, lest perhaps someone presume to demonstrate what is matter of faith and introduce reasons that are not determinative, and lest thereby infidels, reckoning that we believe things of faith on the basis of such reasons, be given occasion for ridicule.

5. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

6. In this position and the reason for it three falsehoods are contained: one is that things of faith are believed and not known; the next is that the beginning of the world is held by faith alone and cannot be demonstrated; the third is that one should not presume to demonstrate things of faith. The same is also said more expressly in his *Disputed Questions* q.54, which concerns whether it can be demonstrated that the world is not eternal. In his response to the question he says that one must take care not to presume to adduce demonstrations for things of faith.

7. As to what he first says, that things of faith are believed and not known, we say it is false, and is against Sacred Scripture and the saints and the doctors. How this is false is

plain as follows: it is clear that God's existence is something for belief, as the Apostle says in *Hebrews* 11.6, 'He who comes to God must believe that he is;' it is also clear that God's existence is demonstrable by reason, for the philosophers demonstrated God's existence, namely the existence of a first cause. God's oneness is similarly both demonstrable and a matter of belief, and similarly his eternity.

8. Thomas' view also seems to be against Sacred Scripture, for *Isaiah* 7.9 (according to the *Septuagint*) says, 'Unless you believe you will not understand,' and *I Peter* 3.15 says, 'Always ready to give satisfaction to anyone who demands of you a reason for the faith and hope that is in you.'

9. It is also against Augustine and Richard of St. Victor. For Augustine *On True Religion* says, 'All the things that we do not believe unless we first follow authority are sufficiently understood that they are seen to be in part most certain and in part things that have come to be or ought to have come to be.' Richard too, in his *On the Trinity* 1.4, says, 'It will be part of our intention in this work to adduce, as far as God has given us, not only probable but also necessary reasons for what we believe; for I without doubt believe that not only probable but also necessary reasons are not lacking to explain each one of them.'

10. As to the second thing too that Thomas says [n.6], that the newness or beginning of the world cannot be demonstratively proved, we say that it is false; for although the beginning or newness of the world cannot be demonstrated by the demonstration that is called most compelling and gives the reason why, yet it can be demonstrated by reduction to impossibility, about the infinity of souls and passing through infinities if the world was eternal. Thomas sets down both these arguments, namely about passing through infinities and the infinity of souls, in his objection in favor of the newness of the world, and he tries to solve them. And I call on the infinite truth, which is God, that, as conscience is my witness, he solves them neither truly nor apparently, neither philosophically nor theologically. For example, as to the argument about the infinity of souls he replies, following those who posit the eternity of the world, in several ways, namely that some do not think an actual infinity of souls is impossible; some say that the soul is corrupted along with the corruption of the body; some that only a single soul from all the souls remains; others that there is a circulation of souls, so that, after determinate temporal circulations, souls are many times separated from bodies and many times return to bodies. After these most absurd falsities he sets down his own, saying that someone could say that the world was eternal, or some creature was, as an angel, but not man. And in this way he tries to defend and to deny the opinion of those who posit the eternity of the world. For he says that the Philosopher, whose opinion he defends, says in his book on plants that the corporeal world is perpetual and has never ceased to produce animals and plants and all the species of them. So it is plain that, in all these ways, his iniquity is led astray.

11. As to the third thing he says [n.6], that one must take great care not to introduce demonstrations for things of faith, I say that is false and against Sacred Scripture, because it is written in *I Peter* 3.15, 'Always ready to give satisfaction to anyone who asks you a reason for the faith and hope that is in you.' It is also against the saints, because Augustine in *On the Trinity* and others of his books, and Richard in *On the Trinity* aim to prove, not just to believe, what the faith holds about the Trinity and about other matters of belief. And he himself produced a book *Against the Gentiles* where he uses reasons for

the faith against them; but if the faith neither can nor should be proved he labored in vain. Hence, just as he produced that book in favor of the faith, so he produced this one in prejudice to the faith and to the saints, and against reason; for if a reason should be given for the faith, as blessed Peter says, and if a demonstrative reason can be given, as is shown by Augustine and Richard, it is more expedient to give demonstrative reasons than probable or sophistical ones.

To the Arguments

12. To the first argument [n.1], therefore, one should say that, although faith is about things that do not appear, which for us do not have an evident reason as to the why, yet they do have signs and effects by which they are demonstrated. For not only does a demonstration as to the why give us knowledge, but so too does a demonstration as to the fact. Besides, when we say that faith is about things that do not appear, the meaning is not that they were non-apparent for all time, but that they were so only for as long as one has faith about them – except by interpretative construction, namely when a man would have been ready to believe the same things by faith if he had not known them by reason, and so there is no loss of the merit of faith.

13. To the second [n.2] one must say that, although the creation of the world first become known through revelation, yet it can and could have been proved and known by the learned through a demonstration as to the fact, namely by reduction to impossibility. For nothing prevents God revealing innumerable truths that are yet demonstrable. But faith does not rely on these sorts of demonstrations but on the first truth revealing them; and yet it rejoices in demonstration when demonstration can be had.

14. The third argument too [n.3] is not valid, because not every demonstration is a demonstration as to the why or through the cause, but some are through signs and effects and reductions to impossibility. (Further, the fact that there is only world is not an obstacle to demonstration, just as the fact that there is only one moon or a single sun is not an obstacle to proving eclipses of both of them by universal demonstration, and the proof would hold of many moons and suns if there were many.) Thus it is that the middle term in a demonstrative proof about this world [sc. that it began in time] is not the definition of the subject term but the definition of the property, that is, of the major term.

15. To the fourth argument [n.4] one must say that, although the will of God cannot be investigated a priori, yet it can be investigated insofar it is made clear to us a posteriori. Hence I say that God's will about creating the world could not, before the creation of the world, have been known save by revelation (had there been anyone to whom the revelation could have been made); but after the creation of the world God's will can be known from the created world itself; for the invisible things of God are seen through the things that are made, etc. [*Romans* 1].

Article Seven

That, if God is the active cause of the world, it does not follow that he is prior to the world in duration

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Also, in the same question and article [q.46 a.2], in response to the first argument, he speaks as follows: one must consider that an efficient cause that acts through motion must necessarily precede its effect in time, because the effect exists only at the end of the action while the agent must be the beginning of the action; but if an action is instantaneous and not successive, there is no need for the maker to be prior in duration to the thing made, as is plain in the cause of illumination. Hence it does not necessarily follow that, if God is the active cause of the world, he is prior in duration to the world, because the creation by which God produced the world is not a successive change, as was said above.

2. These are the words of Thomas

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Here he seems very expressly to say things from which it follows that the creation of the world could have been eternal. For from his words that, if action is instantaneous and not successive, there is no need for the maker to be prior in duration to the thing made (and afterwards he adds that the creation by which God produced the world is not a successive change), it follows that God is not necessarily prior in duration to the creation of the world, and this is to say that it was possible for the world to be coeternal with God; and this is simply false and very close to the error of those who posit that the world is eternal.

4. But that this is not possible is seen as follows. It is clear that one can truly say most of an angel or the heavens, among all the parts of the world, that they were made eternally. But I prove that it is not true even of them. I argue as follows: in no thing is there a having been made without a being made preceding it in duration or at least accompanying it; because everything made is either made successively or through motion, and then being made precedes having been made in duration, or it is made suddenly without succession, and then being made and having been made are simultaneous. So in this way is the stated proposition clear, namely that it was true to say about everything made that it is being made, and this either before it is being made or simultaneous with its having been made. Therefore it was true to say of the heavens that, before they have been made, they are being made. Hence, if it was true that, before the heavens had been made, they were being made, then the heavens have not been made eternally. For, in the case of things where being made precedes having been made, that which is being made is not when it is being made but only is then when it has been made. But if these two statements, 'the heavens are being made' and 'the heavens have been made', are true at once, then they were and are both true together either always or for some determinate instant. But if they were and are both true together always, namely that the heavens both are being made and have been made, then it is also true now to say that the heavens are being made, which no one says since the heavens are the most permanent of beings. If however the two statements, the heavens are being made and have been made, were true together for some determinate instant, then before that instant there were no heavens, because nothing exists before it is being made or has been made. Therefore it could not have been eternally true that the heavens were made; and by parity of reasoning not the world either.

5. Further, Thomas himself posits that the world was made from nothing, and, by his positing this, it seems necessary that the world began and has being after not being. For when it is said that the world was made from nothing, this is meant materially or negatively (that is, not out of anything) or by origin or by order. Not materially or by origin because nothing is the matter or origin of nothing; not negatively only, because if the only reason the world is said to have been made from nothing is that it has been made and not made from anything, then by parity of reasoning one should concede in the same sense that God the Father is from nothing because he is and is not from anything; but no one concedes this latter; therefore neither is the aforesaid sense reason to concede the former. The remaining option then is that ‘being made from nothing’ is said by way of order. Either then by order of nature only, and if so the nothingness or non-being of the world precedes its being by order of nature only and so not by duration; therefore the being and not being of the world were simultaneous in duration; but the same reason that they were at some time simultaneous is a reason that they are now and always simultaneous, for they are not more compossible at one time than at any other time; therefore the being and not being of the world are simultaneous now, indeed always; therefore just as it is true now to say that the world is, so it is true now to say that the world is not, which is plainly false. But if the not being of the world precedes its being in order of actual duration, then the world is not eternal; for the eternal is not preceded by anything.

6. Again, if something were reduced to nothing it would cease to be and could not have infinite duration afterwards; therefore, by likeness, if something is produced from nothing it begins to be and cannot have infinite duration beforehand.

7. Further, note that Thomas says the things he says to solve an argument, namely the argument that if action is instantaneous and not successive there is no necessity for the maker to be prior in duration to the made; note that this is true in some cases but fails in others; for where an eternal maker produces his effect from nothing, the maker must be prior in duration to the made, for an eternal maker never was not; but a thing made from nothing at some time was not, namely when it was nothing. But what never was not was necessarily prior in duration to what sometimes was not; and so the example about a foot’s footprint existing eternally in the sand is sophistical as concerns the production of creatures from nothing; for a footprint produced in the sand is not produced immediately from nothing; by the same reasoning the example about fire and its light is sophistical as concerns creation, because the light generated from fire is not produced immediately from nothing; but as to the generation of the Son from the Father, which is not generation from nothing, the example is a very fitting one and is thus introduced by Blessed Augustine (*City of God* 10.31).

Article Eight

That in the case of incorruptible things there is only one individual for one species

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in a.47 a.2 towards the end of his solution, Thomas says that, in the case of incorruptible things, there is only one individual for one species, because the species is adequately preserved in one individual. And he says the like in q.75 last article, in his main response.
2. These the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We reckon this to be erroneous because, since the intellective soul is incorruptible, there would not then be several numerically different intellective souls, which was the error of Averroes, *On the Soul* 3, and the error is against the faith in many ways.

4. It is also against the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 2.3 when he says that, because of generation, there are many spherical bodies; and it is against the Commentator on the remark in the same work ‘We intend to speak of the figures of the stars, etc.’, that all the heavenly bodies are of the same species and that celestial bodies are many individuals in one species.

5. Further, Thomas’ reasoning is not valid because, in the case of corruptible things, there would not need to be more than two individuals in one and the same species because the species would be adequately preserved in two individuals; yet the contrary is manifest to perception in the case of innumerable species of animals. Hence we say that the corruptibility of individuals is not the only reason for the multiplication of individuals in a species, as is plain from the authority of the Philosopher cited above, namely that celestial bodies are made because of generation or propagation.

Article Nine

That there cannot be another earth besides this one

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Also in q.47 last article, in his response to the last argument, Thomas says that there cannot be another earth besides this one because all the earth, wherever it was, would be naturally carried to this middle point; and the same reasoning holds of other bodies that are parts of the world.
2. These the words of Thomas

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We reply that another earth is or can be formed along with this one. For since the question is not about the works of nature but about divine power, to say that there cannot be another earth is to say that God cannot make another earth, which derogates from the faith telling us that God is omnipotent. But what Thomas gives for reason is false, because the earth’s other movement, if God made another earth, would not be to the center of this earth or of this world but would tend to the center of its own middle, because that middle would be nearer to it. Hence the reason adduced from the Philosopher is not valid.

Article Ten

That an angel is not composed of matter and form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.50 a.2 in the main response, Thomas says that an angel is not composed of matter and form. First, because if an angel had matter he would be distinct but only through quantity, and he would not be distinct if the quantity were removed, as is said in *Physics* 1.2 text.15; but there is no quantity in an angel; so there is no matter in him either. Second because the operation of a thing follows the manner of its substance; but understanding, which is the operation of an angel, is an altogether immaterial operation; therefore the angel too is immaterial. Third because Dionysius says in *Divine Names* ch.4 that, as the first creatures are understood to be incorporeal, so they are understood to be immaterial. Thomas says the same in q.12 a.4 and q.50 a.5 in the main response.

2. These the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From this position something contrary to the faith seems to follow. First because faith lays down that angels suffer, *Matthew* 25.41, 'Depart ye cursed etc.' But, according to the philosophers and the saints, what is immune from matter is immune from suffering, and so if an angel does not have matter he cannot suffer.

4. Second because faith and Scripture hold that God alone is immutable. Now Augustine says, *Confessions* 12.6, that where there is change there is matter; therefore, by denial of the consequent, where there is not matter there is not change; and therefore if an angel does not have matter he is altogether immutable and so he is God, because this is proper to God alone.

5. Third because the faith holds that angels were created neither blessed nor wicked but capable of blessedness and misery, just as of vice and virtue and these sorts of accidents. But Boethius says, *On the Trinity* ch.3, that God cannot be a subject, because he is form and a form cannot be a subject. For the fact that certain forms, as humanity, are subject to accidents is by reason of matter, for humanity does not receive accidents in its essence but in the matter subject to it; for as long as the matter subject to humanity receives some accident, humanity itself seems to receive it. But a form without matter is not a subject. Therefore, if an angel is form without matter, he is not subject to blessedness or damnation or any illumination.

6. One must therefore say that an angel is composed of spiritual matter and form. Hence Boethius in *On One and Unity* says that it is one thing to be simply a unity, as God, and another thing to be a unity by conjunction of simples, as angel and soul, each of which is a unity by conjunction of matter and form.

7. Again the Commentator on *Metaphysics* 8.4 recites Themistius saying that the sun and moon and stars are either forms without matter, or they have matter equivocally, the way disposition is understood to exist in matter.

8. Now that it is necessary to posit spiritual matter is plain from Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 5.5/8, who says that unformed and formable matter, namely the

corporeal and spiritual matter from which was made what was to be made, was made first not in temporal but causal order.

9. Again Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 2.2 says that an angel is said to be incorporeal and immaterial by comparison with us, for in comparison to God, who alone is incorporeal, everything proves to be gross and material. Again in his *Dialectic* ch.67 he says that angels, demons, souls are called immaterial by comparison with body, but if they are compared to the immaterial principle, that is, to God, they are material.

10. Now as to what some say, that an angel is not composed of matter and form but of potency and act or form, this is of no importance; for according to the Commentator on *Metaphysics* 11, potency inseparably follows matter. For he says on Aristotle's remark in that place, 'If there was a moving substance etc.', that in things in which there is potency there is matter. Again, later in the same chapter, on the remark 'But the principle of an image', he says that a composite is everything which has potency mixed in. Again, on the remark in *Physics* 8 'Now we intend to prove,' he says that this proposition is convertible, that what is simple lacks potency and that what lacks potency is simple; for potency is the cause of any composition of two substances. So far the Commentator. And Rabbi Moses Maimonides, in his book *On the Blest God*, says that everything that is in potency to something necessarily has matter, since potency is always in matter. Therefore if an angel has potency he also has matter. However, it is sometimes said that an angel does not have matter, first because his matter is not like the more common corporeal matter; second because his matter is wholly penetrated and brought to rest by his spiritual form, being like it in this respect; third because his matter combines in so great a unity with his form that an angel is reckoned to be pure form; fourth because by this sort of matter, thus absorbed by his form, an angel's operation is not impeded.

To the Arguments

11. To the first argument [n.1] one must say that since an angel's matter is spiritual it is not distinguished by dimensions but by number, as when one point becomes two. Nor do we say that there is a single matter for spiritual and for corporeal things but a different matter, because of corporeal things there is corporeal matter and of spiritual things spiritual matter.

12. To the second [n.1] one must say that when Thomas takes for a rule that operation follows the mode of the substance, then, if the rule means that all modes of operation are according to the mode of the substance of the one operating, it is false both of the operation of a sensitive and of an intellective substance. For we see that, according to the Philosopher (*On the Soul* 2.12), the sensitive soul, through all its exterior senses and through its imagination within, receives the species of material things without the matter; for although it receives them through the senses when the matter is present, and through the imagination along with some of the conditions of matter, yet it receives them always without matter; but the sensitive soul and all its powers are tied to matter and are not abstracted from matter the way the species they receive are. Again, the rule fails in the case of intellective operation; for the intellective soul receives species through the intellect that are universal in comparison to the singulars that are considered in those species; and yet it is certain that the intellective soul can in no way be called a universal thing but a singular thing. Hence the rule is false if it is taken universally. However it can

be true in this way, namely that the nobler thing naturally has a nobler operation and the more virtuous thing a more virtuous one; but as to the mode of materiality or immateriality, singularity or universality, it is false. Hence we say that just as the sensitive powers can receive the intentions of material things without matter, so the intellectual soul, though it is the perfection of spiritual matter, can receive forms altogether abstracted from matter and even from the conditions of matter. Or one can say that the operation of an angel, which is understanding, is called immaterial because it abstracts from matter and the conditions of matter, but not because corporeal and immaterial things are not understood by spiritual likenesses of the species of material things. And so there is nothing problematic if an immaterial thing is received in the spiritual matter that is the intellectual soul.

13. To the quote from Dionysius [n.1] one must say that he calls angels incorporeal and immaterial by comparison to us and not simply, as Damascene 2.2 says (and he was cited above [n.9]).

Article Eleven

That it is impossible for there to be two angels of the same species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Also, in the same question article 4, in the main response, and in q.75 last article, in the main response, Thomas says that it is impossible for there to be two angels of the same species, just as it would be impossible to say that there were two separate whitenesses, for whitenesses are only several as they are in several substances. And even if angels had matter they could not in this way either be several in the same species; for it would thus be necessary that the principle of distinction of one from another would not be matter by division of quantity (since angels are incorporeal), but by diversity of powers; and this diversity does indeed make for a diversity not only of species but also of genus. Again, in things of the same species it is not possible to find a prior and posterior, as is said in *Metaphysics* 3.3. But in the case of angels there are firsts, middles, and lasts in the one order, as Dionysius says in *Angelic Hierarchy* ch.10. Therefore angels are not of the same species.

2. These the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems contrary to the Catholic faith because it derogates from divine omnipotence. For since any multitude or unity of angels comes from the work, not of nature, but of divine power, to say that there cannot be two angels of the same species is to say that God could not do or have done this, which has been condemned by the bishop and masters of Paris [sc. the condemnation by bishop Tempier in 1277].

4. Again, what he adduces about two separate whitenesses is false and against the sacrament of the altar where we hold by faith that, through the work or action of divine power, there are several whitenesses of the same species separate from matter (we assert the same of two angels even if they were altogether immaterial).

5. We say further that angels have spiritual matter and then that their matters are distinguished, not by division of quantity or even by division of powers, as Thomas says, but by multiplication of countability, as when one point becomes two. I will make better reply on this point in articles about the determinations made by Thomas in his question 253 [article 88 *infra*].

6. Further, Damascene, in *Dialectic* ch.26/43 about person, says that a person is that which, by operations and properties that are its own, gives us a distinct portrayal separate from those that are of the same nature as it; for example, when Gabriel talked with the holy Mother of God, one angel was present, separate from other similar angels, and talked there through the presence and discussion he had in that place. The same author in the same book, in ch.11/30 about substance and matter and individual form and person and hypostasis speaks thus: ‘The more excellent philosophers call the most specific species matter, as angel, man, horse.’ And in the same chapter later he says: ‘The holy fathers, dismissing contentious wrangling, called that matter and form which is commonly and by many so called, namely the most specific species, as angel, man, etc.’ See how angel is a most specific species both according to the philosophers and according to the doctrine of the holy fathers.

7. As to what he objects from the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 3.3 [n.1], that in things of the same species it is not possible to find a prior and posterior, one must reply as the Commentator did in his exposition, that among individuals of the same species there is no prior and posterior because there is no posterior constituted by a prior, the way we see in a column under a category where a prior is of the essence of a posterior. But there is no such order in angels.

Article Twelve

That genus and difference are taken according to considerations of determinate and indeterminate

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Also, in the same article and question, in response to the first argument, Thomas says that genus and difference in immaterial things are taken according to a consideration; for insofar as one thing is taken as something indeterminate, it is taken there as the nature of the genus, but insofar as something determinate is taken, it is taken there as the nature of the difference; otherwise it would be necessary for all animals to be of the same species, or for some form in them to be more perfect than the sensible soul.

2. These the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Here an error arises from two other errors, one of which is that spiritual things, as angel and soul, are not composites of matter and form; the second is that in man, and likewise in any animal, there is only one substantial form, as will be clear below.

4. But what he says here is plainly false, because if things were so, never would one and the same person grasp at the same time the genus and difference of immaterial things.

For when he understands the thing as indeterminate, he does not understand it as determinate; and so, when he understands it under the idea of genus, he cannot combine the idea of the difference with it, or conversely; which is plainly false.

5. Again, accidentals that we predicate are not bestowed on immaterial or on material things because of our consideration of them; for if I consider an angel as good or bad, not for this reason is the angel good or bad; or if I consider an angel as knowing things to come for a thousand years hence, not for this reason does the angel know them. Likewise as to material things: if I consider a crow or an Ethiopian as colored intensely white, not for this reason are they such. Therefore if our consideration cannot bestow the accidentals that we predicate, much less can it bestow the essentials that we predicate.

To the Argument

6. As to the argument [n.1], one can say that what he holds as unacceptable, namely that there is another form in a brute more noble than the sensitive soul, is not unacceptable; on the contrary, this has been commonly posited by custom for ages.

Article Thirteen

That since an angel is a subsistent form he is necessarily incorruptible

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Also, in q.50 a.5, in the main response, Thomas says that since an angel is a subsistent form it is impossible for his substance to be corruptible; for what belongs to a thing in itself can never be taken away from it; but what belongs to a thing per accidens can be taken away from it, when that is taken away by which it does belong. For roundness cannot be taken away from circle because roundness belongs per se to circle; but a bronze circle can lose roundness by the taking away of the circular shape from the bronze. Now being belongs to a form per se, for each thing is an actual being according as it has form. A composite, therefore, of matter and form ceases to exist in act by the taking away of the form from the matter. But if a form subsists in its own being, as is the case with an angel (as was said), it cannot lose being. The very immateriality of an angel, therefore, is the reason that an angel is incorruptible in his nature.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Here he does say something true, namely that an angel is incorruptible in his nature; and again he says something that is an invention of error, namely that an angel is immaterial; for if an angel were so, he would not be capable of any accident and consequently not of guilt either, and so not of punishment or glory, as was shown elsewhere [article 10]. And therefore, since an angel has matter, namely spiritual matter, to which the form gives being, then, just as this sort of form can be understood not to give being, so can an angel thereby be understood not to exist or to be corrupted; and therefore Thomas does not give the true cause for angelic incorruptibility.

4. Again, as to his statement that existence belongs per se to an angel and so cannot be taken away from him (just as neither can roundness be taken away from circle), the 'per se' states either the condition of the cause or the condition of the subject. If the condition of the cause, this is to say that existence belongs to an angel because of his existing by no other cause than his own form, for the form and no other cause gives being; in that case Thomas is saying something true but not anything to the purpose, for form gives being not to itself but to the composite. If however the 'per se' states the condition of the subject it is false, because the form, as it is form, is not a subject, nor consequently is it per se a subject of anything, as Boethius says in *On the Trinity* ch.3. And so it does not per se have subsistent being in its kind.

5. Further, roundness cannot be taken away from a circle either in reality or in understanding, because it belongs per se to circle; but being can be taken away from an angel in understanding, because every creature can be understood not to be, as Anselm says in *Proslogion* 3.3, 23. Therefore being does not per se belong to an angel the way roundness per se belongs to a circle.

Article Fourteen

That a multitude materially is not intended by an agent, since it can be increased to infinity.

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Also, in the same question a.4, in response to the last argument, he says that multiplication in number, since it can be increased to infinity, is not intended by the agent, but multiplication in species is.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This is erroneous. First, since the multiplication of men and horses and other animals cannot be in species but only in number (for through the generation of animals the species is not multiplied but only the individual), it would follow that, when God said in *Genesis* 1.28 and 8.17, 'Increase and multiply', he commanded fulfillment of what he did not wish fulfilled, or of what neither man nor any animal nature ought to intend.

4. Further, when the first agent was creating men, he was intending the multiplication of the elect and the repair of the ruin of the angels, as is plain from the effect; and this ought a man to intend when he generates. But this multiplication of the elect and repair of the ruin of the angels was only by material multiplication of individuals. Therefore this multiplication was intended by the first agent, and by the second agent.

To the Argument

5. Further, his reasoning is of no validity, because according to it a man would never intend to divide a line or anything continuous, nor to count anything, since a line can be

divided infinitely; for no one intends to divide a line as much as it can be divided, or to increase a number as much as it can be increased. And in fact an agent intends numerical multiplication in this way, not as it proceeds to infinity, but as it suffices for his purpose.

Article Fifteen

That after the resurrection Christ had a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it.

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.51 a.3, in response to the fifth argument, he says that, although food was not converted into the body of Christ after the resurrection but was resolved into the underlying matter, yet Christ did have a body of such a nature that food could be converted into it.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems erroneous, for since food is not converted into the body of the eater save to restore what has been depleted or for some increase in size, to say that food could have been converted into the glorious body of Christ is the same as to say that there could have been some depletion in it, which is against the gift of impassibility, and the contrary of it is held by faith.

Article Sixteen

That an angel can go from one extreme to another without going through the middle.

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.53 a.2, in the response to the question, Thomas says that, insofar as an angel's motion is not continuous, it is not impossible for an angel to pass from extreme to extreme without passing through the middle. And Thomas adds that moving from extreme to extreme and not moving through the middle can belong to an angel but not to a body, because a body is measured by place and contained by it; but the substance of an angel is not subject to place as being contained in it, but is superior to it as containing it. Hence it is in an angel's power to apply himself to a place just as he wants, whether through a middle or without a middle.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From these arises a condemned error [by Bishop Tempier of Paris, 1277], namely that an angel is sometimes nowhere, which is contrary to *Matthew* 18.10, ‘Their angels always see the face of my Father.’

4. Also it is against *Damascene* 1.18/13 who says that the circumscribable is what is comprehended by place or time or apprehension, while the un-circumscribable is what is contained by none of these. Therefore God alone is un-circumscribable, for an angel is circumscribed by time (for an angel begins to be) and by place (if place is understood the way we say) and by comprehension (for angels know their own essences among each other).

5. Also it is against the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 1.3 who says that all men are in the place of this first movable body, which is the place of spirits. The Commentator adds there that the Greeks, and those of the Gentiles who confess God and his power of creating, only confess him to the extent that a thing not subject to corruption or to undergoing change must be in place.

6. Also, Tully in *Tusculan Disputations* 1, when speaking of the separate souls of the wretched, says that ‘if the wretched are not in hell, then no one is in hell; where then are those whom you reckon to be wretched, or what place do they inhabit? For if, when I place them nowhere, they are nowhere, then I think they altogether do not exist.’ Therefore, by similar reasoning, those who place the angels nowhere posit that they do not exist. But someone who posits that angels pass from extreme to extreme such that they are not sometime in the middle, posits that they are sometime nowhere; therefore they are sometime non-existent; but we do not say this is against the faith and good morals, but we do reckon it in other respects false.

7. Now if this were true about angels, by parity of reasoning it would be true of disembodied souls. For Jerome says, in his *Epistle* 39 to Eustochius and Paula (about the assumption of the Blessed Virgin), that one must believe the army of angels in their columned ranks came to meet the Blessed Virgin in her assumption, and that so too did the Lord Jesus Christ himself, her son. But a meeting only takes place somewhere in the middle. And it cannot either be said that Jerome said this because the Virgin was assumed in her body, since he himself says in the same place that ‘it is uncertain whether she was in her body or departed leaving her body behind.’ Further, it does not seem one should say this was done by way of dispensation; for if the Virgin could have come immediately and without intervening space to the throne of glory prepared for her in eternal mansions, for what use did she pass through so much distance in between?

8. Also, we read about the soul of the blessed Martin that the devil wanted to hold it back when it was being led up to heaven; but this would not have been possible unless his soul passed through a middle space; and also, if it could have reached the place of glory without passing through the middle, why did it pass through the middle where it was going to be impeded?

9. Also, in the office for the commendation of the dead it is said, ‘May the glorious company of the angels meet you;’ and in the same place a little later, ‘Let not the ministers of Satan dare impede your journey.’ And at the burial of the dead the Church sings, ‘Come in aid saints of God, come in greeting angels of the Lord.’ But greeting and impeding cannot happen save to those who are passing through the middle. Therefore blessed souls do thus pass through the middle, and by parity of reasoning so do the angels.

Certainly we do not think the authority of the Church's office has been condemned as false and erroneous and empty.

10. Also, let AD be two extremes and BC the middle, and let an angel pass from A to D. I ask where the angel is when he is passing through? Not in A because as long as he is at A he is not passing through; not in D because as soon as he is in D he is at rest; therefore either he is nowhere when he passes through or he is in BC. But it is not possible to say that he is sometime nowhere, because Augustine says in *Immortality of the Soul* ch.4 that whatever is nowhere cannot exist. So it remains that when an angel is passing through he is in the middle; therefore, when passing from extreme to extreme he passes through the middle. Also, a moveable thing is more in need of place when it is moving than when it is at rest; this is plain from what the Philosopher says in *Physics* 4.4 text 32, that a place would not be required if there was no motion in place. The Commentator says there that motion signifies place more properly than rest does. The major premise is thus plain. But an angel cannot not be in a place when he is at rest; therefore much less so when he is moving or passing through. The minor premise is plain of itself, and also because the opposite has been condemned.

Article Seventeen

That it is not possible for something to be in one term in the whole of a preceding time and to be in the other term in the last instant of that time

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.53 a.3, in the main response, Thomas says that it is not possible for anything to be at rest in one term in the whole preceding time and to be afterwards in the other term in the last instant of the time.
2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems false in the case of the sacrament of the altar. For it is clear that there is a first instant at which the body of Christ exists, when the form of the body is a form at rest; and it is clear along with this that the instant which is the beginning of the time measuring the existence of the body is the end of the preceding time in which it was bread. For the same instant that is the beginning of the future time is the end of the past time, at which it was bread. Since therefore in the whole of the time in which it was bread there was no throwing off of the form of bread by any other change, it is manifest that in the preceding time the bread remained in its own form, and yet in the last instant of that time it is under the form of the body of Christ.

Article Eighteen

That all the species through which the angels have knowledge are connatural to them

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.55 a.2, in the response to the question, Thomas says that all the species through which the angels understand are connatural to them and not received from things; and in response to argument 3 he says that the knowledge of an angel is indifferent with respect to distance and nearness in space. Also in q.58 a.1 in the main reply he says that angels do not get their knowledge from things.
2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. First, I do not believe this is true though many have said it. For I see that all singulars are variable and changeable. I then ask whether an angel has, in respect of a thing, as many species as the thing has of varying modes, or whether he has only one species. If the first, then the angel has infinite or innumerable species. But if he has only one, then either he has one that varies and changes with the change of the thing or he has one that does not vary. If he has a species that varies then an angel would only ever perfectly and truly know the thing through that species when the thing is in the single state that the species represents, and then necessarily he will be ignorant of more things about the thing than he has knowledge of, which is unacceptable. But if an angel has a species of the thing that varies as the thing varies, then the same reasoning will apply to the species of any other thing; and then necessarily infinite changes in the species must happen continuously, or as many changes as there are changes and motions in the world.

4. Again, if angels knew through species connatural to them, they would not need things to exist in order to know them; but they do need things to exist; therefore etc. The proof of the major is from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 3.7, who says that 'we understand whenever we want, because intelligibles, namely the intelligible species, are present to the intellect; we do not, however, perceive whenever we want, because sensibles are not always present to the senses.' Thus the major is plain. The minor is plain from Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 4.35, who says that 'the evening knowledge [of the angels] is said to be less than the morning knowledge (which the things made were prior to), because what can be known precedes the knowing of it.'

5. Again, the second article of Thomas, which says that the knowledge of an angel is indifferent with respect to distance and nearness in space, follows from the preceding one. For if angels understand through connatural species, then, since there is no variation in connatural species as to the distance or nearness of things, it follows that knowledge through them does not vary with the distance or nearness of the things. But, on the contrary, this seems to us to be false. For we clearly experience that we know distant things in the same way as we know simply non existing things – and I mean by distant things what I reckon he means, things that are beyond our vision; for if one such thing is altogether destroyed to nothing, we no more know that it does not exist than we did before, nor do we have more now a different knowledge of its existence or non existence than we did before. Hence it is manifest that non existence and distance are related to knowledge in the same way. So if angels can know distant things through connatural species, it follows that they can know future things and non existent things through the

same species, which is contrary to Damascene *Orthodox Faith* 2.3 who says that ‘neither the angels nor the devils know the future.’ Besides, if the devil had known that he was going to be defeated by Christ and by blessed Job, he would never have sought to tempt them.

6. The third thing Thomas says, namely that the angels do not get their knowledge from things, which we reckon to be likewise false, also follows from the first article. For if angels only knew through innate species and not by reception from things, nothing could be hidden from them; for only what is known through reception can be hidden. But many things can be hidden from the devil. Therefore he knows by reception from things. The minor is present from Chrysostom’s homily 6 on *Matthew* where he says that ‘a good angel sometimes hides himself, making himself invisible to the devil, for a good angel, unless he wants, is not seen by the devil.’ Again in homily 4 ch.2 he says that ‘Christ was born of a woman betrothed and cared for at home so that the virgin birth would be concealed from the devil.’

7. Again, if angels knew only through connatural species and not through reception, they could not, as it seems, be deceived; but the devil can be deceived, as Ambrose says *On Luke* 2, that ‘one reason for the espousals of the Blessed Virgin Mary was that the mother’s virginity should deceive the prince of the world who, when he saw she was espoused to a man, could not have had any suspicion about her pregnancy;’ and he adds that ‘the deceiving of the prince of the world is made clear in the words of the Lord himself when the apostles are told not to speak of Christ, when the healed are prohibited from glorying in their cure, when the demons are commanded not to speak of the Word of God.’

Article Nineteen

That the intellect cannot reduce material forms to intelligible reality unless it first reduces them to the reality of imagined forms

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, q.55 a.2, in response to the second argument, Thomas says that, however powerful the angelic intellect may be, it cannot reduce material forms to intelligible reality unless it first reduce them to the reality of imagined forms, which is impossible because it lacks imagination. By this he indicates that material forms cannot be reduced to intelligible reality unless they are first reduced to the reality of imagined forms.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems false and contrary to experience and philosophy. For the Commentator says in *On the Soul* 3 text 7, on the passage ‘now since the privation of passion in the perceiver...’, that the imaginative, the cogitative, and the memorative powers serve only in place of the sensitive power, and so there is no need of them save when the sensible object is absent; and all these powers aid each other in representing an image of the sensible object for the abstract rational power to gaze on so as to draw out the universal

intention. Again *ibid.* text 33, on the phrase, ‘and thus as to the thing when sought and when absent...’, he says that the aim of cogitation is nothing other than that the cogitative power make into something sensed what is absent from sense; and a little later he says that for this reason, when things comprehensible by sense are present to sense, the intellect will remain focused on them and cogitation will fall away. From these aforesaid words of the Commentator, whose truth anyone can experience in himself, it is plain that there is no need for material forms to be reduced to the reality of imagined forms in order for them to become intelligible.

Article Twenty

That a higher angel understands through fewer species

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.55 a.3, Thomas disputes whether higher angels understand through species more universal than lower angels; and in the main response he says that the higher an angel is the fewer the species through which he can understand the universality of intelligibles, and so the forms of a higher angel must be more universal as extending to more things. Later too, in the solution of the third argument, he argues that the universal idea in the mind of an angel can, because of its excellence, make many things to be known in their own knowledge. And in q.57 a.2 and response to the third argument, he says that angels know singulars through universal forms, which forms, however, are likenesses of the things both as to universal principles and as to principles of individuation. He says the like in q.89 a.1 in the main reply.

2. These from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems false. For blessed Augustine says in *83 Questions* q.46 that ‘everything has been made by reason, and man has not been made by the same reason as that by which a horse has been made (for this is an absurd thing to suppose). Individual things, then, are caused by their own reasons.’ Again, Augustine in *Letter 48* to Nebridius (which begins ‘In your most recent letters’) he addresses him in these words, ‘Nebridius, you ask if the supreme truth and supreme wisdom, by which everything was made and which sacred doctrine professes to be the Son of God, contains the idea of man generally or of each one of us.’ And Augustine replies, ‘Now it seems to me that, as far as the making of man is concerned, there is an idea there of man alone and not an idea of me and you; but as concerns the order of time, different ideas of men live in the Sacred Trinity.’ Thus Augustine. From the authority then of the *83 Questions* it is plain that God does not know and produce man and horse by one general idea, nor therefore are man and horse known by one general idea but everything is known by its own idea. Likewise from the authority of the letter to Nebridius it is plain that God does not know and produce the individuals contained under a species by the one idea of the species. Therefore, if the mode of angelic cognition is not nobler than the mode of divine cognition, then it must

not be the case that angels know many things through few and universal forms but must know individual things through their own forms.

4. Besides, Thomas himself says in q.89 q.1, in the response to the third argument, that separate intelligences know through participated species from the influence of the divine light; therefore, since there is in the divine light one idea of the genus and another of species and another of individuals (as was just shown from Augustine), the different ideas in the angelic intellect must be many, because unity of essence is not greater in the effect than in the cause.

5. Further, if the higher an angel is the fewer the species through which he can grasp the universe of intelligibles (as Thomas himself says), then, since there are nine orders of angels and in each order there are firsts and middles and lasts, as Dionysius says in *Angelic Hierarchy* ch.10, there are many more ranks of angels than there are of forms in the category of substance, when running through these forms from the most general genus to the most specific species and to the individual instances; so it follows that some higher angel would know by the form of the most general genus everything that is contained in the category of substance; and a higher angel (and if there is none higher it is a clear a higher could be produced by God) would understand everything through no form at all, which is impossible; or if he understands through one form then it is not universally true that a higher angel always knows through more universal and fewer forms.

6. Further, a form is only the principle of knowing what is like it and what it is like, as we see in the case of sensitive, imaginative, and intellectual knowledge. Therefore everything that is known through one simple form is like that one simple form. But all things that are like one and the same simple thing are like each other, just as all things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other. Therefore all things that are known by one universal form are like each other; but this is false; therefore the premise is false too.

Article Twenty One

That angels are given grace and glory according to their natural rank

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.62 a.6 in the response to the question and to the arguments, and in q.108 a.4 in the main response, and in the same question a.8 in response to the first argument, Thomas says that grace and glory have been given to the angels according to their natural rank, so that those who had a higher rank had also more of grace and glory.

2. He proves this first from the Master, who says, in *Sentences* 2 d.3 ch.2, that the angels who were created more subtle in nature were also endowed with greater gifts of grace.

3. The second proof is that, as angelic nature was made by God to pursue grace and glory, so the ranks of angelic nature seem ordered also to diverse ranks of grace and glory; therefore those angels whom God made higher in nature were ordained by him to greater grace and glory.

4. The third proof is that this is plain from the fact that an angel is not composed of diverse natures such that the inclination of one nature should impede or hold back the force of the other the way it happens in man, where the movement of the intellective part is impeded or held back by the inclination of the sensitive part, but when this part is not impeding or holding back, then the intellective part by nature moves with all its power. So it is reasonable, therefore, that angels that had better natures should also turn to God more strongly and more effectively.

5. This happens too in the case of men, that greater grace and glory is given in accord with the intensity of their turning toward God. Hence it seems that angels that had better natures had more of grace and glory.

6. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

7. Among the articles formerly condemned [1241 AD] by Lord William, Bishop of Paris of venerable memory, the ninth article was this one, that angels who had better natures of necessity had more grace and glory; now the article from Thomas that we have before our hands differs little or nothing from the aforesaid one; and so the aforesaid condemnation should suffice for rejection of this article and for response to his arguments. However, out of a spirit of abundance, we say that the said article seems prejudicial to grace; for if greater or lesser grace is given according to better natures, then grace is given simply according to nature, for if more follows more then simply follows simply; and if grace is given according to nature than grace is not grace, *Romans* 11.6.

8. Further, if those angels who had better natures had also more grace and glory, then Lucifer, who had a better nature beyond the others, had more of grace and glory, which is false and erroneous.

9. Further, grace and glory are given according to the movement of free choice, which disposes to grace and glory more immediately; but in someone who has free choice the movement that disposes to grace does not happen in accord with nature but with freedom; either then the angels did not have free choice, or they received grace and glory according to their free effort; so not according to their natural rank.

Response to the Arguments

10. In response to Thomas' first argument therefore [n.2] one must say that the Master does not say that grace and glory are given to the angels according to their natures, but that those who were more subtle and perspicacious in nature and wisdom were endowed with greater grace – endowed, I say, not because of their better natures but because of divine good pleasure and the motion of their own free choice.

11. In response to the second about the distinctions of rank [n.3], one must say that if the angels stood firm and exerted effort in proportion to others like them, they reached corresponding ranks of grace and glory.

12. In response to the third [n.4] one must say that an angel has no impediment to his movement on the part of his own nature, but he can have an impediment on the part of his own freedom, whereby he can move himself less toward God, nay can also not move toward him but against him, as is plain in the case of Lucifer and the angels who followed

him. Also as to what Thomas adds, that when nothing impedes then the thing moves with its whole power – this is true of a nature that is not free but false of a nature that is free, at least in the case of wayfarers, which is what the angels were before they possessed glory. And as to his remark that it is reasonable that angels possessed of better natures should turn to God more strongly – it is true that it was fitting so and ought to have been so, but it was not so in fact, as is plain of Lucifer and the other fallen angels.

13. To the fourth [n.5], when he says that such is what happens in the case of men, one must reply both yes and no. For if a man does thus turn himself more toward God he receives more of grace, but not because this turning toward God is the cause but because God's good pleasure is. However, a man who has a better nature does not always turn himself more toward God; on the contrary he sometimes prides himself more on his nature and turns himself away from God more, as is plain of Lucifer.

Article Twenty Two

That good angels do not merit any accidental reward

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, question 62 last article, in the response to the last argument, Thomas says that angels do not merit any accidental reward.
2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems to support the sixth error condemned at Paris [Bishop Tempier 1277, article 71], namely that no change is possible in separate substances; it also supports the eleventh error, namely that an angel understands nothing new [article 76]; also the thirteenth error [article 78], namely that separate substances have all the good they are capable of when produced, and do not long for any good that they lack.

4. The position also seems prejudicial to grace and to the angelic office. For since according to Gregory *Moralia* 2.3 there is a double act in the angels sent to minister to us, namely an act of contemplating by which they never depart from God and an act of ministering by which they go out toward us for our salvation, and the act of ministering is not an act of nature or of glory, it must be an act of service and of grace. Now such an act in one who has the service of a wayfarer is necessarily meritorious; not meritorious of an essential reward, as will be plain below; therefore meritorious of an accidental reward; otherwise there would be prejudice to God's grace in an angel and to the angel's service and ministry. Hence Hugh of St. Victor in his *Exposition on the Heavenly Hierarchy* 3, on the phrase 'Each one of the hierarchies progresses with its own divine praises,' says that it progresses because all the dignity and power grows, according to the grace of service and ministry (by which grace it can preach and enlarge the praise and honor of God), toward the fruit of reward.' And speaking of the same angels in the same place he says, 'Gifts therefore accord with grace, merits accord with gifts, diversity of rewards stands in accord with diversity of merits.'

5. Further, since the bad angel given to us to exercise us is sinning, why is the good angel given to us to persuade us of salvific good not meriting reward?

6. Further, in the legend about St. John the Evangelist, according to the use of the Roman Church, the following is said, "I saw our angels weeping over our failings but the angels of Satan rejoicing over them." The good guardian angels, then, were thus weeping over their apostasy, but they were rejoicing over their penance and good works, according to the verse of *Luke* 15.10, 'There is joy among the angels of God over one sinner who does penance.'

7. But if you say that all the angels, even those standing by, rejoice over the penance of a sinner – agreed. But the guardian angels were weeping; and their joy as ministers was more specific as being over a good procured by them for those they guard; and this cannot be said about the angels standing by who have not been sent as guardians. Hence St. John says [n.6] that he saw 'our angels weeping', not angels simply.

8. But if someone objects that, if the good angels obtain merit by ministering to us, then, since their joy is not lessened by this ministry, as Gregory says *Moralia* 2.3, those who minister seem to be in a nobler and better condition than those who stand by, and the condition, as it appears, is made nobler by the ministry.

9. Again, if the angels merit by ministering an accidental joy, an injustice is done if a greater joy is not attributed to them than to those who did not merit; but if more joy is awarded to those who minister, it follows that it is better and nobler to minister than not to minister; and this result, like the former [n.8], seems unacceptable. Therefore if the angels merit by ministering, then it seems one should posit that they merit an essential reward and not an accidental one, as the Master says in *Sentences* 2 d.5 last chapter.

10. In response to the first objection [n.8] it can be said that the ministering angels are not simply of a better or nobler condition but in a certain respect, namely in the respect that an angel will rejoice over this man as over someone who has been guarded and taught well and saved by the angel's ministry; all the other angels will rejoice over the man only as saved, though through the angel's ministry as displayed in that angel's external mission. However those who stand by, in place of this particular and accidental joy, will have much greater joys as having a clearer knowledge both of the Word and of the man thus saved; and they will have a more fervent love and more fervent joys, and because of these they are of a yet better condition than the ministering angels.

11. To the second objection [n.9] one should say that no injustice is done to the angels standing by and not ministering if more accidental joy is given as reward to them as they stand by and do not minister externally. For they would not have an eye that was 'envious because God is good,' *Matthew* 20.15. Further, if it is the case that, whenever and how much the ministering angels have merited, joy is also given without merit and without ministry to those who stand by, then this is reckoned to be by the grace of God; and if those who stand by have as much or more accidental joy, no injustice is done to those who minister, for these have what is their own; nor do they have less because those who do not minister have more, because they are not envious but each rejoices, and together rejoices, over the good of another; and so it does not follow that it is simply better to minister than to stand by, but that it is in some respect better to minister.

12. Now the fact that angels merit an accidental and not a substantial reward by ministering to us is made plain as follows: because if they merit a substantial reward, then it is either something about to be had or something already had; not about to be had

because then they would not now have it, which is false since they are possessors of God; or they would have it imperfectly and would be expecting increase or perfection of it through their ministry; but this also seems to be false because then their desire would not be at rest and so they would not be perfectly blessed, because blessedness is a state perfected with accumulation of all goods; and also because they would thus be wayfarers in both kinds of life, namely the active and contemplative lives, which no one says or would say. But if it be said that the angels by ministering merit an essential reward already had, that is, already received in their turning to God, this is against Augustine in his *On Correction and Grace* 4, who says that ‘the holy angels who stood while the others fell deserved to receive the reward of that life.’ And in the same book, ‘if the devil and his angels had by free choice stood in the truth, they would, as long as they received the fullness of supreme blessedness, receive the reward of its permanence.’ Therefore the angels merited their essential reward by standing, not by ministering; for Augustine calls the reward of life the essential reward. Gregory too in *Moralia* 5.38 attributes essential reward to this standing and remaining, ‘The Lord God made the nature of the supreme spirits to be good but changeable, so that those who refused to remain should fall to ruin, and those who remained in their condition should now be in it so much the more worthily the more they stood too in the will of God, and should have the greater merit with the Lord the more they had made firmly fixed the changeable motion of their will.’

13. Further, according to Gregory *ibid.* 18.40, ‘As grace precedes merit so merit precedes reward, and precedes either in nature and time or in nature only.’ Therefore the angels do not merit a reward already had, for then merit would follow the reward.

14. Further, God is the one who moves to obtaining the essential reward all those who merit it. But it is proper to every mover to cease moving its movable when the end aimed at is reached. Since therefore a blessed angel has already obtained his essential reward as his ultimate end, God is not now moving the angel to attain it by ministry; nor is the angel moved by himself to this end, because this end is above the power of every created nature without the help of grace. The angels, therefore, merited an accidental and not an essential reward by ministering to us.

Article Twenty Three

That the devil sinned at once, immediately after the first instant of his creation

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.63 a.6, where the question is asked whether there was any delay between the creation and the fall of an angel, Thomas says in the main solution that it is more consonant with the sayings of the saints that the devil sinned immediately after the first instant of his creation. And he says that it is necessary to say this if one posits that in the first instant of his creation he burst forth into an act of free choice and that he was created in a state of grace, as we said. For since the angels reach blessedness by one meritorious act, as was said above, then if the devil, created in grace, merited in the first instant, he would have received blessedness immediately after the first instant had he not at once put an obstacle in the way by sinning. And in the same article, in the solution of

the fourth argument, Thomas says that the fact there is an intervening time between any two instants is true insofar as time is a continuum; but in the case of an angel, who is not subject to the motion of the heavens, which is the first thing measured by continuous time, time is taken for the very succession of the operations of the angel's intellect or also of his affection.

2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Taking what he says, without calumny, as premise, namely that the angel was created in grace and merited in the first instant of his creation (because some long held this view, though the masters did not commonly hold it in this way) – taking his premise I say that nevertheless the said position seems to contain at least two falsehoods. One is that, if the angels had not sinned at once in the instant next after the instant of their creation, they would have received the blessedness they merited in the first instant of their creation; the aforesaid position contains something else that seems contrary to the doctrine of the saints and the philosophers, namely that there is a double time, that is a continuous time, where an intervening time falls between any two instants of the time, and another and discontinuous time, where an intervening time does not fall between instants of the time.

4. The first one, namely that the bad angels would have gained in the second instant of their creation the blessedness they merited in the first instant had they not sinned in that second instant, seems false; because it is well laid down that the time of meriting and of demeriting and of receiving is the same; but as soon as the time of receiving begins, the time of meriting and demeriting ceases, otherwise glory and punishment could increase infinitely. Therefore if the next instant after the instant of creation is the instant of receiving blessedness, then the angels could not have merited blessedness, nor could they have sinned and prevented reception of the blessedness owed.

5. Further, what the aforesaid position lays down about a twofold time seems to be against the saints and the philosophers. For Anselm in his book *On Truth* ch.13 says that there is one and the same time for all things that are together in the same time; and blessed Augustine in his *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 5 says about time that it is one and the same time that follows bodily and spiritual movement, and his teaching is as follows, 'If there were no motion of a spiritual or corporeal creature by whose presence future things succeed to past things, there would be no time.' So time begins from the creature rather than the creature from time.

6. And the intention of the Philosopher in *Physics* 4.11, the chapter about time, adequately shows that there is only one time. For he speaks as follows, 'If we do not change in our mind, or if we change and do not notice it, we will not reckon time to exist.' And a little later he says, 'We perceive time and motion simultaneously, because if we are in the dark and nothing touches our bodies but some change happens to occur in our soul and we establish at the same time that some time is passing, we will reckon that some change is happening; and from this it follows that time is either motion or some part of motion.' These are the words of the Philosopher, word for word, from which it is clearly plain that the time he is dealing with measures and so follows change in the soul. Now that this same thing is continuous is plain from his words in the same place, for the

next phrase adds, ‘Change is also continuous, and because change is continuous time too is continuous.’ These are the words of the Philosopher, from which it is clearly plain that, according to his meaning, time is only continuous and that it follows and measures change in the soul just as change in bodily things. In the *Categories* too, when he deals with continuous and discrete quantity, he shows that time is continuous and he makes no mention of any other time; and from this we take as sign that there is no other time. The commentator Simplicius also says in his commentary on the same place that ‘Time seems most properly to be continuous, for each of the other continuous things is divided while time is always continuous and is never about parts that touch.’

Article Twenty Four

That the appetitive power is proportioned to apprehension, by which it is moved as movable by mover

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.64 a.2, about the middle of the main response, Thomas says that the appetitive power in everything is proportioned to apprehension, by which it is moved as movable by mover.
2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If by this he understands that the appetitive power desires or rejects nothing save what the apprehending power corresponding to it first apprehends and shows it, what he says is true according to the saints and philosophers. But if he means to say that in everything the apprehending power determines the appetite to one thing by necessitating it, the error was condemned publicly in Paris [1277 AD, articles 135, 158, 159, 163], because neither the sensitive nor the rational apprehending power determines or necessitates the will to one thing; so, after reason has shown and judged that one alone of two things is to be willed, the will remains free to reject it and choose the opposite. Hence this position must be treated with caution.

Article Twenty Five

That the will of an angel clings immovably to what it has willed

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in the same question and same article, in the main response, when giving the reason for obstinacy in the demons, Thomas says that the apprehension of an angel differs from that of a man in this, that an angel apprehends by his intellect immovably, just as we apprehend immovably the first principles that intellect is about; but a man apprehends by reason movably, proceeding discursively from one thing to another, keeping the way open to go to either of the opposites. Hence too the will of man adheres

to a thing movably, as being able to depart from it and adhere to the opposite, while the will of an angel adheres to a thing fixedly and immovably. And so, if an angel's will is considered before it adheres to something, it can freely adhere to it and to its opposite (namely in the case of things that it does not will by nature); but after it has adhered, it immovably adheres.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From these statements it is plain that Thomas posits that angels adhere and apprehend and will immovably, and that this is the cause of obstinacy in the bad angels and of confirmation in the good angels, as is plain at the end of his response.

4. This reasoning and position seem to support the sixth error about the angels [1277 AD, article 71], which is that no change is possible in separate substances and that they are not in potency to anything else. For if the will and apprehension of angels existed with the rectitude in which they were created, they would never have been moved by reason or will from the rectitude they had in the first instant of their creation; and if they had never been moved, they would never have sinned, which is clearly false; hence the position from which this view follows is false.

5. Further, the position is contrary to Gregory *Moralia* 5.38, who says that 'If the substance of the angels had been by nature alien to change, then the reprobate spirit would, by his created condition, never have fallen from the height of his blessedness. Now the omnipotent God did wonderfully make the nature of the supreme spirits to be good but changeable, so that those who refused to remain should fall to ruin, and those who remained in their condition should now be in it so much the more worthily the more they stood too in the will of God, and should have the greater merit with the Lord the more they had made firmly fixed the changeable motion of their will.' From this it is plain that the cause of the angels' obstinacy, or even of their confirmation, was not their immovably understanding and willing, but their free will in standing and falling, which freely put itself outside the state of freedom and of meriting.

Article Twenty Six

That place is not penal to angels or souls as affecting them by altering their nature but as affecting them by distressing their will

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.64 the last article, in the main response, Thomas says there is a twofold penal place for the demons, one by reason of guilt and this is hell, and one by reason of human testing and this is the dark air. And a little later, in response to the first argument, he says that place is not penal to souls or angels as affecting them by altering their nature but as affecting them by distressing their will, when souls or angels apprehend that that they are in a place not agreeable to their will.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems erroneous because, by the same reasoning, if a demon or a soul worthy of punishment were in paradise and were to apprehend that place as not agreeable to his will, which he even should do, because paradise is not a place agreeable to the merit and disposition of the demons' will, then paradise would be as penal as hell for demons and bad separated souls.

4. Besides, the aforesaid position plainly indicates that demons and souls are not punished in hell save intellectually or in imagination and not really; but this is plainly against [Ps-]Augustine *On the Faith to Peter*, penultimate chapter, who says that 'By pronouncement of eternal and immutable sentence, all the wicked will go into eternal burning, but the just into eternal life; the wicked will burn eternally with the devil, but the just will reign endlessly with Christ.' And in *City of God* 21.10 Augustine says, 'Why may we not say that incorporeal spirits can, though yet in marvelous true ways, be afflicted by corporeal punishment?' Note that if they were only inflicted by imaginary or some other apprehension, then Augustine would not say 'in marvelous ways'.

5. Further, if souls or angels are only punished because the place of hell is apprehended as disagreeable to their will, then since nothing is opposed or disagreeable to the will save because of disadvantage or injustice (as Hugh of St. Victor says *On Sacraments* 1 p.5 ch.2, and the same is maintained by Anselm *On the Fall of the Devil* ch.5 and again in *On the Agreement of Predestination and Foreknowledge*), and it is clear that souls and demons do not judge the place of hell to be disagreeable or penal because it is contrary to their will by reason of its injustice – first because the damned do not hate injustice, and second because hell is not apprehended by them as cause or occasion of injustice – then it remains that they judge it contrary to them and their will by reason of disadvantage and harm. So either the fire or place of hell is truly harmful and truly a disadvantage and afflicts them as other things are wont to afflict them, and then I have the conclusion intended and Thomas' position is false; or the fire and place of hell afflict them in imagination, and thus they are not truly punished, which is against the authority of Augustine above and against the Gospel, *Matthew* 25.41, 'Depart ye cursed into the eternal fire prepared for you etc.' and 'whose fire is not quenched,' as is had in *Mark* 9.43, 45, 47, and in *Isaiah* 66.24. But it is clear that God threatens punishment truly and not in imagination.

6. Further, it is incredible that those who in other things are most subtle and sharp are most stupid and deceived in this alone that they think themselves afflicted by a fire that they cannot be afflicted by. Hence this position of Thomas' seems to support the error elsewhere condemned at Paris by Lord Stephen, bishop of Paris [1277 AD, article 19], which is that the separated soul after death is not afflicted or pained by corporeal fire.

Article Twenty Seven

That matter cannot precede its form in time

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.66 a.1, in the solution to the question, Thomas says that it is impossible to say that matter without form is prior in time to its formation. From this it follows that there was not the chaos from the beginning that the ancients spoke of.
2. Secondly Thomas says that if unformed matter was prior in duration then it was in act; for duration implies this, since the term of creation is actual being, and that which is in act is form. Therefore, to say that matter without form is prior is to say that actual being exists without act, which implies a contradiction.
3. He also adds in the same place that, if there were several substantial forms in matter, then a later form would be an accidental one and generation would be alteration.
4. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

5. This position derogates from divine omnipotence, for although an accident depends on a subject more than matter depends on form, God can and does make an accident to be without a subject in the sacrament of the altar; therefore too he can make matter to be actually without form, though he did not do so from the beginning, as may be known; hence all the masters agreed recently that it is erroneous to say that God cannot give actual existence to matter without form [not found in the 1277 condemnations].
6. As to the point made to the contrary [n.1] one can say that, although for matter or its operation or lower causes it was impossible for confusion or chaos or matter without form to be prior in time, yet this was not and is not impossible for divine omnipotence or for higher causes.
7. To the second point [n.2] one should say that there is no contradiction here. For matter is compared to form as to that from which it can receive such and such being, and it is compared to its maker as to that from which it receives its own essence different from the essence of form, and this essence does not depend on form but on its creator. I say therefore that if God were to give to matter in act but without form the same existence numerically as this individual form were to give it, then a contradiction would be involved, just as if he were to give white existence to a wall but without whiteness; for this is impossible. But if God were to give to the essence of matter (which does not depend on form) actual existence without form, there would be no contradiction.
8. Further, one can say to it in another way that the implication of contradiction in anything can be understood in two ways: either simply for all time, as that Socrates when running is not moving; or in another way it is understood as to the time now, namely according to the state or course of nature that exists in reality now; for saying that an ass is immortal involves in this way a contradiction; and what involves a contradiction in this way can be done by God, not because God makes contradictories to be simultaneously true, but by his changing the course of nature and bestowing on it a different one, so that, if he were to make an immortal ass, no one would dare to say that he could not do it.
9. But if you say that matter does not have a distinct idea and so neither does it have an essence distinct from the essence of form, then this is false. Indeed, if it did not have a distinct idea in God, it would not come from him and one would have to posit two principles, which is an impious thing to say.

10. But as to Thomas' statement that form is act, this is true, but form is not the whole of act. For God can make the essence of matter to be actual without the act of form; for the word 'form' and the word 'act' are equivocal when we say that form is act and that existence is act; for form is act as habit or state, but existence is act as act.

11. As to the third statement [n.3], which holds it to be unacceptable that several substantial forms can exist in matter, we say that it is not unacceptable because in truth there are several; hence Thomas' position, which denies ranks of forms and posits only one form, has been rejected by the masters because of the several heresies that follow from it, as will be plain below. Nor is his argument cogent, which says that if there were several forms then a later form would be an accidental one. For this consequence only holds of that form or those forms which come to a substantial form that is already constituting complete and specific being.

Article Twenty Eight

That the soul is not composed of matter and form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.75 a.5, in the response to the question, Thomas says that the soul is not composed of matter and form, and he proves it, first, from Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7.47, where Augustine proves that the soul is not made either of corporeal or of spiritual matter.

2. The second proof is as follows: it belongs to the idea of soul that it be the form of some body; therefore it is either form in the whole of itself or in a part of itself. If it is form in the whole of itself then a part of it cannot be matter if matter is said to be only being in potency; now form qua form is act, and that which is in potency only cannot be part of act, since potency opposes act as divided against it. But if soul is form in some part of itself we will call this part soul, and the matter of which it is first act we will call the first animated thing.

3. The third proof is apparent from the fact that what is received in something is received in it according to the mode of the receiver; now each thing is known as the form of it is in the knower; but the intellectual soul knows things in their absolute nature, for example it knows stone as stone is stone absolutely. The form of stone absolutely, then, in its proper formal idea is in the intellectual soul. So the intellectual soul is form absolutely and not something composed of matter and form.

4. Further, if the soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received in it as individuals and thus the soul would only know singulars, as happens in the sensitive powers which receive the forms of things in a bodily organ. For matter is the principle of individuation for forms. The result then is that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance that knows forms absolutely, lacks composition of matter and form.

5. This same position, namely that the soul is not composed of matter and form, is repeated in q.76 a.1, at the end of the response to the question, repeating for this purpose the second argument given above [n.2].

6. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

7. Against this position are what was said against article 10 [supra], namely that angels are composed of matter and form.

8. This position, namely that the soul does not have matter, is plainly opposed to Augustine, who in *Literal Commentary on Genesis 7.47* everywhere supposes that soul has matter but raises in disputation the question whether its matter was prior in time or in origin only, and he holds to the latter. So he says in the place cited, ‘It can be asked whether the soul was made from something already spiritually made by God, because, namely, if the soul were something unchangeable we would not at all look for the matter of it; but, as it is, the soul’s changeability adequately shows that this mutability deforms the soul sometimes with vices and errors and forms it with virtues and doctrine of truth.’ See how Augustine posits that the soul has spiritual matter for its genus. With this the Commentator seems to agree, *On the Soul 3* text 14, when he asks whether intellectual matter is a being and not any form or prime matter; he dissolves it as follows: ‘For the way that the sensible is divided into matter and form is the way that everything intellectual must be divided into things similar to these, namely into something similar to form and something similar to matter; and it is necessary to posit this in the case of an abstract intelligence that understands another thing, although there is no multitude in abstract forms.’ Note that what Augustine calls spiritual matter the Commentator calls, as I think, something similar to matter; for philosophers commonly speak only of corporeal matter.

9. Again the said position is against philosophy, which attributes potency to a thing only by reason of matter and action to it by reason of form. So if the soul were pure form, not composed of matter and form, all its powers would be active and none passive, which is plainly false.

10. Again, the position seems to be against the faith, which says that the soul is capable of punishment and of glory; but all suffering and receiving, both according to the philosophers and according to the saints, is attributed to a thing by reason of matter. The point is plain because nothing is receptive as it is in act but as it is in potency; but every passive potency is reduced to matter, as is said in *Metaphysics 11*. Therefore, if the soul does not have matter, neither does it undergo punishment by the fire of hell, nor does it receive blessedness from God, because the soul does not receive what it cannot receive; but being able to receive belongs to passive potency, and this can only exist in what has matter. Also, what was posited in the case of the composition of angels above [article 10] can also be adduced here.

To the Arguments

11. As to the first point cited from Augustine [n.1], I did not find it though I looked for it carefully. If however Augustine does say it, he means to say that the soul is not made of any spiritual matter that precedes the soul in time but only in order of nature. Hence he says *Literal Commentary on Genesis 7.47* that ‘It is credible that only the idea of the soul by which it was to come to be was created in the first creation of things, and not also some matter of its genus which it would come to be from.’ Hence he maintains

that the soul does not have a pre-underlying matter as body does; but he plainly maintains in the same place that the soul has a spiritual matter agreeable to it, which underlies it in order of nature only and not in time.

12. To the second point [n.2], when Thomas asks whether the soul is form in its totality or in some part of itself, we say that it is form in its totality; and when he infers that therefore it is impossible for a part of it to be matter because matter is something that is only in potency while form as form is act, I say that just as in composite matter (that is, in all matter other than prime matter) there is something in potency, namely prime matter, and some thing or things that are act, namely the superadded forms that dispose matter to its ultimate form (and then the composite is called the matter of the ultimate form, for forms that dispose matter are placed on the side of matter), so I say there is the like in composite form; and the intellectual soul is this sort of composite form, which as a whole should be called the form of the body notwithstanding the fact that some part of it is matter; for although the matter of the rational soul, considered in itself, is being in potency, nevertheless, as it is made perfect through the form of act, it is the act of the body.

13. To the third point [n.3], when Thomas argues that the intellectual soul should be altogether free of matter because it knows things through forms free of matter, and forms free of matter can be received only in a substance free of matter (because what is received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver and not according to the mode of the received), the reply must be made that this argument no more proves that the intellectual soul is immaterial than it proves that the sensitive soul is immaterial. For the apprehensive powers of the sensitive soul plainly receive the species of sensible things without matter, as the Philosopher says *On the Soul* 2.12. If therefore the thing received cannot be received save according to the mode of the receiver, the sensitive powers must be without matter, which is plainly false. Hence one must say that it is not necessary that, in the case of every reception or disposition, the thing received is assimilated to the receiver; for it is not necessary that, if the eye is materially watery, everything visible is materially watery, or that every visible species is watery. However, the said thesis is true as to purity or impurity, perfection or imperfection; for a well-disposed organ receives the species of sensible things more purely and more perfectly but a badly disposed organ receives them more impurely and more imperfectly. Therefore, likewise, a more acute and more subtle intellect apprehends intelligible things better and more acutely, while a dull intellect receives them more slowly and less perfectly.

14. To the fourth point [n.4], which draws an unacceptable conclusion if the soul were composed of matter and form, namely that individual forms would be received in it, one must say that this is not unacceptable but rather is necessary; for every accident must be individuated by its subject; if therefore this intellectual soul is numerically one individual, or at least if this man is, then every accident in this soul or in this man must be individual. Since therefore every intellectual form received in the intellect of this man is an accident, it will necessarily be in some respect individual. Hence one must say, according to Avicenna *Metaphysics* 5.6, that this form, namely the form of animal, is universal in comparison to individuals, but in comparison to the singular soul, on which it is imprinted, it is individual.

Article Twenty Nine

That in separate substances there is no diversity in number without diversity in species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.75 last article, where Thomas asks whether soul and angel belong to the same species, he says in the main response that, in the case of incorporeal separate substances, there is no diversity in number without diversity in species and without natural inequality, because, since they are not composed of matter and form but are subsistent forms, it is manifest that diversity in them will have to be in species. For it is unintelligible for any separate forms to exist save one to a species, just as only a single whiteness could exist if whiteness existed separately. And the same consequence would also hold if separate substances were composed of matter and form; for if the matter of this form is distinguished from the matter of that form, then either the form must be the principle of distinction of the matter, namely so that the matters are diverse by relation to diverse forms (and then diversity in species and inequality of nature also follow), or, if matter is the principle of distinction of forms, then this matter can only be said to be different from that matter by division, but division has no place in separate substances of the sort that angels and the soul are.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position contains two errors, as it seems to us: one is that in separate substances there cannot be diversity in number without diversity in species; the other concerns the example he posits, that if there were a separate whiteness there could be only a single whiteness. The falsity of the first is plain from the authority of Damascene in his *Dialectic* ch.43, where he says that 'when Gabriel was conversing with the holy mother of God, he was present there as one of the angels, separate from his consubstantial angels by presence and conversation in that place.' Therefore, if the angels are consubstantial, they are of the same species.

4. Again in the same book ch.30 he says that 'the more outstanding philosophers called the most specific species matter, as angel and man and horse. And in the same chapter a little later he says that the holy Fathers, dismissing many contentious quibbles, said that matter and form, as angel and man and horse and the like, was the common term that was said of many, namely the most specific species. This from Damascene.

5. Further this position derogates from divine power. For, in the case of things that are subject to divine power alone, to say that this or that thing cannot be is the same as to say that God cannot do this or that. Hence since only God can produce incorporeal substances, to say that there cannot be several in number in one species is to say that God cannot do this, which is a rash thing to say.

6. The example too about whiteness that Thomas posits, when he says that if there were a separate whiteness there would only be one, is false and no less derogates from the Christian faith as to the sacrament of the altar; for the faith holds firmly that the whiteness is separate and yet there are many on many altars at the time of the sacrament.

7. Now a solution is possible for the response that he thus adduces for himself: angels are either simple and per se subsistent forms or they are composed of matter and form. If they are simple forms then they must be diverse in species, for it is unintelligible for any separate forms to exist save one to a species. We say that, although this seems to be so according to philosophy, yet we see that, because of divine power, it fails in the case of the sacramental form, after transubstantiation, of the most sacred bread and wine. And if he then adds in his argument that the same consequence holds if angels are composite of matter and form ('for if the matter of this form is distinguished from the matter of that form etc.' [n.1]), one could say, should one want to adhere to the opinion of Boethius *On the Trinity* and of Porphyry and of Damascene in his *Dialectic* chs.12, 35 [article 10 above], that it supposes something false, namely that the cause of the multiplication of individuals in a single species is matter. For according to the aforesaid authors the cause of individuation and of multiplication of individuals in a single species is accidents and the varieties of accidents. However, since this opinion is not commonly held, one could reply in this other way, namely that the division Thomas posits is insufficient; for he supposes that, in order for the matter of spirits to be able to be the cause of individuation and multiplication of individuals in a single species, it must either have diverse relations to diverse forms or have a division into quantitative parts. But we say by refutation that neither is necessary but that there is a third way that suffices, namely that all the same indivisible matter could be multiplied in number and become actually many, just as one indivisible point can become infinite points, as is plain if one imagines infinite lines touching each other at the center of a circle and being separate from each other beyond the center. For it is clear that the center where the lines touched each other was only a single point and yet, when they are separated from each other, each line has the point as term, and this could not happen unless the point were many. We make the like imagination about the spiritual matter of incorporeal substances, that it is not divided into quantitative parts but that the whole is multiplied or is numbered according to the number of individuals.

Article Thirty

That rational souls are numbered by numbering bodies

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.76 a.2 in the response to the first argument, Thomas says that, although the intellective soul does not have any matter from which it is made, just as neither does an angel, yet because it is the form of some matter, namely the body, and an angel is not, so there are many souls in one species by division of matter, but there cannot be many angels in one species.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From this a double error seems to follow. The first is that there is a single intellect or intellective soul for everyone; for, according to the Philosopher, immediate causes are

such that if affirmation is the cause of affirmation then negation is the cause of negation; therefore, if the informing of diverse bodies is the cause of the multiplicity of souls, then separation from bodies must be the cause of union of souls. And thus the error of Averroes, in *On the Soul* 3, returns, that at least after death there will be a unity of souls.

4. Further the soul, according as it is unitable with a body, is a natural being; hence the soul as it is such, and not as it is separable, belongs to the consideration of natural philosophy. Therefore the properties that belong to souls as they are unitable with bodies belong to them according as these properties are natural things. But unity and multiplicity or one and many, commonness and individuation or common and individual, or universal and singular, belong to beings only as they are beings simply, and so they belong to the consideration of the metaphysician. Therefore individuation and singularity do not belong to souls as they are unitable with or united to a body.

5. If you say that separate souls are distinguished and individuated by their capacity or aptitude for being united to a body – on the contrary: to be distinct or individuated is to be actual; the capacity or aptitude for unity states a potency, or at least something that is in potency, because it states a certain disposition in the essence of the soul, and this disposition is prior in order of nature to the power of the soul; now power does not bestow actual being; therefore the aptitude for unity does not give individuated existence to the separate soul. So the error still stands, namely that at least after death there would be only one intellect or one intellective soul.

6. Further, unitability with the body is natural to the soul; therefore it is the same in everyone; therefore unitability with this body determinately is not natural to this determinate soul, because if unitability with this body determinately were natural to this soul then natural properties would not be the same for everyone. So unitability with the body simply, and not because it is this or that body, remains natural to the soul. Therefore since this belongs to every soul in the same way, it cannot be the cause of individuation; for what is common to all is not cause of individuation.

7. The second error is that God cannot make many angels in one species, because in things whose being has regard only to divine operation, not being able to be and God not being able to do it are the same thing; but the producing of angels into existence, just as also their multiplication in number and in species, has regard only to the power of God. This argument was touched on above [article 29], about the last article in q.75, in the response to the question; and it was reduced in the same way.

Article Thirty One

That in man there is only one substantial form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.76 a.2, in the main response, Thomas says that there is only one substantial form in man, namely the intellective soul whereby man is animal, vegetable, body. He proves it first as follows. Gennadius in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* says, 'Neither do we say there are two souls in man (as James and other heretics write), one the animal soul which vivifies the body and by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, the other the spiritual soul which serves reason. But we say that there is one and

the same soul that vivifies the body by union with it, and disposes it by reason.’ From this Thomas argues thus: ‘As man is in the genus of animal so he is in the genus of animate body and of body and of substance. But he is man and animal by one and the same form, which is the soul, as is plain from the cited authority. So, for the same reason, he is placed in the higher genera by one and the same form, and thus no form existed in the matter before the soul did.’

2. Thomas’ second argument is that ‘Otherwise a thing that had several forms would not be simply one. For a thing is simply one only because of the one form by which it has being. But man is simply one. Therefore he has only one form.’

3. The third argument is that the mode of predication seems to make the view impossible. For terms that are taken from diverse forms are mutually predicated of each other: either per accidens if the forms are not mutually ordered, as that the white thing is sweet; or, if the forms are mutually ordered, the predication will be per se in the second mode of per se. So if there is one form by which a thing is said to be an animal and another by which it is said to be a man, one of the aforesaid results will hold, namely that either the predication is per accidens if these two forms are not mutually ordered, or it is predication in the second mode of per se if one of the forms is the way to the other. But both of these are manifestly false, because animal is predicated of man per se and not per accidens; but man does not fall into the definition of animal but conversely. So there must be a single form whereby something is an animal and is a man, otherwise man would not be truly single and animal would not be predicated of man per se.

4. The fourth is that the view seems impossible because one action of the soul, when it is intense, impedes another action, and this would not in any way happen unless the principle of action were essentially one.

5. Further, the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.3 compares diversity of souls to diversity of species of figures one of which contains the other, as a pentagon includes and exceeds a tetragon. Thus then does the intellectual soul contain in its power whatever the sensitive soul of the brutes has and whatever the vegetative and nutritive soul of the plants has. Therefore, just as a surface that has the figure of a pentagon is not a tetragon by one figure and a pentagon by another figure (for the tetragon, by being included in the pentagon, would be superfluous), so neither is Socrates a man by one form and an animal by another form but by one and the same form.

6. Further, in his response to a.4, Thomas says that if another substantial form preceded the intellectual soul in man, the soul would not give to man existence simply but only existence in a certain respect; nor would the arriving and departing of the soul generate and corrupt the body simply but only in a certain respect; and all these are false. Therefore, just as the intellectual soul must contain virtually in itself the sensitive and vegetative soul, so it must contain virtually in itself the other lower forms, and it must accomplish in man whatever the other more imperfect souls accomplish in other things.

7. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

8. This position about the unity of substantial form is rejected by the masters: first because many things contrary to the Catholic faith follow from it; second because it contradicts philosophy; third because it is repugnant to Sacred Scripture.

9. The first is plain. For the faith posits that the one body numerically that the Son of God assumed from the Virgin, that the Virgin bore, that hung on the cross, was numerically one and the same as the body dead on the gibbet and buried for three days; but if there had been no other substantial form to the body of Christ than the intellectual soul, then, after this soul was separated, only prime matter remained, or some other substantial form was introduced. From this it follows that the body dead on the gibbet and buried in the tomb was not numerically the same. For if only the matter remained, it was not a body and so neither was it numerically the same body, for prime matter is not a body. Further, many other things about the dead body of Christ follow from this against the faith, as that blood and water did not flow from it, the contrary of which is said by the Evangelist *John* 19.34, and by the gloss on *I John* 5 that spirit, water, and blood flowed from his side, which could not have happened if his body did not have the matter of flesh. Further it would not have been a quantity because prime matter has of itself neither position nor place. Further, prime matter is neither heavy nor light; but the body of Christ during the three days was heavy. And many other unacceptable things follow.

10. But if, because of this, it be said that some other substantial form was introduced through the influence of the heavens, then it therefrom follows that the body of Christ was not numerically the same when living as when dead; for where there is a different substantial form there is a different body. Therefore the body during the three days would not have been the body that Christ assumed.

11. Further, the faith posits that in the sacrament of the altar all the bread is changed into the true body of Christ. So if there is only prime matter and soul in the body of Christ, then, since the bread is not changed into the soul (for body is not changed into spirit), it follows that the bread is changed into prime matter, which is contrary to the faith and contrary to the word of the Lord, *Matthew* 26.26, 'This is my body.' He does not say 'This is my matter.'

12. Again, the faith posits that everyone else besides Christ contracted original sin, not because the soul is sinner or cause of original sin, but because, though created pure by God, it is united with flesh drawn from the first parents by natural propagation and infected by them from the beginning, and not because it is united with prime matter. So if there is only one soul and prime matter in man, and if original sin cannot be contracted on the part of the soul (for it was not in the first parent, and God did not create original sin in creating the soul), nor can original sin exist on the part of prime matter (for then original sin would have been in Adam before there was actual sin in him, and also, wherever there was prime matter, there would have been original sin, which is false), the result then is that, if there is only one form in man, namely the intellectual soul, there is and was no original sin in him.

13. This position is rejected secondly [n.8] because it contradicts philosophy. For if the intellectual soul alone is immediately the perfection of prime matter, there would then be no form of elements in man nor any form of the mixture that philosophy says much about. The study of medicine will also cease. Further, one and the same form numerically will give bodily and spiritual being, and consequently this form will be bodily and spiritual at once. Again, it follows that prime matter is heavy and light and that the body gets from the soul its being heavy and light and not from the dominant element in the body.

14. The position is also rejected thirdly [n.8] because it is repugnant to Sacred Scripture: *John* 2.19, 21, ‘Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up,’ and ‘He said this about the temple of his body.’ But it is plain that the same body of Christ numerically is being supposed when he says ‘this [temple]’ and is being visibly pointed out when he says that he will raise ‘it’ up. The ‘this’ here refers to the living body of Christ and the ‘it’ refers to the dead body when it was without the soul and numerically the same; and this would not be true if there were no other substantial form besides the soul in Christ’s body. So there were several substantial forms in Christ’s body, and for the same reason in other men too, since Christ was among us as a man of the one same nature. Hence Anselm *Monologion* ch.17 says, ‘When some man is called body and rational and man, he is not called these three in one way or one consideration; for he is body in one respect and rational in another.’

15. Augustine too, *Retractions* 1.58, says, ‘This too was rashly said: “From the supreme essence I have attributed to the body through the soul a species, whereby the body is as much as it is. The body then subsists by the soul and by that very thing is it animated, whether as the world universally or as each animal in particular etc.” All this is said altogether rashly.’ In these words, then, Augustine retracts what he had said in *Immortality of the Soul*. So if it is rash to say that the soul gives the species of body, that is, the form whereby the body is as much as it is, and if the aforesaid position of Thomas says this, then it follows from Augustine that he has spoken rashly.

16. But against this seems to be what Thomas said in q.75 a.5 in his response to the question, that if the soul is composed of matter and form it can in no way be called the form of the body, for matter is not the form of anything. Response: just as we posit that the virtues of the sensitive soul perfect the grosser matter of the body through the medium of the subtle body that is spirit (which delivers to it these sorts of powers), as Augustine maintains in *Difference between Spirit and Soul*, so we posit that the form of the intellective soul perfects first its own spiritual matter and then, by its means, the bodily matter. I say in addition, therefore, that the matter of the soul is not the form of the body but that, by means of it, the form of the soul informs the body.

To the Arguments

17. To the first argument then [n.1] the response must be that, when he says that there is one soul in one body which vivifies the body and discriminates it by reason, it is true that there is one soul, namely the rational soul that completes and perfects the whole; but there are two other souls that are incomplete and give incomplete being to the human body, which is perfected and completed when the rational soul arrives. Hence some have said that there are three souls in man locally separated, one in the stomach, one in the heart, and a third in the brain. What moved them, perhaps, is that the actions which the soul cannot do without the body it does by means of animal spirits; and so they posited one soul in the stomach that by means of natural spirits performs the natural operations; another in the heart that by means of vital spirits performs the vital operations; another in the brain that by means of animate spirits performs animate operations. But others who posited only two spirits, namely vital and animate, posited only two souls, one in the heart and another in the brain, intending the one in the heart to perform by vital spirits both the vital operations and also those that we now call natural. One can say, then, that

two souls should not be posited in the way that they did; or one can say that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective are three forms that however are related to one another according to incomplete and complete being, according to potency and act, in a way that is suitable for essential unity; and for this reason they did not want to call them several souls but one soul.

18. Or one could say to this first argument [n.1], and say better I think, that it does not prove there is only one substantial form in man, but that there is only one soul, which many concede (but this is not in question now). It can also be said that the whole of *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* was directed against diverse heresies, as is plain to anyone who examines the process of that book. Hence the cited chapter does not mean to deny that there is an intellective, sensitive, and vegetative soul in man the way the philosophers supposed; for if the chapter had intended to deny this it would have said, ‘nor do we say there are three souls in man,’ but rather it would have said, ‘nor do we say there are two souls in man.’ Hence one must say that it intended to deny two souls in man the way the heretics posited two souls, perhaps as the Messalians did, about whom Damascene *On Heresies* ch.40/80 says that among their many errors was this one, that a man should possess two souls, one common to men and another above the heavens. And a sign that the cited chapter is against this heresy seems to be what it says in ch.3, that ‘we do not say there are two souls in man as Jacob and others of the Syrians write.’ But Damascene *ibid.* says about the aforesaid heresy, ‘Once the sickness was made manifest, they were expelled or they departed from Syria into Pamphylia.’

19. To the second argument [n.2] the reply must be that each of the forms bestows some being; but just as the first form is in potency to the second that is completive of it, so the being that the first form gives is incomplete and in potency to complete being. The plurality of forms, therefore, is not opposed to the essential unity of the composite, unless the forms are such that they are not related according to complete and incomplete being, so that they cannot come together in any essential unity.

20. To the third argument [n.3], when it is said that the proposition ‘man is an animal’ is a per accidens predication, the reply must be that it need not be so; for ordered forms that are predicated of each other are of two kinds. Some are accidents immediately of the supposit, and these are predicated of each other with accidental predication, as when a thing with a surface is said to be colored, because neither the surface nor the color are of the essence of the subject, and neither too does the color repose in the species completed by the color that is an accident of it. But other forms belong to the essential features of the supposit, by reason of which supposit they are predicated of each other in the concrete, and here the predication is in no way accidental.

21. To the fourth argument [n.4], namely that the intense action of one power would only impede another if both were founded in one essence, I say that this is not necessary, but rather what is necessary is that the three essences have a natural and essential bond of union. Again, the powers corresponding to them can impede each other in the actions and passions of the body and the body suffers along with the soul and follows the soul in the actions that the soul has – not because they have a foundation in the same essence, but because of their union with each other as perfection and perfectible. And so it is in the case of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellect souls in man. An example for the purpose: if a heavy piece of wood were located in and merged with a light piece of wood, then it seems that the heavy piece, whose motion is downwards, impedes the operation of the

light piece; hence much more would this happen if one thing was naturally joined together with another. Hence Avicenna says in *On Generation* 1 ch.3 text 20 that ‘Any power, if it have nothing whereby it might be joined to another power, would not hinder the other power from its operation, namely if there were no instrument common to both.

22. To the fifth argument [n.5], namely about the likeness with figures, one must say that the likeness is not to be applied in all cases but in some and not in others. For there is a likeness in the fact that, just as a pentagon is not reached unless four angles are first reached, so the intellective soul is not reached unless the sensitive and vegetative souls are first reached. Again, just as a pentagon presupposes prior to it a tetragon in potency and incomplete being, so the intellective soul presupposes prior to it the sensitive and vegetative soul in potency and incomplete being. But there is unlikeness in this that the four angles and the tetragon in incomplete being which a pentagon presupposes are of the essence of a pentagon when it is complete; but the vegetative and sensitive souls are not of the essence of the intellective soul.

23. To the sixth argument [n.6], namely that otherwise the intellective soul would not bestow being simply, one must say that, if the ‘being simply’ means the totality of being that is in the composite, then it is true that the intellective soul does not give the totality of being given by the preceding forms; rather the being the intellective soul gives is complete and perfective of all the preceding forms and of their being. But if the ‘being simply’ is meant according as it is divided oppositely to the being that accident gives (the way the Philosopher says, *On Generation* 1.3 text 20, that when a substance is generated it is called generation simply), then I say that in this way the intellective form gives being simply; for just as the preceding forms were in potency to it as to their essential completion, so too the being of those preceding forms was in potency to its being; and so in the arriving of the complete form there is true generation or essential completion of generation, although there is no true generation in the arriving of an accidental form.

Article Thirty One

That in man there is only one substantial form

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.76 a.2, in the main response, Thomas says that there is only one substantial form in man, namely the intellective soul whereby man is animal, vegetable, body. He proves it first as follows. Gennadius in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* says, ‘Neither do we say there are two souls in man (as James and other heretics write), one the animal soul which vivifies the body and by which the body is animated and which is mixed with the blood, the other the spiritual soul which serves reason. But we say that there is one and the same soul that vivifies the body by union with it, and disposes it by reason.’ From this Thomas argues thus: ‘As man is in the genus of animal so he is in the genus of animate body and of body and of substance. But he is man and animal by one and the same form, which is the soul, as is plain from the cited authority. So, for the same reason, he is placed in the higher genera by one and the same form, and thus no form existed in the matter before the soul did.’

2. Thomas' second argument is that 'Otherwise a thing that had several forms would not be simply one. For a thing is simply one only because of the one form by which it has being. But man is simply one. Therefore he has only one form.'

3. The third argument is that the mode of predication seems to make the view impossible. For terms that are taken from diverse forms are mutually predicated of each other: either per accidens if the forms are not mutually ordered, as that the white thing is sweet; or, if the forms are mutually ordered, the predication will be per se in the second mode of per se. So if there is one form by which a thing is said to be an animal and another by which it is said to be a man, one of the aforesaid results will hold, namely that either the predication is per accidens if these two forms are not mutually ordered, or it is predication in the second mode of per se if one of the forms is the way to the other. But both of these are manifestly false, because animal is predicated of man per se and not per accidens; but man does not fall into the definition of animal but conversely. So there must be a single form whereby something is an animal and is a man, otherwise man would not be truly single and animal would not be predicated of man per se.

4. The fourth is that the view seems impossible because one action of the soul, when it is intense, impedes another action, and this would not in any way happen unless the principle of action were essentially one.

5. Further, the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2.3 compares diversity of souls to diversity of species of figures one of which contains the other, as a pentagon includes and exceeds a tetragon. Thus then does the intellectual soul contain in its power whatever the sensitive soul of the brutes has and whatever the vegetative and nutritive soul of the plants has. Therefore, just as a surface that has the figure of a pentagon is not a tetragon by one figure and a pentagon by another figure (for the tetragon, by being included in the pentagon, would be superfluous), so neither is Socrates a man by one form and an animal by another form but by one and the same form.

6. Further, in his response to a.4, Thomas says that if another substantial form preceded the intellectual soul in man, the soul would not give to man existence simply but only existence in a certain respect; nor would the arriving and departing of the soul generate and corrupt the body simply but only in a certain respect; and all these are false. Therefore, just as the intellectual soul must contain virtually in itself the sensitive and vegetative soul, so it must contain virtually in itself the other lower forms, and it must accomplish in man whatever the other more imperfect souls accomplish in other things.

7. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

8. This position about the unity of substantial form is rejected by the masters: first because many things contrary to the Catholic faith follow from it; second because it contradicts philosophy; third because it is repugnant to Sacred Scripture.

9. The first is plain. For the faith posits that the one body numerically that the Son of God assumed from the Virgin, that the Virgin bore, that hung on the cross, was numerically one and the same as the body dead on the gibbet and buried for three days; but if there had been no other substantial form to the body of Christ than the intellectual soul, then, after this soul was separated, only prime matter remained, or some other substantial form was introduced. From this it follows that the body dead on the gibbet and

buried in the tomb was not numerically the same. For if only the matter remained, it was not a body and so neither was it numerically the same body, for prime matter is not a body. Further, many other things about the dead body of Christ follow from this against the faith, as that blood and water did not flow from it, the contrary of which is said by the Evangelist *John* 19.34, and by the gloss on *I John* 5 that spirit, water, and blood flowed from his side, which could not have happened if his body did not have the matter of flesh. Further it would not have been a quantity because prime matter has of itself neither position nor place. Further, prime matter is neither heavy nor light; but the body of Christ during the three days was heavy. And many other unacceptable things follow.

10. But if, because of this, it be said that some other substantial form was introduced through the influence of the heavens, then it therefrom follows that the body of Christ was not numerically the same when living as when dead; for where there is a different substantial form there is a different body. Therefore the body during the three days would not have been the body that Christ assumed.

11. Further, the faith posits that in the sacrament of the altar all the bread is changed into the true body of Christ. So if there is only prime matter and soul in the body of Christ, then, since the bread is not changed into the soul (for body is not changed into spirit), it follows that the bread is changed into prime matter, which is contrary to the faith and contrary to the word of the Lord, *Matthew* 26.26, 'This is my body.' He does not say 'This is my matter.'

12. Again, the faith posits that everyone else besides Christ contracted original sin, not because the soul is sinner or cause of original sin, but because, though created pure by God, it is united with flesh drawn from the first parents by natural propagation and infected by them from the beginning, and not because it is united with prime matter. So if there is only one soul and prime matter in man, and if original sin cannot be contracted on the part of the soul (for it was not in the first parent, and God did not create original sin in creating the soul), nor can original sin exist on the part of prime matter (for then original sin would have been in Adam before there was actual sin in him, and also, wherever there was prime matter, there would have been original sin, which is false), the result then is that, if there is only one form in man, namely the intellective soul, there is and was no original sin in him.

13. This position is rejected secondly [n.8] because it contradicts philosophy. For if the intellective soul alone is immediately the perfection of prime matter, there would then be no form of elements in man nor any form of the mixture that philosophy says much about. The study of medicine will also cease. Further, one and the same form numerically will give bodily and spiritual being, and consequently this form will be bodily and spiritual at once. Again, it follows that prime matter is heavy and light and that the body gets from the soul its being heavy and light and not from the dominant element in the body.

14. The position is also rejected thirdly [n.8] because it is repugnant to Sacred Scripture: *John* 2.19, 21, 'Destroy this temple and in three days I will raise it up,' and 'He said this about the temple of his body.' But it is plain that the same body of Christ numerically is being supposed when he says 'this [temple]' and is being visibly pointed out when he says that he will raise 'it' up. The 'this' here refers to the living body of Christ and the 'it' refers to the dead body when it was without the soul and numerically the same; and this would not be true if there were no other substantial form besides the

soul in Christ's body. So there were several substantial forms in Christ's body, and for the same reason in other men too, since Christ was among us as a man of the one same nature. Hence Anselm *Monologion* ch.17 says, 'When some man is called body and rational and man, he is not called these three in one way or one consideration; for he is body in one respect and rational in another.'

15. Augustine too, *Retractions* 1.58, says, 'This too was rashly said: "From the supreme essence I have attributed to the body through the soul a species, whereby the body is as much as it is. The body then subsists by the soul and by that very thing is it animated, whether as the world universally or as each animal in particular etc." All this is said altogether rashly.' In these words, then, Augustine retracts what he had said in *Immortality of the Soul*. So if it is rash to say that the soul gives the species of body, that is, the form whereby the body is as much as it is, and if the aforesaid position of Thomas says this, then it follows from Augustine that he has spoken rashly.

16. But against this seems to be what Thomas said in q.75 a.5 in his response to the question, that if the soul is composed of matter and form it can in no way be called the form of the body, for matter is not the form of anything. Response: just as we posit that the virtues of the sensitive soul perfect the grosser matter of the body through the medium of the subtle body that is spirit (which delivers to it these sorts of powers), as Augustine maintains in *Difference between Spirit and Soul*, so we posit that the form of the intellective soul perfects first its own spiritual matter and then, by its means, the bodily matter. I say in addition, therefore, that the matter of the soul is not the form of the body but that, by means of it, the form of the soul informs the body.

To the Arguments

17. To the first argument then [n.1] the response must be that, when he says that there is one soul in one body which vivifies the body and discriminates it by reason, it is true that there is one soul, namely the rational soul that completes and perfects the whole; but there are two other souls that are incomplete and give incomplete being to the human body, which is perfected and completed when the rational soul arrives. Hence some have said that there are three souls in man locally separated, one in the stomach, one in the heart, and a third in the brain. What moved them, perhaps, is that the actions which the soul cannot do without the body it does by means of animal spirits; and so they posited one soul in the stomach that by means of natural spirits performs the natural operations; another in the heart that by means of vital spirits performs the vital operations; another in the brain that by means of animate spirits performs animate operations. But others who posited only two spirits, namely vital and animate, posited only two souls, one in the heart and another in the brain, intending the one in the heart to perform by vital spirits both the vital operations and also those that we now call natural. One can say, then, that two souls should not be posited in the way that they did; or one can say that the vegetative, sensitive, and intellective are three forms that however are related to one another according to incomplete and complete being, according to potency and act, in a way that is suitable for essential unity; and for this reason they did not want to call them several souls but one soul.

18. Or one could say to this first argument [n.1], and say better I think, that it does not prove there is only one substantial form in man, but that there is only one soul, which

many concede (but this is not in question now). It can also be said that the whole of *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* was directed against diverse heresies, as is plain to anyone who examines the process of that book. Hence the cited chapter does not mean to deny that there is an intellective, sensitive, and vegetative soul in man the way the philosophers supposed; for if the chapter had intended to deny this it would have said, ‘nor do we say there are three souls in man,’ but rather it would have said, ‘nor do we say there are two souls in man.’ Hence one must say that it intended to deny two souls in man the way the heretics posited two souls, perhaps as the Messalians did, about whom Damascene *On Heresies* ch.40/80 says that among their many errors was this one, that a man should possess two souls, one common to men and another above the heavens. And a sign that the cited chapter is against this heresy seems to be what it says in ch.3, that ‘we do not say there are two souls in man as Jacob and others of the Syrians write.’ But Damascene *ibid.* says about the aforesaid heresy, ‘Once the sickness was made manifest, they were expelled or they departed from Syria into Pamphylia.’

19. To the second argument [n.2] the reply must be that each of the forms bestows some being; but just as the first form is in potency to the second that is completive of it, so the being that the first form gives is incomplete and in potency to complete being. The plurality of forms, therefore, is not opposed to the essential unity of the composite, unless the forms are such that they are not related according to complete and incomplete being, so that they cannot come together in any essential unity.

20. To the third argument [n.3], when it is said that the proposition ‘man is an animal’ is a per accidens predication, the reply must be that it need not be so; for ordered forms that are predicated of each other are of two kinds. Some are accidents immediately of the supposit, and these are predicated of each other with accidental predication, as when a thing with a surface is said to be colored, because neither the surface nor the color are of the essence of the subject, and neither too does the color repose in the species completed by the color that is an accident of it. But other forms belong to the essential features of the supposit, by reason of which supposit they are predicated of each other in the concrete, and here the predication is in no way accidental.

21. To the fourth argument [n.4], namely that the intense action of one power would only impede another if both were founded in one essence, I say that this is not necessary, but rather what is necessary is that the three essences have a natural and essential bond of union. Again, the powers corresponding to them can impede each other in the actions and passions of the body and the body suffers along with the soul and follows the soul in the actions that the soul has – not because they have a foundation in the same essence, but because of their union with each other as perfection and perfectible. And so it is in the case of the vegetative, sensitive, and intellect souls in man. An example for the purpose: if a heavy piece of wood were located in and merged with a light piece of wood, then it seems that the heavy piece, whose motion is downwards, impedes the operation of the light piece; hence much more would this happen if one thing was naturally joined together with another. Hence Avicenna says in *On Generation* 1 ch.3 text 20 that ‘Any power, if it have nothing whereby it might be joined to another power, would not hinder the other power from its operation, namely if there were no instrument common to both.’

22. To the fifth argument [n.5], namely about the likeness with figures, one must say that the likeness is not to be applied in all cases but in some and not in others. For there is a likeness in the fact that, just as a pentagon is not reached unless four angles are first

reached, so the intellective soul is not reached unless the sensitive and vegetative souls are first reached. Again, just as a pentagon presupposes prior to it a tetragon in potency and incomplete being, so the intellective soul presupposes prior to it the sensitive and vegetative soul in potency and incomplete being. But there is unlikeness in this that the four angles and the tetragon in incomplete being which a pentagon presupposes are of the essence of a pentagon when it is complete; but the vegetative and sensitive souls are not of the essence of the intellective soul.

23. To the sixth argument [n.6], namely that otherwise the intellective soul would not bestow being simply, one must say that, if the ‘being simply’ means the totality of being that is in the composite, then it is true that the intellective soul does not give the totality of being given by the preceding forms; rather the being the intellective soul gives is complete and perfective of all the preceding forms and of their being. But if the ‘being simply’ is meant according as it is divided oppositely to the being that accident gives (the way the Philosopher says, *On Generation* 1.3 text 20, that when a substance is generated it is called generation simply), then I say that in this way the intellective form gives being simply; for just as the preceding forms were in potency to it as to their essential completion, so too the being of those preceding forms was in potency to its being; and so in the arriving of the complete form there is true generation or essential completion of generation, although there is no true generation in the arriving of an accidental form.

Article Thirty Two

That no accidental disposition pre-exists in matter before the substantial form is introduced

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.76 a.6 in the response to the question, Thomas says that it is impossible for any accidental dispositions to pre-exist in matter before the soul or intermediary between body and soul or between any matter and form. This is plain, first, because accident is posterior in both time and idea to substance, as is said in *Metaphysics* 7.1 text 4; so no accidental form can be understood to exist in the matter prior to the soul, which is the substantial form.

2. It is plain, second, from the fact that, since matter is in potency in a certain order to all its acts, what is first in these acts must be understood first in matter. But the first of all acts is existence. Therefore it is impossible to understand matter to be hot or a quantity before it is in the act that it has through the substantial form, which makes it to exist actually, as was said. And so no disposition is in matter prior to form.

3. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

4. From this position, which follows the preceding one about unity of form [article 31], there follows an additional error, namely that the Son of God did not assume flesh from the most pure blood of the Blessed Virgin, which however Damascene 3.2 says he did; and the faith holds it also. But what rather follows from the position is that the Son

of God received prime and bare matter. And from this there follows, as it seems, a worse error, namely that Christ was not the son of the Blessed Virgin, nor was she his mother, because she did not minister to him flesh and body but only prime matter, which if he had taken from some other thing, he would not for this reason be called the son of it.

5. Further, the aforesaid position is against the Philosopher, who says in *On the Soul* 2.2 that a form has its coming to be in a matter proper to it. But matter is not proper to such and such a form save by a disposition intermediate to this sort of form rather than to some other one. Hence too, as he says, the soul is not act of matter without any disposition but act of a natural organic body potentially having life, and all these things state a disposition to the form that the soul is. Therefore this position of Thomas is false both as to the faith and as to philosophy.

6. Further, it is agreed that before the infusion of the rational soul there exists in the body a form of the mixture and of the qualities left by its activity, and a form and figure of bodily organs. Again, all these things are altogether the same after the infusion of the soul as before. And the fact they are not different from what they were before appears from their being alike in every respect, for things alike in everything are the same, as Damascene says 3.16.

7. Further, one similar is not corrupted so as to introduce other similars, for this would be otiose. Therefore nature does not corrupt the accidents that precede the soul's infusion so as to introduce others after infusion that are altogether similar; the result then is that there are the same enduring accidents. But the accidents that were prior were prior to the presence of the rational soul in matter, so those also were prior that it is agreed are present after infusion. And therefore they are intermediary between body and soul or between the rational soul and matter.

To the Arguments

8. As to the arguments one must say that both are fallacious inferences or proceed from a false supposition. For [n.1] if one supposes, as is true, that there are ranks of forms in man and in other animate things, the inference that 'because the accident is posterior to the substantial form therefore it is posterior to the soul' does not hold but is a fallacy of the consequent. And if one supposes that in man and the other animals there is no other form than the soul, as Thomas opines, then the inference holds but the supposition is false, and has been condemned by the Masters at Paris.

9. The second argument is fallacious in the same way. For the inference that 'because existence, which is through the substantial form, is prior in the matter to every accident therefore existence is through the soul' is a fallacy of consequence, unless one supposes first that there is no other form in man and other animate things than the soul, which was rejected at Paris.

Article Thirty Three

That memory as it exists in the intellective part of the soul does not have regard to the past as past

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again in q.79 a.6 in the main response Thomas says that if memory is taken solely as a force for preserving species one must say that memory is in the intellective part alone; but if to the idea of memory belongs that its object be the past as past, then memory in this way will not be in the intellective part but only in the sensitive part, which apprehends particulars; for the past as past, since it signifies with determinacy of time, belongs to the condition of particulars.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From this position an error necessarily follows, namely that an angel has no memory of the past as past and consequently has no certain knowledge of the past; and this seems erroneous, and also prejudicial to them and to us, over whom they have the guardianship. And therefore one must say that, whether memory is taken for the intellective power that preserves species or for the act of remembering the past as past, memory is not in the sensitive power alone; for then it would not be in the angels in whom there is no sensitive power. Now that an angel does not only have intellective memory but also memory of the past as past is plain from *Tobit* 5.8, where the angel Raphael says, 'I know the way that leads to Rages, the city of the Medes, and I have frequently walked along those ways and stayed with Gabelus.' And in *Tobit* 12.12 he says, 'When you were weeping with tears and burying the dead etc., I offered your prayer to the Lord.' And in *Daniel* 10.13 the angel says, 'the prince of the kingdom of the Persians resisted me twenty one days.' From this it is plain that memory, whether it is taken for the force of preserving species or for the act of remembering the past as past, should be placed not only in the sensitive power but also in the intellective.

4. As to the reasoning Thomas insinuates, namely that the sensitive apprehending power is of particulars as they are here and now and that such is the past as past, one must say that not only does the sensitive power apprehend the particular as it is here and now but so also does the intellective power, and remembers it. Nor do the senses differ from the intellect in this that the senses apprehend singulars and the intellect abstract universals, but they differ in this that the senses apprehend particulars only but the intellect apprehends not only universals but also particulars. Otherwise angel and soul would not apprehend Christ, who is a certain singular, since these do not have a sensitive power; but the contrary of this is had in *John* 17.3, 'This is life eternal that they should know thee, the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.' Again from this position it follows that souls already blessed would not remember the passion of Christ nor his other particular benefits already past, nor would they remember their sins; and so they would not be pleasing to God in rendering him thanks for remission of sin and bestowal of benefits, which is plainly erroneous.

5. Further, if opposed to this is put the fact that the Philosopher only posits a sensitive memory (and so he says, when speaking of memory in *On Memory and Reminiscence*, that memory principally and per se is sensitive but the intellect is memory per accidens) – this reasoning supposes something false, because in *Magna Moralia* 1.5 [17] he puts memory in the power that possesses reason. Besides, Augustine plainly

posits an intellectual memory, *On the Trinity* 4.13, 15; 7.21, 33 [10.11-12; 14.8, 14; 15.21-22].

Article Thirty Four

That the intellect is a simply higher power than the will

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.82 a.3 in the main response, Thomas says that, if the intellect and will are considered in themselves, the intellect is in this way more eminent; but if each is considered in a certain respect and in comparison to the other, the will is sometimes found to be higher than the intellect by the fact that the object of the will is found in a higher thing than the object of the intellect is.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems to us false and an antecedent to many falsehoods, even though it does not appear directly contrary to faith and good morals. For Anselm in ch.4 of *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin* says, 'If an accusation is made against the members and senses of the body for the voluntary unjust actions done by them, they can reply that God has subjected us and the power in us to the will, so that, at its command, we cannot fail to move ourselves and do what it commands; and so we cannot and ought not fail to obey the mistress that God has given us.' And later, in the following chapter, he speaks of 'the will to which all voluntary motions of the whole man are subjected.' This authority plainly attributes lordship to the will, not to reason.

4. Further, it belongs to what is better and higher to use what is worse and lower. We see this from sense experience in the case of things where the natural and due order is preserved. And the Commentator on *Ethics* 6, at the words 'Therefore, after the two parts have been stated etc.' says, 'How could the worse use the better?' But the will uses reason and the other powers of the soul; for to use is to take up something into the power of the will, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 4.10. Therefore the will is superior to the intellect and to the other powers of the soul.

5. Further, that thing is better whose perfection is better, as the Commentator says at the end of his prologue on *Ethics* 6, 'How will the virtue and perfection of the better not be better?' But charity, which is the perfection of the will, is the best virtue and perfection, as Augustine says *On the Trinity* 2.17, 18, 'The love of god is diffused in our hearts etc.; there is no more excellent gift of God than this one, which is what alone separates the sons of the kingdom from the sons of perdition.'

6. Again, the Philosopher in *Topics* 3.1, about the more good and the more useful, says, 'What all choose is better than what not all choose, and what many choose than what fewer choose.' But all things desire the good, as he himself says in the same chapter and in *Ethics* 1.1. Yet not all things desire the true, speaking per se, but only rational things. Therefore the good is better than the true; therefore it is the object of a power that is better.

7. Again, to a nobler object there corresponds, as it seems, a nobler power, and Augustine says it in letter 3 to Nebridius, namely that the mind and the intelligence are better than the eyes and common vision, which would not be the case if the things we understand were not better than the things we discern. But if we discern the true by the good, according as they are separable in reason, the good seems to be better, and so nobler, than the true. Therefore the good as good is the object of a better power than the true as true is; and the will therefore will be nobler than the intellect. The proof of the assumed premise here is that the good as good is good by itself, but the true as true is only good by the good; but what is good by itself is better than what is good by another. Therefore the good is better than the true.

8. Further, when many agree together and cooperate with each other in perpetrating some crime, the one to whom more is imputed is reckoned to be more principal; and, conversely, more is attributed to him who is reckoned to be principal; hence too the more principal is summoned in a cause at law. But all sins are imputed most to the will; therefore the will is the more principal even in sin than the intellect is. For example, unbelief or infidelity is attributed more to the will than to the intellect, *John* 12.39, 'For this reason they could not believe, because he says again etc.'; on this text Augustine, homily 51, says, 'If I am asked why they could not, I reply: because they willed not,' and Chrysostom, homily 68, says, 'They could not, that is, they willed not.'

Response to the Argument

9. Now the reason Thomas sets down in confirmation of his opinion is as follows: the object of the intellect is both simpler and more absolute than the object of the will, for the object of the intellect is the very idea of the desirable good; but the desirable good, whose idea is in the intellect, is the object of the will. Since therefore the idea of a power is taken from order to the object, the result is that the intellect is per se and simply higher and nobler than the will. Response: when Thomas says that the intellect's object is simpler than the will's object, because the idea of good is the intellect's object and the very desirable good is the will's object and because the idea of the good is simpler than the good itself, one must reply by taking away the first statement, that he says the intellect's object is simpler than the will's object; and when he proves that the idea of good is the intellect's object and the good itself the will's object, I say that the will's object is as much per se and more per se the idea of the good than the desirable good, the contrary of which he supposes. And this is plain as follows: for it is clear that the essence of good, which he calls the idea of good, is truer and more essential to the good than whatever is not of the essence of good; for the essence of each thing is what is signified per se first by the name. If therefore the essence of good is most truly the idea of good, then the essence is most truly the good itself; and that which is most truly good is most truly the object of the will. The necessary consequence, therefore, is that the essence of good, that is the idea of good, is most truly and first and per se the object of the will, the contrary of which he supposes.

Article Thirty Five
That the better the body the better the soul it is allotted

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.85 a.7 in the main response, Thomas says that the better disposed the body is the better soul it is allotted; and he is speaking of the intellective soul as is plain in the same place. The reason for this is that a form is received in matter according to the capacity of the matter; hence too, since in men who have a nobler body there is a more capable matter, they are allotted a nobler soul and one of greater virtue for understanding.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We believe that he is speaking of a better disposition in composition of the body, not in strength and speed, beauty or size, as if he wanted to say that a body with a better composition is allotted a better soul and one more suited for intellectual and moral operations. And we think that this can be understood well and badly, and we say that in human souls (in themselves and from their creation) there is a difference as to fitness of the apprehensive and motive parts or as to morals. For the Master says in *2 Sentences* d.32 ch.9, 'It does not seem unreasonable to many that, from their creation itself, one soul excels another in natural gifts, just as a different essence is nobler and subtler than another and more fitted for understanding; which is not an improbable statement, since it is agreed to have been so even in the case of the angels.' And what the Master says is the opinion of Hugh of St. Victor in *3 Sentences* ch.9 [29]. The Commentator seems to give witness to this opinion on the statement in *On the Soul* 1 'and sometimes they seek to say etc.', when he says that the bodily members of a lion differ from those of a stag only because the soul of a lion differs from the soul of a stag; for this is manifest in the individuals of a single species, and for this reason are the morals different. In these words the Commentator insinuates that the diversity of bodily members in animals of diverse species, and even the diversity of morals in the same species, are caused by the diversity of souls.

4. Again we say that human souls are diversified in morals and other aptitudes according to the diverse composition of the body. Hence it is that the Philosopher says, *On the Soul* 2.9, 'We say that those hard in flesh are unfit in mind and those soft in flesh are well fit in mind.' Hence too he says in *The Problems* that all those are weak in morals who live in superabundance of heat or cold. So it thus appears that the aptitudes and morals of the human soul must be caused both by the nature of the soul and by the composition of the body. When therefore Thomas says that the better disposed a body is the better the soul it is allotted, we believe that, if his meaning is about the better aptitudes and morals of the soul as these must be caused by the composition of the body, he is telling the truth; but if he means to say that solely from a better composition of the body there is a better fitness in souls for morals and intellectual operations, we believe he is saying something false.

Article Thirty Six

That the separated soul understands through species participated in through influence from the divine light

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.89 a.1 where Thomas asks whether the separated soul understands through innate species or species that it is then abstracting, he says that the soul understands not only through preserved species but also through species participated in through influence from the divine light, in which species the soul participates just as do other separate substances, though in an inferior way. Hence, as soon as the soul ceases to be turned toward the body, it turns to higher things. But not for this reason is its knowledge unnatural, because God is author not only of the inflowing of graced light but also of natural light. He says the like in the same question article 3, in the main response.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. It seems to us that this is false and an occasion for error. For there follows from it that separated souls do not really suffer in the infernal fire, because it is through the same species of fire that the heat of the fire is felt and that the one who feels it is afflicted by it if it is excessive; and generally it is through the same species of the sensible thing that the knowledge and pain of the sufferer comes, when the sensible thing is excessive to sense. Therefore if separated souls know nothing through received species, then the souls of the damned undergo no suffering in infernal fire, and neither do the demons; in vain then are they sent into it and kept in it, and in vain is it prepared for them, about which preparation and sending *Matthew 25.41* speaks.

4. Again, if an inflowing of this sort of species from the divine light were by grace, then in no way would it happen to damned souls, which are unworthy of all grace and are sent into outer darkness; but if the process is natural, as he insinuates – for he says that the soul turns to higher things by the fact of being turned away from the body – if, I say, it is natural for this reason, then contemplative souls in rapture, when the soul is turned wholly away from the body and toward higher things, should have this sort of inflowing of species happen to them, either of all species or at least of some of them, either distinctly or at least confusedly. But it is plain that this does not happen to the latter in this way or in that; therefore it does not happen to the former either.

5. Further, if separated souls know only through species bestowed on them in their separation, then, in order for them to know the things done among the living who are far off from them, there would be no need for any of them to be sent among the living; similarly they would not need to learn from the angels that what was done among the living was of importance to them; but the opposite of both these points is set down by Augustine in *Care for the Dead*, when he says, ‘One must confess that the dead are not ignorant of what is done here; indeed from those who reach them hence when dying, they can hear, not everything indeed, but what they are allowed to hear. The dead can also hear from the angels, who are set in charge of what is done here, anything that he, to whom all things are subject, judges each of the dead should hear.’ And later, ‘The fact

that some of the dead are also sent to the living, just as contrariwise Paul was rapt up from the living to paradise, is testified to by divine Scripture.’ So Augustine.

Article Thirty Seven

That the separated soul knows itself through itself

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, q.89 a.2 in the response to the question, Thomas says that the separated soul understands itself through itself.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This does not seem to need reprehending as contrary to the faith and good morals, but it does seem to us to be otherwise false. For Anselm in *Monologion* ch.23 [33] says, ‘In no way can it be denied that, when the rational mind understands itself by thinking, an image of itself comes to birth in its thought.’

4. Further, the Commentator *On the Soul* 3 text 3, at the words ‘and the soul is understood just the way understood things are,’ says that ‘Aristotle was in doubt about the material intellect and whether the thing understood from it was the intellect itself or something else was in some other way.’ And a little later he adds, ‘He begins to determine that it is understood through an intention in it just as are other understood things.’ These are the words of the Commentator. If therefore the intellect understands itself through an intention, then it does not understand itself through itself, that is, through its own essence.

5. Further, if the soul were for itself the reason for understanding as the word is for the thing understood, the consequence is that the soul would be the word for itself; and since the word is generated from that of which it is the word, as Augustine determines *On the Trinity* 9.7, 8, 25ff., the consequence would necessarily be that the same thing is generated from itself, which is impossible according to Augustine *On the Trinity* 1.1, and also from the Philosopher *On the Soul* 2 and *On Animals* 16.

Article Thirty Eight

That spatial distance does not impede the separated soul’s knowledge

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, q.89 a.7, where Thomas asks whether spatial distance impedes the knowledge of the separated soul, he says in the main response that some have posited that the separated soul would know singulars by abstraction from sensibles; but the abstraction of species from sensibles takes place through the senses and the other sense powers, which do not remain in the separated soul; instead, the separated soul

understands singulars through the influx of species from the divine light, which light indeed is equally disposed to the near and the distant. Hence spatial distance in no way impedes the soul's knowledge.

2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems without doubt to contain three falsehoods. The first is that the separated soul does not understand by abstracting or receiving from the senses because the sense powers do not remain in the separated soul. The second is that it knows through the influx of species from the divine light. The third is that, because the divine light is equally disposed to the near and distant, for this reason spatial distance does not in any way impede the separated soul's knowledge.

4. The first seems to us false because then the separated soul would not experience anything by reception from sensibles; for, as was shown [article 36], the same species must be causing sense knowledge when sensibles are disposed suitably to sense, and be causing sensible hurt and pain when they exceed sense. And so the consequence would be that neither would the separated souls of the mediocre good feel any punishment from the fire of purgatory (the contrary of which is to be maintained), nor would the souls of the very bad from the fire and water in hell (the opposite of which is posited by the faith according to the words of *Luke* 16.24, where our Savior says that the rich feaster begged for a drop of water against the torment of the flames, and *Job* 24.19 says that the wicked will pass from freezing cold to extreme heat).

5. Against the second error, that is, against the inflowing of species from the divine light, refer to what was said in the preceding article but one [article 36].

6. The third error (namely that because the divine light is equally disposed to the near and distant, for this reason etc. [n.3 supra]) seems false and against Augustine in *Care for the Dead*. For if spatial nearness and distance have no effect on the separated soul's knowledge, nothing would be gained by some of the dead being sent to the living to learn the things that are done among the living and to report it back to the dead who remain where they were, the contrary of which is posited by Augustine.

7. Further, if spatial distance impedes the soul's knowledge even after the resurrection, then the separated soul would have a more perfect knowledge of things when it is in the unnatural state and disposition of being separated from the body, than the united soul would have when it is in the natural state and disposition of union with the body; but this is impossible.

8. Further, if this were possible because the divine light is equidistant, then by parity of reasoning – since the divine light is disposed equally to the present and the future – distance would in no way impede the separated soul's knowledge and so the separated soul would know the future equally with the present, which is false. For John Damascene says 2.4, 'The future is known neither by angels nor devils, and by souls much less so.'

Article Thirty Nine

That essential reward responds to quantity of love only and not to quantity of work

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.96 last article in the main response, Thomas says that essential reward responds to quantity of love only and not in any way to quantity of work, but accidental reward does so respond. And for this he adduces neither argument nor authority.
2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. About this there was an opinion or rather error of Jovinian, as Jerome in *Against Jovinian* 2 [3] reports it as follows, 'If someone objects to me why the just man labors in peace or persecutions if there is no advance or greater reward, know that he does this not to merit more but so as not to lose what he has received.' Blessed Jerome considers this an error and rejects it in the same book through the parable of the ten talents.

4. Further, it is certain that a habit is ordered toward act as to its end and is posited because of act, as is plain from *Ethics* 10.1; but an end is better than what is for the end; and what is better God loves more and accepts more, and what he loves more and accepts more he rewards more. Therefore he rewards more because of the act of charity than because of the habit. But he would not reward more if essential reward responded to the habit of charity and only accidental reward to the act. Therefore essential reward responds not only to the act of charity but also to the act, rather to the act more than to the habit.

5. Further, Sacred Scripture attributes rewards not to the habit but rather to the work, which it would not do unless a greater reward was due to the work than to the habit. Hence *Psalms* 61.13, 'You render to each according to his works,' and *Matthew* 16.27, 'The Son of Man will come in the glory of his Father with his angels and render to each according to his works,' and *Matthew* 20.8, 'Call the workers and give them their wages,' and *Romans* 2.6, 'Who renders to each according to their works.' Notice that there [the second quote from *Matthew*] the wages were rendered not according to the time when nor according to the how much; but the quantity of the wages ought, in the view of the first [sc. those who started laboring in the vineyard first], to have responded to the quantity of the work.

Article Forty

That nothing is reduced wholly to nothing

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.104 a.4 in the main response, Thomas says that nothing is reduced wholly to nothing.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems an error, because freely given grace is something in the soul and yet, when someone sins, it ceases wholly to be, or it exists at the same time with mortal sin, which is erroneous. This is also against Augustine in several places, as *On Music* 5 and *On the Trinity* 11; for Augustine clearly indicates that species in the memory, by being forgotten, can be totally destroyed. The same thing seems to hold of light when it leaves the medium.

4. Further the Philosopher in *Sleep and Waking* 2 sets down an experiment in which it appears that a sign or species of a bright thing received in the eye is corrupted into nothing. For he says, 'If someone gazes long on some white color or another very bright one, and then shuts his eyes, he first sees the sort of color he first saw; then it changes to purple red, then to purple, then to black until it disappears.' The same experiment is set down by Augustine *On the Trinity* 11.3 in these words, 'Oftentimes, when we focus on some bright lights until we close our eyes, there turn around in our vision some bright colors and some colors changing variously and shining less and less until they altogether cease to be.'

Article Forty One

That higher angels pass on whatever they receive from God to those subject to them

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q. 106 last article in the main response, Thomas says that whatever the higher angels, who have the fullest participation in the divine goodness, receive from God, they impart to those subject to them.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This is contrary to *Isaiah* 63.1, 'Who is this who comes to Edom etc.,' and the interlinear Gloss says, 'This is said in the person of those angels who are ignorant of the mystery of the Incarnation,' and, according to another Gloss, 'They were asking this of other angels who knew it even before the Incarnation;' so they had not revealed it to the others.

4. Again, *Ephesians* 3.10, 'Grace was given to me to enlighten all about what is the dispensation of the sacrament hidden through the ages, so that the manifold wisdom of God might be made known in the heavens through the Church.' The Gloss says, 'By this he attributed something to the angels, because they learnt many secrets in these things.' And another Gloss says on this place that angels knew these secrets of the Incarnation; and a third Gloss agrees saying, 'The things said were known in part to the angels of higher dignity as to those who were familiar and messengers, through whom also these

things were announced, but they were not known to the angels of lesser dignity.’ From this it is plain that the superior and familiar angels do not impart to inferiors everything that they receive from God, because the inferiors learnt and came to know it later through the Church.

5. Again, Hugh of St. Victor on *Celestial Hierarchy* 7 speaks as follows, ‘When the Savior was ascending to heaven in his assumed flesh, and when some angels, who were ignorant of the exaltation of his humanity, asked, Who is this king of glory?, response was made to them by other more enlightened angels, The Lord of hosts, he is the king of glory.’ Again, the same Victor on *Celestial Hierarchy* 5 says, ‘The higher angels have all the enlightenment and virtues of the lower angels, but the lower angels do not at all have the enlightenment and virtue of the higher orders.’ And there follows, ‘We understand by enlightenment knowledge of truth, and by virtues love of goodness and perfection of work.’

To the Argument

6. Now the reason for Thomas’ position is that to the idea of good belongs that it communicate itself to others; and hence it is that bodily agents pass their likeness on to others as much as possible. So the more certain agents are further established in their participation of the divine goodness, the more do they strive to pour their perfections into others as much as possible. And therefore the higher angels etc. Response: the likeness does not hold, because a bodily agent acts by necessity in communicating its goodness and its likeness, but an angel communicates his perfection by will, and so he does not necessarily communicate everything, but he communicates as much as he wishes and as befits the other to receive. And because it befits the higher angels to know more and to have more power than the lower ones, therefore do the higher ones not always impart to the lower what they receive from God.

Article Forty Two

That spatial distance is no impediment to the locution of the angels

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.107 a.4 Thomas discusses whether spatial distance has any effect on the locution of an angel, and in the main response he says, ‘The locution of an angel consists in an intellectual operation; now the intellectual operation of an angel is altogether abstracted from space and time, for even our own intellectual operation is by abstraction from the here and now (save per accidens on the part of phantasms which do not exist in angels). But what is altogether abstracted from space and time is not acted on by diversity of time or distance in space. Hence spatial distance is no impediment to the locution of angels.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The principal point aimed at here, namely that spatial distance is no impediment to the locution of angels, we believe to be false. The other two points, by which he confirms the principal one, are either false or, to the extent they are true, do not entail his proposed conclusion. One of them is that the locution of an angel consists in an intellectual operation; the other is that the intellectual operation of an angel is altogether abstracted from space and time.

4. Now spatial distance does seem to impede the locution of an angel because the Gloss on *I Corinthians* 13.1, 'If I speak with the tongues of men and angels,' says, 'The superior angels signify to the lesser angels what they first perceive of the will of God, and they do it by certain indications or signs.' These indications or signs are not the very conception itself of the angels, for the apprehending of which they are made, because nothing is a sign of itself. These indications and signs are also not the desire of the angels whereby they desire another angel to perceive their thought, because signs and indications are more manifest than that for the perceiving of which they are made; and desire is either equally or more hidden than thought itself. Therefore the indications and signs must be acts directed externally to another. But all such operations can be impeded by spatial distance. Therefore the locution of angels can be impeded by spatial distance.

5. Further, Augustine in his book *Care for the Dead* says, 'The dead can also hear from the angels, who are set in charge of what is done here, anything that he, to whom all things are subject, judges each of the dead should hear. For unless the angels could be present at the places of the living and the dead, the Lord would not have said, 'And it came to pass that he too was taken by the angels to Abraham's bosom.' Therefore the angels will be able to be present here and now.' From these words of Augustine it is plain that spatial distance is an impediment to the locution of the angels with the dead; otherwise they would in vain pass from the place of the living to the dead to announce what they had seen among the living. But a reason that shows spatial distance can impede the locution of the angels with dead men shows equally that it can impede their locution with angels, for dead men are on a par with angels.

6. But as to what Thomas first says in confirmation of his view, namely that the locution of angels consists in intellectual operation, it can be understood in two ways: with precision and without. If it is understood with precision, namely that the locution of angels is nothing other than intellectual operation, that is, thought alone or thought along with the desire that another understand the thought, then we say that it is false – as was shown above [n.4], because the indications and signs by means of which the locution of angels takes place are other than their thought and desire. But if it is understood without precision, namely that the locution of angels consists in intellectual operation and also in some other operation directed externally to another by signs, then we believe that what Thomas says is true; but when it is understood in this way it does not entail the conclusion he intends, namely that spatial distance does not impede the locution of an angel; for an operation directed externally can be impeded by distance.

7. As to the other point he also makes, namely that the intellectual operation of an angel is altogether abstracted from space and time, it can be understood in several ways. If the understanding is that the essence itself of angelic operation is not in space or time but outside both, we say it is false. For from the fact that the substance of an angel is definitively in this or that place it needs must be that an angel's operations, as to what they are, determine a place and a time; otherwise the operation would be nobler than the

substance, which is impossible. But if the meaning is that the operation of an angel has respect to an object abstracted from the here and now, we say that in a way it is so and in a way not so. For it is clear that the angels have understanding of what is here and now, for example of those whom they guard and of what they are doing and the circumstances of what they are doing, all of which are here and now. The angels do also understand things abstracted from the here and now, as God and universals; and from this therefore Thomas' intended conclusion does not follow.

8. The reason Thomas gives for his position is as follows, that in *Luke* 16.23ff. the rich man placed in hell was speaking to Abraham without any impediment from the distance in space; therefore much more so can spatial distance not impede the locution of one angel with another. To this the response can be made that the place of Abraham's and Lazarus' rest was, at that time, on the outer boundaries of hell and possessed some light without any material pain, as the Master, Peter Comestor, says in the *Scholastic History on the Gospels* ch.103; hence, accordingly, there was perhaps not so great a distance between Abraham and the rich man that the one could not speak to the other.

Article Forty Three *That all angels are unequal*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.108 a.3 in the response to the first argument, Thomas says that all angels are unequal.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We do not blame this as erroneous yet the contrary seems more probable, namely that some angels are equal to each other. And one can be moved to this view by what we firmly maintain, namely that men can be equal to angels; otherwise the ruin of the angels could not be repaired through men. Further, men can be equal to each other, otherwise one could not be allotted the crown of another, as is said in *Revelation* 3.11, 'Keep what you have lest another receive your crown.' Therefore if men can be equal to the angels and to each other, it is probable by likeness that angels too can be equal to each other.

4. Further, the Philosopher in *Ethics* 8 and the Commentator on the same place say that friendship above all makes for equality, and the Commentator says that true friends must be equal to each other, for friendship will not exist in abundance over another. So if there is the truest friendship among the angels it is not likely that there is in every way inequality among them.

5. Again Augustine in *Quantity of the Soul* says, 'You rightly put equality before inequality, nor, I suppose, is there anyone endowed with human spirit who does not think this.' Therefore if that which is better is to be posited among the blessed orders of angels, equality should be posited among them rather than inequality.

Article Forty Four

That angels who are on the margin between two orders agree more with each other as to nearness of nature than any one of them does with those of his own order

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.108 a.3 in the response to the third argument, Thomas says that angels who are on the margin between two orders agree more with each other as to nearness of nature than any one of them agrees with those of his own order but agrees less as to suitability for like offices.

2. Again, in the same question a.4 in the main response, he repeats what he had said earlier, namely that to angels graced gifts are given according to the capacity of their natural powers.

3. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

4. Argument against this was also given above, in article 21.

5. As to the first point, however, we do not say that it is an error but we do think it is false. For we believe that all angels are of one species, as was shown above in article 11 through authorities from John Damascene, which we repeat in part. For Damascene says in his *Logic* ch.43 [26] that when Gabriel was talking with the holy Mother of God he was a single angel present talking there separate from those of the same substance as he. If the angels, then, are of the same substance they are of the same species; for we do not say that things of diverse species are of the same substance. Again, in the same book ch.30 [11], he says that previous philosophers called nature the more specific species as angel, man, and horse. And earlier in ch.30 [10] he says, 'The holy fathers, dismissing much contentious wrangling, called that substance and matter and form which is commonly and by many so called, namely the most specific species, as angel, man, horse, and the like.' From which it is plain that, according to him, angel is the name of a most specific species according to both the philosophers and the saints.

6. Further, from two things said above, namely that neighboring angels on the margin between two orders agree more in nearness of nature and what he said in q.62 a.6, namely that to the angels graced gifts are given according to the capacity of their natural powers, it follows that neighboring angels on the margin between two orders, since they agree more in natural powers, agree more in graced gifts. And it is plain that angels who agree more in natural powers and graced gifts agree more in suitability for like offices, and that those who agree in these agree more in order. Therefore it necessarily follows from the aforesaid that neighboring angels on the margin between two orders agree more in suitability for like offices and also agree more in order, which is plainly false.

Article Forty Five

That a per accidens being does not have a cause

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.115 a.6 in the main response, Thomas says that a per accidens being does not have a cause because it is not truly a being, for it is not a one.
2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This we say is against the faith and against philosophy.
4. It is against the faith because from it follows that there is something, nay that there are many things, which are neither God nor from God. For it is clear that a per accidens being is not God; and it is clear that if a being per accidens does not have a cause it is not from God; and so every per accidens being is neither God nor from God, which is impossible.
5. It is also against philosophy. For Aristotle says in *Metaphysics* 6.3, 'The causes of things that are will be either per se or per accidens.' And the Commentator says on that place, 'The causes of what is per accidens are also per accidens, namely all the causes there are, indeed infinite causes.'
6. Further each of the inferences of his argument is fallacious. For this does not follow: a per accidens being is not truly a being, therefore it does not have a cause; rather it is a fallacy of the consequent. The other inference is also not valid: a per accidens being is not truly one, therefore it is not truly a being; for what is truly being is divided into one and many, and the one that converts with being is not truly one but is a one common to the truly one and to the many.
7. Further, if whatever is not truly one is not truly a being nor has a cause, then since the world is, among all beings, least truly a one and is the most of all an aggregate of many things in act and in potency, the consequence is that the world is not truly one nor has a cause, which is most false.

Article Forty Six

That all human intellects are of the same rank

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.117 a.1 in the main response, Thomas says that all human intellects are of the same rank of order.
2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If by the word 'nature' Thomas understands the species or the specific difference then he says what is true, according to Damascene in his *Logic* ch.30 [11], and according to Boethius *On the Two Natures and One Person in Christ* ch.1, where Boethius says that nature is in one way the same as the specific difference that forms each thing; for taken in

this way nature does not receive the more and less. But Thomas does not seem to understand nature in this way, as is plain to one who looks at what he says there.

4. In another way nature is taken for natural property or virtue, the way the Philosopher says in *Physics* 2.1 that it is possible to know natures if one concedes that the body changes. And Thomas seems to be speaking in this way in the place cited, for he lays down as premise that angels use some active virtue of a quasi superior nature to strengthen the intellect of a man learning but that men do not, because all human intellects are of one rank in order of nature; and in this sense what he says is false, for one soul exceeds another in property, dignity, and natural virtue; otherwise the soul of Christ would not be nobler than other souls, nor would one intellect be nobler than another, which however is an error recently condemned at Paris in these words [article 124 in Bishop Tempier's 1277 condemnation]: 'It is unacceptable to say that some intellects are nobler than others;' it is also error 33 in ch.8 about the intellect and soul, as is plain because the soul taken in this way receives the more and less.

Article Forty Seven

That a perfection added to the substantial form changes the species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.118 a.2 in the response to the second argument, Thomas says that a perfection added to the substantial form changes the species.
2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If Thomas means the addition of a natural perfection, which some call first perfection and which also does change the definition of a thing, what he says is true according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* 4.22. If Thomas means the addition of an accidental perfection, or addition by way of intensifying the property of the natural virtues, which is sometimes called second or later perfection, what he says is false, and seems neighbor to the error that posits all human intellects to be equal and one not to be nobler than another.

Article Forty Eight

That there is only one substantial form in man

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in the same place he also posits that there is only one substantial form in man and in any composite.
2. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This opinion was rejected as erroneous in article 31 above.

On the First Part of the Second Part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica*

Article One/Forty Nine

That the essence of blessedness consists in an act of intellect and not in the very act of will

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In the first part of the second book (*ST Ia IIae*), in q.3 a.4 in the main response, Thomas says that two things are required for blessedness: one is the essence of blessedness, the other a sort of accident of it, namely the delight joined to it. He says therefore that, as regard what blessedness essentially is, it is impossible for it to consist in an act of will.

2. The reason for this is that blessedness is the attainment of the ultimate end; but the attainment of the end does not consist in an act of will; for the will is drawn both to the end as absent (when the will desires it), and to the end as present (when the will rests and delights in it). But it is manifest that desire of the end is not attainment of the end but motion to the end; but delight comes to the will from the fact that the end is present, and nothing conversely comes to be present from the fact that the will delights in it. So it is necessary that something else besides the act of will be that through which the end is present to the will.

3. So Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

4. Thomas says three things here that are either doubtful or simply false. The first is that the delight joined to blessedness is an accident of blessedness and not of the essence of it. The second is that the act of will does not belong essentially to blessedness. The third he does not state expressly here but it is plain from the argument that he intends it, namely that the delight accompanying the vision of the divine essence is truly an act of will; and this he says expressly in q.4 a.2 in the main response in this words: 'The operation of the intellect, which is vision, must be greater than delight; for delight consists in a certain quieting of the will.'

5. The first thing he says, then, that delight is an accident of blessedness and not essential to it is either doubtful or simply false. For Augustine *Confessions* 10.20 says in his address to God, 'Blest life is to rejoice in you for your own sake; this it is and no other.' And in the same place, 'Blest life is joy in the truth.' From these words of Augustine it is plain that joy is essentially blessedness itself, or belongs to its essence; and if joy then delight, because delight is the genus and joy a species of it, as Avicenna says *Natural Philosophy* 6.4.5. The authority from the Philosopher *Ethics* 8.6. and the Commentator on that place are to the same effect. For the Philosopher says, 'No one would continuously put up even with the good if there were sorrow in it,' on which the Commentator says, 'The good is nothing other than happiness, which cannot be sorrowful; but nevertheless the Philosopher speaks by supposition, that if happiness made life

sorrowful no one would want to be happy.’ So the Commentator. And it is plain that that is of the essence of blessedness without which blessedness would not be desirable.

6. The second thing that Thomas says, namely that the act of will is not of the essence of blessedness, seems false. For it is plain that blessedness is the supreme good of a rational creature; therefore happiness, from the fact it exists in act, must consist in an act of the same power in whose act the goodness of a rational creature essentially consists; but this consists in an act of will, because it consists in perfect delight; therefore blessedness consists essentially and principally in the act of will that is perfect delight.

7. Again, it is plain that the rational creature should supremely want what God supremely requires of it, and want more what God requires of it more; but God requires of the rational creature that he be perfectly loved more than that he be perfectly seen; and God approves more of this in the creature, both in the fatherland and on the way to the fatherland; therefore the rational creature has to desire this more, and by doing this he has to rest more. But such an act is essential to blessedness, nay most essential to it; and clearly it is an act of will.

8. Again, Augustine *Christian Doctrine* 1.3 says, ‘We are said to enjoy that which we love for its own sake, and we should enjoy that by which we are made blessed.’ From this it is plain that we are made blessed in enjoyment and delight, which are acts of will.

9. Again, Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.26, when speaking of our state in the fatherland, says, ‘Life and the whole of virtue is to love what you see, and supreme happiness is to have what you love.’ But God is possessed rather through love than through knowledge. Therefore etc.

10. Again, Hugh of St. Victor *Angelic Hierarchy* 4, when speaking of the blessedness of the fatherland, says, ‘Knowledge illumines there, and delight satisfies.’ And in the same place in the same book he says, ‘Delight surpasses knowledge and is better than intelligence; for God is loved more than he is understood.’ But blessedness exists in the surpassing and better act.

11. The third thing Thomas says, that the delight accompanying the vision of the divine essence is an act of will, we say is false, because the delight accompanying the act of any unimpeded power is in the same power as the operation is in; for the delight that is in seeing beautiful and delightful things is in the eyes, *Ecclesiastes* 11.7, ‘Light is sweet to the eyes, and to see the sun delightful to them.’ For *Ecclesiastes* does not say it is delightful to the will, and yet we posit that if the will wants to see the sun, then by seeing it through the eyes it delights with a different delight, because its appetite is filled. And that the operation and the accompanying delight are in the same power is a point made by Avicenna in *Canons* 1 last chapter, ‘It is delightful,’ he says, ‘to feel what is agreeable.’ And in his *Metaphysics* 3 last chapter he says, ‘Know that delight for each virtue is full acquisition of its perfection, and so things sensed are agreeable to sense, revenge to anger, attainment to hope, and to each thing what is proper to it.’ Again, Algazel in his *Metaphysics* 13, ‘Delight is the perception of an agreeable thing, and pain is the perception of a harmful thing.’ Hence without doubt the delight accompanying the manifest vision of God is in the intellect, and the delight accompanying the love of God is in the will.

To the Argument

12. To Thomas' argument [n.2] one must reply that the beginning of his reasoning is true, namely that blessedness is attainment of the ultimate end; but the next part is false, namely that it is not attained by the will; for although the will does not attain or obtain it through desire or delight, yet it does attain the end through the act of will that is love, as was seen above. About this act Thomas is silent, as if there were no other act in the will than desire or delight, which is false. For the fact that loving is a different act from desiring or delighting is plain because desire, to the extent it is of some such absent or present thing, is not of it as it is present but as it is in some way for use or enjoyment in the future; but delight, especially delight of a spiritual thing, is of it above all as present and as possessed. Now love is cause of delight and of desire; but a cause is not an effect; therefore love, although it is not desire nor delight, is yet an act of will; delight, however, is not the proper act of the will but an accident accompanying the acts of any power and virtue about its proper object.

13. As to the statement in *John* 17.3, 'This is life eternal, that they might know thee, the only true God,' one must say that the Lord attributes eternal life to knowledge, not because it is consummated in knowledge, but because it relies on it, since a thing is not loved unless known; eternal life is also attributed to knowledge rather than to love because the vision of the divine essence distinguishes the state of the wayfarer from the state of the fatherland more than delight does, for the divine essence is only seen in its essence in the fatherland; love, however, is drawn to the divine essence on the way to the fatherland and also in the fatherland, but such love is only inchoate on the way and consummate in the fatherland.

Article Two/Fifty *That the intellect is best power*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.3 a.5 in the main response, Thomas says that the intellect is best power.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We say that if the intellect is called a best power, that is a very good power, the statement is true; nor is it an objection that the will is better or equally good. But if the intellect is called the best power, that is, a power good above all powers, we say that in this way the statement is false. The fact is clear on four grounds, namely mutual operation, objects, acts, and habits.

4. In the first way the will is nobler, both because it commands all the powers, as Anselm says *On the Virginal Conception*, and because reason serves it, namely the will, as companion and follower, as Bernard says *On Grace and Free Choice* 2 [3].

5. The second is plain because the object of the will is the good under the idea of good, but the object of the intellect is the true, or the good under the idea of true. But the good under the idea of good is nobler than the good under the idea of true. Therefore etc.

6. The third is plain because the will's act is nobler, namely to love God the ultimate end perfectly is nobler than to know him perfectly, because the second is ordered to the first. But to love is an act of will. Therefore etc.

7. The fourth is plain because the will is perfected by the virtue of charity, which is a nobler habit, *I Corinthians* 13.13, 'The greater of these is charity.'

8. Further, the intellect can be compelled but not the will.

9. Again, Thomas adds in the same response that the ultimate and perfect blessedness that we wait for in the future life consists wholly in contemplation of God. This is plainly false from what has been said [article 1/49], where it was maintained that blessedness consists more in consummate love of God; or by saying what he said Thomas spoke [if not falsely, then] less well.

Article Three/Fifty One

That rightness of will is required antecedently and concomitantly for blessedness

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.4 a.4 in the main response, Thomas says that blessedness consists in vision of the divine essence but that rightness of will is required antecedently and concomitantly for blessedness.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. That this is imperfectly stated as thus stated is plain at least from what was said before, that the act of the will is of the essence of blessedness.

Article Four/Fifty Two

That the soul of man, when separated, has the being of the composite

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.4 a.5 in the response to the second argument, Thomas says that the being of the composite remains in the human soul after separation from the body, and for the reason that there is the same being for the form as for the matter, and this being is the being of the composite.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If this is true then, since any substantial form bestows some being, there would be no other form in man besides the soul, which is erroneous because of the many things

contrary to the faith that follow from it, as was shown in the first part [articles 31, 48]. So it is an error to say that the being of the composite remains in the human soul.

4. Further, I lay down this proposition, namely that what loses the being that it has is totally destroyed, because to lose one's being totally is to be fully and perfectly destroyed, and conversely. Therefore, if the matter or body of a man has no being other than that of the intellective soul, the matter or body of a man loses all its being in the instant the soul is separated; therefore it is totally and perfectly destroyed, the contrary of which we see, and it is against the Philosopher who in *Physics* 1 says that matter is ungenerated and incorruptible. But if you say that the matter or body remains because another form arrives or succeeds that gives being to it (for the corruption of one thing is the generation of another and conversely, according to the Philosopher), on the contrary: the separation of the form, which is the soul, is prior at least in nature to the succession or introduction of a second form; therefore the matter or body necessarily loses all its being and is destroyed, departing into nothing; and so generation is from simply non-being to being, and this is creation; therefore generation is creation; and this is erroneous; therefore what it follows from is erroneous.

5. Further, it seems that, when the soul is separated, another form is newly introduced by the action of intelligence and not by the action of the heavenly bodies. For it seems that the heavenly bodies require a definite position and aspect in relation to the matter that they act upon; and we see that all actions of these bodies vary according to these bodies' diverse positions and aspects; for the sun generates and corrupts inferior bodies in one way in summer and in another way in winter; and it generates, corrupts, and transmutes things outside under the sky in one way and things inside under a roof in another way. But we see that the body after the separation of the soul is disposed in the same way in summer and in winter and at any time, and in the same way inside under a roof and outside under the sky and in any place. Therefore the form that it then has does not come from the heavenly bodies.

Article Five/Fifty Three

That blessedness does not increase intensively but extensively when the body is taken up again

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.4 a.5 in the response to the fifth argument, he lays down that blessedness increases not intensively but extensively when the body is taken up again.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. That he says blessedness increases extensively he says well; that he denies it increases intensively he says badly and against Bernard *On Loving God* ch.11[12]; for Bernard, when speaking of disembodied souls, says, 'Until death is swallowed up in victory,' and then follows, 'Souls bound to bodies cannot of themselves totally open up and pass over to the living God, while natural affection too is drawing them back, so that

without bodies they neither want nor are able to be consummated.’ Therefore before the restoration of their bodies the defect in souls will not be made perfect, which is their supreme condition.

4. Again, it is against Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.35, ‘It is not at all to be doubted that the mind of man, both when torn away from the senses of the body and when after death the body has been cast aside and the likenesses of bodily nature have been transcended, that not even so can the mind see the unchangeable substance as the angels see it, either for some more hidden cause or for the reason that the mind has some natural appetite to administer the body, and by this appetite it is slowed down in some way from passing with its whole intent up to the supreme heaven, as long as the body, in whose administration its appetite may rest, is not subjected to it.’ From this authority it is plain that the vision of blessed souls is different as to totality of intent before and after the resumption of their bodies. But this means that their vision differs intensively.

5. Again, Bernard *On Loving God* in this ch.11[13], on the verse of *Song of Songs* 5.1, ‘Drink and be drunken etc.’ says, ‘Those who still groan weighed down in the flesh are dear for the love that they have; those who are now released from the shackles of the flesh are the dearer the more prompt and unimpeded they are in loving; further, named before both and most dear are those who, having received a second garment in bodies now taken up again in glory, are borne to love of God the more freely and the more quickly the more there is nothing of what is proper to them now left that might worry or delay them in any degree, which indeed neither of the previous two states claims for itself.’ And later, ‘Drink my wine with my milk: With the wine of divine love the soul even then mixes the sweetness of natural affection whereby it desires to take up its body and that glorified; so the soul is then already set on fire by drinking the wine of holy love but plainly not yet as far as to be intoxicated, while the mixing in of this milk tempers the while its ardor.’

Article Six/Fifty Four

That man is lord of his acts because he has deliberation about his acts

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, q.6 a.2 in the response to the second argument, Thomas says that man is lord of his acts because he has deliberation about his acts; for from the fact that deliberating reason is disposed to opposites, the will has power for either of them.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We reckon this to be false, for from this it follows that man does not do freely what he does without deliberation, which is plainly false both of good and perfect men and of the worst men. For we manifestly see that holy and perfect men, whether in secular or religious life, desire at once what they have understood to be good, and when they have desired it they often do it at once without deliberation; for example, they give

alms, they repel seductive allurements; likewise religious men obey immediately on hearing without deliberation, and yet it is clear that they do so freely. And we thus see in very bad and the worst of men that as soon as they have desired something bad, as for example to slander, blaspheme, curse, revile, and such things as an incontinent man does, they carry out without deliberation what they desire, if they can, and it is plain they do so freely.

4. Further, if it were because of deliberation that man is lord of his actions and freely acted then, since there is no deliberation with respect to the end to be chosen but only with respect to what is for the end, the result would be that a man would not freely but slavishly desire the end but freely desire what is for the end.

5. Further, we manifestly see that when something desirable is proposed to the will, for example honor or knowledge, the soul can, if it desires this honor or knowledge, restrain the desire until it deliberates whether such desire is due or permitted or expedient. But it is clear that the soul is lord of such restraint and does it freely before deliberation, as is plain from the authority of Damascene 3.26, where he says, ‘Irrational things do not have free choice, for they are acted on rather than act, and therefore they do not oppose their natural appetite but as soon as they desire something they do the appetite and the act; but a man, being rational, acts according to nature rather than is acted on, whatever he desires, and if he wishes he has the power to restrain his appetite or to follow it.’ Note that he says: ‘irrational things do not have free choice.’

Article Seven/Fifty Five

That man determines himself by reason to will this or that

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, q.19 a.6 in response to the third argument, Thomas says that man determines himself by reason to will this or that thing that is truly good or an apparent good.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If by act of determining Thomas means that reason by inquiring, considering, passing sentence offers or presents one and not the other of the opposites for the will to will and follow, the thing does not appear reprehensible but well said. But if by act of determining he means that, when reason concludes that one of the contraries is to be willed and pursued by someone, it thereby determines the will to it, that is necessitates it, such that the will cannot will or pursue the opposite, then this is against Bernard *On Grace and Free Choice* ch.2[3], and against the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5, and is erroneous and was recently condemned along with a number of articles about the will [ch.9, articles 158, 159, 163, in the 1277 condemnation by Bishop Tempier at Paris]; condemned there as an error is that the will does not remain free after a conclusion about something to be done; also that the will of man is necessitated by his knowledge the way

the appetite of a brute is; again, that the will necessarily pursues what is firmly believed by reason and cannot refrain from what reason determines.

Article Eight/Fifty Six *That to command is an act of reason*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.17 a.1 in the main response, Thomas says that to command is an act of reason presupposing an act of will; and he adds that to command is essentially an act of reason. And in the same question a.3 in the response to the first argument he says that the will, by the act that is using, carries out the command of reason. Also in the same question a.5 in the main response he says that command is nothing other than an act of ordering reason along with movement to do something.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This opinion seems to us not only false but erroneous because, as he says in the same question a.5 in the response to the last argument, the act subject to reason is commanded. Therefore, if reason commands the will, the will is subject to reason. But what gives commands to another as to a subject does not give that other freedom of acting. Therefore the will is not free nor lord of its acts, which is against Damascene 2[3].27, and against the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5. It is also against Anselm *On the Virginal Conception* ch.4, where he says, in the person of the bodily members and senses, 'God made us and subjected the power in us to the will, as we cannot, at its command, fail to move.' The same is also against Bernard *Grace and Free Choice* ch.3 says, 'The will is a rational motion presiding over sense and appetite;' and next, 'Whatever the will turns to, it has reason as attendant and in some way as footman.' Hence as follows: it does not belong to an attendant to command its leader and commander; but the will is presider and commander, as is plain from what has been said, and reason is attendant and footman to the will; therefore etc.

4. Again, what Thomas says seems false from the authority of the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 9.5, whose opinion, according to the Commentator [*ad loc.* ch.4], is that rational powers have power for doing contraries; hence the will (that is, the first principle of doing sometimes one contrary and sometimes the other), must become different; and this is appetite or will. From this authority of the Philosopher and the Commentator it is plain that the will is more principle in acting than any other rational power.

5. Again, when someone gives us our command we say he gives us our will; we do not say he gives us our knowledge or faith or opinion, which three things belong to reason according to Augustine *Utility of Believing* ch.11. Again, when I know and hope that some subordinate will do perfectly what I want, I command him at once to do so; but if I know that he will do what I know, as that I know or think or believe he will fornicate, I do not for that reason command him to do so. So if the will is what gives command, then reason does not do so.

Article Nine/Fifty Seven

That the first mover in the powers of the soul for carrying out an act is the will

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.17 a. 1 in the main response, Thomas says that the first mover in the powers of the soul for carrying out an act is the will.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. It seems to me that this opinion can be understood well or badly. For if the meaning is that the first thing necessary for movement, or that the first mover for carrying out an act, is the will, then both are false, because, according to the philosophers and saints who speak about this issue, the first unmoved mover is the desirable object. Further, the object and the power of apprehending the object and the apprehension of the object are necessary before the will moves; for the will only moves when the desirable object has been apprehended; hence the will cannot be the first mover.

4. But if the meaning is that among the powers of the soul the first motive force, or the first power of moving, is the will, then I say that he states the truth. For the object, which is the first mover, is not a power of the soul; and the apprehensive power, although it is necessary for motion first before the will, yet it does not move first, nor is it called a moving power, but the will or appetite moves first. For the order is as follows: for first the object, the good, moves the apprehensive power with the power of apprehension; then the object, thus apprehended, moves the appetite or the will. Hence that which moves the will is not reason or its act of apprehending, but the good that reason apprehends. Then the will, thus moved by the apprehended desirable object, moves the other powers and the bodily organs (or the whole animal) to carrying out the act.

Article Ten/Fifty Eight

That reason is the cause of freedom

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.17 a.1 in the response to the second argument, Thomas says that the root of liberty is the will as subject but reason as cause. For the will can be carried to diverse things because reason can have diverse conceptions of the good. And therefore the philosophers defined free choice as free judgment of reason, as if reason was the cause of freedom.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Now we think this opinion is false, because the consequence of it is that the will does nothing freely before reason possesses diverse conceptions of the good; and thus neither perfect men, who follow their first desire for good before having these sorts of diverse conceptions of it, nor likewise the bad and worst men, who similarly follow their first desire for evil, would act freely, which is plainly false. Hence one should say that freedom is in the will by its own natural property and not by reason; indeed, to the extent freedom is in the reason and the other powers, it is present more so in the will, according to Bernard *Grace and Free Choice* ch.2 when he says, 'All the things that belong to man because of the will alone are free, and so only the will, which alone is endowed with freedom, is coerced by no force and by no necessity.' Again in the same book ch.1, 'Where the will is, there freedom is;' and in ch.3, 'Free consent, because of the inalienable freedom of the will and the unchangeable judgment of reason that is carried along with it, is called free choice; it is free because of the will and judge because of reason;' and in ch.3, 'Since the will has in itself nothing free save itself, it is rightly judged to be free only because of itself.' From these references it is plain that the will is free by its own innate and natural property and not by reason or by reason's deliberation.

4. Again in *Metaphysics* 1., 'That is free which is cause of itself.' But reason is not cause of itself but is minister to the will and its companion and footman, as Bernard says *Grace and Free Will* ch.2.

5. Again, that power is free and cause of freedom which is able to do and not do, and to which belongs the eliciting of acts of choice. But this power is not reason but the will, as *Damascene* says 3.26.

6. Again, in *ST* Ia q.82 a2 in the response to the third argument, where Thomas speaks of this matter, he says that the sensitive power does not compare diverse things as reason does but simply apprehends one thing, and so it thereby moves the sensitive appetite determinately; but reason compares several things and so the intellectual appetite, namely the will, can be moved by several things and not necessitated by one thing. In these words Thomas tries to give a reason why sensitive appetite is not free the way the intellect is, namely because the sensitive power does not compare several sensed things as reason compares several understood things.

7. The first thing that Thomas says here about the sensitive power is true of the individual senses, but is said falsely of the common sense; for the Philosopher, near the end of *On the Soul* 3.2 and a little after the beginning of *On Sleep and Waking* ch.2, says that the work of the common sense is to distinguish the sweet from the white, and so there belongs to it the comparing of the sensed objects of the individual senses; yet no sort of liberty is for this reason posited in the sensitive appetite.

8. Again, in the second thing he says [n.6], that because reason compares several understood things therefore the will can be moved by diverse things and not necessitated by one thing, he seems to insinuate that, if reason does not propose several desirable things to the will but one only, the will would be carried necessarily toward it, just as the sensible appetite is. This has been shown to be false both in good men and bad men, who are moved to action at once on the apprehension of one desirable thing and are moved freely; otherwise neither would the good merit nor the bad demerit.

Article Eleven/Fifty Nine
That reason is the proper principle of evil acts

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.88 a.2 in the main response, Thomas says that reason is the proper principle of evil acts; and, as it seems, he is in the same place speaking about reason divided from will.
2. *[Not in fact found in the cited article.]*

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If by the proper principle of evil acts is understood that reason is what properly does evil it is false and also seems erroneous; first because from it there follows that there is no sin in the will before there is error in the reason, which has been reckoned false, as was shown elsewhere, and is against Augustine *Nature and Grace* ch.17[5], who says, 'From necessities lead me which, when placed in, we cannot or will not understand or will not or cannot carry out what we understand;' and second because something would be a sin because of defect of reason and not of will, and so not every sin would be voluntary; and third because, since reason can be coerced, a man will sin even against his will.

4. But that not reason but will is the proper principle of evil acts is stated by Augustine *On Two Souls* ch.10, 'There is no sin save by will.' Again in *Against Faustus* 22.22[44] he says, 'If iniquity and injustice were not in the will they would not be in our power.' Again in *Life of Clerics* ch.5, 'All these evils burgeon from the one root of one's own will.' Again Anselm [rather Eadmer] *On Likenesses* ch.8[9], 'The beginning of every evil in man is his own will;' and again *Fall of the Devil* ch.19, 'No thing is called evil save the will or because of the will.'

5. But if by the proper principle of evil acts is understood a distinct principle of evil acts, namely a principle by which there is distinction in evil acts, then what Thomas says is true, namely that reason is the proper principle of evil acts. For that the will distinctly desires this apart from that, whether good or evil, it has from ministering and apprehending reason, such that reason's showing it things is only the sine qua non distinguishing cause. And although what Thomas says, namely that reason is the proper principle of evil, could be true in this sense, yet this second member of the distinction does not seem to be implied by what he says, nor does he seem to pursue it in his response. Hence he does not much seem to be adequately excused by it.

Article Twelve/Sixty
That matrimony in the old law was instituted to serve nature and not as a sacrament of the union of Christ and the Church

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, q.102 a.5 in the response to the third argument, Thomas says that matrimony in the Old Law was in the service of nature and not a sacrament of the union of Christ and the Church, which had not yet happened; hence in the Old Law a writ of divorce was given, which is against the idea of a sacrament.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems to be against the Apostle in *Ephesians* 5.31, 'For this reason will a man leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife and they will be two in one flesh; this is a great sacrament, but I speak in Christ and in the Church.' Here the Gloss (Jerome *Commentary on Ephesians*) says that the above authority is from *Genesis* 2, according to which it is taken of Christ and the Church, 'they are not now two.' And later another Gloss says, 'Of this spiritual unity, namely of Christ and the Church, was that a sacrament which is read in the words of *Genesis* about the union of spouses.' So it is plain from the text of the Apostle and likewise from the Glosses that matrimony in the Old Law was then a sacrament of Christ and the Church.

4. As to Thomas' statement that it had not yet happened, it seems to have no validity because the immolation of the paschal lamb and certain other sacrifices were sacraments of the immolation of Christ, which however had not yet happened.

5. Again, his statement about the writ of divorce is of no validity because repudiating a wife did not belong to the institution of marriage but was against the institution of it; yet it was permitted by Moses, not as less good, but to prevent worse things, and even this was done because of the hardness of their hearts, as is said in *Matthew* 19.8. And so, since divorce by repudiation was illicit, it is plain that matrimony in the old law was indissoluble by its institution and therefore, notwithstanding the illicit repudiation, was a sacrament of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, the contrary of which Thomas asserts.

On the Second Part of the Second Part of Thomas' *Summa Theologica*

Article One/Sixty One *That charity is not increased by addition*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In the second part of the second part [*ST* IIa IIae] q.24 a.5, Thomas asks whether charity is increased by addition of charity, and in the main response he determines the question and says that charity can in no way be increased by addition of charity to charity but by way of the subject participating in charity more and more, that is, by being more reduced to the act of charity and made more subject to it.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The first thing he says, that charity can in no way be increased by addition of charity to charity seems false, and also prejudicial to divine power. The second thing he says, that charity is increased by the fact that the subject is reduced to the act of charity and is more subject to it, does not seem true either.

4. The first seems false because we see that Christ gave the Holy Spirit twice, once on earth after the resurrection, *John* 20.22, and once from heaven, *Acts* 1.8, 2.4; and on each occasion charity was diffused by the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says, *Romans* 5.5. Either then the disciples had, in the second gift, lost the charity that they had first received, or charity was increased by addition from outside as on the first occasion.

5. Further, there is no doubt that God gave to some saints, as to the Blessed Virgin and to blessed Paul, much more grace in the first infusion than he gave to other saints, as to Linus. But every excess is divided into what is exceeded and into the increase, as is said in *Physics* 4.8. Therefore the greater charity of Paul can be divided into the lesser amount that Linus had and into something more. But everything divisible that God gives all at once he can give successively in parts, and hence the parts can be given and be possessed divisively. Therefore the great amount of charity that God gave on one occasion he could have given on several occasions. But this is not possible if charity cannot be increased by addition of charity. Therefore what Thomas says is impossible.

6. Further, the mode of increase that Thomas sets down we do not reckon to be true, namely that charity is increased by the subject being more and more reduced to the act of charity and made more subject to it; for he is speaking either of the act of charity that is act by way of habit, or of the act of charity that is act by way of use. If he is speaking of the act of charity as it is a habit, then it is the same as if he were to say that the habit of charity is increased by the soul or will being more reduced to the habit of it, that is, of charity, and the position he needs to demonstrate is this, as if he were to say that the quantity of a child is increased by the fact it is more reduced to quantity, and this is to say nothing. But if he is speaking of act as use, then in this sense the habit of charity is increased more and more only because the soul or will is more and more reduced to the

use of charity without any addition from outside. Understood in this way the statement does not seem to us to be true, because according to this the first generation alone of grace would be by infusion and all the increase would be by habituation and exercise, so that charity would be an infused virtue by reason of its being first infused but would be a virtue of custom by reason of all its increases; indeed, in many people it would be more a virtue of custom than an infused virtue, because in many people there is much more that comes by increase than is first infused, as is seen in the case of natural things, because the tiny seed of a plant or an animal grows into a great tree or a large animal. But no one asserts this view, that charity according to some part or a great part of itself is a virtue of custom.

7. Further, both intellectual and moral virtues are increased in the same way as they are generated; so the infused virtues are increased similarly. As to the intellectual virtues the Philosopher says, *Ethics* 2, that intellectual virtue gets most of its generation and increase from teaching. Again, in the same book ch.3, he speaks as follows about the moral virtues: not only do generations and increases and corruptions come about from and by the same things, but the operations will be in the same things. And later in the same chapter he says, 'That virtue therefore concerns pleasures and pains and that it comes to be from and is increased and corrupted by the same things, let so much be said.'

To the Arguments

8. The reasons that Thomas adduces for himself are not cogent.

9. The first reason is as follows: an indivisible added to an indivisible does not make a greater, as is proved in *Physics* 6.6; but charity is indivisible; therefore it does not become greater by addition. – Response: just as quantity is double, namely quantity of bulk and of power, according to Augustine, so the indivisible is double, in bulk and in power; likewise too what is greater is double. And also, what is indivisible in bulk is in power a quantity. And thus can it be in all forms besides mathematical ones. Hence charity is indivisible in bulk but in power a quantity.

10. The second reason he posits is as follows: if charity is increased by addition of charity, then that to which the addition is made and that which is added must be distinct, at least in understanding. But charity cannot be distinguished from charity in the same soul, because it cannot be distinguished either in species or in number. Not in species, because distinction of species in habits is taken from the objects; but one charity is not distinguished from another charity by the object but they have respect to the same objects. Not in number, because distinction in number is through subjects, and it cannot be found in the soul. – Response: Thomas' argument is insufficient because the mode of distinguishing according to number is different from that according to subjects, namely according to times by change of time, as the Philosopher says in *Physics* 5.1; and it is per se evident that the health that precedes sickness is different from the health that follows it; likewise as to the charity that is infused at one time and the charity that is infused at another time.

Article Two/Sixty Two *That charity can be increased infinitely*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.24 a.7 Thomas disputes whether charity can be increased infinitely. In the main response he says that no limit can be fixed in advance to the increase of charity in this life.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We think that this is not true. For every finite thing can, by increase to infinity, reach the quantity of any other finite thing of its own genus, indeed can incomparably surpass it. Since therefore the charity of Christ and the Blessed Virgin was finite and is also of the same genus as the charity of other men, the charity of any wayfarer, if it grew infinitely, could surpass the charity of Christ and the Blessed Virgin, which is a horrible thing for pious ears to hear.

4. Further, the more the habit of love is increased the more intense the act of loving. Therefore if the habit is increased infinitely so is the act; but the act cannot be so increased; therefore neither can the habit; therefore etc.

5. Further, this is against Augustine; for he says in *Retractions* 1.7 (where a retraction of his book *Morals of the Church* is set down), 'The remark I made, "The God whom we wish to know we love first with full charity," would be better said 'with sincere charity' than 'with full charity', lest perhaps it be thought that the charity of God will not be greater when we see him face to face. So, therefore, let 'full' be taken as 'full' in the sense of that than which there cannot be a greater while we walk by faith. For charity will be fuller, indeed most full, in vision.' The same Augustine in his book *On the Perfection of Justice*, before the middle, ch.10, says, 'For charity to be possessed as much as it can be in the body of this death, the choice of our will is too little without the help of God's grace through Jesus Christ our Lord.' From these authorities it is plain that charity cannot be increased infinitely in this life; otherwise it could not be so great in this life that there could not be a greater, the opposite of which is shown by the first authority; further, if charity could be increased infinitely, never would as much be had as could be had, the contrary of which is stated by the second authority.

To the Arguments

6. Further, the reason that Thomas adduces in confirmation of his position is taken from the Gloss on *Philippians* 3.12, 'Not that I have yet attained or am now perfect;' the Gloss says, 'Let none of the faithful say, even if he is far advanced, "It is sufficient for me;" for he who says this is at rest on the way before the end.' – Response: sufficiency of charity can be understood in two ways: one is sufficiency of habit, the other is sufficiency in use and number of merits. So the Gloss is not denying that so great a sufficiency can be had on the way that a greater than it cannot be had, but is denying this about use and sufficiency of merits, which are indeed never so many or so great on the way that there cannot be more and greater and that one should not still be trying for greater. That the Gloss should be so understood is plain in the same place where the it says, 'The Apostle

says this of himself, “Not that I have attained or am now perfect,” because men need to understand that they need to labor so that their merits of justifications may attain something of perfection.’

7. The other reason he posits is as follows: a limit is not fixed in advance for the increase of any form save either by reason of the form in itself, or on the part of the agent cause, or on the part of the receiving subject. No term can be fixed in advance by reason of charity in itself, for charity has no limit as to the idea of its proper species, for it is a participation in infinite charity, which is the Holy Spirit. Nor does charity have a limit by reason of the agent cause, namely God, because he is of infinite virtue. Nor does it have a limit by reason of the receiving subject, because as charity increases so does fitness increase for participating in a still greater charity. – Response: we say that in at least two ways is a limit fixed in advance for an increase in charity: first by reason of charity in itself, because of the fact that it is a form having a contrary; for forms that can be infinitely increased do not have a contrary, as is plain in the species of quantity, to which nothing is contrary as the Philosopher says; the reason is that contraries are by definition things that are most distant. If therefore there were any two quantities both or one of which was infinitely increased, distance there would of necessity infinitely increase and there would never be a maximum; and so things where both or one increases infinitely cannot be contraries. And therefore charity, which is a form having a contrary, necessarily cannot increase infinitely. This argument is drawn from the words of the Commentator *On the Heavens* 4, on the phrase, ‘It is manifest that if it were possible to take a lighter beyond the light to infinity, the light would not be contrary to the heavy because contraries are at the greatest distance from each other.’ Nor is it valid to say that charity is a certain participation in divine and infinite charity, which is the Holy Spirit, and therefore it can increase infinitely, because it cannot be inferred from this alone that charity can be increased infinitely, but from the fact that charity is infinite because it is a participation in what is actually infinite; and it is plain that this does not follow. We say similarly that the increase of charity has the state it has by reason of the receiving subject; and when Thomas says that the subject of charity always increases when charity increases, we say that either he is speaking of the proximate subject, namely the power of the will, or of the remote subject, namely the essence of the soul, and we say that it is false; for the essence of the soul is neither infinite nor increases infinitely, as is plain; likewise neither are the powers of the soul infinite; hence Aristotle says in *Problems*, on the phrase, ‘We do not have receptive and active infinite powers, but finite ones that have a common measure.’ Besides, powers that are natural, even if they are posited to increase, would still not increase infinitely; for the Philosopher says *On the Soul* 2.4, ‘Of all things naturally constant there is a limit and principle of amount and increase.’

Article Three/Sixty Three

That one should not obey a superior against divine precept

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.33 a.7 Thomas asks whether private correction should precede denunciation, and in the response to argument five he says that a superior is not to be

obeyed against divine precept, as is said in *Acts* 5.29, 'We should obey God rather than men.' And so, when a superior commands that he be told what anyone knows needs correcting, the command must be understood sensibly, namely by keeping to the order of fraternal correction, whether the command is given universally to all or specifically to some individual. But if a superior gives a command contrary to the order instituted by our Lord, both he who commands and he who obeys would sin, namely by acting against the command of the Lord. Hence the superior should not be obeyed, because a superior is not judge of what is hidden but only God is; hence a superior has no power to give any command about things hidden unless these are made manifest by some sign, as through notoriety or the like; in these cases a superior can give command, just as a secular or ecclesiastical judge can demand an oath to tell the truth.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Against this is that it is too much contrary to regular observance; for according to it a private inquiry should never be carried out unless a preceding warning or command of fraternal correction has first been made according to the order instituted by the Lord, which is very seldom wont to happen.

4. And we also think it false. For it is certain that the command of an inferior should be obeyed in all things where the command of an inferior can be fulfilled along with the command of a superior; but this is possible in the case proposed; therefore etc. The major is plain of itself. The minor is made clear as follows: a private denunciation made to a superior does not take away the order of correction instituted by the Lord; indeed, after a denunciation it can be completely, fully, and perfectly done; for the superior does not prohibit or prevent it in any way by reason of the denunciation made to him. Therefore in this matter a superior must be simply obeyed.

5. Again, it seems that if the superior does not give command, yet denunciation should be made to him. For it is clear that fraternal correction and the order of correction is directed to advantage, that is, to the correction of the brother sinning. Therefore both this way and every way is to be held to that advantages the sinner more and advantages him more directly and more probably. But denunciation made to a superior along also with private correction advantages the brother's, that is the sinner's, correction more than correction by itself does. Therefore it seems more in accord with right reason that both be done rather than one of them alone.

6. Besides, let it be that both ways cannot be kept at once, though this seems false; still it does seem that denouncing a sinner to a superior who is good and pious and discrete is more to be chosen than private correction. For because the intention of both is nothing other than emendation of the sinner, that way is more to be chosen which gives hope and belief that he can be better corrected; but, as is more often the case, this way is that of denunciation. For correction of a sinner consists in two things, namely caution for the future and penance for the past; caution is primary, because without it penance for the past cannot be fruitful; hence it is in this way that command is given in *Ecclesiasticus* 21.1, 'You have sinned once; do not add to it again; but also pray that the former ones be forgiven you.' But it is clear that in the case of caution for the future a superior can always do more, or do it more frequently, where sin can be repeated, than a simple

subordinate can; therefore the way of denunciation is stronger and more powerful with respect to this precaution of correction; therefore it is more to be chosen. Likewise as to the other part of correction, which is penance for the past, a superior seems to be able to do more than a subordinate. For there are two things that most induce a sinner to penance, namely promise and threat; a superior must be greater and more sufficient for both of these than a subordinate, whether the threat and promise are about temporal things or eternal things. Therefore the way of denunciation is more effective in fraternal correction; therefore it is more to be chosen.

To the Arguments

7. The reasons that Thomas indicates to support his position are not valid.

8. The first is that it is against the divine command to denounce a brother's hidden sin to a superior if correction in accord with the order constituted by the Lord has not first been made; and a superior who commands something against the divine command is not to be obeyed, according to *Acts* 5, 'We should obey God rather...' To this reasoning we say that, when the Savior prescribes fraternal correction and the order of it, he is not prohibiting private denunciation to a superior; for when he says, *Matthew* 18.17, 'Tell it to the Church,' this is said of accusation in the presence of the witnesses who were there at the second correction. Hence it is clear that the Savior does not prohibit it explicitly or implicitly or by inference, because denunciation and correction can both be done, and neither is impeded by the other. It seems therefore that a superior who by command requires this sort of denunciation commands nothing against the divine command, as Thomas posits.

9. The second reason he posits is as follows: a superior is not a judge of things hidden, but God alone is; hence he does not have power to give command about things hidden, and if he does give command he is not to be obeyed. To this we say that a superior who requires denunciation about things hidden is not intending to proceed in the denunciation by way of judgment as a judge, namely by punishing or condemning, because no one can be judicially condemned by the voice of one witness, *Deuteronomy* 17.6 and 19.15; but he is intending to proceed as a father and pastor and doctor, by curing without damage, if he can, to reputation or occasion for unfavorable opinion; for damage to reputation and occasion for unfavorable opinion verge on public punishment, which ought not to be inflicted for things hidden.

Article Four/Sixty Four

That subordinates are not bound to obey superiors in everything

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.104 a.5 Thomas disputes whether subordinates are bound to obey their superiors in everything; and in the main response he speaks as follows: The mind is *sui iuris*, and therefore in things that belong to the internal movement of the will a man is not held to obey man but only God; but a man is bound to man in things done through the body externally.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This view does not seem to us true. For it is clear that by the same intention by which someone is bound to some act he is bound to the consequences without which the act cannot be fulfilled; so if I am bound to be present in choir for matins, I am bound to rise from my bed and go to church. Therefore, since the bodily acts, by which subordinates are held to obey superiors, cannot be completed without command of the will, it holds that subordinates are bound to both by one and the same intention. From this the argument proceeds further: if subordinates are bound to obey superiors in an external bodily act and an act of will when both are joined together, then subordinates are much more strongly bound to obey in a sole act of will if it is individually commanded. There is the same proof about movement of the intellect: if a superior commanded subordinates to deliberate about some business that needs to be done, as about what should be replied on some matter of doubt, I suppose that no one would say that the subordinates are not bound to deliberate in order to proceed cautiously and respond sensibly. So if subordinates are bound to a superior in an act of deliberation where operation and response follow, it is probable that they would also be bound similarly if deliberation alone were commanded of them. And therefore those seem to us to think more religiously and truly who say that hereby is meant that, as the example makes plain, a subordinate is bound to obey in all acts, at least as to will and desire, even if the superior commands the impossible; just as Gregory writes in his *Dialogues* 2.8 about a certain crow that blessed Benedict bade take poisoned bread to a place where no one would find it; the crow, he says, with open mouth and wings outspread, took to running around and crowing as if it were openly saying that it both wanted to obey and could not fulfill the command.

4. Again, what we say seems to accord with Apostolic doctrine, for the Apostle says in *Ephesians* 6.5, ‘Servants obey your earthly masters with fear and trembling in simplicity of heart;’ and the Gloss says, ‘As subordinates do in what is external, so let it be in your will.’ Hence the Apostle says in the same place, ‘Not as eye servants but as servants of Christ with good will, as serving the Lord and not as serving men.’

To the Argument

5. As to Thomas’ objection, that reason is *sui iuris*, it is not cogent. For as reason has its own right, so the body in a free man belongs wholly to the right of reason; and just as reason by a vow of obedience can give to another the right it has over the body, so it can give the right it has by reason of itself.

Article Five/Sixty Five *That not every lie is a mortal sin*

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.110 a.4 Thomas asks whether every lie is a mortal sin; in the response to the fifth argument he says that some say every lie is a mortal sin for perfect men; but this is irrationally said; for no circumstance worsens a sin infinitely save a circumstance that puts it into a different species; but the circumstance of the person does not put a sin into a different species save perhaps by reason of something annexed, to wit if it is against his vow, and this cannot be said of a useful or jocose lie; and therefore a useful or jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men save by reason of scandal.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. What he says about useful and jocose lies in perfect men seems false and against Augustine *On Lies* ch.8, 'We must either not believe the good,' he says, 'or we must believe those whom we believe sometimes lie, or we must not believe that the good sometimes lie; of these three the first is pernicious, the second foolish; there remains then that the good never lie.' This is the reasoning and inference of Augustine. Now from Augustine's conclusion the argument goes as follows: the good while they are good never lie; therefore a lie takes away goodness; but a lie does not take away goodness unless it is a mortal sin; therefore a lie is a mortal sin. Nor let an instance be taken from jocose lies because, as Augustine says *ibid.* ch.2, 'jokes are never pure lies; for the pronunciation and manner of the speaker make the meaning very clearly that of a mind in no way practicing deceit.'

4. Again, if a useful lie is not a mortal sin then it is not a mortal sin to lie to save souls, because this is supremely useful; from which it follows that it is not a mortal sin to lie when preaching faith and morals, for the salvation of souls is there at its greatest; from which it follows that it is foolish to believe preachers who are lying and, if so, that it is foolish to believe and licit not to believe, because faith for the most part comes only through hearing someone preaching. Therefore, from the first premise, if it is not a mortal sin for perfect men to tell useful lies, then it is not a mortal sin not to believe, rather it is most foolish to believe; but this is most false; therefore the first premise is false too.

To the Arguments

5. The arguments on which Thomas relies can be easily solved. The first is put as an objection to the contrary, and it is as follows: As the Gloss says on the words of *Psalms* 5.7, 'You destroy all who tell a lie,' there are two kinds of sins that are not without fault but are without great fault, as when we lie in jest or to benefit our neighbor. But every mortal sin is a great and grave fault. Therefore useful and jocose lies are not mortal sins. – One must say that every mortal sin absolutely speaking is a grave fault; and in this way, that is, speaking absolutely, a useful lie is a great fault, at least for perfect men; speaking in comparison to a graver fault, however, both in Scripture and in the writings of the saints, a less grave mortal sin is said not to be a great fault, as is said in *Proverbs* 6.30, about theft in comparison to adultery, 'It is not a great fault when someone has committed theft;' and the interlinear Gloss says, 'It is not a great fault in comparison with adultery', and the magisterial Gloss says, 'Theft is not a great fault, not in itself, but in comparison with a greater sin, that is, with adultery,' as is said in *Ezekiel* 16.52 about the

more gravely sinning Jerusalem, ‘Sodom is made just by thee.’ And in this way is it said, in the aforesaid gloss from Augustine on the psalm, that to lie to benefit one’s neighbor is not a great fault. And that Augustine so understands it is plain from his *On Lies* ch.5, a little after the middle, when he says of the lies of the harlots, ‘They say they are approved and rewarded by God in their degree; for he who was accustomed to lie in order to harm has much advanced if now he lies in order to benefit, for in the Scriptures themselves Sodom is said to be justified in comparison with the wicked people of Jerusalem.’

6. The second reason that Thomas indicates is of this sort (and he puts it in the main response): a mortal sin properly is repugnant to charity; hence if the end intended in a sin is not contrary to charity then a sin in this sense will not be mortal, as is seen in jocose and useful lies, where in the first case a little pleasure and in the second a neighbor’s utility is intended. – Response: in a useful lie the temporal advantage of some one person or of several can very well be attended to; yet there follows from it a subverting and hindering of the faith and of the authority of Catholic doctrine, and this in many more ways, especially if perfect men are doing the lying, as was shown; but what hinders or subverts the faith hinders or subverts charity.

7. The third reason that Thomas indicates is of this sort, and he puts it in the response to the fifth argument: No circumstance worsens a sin infinitely save a circumstance that puts it into a different species; but the circumstance of the person does not put a sin into a different species; therefore etc. – To this one must reply by taking away the major: the circumstance of the person does worsen a sin infinitely, that is, it makes mortal what in its kind is venial. For it is clear that weakness, inexperience, malice are conditions of the person, and yet some kinds of sin that are venial by reason of weakness or inexperience are made mortal by malice, as Augustine says *83 Questions* q.26, ‘Whoever knows what the virtue and wisdom of God are can assess what sins are venial; and whoever knows what the goodness of God is can assess to what sins is due fire eternal, that is, in the age to come.’ Again, we see that carnal union for those unyoked is a mortal sin but for spouses is either not a sin or a venial sin; therefore the same act is either lessened or worsened infinitely by marriage and release from marriage, and these are only circumstances of the person. Again, if anyone has an erring conscience that some venial sin is mortal and yet commits it while having such conscience, he sins mortally; and yet an erring conscience or an error of conscience is a condition or circumstance of the person. Again, we see in the case of nature as created and as fallen that in the state of innocence sins were mortal and, according to some, all sins would have been mortal; in the state of fallen nature many sins are venial; and yet innocence and the fall are conditions and circumstances of the person.

8. Now to the argument [n.1] we say that in every way one of the premises is false. For some say that venial and mortal are essential differences of sin that divide sin into genus and species; and according to them the major is true, namely that nothing worsens a sin infinitely save what puts it into a different species, and the minor is false, namely that circumstances of the person do not worsen infinitely. But others say that venial and mortal are accidental differences of acts and sins, as white and black are of body; and according to them the major is false and the minor true.

Article Six/Sixty Six

That the Holy Spirit moves the mind of someone to do something the significance of which he does not know, as in the case of the soldiers casting lots for the garments of the Lord

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.173 a.4 Thomas discusses whether prophets always know what they are prophesying; in the main response, when touching on the several ways in which a prophet's mind is touched by the Holy Spirit, he says that when the Holy Spirit moves the mind of someone to doing something, sometimes indeed the prophet understands what it signifies, as is plain of Jeremiah who hid his loin cloth in the Euphrates, as is said in *Jeremiah* 13.4-7; but sometimes he does not understand, as the soldiers who divided the garments of the Lord did not understand what it signified.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This does not seem to us true, namely that the Holy Spirit moved the minds of the soldiers to do this, but greed did, if they were poor, or, according to others, sport and derision did, if they were rich and did not need such garments. For any reason by which they can be said to have been moved by the Holy Spirit to make the division (because it signified the division of the Church by heretics or some other mystery), is also a reason by which it could be said they were moved by the Holy Spirit to kill Christ, for, as Augustine says *Enchiridion* ch.41 or 53 [40], 'the crucifixion signified the spiritual crucifixion of which the Apostle says in *Galatians* 5.24, "Now those who belong to Christ are his flesh...";' and also a reason by which it could be said that Cain was moved by the Holy Spirit to kill his own brother, because that killing signified the killing of Christ by his own brothers, namely the Jews. But no one would say this.

4. Nor is it necessary, if the division of garments was ordained to signify something in the Church, that it was for this reason from the Holy Spirit; for just as a man can set up as a sign a stone or piece of wood or any other material object that he did not make, so also can the Holy Spirit, and indeed much more so.

Article Seven/Sixty Seven

That in prophets there is an alienation of the senses without any disorder of nature

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.173 a.3 Thomas asks whether prophetic vision is always accompanied by abstraction from the senses of the body, and in the main response he says that alienation from the senses in prophets is not accompanied by any disorder of nature as in the mad and raging, but occurs through some ordered or natural cause as through sleep,

or some force of soul as vehemence of contemplation (as is said of Peter in *Acts* 10.10 that when he was praying in a small room a trance fell on him), or by the rapture of divine power, according to *Ezekiel* 1.3, ‘The hand of the Lord was upon me.’

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If we understand the second member [of the aforesaid three] to be without exclusion of divine power such that the force of soul or vehemence of contemplation is a disposition for the rapture and trance that happens by divine power in contemplation, then this seems to be true; for Peter was in prayer when the trance in the text fell on him. But if the second member is understood with removal and exclusion, as seems *prima facie* the case (for the division is of disparate and separate things and the third member of it is of what sometimes happens by divine power) – the exclusion being that it happens only by the soul’s own force – then it is wholly false and unacceptable, for the text seems opposed to it; and if Peter had been in rapture by his own power the text would not have said that a trance fell on him, but that he fell into a trance or was alienated from his senses or the like. Again, the text says first that Cornelius in a vision saw an angel of the Lord coming to him and that the angel told him to summon Peter etc., ‘who will tell you what you must do.’ And as the messengers are coming Peter is told in the vision to kill and eat, wherein he received revelation about the conversion of the Gentiles. Therefore the vision of Peter was ordered to the vision of Cornelius; so just as the latter was divinely sent, so also was Peter’s trance.

4. Further, it is against Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12[13].22, where he says that no vision is significative unless the human spirit has been taken up by a good or bad created spirit or by the divine spirit. If then Peter’s vision was significative and prophetic, then his spirit was taken up by a superior power; not by an evil spirit because then Peter would have been mad and a false prophet, which is unacceptable to say about so great an Apostle; therefore he was taken up by a good angelic spirit, at divine command, or by the Holy Spirit directly. And Augustine gives the reason, because the human soul does not have a power of divination as some have said. Therefore Peter’s trance was not only by force of soul (as Thomas says) but fell upon him as even the text says. And Thomas himself later says the opposite in q.175 a.3, in the response to the first argument; for he says that the mind of Peter was in rapture by divine power, because a trance fell on him while he was praying.

Article Eight/Sixty Eight

That it is possible to continue longer in the work of the contemplative than of the active life

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.180 a.8 Thomas asks about the lastingness of contemplation, namely whether the contemplative life is lasting, and he says that it is possible to continue more and longer in the work of the contemplative than of the active life, even in the state of

this present life. The reason is that contemplation belongs to us in accord with the action of the incorruptible part of the soul, namely the intellect; a sign of which is that contemplation continues after this life. Another reason is that we do not work with our body in these sorts of works.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. But this seems by experience to be false. For if the work of the contemplative life is meditation, reading, prayer and the like, anyone at all experiences that we are less able to persist in such things; for intention can scarcely for a moment be fashioned and held in a single state, but it is at once distracted and begins to wander. There can be a threefold reason for this: one is care of the animal body and the load of the fleshly body, for it is said in *Wisdom* 9.15, 'The body that corrupts weighs down the soul and earthly thought presses down on the senses much engaged in thought;' hence when the body is sleeping, and when the needs of the earthly body are worrying the spirit, the soul is permitted scarcely for a moment to focus on higher things. Another reason is because of the property of the senses, whose phantasms enter the soul and disturb its quiet so that it can scarcely rest for a moment; hence in the prose preface it says, 'The Sabbath of the heart is disturbed by the inrush of so many phantasms.' Now contemplative operations require leisure and quiet, and for this reason Augustine says in the prologue of *On the Trinity* 4, 'So certainly I sense how many imaginations run through the human heart.' The third reason is because of the difficulty and subtlety of the things that are the object of the contemplative life, which the human mind can reach with difficulty. For the object of the contemplative life are eternal things, according to the Apostle *2 Corinthians* 4.18, 'We contemplate things that are not seen;' and Augustine *On the Trinity* 14.2, 13.8 says that 'the superior part, to which the contemplative life belongs, looks up to eternal things;' but as long as we are subject to corruption we can scarcely for a moment focus on eternal things; for the eye is blind for such things, according to Hugh of St. Victor.

To the Arguments

4. As to Thomas' arguments, I say to the first that although the operation of the contemplative part is the operation of the incorruptible part and so it remains after this life, yet as long as we live here the soul is little permitted to dwell there, both because of the distraction and worry by which the soul focuses on the body, and because of the disturbance of phantasms and the like; for as long as the soul is in the state of this life it is more fit for the works of the active life, for the works of the contemplative life in some way transcend the state of this life.

5. To the second one must say that we do not labor in these sorts of work to the extent labor means movement of the body and is caused by movement of the body; but yet, the more the mind is raised higher and focuses more vehemently on spiritual works, the less it bears the care of the body; and hence it is that sometimes by this vehemence a man is alienated from the sense of the body, so that the soul abandons the body; and on such occasions it is made more tired and listless than on others; and the vehemence could be such that the soul is separated from the body. Further, however much the body labors

in works of the active life, the labor has in the meantime relaxation and rest annexed to it, nor does it require as much intensity as the works of the contemplative life do.

Article Nine/Sixty Nine

That the perfection of the Christian life consists in the counsels and precepts

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.184 a.3 Thomas asks whether the perfection of Christian life consists principally in the precepts or the counsels; and in the main response he says that the perfection of Christian life consists per se and essentially in charity of God and neighbor, because charity is the end, about which the principal precepts of the divine law are given; hence it is plain that perfection consists principally in the precepts and secondly and instrumentally perfection consists also in the counsels which, like the precepts, are all ordered to charity, but in different ways; for the precepts are ordered to removing things contrary to charity and things with which charity cannot stand; but the counsels are ordered to removing impediments to the act of charity which, however, are not contrary to charity, as are matrimony and occupation in secular business. This is the summary of his solution.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This reasoning leads the discussion to this, that human perfection consists essentially in the two precepts of charity, and consists instrumentally in the other counsels and in the precepts that are ordered to charity; and that this is Thomas' understanding is plain from what he says later in q.185 a.6 in his response to the first argument; for he says that the perfection of Christian life does not consist essentially in voluntary poverty, but that voluntary poverty works instrumentally to perfection of life. And this seems to us not sufficiently said, and because he understands it from his conclusion, his conclusion seems to us false. For it is clear that perfection consists essentially in the other precepts and counsels and not just instrumentally, as can be shown thus: every virtue is essentially perfection, for the Philosopher says *Physics* 7.3 text 18 that virtue is a certain perfection, for each thing is then said to be perfect when it attains its proper virtue. And again in *Ethics* 2.6[5] he says that every virtue, whosever virtue it is, perfects the possessor and makes his work good. And it is clear that human perfection consists essentially in all the virtues; and if perfection consists essentially in the virtues, much more does it consist in the works of the virtues, for the virtues are for the sake of the works; for the Philosopher says *On the Heavens* 3 that everything that has a work is for the sake of that work. And again the works are also the perfection of the virtues; for the habits are first perfections while the operations are ultimate perfections, being as it were perfections of perfections. And if perfection consists essentially in the virtues and the operations of the virtues, then it consists essentially in the observance of the moral precepts and of the counsels; for the moral precepts prescribe nothing but the virtues and the operations of the virtues and they prohibit the contraries; and the counsels too prohibit

and counsel nothing else. From this it is plain that the perfection of man as wayfarer consists essentially, not just in the precepts of charity, but in the other moral precepts and counsels. Yet nevertheless one must concede that perfection consists instrumentally in the same things. Nor is this an unacceptable result. We also see something similar in nature; for we see that in the case of the bodies of the animals their perfection consists essentially and instrumentally in the members and sense organs, which members and organs are instruments of the whole body and are parts integrally making up its essence; in the sciences too we see that the rational or logical sciences are instruments of philosophy and essential parts of it, as Boethius says in his *Commentary on Porphyry* at the beginning, 1.1. Likewise the virtues other than charity, and their works, are perfections and yet also cooperating instruments ordained to further perfection. Also charity itself for the wayfarer is a perfection and nevertheless an instrument ordered to blessedness; and for this reason the Master of the *Sentences*, bk.1 d.1 ch.8, says that the virtues are desirable and to be loved for their own sake and for the sake of blessedness: as being for their sake they are therefore perfections; as being for blessedness they are therefore instruments. And hereby can the authority of Cassiodorus be expounded in Cassian's *Collations of the Fathers* 2.2, which Thomas cites and which is as follows: fastings, vigils, meditation on Scripture, nakedness, and privation of all resources are not perfection but instruments of perfection, because the discipline of the end does not consist in them but the end is reached through them. The understanding must be that they are not so much perfection, that is, ultimate perfection, which is charity and purity of mind, but they are perfections in this sense that they are instruments of coming to ultimate perfection for the wayfarer.

4. In this way, then, is the conclusion got that the perfection of man as wayfarer consists essentially in the moral precepts and counsels, but in different ways. For perfection is twofold in the way the masters are wont to distinguish it: one is the perfection of sufficiency and necessity; the other is the perfection of abundance and supererogation. The first consists principally in observance of the precepts, because it can be in the precepts without the counsels and cannot be in the counsels without the precepts. The second perfection of abundance and supererogation consists not only in the precepts nor in the counsels, but in both together. But in which does it consist principally? We say, as it appears to us, principally in the counsels. A sign of this is that those entering and vowing religion, and those leading others to the same, either all or for the most part direct their attention to the counsels, the former vowing and the latter leading to observance of the counsels, either simply or more perfectly than when in the world, and not the observance of the precepts. But those vowing and leading would vainly direct their attention to this if the perfection they intend did not consist principally in this. Besides, the observance of the counsels is perfection essentially, and it is not the perfection of necessity, as is clear; it is therefore essentially perfection of abundance and supererogation; yet it is not the essence itself, as is certain, because a man has to be perfected, as to any kind of perfection, more principally by that which is perfection essentially than by that which is not perfection essentially; for a man is more principally perfected with perfection of abundance and supererogation through the counsels than through the precepts. Thus it is plain therefore, as it seems, that the perfection of man the wayfarer consists not only instrumentally but essentially in the counsels and in all the moral precepts. It is plain therefore that the perfection of abundance or supererogation

more principally consists in the counsels than in the precepts other than charity or the precepts of charity.

5. We say further that if any perfection consists more principally in the precepts other than charity than in the counsels, yet observance of the counsels and its perfection is of greater merit than observance of the precepts and its perfection.

6. This is manifestly plain when speaking of the observance of the precepts in themselves, as these are observed generally by seculars, and when speaking of the observance of the counsels by religious. For a religious, by observing the counsels, also observes in a more perfect way, for the most part, the precepts of necessity than a secular does; and no one doubts but that it is more perfect and of more merit to observe both together than to observe the precepts alone. Further, in the case of religious men who observe both together, it seems more perfect and of greater merit that they observe the counsels than that they observe the precepts other than those of charity. And the authority of Ambrose makes for this in his book *On Offices* ch.10, 'Every office,' he says, 'is either in the mean or something perfect; which we can prove by the authority of the Sacred Scriptures: "do not commit murder, do not commit adultery, do not bear false witness, honor your father and mother, love your neighbor as yourself;" these are all in the mean, to which something is lacking. And a little later, "If you wish to be perfect, go and sell all that you have and come and follow me;" and the fact Christ says one should "pray for calumniators and persecutors and bless those who curse you," this he shows we ought to do if we wish to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect; this then is perfect office.' From these words of Ambrose, as it seems, the proposed conclusion is plain.

7. Besides, one work is more meritorious than the rest, either because of the greater difficulty of the work, as fasting on bread and water than on bread and fish and wine; or because of the greater will of the doer, for example, if two works are in all respects equal with the exception that one is done more willingly than the other, it is clear that the one done more willingly is more meritorious. But these two features seem to come together in the observance of the counsels compared with the observance of the precepts; for it is greater to abstain from all carnal concupiscence than to abstain only from that which is illicit; and it is greater to condemn all dominion and all temporal possession than to abstain only from that which is illicit. Again, the works of the counsels are observed because they are counseled, and the works of the precepts are observed because they are prescribed, per se speaking I mean. But it is certain that he works more willingly who works by looking only at what is counseled than he who works looking only at what is prescribed. Therefore in both ways the observance of the counsels is more meritorious than the observance of the precepts; therefore the observance of the counsels in the same man is of greater perfection than observance of the precepts.

8. Further, it is got from Aristotle *Topics* 8.2 that to a greater good a lesser good is opposed, unless one of the two implies the other, for then to a greater good a greater evil is opposed, as is plain in the case of living and living happily; for it is a greater good to live happily than to live, and yet it is a greater evil not to live than not to live happily, because to live unhappily implies to live. Since therefore observance of the precepts follows upon observance of the counsels and not conversely, and transgression of the precepts is a greater evil than transgression of the counsels, it necessarily follows that observance of the precepts is less good than observance of the counsels.

Article Ten/Seventy
That bishops are simply more perfect than religious

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.184 a.7 Thomas asks whether the state of prelates is more perfect than that of religious, and in the main response he says that the state of prelates is simply more perfect than that of religious, for prelates are simply more perfect, according to Dionysius *Ecclesiastical Hierarchy* ch.5[6].

2. Again, in q.185 a.8 he asks whether religious who are promoted to being bishops are bound to regular observance, and in the main response he says that the state of the religious is a sort of way of tending toward perfection; but the state of bishops or the episcopal state pertains to perfection as a certain mastership of perfection. And he confirms his statement from canon 16 q.1 where it is said that the sacred ordination of a monk makes a bishop; but no one is permitted to pass from a higher to a lower state.

3. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

4. We do not deny that the state of prelates is in many ways more perfect than the state of religious; however, so as to suppress the vilification of some, it seems we must expound how it is more perfect and how it is not more perfect. For Augustine says in his book *Baptism of Children* near the middle, 'When it is said that the state of someone is more perfect, one must see in what way it is said. For we have the place from the Apostle where he confesses that in the attaining of the perfection he desired he was not yet perfect; and yet he at once says, *Philippians* 3.15, "Let us therefore, as many as are perfect, be so minded," which indeed he would not say unless he were perfect in something and not perfect in something else; for it can happen that someone is a perfect hearer of wisdom who is not also a perfect teacher of it.' Thus Augustine. We say therefore that the state of prelates is more perfect in authority, dignity, and office than that of religious. But is it more perfect in merit? This does not appear. Yet I say without prejudice that it is also more perfect in merit provided the prelate is good according to the demands of his state, omitting nothing of what concerns his office. But comparisons of states and of other things of any genus must be made according to what is essential and good in the genus and not according to what is bad in it. Hence if a prelate procures the care of souls as he ought, teaching publicly and praying privately, and offering goods and sacrifices for his own and others' sins, conducting himself without complaint, and if a religious on his part perfects the essential duties of his state, living in obedience, without anything his own, in chastity, then it seems, as was said, that a prelate has greater merit than a religious. And the authority of Augustine makes for this in epistle 21[26] *To Valerianus*, 'Nothing in this life, especially at this time, is more difficult, more laborious, more dangerous than the office of bishop, priest, deacon; but nothing is more blessed if he serves in the way as our General Christ commands.' Again Dionysius in *Celestial Hierarchy* ch.3, 'The most divine of all co-workers with God clearly comes to be because the most noble work is the salvation of souls. But the co-workers of God in this work are most properly prelates, as

far as concerns the essence of their state. Therefore, their state is most divine.’ Again Gregory *Sermon 12 On Ezekiel*, ‘There is no sacrifice to the omnipotent God like zeal for souls.’ But this pertains to the state of prelates. For only a prelate is a spouse of the Church, as his ring testifies. Therefore the sacrifice that most pertains to their state is most pleasing to God.

5. Further the state of a prelate requires a greater perfection in the professors of it than religion requires in its professors, as the Gloss says on *James* 3.2, ‘He who offends not in word...,’ says, ‘He who desires to be over others must be more perfect than they are.’ From this the argument is as follows: the state that by congruity requires better and more perfect persons, by congruity requires better and more perfect works. But where the works are better and more perfect, there the merits are more perfect and better. So there are in the episcopacy, per se speaking, better and more perfect merits than in religion; but I am speaking as to the requirements of what is essential to each state.

6. However, saving the peace and grace of prelates, it seems that the state of religion can in some way be said to be more perfect than the state of episcopacy, because of the greater and stricter discipline to which religious are subject and their greater removal from the world and from the occupations and occasions of prelates. A sign of this is that those who are taken up into the episcopacy from religion, if their conduct in the episcopacy is praiseworthy, prefer the state of religion to the state of a prelate, and they bewail the state which they are in by comparison with the state they have left behind. It is read that Gregory did this; hence he writes of himself, at the beginning of his *Dialogues*, ‘The grief, Peter, that I suffer daily is always old to me by use and always new by increase. My unhappy spirit indeed, beaten with the wound of its occupations, remembers how its condition once was in the monastery when all the things that pass away were beneath it, when it soared above all things that change, that it was accustomed to think only of heavenly things, that even when held by the body it was already transcending in contemplation the confines of the flesh, that death too, which is almost penal in all things, it loved as the entry into life and the reward of labor. And now it suffers, by the occasion of pastoral cares, the business of secular men and, after the so beautiful appearance of its quiet, it is soiled with the dirt of earthly acts, and while it disperses itself, for the defense of many, in exterior things, even when it desires interior things it without doubt returns to them smaller.’

7. Further, those few who pass from the state of episcopacy to religion and have advanced in religion as they ought, prefer the state of religion to the state of bishop. Lastly in death, when the consideration and conscience of their merits console them, many even the least are found, both among prelates and religious who, if they were given the choice, would not prefer to have lived their whole life in religion; and this is sufficiently plenty for the commendation of religion. For the Philosopher *Rhetoric* 1.8, in the chapter about what is of more advantage, says that things that are opportune in greater necessity are greater, as things that are opportune in old age or sickness.

Article Eleven/Seventy One

That the perfection of Christian life does not consist essentially in voluntary poverty

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.185 a.6 Thomas asks whether it is licit for a bishop to possess anything, and in response to the first argument he says that the perfection of Christian life does not essentially consist in voluntary poverty, but that voluntary poverty works instrumentally for perfection; indeed, there can be supreme perfection with great opulence, for Abraham, to whom it is said *Genesis* 17.1, 'Walk in my presence and be perfect,' is said to have been wealthy.
2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Thomas' statement that the perfection of Christian life does not consist in voluntary poverty is in one way true and in another way not. For the perfection of Christian life, as the masters commonly distinguish it and as was said above [a.10/70], is twofold; for one is the perfection of sufficiency or necessity, the other the perfection of abundance and supererogation. Voluntary poverty is not essentially the perfection of necessity nor is it any part of its essence, because perfection can be had without it by observance of the precepts. But voluntary poverty is essentially one of the perfections of supererogation and is an essential part of the total perfection that consists in the counsels; just as generosity too is essentially a certain first perfection of necessity, and its work, which consists in the right use of temporal wealth, is a certain second perfection of necessity. Thus voluntary poverty as a habit is said to be in some way a first perfection of supererogation and its use a second perfection and an essential part of the total perfection that consists in the counsels. For it seems most absurd that liberality, which freely uses temporal wealth, should be a virtue and consequently a first perfection and its use a second perfection, and that voluntary poverty should not be a perfection nor of the essence of perfection, since the Gloss on *Luke* 14.33 says, "There is a difference between renouncing everything and leaving everything, because to renounce belongs to everyone who so uses everything he possesses as yet to tend in his mind toward eternal things; but to leave everything belongs only to the perfect, who set aside all earthly things and long only for eternal things.'

4. Hence we say that the perfection of Christian life consists neither totally nor most of all in voluntary poverty; for the total perfection of Christian life consists in the aggregation of all the virtues and in the works of all the virtues according to place and time, but consists most of all in charity, for which and through which all the virtues and works of virtue, whether those of precept or those of counsel, are ordered and perfected. Nevertheless we say that the greatest perfection of the Christian life in a certain respect, namely as to the use of temporal riches, consists in voluntary poverty. For a man is said to use the things that, for temperance and abstinence, he abstains from, according to Augustine 83 *Questions* q.30[20]. And to this extent we say that where a greater voluntary poverty is there a greater perfection is. Augustine testifies to this in *The Good of Marriage* ch.8 when he says, 'What those did who of their substance ministered to the necessities of Christ and his disciples was good, but better was what they did who gave away their substance so that they might more easily follow Christ.' Again [Gennadius] in *Ecclesiastical Dogmas* ch.38 says, 'Good it is to manage one's resources along with

distribution to the poor; better it is to give at once all away with the intention of following the Lord and, absolved of care, to be needy with Christ.’ Hence, as to Abraham and anyone else who is read as having been perfect and rich, one must consider in what respect he is said to be perfect, as Augustine says *Baptism of Children* 2[1].15, ‘When the perfection of any state is spoken of, one must see in respect of what matter it is spoken.’ For nothing prevents something working instrumentally for greater perfection although it is essentially perfection or part of perfection, as was shown above in article 9/69.

Article Twelve/Seventy Two

That the words of the Lord, ‘Take no gold or silver or any money in your purse’ are to be expounded so as to mean they were said by way not of prescription but of permission

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.185 a.6 in the response to the second argument Thomas says that the words of the Lord in *Matthew* 10.9-10, ‘Take no gold or silver or any money in your purse,’ can in one way be expounded as Augustine expounded them, *The Consensus of the Evangelists*, that this statement is understood by way not of prescribing but of permitting. For Christ permitted the disciples to go preaching without silver or gold, so as to receive the expenses of life from those they preached to.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. As to Thomas’ saying that the Lord said by way not of prescribing but of permitting, ‘Take no gold...,’ we say that it is false and contrary to the Gospels and the witness of the saints. In *Matthew* 10.5, 9 is written, ‘Jesus sent out the twelve saying, “Go not in the way of the Gentiles”’; and after a few other remarks interposed he adds, ‘Take no silver or gold...’ And in *Mark* 6.8 is written more expressly, ‘And he commanded them to take nothing in the way but a staff, no bag or bread or bronze in their belt, but to be shod with sandals and not to wear two tunics;’ the text expressly says that he commanded them. And Ambrose *On Luke* bk.7[6] at the verse *Luke* 10.4, ‘Carry neither bag nor purse,’ says, ‘Matthew says that the Lord said to the disciples, “Take no gold or silver;” if we are forbidden to have gold, why do you snatch, why do you take away? If you are commanded to give what you have, how is it you pile up what you do not have?’ And later, touching on *Acts* 3.6, ‘Gold and silver have I none...,’ Ambrose says, ‘Peter did not so much glory that he had no gold as that he was keeping the Lord’s precept, or the command that was prescribed: ‘Take no gold or silver;’ that is to say, ‘You see that I am a disciple of Christ and you ask of me gold?’’ Again, on that verse ‘Gold and silver have I none,’ the Gloss says, ‘Mindful of the precept, “Take no gold or silver or money,” they were storing up what they laid at the feet of the Apostles not for themselves but for the use of the poor.’

4. From these words it is plain that the verse, ‘Take no gold or silver etc.’ was prohibited, not permitted, to the Apostles; but to receive expenses and food from their

preaching was conceded to them but not commanded. And this is what Gregory *Homily 17* on the Gospels says, ‘He who forbade them to carry bread and purse, allowed them expenses and bread from their preaching, for there follows, “Stay in the same house, eating and drinking what they have.”’ From these words of Gregory it is plain that the section of the quoted authority, namely, ‘Take no gold or silver, no bag or purse,’ was a prohibition; but the receiving of necessities that is understood at the end of the authority, ‘For the laborer is worthy of his hire or his bread,’ which the Lord says more expressly in *Luke*, ‘eating and drinking what they have’ – this, I say, was conceded and not prescribed. And about this concession, from the Gloss on *I Corinthians 9.4*, ‘Do we not have power to eat and drink?’ there is said, ‘The Lord permitted but did not command the Apostles to receive necessities from those subject to them, so that anyone who wishes may use what is permitted to him by the Lord’s concession, and if anyone does not wish to use it, he does not act against the command but yields of his right.’

Article Thirteen/Seventy Three
*That poverty, continence, and obedience pertain to perfection
instrumentally*

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.186 a.2 Thomas asks whether any and all religious are bound to all the counsels; and in the main response he says that a thing pertains to perfection in three ways: in one way essentially, and in this way perfect observance of the precepts of charity pertains to perfection; in another way consequentially, as those things that follow from perfection of charity, for example blessing those who curse, especially outside a case of necessity; in a third way instrumentally and dispositively, as poverty, continence, and abstinence and the like. And thus poverty and continence and abstinence do not pertain essentially or consequentially to perfection but dispositively and instrumentally.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Now it seems to us that this is not true, nay rather that these three are perfections and that consequently they pertain essentially to perfection, and that they more pertain and more frequently to charity consequentially than instrumentally. Nevertheless it does seem well said to us that they pertain to the perfection of charity instrumentally and dispositively.

4. Now, that voluntary poverty is a perfection appears from the authority of Jerome to Demetriades (*Letter 130*). For he speaks as follows: ‘It is a mark of apostolic height and perfect virtue to sell everything and distribute it to the poor, and thus to fly light and unencumbered to heaven.’ Therefore poverty according to Jerome is a perfect virtue; therefore it is a perfection.

5. Further, each of the things in question is a virtue or a grade of virtue. If it is a virtue then it is a perfection. For Aristotle in *Physics 7.3* text 18 says that virtue is perfection and that each thing is then most perfect when it attains its proper virtue. The

same author says in *Ethics* 2.5 that any virtue, to whomever it belongs, perfects the possessor and makes his work good. But if the things in question are grades of virtue, it is clear they are of the highest grade; voluntary poverty, for example, which once and all at once gives everything to the poor is the highest grade of liberality or corporal mercy; widowhood or virginity, which is more excellent, is the most excellent grade of continence; abstinence is the most excellent grade of temperance. Since therefore the lower grades of the aforesaid virtues, to which addition can be made, are perfection (as the liberality whereby a man uses temporal goods, and mercy by which he gives his goods individually and successively to the needy), much can the aforesaid grades, to which addition cannot be made, be called perfection.

6. Again, Algazel at the beginning of his *Logic* speaks as follows: ‘The soul’s perfection,’ he says, ‘consists in two things: in cleanness and ornament; its cleanness is that it is purified of sordid habits and is protected from ugly imagination; its ornament is that the certitude of virtue is depicted in it.’ And later, ‘Eternal happiness cannot be had save by perfection of soul, which is nothing other than cleanness and ornament.’ From this the argument goes as follows: cleanness from sordid habits and from ugly imagination is above all voluntary poverty, continence and abstinence, and obedience; for voluntary poverty is cleanness from the concupiscence of the eyes, continence is cleanness from the concupiscence of the flesh, obedience is cleanness from the pride of life. Therefore these three are true perfection or true perfections.

7. But that they sometimes pertain to the perfection of charity consequentially manifestly appears in Christ. For the charity of Christ from the first moment of his conception was so perfect that it could never thereafter be increased. So poverty and continence and abstinence did not belong to the perfection of his charity instrumentally and dispositively, because they did not dispose to its introduction or to its increase, but they pertained to it consequentially. And about the poverty of Christ the Apostle says in *2 Corinthians* 8.9, ‘You know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is, his charity, that for our sake he became poor though he was rich.’

8. Further, it seems that the aforesaid things pertain to charity (which is perfection) consequentially rather than instrumentally and dispositively, and that they should be done more from charity possessed than for the possessing of charity. For Augustine says *On Music* 6.16, ‘The love of temporal things is not expunged save by some of the sweetness of eternal things.’ It is clear that the sweetness of eternal things is either the very love of them or an effect of the love of them. Again the Gloss on *Song of Songs* 8.7, ‘If a man has given all the substance of his house for love etc.,’ says, ‘Where the love of eternal things abounds, the possession of things that pass away soon loses value.’ Again Gregory in *Homily* 11 on the Gospel says, ‘As death takes away the body so charity of eternal life kills off love of temporal things.’ Besides, we clearly see that men who have perfect charity give alms more richly and abstain more strictly and contain themselves more carefully and obey more humbly than those who do not have charity or have imperfect charity. Therefore, these things have to follow from perfect charity more than dispose instrumentally to the having and increasing of it.

9. Further, it appears from the Apostle that the other virtues can be called perfection or perfections and charity an instrument. For when speaking in *Colossians* 3.15 about several of the virtues he says, ‘But having charity above all, which is the bond of perfection.’ And the Gloss says, ‘The rest cause perfection, charity binds them all lest

they depart.’ And this seems to us true both of charity and of the other virtues, that they can for different reasons be called instruments and perfections.

Article Fourteen/Seventy Four

That he who professes the rule does not vow to keep all that is contained in the rule but to keep a regular life

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in the same q.186 a. 9 Thomas asks whether a religious sins mortally by transgressing what is in the rule, and he argues as follows with this sort of reason: to act against a vow is a mortal sin; but religious are bound to the rule by a vow of profession; therefore they sin mortally by transgressing what is contained in the rule. And in his reply to this he says that he who professes the rule does not vow to keep all that is in the rule but vows a regular life, which consists in three things: continence, poverty, and obedience. Hence in certain religions some profess with more caution, not indeed to keep the rule, but to live according to the rule, that is, to aim to form their morals according to the rule as according to a certain exemplar; but in other religions they profess, with even more caution, obedience according to the rule, so that only what is against the command of the rule is contrary to their profession, but transgression or omission of other things does not bind them save to merely venial sin.

2. By these words of this solution the argument he intends to solve is totally taken away. For, according to this, it is expressly understood that when religious profess the keeping of some rule, they do not vow to keep all that is contained in the rule; otherwise, by transgressing any of them, they would sin mortally. And that this was his opinion appears manifestly in his *Quodlibet* 1 q.20, which is about whether a monk sins mortally by eating meat or not. For there, in his main response, he says as follows, that if a religious vows in his profession to keep the rule it seems he binds himself by his vow to each thing contained in the rule, so that by acting against any of them he sins mortally.

3. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

4. This seems to us false, for in *Exodus* 24.7 one reads that, after Moses had told the people all the words and judgments of the Lord, all the people replied with one voice, ‘All that the Lord has spoken to us we will do and we will be obedient.’ And after they had made this promise, Moses sprinkled the blood of the covenant on the people saying, ‘This is the blood of the covenant which the Lord God has made with us.’ Again in the last chapter of *Joshua*, 24.24ff., this covenant is renewed, with the people saying to Joshua, ‘We will serve the Lord our God and we will be obedient to his precepts.’ Therefore ‘Joshua made a covenant with the people on that day and imposed precepts and judgments on the people.’ And the Apostle in *Galatians* 3.10 says, ‘Cursed is everyone who does not persist in all that is written in the law to do it;’ and he took it from *Deuteronomy* 7. And again in *Galatians* 5.3 the Apostle says, ‘I testify to every man who circumcises himself that he is debtor to the whole law to do it.’ From all this it is manifest

that the Jews, by a most firm promise under imposition of a curse, were obliged to keep everything contained in the law; and yet it is clear that there were many things in the law whose transgression was not mortal, as is *Exodus* 23.5, 'If you chance upon the sheep or ox of your neighbor, take it back to him;' and *Leviticus* 19.32, 'Rise in the presence of the bald head and honor the person of the old.' By similarity, then, he who promises to keep the rule and all that is in the rule does not have to be sinning mortally by transgressing or omitting any one of them.

5. Further, in the *Rule* of blessed Benedict ch.58, namely the one about the discipline for receiving brothers, command is given first that after two months the rule be read to the novice and again a second time after six months and yet a third time after four months; and if the novice has with due deliberation promised to guard everything and to keep all that is commanded him, then let him be received into the congregation, knowing that he is constituted by the law of the rule, that from that day he is not permitted to leave the monastery or to remove his neck from under the yoke of the rule. Behold how novices according to the rule of blessed Benedict promise that they will guard everything that is contained in the rule; and yet it would be insane to say that they sin mortally by transgressing any one of them.

6. Again, at the beginning of the rule of blessed Francis, which was approved by Pope Innocent III and confirmed by Pope Honorius III, successor of the same, it is said, 'The rule and life of the Friars Minor is this: to observe the holy gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ.' And at the end of the same it is said, 'We will observe the poverty and humility and gospel of Our Lord Jesus Christ that we have firmly promised.' And yet Pope Gregory IX, who dictated the rule and witnessed that he knew more fully the intention of blessed Francis, said when expounding the rule, 'The brothers desire to know whether they are bound by all the counsels of the gospel or to those that in the rule are expressed by precept or prohibition, especially since they did not intend to bind themselves to other things and they could scarcely or never observe them all to the letter. But we say in brief that you are not bound by rule to other counsels of the gospel save to those that you have obliged yourselves to in that rule; but to the rest you are not bound save as the rest of Christians are, and the more so by goodness and justice, because you have offered a holocaust to the marrow by contempt of all worldly things.' Thus Pope Gregory. Therefore by the exposition of our lord the Pope it is clear that, although the Friars Minor have promised to observe the gospel, yet they are not bound to all the counsels of the gospel save those that are expressed in the rule by precept.

7. Further, whoever promises and vows some rule or what is contained in it, intends or should intend nothing other than to conform his will and conversation to the parts of the rule according to the intention of him who founded the rule. But it is clear that the founder of a rule does not intend that those who profess the rule are obligated to everything in the rule equally and are bound to everything equally, unless it be such that, by transgressing it, they sin mortally. But this would be very stupid to do, and would set a snare for those whose salvation the rule ought to be seeking; and especially when the rule distinguishes between warnings and precepts, as in the rule of blessed Francis. Therefore no one who vows any rule is so obliged by professing it that, if he transgresses anything contained in the rule, he sins mortally.

8. The second thing that Thomas says is that those profess more cautiously who do not profess the rule but to live according to the rule, and that in some religions some

profess a rule more cautiously still who profess only obedience according to the rule; in these words he insinuates that those who enter religion ought not to profess the rule, otherwise they are acting with less caution. And this we reckon to be false, because in the *Extravagant* about regulars and those passing over to religion, in the chapter ‘On your part it was proposed’, it is said, ‘We charge that those subject to such diocesan law, who in the aforesaid way do not fear to enter the land in double way, be compelled by you with ecclesiastical censure, after they have worn the habit of a monk for a year, to profess and keep the rule according to the form of the order.’ In these words note that those who enter an order must profess the rule of that order, because it says, ‘to profess the rule according to the form of the order.’ Further, it seems that in the aforesaid words, because it says, ‘after they have worn the habit of a monk for a year,’ one should note that the form of professing in the case of the order of monks is to profess the rule of blessed Benedict, and to promise conversion of morals according to that form. But this form of profession blessed Benedict instituted like a man who wished to impose a snare on his monks the way Thomas says it in *Quodlibet* 1 q.20, which is about whether a monk sins mortally by eating meat; and in the response that we have in our hands he insinuates that very thing, save that he does not expressly state the name of Benedict.

Article Fifteen/Seventy Five

That the having in common of moderate wealth, necessary for human life and procured at fitting time, is not repugnant to perfection, and does not take anything from perfection

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.188 a.7 Thomas asks whether the having of anything in common diminishes at all the perfection of religion; and in the main response he says that if external possessions are sought or held only in limited amount, as much as suffices for a simple way of life, then care of this sort does not much impede a man; hence it is not repugnant to human perfection nor to Christian life. And a little later he adds that it matters here whether wealth is held privately or in common; because care for property of one’s own belongs to private love, but a care that is had for things common belongs to love of charity, which does not seek what is its own. And since religion is ordained to the perfection of charity, which is perfected by a love of God that extends to contempt of self, then having property of one’s own is repugnant to the perfection of religion; but a care that is for common goods can belong to charity, although hereby some higher act of charity could be impeded, as contemplation of God and instruction of neighbor. From this it is plain that having in common a superabundance of wealth, whether movable or fixed, is an impediment to perfection; but having in common as much of external possessions, whether movable or fixed, as suffices for a simple way of life is not an impediment to the perfection of religion, which perfection is freedom for divine worship. But if poverty is considered in comparison to the special ends of religions, then a religion will be the more perfect in poverty the more it has a poverty better proportioned to its end. And later he says that it belongs to religions that are ordered to contemplation, and to handing on the fruits of contemplation to others by teaching, to have a poverty most free from external

cares; which is done when a limited amount is kept, necessary for life and procured at fitting time. And this is the teaching of the Lord, who instituted poverty; for in *John* 12.6 it says that Judas had the bag in which he carried what was put in it; and in *John* 4.8 it says that when the Lord was speaking with the Samaritan woman his disciples had gone off into the city to buy food; and in *John* 13.27-29 it says that when the Lord said to Judas, 'What thou doest, do quickly,' his disciples thought that, because Judas had the bag, the Lord was telling him to buy necessaries for the feast day or to give something to the poor. Therefore it is, by the example of Christ, licit to keep money or any other thing in common for the use of some assembly, because this is not repugnant to, but rather conformable with, the perfection of Christ that Christ, by his example, taught. But the disciples too, from whom all religion has taken its beginning, kept the price of landed estates, after the resurrection, and made distribution as each had need.

2. Thomas adduces to the same effect the authority of Prosper *On the Contemplative Life* 12 q.1 [rather: Julian Pomer, 2.9], who says, 'It has been sufficiently shown both that private property should be contemned for the sake of perfection, and that resources truly common can be possessed without impediment to the perfection of the Church.'

3. Further, in the solution to the second argument, Thomas says what the Lord says in *Matthew* 6.25, 'Do not be anxious for the morrow,' does not mean that nothing may be kept for the future; for this is declared to be dangerous by blessed Anthony, in *Collections of the Fathers*, when he says that those who pursue the privation of all resources, so that they do not allow themselves to have thereby even the victuals of a single day or a single penny, and who do other such things, are seen to be at once so deceived that they cannot complete successfully the work they have been given.

4. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

5. In the aforesaid solutions, both from the words Thomas says as from the question he intends to solve, three things at least are seen to deserve censure: the first is that the having of anything, namely moderate wealth necessary for the use of human life procured at fitting time, is neither repugnant to perfection nor takes anything from perfection; the second is that each religion is the more perfect in poverty the more it has a poverty better proportioned to its end; the third is that it is dangerous to give up all resources such that not one penny is kept for victuals in the future.

6. As to the first: we do not at all blame as imperfect any religion that holds something in common; but yet, with the trust and peace of all and without any doubt, we believe and assert that it is a mark of greater perfection to have altogether nothing either in common or in private.

7. For if the question is about poverty, it is clear that the poverty of those is greater and more perfect who have altogether nothing either privately or in common than the poverty of those who nevertheless have sufficient in common; for in religion there is need only to consider common persons or private persons; but it is clear that the poverty of an individual person is greater when he has nothing than when he has something; so by parity of reason it is clear that the poverty of a community is greater when it has altogether nothing in common than when it possesses sufficient. Since therefore the whole of religion consists in these two things, namely individuality and community of

persons, it follows that the poverty of religion is greater when not even the community has anything. And if anyone presumes to deny this, he will by parity of reason be able to deny that the continence of those is greater who have no wives at all than of those who have wives in common.

8. But if the question is about penance, it is clear that the penance is greater when everything is left behind both in private and in common than when people have sufficient necessities in common. This is clear from the witness of all who receive and do penance. With this does Gregory agree in his *Homily 31 on Ezekiel*, ‘Whoever is able to despise this age and, leaving everything, to give himself as a holocaust to the Lord, he now perfectly knows and bewails his sins in deed, his sins in thought, or the evils that he did or the good he should have done and did not do; for he who has left everything sees his faults now more freely in his weeping.’ If then poverty and penance are perfections, it follows that the having of wealth in common takes as much away from perfection as it takes away from poverty. But if it be said that penance and poverty are not perfections but instruments and ways leading to perfection, which perfection indeed is charity, it is clear that these instruments have been instituted and ordained in the best and most fitting proportion for attaining the aforesaid end, because they have been ordained by Christ, in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; yet the same point remains as before, namely that whatever takes away from poverty and penance takes away from the perfection that is attained through them.

9. Further, if the question is about preaching and doctrine, it is clear that preaching is the more believable and the more acceptable and the more persuasive and the less suspect the more that what is preached shines forth in the life of the preacher and teacher. Hence on the word of *Matthew* 5.16, ‘Let your light so shine etc.,’ the Gloss says, ‘Seek that the works may be seen and that thus the doctrine may be confirmed.’ And on *Matthew* 10.9, ‘Do not have possessions etc.,’ the Gloss says, ‘If they did have possessions, they would not seem to be preaching for the sake of salvation but for the sake of gain.’ If then a more perfect contempt of the world and a more perfect penance appear in the life of those who have altogether nothing and do not want anything than in the life of those who have sufficient in common, it is clear that the preaching and doctrine of such as the former is more believable and more acceptable and more persuasive than that of the rest. With this does Gregory agree in his *Homily 18 on Ezekiel*, ‘The holier the life of the teacher the humbler the senses of the hearer, and the hearer looks into himself when he examines in great depth the life of the preacher.’ Now it is clear that to generate sons of God through the seed of the divine word is a great perfection and belongs to the more perfect, just as also natural generation belongs only to the perfect [sc. in body].

10. Further, if the question is about charity, the words of Augustine come to mind, in *Christian Doctrine* 3.10[37], ‘The more the kingdom of greed is destroyed, the more the kingdom of charity is increased;’ and the words of *83 Questions* q.36, ‘The diminution of greed is the food of charity.’ So where greed is lessened and annulled, there charity is more increased and fed and perfected. But it is clear that this happens more in a religion where there is removal of property altogether than where the community at least does not have its property removed. Therefore, as far as concerns the condition of states of life, there will be a more perfect charity where there is a poorer religion.

11. But as to what Thomas says next that each religion will be so much the more perfect in poverty the more it has a poverty better proportioned to its end: we say that if

the meaning is about the proximate end, the way he himself means (as is plain from what he says), then it is not simply true. For it can be that the proximate end of one religion much exceeds another in every way, for example preaching and doctrine thus exceed hospitality; together with this, it is even possible that the religion whose proper end is hospitality has a poverty a little bit more proportioned to its end than a religion whose proper end is preaching and doctrine; must it then for this reason be said that a poverty ordained to hospitality is more perfect than a poverty ordained to preaching and doctrine just because the former poverty is a little bit more proportioned to hospitality than the latter is to preaching and doctrine? Far from it. For to say this is as if one said that a proportioned music that is ordained to strengthening bodily weakness is better than a less proportioned music but one sufficiently ordained to exciting devotion, as was the case with Elisha in *4 Kings* 3; which is indeed clearly false. But if the meaning is about the common and the ultimate end of religion, namely about advance and perfection of charity, then in this way it is true. For in the case of every art and every business we see that, when the instruments and operations are proportioned to attaining the end, they are so much more perfect, and the art in accord with them is so much the more perfect. Now what the poverty is that is more proportioned to the perfection of charity is sufficiently plain from the authorities cited before from Augustine, *Christian Doctrine* 3.10[37] and *83 Questions* q.36. It is clear, then, that only as to the common and ultimate end of wayfarers, namely advance and perfection in charity, is it true that each religion is so much the more perfect in poverty the more it has a poverty better proportioned to its end; it is also plain that that religion is the one which has nothing either in common or in private, because greed there is most destroyed and annulled.

12. But Thomas, who said this, did not mean the aforesaid remark to be about the common end of religion but to be about the proper end; and therefore what he said in response to the first argument, in the same article in the same question, is false: ‘It is not necessary,’ he says, ‘that a religion is so much the more perfect the more its poverty is greater, but that it is the more perfect the more its poverty is better proportioned to its common and to its special end.’ And as to the common end he says the truth; for a poverty is greater by the fact it is more proportioned to the common end; and of this end alone is this true, as was shown, and not of the special end. And yet it is certain that when he makes his statement his meaning is principally about the special end, as can be made plain from considering his words in the main solution, which words are these: ‘if poverty is considered in relation to the special ends of religions, then a poverty based on the presupposition of such end is in this way more or less accommodated to religion; and each religion will be so much the more perfect in poverty the more it has a poverty better proportioned to its end.’ He says therefore, to confirm his solution, that having something in common is conformed to the poverty of Christ; for Christ, the institutor of poverty, taught this by his example, for he had a bag in which Judas carried what was put in it, *John* 12.6; again in *John* 4.8 it is said that the disciples went into the city to buy food. We say that if what is said about the bag is carefully weighed, as the Gloss and the saints expound it, it proves rather that having something in common is a mark of imperfection than of perfection. For we read that for three reasons the Savior had a bag and bought necessaries, namely for sustaining life, for aiding the poor, for the use of himself and his followers on account of pressing necessity and condescension and dispensing for the sake of the weak, who were going to do such things in the Church.

13. About the bag for aiding the poor Chrysostom in *Homily 72[73] on John*, at the verse 13.29, ‘or that he should give something to the poor,’ says, ‘But how was he, who bade them to take or bear neither purse nor staff nor coin, carrying a bag? For ministry to the poor. For the disciples reckoned that he should give something to the poor.’ Again on *Matthew 17.27*, ‘In its opened mouth you will find a gold coin,’ the Gloss from Jerome [*Exposition of Matthew 3.17*] says, ‘The Lord was so poor that he did not have wherewith to pay the tribute. Judas indeed had the common funds in the bag, but Christ thought it impious to turn the money of the poor to his own uses, thus giving us an example.’

14. Second, as was said, it is written that Judas had the bag to buy necessities for their use; for he had the bag for this reason, that he might buy necessities when they passed through Samaria, as it is written in *John 4.8* that the disciples went into the city to buy necessities. For the Samaritans were not hospitable to Jews, hence it is written elsewhere that when Jesus was going to Jerusalem the Samaritans refused to receive him, *Luke 9.53*. For this reason, with his passion and the persecution of the disciplines imminent, he both himself then had a bag and permitted the disciples to have a bag; hence in *Luke 22.35* we read, ‘When I sent you without staff and purse and shoes, was there anything lacking to you? And they said, Nothing. He said therefore to them, But now he who has a bag let him take likewise a purse etc.;

here the marginal Gloss from Bede says, ‘He informs the disciples that there is not the same rule for living in time of persecution as in time of peace; indeed when the disciples were sent to preach, he bade them not to take anything on the way, ordaining namely that he who announces the Gospel should live from the Gospel; but when the moment of death was to hand and the whole nation was persecuting the pastor and the flock, he taught the disciples a fitting rule, permitting them to take necessities for food until, after the insanity of the persecutors was lulled, the time for evangelizing might return.’ Again another Gloss says, ‘In this too an example is given us that sometimes, when a cause presses, we can without guilt suspend some of the rigor of our settled purpose.’

15. Third, it is further written that they carried a bag by condescension and for the sake of the weak, as the Gloss says on *Psalms 103.13*, ‘Giving hay to beasts of burden,’ that the Lord had a bag for the use of those who were with him: religious women who were of their company and who ministered to him of their substance; the Lord, taking on rather the person of the weak, foresaw how there would be many who were weak and thus in need, to whom he gave the example of receiving necessities from subordinates.’ Again Augustine *On the Work of Monks* ch.5 says, ‘The Lord, suffering along with the weak in his merciful manner, although the angels ministered to him, yet had a bag in which was put the money necessary for their food that was given by the good faithful, and he entrusted the bag to Judas.’ Again Augustine *Homily 88 on John*, ‘He was a thief and had the bag; Why did he have a bag, whom the angels ministered to, save because his Church was going to have a bag?’

16. So from none of the aforesaid ways can one get that having something in common is a mark of perfection in religious men. For having something, or something common, in the first way, namely just so as to distribute to the poor, is not to have something in common as religious have but as bishops have, who are managers and distributors of the goods of the Church and not lords. Hence from this manner of possession cannot be shown the perfection of a religion that has something in common but rather the perfection of prelacy.

17. Likewise the second manner of possession, namely for necessity, cannot show it either. For that which sometimes happens only because of necessity is simply more a mark of imperfection than of perfection; for example, David and his young men, when compelled by necessity, ate the bread of proposition that it was not lawful for them to eat but only for the priests, as is reported in *1 Kings* 21.6ff.; for simply eating this sort of bread was forbidden to laymen, eating it was not a perfection; the Maccabees too were compelled by necessity to fight on the Sabbath day, as is reported in *1 Maccabees* 2.38, and *Joshua* 7.5; yet Gregory simply says in *Homily 11* on Ezekiel, ‘Because I am, by necessity of location, often joined to secular men, I sometimes relax my discipline of the tongue; should it be said for this reason that relaxing the discipline of the tongue is simply a mark of perfection? Far from it.’ Likewise Christ by necessity of time and place had a bag and permitted the having of it; therefore does it follow that having a bag and holding something in common is simply a mark of perfection? Rather the opposite follows.

18. We say the same about the third manner of possession, about condescension for the weak. For that which is only done for the weak is for the most part and in itself rather a mark of imperfection than perfection; for example the imperfection that Gregory asserts of himself in *Homily 11* on *Ezekiel* where, as before, he says, ‘If I do not hold myself in the continual rigor of my custom, I know that I am made to flee from it by the weak and I never drag them to that which I desire; hence it often happens that I listen to their idle words patiently. But because I am compelled a little to speak freely in idle words to someone weak, I hear what I had undertaken to hear unwillingly. Should it then be said that to listen patiently to idle words is a mark of perfection? In no way.’ Likewise when a bishop with someone weak dispenses wholly or particularly in something which is against or outside the common observances in religion, for example to eat meat on a day of fast, certainly not for this reason should it be reckoned that thus to eat meat or to make dispensation is in itself or simply a mark of perfection; far from it; rather it is more a mark of imperfection, as is apparent. Indeed, to have necessities in a pressing necessity, at times because of the necessity of the weak, was a mark of the greatest perfection in Christ; however doing this is simply and absolutely a mark of imperfection; for example, it is a mark of the greatest perfection in a master to dispense doctrine according to the capacity of the hearers, handing out subtler things to the subtle and the perfect but historical and grosser things to the uneducated and gross; and yet this historical and gross doctrine is not a doctrine perfect and suited to the perfect.

19. But if someone contend that the Lord had a bag not only for the aforesaid causes but simply and for its own sake to procure necessities from it, let him certainly know that he is speaking and teaching against the manifest witness of the saints. For Jerome speaks as cited above on the verse of *Matthew*, ‘In its open mouth you will find a gold coin;’ the Gloss says, ‘The Lord was in so great poverty that he did not have whence to pay the tribute.’ Again on *Mark*[*Matthew*] 11.11, ‘Looking around on all things when it was already night,’ the Gloss says, ‘If anyone would receive him in hospitality; for the Lord was in so great poverty that, fawned on by none, he would in so great necessity find no hospitality.’ Again Chrysostom on *Luke* 9.58, ‘But the Son of Man has nowhere, etc.’ says, ‘Look how he showed in works the poverty he taught; for there was neither table nor candlestick nor house nor anything else of the sort.’ This authority is set down by Thomas in his own continuous gloss on *Luke* in the same place. Again, Chrysostom on

Matthew 8.20, 'The Son of Man has nowhere etc.' (and it is his *Homily* 27) says, 'Christ did not say that I condemn all I have, but that I do not have.' Again Augustine in his epistle on *Sacraments of the Church* says, 'Christ was so poor that when he came into the world he was born not in his own house but another's, and when born he was, because of the poverty of the place, put in a manger of animals, and when living in the world he did not have where to lay his head, nor when dying wherewith to cover his nakedness, nor when dead wherewith to be wrapped nor a tomb wherein his dead body might be put.'

20. Lastly, if anyone stubbornly asserts that it is a mark of perfection to imitate Christ in the case of the bag, he can and should by parity of reason say that it is a mark of perfection to imitate Christ in the matter of the sword; and he should, in order to be a perfect imitator of Christ, carry or at least have possessions in common; which would be a stupid thing to do and say.

21. But as for what Thomas alleges about the price of fields that were laid at the feet of the Apostles and held in reserve, it does not make for his case; because the money was not the Apostles' nor turned to their use, but was only distributed by them to whoever had need. Hence on the verse of *Acts*, 'Silver and gold have I none etc.,' the Goss says, 'Mindful of the precept, 'Do not possess gold etc. '; the money that was laid at the Apostles' feet they did not keep for themselves but for the use of the poor who had left their inheritance;' as Ambrose on *Luke*, 'Carry no purse etc.,' when treating of the words, 'Silver and gold have I none,' says, 'Peter did not so much glory that he had no silver or gold but that he was keeping the commandment of the Lord, 'Do not possess gold etc.,' that is to say, You see me a disciple of Christ and you ask of me gold; but he gave us something more precious than much gold, that in his name we should perform works of power; therefore I do not have what he did not give, but what he gave I do have: Rise up and walk.' In another way it can be said that perhaps the Apostles took from the money that was laid at their feet the necessities of life by reason of their labor in preaching, just as they took, but by the command of the Lord, the necessities of life from those to whom they preached, that is, they were able to take it by reason of their labor in preaching, and yet they did not have anything in common either with the one or the other.

22. But what Thomas cites from Prosper 12 q.1 does not make for his case; for that chapter, as is plain, applies properly to bishops; for Prosper speaks as follows, 'Whoever has left and sold all that he had and contemns his own possessions, becomes when put in authority, by occasion of all that he has, a distributor of the Church;' and he adds examples from the bishops St. Paulinus and St. Hilary. It is manifest therefore that what he says he means of bishops; but bishops, because they are dispensers of the goods of the Church, can, without loss in perfection, possess what needs to be dispensed to others; but regulars who do not have this sort of excuse cannot do so without loss in perfection.

23. But as to what Thomas says in the solution to the second argument, that it is dangerous so to leave everything that nothing is kept for food for the morrow, in accord with the fact that Anthony in *Collections of the Fathers* says he has seen others who so acted being altogether deceived – the citation is introduced falsely and against the intention of the author. For there Moses narrates that once, in the time of his boyhood, many elders came to Abbot Anthony asking of him what virtue or observance could keep a monk from the snares of the devil; for some said that this was conferred by attention to fasts, others to vigils; others said it was by contempt for all temporal things, others by remaining in one's anchorite cell and by an eremitical life, others in offices of humility.

After all these things St. Anthony said, ‘All that you have said is necessary and useful for those thirsting after God and longing to reach him, but to attribute the grace of escape principally to these things is in no way permitted by innumerable happenings and also by the experiences of many ancestors.’ And he adds that it has even been seen that sometimes the followers of all the aforesaid things have been deceived. And he concludes, ‘Wherefore what principally leads to God we will be able manifestly to recognize if the cause of their ruin and deception is more diligently searched into by us; now they, although their works of the aforesaid virtues were abundant, were prevented by lack of discretion alone from persisting in them right up to the end.’ With these words blessed Anthony does not say that leaving everything is dangerous; on the contrary he says this is both necessary and useful for those desiring to reach God, but the grace of escaping the snares of the devil is not to be attributed principally to these things but to discretion, without which men are in the other things sometimes deceived; and this indeed is true; nor can it more be inferred from the words of blessed Anthony that it is dangerous to leave everything than that it is dangerous to fast and lead a solitary life or to persist in works of humility and mercy; for he says that the followers of all the aforesaid things were sometimes deceived on account of lack of discretion.

Article Sixteen/Seventy Six

That monks can transfer to the order of canons

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in q.189 a.8 Thomas asks whether it is licit to transfer from one religion to another yet stricter one; and in the response to the second argument he says that although the order of monks is of stricter observance, yet if the monks were laymen it would be licit to transfer from the order of monks to the order of regular canons, according to the remark of Jerome to the monk Rusticus, ‘So live in the monastery that you deserve to be a cleric.’ But he gives a reason for this which is as follows: each order, namely that of monks and that of canons, is ordered to the contemplative life or to the works of the contemplative life, among which those are chief that are carried out in divine ministries; and the order of canons is directly ordered to these works, because it belongs per se to canons to be religious clerics, but it does not so belong per se to monks, as is contained in [*Canon Law*] 18 q.1.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Here is expressly indicated that it is licit, for promotion to the clerical state, to transfer from the order of monks to the order of canons and from a stricter order to a laxer one. But we reckon this to be false. For Innocent, as is contained in [*Canon Law*] 19 q.3, says: ‘We establish that monks who have spent a long time in the monastery should not, after they have come to the clerical state, depart from their prior commitment. For the laws about transfer from one religion to another do not have regard to promotion from the laity to the clergy in the religion to which transfer is made, but only to the greater

strictness of the manner of life, as is said in the *Extravagant* about Regulars and those transferring to religion, in the chapter *Sane*, where determination is made about someone who had been professed in a certain church and, fleeing thence, was accepted as a monk by a certain abbot; and if the place where he was accepted was of greater religion, he should be permitted to stay there and not be compelled to return to his former church.’ And at the end the following is said about certain monks: ‘When your monk transferred to the brothers of the Cistercian Order, not so as to derogate from your order but to live a stricter life with them, we command you, to that extent, to disturb him in no way, because charity is one’s own fountain source in which no one else shares.’

4. The authority of Jerome, if it be rightly understood, does not make for Thomas’ case; for rather Rusticus is being exhorted to live both religiously in manner of life and studiously in meditation on the Scriptures, so that he should deserve to be made a cleric in the order; but in no way is it licit for him to leave the order for promotion to the clerical state, as is expressly said in the afore cited chapter. Hence this admonition of Jerome would have its effective place if monks could not be promoted within their own order, the way monks were anciently up to the times of Eusebius and Zosimus when they were thus monks because they were not clerics, that is, not ordained, as is contained in the authority above [*Canon Law*] 16 q.1. But Jerome’s admonition was useful at the time of Jerome and Rusticus, because then educated religious and monks used to be promoted to orders.

5. Now the reason that Thomas indicates, namely that the works carried out in divine ministries are chief among the works of the contemplative life etc., is easily solved. For when some two things are so disposed that one belongs to necessity and the other to eminence and nobility, that which is of necessity is more to be chosen, as the Philosopher says, and he gives an example about philosophizing and acquiring wealth [*Topics* 3.2]; for it is simply nobler and better to philosophize than to acquire wealth; however for someone in need of necessities acquiring wealth is more to be chosen. It is similar in the issue at hand: for the office of a cleric is of greater excellence than the lowness of a monk, just as offering the Eucharist and celebrating divine services and preaching to the people is more excellent than to bewail one’s own and the people’s sins in lowness and abjection; however for a sinner seeking to save his soul the latter is more necessary than the former; and so it is simply more to be chosen and held to.

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Truth*

Article One/Seventy Seven *That God can make an actual infinite*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.22 [2.10] Thomas asks whether God can make infinites, and in the response to the question he says, 'If the infinite can be actual in nature, or even if, because of some impediment other than the idea itself of the infinite, it cannot, I say that God can make an actual infinite to exist. But if actual existence is repugnant in idea to the infinite, then God cannot make it.'

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems to be an occasion of error. For Thomas insinuates that God can make everything to which existence is not in idea repugnant; and it is clear that this is false. For existence is not repugnant to the idea of sin and lying, and yet God can do neither; and there are many things of this sort.

4. Again, actual existence does not seem to be repugnant to the idea of the infinite, as is plain in God, who is supremely actual and yet supremely infinite and has infinite ideas in himself. But being made by one who is supremely wise is repugnant to the idea of the infinite or to the per se property of the infinite. For infinity in multitude imports confusion and lack of order; but God, since he is supremely wise, cannot make anything disordered; for to order belongs to the wise man, as is said at the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. Also infinity in magnitude of necessity imports infinity in power; but an infinite power of necessity excludes all need and dependency; but God has no power for anything that does not depend on himself. Hence the fact that existence is repugnant to the idea of something is altogether not the only cause why God cannot make that something, but there is also the cause that to make such a thing is repugnant to the divine will.

Article Two/Seventy Eight *That eternity is present to every distinction of time*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.24 [2.12] Thomas asks whether God knows singulars and future contingents, and in the response he says that of the contingent as it is future is no knowledge to which falsity cannot be present; hence, since falsity is not and cannot be present to God's knowledge, it would be impossible for God to have knowledge of future contingents if he were to know them as they are future. And next in the same question and article he says in his response that God does not know future contingents as they are

future but as they are present. And in the same place, at the end of his solution, he says that if one were to signify the future as it exists in God's knowledge one should rather say that God knows that it is than that he knows it will be, because things are never present to him as future but as always present. He states the same opinion at the end of his solution to the question about whether God's knowledge is changeable [2.13].

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If Thomas intended to say that God knows contingent futures with certainty as if they were actually present he would say the truth; but this is not his intention, as it seems, but rather that eternity is present to every distinction of time and that every distinction of time is present to eternity, and therefore all future contingents, although future in time, are really and actually present to the divine vision; and so falsity about future contingents cannot be present in divine knowledge, just as neither can it be present in our knowledge when we see some contingent thing existing in the present and really, as when we see Socrates seated when he is seated. This seems to be a very great error, namely that things really, essentially, and naturally in time have existed from eternity just in the way some of them sometimes exist in time, although however according to the truth of the Catholic faith only God exists from eternity.

4. The reason too for this position is not cogent. For when we say that eternity is present to every distinction of time and every distinction of time present to eternity, I judge that this must be understood in the sense that eternity is present to all the reasons for knowing and that the reasons for the knowing of all things are present to eternity; for the eternal God knows in his present and with certitude all the future and past and present things in their ideas; hence the reasons for the knowing of past, present, and future things are present to eternity and present to God from eternity, and his knowledge of them is always present, but not the known things themselves. With this Augustine agrees in *Confessions* 11.18 when he says, 'Future things are said to be seen, not the very things that altogether not yet are, that is, that are future, but their signs or causes perhaps are seen and these already are; therefore not future things but present things exist for those seeing now, and from these things they predict future things already conceived in their mind; and these conceptions again already exist, and those who make predictions look upon conceptions existing now within themselves.' So Augustine.

Article Three/Seventy Nine

That matter does not have in God its own proper idea

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.32[3.5] about whether prime matter has an idea in God, Thomas says in the main response and in the solution to the first argument that an idea properly speaking has regard to the thing according as it is producible in being; but matter cannot issue into being without form, or contrariwise; nor does the proper idea respond to matter

alone or to form alone, but there is one idea responding to the whole composite, which idea is constructive of the whole as to matter and as to form.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems to many masters to be false, because God can give being to matter without form and conversely, just as in the sacrament of the altar he gives being to the accidents without a subject, although however accidents depend more on the subject than matter does on form.

4. Second, it is necessary that everything that has a distinct essence have also a corresponding idea in God; otherwise one would have to posit a principle other than God in which the principle of it would be, which is erroneous. So since there is one essence of matter and another of form, matter must have a different idea distinct from the idea of form, and conversely; and also there must be a different idea of the composite.

5. Third, whatever God can give through a second cause he can give through himself, the first cause. Since therefore God gives actual being through form, he will be able per se to give actual being to matter, not that he himself is the formal act of it but that by his infinite power he can give being to matter without form and conversely, as he can to an accident without a subject.

6. Again, it seems that one should posit rather that God has distinct ideas of the matter and from than of the composite. For the Commentator says on *Physics* 1.2 text 3, on the third point, that in the case of artificial things the causes are more known to the artisan than the composite is; hence if we were to make natural things then, according to the Commentator, the causes would be more known to us. Therefore God, who is the artisan of natural things, knows the matter and the form more than the thing composed of them, if however there is anything for him that is more known than something else. Therefore, according to the principle of understanding, he has ideas of matter and form prior to, and more expressly and distinct than, an idea of the composite.

Article Four/Eighty

That accidents do not have their own proper idea in God

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.34[3.7] Thomas asks whether accidents have an idea in God, and in the solution to the question he says that, when speaking of accidents that are never separate from their subjects and are produced by one operation along with their subjects, then, since an idea properly speaking is an operable form insofar as it is such, there will not be a distinct idea of such accidents, but there will be one idea of the subject along with all its accidents.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Against this position are the three first arguments stated immediately above against his position about prime matter [article 79]. Besides, just as God has made everything so has he distinguished all distinct things, as is plain in *Genesis* 1. Therefore, just as there were ideas of all that he made, so there were distinct ideas of all that he distinguished, and these ideas are in God. But the essence of accidents is truly distinct from the essence of the subject. Therefore there must be ideas of accidents distinct from ideas of subjects.

Article Five/Eighty One

That there is one idea corresponding to genus and species and individual

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. On the same point, in q.35[3.8], the question is whether singulars have an idea in God, and in the response to the second argument Thomas says that, when speaking properly of an idea according as it is of the thing (in the way that it is producible in being), then in this way one idea responds to the singular and to the species and genus individuated in the singular. But if the idea is taken generally for the likeness or nature, then, since the consideration of Socrates as he is Socrates and the consideration of him as he is man and as he is animal are diverse, there thus correspond to him diverse ideas or likenesses. And in the first part of the *Summa Theologica*, in q.15 a.3 in the response to the fourth argument, he says that genera cannot have a different idea from that of the species as idea signifies the exemplar, because a genus is only ever in some species. The like is also true of accidents that follow the subject, because these are in the subject; but accidents that supervene on the subject have a special idea; for an artisan makes, through the idea of a house, all the accidents that are concomitant from the beginning to the house, while the accidents that supervene on the house once made, as pictures and the like, are made by the artisan through a different idea.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems contrary to Augustine in his *Letter 14* to Nebridius, which begins thus, 'In your most recent letters to me etc.,' where Augustine says that as concerns the making of man there is a natural reason of man indeed but not one of me or of you; but that as concerns the various natural reasons of men of the same time, these live in the Holy Trinity. Note that Augustine says 'as concerns the making of man' not 'as concerns the knowing of man.' Now what he says about rational natures must be understood of the ideas. And that Augustine means the same by natural reason and idea is plain as follows from *On the Trinity* 6 [in fact 83 *Questions* q.46], 'All things were made by natural reasons, but man was not made by the same natural reason as horse; for it is absurd to think this; for individual things are created by their own natural reasons.' And later he says, 'And these natural reasons of things Plato calls principal ideas.' And in the same question as above he says, 'The principal ideas are the substantial forms or natures of things.'

4. Against this article see what was said above on question 32 [William's article 79], which is about whether matter has an idea in God, and on question 34 [William's article 80], which is about whether accidents have an idea in God. Again see better above against the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.15 a.3 [William's article 4], where the question is asked whether there are ideas in God of all that God knows.

5. Again the distinction Thomas draws between the being of a thing as it is producible and the being of a thing only as it is knowable does not seem acceptable, because, according to this, a thing would have one idea when it is becoming or is needing to be made and another when it has been made; but this is not a position that is held, and it appears false in our own case. Besides we see in our own case that when to the idea by which a thing is known there is added the power or will to make that thing, then the idea is the idea of the thing as producible in being; but when to the knowledge we have of a thing is not added the power or will to make it, the same idea remains as before, and it is only of the thing as knowable. Therefore it seems that the distinction is not on the part of the idea.

Article Six/Eighty Two

That a defect in reason precedes sin in a movement of the will

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.204[24.8] Thomas asks whether the free choice of a creature can be confirmed in good by some good of grace, and in the main solution about the middle he says that there cannot be sin in a movement of the will, namely that it desire something evil, unless there first exist a defect in the apprehending power whereby an evil be proposed to it not as evil, which is a defect of reason. And hence it happens that free choice reckons some particular good to be the end which is not the end nor useful for the end. Or reason fails because of something extrinsic, namely that, because of the inferior powers that are moved intensely toward something, the act of reason is intercepted so that it does not firmly and clearly propose its judgment about the good to the will. And in the same question and following article [24.9], about whether the free choice of a man when in the status of wayfarer can be confirmed in good, Thomas says in the main solution, about the middle, that the origin of sin is either due to an error of reason, which is deceived in some particular, or because of some passion in the inferior powers.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Although, in the opinion of some, this seems to agree with the Philosopher in *Ethics* 7[8], yet it seems to smack of the error of Pelagius against grace. For if sin in the will is always caused by a defect and error in reason, whether in itself or because of a passion in the inferior powers, then, since knowledge and teaching are necessary for direction of the will toward the good, things are as the heretic Pelagius says, who posits that God helps us by law and teaching so that we learn what to think and what we ought

to do, but he does not help us by the gift of grace from the Holy Spirit to do the things we have learnt ought to be done.

4. Further, anyone can experience in himself that, although reason truly declares something to be a sin, as fornication or something else, yet the will can, while the judgment remains, move the body toward sin and the commission of sin. If you say that reason only judges it is to be done when led by the command of will, then in this way it is rather the perverse command in the will that is prior to the bad judgment in reason.

5. Again, it is possible to see most of all from within that the will can sin in willing and choosing without a defect of reason as to the procuring of the universal good, or something useful for a particular good, or without interception of judgment by vehemence of passion in the inferior powers. As the Philosopher says in the chapter on pleasures in *Rhetoric* 1.2, ‘Honor and approval are among the most delightful things.’ Besides, honors, concupiscence, and approval are not in the inferior powers because these things are not apprehended by the senses; hence the Philosopher says in *Ethics* 3 that a friend of these things rejoices in honor and teaching while suffering nothing in the body but in the mind. I posit then that the intellect says: honor is of no or little advantage for salvation; I posit that it says the same about the approval of men in itself. When the intellect says this, it is clear that it is telling the truth. Again I posit that the intellect says: honor and approval are delightful things. Clearly when it is still saying this, it is not erring but telling the truth. Besides, the judgment of reason cannot be intercepted by a passion in the inferior powers desiring these things, because, as was said, desire for such things does not regard the inferior powers but the mind only. When the situation then is as thus proposed, it is clear that the will cannot be desiring and choosing human honors and man’s approval because of the delight that is in them. From this it is manifest that the will can sin in willing and choosing without any defect of reason in the aforesaid ways.

6. Again, Chrysostom in *Homily 24 on Matthew* at the verse, ‘Beware of false prophets etc.’ says, near the middle, ‘One must be vigilant in good works because error does not generate sin but sin error, as *Wisdom* says, The impiety of men draws to error.’ And Gregory says the same *Moralia* 20.12 on the verse, ‘It dwells in the burning deserts.’ Again, Augustine in *Enchiridion* ch.19 says, ‘Error itself of itself, whether it is great in a great thing or small in a small thing, is yet always evil. For who but someone in error would deny that it is evil to approve the false in place of the true?’ Therefore, according to Augustine, error is always in itself evil, at least the evil of punishment. But it is clear according to the faith itself that in Adam there was no punishment before there was guilt; and guilt is only in the will, or is not without guilt in the will. Therefore, since all error is a punishment, there was punishment of error in Adam’s intellect before there was guilt, which is false and erroneous. Therefore error is not necessarily in reason before sin is in the will, but the converse.

7. Again, the Gloss of Augustine on *Psalms* 83.3, ‘My soul longs and is faint,’ says, ‘We see sometimes by reason how useful are the justifications, that is the just works, of God; but, impeded by weakness, we sometimes do not desire them. The intellect flies ahead, then, but affection is slow or non-existent.’ From these words it is plain that the will follows the intellect; for they are not together inseparable as light and its splendor are, but will follows as knowing follows learning and being healthy follows being cured. But in such things, according to the Philosopher *Posterior Analytics* 2 and at the end of *Generation and Corruption* 2, an inference never holds from the prior to the posterior but

conversely. This inference does not hold then: reason is right, therefore will is right and good. But if this inference does not hold, then the opposite of the consequent can stand along with the antecedent, namely the will not being right along with reason being right. So it is not necessary that, if sin or crookedness is in the will, error in reason has preceded.

Article Seven/Eighty Three

That a separated soul suffers from corporeal fire insofar as it is hindered from its proper operation or from something belonging to it

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.220[26.1] where Thomas asks how the separated soul suffers from corporeal fire, he posits in the main response three meanings for the word 'passion' or 'suffering'; and he says that in the third meaning, when 'suffering' is said metaphorically, the soul suffers by the fact that its operation can be hindered. And later he says that the soul suffers from corporeal fire in the above said way, insofar as we say that everything suffers that is hindered from its proper operation or from something belonging to it.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. From these words Thomas seems to think that separated souls and reprobate angels are tormented by being hindered from their proper operations or from something belonging to them, and not by the pain of heat; hence also in his commentary on the *Sentences* 4 d.21, in the solution to the last question, he says that the fire, as it is an instrument of divine justice, is able to keep a spirit bound to it in some way, and that in this way the fire is truly harmful to a spirit; and thus a soul, seeing that the fire is noxious to it, is troubled by the fire. These are the words of Thomas in the same place, and they seem erroneous because they are against the Gospel and the teaching of the saints: *Matthew* 21.41, 'Depart ye cursed etc.,' and *Luke* 16.24, 'Dives is dead and buried etc.' and then follows, 'but he, lifting up his eyes since he was in torment,' and then follows, 'Send Lazarus to dip the end of his finger in water so that he may cool my tongue for I am tormented in these flames.' On this Ambrose says [*On Luke* 8] that it is rather to be considered a true story than a parable.

4. Again, the saints say that the reprobate are punished with the pain of true heat, as Augustine [Ps. Augustine] says in *On the Faith to Peter* last chapter, 'All the wicked will go into eternal fire, but the just to eternal life; the wicked always to burn with the devil but the just always to reign with Christ.' Again in *City of God* 21.10 Augustine says much on this matter: 'Why do we not say, as much as you please, that incorporeal spirits are afflicted in remarkable but true ways by the pain of corporeal fire?' And Gregory in *Dialogues* 4.29 says, 'Thus it happens that a corporeal thing burns an incorporeal thing, as heat and pain are drawn from invisible fire so that through corporeal flames even the incorporeal mind is tormented with incorporeal flame. Because we can gather from the words of the Gospels that the soul suffers not only by seeing the fire but also by feeling it.' In agreement with this is what was said above about the feaster Dives; for why did

Dives desire to be cooled by water if he did not feel the heat of the flames? Did he seek for water to end his detention in or bondage to the fire? From these words it is plain to those who beat with a Catholic and Gospel pulse that an incorporeal spirit is tormented by corporeal fire and by the pain of fiery heat, and this insofar as fire is an instrument of divine justice but not by the power of its own nature.

5. Again, against what Thomas says in his commentary on *Sentences 4*, that spirits suffer for the reason that they see the fire is noxious to them: either then he understood this of the harm of detention and of hindrance from operations desired or otherwise fitting, or he understood it of the hurt of heat, namely that spirits suffer the pain of heat from the fire because the fire is in this way noxious to them. If he understands it in the first way, this has already been rejected above. If in the second way, then he understands it only either of sensed vision, or of imaginative vision, or of intellectual vision (namely vision in thought), or of two of these, or of all together. If then he means that they see that the fire is noxious to them by the hurt of heat, although however it is not in truth hot, and thus they suffer from the fire, that is are hurt by it, because they are aware of it with the awareness of the sense of sight but not with the awareness of the sense of touch, then without doubt the fire should be posited as bright rather than hot, and heat rather than light should be removed from it, the opposite of which is said by Basil in his *Hexaemeron*. Again, if spirits were punished only by seeing the fire and not indeed by touching it, Christ should have said in *Matthew 25.41*, Depart ye cursed *to* the eternal fire, and not *into* the eternal fire, because the preposition ‘to’ imports distance, which is necessary for sight, while the preposition ‘into’ imports lack of distance, which impedes sight but is required for touch.

6. Further, if spirits suffer from the fire by seeing and imagining that it is noxious to them but not by thinking that it is, then, because demons are very clever and know that fire cannot act on a spirit, this view does not seem it can stand; for the Philosopher *On the Soul 2[3].11* gives as a difference between thought and imagination that we can set aside imagination but not at all thought. But if they are tormented by imagining the torment of fire and not by thinking it, then they could, when they want, set aside the imagination and consequently the pain of the fire. Besides the Philosopher says, *On the Soul 3[2].3*, that when we think something terrible we do not at once suffer it; from which it is plain that opinion is stronger at inducing or prohibiting suffering than imagination is. Since therefore the demons have a sound opinion that they neither suffer nor can suffer from corporeal fire, then however much they imagine it to be noxious to them they do not for this reason suffer from it.

7. But if Thomas’s meaning is the third way, namely that the demons are burned and tormented in the fire although however they neither burn nor blaze in truth, this was already rejected above by the authorities from the saints. Besides, we see that the demons are very clever and have sound and true opinions in other things; how then by the fact merely that they feel more would they be so in error that they thought there were being burnt in the fire when they can in no way be burnt? Further, if they are tormented by the fire only because they see it and think they are tormented by it, then those who have sounder opinions and judgments and perhaps are the more astute among them, as Lucifer, would be less punished; which is false because knowledge aggravates their sins and consequently their pain.

8. Now as to the authorities that Thomas cites in confirmation of what he says, they are badly cited, as is plain from examining the originals.

9. But examples can be set down by which it can be shown that corporeal fire can impress on spirits the pain of heat, though in such a way that it neither heats nor consumes them. One is that the eye or the imaginative power apprehends whiteness or blackness through the species of white and black, and the eye does not become white or black; but neither does it become such by the species it receives. Bare or separated spirits apprehend in the same way and, as it were, truly sense heat and cold, and yet they are not hot or cold. Hence it is not necessary that a spirit be heated by the fire that it apprehends as a body, and yet it truly apprehends it as corporeal, as a body or the color of an eye and as an organ of smelling odor. And with this seems a little to agree what the Philosopher says on the causes of the *Motion of Animals* 7, that imagination and intelligence possess the power of things; for in some way the understood species of hot or cold, pleasing or distressing or the like, is the way each of the things is, for which reason those who merely understand tremble and are afraid. But that in the bodies of the damned, after and before the judgment, and in spirits there can be the pain of heat without consumption even then is shown by the fact that this is possible in a passible body; hence the Master [Peter Comestor] on the *History of Genesis*, ch.24 on the election of the first man in paradise, says, 'If it be asked what the fire consumes, one can say that it is a certain species of fire, as is written in the life of blessed Nicolas, that if you put your hand to it you feel the heat but do not suffer being burnt.' Again, he says the same in his *History on the Gospel of Luke*, about the feaster Dives and Lazarus. If then this is possible in a corruptible thing, much more is it true in incorruptible bodies and bare spirits. Besides we feel by experiment that sometimes a body is intensely heated by fire; the pain of the blaze or the extreme heat is felt long before the body itself can be consumed and burnt up. From the fact then that these are separable in time, it is clear that God can simply separate the first from the second throughout eternity, even if one is the efficient cause of the other. Fire, then, as it is an instrument of divine justice, can inflict on the damned the pain of heat without the heating up of a corruptible body or a bare spirit.

To the Arguments

10. But as to the arguments that in the said question he sets down against what has now been stated, here is the response.

11. The first argument is as follows. In *On the Soul* 3 it is said that the agent is always more honorable than the patient. And Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.16 says, 'What makes is in every way more outstanding than that from which it makes.' Therefore a soul cannot be made to suffer by fire. – Response: to the extent that the agent has actually the form, or the likeness of it, which the patient has only in potency, to that extent it is nobler than the patient; but this need not simply be so; for, according to the Philosopher, every agent suffers physically [*Generation and Corruption* 1.7 text 50]; therefore if the agent is nobler than the patient simply, then it would of necessity follow that the same thing would be more noble and more ignoble in respect of the same thing. Hence one must say that an agent is nobler insofar as it is agent and not simply; and thus corporeal fire insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice is nobler than the sinner insofar as he is sinner.

12. Thomas' second reason about what seems needing to be weighed is that Damascene 4.27[6] says, 'The demons and such, namely wicked Antichrist and the impious and sinners, are handed over to eternal fire, not a material fire such as is here among us, but such indeed as God knows.' But all corporeal fire is material. Therefore the fire that the separated soul suffers is not material or corporeal. But only corporeal fire inflicts heat. Therefore they will not suffer the pain of heat. – Response: the negation does not stop at the word 'material' only but covers the whole phrase 'a material fire such as is here among us;' and this is true. For, besides other differences, that fire differs from our usual fire because our fire is kindled and nourished from below but that fire is not. *Job* 20.26, 'A fire will devour them that is not kindled,' on which Gregory says [*Moralia* 15.29], 'That fire heats most and gives light least; ours gives more light than heat because it illumines much further than it heats.' And therefore does Damascene say that it is not a material fire such as is here among us.

13. Thomas' third reason is as follows: that fire afflicts the soul; therefore it is felt as hurtful. This consequence is plain of itself, according to Augustine *Enchiridion* 12, 'If it is felt as hurtful, something is taken away by it.' But corporeal fire can take nothing away from the soul. Therefore a corporeal fire cannot afflict the soul. – Response: Augustine speaks thus, 'Now the fire hurts by taking away a good. Hence I say that the fire takes nothing away from the substance of a soul or an angel, because these are unchangeable in their substance; but it takes away the delight that the apprehending power will have in apprehending its object in due and moderate proportion, and it takes away the peace that the knowing substance has when its powers are not weighed down by a surpassing object.' And something like this we find in *On the Heavens* 2.8 where the Philosopher says, 'If there were many wandering stars or planets in each of the spheres, the highest sphere would be in pain and labor since it would not move the spheres that come after its motion.' Now if all pain and labor take something away, I ask what is it that is taken away from the highest sphere and the intelligence that moves it? Certainly one cannot say that something belonging to the substance is thereby taken away; but, as the Commentator explains, the due proportion of the mover to the thing to be moved is destroyed, and of the moved to the thing to be resisted; and this would be the reason for the labor and pain if there were many wandering stars in a sphere.

14. Thomas' fourth reason is of this sort: everything that acts on another impresses on it the likeness of its form whereby it acts on it. But fire acts through heat. Therefore since the soul cannot be heated, it seems that it cannot be made to suffer by fire. – Response: the fire impresses the likeness of heat on the soul, not heat, just as a colored thing impresses the likeness of color, not color, on the eye, and so of the other senses. But the reason that the fire impresses only a likeness of heat on the soul, but impresses true heat on a heated body, can be that the fire, by acting on a body, impresses its species on it and, through the impressed species, impresses on it the true heat that is potentially in the acted on body, and through the species the fire is drawn to act. Hence the true heat that comes to be in the body heated by the action of the fire is not impressed by the fire but is drawn from potency to act in the thing acted on. Now in a bare spirit there is no potency for true heat; hence the fire acting on a spirit impresses only the species, and by so impressing it does not draw out any heat from potency to act; and thus does a colored thing impress a species on the eye, and does not draw true color from potency to act, because there was no such potency there. But there is a difference in this, that the fire impresses on a spirit,

over and above its species, the true pain of heat without the heat, according as it forces punishment on the spirit on which the fire acts insofar as it is an instrument of divine justice, and insofar as the acting power of the fire surpasses the due proportion of the passive power of the spirit, in just the way that something visible, whether it is light or heat, wounds and harms sight, even though only the intention of light or color is impressed on the eye.

15. Thomas' fifth reason is as follows: everything that is acted on by something is moved by it, because moving is more general than acting, as the Commentator says on *Generation and Corruption* 1, the chapter on the tangible. But the soul can be moved in no species of motion by corporeal fire. – Response: as Simplicius says on the *Categories*, the chapter on motion, 'There are three kinds of motion: intellectual, natural, animal; but in the *Categories* Aristotle only makes determinations about natural or corporeal motion, as he says in the same place.' I say therefore that a spirit is not moved corporeally or naturally by fire but moved with the motion of intellectual or animal alteration. But such alteration or passion does not taken anything away from intellectual or spiritual substance.

16. Thomas' sixth reason is thus: what is acted on by something shares with it in matter, as Boethius says *On the Two Natures and One Person in Christ* ch.6. But soul and corporeal fire do not share together in matter, according to Boethius in the same place. Therefore the soul cannot be acted on by corporeal fire. – Response: the aforesaid major cannot be got from Boethius in that place. However, let it be that Boethius does mean to say this. I say that it must be understood of a passive thing that, in being acted on, acts on that which acts on it; because things that mutually act and are acted on share together in matter; but things that are so acted on that they do not act back do not share in matter together with their agents; and this is how things here below are disposed with respect to the supercelestial spheres, and how a spirit is disposed with respect to corporeal fire. And this is what the Philosopher says, *On Generation and Corruption* 1.10 text 87, the chapter on action and passion; 'All things,' he says, 'that do not have the same matter make the entities impassible;' and he says many other things about this in the same place.

Article Eight/Eighty Four

That material fire does not act as an instrument of divine justice save insofar as it exercises some action

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.220 [26.1], where Thomas asks whether a separated soul suffers from fire, in the main response and in the response to the second argument he seems plainly to think, indeed expressly to say, that the infernal fire cannot act on a spirit, even as an instrument of divine justice, except by exercising on it some natural action.

2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems contrary to the common opinion and to be an occasion of error, because it posits that divine power is restricted by nature. And against this is the verse of *Daniel 3.50*, where is said that an angel made the inside of the furnace as a moist wind blowing; hence it is clear that the fire, as an instrument of divine mercy, brought cooling there without any natural operation. Nor can anyone escape from this by the fact of the preface there saying that the angel of the Lord extinguished the flame of fire from the furnace, so as thereby to say that the fire was totally removed from the young men; for there follows, ‘Behold,’ said Nebuchadnezzar, ‘I see four men walking in the midst of the fire;’ and later, ‘Then Nebuchadnezzar went up to the mouth of the burning furnace.’ Rather, the extinction performed by the angel of the Lord is understood to be on the part of the flame, which burnt the Chaldeans next to the furnace.

4. Besides, blessed Laurence says, ‘Learn, O wretched one, that these coals bring me not heat but cooling.’ And blessed Tiburtinus when walking on coals, as is written in the passion of the same martyr, said to the judge Sabinus, ‘In the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, it seems to me that I am walking on rose petals.’ So therefore, in these examples fire was an instrument of divine justice for cooling without the natural action of heating.

Article Nine/Eighty Five

That there are no active powers in matter

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. In q.234[28.3] Thomas asks whether free choice is required for justification of the impious, and in response to argument 16 he says that natural things can, by a certain violence, be disposed to a form, so that namely the principle of the disposition is external, with no force conferred by the undergoing subjects; hence the disposition in them for the form is not from an intrinsic principle but from outside.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. By these words he seems to deny the beginnings of forms or the active potencies in matter that the philosophers posit, and also Augustine, who calls them seminal powers or reasons. About these seminal powers Augustine speaks in many places; for in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* he speaks as follows, ‘All the most usual caused processes of this life have their own natural laws, and, in accord with them, the created spirit of life also in some way has certain determinate appetites which even a bad will cannot exceed; and the bodily elements of this world have their own definite force and quality, as if each thing has something from which it can or cannot come to be. Now what comes to be at any time takes from these beginnings of things the end of its issue and of its progress, because it takes therefrom the disposition of its kind. Hence it is that no beans are born from a grain of wheat or a grain of wheat from beans, or man from beast or beast from man. Over this movement God possesses in himself the supernatural direction of being able to make from all of them something other than what is had by their seminal reasons.’ Again *On the Trinity* 3.14 he distinguishes a threefold seminal source, namely a shoot

that, suitably planted in the earth, produces a tree; the next is more subtle, namely seed of the same genus of seed; and these two are visible; the third is the seed of this seed which, although we cannot see it with the eyes, yet we can conjecture, for unless there were such a force, innate in the elements themselves, things not sown in the earth would not for the most part spring from it.' And a little later, 'The cause of invisible seeds is the Creator of all things himself, for whatever comes forth in being born before our eyes receives from hidden seeds the beginning of its progress or takes as rules from its origins the increase in its due size and the distinctions of its forms.'

4. Again, Ambrose in *Hexameron* 3.8 says, 'When individual things are born, either seed or some other seminal power or something of the like comes from the things that are sown or germinate from their roots, so that what is born should emerge as of like kind, as wheat from wheat, millet from millet, pear from pear.'

5. The philosophers too are found sometimes to use the name of seminal reasons. Hence Macrobius *Saturnalia* 3, a little before the end, says, 'The seminal reasons that are in the egg are believed to be certain elements as it were of the hen.' And the Philosopher *Metaphysics* 11.6 expressly posits in matter the beginnings or potentials of forms, so that from the potentially white the actually white should come to be; likewise in *Generation and Corruption* 1.10 text 84, 'so that all things are from potential being and not actual being.' And the Commentator on the same book a little later says of that very phrase, 'And the doubt must be said to be in this, from what non-being generation comes to be; for not just any being comes to be from just any potency, but each being comes to be from what is potentially that which comes to be in its proper potency, so that the number of the potencies is as the number of the general species of things. And he says, that is, Aristotle says, that he thought that potency is one in substance and many in dispositions or aptitudes.' This from the Commentator. Again the Philosopher *Physics* 2[3].8, a little before the end, says, according to the old translation, 'But if the art of building ships were in the wood itself, then it would operate the way nature operates.' On this the Commentator says, 'It is true that there is no difference between art and nature save that art acts from without and nature from within.' The same opinion is indicated by the Philosopher, and is expressly set down by the Commentator, in *Ethics* 6.6. Hence it is manifest that to deny seminal reasons or active potencies is to deny the doctrine of the philosophers and the saints.

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on the Soul*

Article One/Eighty Six

That the being of the soul is communicated to the body

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.1 Thomas asks whether the soul can be a form and a 'this something'; and in the main response he says that the same being that the soul has is communicated to the body so that there is a single being for the whole species. And in his commentary on *Sentences* 1 d.8, when he asks whether the soul is simple, he says the same thing more plainly in his solution to the third argument, namely that the single being that belongs to the soul becomes per se the being of the composite, and that only the being of the form itself is there. He also says the same thing in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.76 a.1 in the response to the fifth argument.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems to us to be tending toward an error, namely that Christ's body was not numerically the same alive and dead, and that no one else's body is either. For if there is no other being for the body and the composite besides the being of the soul, then, since all being is from the form as the Philosopher says *On the Soul* 3 and Boethius *On the Trinity* 1[3].2, the body will have a different being after its separation from the soul; for it is really proper to say of it, 'this is a body,' and yet the being of the soul is not predicated of this body, which clearly is a body; therefore it must necessarily be that this body, as this body, has a form from somewhere else besides the soul, which soul alone gives the body being in the composite. But if this body, as this body, has a different form after separation from what it had before, then it is impossible that the body of Christ, according as it is body, is the same in number. But this has been condemned as false.

4. Besides, it is certain that the body has being before the soul is united to it and after the soul has been separated from it. Therefore the whole being of body and composite is not the being of the soul.

5. Further, in other composites of matter and form, for example in the elements, we clearly see that they are made up of components but yet that the being of the composite is not the being of any component, because neither of them has being per se; therefore in the case of man, in whom each component, as body and soul, has being per se (as is plain after the separation of soul from body), one can truly say that this body is; and clearly the being of the soul is not being predicated then of the body; nor is the statement 'this body is' asserted for any other reason than that this is a body; for it were not a body in the way it is not a man, then one could not truly say 'this is a body', just as neither does one say that it is a man. If then there is numerically the same body after separation of the soul as before, then it has the numerically same being after separation as before; but this could not be true if the whole being of the body and the composite were the being of the soul. Therefore the upshot is that this view is false.

6. In the third question too, whether the possible intellect or the intellectual soul is one and the same in everyone, Thomas says in the main response that the fact this soul is unitable to this body and that soul to that body multiplies the number of souls. And he says the same in the same question in response to the third argument; and the same in his commentary on *Sentences* 1 d.1 last question in response to the second to last argument; and the same in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.76 a.3[2] in response to the third argument, and it was rejected there [articles 30-31 above].

Article Two/Eighty Seven

That in separate beings there is only a distinction in species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In the same question, in response to argument 6, Thomas says that in things that are in their being separate from matter there can only be a distinction in species.
2. This from Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This is expressly against what the faith says of the sacrament of the altar, about which we faithfully hold that there is quantity, whiteness, flavor, and figure there separate from all matter, and yet these accidents differ numerically from similar accidents on another altar.

Article Three/Eighty Eight

That angels differ in species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.7 Thomas asks whether angel and soul differ in species, and in the main response he maintains that angels differ in species not only from the soul but also from each other. And in the response to argument 5 he says that the act of understanding of diverse angels is not of the same species. And he indicates for this the following reason, that, setting aside the fact that angels are not forms of bodies as souls are, if angels are not composed of matter and form, then the difference between angels and the soul or each other is a formal one. But a formal difference varies the species, for form is what gives the species. And thus the upshot is that angels differ in species not only from souls but also from each other. But if someone posits that angels are composed of matter and form, and likewise the soul, this can still not stand. For if there is matter both in angels and in the soul, this matter must of itself be one, just as there is of itself one matter for all bodies, though diversified by form; and if matter is of itself one, the division of this common matter will have to be the principle for the distinction of angels from each other and from the soul. But this diversity of matter before the reception of form, which is multiplied according to the division of matter, cannot be understood to take place apart from

quantitative dimensions. Now if such [quantitative] diversity preexisted in the matter of soul and angel, the result is that soul and angel would be composed of corporeal matter, which no one says. But if their matter is not a single common matter but one of diverse orders, this cannot be posited save according to order to diverse forms. But such diversity of order demands forms of diverse species. Therefore angels would still differ in species from the soul and from each other.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. We concede that soul and angels differ in species; but we deny that all angels differ in species from each other. Hence Damascene in his *Logic* ch.30[11], about substance and nature etc., says, ‘The more excellent philosophers called natures the most specific species, as angel, man, horse, ass, and the like, as being more universal and constitutive of individual hypostases.’ And later, ‘The holy Fathers, dismissing many contentious quibblings, called that which was indeed common and asserted of many, that is, the most specific species, nature and substance, as angel, man, horse, and dog.’ Behold how, on the evidence of Damascene, an angel is, according to both philosophers and the holy Fathers, a most specific species. And later, ch.43[19], he says of the person of Gabriel, ‘When one of the angels, being present there by himself alone, was holding discourse with the holy Mother of God, he discoursed in separation from his consubstantial angels by the fact of his presence and discourse in that place.’

To the Argument

4. To the argument one can say that there is not one common matter for spiritual and corporeal things. For the matter of corporeal things is said to be one and common according to the primary signification of common, which is that the common is said to be what is divided into parts; and in this way the whole is common but its parts are of singulars and individuals as constructed points, the way Boethius says when he distinguishes the four senses of ‘common’ at the beginning of his commentary on the *Categories*. And in this way corporeal matter is said to be common because corporeal and singular things are made from different parts of it, so that none of them is at all made of the whole of it. And this is quantitative division, as an intelligible species by which many individuals of one species in corporeal things can come to be. But we do not posit this sort of commonness and diversity in the matter of spiritual things, but we posit that an individual in spiritual things is caused at once, namely both as to matter and as to form, and the whole of the matter is comprehended within each one; and for this reason there can be many in one and the same species although the matter is not divisible as to quantitative dimensions, which is a whole that is multiple in number. So when the Philosopher says, in *On the Heavens* 1.8 text 76, 9 text 98, that there cannot be several worlds because a world consists of all its matter, his statement is intelligible according to the false opinion he had of matter, namely that matter is ingenerable and incorruptible; on this supposition many worlds are impossible, just as to be sure, if he had believed, as is true, that the corporeal matter of the whole world was created and that God could, in the same way, have created a second and third matter, he would never have denied the

positing of several worlds although this world would occupy all the matter first created, because many matters could be daily created similar to it. I speak in the same way of spiritual things. Hence I say that in them the multiplication of individuals is not by the fact that one has a part of spiritual matter divided off from another, for since spiritual matter is not a quantum, it is not divisible into quantitative parts but each has the whole of its matter within itself, being prior not in time but in origin. Hence Augustine in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 5.21 sets down this example, 'Let us imagine that an infinite number of lines is drawn from the center of a circle. It is clear that each of them is drawn from the center to the circumference and that the center is one and the same point, being the term for all the lines; however all the lines are divided from each other at that point as before, and the point is what it was before; and this could not previously be the case unless one and the same point had become many points. And nevertheless it is not proper to say that the terminating point, while it contains all the lines, would be divisible into dimensional or quantitative parts, but the parts are divisible by relation and order to diverse forms but are one indivisible in matter, and in this way they are many indivisibles in potency.' Hence to the form of Thomas' argument: when he says that in order for the matter of spiritual things to be the cause of multiplication of supposits in one form it must have diversity in quantitative parts for diverse forms, we reply by denying that it is so either in this way or in that; but it suffices that the same totality can be multiplied in number and is many in potency.

Article Four/Eighty Nine

That the heavens according to the philosophers are ensouled

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.8 Thomas asks whether the rational soul should be united to this sort of body, and in the response to argument 3 he supports the view that some intellectual substance is the perfection of a celestial body as its form, which does indeed have an intellectual power though not a sensitive one, as can be collected and taken from the words of Aristotle. And in the response to argument 4 he says that, although by their nature all intellectual substances could sin, yet, by divine election and predestination through the aid of grace, several were preserved from sinning, among whom one could place the souls of the celestial bodies.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. He seems to have been led to this position by the sort of reason that was stated by the respondent: although the human body is made of the elements, yet from the fact that it is reduced to an equality in composition it has a likeness with the heavens, which are altogether removed from contraries, and hence they are of such nobility that the rational soul could agreeably be united to them. And this matter seems to be openly touched on by Avicenna, *Natural Philosophy* 6 p.8 a.5, that the composition of body that more reaches the mean, because its composition is more complete, is more suited to receive

increase in perfection of life; but since it is so adapted that the contraries are equalized in it and operate equally, it will be adapted for perfection of rational life or celestial life. Now this aptitude exists in the human spirit. And Avicenna says the same in the last part of the last chapter. From this the following argument is formed: if the nobility of the human body consists in the fact that it is neighbor to and like the celestial body, it seems that the celestial body is nobler. And for this reason, since perfection should be proportioned to perfectible, the celestial body should have a nobler perfection than the rational soul is.

4. In truth, the opinion of the Philosopher does seem to be that the celestial bodies are ensouled, as is plain from *On the Heavens* 2.2-3, and Avicenna and all Peripatetics say the same thing. And Augustine on this matter, *Enchiridion* ch.58, seems to be in doubt, 'I am not certain,' he says, 'whether sun and moon and all the stars belong to the company of the angels, though this seems doubtful to some; however one should truly hold that the body of the heavens is not ensouled.' Hence Damascene 2.6 says, 'Reckon that none of the heavens or luminaries are ensouled; for they are inanimate and insensible; heaven, earth, stone do not have life, though they are life in God.' A sign of this seems to be that blessed Dionysius, a man wholly divine and taught by the apostles (in particular by Paul who was caught up to the third heaven), when he delivers his doctrine about the whole disposition of the ecclesiastical, angelic, and celestial hierarchy, never delivers a doctrine about the disposition of a hierarchy of the stars; but if the stars were ensouled they would certainly be hierarchies, and if they were hierarchies Dionysius would never have jumped from the angelic to the ecclesiastical hierarchy without touching on the hierarchy of the stars; nor let anyone be moved by the fact that Dionysius speaks of a celestial hierarchy, because without doubt he calls the angelic hierarchy celestial.

5. Again if the heavens were ensouled it is clear that, just as their bodies are nobler than ours, so would their souls be proportionally nobler than the human soul, and so the heavens would be nobler than men; and thus, since the nobler is not for the sake of ignobler, the created celestial bodies would not be for the sake of men, the opposite of which is written in *Deuteronomy* 4.10, 'Do not, he says, look with raised eyes on sun and moon and all the stars of heaven and, being deceived by error, adore them and worship what God has created for the service of all the peoples under heaven.'

To the Argument

6. To the argument it can be said that the higher bodies are nobler than the bodies of animals in a certain respect, in that the former are incorruptible and the latter corruptible; but simply, to the converse, everything animate is nobler in order of nature than everything inanimate, and all ensoulable bodies, so to say, are nobler than all unensoulable ones. And as to what is said about being removed from contraries [n.3], or being by nature like the fifth essence, or that by approach to tempered and equalized complexion the body is adapted for receiving a more perfect form, it does not seem true simply speaking. We have a sign of this in the parts of the body; for it is clear that heart and spirits are more suited for receiving perfection from the soul than flesh or skin; and yet flesh and skin approach to temperament more than heart and spirits do, as Avicenna says in his *Canon* 1.3 about the composition of the bodily members, when he asserts, 'What is warmer in the body is the heart and the spirits that proceed from it.' And in the

preceding chapter he says in these words, ‘It is manifest that the principal bodily members are rightly not very near to equality, but rather flesh among the members is nearer to equality than the other members are, though skin is nearer than flesh.’

Article Five/Ninety

That the soul is united to corporeal matter without any intermediary

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. In question 9, whether the rational soul is united to the material body by some intermediary, Thomas says in the main response that numerically the same form is that by which the thing has the fact that it is in the last most specific species and is in all the intermediate genera. And later he says that there is no form intermediate between the soul and prime matter, but man has to be perfected by the soul as to diverse degrees of perfection so as to be a body and animate and rational. And later he says that therefore in this way the soul, according as it is the form that gives being, does not have any intermediary between itself and prime matter. He says the like in the response to argument 5. And later, in question 11 in the main response, he says that no substantial form is united to matter by the intermediary of any other substantial form.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position has been deservedly condemned by the masters as erroneous; first because, if there is only one substantial form in man, then it follows that in the sacrament of the altar the bread is converted only into prime matter or at the same time into the rational soul, and both of these are against the faith; second because it follows that the body of Christ when dead for three days would not have been the same, which is erroneous; also indeed, since body would not have existed with prime matter, which (as is clear) is not body, it will not be predicated of the dead body of Christ. Further, because blood and water flowed out, which do not flow out in prime matter, there was then in that body some other substantial form beside the rational soul. Further, according to this there would not be nor could there be original sin in us, for if there is no intermediary between the rational soul and prime matter and our soul does not have original sin either of itself or from its maker or from prime matter, then it is clear that since it has no act nor anything that could in any way infect it, the result is that it did not contract original sin.

4. Further, his statement that no substantial form is united to matter by any other substantial form, but every substantial form is united immediately to prime matter, is against the Commentator as it seems, who on *Physics* 2, at the phrase which begins ‘and sometimes they have one mode,’ says, ‘Prime matter, according as it is called nature, is subject to all forms, since it is not composed of matter and form.’ Again, he says something similar to this on *Metaphysics* 12[11].1 text 1 at the phrase ‘that is, one must doubt,’ when he asserts, ‘Any being has its own matter along with common matter.’

Brother Thomas’ Opinion *bis*

5. In question 11, whether the rational, sensible, and vegetable soul are one substance in man, he says in the main response, ‘The upshot, then, is that there is in man only one soul as to substance, which soul is rational and vegetable and sensible; and this follows from what we showed in the preceding about the order of substantial forms, because no form is united to matter by the intermediary of any other substantial form, but the more perfect form gives to the matter whatever the more imperfect form gives and gives yet more. Hence the rational soul gives the human body what the sensible soul gives to brutes and the vegetable soul to plants.’

6. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion *bis*

7. This position, to the extent it denies degrees of forms, was rejected above [n.3]. [Alt.: This position, as to its denying degrees of forms in man and in any composite, has been condemned by the masters (as was touched on in the preceding article [n.3]), and this is sufficient.] However, because Thomas tries to fortify the aforesaid opinion with reasons, one must try to dissolve them.

To the Arguments

8. He says, then, in the main response of the same question just above, that if man is said to be an animal and an animal to be a body and a body a substance, then man will be a per accidens substance if this whole is not one but many, provided indeed man is said to be all of them. And later, that something else unacceptable follows: a single thing does not come to be from many things actually existing unless there is some one thing uniting them and binding them in some way to each other. If then Socrates is man and animal according to diverse forms, these two, in order to be united simply, would need something to make them one. Hence since no such thing can be assigned, the upshot is that man will only be one by aggregation as a heap is, which is one in a certain respect and many simply. And again something else unacceptable follows, that the rational soul is an accidental form. Thomas explains this as follows: since genus is an essential predicate, it is necessary that the form by which an individual receives predication of the genus be the substantial form; and so it is necessary that the sensible form by which Socrates is said to be an animal be substantial in him, and so it is necessary that it give the body existence simply and make it to be a ‘this something’. If the rational soul, therefore, is different in substance, it does not make the body to be a ‘this something’ nor to be simply, but to be in a certain respect, since it comes to it as already subsisting. Hence it will not be a substantial form but an accidental form, and thus will not give specific existence. These unacceptable results or arguments confirm Thomas’ position about the unity of substantial form in a composite.

9. To the first opposing argument one must say that it is true in the case of forms that do not have an essential ordering to each other, as are white and musical and the like; but in the case of forms having an essential ordering to each other as to more and less perfect the argument fails both of accidental and of substantial forms. For if snow or Socrates is white and is colored, it is, with essential predication, white colored; likewise

in substantial things: Socrates is a man and a man is an animal, therefore Socrates is an animal.

10. To the second one must say that the statement that a one does not come to be from several actually existing things is true when the act is so complete that it is not in potency to further perfection. But in substantial forms ordered to each other, the more general forms, although they are actual and complete, yet are imperfect and in potency to further completion by less universal forms up to the most specific form.

11. And when Thomas adds that if Socrates is man and is animal according to diverse forms these forms would need something to make them one etc., one must say that one of these forms, namely the prior one, is in potency and as it were material with respect to the later and posterior form – material I say, not in itself, but because it disposes the matter and adapts it in respect of the posterior form. And therefore, just as form and matter are united without an intermediary uniting them, as the Philosopher says at the end of *Metaphysics* 8[4].6, so neither do the forms need any intermediary uniting them.

12. To the third unacceptable result, namely that the rational soul would be an accidental form etc., one must say that not every substantial form coming to something gives it ultimate and complete existence in its most specific species; and this can be expressly argued from what the Philosopher says *Generation of Animals* 2.3 [*On Animals* bk. 6], namely that an embryo is not simultaneously animal and horse, otherwise the form by which it is a horse, since animal is prior in time, would be an accidental form, which is clearly false.

Article Six/Ninety One

That the soul is not a composite of matter and form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.14 Thomas asks about the immortality of the soul, and in the main response he speaks as follows, 'It is manifest that the principle (namely the soul, of which he is speaking) is not composed of matter and form, because species are received in it immaterially.' This he makes clear from the fact that the intellect is of universals that are abstracted from matter and from the conditions of matter. Again, when he asks whether the rational soul is created in the body or outside the body, he says in the main response that the soul is not composed of matter and form.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position seems contrary to the faith. For what has no matter seems not to be susceptible of change; therefore if the soul does not have matter it is not changed from vices to virtues or conversely, nor from grace to glory, nor from sadness to joy, nor from the waters of snow to extreme heat, *Job* 34.19. Hence Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7.6[4] says, 'If the soul were something immutable etc.' (and it is above in the first part, when the question is raised whether the soul is composed of matter and form [article 10]). And again in 7.27, when speaking of the matter of the soul, Augustine says,

‘What would precede its formation, not in time but in origin, if the soul is not believed to have been fittingly made of spiritual matter?’ Again in 5.5[4] Augustine expressly speaks of corporeal matter and spiritual matter, for he says, ‘Not in temporal but in causal order was first made unformed matter and the formal matter, both corporeal and spiritual, from which would come to be what was to be made.’ So Augustine. But it is clear that corporeal things are not made from spiritual matter; therefore spiritual things are. Hence this position of Thomas seems to favor the sixth condemned error, about the angels, which is that in abstract substances no change is possible and they are not in potency to anything, because they are eternal and free of matter.

4. Besides, if the soul did not have matter and were form only, it would suffer nothing, as the Philosopher says *On Generation* 1.7 text 55, that it belongs to matter to suffer, and that the same matter, as it is matter, is a passive thing.

5. Further, if the soul is form without matter it would be subject of no accidents, and so would receive neither vice nor virtue nor punishment nor blessedness, although Boethius says *On the Trinity* 1.2[13], ‘Neither can God be a subject etc.: for a form without matter cannot be a subject.’

6. This is also plain from reason as follows: In the case of all things that act according to order, a second agent only acts in virtue of a first agent, which also has more influence on the thing caused than the second agent does, as is said in *On Causes*. Therefore similarly, in things that are acted on nothing will be acted on save by reason of a first passive element. But just as form is the first principle or the first reason of acting, for everything that acts acts through its form, so the first principle or first reason of being acted on is matter. Therefore just as that which lacks all form does not act, so the soul, if it lacks all matter, will not be acted on.

To the Argument

7. To the argument for the position it can be said that the following inference does not hold: the species is received in the intellect immaterially, therefore the intellect is immaterial. There is a manifest instance against this in the case of the senses and imagination; for the senses are susceptible of species without matter and yet they are not immaterial but are clearly powers in matter; for the eye is pupil and also sight, as the Philosopher says *On the Soul* 2.1. Besides, if it is necessary for intellect and soul to be assimilated to the conditions of the thing that they receive, then, when they receive things abstracted from the here and now and from all difference of place and time, they will not be at any place or at any time; but this is impossible. The upshot then is that the inference is not valid.

8. Again, in another way it is shown that the reason for the position is not cogent. For a thing abstract from matter and from the conditions of matter can be understood in two ways, namely either because that which is understood is in its nature separate from matter or because it is considered without matter and the conditions of matter. The first is false, for the object of the intellect is the what or the quiddity, as is found in *On the Soul* 3.7 and *Metaphysics* 4 and from Avicenna when he adds that the quiddity of a thing that is understood is not matter or form but the composite embracing matter and form. The second is not simply true either, for although the intellect abstracts from dimensional corporeal matter it does not abstract from all matter.

9. Further, it is not unacceptable that the universal abstracted from corporeal matter be in an intellect having spiritual and intelligible matter. For, it is as Avicenna says, *Metaphysics* 5, when he speaks of the universal form that is universal with respect to individuals but with respect to the soul on which it is impressed it is individual and singular. Since therefore the singular is not repugnant to matter, and the universal as it is in the soul is an individual and singular form, as Avicenna already said, there is nothing unacceptable about the intellect having matter on the ground it receives the universal.

Article Seven/Ninety Two

That the higher spiritual substances understand through fewer species

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.15, whether the separated soul can understand, Thomas speaks thus in the main response, 'The higher each spiritual substance is the fewer forms it has and the more powerful virtue it has for understanding everything through few forms.' He speaks similarly to this in response to q.20, which is whether the separated soul knows singulars, and the same in response to argument 5. And in q.67 [8.14], which is whether angels understand many things, and in the main response, he says, 'Any angel understands many things by the same form, at least all the singulars in one species; but higher angels can understand more in one species than lower angels, because they can perfectly and distinctly understand more things through few forms.' He says the like in many places in the first part of the *Summa* both about angels and about souls.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems false. For if this were possible then, since it is a mark of nobility, it should most of all belong to God, the contrary of which is asserted by Augustine in his letter to Nebridius, 'In your most recent letter to me etc. As to what concerns the making of man, there is in God only the idea of man, not an idea of you or of me; but as to the cycle of time various ideas of men live in the Holy Trinity.' See that Augustine posits in God, besides universal forms, the ideas or forms of singulars.

4. Further, let us grant that there is some number of forms by which the highest created intelligence understands all intelligibles or knowables, for example a hundred forms. It is clear that God can create innumerable intelligences and intelligences superior to that one in progressive degrees. Therefore if the next degree of nobility decreases the number of forms by which the intelligence understands, it will be possible to come to some intelligence that will understand more things, indeed all the things it does understand, through one form, and the other intelligences that are higher will understand without any form, which is unacceptable; for then they would surpass the nobility of the divine understanding, as it seems; or they will understand through one form and then the lower degrees will be equal in this respect to the higher ones, which is unacceptable even according to Thomas' own position.

Article Eight/Ninety Three

That a soul in the wayfarer state cannot understand without phantasms

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.15 Thomas asks whether the separated soul can understand, and in the response to the two last arguments he speaks thus, 'Knowledge in our soul is caused by phantasms when it is in the state of being united to the body, in which state knowledge cannot be caused by superior agents alone.' And immediately in the following response he says that, just because knowledge of separate substances is not proportioned to the soul, it does not follow that the soul can get no understanding through their influence, but only that it cannot get a perfect and distinct knowledge, as was said.

2. These are the words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The first point seems erroneous, because it seems to derogate from the divine power, as if God could not give prophetic or even universal knowledge to anyone save about things the phantasms or species of which are received through the senses, which is clearly false. Indeed, God could give to someone blind from birth a knowledge of colors and other visible intentions; for it is clear that God can do much more through himself than nature can do through its own ministry.

4. The second point also seems false, because the prophets, in the revelations made to them, received foreknowledge of future things and knowledge of hidden things either immediately from God or by the mediation of angels, and this whether in dreams or awake.

5. Also the reason that he takes from the disproportion of the knowledge is not cogent, because an agent that acts deliberately does not act in proportion to its natural disposition as a natural agent does, but according to the good pleasure of its choice. For a giant who, by the excellence of his power, could restrain a bull or a war horse so that it not escape can, if he wishes, hold a ram so loosely that it does escape. The example is from Anselm *On Original Sin*. But it is clear that God and angels, when infusing knowledge, act deliberately; and therefore the argument is not valid.

Article Nine/Ninety Four

That the soul's knowledge is, as to some things, confused and universal

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.18, about whether the separated soul knows all natural things, Thomas says in reply to the second argument that in the case of those who have acquired knowledge of some sensible natural things in this life will have a determinate knowledge in particular of what they have acquired here, but a confused and universal knowledge of other things.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If his meaning is about all natural actions, it is false and seems erroneous. For it is clear that the souls of the blessed will know in the Word some natural things the knowledge of which they did not acquire here. But the knowledge of things in the Word is more perfect and more certain, and consequently not confused but particular and complete, even more so than evening knowledge and than any knowledge acquired here through sense experience or teaching.

4. Further, [he says that] then those devoted to study and knowledge would have a more perfect knowledge in the fatherland than those devoted to charity and piety; which seems false because charity and piety will be more rewarded than knowledge and application to knowledge.

Article Ten/Ninety Five

That our intellect does not know material singulars first

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.20, about whether the separated soul knows singulars, Thomas says in response to the first argument that our intellect knows through species that are taken from things and that are abstracted from matter and all conditions of matter, and so it cannot know singulars, whose principle is matter. And in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.56 a.1 in response to the second argument he says that we do not have understanding of the singulars that are in material things, not by reason of singularity but by reason of matter, which is the principle of individuation in them.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems erroneous and contrary to the Gospel where in *John* 17.3 it is said, 'This is eternal life, that they may see the only true God and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.' It is clear that Christ is an individual and a singular thing, which it is clear the blessed soul sees; not by the sense of sight but by the intellect, or it would not be blessed; but it is blessed; therefore it understands Christ.

4. In addition, one soul knows another one, and yet each is a singular. Further it is clear that particular and singular sins can exist in the superior part of reason, which sense does not apprehend. If therefore man does not apprehend them through the intellect he will not repent; for man does not repent save of that which he understands and knows to be bad.

5. Further, this position is against the philosophers and against good morals, for if even the separated intellect does not know or understand singulars, the result is that it cannot deliberate about doable things, nor can it find right reason about political actions, since every action is singular and also concerns singulars. Further, how could the intellect abstract from singulars an intelligible form, even one knowable to it, if it did not know

singulars? Nor could it take up a singular term for composing a proposition, nor could it judge the truth or signification of a proposition in which there is a singular term; nor could it distinguish universal and singular if it did not know both. Hence it is clear that the intellect knows universal and singular, as the Commentator says *On the Soul* 3, but in different ways, because it knows the universal per se and not by the senses (though by the ministry of the senses), but it knows the singular by means of the senses; that is to say that the intellect and the senses know the singular but only the intellect knows the universal.

6. In q.20, about whether the separated soul knows singulars, Thomas says in the response to the third argument that separated souls are not prevented from knowing what is happening here by distance of place.

7. This is plainly against Augustine, *On Care of the Dead* ch.15, where he says that the dead do not know what is done here but learn from those who pass to them from here what they are allowed to tell them and what these others must hear. Similarly the dead sometimes learn from the angels by divine revelation, just as many things were also revealed to living prophets; and sometimes some of the dead are sent to the living to learn things, just as Paul contrariwise was taken in rapture alive into paradise, where he learnt hidden words. From these statements of Augustine is gathered that nearness and distance in place does affect the knowledge of separated souls, otherwise there will be no necessity for some to pass from here to them or be sent from them to those here, and thus also to learn from the one from the other.

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Virtues*

Article One/Ninety Six

That the words, 'Take nothing on the way,' do not relate to perfection

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.24, about whether all are bound to perfect charity, Thomas says in response to argument 7, that one must note that the words of the Lord to his disciples, 'Take nothing on the way etc.,' according to Augustine's exposition in *Consensus of the Evangelists*, do not relate to perfection of life but to the power of the apostolic dignity, whereby the Apostles, taking nothing with them, were able to live on what was ministered to them by those they preached to, because, as is said in the same place, the laborer is worthy of his hire or of his food. Hence it was neither a precept nor a counsel but a concession. And for this reason Paul, who took necessaries with him using this concession, acted by supererogation as if campaigning at his own expense.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. These words, if well attended to, contain falsehood as well as derogate from apostolic perfection. For there are four things said in these words of brother Thomas: one is that the above cited words of the Savior (from 'Take no...' up to 'of his hire...') do not relate to perfection of life; the second is that they relate to apostolic dignity; the third is that these things are taken from Augustine's exposition in *Consensus of the Evangelists*; the fourth is that the whole of 'Do not have gold etc.' up to 'of his hire' is not said about the counsels, as is plain if one considers his words, 'The whole is not a precept nor a counsel but a concession.'

4. The first thing he says, that the cited words of the Savior, 'Take no etc.,' do not relate to perfection of life, is false and against the saints. For Chrysostom in homily 32[33] on *Matthew* 10.10 says, 'Perhaps someone might say that they had another reason not to have a purse on the way or two tunics or a staff or shoes, and this other reason was why he enjoined on them etc.:' and after a few words interposed he replies, 'For he was going to send them as teachers of the world, and choosing them on this account from among men he established for this twofold reason that they were to be released from all concern for this life, so that they would be occupied with this one thing that was teaching; and rather for this latter reason too the Lord released them when he said, 'Think not how or what you are to say' [*Matthew* 10.19]. For nothing so gives joy as to be snatched away from care and worry, and especially since it is possible for someone snatched away therefrom to dwell before all else on the presence of God and on his service.' Again Ambrose *On Luke* 7[6] at the verse, 'Carry no sack etc.' [*Luke* 10.4] says, 'When the Apostle Peter was asked by the pauper to bestow some little money on him, he said, "Silver and gold have I none." Peter gloried that he had no silver. Therefore poverty is glorious, because poverty is also blessed, as it is written, "Blessed are the poor in spirit" [*Matthew* 5.3].' From these authorities of Chrysostom and Ambrose it is plain that the renunciation of the aforesaid things likens one to the angels and gives joy above all in

God, and that it relates to blessed and glorious poverty; and if so, plainly it relates to perfection of life.

5. It shows further that the power of apostolic dignity in receiving necessities from the Gospel is not prejudicial to poverty and the perfection of life that consists in poverty. And the argument for this goes as follows: When Christ appointed the Apostles to live from the Gospel, it is clear that he did not appoint them to take necessities from believers by extorting it through contention and violence, but to request and beg. But lordship and power over a thing that cannot be had save by asking and begging differs not at all from poverty, just as an heir, as long as he is a child, does not differ from a servant, although he is lord of all [*Galatians* 4.1]. Therefore the power of apostolic dignity departs in no way from the perfection of life that is poverty. Therefore the perfection of life that is in poverty and the power of apostolic dignity are very well compatible with each other.

6. As to the second thing Thomas says, that the cited words of the Savior pertain to the dignity of apostolic power, one must note that the Savior says two things: one by command, namely not to possess silver or gold or copper etc., the other by indication, namely that necessities should be administered to them by others when he says, 'For the laborer is worthy of his hire,' as if he were saying, 'You are worthy to receive these necessities from those you preach to.' As to the second, it is plain that it relates to the dignity of apostolic power; but this does not seem true of the first. For who would say that it is for anyone a mark of power and dignity not to carry gold or silver or copper (namely not to carry the price of victuals) or purse (namely victuals) or two sets of clothes or shoes? Not these, to be sure, but their opposites are marks of power and dignity.

7. Further, how were the Apostles granted things for power and dignity that anyone who wants can have and whenever he wants? Certainly if these things were in any way and at any time marks of power and dignity, it is clear that this would only be so in him who can, by authority and power, claim back and take from others even what he is owed, as would be if a lordly king were to pass without silver and gold through the city and the dwelling places of his kingdom. But such a power of claiming and taking what is owed was not licit for the Apostles. Therefore the aforesaid renunciation cannot be said to relate to the dignity of apostolic power, but to perfection of life as this consists in poverty.

8. The third thing Thomas says, that the cited words of the Savior, 'Take no etc.' to 'of his hire,' are expounded by Augustine as not relating to perfection of life but to dignity, can be understood in two ways. If Thomas' meaning is that one does not get from Augustine's exposition that the cited words relate to perfection of life, he says the truth, because Augustine and other saints do not always expound Scripture in all the ways in which it can appropriately be expounded. But if Thomas' meaning is that one can get from Augustine's exposition that the cited words of Christ do not relate to perfection of life, he thus says what is false, as is plain to anyone who considers Augustine's words, which are, 'When, according to *Matthew*, Christ said to them, that is, the Apostles, "Take no gold etc.' he at once adds, The laborer is worthy of his hire or his food. Hence it is sufficiently plain why Christ did not want the Apostles to have or to carry these things – not because they were not necessary for sustaining this life but because he was so sending the Apostles that he was showing these things to be supplied for them from the believers to whom they announced the Gospel.' Thus Augustine. In these words Augustine does not deny that renunciation of the said necessities relates to perfection of life, though he indicates that these necessities should be ministered to them by believers. Therefore the

Savior, in the cited words, took necessities from them and declared a necessity for them; and so, to prevent them fearing penury and shame, he showed them that necessities should be ministered by their hearers. Hence Ambrose [in fact Chrysostom] says in homily 33 on *Matthew*, ‘And lest the Apostles should say, “you bid us live begging and shamefully,” Christ shows by this that this is a debt, calling them laborers, and naming as hire that which is given.’

9. As to what Thomas infers fourth, that the whole of ‘Take no gold etc.’ is not a precept or a counsel but a concession and permission, this seems in truth to be against the Gospel and against the saints. In *Matthew* 10.5ff. is written, ‘Jesus sent these twelve, commanding them and saying, “Go not in the way of the Gentiles etc.”,’ and a little later he adds the cited words, namely, ‘Take no gold etc.’ In *Mark* 6.8 he commands more expressly that they are not to take anything on the way save a staff only, not a purse or bread or copper in their belt but shod with sandals and not to wear two cloaks. And Ambrose on *Luke* 5, on the verse ‘Do not carry etc.,’ says, ‘Matthew writes that the Lord said to the disciples, “Take no gold etc.,” if we are forbidden to possess gold what are we forbidden to snatch away, what to carry off? If you are commanded to give what you have, how do you take by force what you do not have?’ And later, ‘Peter does not so much glory that he does not have gold and silver as that he keeps the Lord’s command, “Do not possess etc.”’ Again on the words of *Acts* 3.6, ‘Gold and silver have I none,’ he says, ‘Mindful of the precept: Possess no gold etc., the money laid at the feet of the Apostles was reserved not for them but for the use of the poor.’ Again Gregory homily 17 on the Gospel says, ‘He who forbade purse and bag, conceded expenses and food in the same preaching, for there follows, “Remain in the same house eating and drinking what they have.”’ From these words it is plain that part of the cited authority is given by way of command and prohibition; for the end, or what is understood in the end, namely the taking of necessities from the hearers, is said by way of concession. Hence on the verse of *1 Corinthians* 9.4, ‘Do we not have power to eat and drink?’ the Gloss says, ‘The Lord permitted but did not command the Apostles to receive necessities from subordinates, so that whoever wanted might use what by divine institution was licit for him; but if someone did not wish to use it, he would not be acting against a command but ceding his right.’

On Thomas' *Disputed Questions on Power*

Article One/Ninety Seven

That matter properly speaking does not have an idea in God

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.14 Thomas asks whether God can create something from nothing, and in response to argument 13 he says that matter properly speaking does not have an idea; and in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.15 a.3 in the main response and to the third argument he says that matter has an idea in God but not other than the idea of the composite, for in itself it neither has being nor is knowable.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Response

3. This is false because, since matter properly speaking has a different essence from the essence of the form and the composite, matter must have in God an idea corresponding to its essence, or there will be a positing of some principle other than God from which matter will have its idea, and this principle will be efficient cause of matter, or there will be a positing that matter has eternal being caused not by God but by some principle, both of which are erroneous. This view was rejected in other ways and more diffusely above in article 3.

Article Two/Ninety Eight

That the vegetative, sensitive, and rational soul are one substance in man

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.22 Thomas asks whether the rational soul is drawn into being by creation, and in response to argument 9 he says, speaking of the generation of man, as follows, 'By the formative power, which is from the beginning in the seed, first after the casting off of the form of sperm etc.; at length, after all forms are cast off, a soul is introduced by the creator that is at once rational, sensible, and vegetative.'

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This view comes back to the unity of form in man, which was rejected in q.247, in the questions on truth.

Article Three/Ninety Nine

That God produces things in being by no other operation than that by which he conserves them

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.35, about whether things are conserved in being by God, Thomas says in the response to argument 2 that God produces things in being by no other operation than that by which he conserves them.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. Against this is that creation neither is nor can be done by the cooperation of anything else; but conservation in being is done, in the case of many things, through the cooperation of grace and art and nature and such like. Therefore creation and conservation are not the same.

4. Further, the operation whereby God produces things in being and conserves them in being can be understood in two ways. Either, first, as work working, that is, the will whereby God produces things in being from nothing and the will whereby he conserves in being the things thus produced; and taken in this way the former operation must be said to be other in notion than the latter but not in reality, because the will whereby God wills a thing to be produced in being is different in notion from the will by which he wills the produced thing to be conserved in being; for unless a diversity of wills, as also of ideas, can be posited in notion, not in reality, it could be said that God wills by the same will that the sun rise and that Lucifer be damned and that Peter be saved, which does not seem to be the case. Next, second, the operation whereby God produces things in being and the operation whereby he conserves things in being can be understood as work worked, namely the beginning of being and the continuation of being, or a thing first beginning to be and a thing persisting in being; and thus too the operation of production and the operation of conservation are not altogether the same. For *Genesis* 2.2 says, 'On the seventh day God rested from all the work that he had made.' And *John* 5.17 says, 'My Father still now works and I work;' for God has rested from the production of the things produced and still now works the conservation of them; for otherwise they would tend to nothing, according to Gregory. So God produces things in being by one operation and conserves them in being by another operation. Again, Augustine on *Genesis* 1 says that the work of founding is other than the work of conserving; but founding and producing are the same thing; therefore etc.

Article Four/One Hundred

That separate substances are not composed of matter and form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.42, about whether action and passion in the elements stops when the motion of the heavens stops, he says in the main response that separate substances are more perfect in acting than the heavenly bodies are, because they are not composed of matter and form.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This last point is false, namely that separate substances are not composed of matter and form, as was shown above on the first part of the *Summa Theologica*.

4. For everything that acts and is acted on is composed of matter and form; for action is by form and being acted on is by matter, as is said in *On Generation and Corruption* 1.7; but separate substances act and are acted on. Again the Commentator says on *Metaphysics* 7 that the composite is everything that potency is admixed with. Again on *Physics* 8, on the phrase 'But now we wish to prove,' he says that the proposition is convertible, namely that what is simple lacks potency and that what lacks potency is simple; for potency is the cause of any composition from two substances, and so not only of composition from potency and act as some are wont to say.

On Thomas' *Quodlibetal Questions*

Article One/One Hundred and One *That an angel is in place by application of power*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.4 in the first *Quodlibet*, about whether an angel depends on corporeal place, Thomas says that an angel is in place by contact of power, that is, by operation. And in the first part of the *Summa Theologica* q.52 a.1, in the main response, he says that an angel is in corporeal place by application of angelic power to some place in some way or other; hence it is not necessary that an angel be in place as contained but as in some way containing. And in the same question a.3, in the main response, he says that an angel is said to be in place because his power is in immediate contact with a place by way of perfect container.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If Thomas is there understanding that angels are not otherwise in place than as his words here and elsewhere seem to claim, then it is multiply erroneous and against the Gospel, *Matthew* 18.10, 'Their angels always see the face of my Father etc.' For since an angel does not touch, and does not need, a place for the operation or in the operation that is the vision of God, angels who are at leisure for the contemplation of God alone and are said to serve in his presence will not now be in place, and consequently not in the heavens either, the contrary of which is held by the faith and the Gospel. Hence Gregory *Moralia* 2.3 says, 'The spirits of angels are indeed circumscribed by place; and it follows that by being thereby in place they go out, and by being present interiorly, they never depart.'

4. Again, the said positions are contrary to one of the assertions [article 4] made by William [Tempier], bishop of Paris, in his judgment that an angel is in place as in a boundary, and that the place of angels and holy souls is the same as will be that of glorified bodies, namely the empyrean heaven.

5. Again, this position seems to favor error 24 [Tempier's article 204] about angels that was recently condemned, namely that separate substances are not anywhere save by operation, and cannot move from extreme to extreme through the middle save in that they can want to operate on the middle or extremes; it is an error if Thomas means that the substance of an angel is not in place nor passes from place to place.

Article Two/One Hundred and Two *That it is impossible for there to be several substantial forms in the same thing*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.6, about whether all the forms that were previously present, substantial and accidental, are corrupted when the rational soul comes to the body, Thomas says in the main response that it is impossible for there to be several substantial forms in one and the same thing, and this for the reason that a thing gets being and unity from the same thing. Now it is manifest that a thing has being through form; so it has unity through form as well; and therefore wherever there is a multitude of forms there is not simply one thing. Hence, when the human soul arrives, the substantial form that was first present is taken away; otherwise generation of one thing would not be corruption of another. But the accidental forms that were previously present disposing it for the soul are corrupted, not indeed per se but per accidens, upon the corruption of the subject.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position was rejected above. But as to the claim that a multitude of forms is against the nature of unity, one must say that a thing that has a multitude and a ranking of forms is a unity by the ultimate form, as the Philosopher expressly says in *Metaphysics* 8.5 text 16; and his Commentator on the phrase, 'And so it is manifest that if they are all substances,' asserts, 'We say that the one thing that one definition signifies is one by the substance that is the form, namely by the ultimate form and the ultimate difference.' Such a thing then is one simply, that is, indivisible.

4. As to what Thomas says about when the rational soul arrives etc., one must reply that the proposition of the Philosopher 'the generation of one thing is the corruption of another' [*Generation and Corruption* 1.4 text 17], is always true in the case of the generation of something simple, as when element is generated from element; but it is not always true in the case of the generation of a composite, namely when a composite is generated from simples, or one composite from another composite. Although there are in the individual elements several substantial forms (as form of substance, form of body, form of element), yet only one elementary form makes the element to exist in act; therefore elements do not exist in act save by elementary forms, which are contraries; so when one element is generated another is corrupted. But it is not thus in the case of the generation of what is mixed from simple elements; for when something mixed is generated from simple elements the elements are not corrupted (far from it), but they are altered, according to the Philosopher; therefore the generation of one is not the corruption of another in such cases.

5. It can be said in another way that the proposition is true if it is understood rightly according to the mind of the author. For the Philosopher does not say that the generation of one is the corruption of the same but the corruption of another; the point is plain, for in the generation of man from seed being is first introduced, second the vegetative soul, afterwards the sensitive soul, and finally the rational soul is infused; and all these belong to the generation of one and the same thing; and so there is no need that by the infusion of the rational soul the sensitive and vegetative soul be corrupted, because they belong to the generation of the same individual.

Article Three/One Hundred and Three
*That religious are not on occasion bound to reveal to their superior a secret
 committed to them*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.15, about whether a religious is bound to reveal a secret committed to his confidence to a superior when he commands it, Thomas says in the main response that a secret is twofold: one that verges on danger to others for whom one is bound to care, and this secret one is bound not to hide but rather to reveal; another secret is what can of itself be hidden without sin, and such a secret a religious is in no way bound to open up to his superior even when he commands, if it has been committed to his confidence. The reason is that the obligation to keep what belongs to faith and charity, which is of natural law and of the promise made in baptism, is more solemn than what is of the promise that exists in religion.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The second member of the division does not seem true, but rather an occasion for non-obedience. The first member is plain because, just as what is of itself licit is, when prohibited, no longer licit, so what can of itself be hidden without sin cannot, when the command of a superior supervenes, be hidden from the superior without sin, especially since one can, would, and should do good and not harm. The second is plain, namely that it is against the good and the duty of obedience, and is thereby an occasion for disobedience; for, according to Bernard, when a subordinate makes profession of himself totally as to body and soul, he gives and commits himself to his superior, retaining for himself nothing of himself or of his things. If therefore he receives a secret committed to his confidence such that he not reveal it to a superior who commands and desires good and not harm, then indeed the promise is illicit and to the prejudice both of the superior and of his subordinate, who should be directed by the superior, and to the prejudice of the secret itself in which he should and can be helped by his superior; and therefore he is not bound to hide it but should reveal it when commanded, notwithstanding the foolish promise, according to the saying of Isidore, 'In the case of evil promises, take back your confidence; in the case of base vows, change your decision.'

4. Besides, the fact that someone receives a secret committed to his confidence does not absolve him from the faith that he owes to his superior or the republic; therefore a subordinate owes for this reason faith to his superior, and anyone owes faith to his neighbor, and more so to the republic, because, as Tully says *Offices* 2, nothing holds the republic together more than faith; but hiding this sort of secret is to the prejudice of the republic, neighbor, and superior; one is not bound then to hide it from a superior who gives command, but to reveal it.

To the Argument

5. As to Thomas' reasoning, one should say that the obligation of faith, which is a theological virtue, is more solemn than the obligation of a promise in religion; not more solemn, however, than the obligation of faith, that is, of faithfulness, which is a moral virtue, a species of justice; for just as we are bound by natural right to observe faithfulness with our neighbor, so also to obey a superior; and, moreover, we are obliged by a solemn vow of profession or religion to obey a superior.

Article Four/One Hundred and Four

That a subordinate is not bound to reveal the hidden guilt of a brother to a superior, even when the superior commands, without an admonition first

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In q.16, about whether a subordinate is bound to reveal to a superior the hidden guilt of his brother, Thomas says in the response that, if the process is by way of simple denunciation, then a subordinate is not bound to reveal the guilt of a brother to a superior who commands it unless he sees that a previous warning has not corrected the brother; rather he would sin more if he revealed it at the command of the superior, because he is more bound to obey the precept of the Gospel than a superior; and the superior would sin much more if he induced a subordinate to pervert the order of the Gospel.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. As to this condemning to mortal sin of the one who commands and of the one who obeys, Thomas seems to err, because he is judging of an affirmative precept as of a negative one. For the verse of *Matthew* 18.15, 'If thy brother sin against thee etc.,' is not a negative precept that is always obligatory and at all times but is an affirmative precept that is always obligatory but not at all times, but only for the place and time when it is necessary, like the command, 'Honor thy father and mother etc.' Now there are six conditions under which, when they come together, someone sins if he does not rebuke a sinning brother according to the Gospel order; but when any of these conditions is lacking, there is no necessity to rebuke, but rebuke can either be given or deferred; and then, if any superior who can and wants to do good commands the guilt of a brother to be revealed to him for rebuke, a subordinate is under necessity because of the necessity of the command to reveal the fact to a superior who wants and can do good and not harm; to reveal, I say, his brother's guilt as he knows it, so that if he alone knows he alone reveals it to the superior, and if he knows it along with several others he reveals it along with those several others, or in their presence, according to Augustine's remark that guilt abides there where it arises. Now as to the six conditions, three are taken on the part of the brother sinning and three on the part of the one rebuking.

4. The first condition on the part of the sinner is that the sin be not only venial but also mortal, as is plain from the tenor of the precept in *Matthew* 18 where it is said, 'If he hears you, you have gained your brother;' and there follows, 'If he will not hear you and the Church, let him be to you as a heathen and a publican,' that as excommunicate. But it

is clear that gaining a brother presupposes that he was lost; but he is not lost save through mortal sin; further, no one ought to be excommunicated save for mortal sin. Therefore the command to rebuke is given only for mortal sin, not venial. He then who, for cause, reveals a venial sin to a superior does not act against the Gospel, nor consequently does he who obeys sin, nor he who commands.

5. The second condition is if there is hope of the sinner's emendation, not probable fear of his thereby becoming worse. Hence *Proverbs* 9.8, 'Rebuke not a mocker lest he hate you;' Gregory [Rabanus Maurus *On Proverbs*] in the Gloss says, 'You should not fear that the mocker, when rebuked, may heap insults on you, but you should take care lest, being drawn into hate, he thence become worse; and therefore sometimes you should cease from rebuke, not for your own advantage, but for love's sake.' And Augustine *City of God* 1.9, 'If someone refrains from reproving and rebuking those who act badly because he fears that they may be made worse, it seems not to be occasion of greed but counsel of love.' In this case a brother is not bound to rebuke a sinner. Because, however, a superior is bound to know the complexion of his flock, so that he can at the proper place and time apply a cure for its wounds, it is certain that in this case a subordinate is bound to obey the command of his superior.

6. The third condition is when a more opportune time for rebuke is awaited; for if a brother has a reasonable cause, he can put it off. Hence Augustine in the same place as above says, 'If someone refrains from reproving and rebuking those who act badly because he fears that they may be made worse, it seems not to be occasion of greed but counsel of love.' And in *Conflict of Vices and Virtues* 8[4], 'I will await a fit time to rebuke a sinner and to place his sins before his face.' When command, then, is given to a brother who is thus waiting, he is bound to reveal it, because a superior can frequently have a fit time when a subordinate does not; for in this way rebuke is speeded up.

7. But on the part of the rebuker three things must come together for him to have to rebuke at once. The first is knowledge of the sin, because suspicion is not enough, nor any trifling revelation by others. Hence Augustine *On the Words of the Lord* sermon 82[16], when treating of *Matthew* 18, 'If thy brother sin against thee etc.,' says, 'How has he sinned against you save when you know that he has sinned?' And later, 'I know adulterers from wives,' that is, those busy with wives. I do not say, You, adulterer, correct yourself, lest perhaps I should say what I do not know and am suspicious because I have casually heard.' For this reason is it said in *Ecclesiasticus* 11.7, 'Blame no one before you have made examination; and when you have done so, rebuke justly.'

8. The second condition is that at the time of rebuke the rebuker be mild, because if anyone rebukes in anger he provokes rather to the worse than corrects. Hence *Job* 36.18, 'Let not anger overcome thee.' On this Gregory *Moralia* 26.43 says, 'It is surely right to judge ourselves when we rebuke others, so that the mind that first observes within itself its own act composes the force of its zeal with quiet equity, lest, if we are drawn to notice vices in hot haste, we sin in rebuking a brother; in the rebuking of vices, indeed, anger should be subject to mind not in charge of it; for if mind is overcome by anger as to what it strives to correct, it oppresses rather than corrects.' Hence *James* 1.20, 'Man's anger works not the justice of God,' and *Psalms* 89.10, 'Meekness supervenes and we will be rebuked.'

9. The third is that another not have a greater obligation to rebuke. For if a subordinate sees a brother, in company with the brother's superior, sinning, the non-

sinning brother can licitly suppose that the superior would rebuke him as he ought; as is contained in *Hebrews* 12.7, ‘For what son is there whom his father rebukes not?’ because, as is said in *3 Kings* 20.39, ‘Guard your servant; for if he sin it will be your soul for his soul.’

10. I say, therefore, that whenever the three aforesaid things in a brother, or one who knows the sinner, come together with the three aforesaid things on the part of the sinning brother, then is the necessary time and place such that, if he do not rebuke, he is a transgressor of the affirmative precept, ‘If thy brother sin against thee etc.’ If any of these is absent, he is not bound to correct, as far as concerns what is affirmative in the force of the Gospel precept. For the Gospel intends the emendation of the sinner; and therefore the rebuker should be so disposed that he can attain this end; for, as Tully says *Rhetoric* 1, ‘The laws should be given interpretation from the advantage of the republic not by the written inscription of the law. For the laws should be interpreted by the reason for which they were instituted.’ And because a superior can more easily and better correct a subordinate than a brother subordinate can, the Gospel aims at rebuke by a superior. Hence it is that in these cases a brother is not then bound, by the force of the precept in *Matthew* 18, ‘If thy brother sin against thee etc.,’ to rebuke his brother; however he is bound to reveal his brother’s guilt to a superior when the superior commands, so that it may be corrected: *Matthew* 23.3, ‘Whatsoever things they say, that do;’ because, as Augustine says, whether by punishing or forgiving this one thing is argued, that the life of men may be corrected. For although, according to certain laws, he who denounces a superior’s sin, even for purpose of correction, is not heard but repulsed if he has not first given a charitable warning – which is done in favor of peace and so as not to give subordinates occasion of rising up against superiors (for they do this easily) – yet, when a superior of some religion acts, in chapter or elsewhere, in familiar fashion and on the basis of a statute of religion to correct subordinates, the order of correction stated in *Matthew* 18 does not always have to be observed, as is said in *Extravagant* ‘On Accusations, how and when the should be done etc.’ Indeed, we do not believe that this order should be in all ways observed in the case of religious. It should not therefore be said, as Thomas says, that a religious sins by obeying a prelate who commands the revealing of a brother’s sins, and that the prelate sins by commanding this; nor do they in this pervert the Gospel order but observe it, because, just as the order indeed of ruling is that the king judge of the deeds of barons and the magistrate of the deeds of citizens, yet when the magistrate sees that he cannot judge the deed of a citizen, or not as well at any rate as the king can, then, if he refrains from judging or punishing because he defers to the king, he does not pervert that order.

Article Five/One Hundred and Five *That perjury is a greater sin than murder*

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. In q.19, about whether perjury is a greater and graver sin than murder, Thomas says that it is. He confirms it by the verse of *Hebrews* 6.16, ‘The end of every controversy is an oath.’ Hence from the fact that in a cause of any kind deference is given

to an oath, it is shown that perjury ought to be held to be the greatest sin; and not undeservedly, because perjury seems to be a certain denial of the divine name.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This does not, simply speaking, seem to be true. For more sins that harm our neighbor or offend God are found in murder than in perjury. Hence if, in his own judgment, someone is under necessity to kill or to commit perjury, it seems that, according to right reason, he should rather avoid murder than perjury. Hence David, who had sworn to kill Nabal, repented, and judged murder more to be avoided than perjury; hence he blessed God and Abigail, by whose persuasion he had withdrawn himself from murder, *1 Kings 25.32-33*.

To the Arguments

4. As to the reason Thomas gives to confirm what he says, one could with equal reason conclude that perjury is a graver sin than idolatry and than the sin of sodomy, because if, in the sin of some crime, rumor is strong against someone but the fact cannot be proved, purging through oath is introduced. But this is not because perjury is graver than any sin whatever, as he supposes, but because there seems to be no other way in which to purge oneself, and because even in oaths God is invoked as witness, who is the truth that cannot deceive or be deceived.

5. But as to what he adds about perjury being a certain denial of God, one must note that it is not true, because there are many who have not only lightly but also knowingly committed perjury, who would for no reason at all, not even to avoid death, deny the name of God.

Article Six/One Hundred and Six

That he who vows all things that are in a rule sins mortally by transgressing them

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.20, about whether a monk sins mortally by eating meat, he speaks in his response as follows, 'It is necessary to consider what a religious binds himself to by a vow of religion; and if indeed he vows to keep the rule, it seems he obliges himself by his vow to every singular that is contained in the rule, and thus that he would sin mortally by acting against any one of them.' And later he says this, 'Therefore the saints who founded orders ordained, so as not to place before men snares of damnation, a mode of profession whereby a religious does not promise to keep the rule but obedience according to the rule. Blessed Benedict in fact laid down that a monk does not, to be sure, promise to keep the rule but that he promises by his profession obedience according to the rule and observance of morals, namely conversion of morals, according to the rule.'

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The first point, namely that in professing the rule a religious binds himself to everything contained in the rule so that he sins mortally by doing the contrary, was rejected by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Alexander IV, all three of whom say, when expounding the rule of blessed Francis, that the Brothers are not obligated by the rule save to what is expressed in it by way of command or prohibition; but to the evangelical counsels that are contained in it they are bound just as are other Christians, and as much the more by good and right etc. This is also plain according to the Apostle *Galatians* 5.3, 'He who is circumcised is made a debtor to the whole law etc.,' and this is plain above, against the second part of the second part of the *Summa Theologica*, in a.14, whether a religious sins mortally by transgressing what is in the rule. Also even the baptized promise to keep the Gospel, namely the commandments as necessary for salvation and the counsels as expedient and conducive to perfection. So likewise, since in the rules of the Fathers some things are given by way of precept and prohibition, some things by way of statute, some things by way of warning, those who profess the rule do not bind themselves to everything by way of precept but to some things thus and some things not thus.

4. Further, because any rule counts as law for those making the profession proper to it, then if the Fathers who instituted religions had wanted those professing the rule to be obligated equally to everything, for what purpose would they have distinguished the rule into chapters, some of which contain the substantial elements of the rule, namely poverty, continence, obedience, while others contain additions of precepts and prohibitions, others instructions about what is to be done, others warnings about what is to be avoided, others exhortations to perfection – in which manner blessed Francis distinguished his rule? What Thomas says, then, false, that those who profess a rule are obligated to every singular that is contained in the rule.

5. The second point, namely that a religious ought not to profess the rule but obedience according to the rule, is against the decretal *Extravagant* about regulars etc., as was plain above. And further, if it is enough to profess obedience according to the rule, as Thomas says, then, if the rule does not bind to continence by way of precept and if the superior does not prohibit it under obedience, a religious who has made profession in this form will, if he is not in sacred orders, be able to take a wife; which is an absurd thing to say. It is necessary, therefore, to say that to profess obedience according to the rule and observance of morals according to the rule is the same as to profess the rule, and conversely; otherwise a profession of the sort that is made by professing obedience according to the rule and observance of morals according to the rule would be contrary to right reason and canon law.

Article Seven/One Hundred and Seven

That the body of Christ during the three day triduum was in some respect not the same as it was before

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.23 [11.1], about whether Christ during the three day triduum was numerically the same man, Thomas says in the main response that it cannot be said that the body of Christ was simply the same in number, because any substantial difference excludes simple sameness; but being animated is a substantial difference, and therefore to die is to be corrupted. Nor again can it be said that it was simply not the same but other, because not as to this whole substance is it not the same or other; therefore it must be said that it is in a certain respect the same and in a certain respect not the same.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position Thomas seems to have retracted the way it is stated; but because a retraction is not found written down, one must say that the body of Christ alive and the body of Christ dead during the three days was simply the same body in number, not only because of the unity of the divine supposit which was there alone, but also because of the unity and identity of the substantial form of the body as it is body; for there is the same form of body as it is alive and dead.

To the Argument

4. To the reasoning one must say that being animated is not a substantial difference of body as it is body but as it is alive; for a body without a soul is truly something; hence to die is to be corrupted, not for a body as it is body but as it is alive. And one must hold as a Catholic that the body of Christ was not in a certain respect the same, but that it was simply the same, because it had the same matter and substantial form, namely corporeal form.

5. One can respond somewhat in another way to the reason he indicates, which reason can be formulated as follows: substantial differences according to Porphyry make things to be different things; animate and inanimate are, according to the same Porphyry, substantial differences and divide the genus of body; therefore they make different bodies. Therefore the body of Christ was one thing before when animate and another thing afterward when inanimate. One can say in reply that inanimate is capable of being taken in two ways, namely first privatively, and thus it is not a difference constitutive of body because a privation constitutes nothing; therefore neither is it a difference that divides the genus of body, because, according to Porphyry, the differences that constitute the species below and divide the genera above are the same. Therefore inanimate when thus taken privatively does not make the body of Christ to be different; on the contrary this rather argues that it is numerically the same; for absence of form is naturally in the same thing numerically as the presence of it was in, just as it is said in the *Categories* that privation and possession concern the same something; and thus did inanimate succeed to animate in the body of Christ. In a second way inanimate is taken positively and as it were as contrary; and in this way is inanimate taken in the division of the genus of body; for the difference that constitutes the inferior species and divides the superior genus must be positive; and thus taken it makes a different thing; and thus is it not taken in the dead body of Christ, or in any dead body.

Article Eight/One Hundred and Eight
That God cannot make matter to be without form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.1 [3.1], about whether God can make matter to be without form, Thomas says in the response to the question that God cannot do this because it involves a contradiction, namely that matter is in act and not in act.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This position is not to be held because it is prejudicial to the sacrament of the altar, as is plain thus: An accident depends more on a subject than matter depends on form; therefore if matter cannot be without form, much more can an accident not be without a subject. But God can make, nay does make, an accident to be without a subject, as is plain in the sacrament of the altar. Therefore he can make matter without form.

4. The major is plain: first because matter is substance but accident is not. Second because, although matter is sustained by form according as form is its complement and matter cannot be denuded of all form by an action of nature, yet nevertheless matter itself sustains form according as form cannot be without matter, as the Commentator says on *Physics* 1.5 text 82, 'and we have already said that they are etc.' Now an accident sustains nothing, neither form nor matter nor composite, but is only sustained. Hence it is manifest that accident has a greater dependence than matter.

5. To this Thomas responds in the same place by saying that an accident as to its being depends on its subject as on the cause sustaining it, and because God can produce all effects of second causes without those second causes, therefore he can conserve in being an accident without a subject; but matter in its actual being depends on form insofar as form is its act; hence there is no similarity. This is his response. But the thing that he denies about matter is proved from the following; for since all being is from form, as the Philosopher says *On the Soul* 2.2 and Boethius *On the Trinity* 1[3].2, and since it is clear that form is not the first cause but God is, for God, as Thomas himself says, can produce all effects of second causes without those second causes, the result necessarily is that God can make matter subsist without any form just as form makes it subsist, since the first cause has more influence on an effect than a second cause has. Hence Thomas' stated position seems to favor the recently condemned error 25 [article 63 condemned by Bishop Tempier], which is that God has no power over the effect of a secondary cause without that secondary cause.

6. As to the point about contradiction, one must say that 'to involve a contradiction' can be understood in two ways, namely first simply and as to all time (as that someone running is not moving) or second as to what is now and according to the natural course of things; this latter contradiction is implied by these cases: an ass speaks, a virgin gives birth, the dead rise. Now what involves a contradiction in the first way God cannot do, just as he cannot be opposed to himself; but what involves a contradiction in the second

way, namely only as things are now, God can very well do, because if God acts differently no contradiction is involved. Or one should say that it does not belong to the idea of nature that it is only in potency simply, but that it is only in potency according to the course of nature, that is, according to the course now conferred on things. Hence being in act according to potency above nature, and being in potency according to the course of nature, do not state a contradiction. Further, the being of matter does not depend only on the act of form, and so the statement is not a contradiction because it is not in respect of the same thing, just as in the case of what is long with respect to one thing and not long with respect to another.

Article Nine/One Hundred and Nine

That it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world is not eternal

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in q.31 [3.31], about whether it can be demonstratively proved that the world is not eternal, Thomas says in the response to the question that things which are simply subject to the divine will cannot be demonstratively proved, as is said in 2 *Corinthians* 2.11, 'What are the things of God no one knows but the Spirit of God.' Now the creation of the world depends on nothing but the sole will of God; hence what pertains to the beginning of the world cannot be demonstratively proved. And a little later he says that great care must be taken lest anyone presume to adduce proofs for things of faith.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The first point, namely that it cannot be demonstratively proved that the world is not eternal, seems to be an occasion for erring into the belief that the world was or could be eternal. For we say that the eternity of the world can be demonstratively disproved, namely *per impossibile*, as was plain above. And also in another way, through something they themselves posit as a principle: 'it is composite, therefore it is new,' as the Commentator says on *Metaphysics* 11.3 text 29 at the phrase, 'And will and action.' But it is clear that the world is composite with the greatest degree of composition; therefore it is new.

4. Now Thomas' reason no more shows that the eternity of the world cannot be demonstrated than that the eternity of the rational soul or an angel cannot be demonstrated, because the creation of neither soul nor angel depends on any other cause but the sole will of God. One must say therefore that one can speak about things that depend on the sole will of God in two ways: in one way before they are made, in another way after they are made. If in the first way, then none of the things can be demonstratively known save by revelation; if in the second way, then many of them can thus be demonstratively known, because the making of them itself has the force of revelation and demonstration. And so it is in the case of the world. Hence after the world

has been made its newness can be demonstrated, while before it existed absolutely nothing could be demonstrated of it.

5. And as to what Thomas says afterwards, that great care must be taken lest anyone presume to adduce proofs for the things of faith because thereby detraction is made from the excellence of the faith – it seems therefrom that arguing persuasively for the faith tends more to the detriment of the faith than to its advance, which is against blessed Peter, *1 Peter* 3.15, ‘Be always ready etc.’ as above. And as to what Thomas adds, that detraction is made from the faith because the truth of the faith exceeds all man’s reason, one must say that the truth of the faith in the case of certain articles, not in the case of all, does not altogether exceed human reason, because, as Augustine says *True Religion* ch.3, ‘All those things that we initially believe, having followed nothing but on authority, are in part understood in such a way as to be known to be most certain, and in part in such a way as to be seen to be able to be thus and to need to have been thus.’ Further, although things surpass human reason at the time they are coming to be, yet when they have come to be they by themselves enlighten reason and raise it to knowledge of their maker, as is said in *Romans* 1.20, ‘The invisible things of God etc.;

hence Richard of St. Victor *On the Trinity* 1.4 says, ‘It will be part of our intention in this work to adduce for the things we believe not only probable but necessary reasons, and to build up proof of the faith by the untying and laying bare of the truth. For I believe without doubt that, for the laying bare of anything that is a necessary existent, not only probable but nay more necessary arguments are not lacking, although sometimes they happen to escape our industry.’

On Thomas' *Commentary on Sentences 1*

Article One/One Hundred and Ten *That the powers of the soul are accidents*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. In his *Commentary on the Sentences* 1 d.3 q.9 Thomas says in the main response that the powers of the soul are proper accidents consequent to the species, originated from the principles of the soul itself, though from the wholeness of the soul as it is a certain potential whole.

2. The words of Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. I do not see an error here, yet Thomas is plainly speaking against Augustine *On the Trinity* 9.4, where Augustine says that these three, mind, knowledge, and love, that he calls powers of the soul and parts of the image, are in the soul substantially or essentially, so to say, though not in a subject as color or shape and the like are. Again *On the Trinity* 10 penultimate chapter he says, 'These three, memory, intelligence, will, since they are not three lives but one life, not three minds but one mind, not three substances but one substance...' And he says the like in many places, and in *On Spirit and Soul* 2, 3, 10, 15.

4. Avicenna seems to maintain the same in *Natural Philosophy* 12, the first part, where he says that the soul is a power in respect of actions and in respect of the sensible and intelligible forms that it receives, and it can be called a form in respect of the matter in which exists, and from each of these the substance is constituted, animal and vegetable. Further in *Categories* 3 it is said that proper most of all to substance is that the numerically same existing thing is susceptible of contraries. But this property does not belong to an accident, as is said in the *Categories* – belongs in itself, I say, because although the same surface is susceptible of white and black, this is not according to surface in itself, as Avicenna says *Metaphysics* 5, but by reason of the underlying substance.

Article Two/One Hundred and Eleven *That the first movable sphere is composed of mover and moved*

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in d.8 q.7 a.1 in the response to the third argument, Thomas maintains that the first movable, which is said to be moved of itself, is composed of mover and moved; and in fact he seems to understand this of a mover not separated but conjoined, which is a soul; and this is plain from the fact that he says it is moved of itself, for what is moved by a separate mover cannot be said to be moved of itself; and so he posits that the heavens too are ensouled, as certain philosophers did and almost everyone.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. If Thomas thought this, as in fact seems to be the case, then he plainly errs, as did also the philosophers who posited this. Against them Damascene 2[1].6 says, ‘Let none reckon the heavens and the luminary bodies to be animate; for the heavens are inanimate and insensible.’ Again this is against Rabbi Moses who says, ‘If the heavens were moved by a soul they would sometimes be at rest, the opposite of which we see.’

4. Again, if the heavens were animate, then since their bodies are nobler than ours likewise the souls will be too, as it seems; and consequently the heavens would be nobler than man; and thus, since the nobler is not for the sake of the ignobler, the heavenly bodies would not have been created for the service of man, the contrary of which is contained in *Deuteronomy* 4.6, ‘Do not, with eyes raised to heaven, look upon sun and moon and all the stars of the heaven and, being deceived by error, adore them and worship what your God has created for the service of all the nations that are under heaven.’

Article Three/One Hundred and Twelve

That the first moved sphere is the cause of all corporeal motion

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in d.8 q.8 in response to the third argument, Thomas says that the movement of the heaven is the cause of all corporeal motion, because every corporeal motion is set in order at the local motion of heaven.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems a non-Catholic thing to say. First, because after the judgment, according to our faith and the doctrine of the saints, the motion of the heaven will cease; and yet in hell they will pass from snow-cold waters to extreme heat, as is contained in *Job* 24.19; but where there is a passage of bodies there is also local corporeal motion. Second, because after the judgment, according to Augustine, the body of the blessed will at once be wherever its spirit wants to be; we have example and proof of this in Christ after his resurrection, of whose bodily motion the motion of the heaven was clearly not cause. Third, because we believe that the motion of resurrection of bodies from the dust of the ground to the resumption of their souls, of which the motion of the heaven is not cause, is not set in order at the local motion of the heaven either. Fourth, because the progressive moving about of man and animal is the motion of the body, of which the cause is not heaven but appetite. Fifth, because this is against Augustine in *Confessions* 11.23, who maintains that when the motion of the heaven ceases the wheel of a potter can still move and distinct speech in long and short syllables can still be delivered. He speaks there as follows, ‘But if the luminaries of heaven were to cease and the wheel of the

potter were to move, there would only be time, or there would only be short and long syllables in our words, because the latter sounded for a longer time and the former for a shorter time.’

Article Four/One Hundred and Thirteen *That the soul is not composed of matter and form*

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in d.8 penultimate question [q.5 a.2], in the response to the first argument, Thomas says that the soul is not composed of anything that is part of its quiddity, as neither is any other form.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This is against Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis 7.27*, a little before the end, where he says that the soul of the first man was made of spiritual matter, which to be sure preceded the form not in time but origin, as voice precedes singing. And many other things that were said above are against this.

To the Arguments

4. I reply to the first argument, which is of this sort: it is said, *On the Soul* 2.1-2, that the soul is the form of the body; in the same place it is also said that form is neither matter nor the composite. – Response: the argument only shows that the soul is not the composite nor is it that of which it is the form. And this is true because the soul is not the body.

5. The second argument is as follows: every composite has being from its component parts; so if the soul is a composite then it has in itself some being which is never removed from it, since it is immortal. Also, some being results from the conjunction of soul and body, and it is the being of a man. Therefore there is in man a double being, namely the being of the soul and the being of the conjunct, which seems to be impossible since of one thing there is one being. – Response: we say that this argument is as much against him who posits that the soul is immaterial as it is against those who posit that it is composite; because the former and the latter posit that the soul is existent when it is separated, and thus, according to this way, it goes on having a double being when it is conjoined, namely the being of the soul and the being of the conjunct. However to the argument we say that the being of the soul and the being of the composite is the being of two things and not of one thing; and this is not unacceptable, because of two things there are two beings.

6. The third argument is thus: every composition that comes to a thing after its being is complete is accidental to it. So if the soul is composite, having in itself perfect being from its principles, the composition of it with the body will be accidental to it. Therefore, from body and soul only something one per accidens is brought about. – Response as

before: this reason is as much against him who posits that the soul is a simple form which is per se subsistent and has the perfect being of its nature; therefore accordingly its composition will be accidental. To the argument however we respond differently, that when it says the soul has perfect being before it is joined to the body, this is false; for, because the soul is naturally fit to be the perfection of the body, it only has the perfect mode of its nature when it has a body conjoined to it, not an animal body, I say, but a spiritual one, that is, a body obedient to it with so much facility that what was before a tomb is now a glory for it, as is said in *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 12.35 at the end. So now too it would not have the perfect being of its nature unless it were joined to an animal body, that is, a body that makes it animal.

Article Five/One Hundred and Fourteen

That a conjoined thing has no other being than the being of the form

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in the response to the second argument Thomas says that by the conjunction of soul with body another being is not brought about, but the being that is per se of the soul is made to be the being of the composite, such that the composite has no other being than the being of the form. He says the same in d.15 in the last question in the main response.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This statement arises from a double error, one of which is that there is one substantial form in a composite, which, along with the prime matter that it is immediately joined to without any preparatory disposition, makes the composite. The second is that such matter, namely prime matter, has and can have no being save that of the form; and both errors have been rejected by the masters.

4. I say therefore that a composite of soul and body is a different being from either of the two components; in this way too the being of the composite is also other than the being of the form; for being is the proper act of an entity such that any entity has its own being. Since therefore the body has being before the infusion of the soul, and also has being after the separation of the soul, it is manifest that the whole being of the body in the composite is not the being of the soul; otherwise the body would altogether cease to be after the separation of the soul, just as do accidents, which have no other being than the being of their subjects and so when they lose the being of the subject they lose being altogether, unless they are sustained by a miracle, as in the case of the sacrament of the altar.

Article Six/One Hundred and Fifteen

That the soul is individuated through the body, and cannot be created before it is infused

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in d.8 in the penultimate question in response to the last argument, Thomas says that the soul is not individuated save by and through the body, and that it is impossible for the soul to be created before it is infused.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The second statement seems plainly to derogate from the faith, which says that God is omnipotent; for since the creation of the soul is not and cannot be from any other than God, to say that the soul cannot be created before it is infused is nothing other than to say that God cannot create it before he infuses it, just as, according to Anselm, the world not being able to be made is the same as God not being able to create the world. Therefore, God would not be omnipotent. Again, this is against Augustine *Literal Commentary on Genesis* 7.24[21], 'Certainly,' he says, 'it seems to me more tolerable for human opinion that God, who created everything at once, also created the human soul in those first days than that he breathed it into members formed of clay at their own time.'

4. Again, the first statement, namely that the individuation of the soul is done through the body seems to be false and an occasion for error; because there follows from this either that the soul ceases to be after separation from the body or at least that there will only be one intellect or soul after men's deaths; for if conjunction with the body makes for distinction or individuation of souls, then separation makes for unity.

5. Again, I argue as follows: either the body is the whole cause of the individuation of the soul, or it is part of the cause, or it is a co-cause. If it is the whole cause then, when it is posited, the effect is posited, namely individuation, and when it is removed its effect is removed; therefore after death there would be no individuation of souls but one soul only or one intellect, which was the error of Averroes. But if the body is a co-cause of individuation, then I ask what is the other part that is co-cause with it? Nothing other can be given than the matter of the soul, just as they too grant in the case of other forms; therefore the soul has spiritual matter through which it is individuated. But if it be said that the soul is not individuated through matter but through the body and the accidents, then either these accidents are caused by the conjunction of soul with body, or they are caused by the conjunction of the spiritual matter of the soul and of its form, because matter and form are the cause of all the accidents that are and come to be in it, as is said in *Physics* 1.7. If in the first way, then since the accidents do not remain when the soul has been separated from the body, the individuation of the soul would not remain; therefore neither would the soul remain. If in the second way then I have the conclusion intended, namely that the soul is not individuated through its body. Again the Commentator says on *Metaphysics* 4 that the substance of each thing, through which it is one, is its being. Again, on *Metaphysics* 10, he says that everything that is the principle of being is the principle of number, and that what is the principle of number is the principle

of being. Since therefore the soul does not have being through the body, as is plain, it follows that the soul does not have unity and the principle of individuation or number through the body.

Article Seven/One Hundred and Sixteen

That place is not due to anything simple save through the relation it has with a body

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in d.8 in the last question in the response to the question, Thomas says that place is not due to a simple substance save according to the relation it has with a body; but the soul is compared to the body as its form. He speaks similarly to the first part of this position later, in d.15 last question, in the response to the third argument.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. The first thing said here, together with the article above that the soul is not composed of spiritual matter and form, can be the occasion of error in thinking that souls separated from bodies are nowhere, namely neither in heaven nor in purgatory nor in hell, which is against the faith and against Damascene 2.3, where he speaks as follows, 'The angels then are circumscribable by place; for when they are in heaven they are not on earth, and when they are sent by God to earth they do not remain in heaven.'
4. Again, it is against the Philosopher *On the Heavens* 1.3 text 22, where he says that all men agree in the fact that the first glorious body (and he is speaking of the heaven) is the place of spirits; here the Commentator says, 'of the spirits of God and other spirits, who are commonly called angels.' But if the angels are in place, then for the same reason, or more so, separated souls are in place as well.

Article Eight/One Hundred and Seventeen

That the Father and Son spirate the Holy Spirit by virtue of one nature

Brother Thomas' Opinion

1. Again, in d.11 q.1, in response to argument 7, Thomas says that the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit by virtue of one nature with a single spiration, and for this reason he who is spirated is simple.
2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. There are some who excuse this opinion. For Damascene says 1.8, 'Generation indeed is without beginning and eternal, an existing work of nature.' Certainly, if

generation is a work of nature, spiration is too. Because therefore Thomas did not say that Father and Son spirate insofar as they share the power of one nature but only by the power of one nature, one can say that he does not intend by the ‘virtue of one nature’ the reason for being principle or for spirating the Holy Spirit, because if so, then the Holy Spirit would spirate himself, since the same virtue of nature is in himself; but Thomas intends to say the Father and Son, having the virtue of one nature, spirate the Holy Spirit by spirative force. And thus does Anselm seem to speak, *On the Procession of the Holy Spirit* ch.17[21], ‘From the fact,’ he says, ‘that the Father and Son are one,’ that is, the Holy Spirit is from God, but not from him in the respect in which Father and Son are different. And in the same book ch. 8 he says that the Holy Spirit is from the essence of God. Again in *Monologion* 54, ‘The Holy Spirit does not proceed from God in the respect in which Father and Son are two but in the respect in which they are one; for the Holy Spirit is not from the relations that are many; for the relation of Father is one relation and the relation of Son is another; but from the essence itself, which does not admit of plurality, do Father and Son equally send forth so great a good.’ Again in ch.57, ‘Father and Son do not make or generate but, if one can so speak, they in a certain way spirate their own love, though the supreme and incommunicable essence does not spirate love in the way we do.’

4. Again, the Philosopher in *Rhetoric* 1.4 says that those things are by nature whose cause is in themselves and is ordered; so because there is in the Father and Son a cause, or rather a principle, of spirating the Holy Spirit, it can thus be said in an extended sense that by virtue of one nature, that is, insofar as they are one in power of nature or in essence, do they, according to Anselm above, spirate the Holy Spirit.

5. It seems to others that the said position of Thomas is not to be accepted. For by the ‘virtue of one nature’ the reason for being principle is indicated; since therefore the same virtue and nature is in the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit would spirate himself, which is erroneous. Further, as Richard of St. Victor says *On the Trinity* 6.16, ‘Generation is production of existent from existent according to operation of nature;’ if therefore spiration is by virtue of nature and by operation of nature, spiration will be generation. Further, although there is one nature in Father and Son, yet the nature is not the immediate and chief principle in spirating but the common spirative power is. Therefore not by virtue of one nature but by virtue a common spirative force do they spirate the Holy Spirit. Again *On the Trinity* 5.14 Richard says, ‘The Holy Spirit comes from the Father not as born but as given;’ but to be spirated by virtue of one nature is not to come from as given but as born, for as is said in *Metaphysics* 11, ‘It is characteristic of nature to generate another like itself.’ But to spirate does not seem characteristic of nature but of a loving will; therefore etc. Again Richard *On the Trinity* 6.18 says, ‘Therefore nothing in divine reality is according to the gift of a grace that lavishes, but the whole is according to the property of a nature that requires.’ But the property of nature requires that the will or the spirative force spirate, not nature, but rather that nature generate. Therefore etc.

Article Nine/One Hundred and Eighteen

That he who has better natural faculties receives more grace

Brother Thomas’ Opinion

1. Again, in d.17 q.3 in the response to the question, Thomas says what he also says at the end of the same distinction in clarification of the text, that a soul possessing better natural faculties, provided however there be equal effort, receives more of grace and of infused perfections.

2. Thus Thomas.

Rejection of the Opinion

3. This seems to be capable of being understood in two ways, namely either, first, such that the grace and the perfections infused by grace are indeed more and less in their nature or essence (as they are infused by God) than the grace and perfections infused into someone having less good natural faculties. This we think to be false and close to error, because according to it grace would in some way not be grace, *Romans* 11.6, and he who labored more would not receive more. For it is more consonant with grace and justice that he who has less good natural faculties, provided the effort be in this respect the equal of his who has better natural faculties, should receive more of grace, because he is laboring more according to his strength and is disposing himself more for grace, just as the widow, who put one mite into the treasury, put in more than the rich who were casting in many, and did it more firmly than they if they had cast in one mite; just as also, I believe, a weak man who is prone to suffer when fasting, making vigils, going on pilgrimage, or otherwise laboring, disposes himself more to grace, and also receives more grace, than a strong man and a giant who is equal to the doing. Or, second, the point can be understood such that the grace and perfections infused into someone who has better natural faculties are of greater efficacy with equal effort insofar as they are received by him, although in and of themselves they are equal. In this way what Thomas says is true; for if grace is infused in a naturally impious and cruel man and also in a second pious and mild man when they are both striving equally to possess grace, the pious man is more fitted for good works, as for loving neighbor and God, than the impious man; just as the same ray illumines less dark or less dense air more than it illumines denser air; and if there are two soldiers equally strong, he who has a better horse can do more in war; but grace, according to Augustine, is disposed to free choice as a rider is to a horse; and an equal fire burns dry and oily wood more than it burns damp and green wood.