ON THE TEXT OF SOME DISPUTED PASSAGES IN ARISTOTLE’S
ETHICA EUDEMIA

The text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics (EE) is generally held by scholars to be in an unusually poor state,¹ and to stand in need of considerable emendations. Advances toward this end have been made over the years by many scholars and we also now have, besides Susemihl’s old edition, the new Oxford Classical Text.² The OCT is much to be welcomed but it has its flaws.³ Further, it indulges, as did also Susemihl, in a number of emendations that, on closer consideration, are not at all necessary, for the manuscript readings can be shown to be both grammatically and philosophically acceptable as they stand. The purpose of this article is to illustrate the fact with respect to a number of such proposed emendations. The text of the EE, despite lingering problems, is in better shape than scholars are wont to believe.⁴

8.1.1246a27, 35-37
It is worth noting, to begin with, that the manuscripts of the EE do suffer from one besetting fault, that of misreading one letter for another. Some very obvious examples, already noted and corrected by scholars, are contained in 8.1 (also numbered as 7.13), where Bekker’s text makes no sense but where sense is at once restored with the change of a single letter or a diphthong. So at 1246a27 the manuscripts have καὶ τοῦτο ἦ αὐτό ἢδον κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ‘and this either itself sweet accidentally’, where ἦδον, senseless in the context, is a misreading for ἦ αὐτό (Jackson; HAY for HAY): ‘and this either itself or accidentally’.⁵ Again, at 1246a35-36 the manuscripts have ἢδη (or ἢδη) πᾶσαι αἱ ἀρεταὶ ἑπιστῆμαι εἴπαν καὶ τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ ὡς ἀδικία χρήσθαι: ‘already all the virtues knowledges said and to use justice as injustice’, where εἴπαν, senseless in the context, is a misspelling for εἴη ἄν (Spengel; EIIAN for EIHAN), and ἢδη a misspelling (and εἴη a misreading) for εἰ δῆ (Spengel; ΗDH for EΙΔΗ): ‘So if all the virtues were knowledges, it would in fact be possible to use justice as injustice’. At 1246a37, immediately following on from the previous words, the manuscripts have: εἰ δικῆς εἰ ἄρα ἀπὸ δικαιοσύνης: ‘If of right if then from justice…’, where εἰ δικῆς εἰ, clearly senseless, is a misreading for ἀδικῆςει (Spengel; ΕΙΔΙΚΗΣΕΙ for ΑΔΙΚΗΣΕΙ): ‘He will then do wrong from [the habit of] justice’⁶

7.10.1242a22-26
Another and very striking example is in 7.10 at 1242a22-26 where the manuscript readings as printed by Bekker have: ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἄλλα καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῶον, καὶ οὐχ ὀσπερ τὰλλὰ ποτὲ συνδιάζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι καὶ θῆλει καὶ ἄρρενι ἄλλον ἂν διὰ δύο πολύλκον, ἄλλα κοινωνικὸν ἄνθρωπος ζῶον… ‘For man is not only a political but a domestic animal and does not, like the other animals, couple with just anyone, both female and male, but ???, but man is a communal animal…’ The problem phrase is ἄλλον ἂν διὰ δύο πολύλκον which is just unintelligible. The letters need to be differently divided and one letter needs to be changed, so as to give: ἄλλα ἴδια οὐ μοναξικὸν (Spengel; ΑΛΛΑ ΑΙ ΔΙΑ ΔΥΜΟΝ ΑΥΑΙΚΟΝ misread and misspelled for ΑΛΛΑ ΙΔΙΑ ΟΥ ΜΟΝΑΩΛΙΚΟΝ), ‘…both female and male, but man is in private not a solitary but a communal animal…’
3.5.1232a33-34
Given the frequency of this error in the manuscripts, one is well advised to see if it may explain other puzzles elsewhere, and indeed scholars have continued to use the device of respelling to advantage.7 Here then is a suggestion of this sort about 1232a33-34 in a chapter about magananimity where Bekker’s text reads: καὶ γὰρ τὸ ὀρθὸς κρίναι τὰ μεγάλα καὶ μικρὰ τὸν ἁγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖτον. δοκεῖ δὲ ταῦτ’ εἶναι μεγάλα, ἃ διώκει ὁ τὴν κρατίστην ἔχον ἐξίν περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα’ εἶναι ὡδέα. ‘For in fact it is praiseworthy to judge the great and small things rightly among goods, and those goods are held to be great which he pursues who has the best habit with respect to such things to be pleasant.’ The problem words are clearly the final εἶναι ὡδέα. Susemihl leaves them in the text but marks them as corrupt in the apparatus criticus where he also lists, but without any endorsement, the several scholarly emendations. The OCT deletes them suggesting, plausibly enough, that they arose by dittography, the εἶναι from the ταῦτ’ εἶναι in the previous line and the ὡδέα from the ἢ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία with which the next sentence begins. Another solution, however, is to keep the words but change the εἶναι ὡδέα to εἰ καὶ ὡδέα (EINAI for EIKAI) thus producing: ‘…and those goods are held to be great which he pursues who has the best habit with respect to such things, even if they are pleasant.’ The point of this final remark will be to specify the nature of the inference. What makes the pursuit of these goods by this man a mark of their being great is that he has the best habit about them and not that they are pleasant (as they would likely be).8 For people without the habit could as easily pursue them for their pleasure, and if he pursued them for their pleasure and not because of his habit they would not thereby be shown to be great.

7.1.1234b25-31
Another method for solving textual problems is to vary the punctuation, adding or removing commas or starting and ending sentences at different places (the extensive system of punctuation we now use when printing ancient texts was, of course, not available to the original writers and can, subject to the rules of grammar, be varied almost at will). There is in fact one particular passage where changing the punctuation seems entirely to solve a problem that has hitherto escaped satisfactory emendation. The passage is 1234b25-31 which in Bekker’s edition (followed by Susemihl) reads: ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον περὶ τοὺς φίλους εἶναι μάλιστα πάντες φαμέν, καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δοκεῖ ἄνηρ εἶναι καὶ ἁγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, καὶ φιλία ἡ ἔτη τῆς εἶναι ἔξις, καὶ ἕαν τὰς βούλησαι ὅστε μὴ ἄδικεν, ἄλλ’ εἰς φίλους ποιῆσαι· οἱ γὰρ ἄληθινοι φίλοι οὐκ ἄδικοςιν…ἡ ταὐτὸν ἅρα ἢ ἔγγυς τι ὅ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ φιλία. ‘Further, we all say that the just and the unjust concern friends above all, and the same man appears to be both good and a friend, and friendship seems to be a moral habit, and if someone wants to make [people] not do wrong, but make them into friends. For true friends do not wrong…Justice, then, is either the same thing as friendship or close to it.’ The problem here is the ἄλλ’ εἰς φίλους ποιῆσαι which, in the context, lacks grammatical sense. Scholarly emendations are several. Casaubon suggested changing ἄλλ’ εἰς τὸ ἄλληλοις, Bekker to ἄλληλοις, Spengel to ἄλλους, Jackson to ἄλις (followed by the OCT), Mingay to ἄληθινοις. Casaubon also suggested changing the second occurrence of the infinitive ποιῆσαι to the optative ποιῆσαι and Spengel to the indicative ποιῆσαι. In fact, however, the problem seems to be just a matter of punctuation and instead of… εἶναι ἔξις, καὶ ἕαν τὰς βούλησαι ποιῆσαι ὅστε μὴ ἄδικεν, ἄλλ’ εἰς φίλους ποιῆσαι, one should print… εἶναι ἔξις καὶ, ἕαν τὰς βούλησαι ποιῆσαι
The second occurrence of the infinitive ποίησαι is now seen to be dependent, like the preceding infinitive εἶναι with which the καὶ connects it, on the δοκεῖ in b27, and the ἀλλ’ εἰς φίλους becomes a natural continuation from the ὦστε clause: ‘…and friendship seems to be a moral habit and, if someone wants to make people not do wrong but into friends, seems to do it’.

The change of punctuation here seems simple enough, and the resulting grammatical sense clear enough, that one might well wonder why the possibility was not thought of before. Perhaps it was thought of but then rejected because of the seeming redundancy of the philosophical sense produced. For what else, one might ask, could friendship do than make people into friends? But the redundancy is only apparent. Aristotle is marking a contrast from habit to action and his point is that friendship is a moral habit which makes people, from that habit, not wrong each other but treat each other instead as friends. So when he adds that true friends do not wrong his meaning is that they do not wrong because they have the moral habit of friendship and treat each other accordingly. Hence his conclusion at b31, that friendship and justice are the same thing or close, for friendship is a moral habit which, like the moral habit of justice itself, makes people just from that very habit (or, as he remarks at Nicomachean Ethics 1155a28, the highest form of justice seems to belong to friendship).

2.8.1225a17-19
Another case where punctuation seems to solve the problem is found at 1225a17-19 where Bekker’s text reads: οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ μὴ βία πράξει, ἢ οὐ φόσει, ὥστε ἰδίων ἢ μείζονος κακοῦ ἀπολύσεως πράττῃ… “For thus one will act under necessity and not by force, or not by nature, when one does an evil for the sake of a good or for release from a greater evil.” In the context Aristotle is discussing the voluntariness of actions done under duress (as obeying the unjust command of a tyrant to avoid torture or death), and he is here summing up his position. The problem concerns the καὶ μὴ βία which seems to be contradictory, for if one is under necessity (ἀναγκαζόμενος) one is surely also forced. Susemihl therefore follows Fritzsche in deleting μὴ. The OCT, by contrast, alters the punctuation: οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος, καὶ μὴ βία, πράξει, ἢ οὐ φόσει… The sense thus produced is not easy to work out unless we are meant to suppose that Aristotle is drawing some sort of distinction between acting under necessity and acting by force. But if so there is a further problem, for the negative should then really be οὐ and not μὴ (as with the following φόσει). A simpler solution would be to alter the punctuation by adding only one comma, not two, and after μὴ, not after ἀναγκαζόμενος or βία. The Greek will then read: οὕτω γὰρ ἀναγκαζόμενος καὶ μὴ, βία πράξει, ἢ οὐ φόσει… “For being thus under necessity and not under necessity, one will act by force, or not by nature…” The grammar and the sense are now clear. The μὴ is correct because it is going with an understood repetition of the participle ἀναγκαζόμενος, not the indicative πράξει, and a participial clause that expresses a condition, as ἀναγκαζόμενος does here, takes μὴ as negative (LSJ sv μὴ B6). The sense is not contradictory because it is just summarizing how the being and not being under necessity that is distinctive of duress (having a choice but under compulsion to undesirable alternatives) is forced or unnatural: there is indeed a choice (either to accept death or to commit the unjust deed), but it is unnaturally constrained (it is limited to alternatives that no one would naturally choose to be limited to).
2.2.1220a39-b7
There are other passages where a change of punctuation can help resolve the problems, but none is quite as clear as these two. Moreover the other passages require more use of another method, or rather check, for textual emendation, namely the philosophical sense. For as emendations to verse passages should fit the scansion, so emendations to philosophical passages should fit the argument. The examples just given are already cases in point because the changed punctuation saves the reasoning as well as the grammar (the same rule applies to all writings, of course, as that emendations to historical writings should fit the historical argument, and indeed that emendations to verse passages should fit the poetic argument).

Another case in point is found at 2.2.1220a39-b7 where Bekker’s text reads: ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἰθὸς ὀσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ ἰγιόγῃς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, οὕτως ἢ δὴ τὸ ἐνεργητικὸν. δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἰἀνύχοις οὐχ ὀρώμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢν μυρίακες ρίψης ἀνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τούτῳ μὴ βία. διὸ ἔστω ἢθος τούτῳ ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιήσης. ‘Since moral character as its name also signifies because it gets its increase from custom, but what is under a guidance not innate gets to have a custom by being moved often in a certain way, thus now the activating part. A fact which we do not see in things without soul; for even if you were to throw a stone upward ten thousand times never will it not do this by force. Therefore let a moral character be this of soul accord with prescriptive reason, but of being able to follow reason a quality.’

The reason for such a wooden, word for word translation is to highlight the problems that induce scholars to propose emendations. The OCT, for instance, prints the following: ἐπεὶ δ’ {ἔστι} τὸ ἰθὸς, ὀσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα σημαίνει, ὅτι ἀπὸ ἔθους ἔχει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν, ἐθίζεται δὲ τὸ ὑπ’ ἰγιόγῃς μὴ ἐμφύτου τῷ πολλάκις κινεῖσθαι πώς, οὕτως ἢ δὴ {τὸ} ἐνεργητικὸν (δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἰἀνύχοις οὐχ ὀρώμεν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἢν μυρίακες ρίψης ἀνω τὸν λίθον, οὐδέποτε ποιήσει τούτῳ μὴ βία) — διὸ ἔστω <τὸ> ἢθος τοῦτος ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον <τοῦ> ἀλλόγου μὲν, δυναμένου δ’ ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιήσης.\footnote{Adapting Woods’ translation,\footnote{This text and translation give a sense that is philosophically acceptable, but the emendations are extensive. They are also unnecessary. The Greek of the manuscripts admits of a fairly acceptable sense if, through the device of punctuation, one makes the syntax a little more perspicuous, as in the following English translation: ‘But since moral character – as its name in fact signifies, because it gets its increase from custom and because what is under a guidance not innate gets to have a custom by being changed a certain way repeatedly – is now in this way the activating element (a fact...by force), therefore let a moral character be this, a quality of soul in accord with a reason that gives commands, but to a being-able to follow reason.’ The English is compressed, as is the Greek, but it is intelligible enough as well as logically tight. Moral character is a quality of soul (it is a property acquired through custom and custom does not arise in things}
without soul), it is in accord with a reason that gives commands (the custom comes about through extrinsic guidance), and what receives the commands is a something able to follow reason (else it could not respond to the guidance and become itself the active element in following reason but would, like the stone, keep on behaving as it did before). The emended text does, to be sure, give roughly the same sense, if with some loss of logical tightness, but since we can get the sense without the emendations, we do not need the emendations.

1.8.1218a15-24
Another case of emendment unwarranted by philosophical sense can be found at 1218a15-24, where Bekker’s Greek reads: ἄνάπαλν δὲ καὶ δεικτέον ἢ ὡς νῦν δεικνύουσι τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτό. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογομένων ἐχεῖν τὸ ἄγαθὸν, ἔξ ἐκείνου τὰ ὀμολογούμενα εἶναι ἄγαθα δεικνύουσιν, εἰ ἔριθμῶν, ὅτι ἡ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἡ ώστε ἄγαθόν· τάξεως γὰρ καὶ ἀριθμοί, ὡς τοῖς ἀρίθμοις καὶ ταῖς μονάσσεσ άγαθόν ὑπάρχων διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄγαθόν, δεῦ δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογομένων, ὅσον ὑφείας ἵγιες σωφροσύνης, ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις μᾶλλον τὸ καλόν, πάντα γὰρ τάδε τάξεις καὶ ἠμείμα· εἰ τρα κακόν γαθὸν· ἐκείνους γὰρ ὑπάρχει τά μᾶλλον. ‘They should, also, prove the Good Itself reverse to the way’ they now prove it. For now from things agreed to have the good, from those things they prove things agreed to be good — from numbers that justice and health are good, for these are orderings and numbers, their assumption being that the good is present in numbers and monads because the one is good itself. But they should prove from what is agreed, as from health, strength, moderation, that in changeless things too the beautiful exists more, for all these things are order and rest. If so then the latter are more, for they belong to the latter more.’

The passage is part of Aristotle’s involved criticism of the Platonic doctrine of the Idea of the Good and the problem scholars universally find with it is that a ‘not’ seems to be missing in the second sentence, for instead of ‘from things agreed to have the good, from those things they prove things agreed to be good’ the text should say ‘from things not agreed to have the good, from those things they prove things agreed to be good’. So ἐκ τῶν ὀμολογομένων is changed to ἐκ τῶν ἀνομολογομένων (Victorius, followed by Susemihl and the OCT). The change is easy enough but it is wholly unnecessary. For even if the revised text produces an acceptable argument, so does the unrevised text. The argument turns on a contrast between ‘have’ and ‘be’ (ἐχεῖν…εἶναι) and not, as scholars wish, on a contrast between ‘not agreed’ and ‘agreed’. The proponents of the Idea of the Good go wrong, it says, because they start with things agreed to have the good when they should start with things agreed to be good. They prove that justice and health are good because justice and health are orderings and numbers and because numbers and monads have the good. The reason numbers and orderings have the good is that they have the One as their principle (the unit is the beginning of number and of numbered orderings) and the One is good itself. The problem with this reasoning, says Aristotle, is that it gets the agreements back to front. Justice and health are not agreed to be good because they are order and number which are agreed to have the good. On the contrary, things that have order and number should be agreed to have the good because the things that are agreed to be good are order and number. Or as the text puts it (at a21-24): because it is agreed that health, strength, and moderation are good, therefore the beautiful (the good at its best) exists more in changeless things (or the changeless things have the beautiful more). For
health, strength, and moderation are order and rest, and if so then the changeless things are more beautiful because they have order and rest more.

Now whatever we may come to think of the success of this argument both in itself and as an attack on doctrines prevalent in the Academy, it is an intelligible argument that makes sense of the text as preserved by the manuscripts. The manuscript reading should therefore be retained. The emendation, since it is not needed to explain any oddity of grammar or argument, is unwarranted.

3.5.1232a28-32
A third case of unwarranted emendation is found at 1232a28-32, where Bekker’s text reads: λέγομεν δὲ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ὀνόματος προσηγορίαν, ὡσπερ ἐν μεγεθεῖ τινὶ ψυχῆς καὶ δυνάμεως. ὡστε καὶ τῷ σεμνῷ καὶ τῷ μεγαλουργεῖ δύμοις εἶναι δοκεῖ, ὡστε καὶ πάσαις ταῖς ἁρεταῖς ἀκολουθεῖν φαίνεται. ‘We speak of the magnanimous man according to the title of his name, as existing in a certain greatness of soul and power. Consequently, he seems like both the man of dignity and the magnificent man, when in fact he appears to follow all the virtues.’ The main problem that has exercised scholars is the subject of φαίνεται. What should follow all the virtues, it seems, is not the magnanimous man but magnanimity. For, even if the magnanimous man is like the dignified and magnificent man, surely it is the virtue and not the man that follows all the other virtues? The text, however, makes the man and not the virtue the subject. A suggestion, then, is to change ὅτε to ἔτι (Spengel), and even make it begin a new sentence (Jackson), understanding thereby at the same time, however abruptly, a change of subject. A further and more radical suggestion is to obelize ὅτε and mark a lacuna after it where a change of subject for φαίνεται was explicitly made (Russell, followed by the OCT).

The problem is invented. The text is fine as it stands and there is no change of subject because there does not need to be a change of subject. Indeed the philosophical argument requires that there not be a change of subject. A few lines earlier at the beginning of the chapter (1232a19), Aristotle says that because of the difficulty of telling apart things that are different but close to each other we must make determinations about magnanimity from what is attributed to the magnanimous man. Not surprisingly, therefore, he adopts this procedure in what follows and starts with the man and not the virtue. So when he says, in the passage under consideration, that the magnanimous man seems like the man of dignity and the magnificent man, he is giving an example of things that are close yet different and is doing so from the man and not from the virtue. Further, when he immediately adds that in fact the magnanimous man appears to follow all the virtues, he is again arguing from the man and not the virtue. The magnanimous man seems to follow all the virtues, Aristotle goes on to explain (in the passage already discussed above about changing εἶναι ἡδέα το ἐι καὶ ἡδέα), because those things seem great which he who has the greatest habit pursues, and magnanimity is greatest, and in each case it is by the virtue that one rightly judges what is great. So the magnanimous man seems to follow all the virtues because he has what all the virtues have, namely pursuing and rightly judging great things. Indeed Aristotle recalls the point a few lines later (1232b23-25) when he says that no virtue is without greatness and that therefore, ‘as we said’ (ὥσπερ εἰπομεν), the virtues seem each to make people magnanimous as regards what the virtue is about. Or, in other words, magnanimous people seem to follow all the virtues because every virtue makes its possessor great with respect to the object of that
virtue. So however odd it may initially seem for the meaning of the passage under consideration to be that the magnanimous man and not magnanimity follows all the virtues, Aristotle’s argument requires that its meaning be nothing else.

7.2.1236b31-34
A lesser but still interesting case is found at 1236b31-34 which in Bekker’s text reads thus: ὁ δ’ ἀληθινὸς φίλος καὶ ἡδύς ἐστιν ἀπλῶς· διό δοκεὶ καὶ ὁ ὀψοσοῦν φίλος ἡδύς. ἐτὶ δὲ διωριστέον περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον ἔχει ἐπίστασιν. πότερον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῶ ἁγαθὸν…; ‘But the true friend is also pleasant simply; hence it is held that any friend at all is pleasant. But there needs yet to be more distinction about this it has a stop. For is it the case that what is good for oneself…?’ The problem here is ἔχει ἐπίστασιν which editors since Erasmus’ Basel edition, including the OCT, have generally emended to something like: …περὶ τούτου μᾶλλον. ἔχει ἄγαθον πότερον γὰρ τὸ αὐτῶ ἁγαθὸν… ‘…more about this. For there is a stand (= dispute, pause for reflection?) whether what is good for oneself…’ The emendation has a certain plausibility, but when the same word in its verbal form reappears later at 1237a18-20 it must bear its primary and literal meaning of stopping: ἐνταῦθα γὰρ ἐπιστατέον, καὶ σκεπτέον πότερόν… ‘For here we must stop and examine whether…’ An alternative suggestion, then, is to translate the word the same way in both places and, leaving the text as it is but, for perspicuity, enclosing the relevant words in parentheses, make the first occurrence a reference ahead to the second: ‘But there needs to be yet more distinction about this (there is a stop to it [sc. to making more distinction]). For whether <…> (for here we must stop). And we must examine…’ The point of Aristotle’s speaking here about stopping will be that he is about to embark on a digression which, while necessary, is disruptive, and so, to prevent possible confusion and even annoyance on the part of the reader, he indicates that the disruption has a stop to it. Then, after the digression is finished, he marks the fact by saying he has reached the stop.

Aristotle does sometimes mark digressions elsewhere, as Nicomachean Ethics 1.5.1095b14 (where he marks the end of a digression), but here, unusually, he will be marking both beginning and end of the digression. The reason will be that the digression is involved as well as disruptive. For he has just concluded (at 1236b21-26) that to explain the phenomena about friendship it is necessary to say that there is in a sense only one friendship, the true or virtuous kind, and in a sense several, including those of pleasure and utility. But the point needs explanation, which Aristotle gives by talking about the good and the pleasant (the useful is picked up directly) and saying that the simply good is simply pleasant and that the true friend is for that reason simply pleasant. Hence, he continues, people suppose that any friend, to be a friend, must be pleasant. But this conclusion is too quick. It assumes that goods and pleasures are all equally good and pleasant. But that one friendship is pleasant does not entail that the others are too, and even if all friendships do involve pleasure the pleasure need not be the same. More distinctions need to be made, in particular about whether the thing that friends hold dear is the good simply or the good for them (or the useful), and whether loving is necessarily pleasant. In what follows, in fact, it transpires that while the simply good is always simply pleasant and the simply pleasant always simply good, this connection no longer holds when it comes to the pleasant for and the good for. The pleasant for need be neither simply good nor good for; and the good for need be neither simply pleasant nor pleasant
for. Only when these facts are sorted out can we say the things that need to be said: that
the friendship of virtue is the only true friendship and that the other friendships, of
pleasure and of utility, are distinct and involve a necessary reference back to true
friendship. Hence Aristotle has to embark on an involved discussion about the good and
the good for, about the beautiful and the pleasant, and about how these are the same for
the virtuous but different for the non-virtuous. Only at the end of this discussion is he
able to explain how the pleasant and the useful are found in true friendship, and how the
other friendships arise by a sort of separation or decline from it. But since the relevance
of this discussion does not immediately appear when it begins, Aristotle marks the fact by
saying that the discussion will end and the thread of the argument be picked up again, and
then, when it is picked up, marks that it is being so picked up. Hence arise the ἐπίστασιν
and the ἐπιστατέον. So there is no need for any emendation to the text.

3.5.1233a25-28
Two final suggestions, the first of which, while not required to save the manuscript
readings, takes a different variant in those readings (and an arguably preferable one in the
context), and the second of which is needed to save the readings but is rather speculative.
The first of the passages comes from the same chapter, 3.5, as one already discussed, but
about what it says of the small-souled man and not of the magnanimous man. At
1233a25-28 the Greek as printed by Bekker has: ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος, δὲ ύπαρχόντων αὐτῶ
μεγάλων κατὰ τιμὴν ἀγαθῶν ὡς ἀξίω, τί ἄν εἴποι, ἐκ μικρῶν ἄξιος ἦν; ἢ γὰρ ἄν μεγάλων
ἀξίων χαῦνος ἦν, ἢ ἐπὶ ἐλαττόνων. ‘But the small-souled man, who, when great goods in
accord with his honor are present, does not think himself worthy of them, what would he
say if he was worthy of small things? For either, thinking himself worthy of great things
he would be vain, or of yet smaller things.’ The last sentence is problematic and there are
a number of textual variants to note. Instead of εἴποι an old medieval Latin translation
must have read ἐποίει (for it translates as faceret), and for ἢ γὰρ some manuscripts have
ἐκ γάρ; some manuscripts also omit ἄν; some again reverse ἐπὶ ἐλαττόνων to ἐλαττόνων
ἐπὶ. The OCT prints what Bekker does apart from changing εἴποι to ἐποίει. Susemihl
makes the same change but prints ἐκ γάρ instead of ἢ γὰρ, brackets ἄν, and marks a
lacuna after χαῦνος ἦν. Perhaps ἐποίει is better, but whatever we do there we are still left
with the problem of the last sentence. If we read Bekker’s text we must understand the
sense to be that the person in question, were he in fact worthy of small things, would
either, if he thought himself worthy of great things, be a boaster, or, if he did not, would
end up thinking himself worthy of still smaller things. The interpretation is possible but
it has the drawback that, in its first alternative, it denies the supposition of the example,
which is that the person in question does not think himself worthy of what he is worthy
of. Some sort of denial of the supposition is involved, to be sure, but not in so direct a
way. A suggestion then is to follow Susemihl and read ἐκ γάρ for ἢ γὰρ omitting ἄν, but
to take the sentence as a wish: ‘Would that he were a boaster thinking himself worthy of
great things than of even lesser things!’ Better, in other words, that he who does not think
himself worthy of great things have the vice of a boaster, should he be worthy of small
things, than that he go on underestimating his worth and think himself worthy of still
smaller things (for how low could he sink if he always thinks himself less worthy than he
is and he is worthy of very little?).
Lastly a passage from 1.3, at 1214b34-15a3, which in Bekker’s text reads: ὁμοίως δὲ ταύτας οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν· εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνος· ἄτοπον γὰρ προσφέρειν λόγον τοῖς λόγοις μηθὲν δεομένοις ἄλλα πάθους· ‘In like manner with these, neither [sc. is it worth examining] the opinions of the many. For they speak at random about almost everything, and most of all about…must be examined into alone. For it is absurd to set reason before those who do need not reason but suffering.’ This passage has already had to have εἰκῇ introduced as an emendation for the ei μὴ of the manuscripts (as mentioned in an earlier note), but clearly something more substantial has gone wrong. The OCT adopts the major emendations suggested by Dodds (inspired in part by some marginal notes in one of the manuscripts): ὁμοίως δὲ ταύτας οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν <ἐπισκεπτέον>· εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ <ταύτης· ἄλλα τὰς τῶν σοφῶν ταύτης γε πέρι> ἐπισκέπτεον μόνας: ‘In like manner with these, neither should the opinions of the many be examined into, for they speak at random about almost everything and especially about this [sc. happiness], but only the opinions, at least about this, of the wise.’ The emendation is ingenious but requires considerable alteration of the manuscripts. In addition, it does not seem to produce an altogether acceptable philosophical sense. Aristotle is not of the view that the opinions of the many about happiness should not be examined, for he does examine the opinion, espoused by the many, that happiness is bodily pleasure. Now it may be that he examines this opinion not qua opinion of the many but qua opinion of people of significance, like Sardanapalus and Smyndirides, whom the many admire (1.4&5). But still, the opinion is one that is held by the many (cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1.5.1095b15-22). Other emendations are less drastic, such as Spengel’s replacing of μόνας by εὐδοκιμώνιας, along with the transposition of ἐπισκέπτεον (followed by Susemihl). But this emendation still has the drawback of saying that the opinions of the many are not to be examined.

Attempts to correct the text by seeing if the EE’s besetting fault of misreading letters is at work again do not seem to lead anywhere. A way, nevertheless, of saving the manuscript readings does exist but it is a rather speculative one. It deserves at least to be canvassed if only because it relies on the devices, whose success in other passages has already been noted above, of punctuation and of re-dividing the letters. It goes as follows: ὁμοίως δὲ ταύτας οὐδὲ τὰς τῶν πολλῶν (εἰκῇ γὰρ λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ ἀπάντων καὶ μάλιστα) περιπεσκεπτέον μόνας: ‘In like manner with these, neither should the opinions of the many (for they speak at random about almost everything even most of all) be ‘examined into about’ alone.’ This reading does have the advantage of not denying that the opinions of the many are to be examined (it only denies that they alone are to be examined), but it faces the two main difficulties of the peculiar position of καὶ μάλιστα and the neologism περιπεσκεπτέον. The first can be defended on the grounds of emphasis and a certain tone of sarcasm, and the second on the grounds of a mocking exaggeration in that tone (which indeed is carried over into the next sentence), for περιπεσκεπτέον will be a nonce word made up for the occasion (and so should perhaps be printed with scare quotes). The mocking sarcasm will be directed at sophists and other public flatterers who spend all their time, when discussing happiness, on an examination over and over of popular opinions and only of popular opinions (whereas, in fact, it is absurd to set reason before the many, who need pain and not verbal persuasion). The
serious student, on the contrary, while paying these opinions the due they deserve, little enough to be sure, should examine also and more the opinions of better people, of gentlemen and philosophers, who think happiness to be virtue and wisdom (and such a procedure is what Aristotle follows in the succeeding chapters).

There are no parallels for περιεπισκεπτέον (nor should there be if it is a nonce word), but there is a parallel for the prefix περιεπ-, and for doubling prefixes with the same or similar meaning to the same verb. Epicurus on one occasion at least used the verb περιεπικείμαι in the form περιεπικείμ[ε]να,\(^1\) but the text is so damaged that we can work out little of the context. Also, in the fifth Homeric Hymn (to Aphrodite) at line 271,\(^2\) the poet, speaking of trees dying, puts ἄμφι and περί together at the beginning of the same verb: φλοιὸς δ’ ἄμφιπεριφθινύθει, πίπτουσι δ’ ἄπ’ ὄζοι… ‘And the bark decays round about them, and the twigs fall off.’ These parallels are enough to show that περιεπισκεπτέον, however unlikely, is yet not impossible as a Greek word. But if, despite them, the suggestion that Aristotle was using this word in the passage in question is considered too farfetched, then the only option left will be to engage in some more or less extensive emendation.


See Barnes (n. 1). The OCT also frequently gets the Bekker line divisions wrong, as at 1218a12-19, 1236a35-b3, 1238a12-19 and no doubt elsewhere.

An exception is A. von Fragstein, *Studien zur Ethik des Aristoteles*. (Amsterdam, 1974), 4, who says, rightly on the whole, that there is usually need only for ‘geringe Korrekturen.’

Whether there is a further error here and ἢ has dropped out after, or should replace, the first ἢ (‘and this [either] as itself or . . .’) is also likely if not as manifest.

There are similar examples elsewhere, some obviously correct and others less so, which are worth listing (the list does not pretend to be exhaustive): at 1215a1 εἰκὴ is misread for εἰκῆ (Sylburg; EIMH for EIKH); at 1218a15 πῶς is misread for ἢ ὡς (Victorius; ΠΩΣ for ΗΩΣ); at 1219a28 πλέον is misread for τέλεον (Bekker; ΠΛΕΟΝ for ΤΕΛΕΟΝ); at 1219a33 ἑνέργεια ἢ is misread for ἑνέργειαν (Bonitz; ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΗ for ΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙΝ); at 1219b24 μῆ is misread for πῆ (Casaubon; ΜΗ for ΠΗ); at 1237a2 τοῦτον misread for τοῦτο ἢ (Bekker; ΤΟΥΤΟΝ for ΤΟΥΤΟΗ)


Susemihl leaves Bekker’s text as is save that he puts the τὸ before ἢθος and adds the τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν.


Here is where, as mentioned in n. 6, the manuscript reading πῶς has had to be corrected to ἢ ὡς. von Fragstein, however (n. 4), 37, thinks πῶς can stand. He takes Aristotle to be thinking of different sides of a formal division and to be meaning by ἀνάπαλαν κτλ something like ‘Turning to the other side [sc. of the division of the good that the Platonists talk about], we must also show how they now prove . . .’

The emendation has hardly managed to produce an argument that either escapes criticism or indeed is easy to decipher; Woods (n. 11), 74-76.

Susemihl, however, brackets ἐπίστασιν. πότερον as corrupt and marks a lacuna after γάρ.

H. Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, (Berlin, 1870), s.v. ὕποστάτων.


Although perhaps ἂν could be retained, for post-Classical Greek, contrary to the practice of the Classical models, does seem sometimes to allow the use of ἂν with a past tense of the indicative in wishes, and Aristotle, however much of a model he may be in philosophy, is hardly one in Classical Greek. Perhaps ἂν could also be retained, not as going with ἢ, but with the participle ἀξιῶν and giving it a more remote sense, since, after all, the hypothesis (that the man in question should think himself worthy of more than he is worthy of) is contrary here to the supposed case.


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