On Emending and not Emending the Text of Some Passages in Aristotle’s

Ethica Eudemia

The text of Aristotle’s Ethica Eudemia (EE) is often in need of emendation, especially because of the particular fault in the mss. of misreading one letter for another or misdividing letters to form words. Scholars have already done fine work in correcting many of these errors (especially at the beginning of 8.1), but more needs to be done. A second problem with the text does not have to do with matters of spelling or grammar (or even of punctuation), but rather with those of philosophical sense. For, as scholars have noted, the EE is marked by considerable compression of thought, and this compression leads scholars to propose changes where, on further consideration, it can be shown that not change of words but change of comprehension is needed.

The following article is divided into two parts. The first is about passages where scholars have judged emendation to be necessary but where, or so it will here be argued, not emendation of the Greek but only change in comprehension is required. The second is about passages where some emendation is indeed required but where there is room for further suggestion about what the emendation should be. In both parts the passages are discussed in order of appearance in the text. First the Bekker text is given, then a translation (sometimes excessively literal), then discussion of emendations, then finally a revised translation (where necessary). Reference to the mss. is by the name the OCT gives them. These passages have, of course, already been subject to much scholarly discussion and emendation, always learned and sometimes ingenious, but the
suggestions to be made here are new and have not, to my knowledge, been proposed elsewhere.

*Some Passages not Needing Textual Emendation*

2.10.1226b2-5

ἐπειδή οὖν οὔτε δόξα οὔτε βούλησις ἐστὶ προαίρεσις, ἐστὶν ώς ἐκάτερον, οὐδ’ ἁμφω…

ὡς ἐξ ἁμφοῖν ἄρα. ἁμφω γὰρ ὑπάρχει τῷ προαιρομένῳ ταῦτα. ‘So, since choice is neither opinion nor will, it is as each but not both… As from both, then; for both of them are present in one who chooses.’ The main problem here is ἐστὶ προαίρεσις, ἐστὶν ώς ἐκάτερον, for not only does there seem to be an unnecessary reduplication of ἐστὶ but this reduplication also seems to give a false sense. For how can choice be as each and yet not both? Indeed P and C seem to reflect this puzzle because they omit ἐστὶ προαίρεσις altogether. The OCT, by contrast, follows Allan in deleting the first ἐστὶ and the comma after προαίρεσις to give the sense: ‘So, since choice is not opinion or will as each of them nor both…’ It also notes in the apparatus Ross’ suggestion to read ἐστὶν <ἡ> προαίρεσις {ἐστὶν} ώς ἐκάτερον. Susemihl leaves the text as is save for removing the comma, but notes in the apparatus that Bussemaker also deleted ἐστὶν after προαίρεσις and that Bonitz (in part anticipating Ross) suggested deleting ἐστὶ before προαίρεσις and replacing it with ἡ. However, there is no real need to add ἡ (and the OCT does not add it), nor, more importantly, is there need for any other emendation. In fact the emendations give a false sense for, although it looks odd at first sight to say that choice is each but not both, Aristotle’s meaning seems to be precisely of this sort when
he concludes, in the next line, that choice is from both. For, as he says later, it is from both in the sense that choice is both opinion and appetite (of which will is one species) when these, as a result of deliberation, are brought together in a conclusion (1227a3-5). A better solution, then, is to keep Bekker’s text as it is and construe ἔστιν ώς the way phrases like ἔστιν ὡτε are construed (‘there is a time when…’) and get the meaning ‘there is a way that…’ Hence we should accent differently and print προαιρεσις, ἔστιν ώς and translate: ‘So, since a choice is neither opinion nor will, there is a way that it is each but not both…’ The ‘there is a way that’ will now be qualifying the ‘it is each but not both’ in anticipation of the conclusion about the nature of choice that Aristotle finally reaches.

3.1.1229a11-16

ἔστι δ’ εἰδὴ ἀνδρείας πέντε λεγόμενα καθ’ ὁμοιότητα: … δευτέρα ἡ στρατιωτική· αὕτη δὲ δι’ ἐμπειρίαν καὶ τὸ εἰδέναι, οὕχ ὡσπερ Ἐσκράτης ἔφη, τὰ δεινά, ἀλλ’ ὃτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν. ‘There are five kinds of bravery spoken of by likeness… A second is military bravery, and this is based on experience and knowing, not terrible things, as Socrates said, but that helps for terrible things.’ The problem word here is the ὃτι in ἀλλ’ ὃτι τὰς βοηθείας τῶν δεινῶν which is not only unnecessary but disrupts the sense. Susemihl prints Bekker’s text but notes in the apparatus that Sylburg proposed deleting ὃτι, which is followed by the OCT, and that Bonitz proposed instead adding ἰσασι. A simpler solution is to leave things as they are and regard the construction as an infinitive and accusative clause with pleonastic ὃτι (LSJ s.v. II.2), the ὃτι serving, in this case, to show that the accusatives are not objects of εἰδέναι but an indirect statement dependent on it:
'...knowing, not terrible things, as Socrates said, but that there are helps for terrible things.'

3.4.1231b38-32a4

διχώς δὲ τὰ χρήματα λέγομεν καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικὴν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὸ χρήσις τοῦ κτήματος ἐστίν, οίον ύποδήματος ἢ ἴματίου, ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός μὲν, ὡς μέντοι οὕτως ὡς ἄν εἰ τις σταθμῇ χρήσαιτο τῷ ύποδήματι, ἀλλ’ οἴον ἡ πώλησις καὶ ἡ μίσθωσις: χρῆται γὰρ ύποδήματι. 'We speak of things monetary and of business in two ways. For there is the using of a piece of property per se, as of a cloak or a shoe, and there is a using of it per accidens, not however in the way one might use a shoe for a weight, but as selling and lending, for it uses a shoe.' The only problem here is the word ύποδήματι, for the mss. tradition is unclear. The OCT reports that P has ύποδη with μτ added as a superscript, that C has ύποδημ with τ added as a superscript, and that L has ύποδήματα. The reading ύποδήματι is proposed by Victorius and is adopted by Susemihl. The OCT, however, thinks that this proposal is not sufficient by itself and follows Richards in adapting from Pol 1.8.1257a11-12 and writing χρῆται γὰρ <ν> ύποδήματι <ὁ δεόμενος>. 'For the one who needs it uses it as a shoe.' This more extensive emendation gives a better sense than ύποδήματι by itself but it has the disadvantage precisely of being more extensive and so harder to explain philologically. The OCT also puts the whole phrase into parentheses, which may well be an improvement but does nothing by itself to favor or disfavor the emendation. An alternative to the emendation, then, would be to follow L and write ύποδήματα but
understand χρήται as passive (‘are provided’) and not as middle (‘it uses’), and so translate: ‘for shoes [sc. and not weights] are provided [sc. by selling and lending shoes].’ Aristotle will thus be playing on the double meaning of the verb χράω: to provide, and (in the middle) to use; the point is that in selling and lending one is using shoes as a medium of exchange and not for wearing (so that the use is per accidens), but one is nevertheless providing people with shoes and not, say, with weights. The drawback with this suggestion is, of course, that it depends on exploiting a double use of χράω, which, in the absence of any warning of the fact, might be hard to catch, even for native Greek speakers. But perhaps Aristotle intends such readers to catch it when they see that without a double use the phrase will be ungrammatical. Compression of statement, both in grammar and logic, is after all a feature of EE so that to posit another instance of it here is hardly out of keeping with the rest of the text; it speaks more in favor of the suggestion than against it.

3.6.1233b6-15.

ὁ δὲ κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ ώς ὁ λόγος, μεγαλοπρεπῆς· τὸ γάρ πρέπον κατ’ ἀξίαν ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γάρ πρέπει τῶν παρὰ τὴν ἀξίαν. δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι. καὶ γάρ τοῦ πρέποντος κατ’ ἀξίαν, καὶ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ὃ, οἷον περὶ οἰκέτου γάμον ἔτερον τὸ πρέπον καὶ περὶ ἐρωμένου, καὶ αὐτῷ, εἰπέρ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἢ τοιοῦτον, οἷον τὴν θεωρίαν οὐκ ἔμετο Θεμιστοκλεῖ πρέπειν ἢν ἐποιήσατο Ὀλυμπίαζε, διὰ τὴν προὔπαρξαν ταπεινότητα, ἀλλὰ Κίμωνι. ὁ δ’ ὁπως ἔτυχεν ἅχων πρὸς τὴν ἀξίαν, ὁ οὐθεὶς τούτων. καὶ ἔτπ’ ἐλευθεριότητος ὡσαύτως· ἐστι γάρ τις ὡς ἐλευθέριος, ὅταν ἐλεύθερος. ‘But he who does what is according to worth and as
reason says, he is magnificent. For the fitting accords with worth; for nothing is fitting that is contrary to worth. But it must be fitting, for indeed of the fitting in accord with worth, and fitting and as regards what (for example, one thing fits the marriage of a servant and another the marriage of a beloved) and to it/him, if up to so much or of such a sort; for example the thinking was that the embassage Themistocles made to Olympia was not fitting for him (on account of his former low condition), but it was for Cimon. He who is disposed to worth as it chances, the nobody of these. Things are the same way too with liberality, that there is someone who is as a liberal man when he is free.’ There are several problems here, as the rather wooden translation shows. Susemihl follows Fritzsche in marking a lacuna after δεῖ δὲ πρέπον εἶναι and in deleting ὅ in ὅ οὐθεὶς τούτων. He also includes in one parenthesis all of καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον and follows Casaubon in emending ἔστι γὰρ τις ὡς ἐλευθέριος, ὅταν ἐλεύθερος to read ἔστι γὰρ τις οὔτ’ ἐλευθέριος οὔτ’ ἀνελεύθερος (‘it is possible for someone to be neither liberal nor illiberal’). The OCT follows Casaubon’s emendation, does not delete ὅ in ὅ οὐθεὶς τούτων, accepts Susemihl’s parenthesis, and marks as corrupt the whole of πρέπον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πρέποντος κατ’ ἀξίαν καὶ πρέπον). The passage is certainly obscure but there is a way to make sense of Bekker’s text as it stands if, in particular, one gives to τοῦ πρέποντος a verbal force and treats it as a compressed genitive absolute. ‘But he who does what is according to worth and as reason says, he is magnificent (for the fitting accords with worth; for nothing is fitting that is contrary to worth). But it must be fitting, for as indeed the fitting is in accord with worth, there must in fact be a fit both as regards what (for example, one thing fits the marriage of a servant
and another the marriage of a beloved) and for him, if he is really up to so much or such; for example the thinking was that the embassage Themistocles made to Olympia was not fitting for him (on account of his former low condition), but it was for Cimon. He who is disposed to worth as it chances is the nobody among these. Things are the same way too with liberality, that there is someone who is as a liberal man is - when he is free to be.’ The sense of the last two sentences is that someone might be disposed as the liberal man is but only be able to behave so when the conditions are met, namely when he is free of restraints (financial or physical), just as also in the case of magnificence. For one could be disposed as the magnificent man is but be unable to behave so because of lack of pre-conditions, like Themistocles who, though he had, like Cimon, the resources to put on a splendid display, did not have the right family status, and so, when he tried to be magnificent, only succeeded in being a swaggerer. He should have refrained because he was out of his league, or a ‘nobody’, in the context.

7.2.1236b1-5

φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι ἡ πρώτη φιλία ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. φίλον μὲν γὰρ τὸ φιλούμενον τῷ φιλούντι, φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλούμενῳ καὶ ἀντιφιλῶν. ‘From this it is clear that the first friendship is the mutual loving and choosing of the good for each other. For dear to the lover is the object beloved but dear is he? to the beloved when he also loves back.’ The oddity here is the abrupt change from the neuter φίλον in the first clause to the masculine φίλος in the second. Susemihl leaves the text as it is but notes in the apparatus Fritzsche’s suggested emendation of φίλος δὲ τῷ φιλούμενῳ τῷ φιλούμενος (‘the beloved is dear when he loves back) as
well as his own to φιλος δὲ τῷ φιλουμένω καὶ ἀντι< φιλούντι καὶ ο> φιλῶν (‘dear to the beloved and to the one who loves back is also he who loves’). The OCT adopts Fritzsche’s emendation. However, Fritzsche’s sense, which seems right, can be found in the text already, though with considerable economy of expression (a particular feature of EE’s style): ‘for dear to the lover is what is beloved, but dear to the beloved when he also loves back.’ A remark is first made, then, about the thing loved (in the neuter) being dear to the lover, and then a remark is made about he who loves back (in the masculine) being dear to him who is loved (i.e., in this case, loved back). The abrupt shift in gender is, it seems, deliberate, so as to highlight the point at issue: inanimate things like wine can be loved, but only animate things like other human beings can, when loved, love back and make the lover into the beloved. That is why, as Aristotle says in the opening sentence, friendship is only possible in the second case and not in the first.

7.2.1237b10-13

tὸ γὰρ κεκριμένον βέβαιον, τὰ δὲ μὴ ταχύ γινόμενα μηδὲ ραδίως οὐ ποιεῖ τὴν κρίσιν ὀρθήν. οὐκ ἔστι δ’ ἄνευ πίστεως φιλία βέβαιος· ἥ δὲ πίστις οὐκ ἄνευ χρόνου. ‘For what has passed judgment is firm, but things that do not happen quickly or easily do not make judgment right; and there is no firm friendship without trust, and there is no trust without time.’ The problem scholars find with this passage is the οὐ in οὐ ποιεῖ, for it seems the opposite must be true, that things that do not happen quickly and easily do make judgment right and not that they do not make it right. At any rate the following remarks about friendship and trust seem to mean that friendship is only rightly judged after passage of time. Hence both Susemihl and the OCT agree with Bonitz in deleting οὐ.
The deletion is unnecessary. The sense is that things that happen quickly and easily make for correct judgment because what they really are is soon seen, while things that do not happen quickly and easily do not make for right judgment because what they really are is not soon seen. Friendship is of the latter kind because it needs trust and trust needs time. So translate more along the lines: 'For what has passed judgment is firm, but when things do not happen quickly or easily the judgment is not made rightly, and there is no firm friendship without trust and there is no trust without time.'

7.2.1238a4-8

ἀγαθὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐστὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθῷ· ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸς καὶ φίλος, ὅταν συμφωνήσῃ ταῦτ’ ἁμφω, ὥστε ὁ ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν, τῷ τοῦτον ἄλλω, ἦ καὶ μὴ ἀπλῶς μὲν σπουδαίῳ, ἄλλῳ δ’ ἀγαθός, ὃτι χρήσιμος. ‘For he is simply good by being good and a friend by being good for another. Simply good and friend when these are both in harmony, so that what is simply good, by the other of this, or also not simply good to a virtuous man but to another, because useful.’ The problems here are clear from the literal translation. Susemihl and the OCT both follow Λ¹ and add δ’ to ἁπλῶς <δ’> ἀγαθὸς so as to give the new sentence its opening particle. Instead of τῷ τοῦτον ἄλλω Susemihl follows P² and writes τὸ τοῦτον ἄλλω but with what sense is unclear since he marks the whole of ὁ ἐστὶν…ὁτι χρήσιμος as corrupt. The OCT follows Richards in writing τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλω and, like Susemihl, follows P and C in writing εἰ καὶ for ἦ καὶ, thus giving the following sort of sense to the whole clause: ‘…so that what is simply good, the same is good to another, even if to one not simply virtuous, but to another he
is good, because useful.’ Again, however, Bekker’s text can be given an intelligible sense as it stands. First, if one removes the stop that Bekker puts after τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθῷ and makes it one sentence with what follows (so that no δ’ needs to be inserted between ἀπλῶς and ἀγαθῶς), one can translate: ‘For a simply good man and friend, when these are both in harmony, is simply good by being good and dear by being good for another.’ Second, if one construes ὅ ἐστιν ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν rather differently, treats τούτου in τῷ τούτου ἄλλῳ as a genitive of comparison with ἄλλῳ, and retains ἥ καὶ but accents ἥ as ἦ so that it means not ‘or’ but ‘yes’, one can translate: ‘Consequently, what he is simply is a good for the man other than this - yes, even for one not simply virtuous but other [sc. other than virtuous] he is good, because he is useful.’ Alternatively, one could, perhaps, retain the ἥ καὶ or the εἰ καὶ of the mss. and, instead of: ‘yes, even for one not simply...’ translate: ‘or even for one not simply...’ or ‘even if for one not simply...’

This sort of construal of the Greek is not obvious but it is not impossible either, and that Aristotle is requiring his readers here to puzzle out his grammar as much as his logic is manifest from the phrase φίλος δὲ τῷ ἄλλῳ ἀγαθῷ (where, to make sense, the τῷ must be construed with an understood εἶναι and not with ἄλλῳ). The sense, at any rate, will be that the simply good man and friend, while he is of course a good for a virtuous friend, will also, because he is simply good, be a good for anyone else, including those who are not virtuous, for he will be useful to them. First, then, he will be useful to other virtuous people with whom he is unable to be virtuous friends (one can only be virtuous friends with a few and not with many, as Aristotle remarks in the immediately next sentence), because he will deal with them justly. Second, he will be
useful to the vicious for the same reason (the vicious will be able to rely on his honesty), and also because, by rebuking them as occasion requires, he may help to reform them.

7.4.1239a28-33

φύσει δὲ γίνονται οἱ μὲν φιλητικοί οἱ δὲ φιλότιμοι. φιλητικός δὲ ὁ τῷ φιλεῖν χαίρων μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ φιλεῖσθαι· ἐκεῖνος δὲ φιλότιμος μᾶλλον. ὁ μὲν οὖν χαίρων τῷ θαυμάζεσθαι καὶ φιλεῖσθαι τῆς ύπεροχῆς φίλος· ὁ δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ φιλεῖν ᾑδονῆς ὁ φιλητικός. ἐνεστὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν συμβεβηκός· ἐστὶ γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλοῦμενον, φιλοῦντα δ’ οὖ. ‘Some are by nature love-inclined and others lovers of honor. He is love-inclined who enjoys loving more than being loved; the other, however, is more honor loving. So he, enjoying being admired and loved, is friend of excess; but the first, the love-inclined, is friend of the pleasure in loving, for necessity is present ?being active; for loving is accidental; for it can escape the notice of the one loved, but not of the one loving.’ The problem words here are ἐνεστὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα· τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν συμβεβηκός· ἐστὶ γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλοῦμενον, φιλοῦντα δ’ οὖ. The OCT follows Sylburg and Robinson in replacing ἐνεστὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐνεργοῦντα with ἐστὶ γὰρ ἀνάγκη <φιλεῖν> ἐνεργοῦντα (’it is necessary that he love when active’), and follows P² and Λ¹ in replacing τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν συμβεβηκός with τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖσθαι συμβεβηκός (’for being loved is accidental’). Susemihl makes the second change but not the first though he remarks in the apparatus that the text is somehow corrupt. If it is somehow corrupt the simplest change would be to follow Richards in replacing ἀνάγκη with ἀνάγκη, for then ἐνεργοῦντα (which need not be changed, with Richards, to ἐνεργοῦντι) can be read as
an accusative absolute to give the sense: ‘for it [sc. the pleasure in loving] is necessarily present within when he is active’ (pleasure is necessarily present when activity is unimpeded). It is not, however, necessary to change φιλεῖν to φιλεῖσθαι for, despite the seeming oddity of the remark, we can, if we press the transitive force of φιλεῖν, take it to mean that having an object of one’s love is accidental (for the object might be unaware that it is the object). The point can be reinforced by noting that the position of μὲν and δ’ requires us to contrast φιλοῦντα δ’ οὐ with τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλεῖν συμβεβηκός and not with ἔστι γὰρ λανθάνειν φιλούμενον. The translation should therefore be: ‘for that he has a love is accidental (for it can escape the notice of the object loved) but his being a lover is not.’ An act of love has an object that it loves and a subject that does the loving. The object is accidental to the act because the act can exist even if the object knows or cares nothing of the fact, but the subject is not because the act exists in the subject.

7.5.1239b29-32

ἔστι δὲ πως καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἐναντίου φιλία τοῦ ἁγάθου. ὀρέγεται γὰρ ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ μέσον· ώς σύμβολα γὰρ ὀρέγεται ἀλλήλων· διὸ οὗ τῷ γίνεσθαι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσον. ‘But friendship of the opposite can in a way also be of the good. For opposites are drawn to each other through the mean; for they are drawn to each other as matching tallies. Hence they are a mean not by becoming a single thing from both.’ Both Susemihl and the OCT take exception to the last phrase and instead of ...ἀλλήλων· διὸ οὗ τῷ γίνεσθαι write, following Spengel, ἀλλήλων διὰ τὸ οὕτω γίνεσθαι... (‘they are drawn to each other as matching tallies because they thus become a single thing from both’). The
emendation gives a false sense. For, as the example of the tallies shows, the point is that the extremes do not, when coming together, cease to be extremes, but just have their defects supplied by each other. Some confirmation is given a few lines later (1240a1-3) when Aristotle speaks of unlike people rejoicing in each other (as the austere in the witty and the hasty in the sluggish) because they bring each other toward the mean. The hasty and sluggish, and the austere and witty, do not hereby become a one; their temperaments are just relieved by each other. We should, therefore, leave Bekker’s text (and the translation) as it is.

7.6.1240a33-39

ἐτι τὸ ἄλγοντι συναλγεῖν μή δι’ ἔτερον τι ἀγατᾶν θήσομεν… βούλεται γάρ μάλιστά τε οὗ μόνον συλλυπεῖσθαι ὁ φίλος τῷ φίλῳ, ἄλλα καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν λύπην, οἷον διψῶντι συνδίψῃν, εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι μὴ ἐγγύτατα. ‘Further, we will lay down as love to feel pain with someone in pain not for any other reason… For the friend most wishes to feel not only pain with his friend but also the same pain, as to thirst with him when thirsty, if it was possible because not very near.’ The problem words here are εἰ ἐνεδέχετο, ὅτι μὴ ἐγγύτατα. Susemihl deletes μὴ with Fritzsche but notes in the apparatus Fritzsche’s further suggestion of replacing εἰ with ἃ εἰ μὴ. The OCT also deletes μὴ, adopts Fritzsche’s further suggestion (P and C have ἃ in place of L’s εἰ), but adds a comma, with Robinson, to give ἃ, εἰ μὴ (‘...to thirst with him when thirsty or, if it was not possible, as nearly as could be’). Bekker’s text can, however, be given an acceptable sense, and perhaps indeed a better sense, if we take the verb ἐνεδέχετο not in its meaning of ‘it was
possible’ but in its primary meaning of ‘to take upon oneself’ and translate: ‘...to thirst with him when thirsty, if he took it upon himself...’ The main problem here is that the verb ἐνδέχεσθαι so often has the modal force of ‘can’ or ‘be able’ that it may seem a stretch not to give it that meaning here too. There is, however, another place in the Aristotelian corpus where the verb seems to require being understood in the sense of ‘take upon oneself’. The passage is Poetica 24.1460a33-35 where Bekker’s text reads: ἐξ ἀρχῆς γάρ οὐ δεῖ συνήστασθαι τοιούτους· ἢν δὲ θῇ καὶ φαίνηται εὐλογωτέρως ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ἄτοπον… “[The poet] should not construct such plots. But if he does posit [such a plot] and it appears fairly plausible, he should accept even an absurdity.” However the mss. have ἐνδέχεσθαι in place of ἀποδέχεσθαι and ἀποδέχεσθαι is an emendation proposed in certain late mss. The emendation is unnecessary. Since ἐνδέχεσθαι in its primary sense means ‘accept’ or ‘take upon oneself’ it is already in this sense equivalent to ἀποδέχεσθαι. Accordingly, one should allow that Aristotle might very well have been using the same verb in the same sense here in EE.

As for the final phrase ὅτι μὴ ἐγγύτατα, it too can be given an acceptable sense, but it is ambiguous. The words ὅτι μὴ can either be taken together with the sense of ‘unless’ or ‘except’, or be taken separately with the sense of ‘because not’. In the first way the phrase will mean: ‘[...took it upon himself,] unless very close by’, and in the second: ‘[...took it upon himself,] because not very close by.’ The meaning in either case is more or less the same, that the friend would in solidarity take it upon himself to suffer as his friend is suffering (e.g. to thirst when he is thirsting) unless he is sufficiently close by to come to his aid and relieve him directly. Both construals have, however,
grammatical problems. ὅτι μὴ taken as a single phrase normally follows a negative clause (LSJ sv ὅτι II), and ὅτι taken separately would have οὐ rather than μὴ as its negative. As regards the problem of the negative particle, since the ὅτι clause is here not only causal but also conditional (it is a subordinate part of the εἰ clause), a μὴ is perhaps not impossible. As regards the problem of the negative particle, one could perhaps write ὅτε instead of ὅτι. For ὅτε μὴ is likewise a phrase but need not follow a negative clause, and it too means ‘unless’, ‘except’, ‘save when’ (LSJ sv ὅτε I.2.c).

7.6.1240b28-34

ζητεῖ δὲ ὁ ἀπλῶς ὃν ἀγαθὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ὡσπερ εἰρηται, ὅτι δὲ’ ἔχει ἐν αὐτῷ ἀ φύσει βούλεται εἶναι φίλα καὶ διαστάσει ἀδύνατον. διὸ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπου μὲν δοκεῖ ἕκαστος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ φίλος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων οἶον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἀρα φίλος. ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ τὰ παιδία, ἀλλ’ ὅταν ήδη ἔχῃ προαιρέσειν· Ἦδη γὰρ τότε διαφωνεῖ ὁ παῖς πρὸς τὴν ἑπιθυμίαν. ‘He who is simply good seeks to be also himself a friend to himself, as was said, because he has two parts in himself that naturally want to be friends and it is impossible to split them asunder. Hence in the human case each seems to be himself a friend to himself, while in the case of the other animals as a horse itself to itself; so it is not a friend. But children are not either, except when they already have choice, for then the child is already discordant in relation to its desire.’ The problem phrase here is ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων οἶον ἵππος αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. Susemihl follows Spengel in adding οὐ after ἄλλων ζώων (‘while in the case of the other animals it is not so’) and marks, on his own
account, a lacuna after αὐτὸς αὐτῷ. The OCT also adds οὗ but follows Rieckher in adding οὐκ ὀρεκτός after αὐτὸς αὐτῷ (‘...it is not so, for example a horse is not itself desirable to itself’). However, again Bekker’s text can be given an acceptable sense as it stands: ‘Hence in the human case each seems to be himself a friend to himself, while in the case of the other animals, as a horse, each seems to be itself to itself, so it is not a friend.’ An animal, unlike a man, is not a ‘two’ in its soul (it is just an ‘itself’) and so cannot be a friend to itself. Like the child mentioned next, animals have desire but no choice and so do not have parts that can either conflict or be brought into friendship with each other. Hence, further, we should not follow either Susemihl or the OCT (themselves following Fritzsch) in replacing παῖς with νοῦς in the next sentence. When a child is old enough to have choice it can be in conflict with itself in relation to desire (it judges and chooses one thing as better but is drawn by desire to something else); hence it is then a ‘two’ and can be, or fail to be, a friend to itself. Animals, by contrast, never get to this point because they never get to have choice.

7.10.1242a20-25

καὶ γὰρ ὅλως τὸ δίκαιον ἀπαν πρὸς φίλον. τὸ τε γὰρ δίκαιον τισι καὶ κοινωνοῖς, καὶ οἱ φίλοις κοινωνοῖς, οὶ μὲν γένους, οὶ δὲ βίου. οἱ γὰρ ἀνθρωπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ οἰκονομικὸν ζῶον, καὶ οὐχ ὡσπερ τάλλα ποτε συνδύαζεται καὶ τῷ τυχόντι καὶ θηλεὶ καὶ ἄρρενι... ‘For in fact generally the just is all in relation to a friend. For the just is for certain people, that is, for sharers, and a friend is a sharer, the one in family and another in way of life. For man is not only a political but a household animal and does not, like the other animals, couple together by occasion and with any chance male or female...’
However, the words ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος οὐ μόνον πολιτικὸν are Casaubon’s emendation (followed also by Susemihl and the OCT), and what the mss. have is ὁ γὰρ ἀνθρώπος μόνον οὐ πολιτικὸς (‘for he of man is only not political’). The emendation seems obvious, but if we supply the word for ‘friend’ from the preceding sentence we can translate: ‘For he who is friend of a man alone does not belong to a city (= is not political), but he is indeed a household animal...’ The phrasing is peculiar but it does have a sense. Moreover this sense serves a logical role in the argument in the context. For he who is ‘friend of a man alone’ will be someone who is friends with one or a few and not with many in a city. But such a person, even if he is not part of a city, must at least be part of a family (he is a household animal), for man, unlike other animals, sets up permanent relations with another and does not pass from one chance encounter to the next. Hence, if everyone is either part of a city or not, and if those who are not are still friends and sharers with others, at least in a household, and if, further, being friends and sharers in city and household is a relation of justice, then all relations of friends are relations of justice, which is the statement Aristotle began with (or part of it; the converse, that all relations of justice are relations of friends, is something he argues for in the larger context).

7.10.1243b14-18

πολλὰ ἐγκλήματα γίνεται ἐν ταῖς φιλίαις τοῖς μὴ κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἰδεῖν. οὐ ράδιον γὰρ χαλεπὸν μετρήσαι ἐνι τῷ δὲ τῷ μὴ κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν, οἷον συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τῶν ἑρωτικῶν. ὃ μὲν γὰρ διώκει ὡς τὸν ἥδυν ἐπὶ τὸ συζήν, ὃ δὲ ἐκεῖνον ἐνίστε ὡς χρήσιμον· 'Many complaints arise in friendships for those not in a straight line and to see the just.
For it is not easy hard (?) to measure by a single thing for him who is not in a straight line, as happens in love affairs. For the one pursues as after one pleasant to live with, and the other after him sometimes as useful.’ The problems here are clear from the literal translation (note, though, that the meaning of ‘not in a straight line’ is clear from the example: those are friends ‘not in a straight line’ who are friends on different bases, as one on that of pleasure and the other on that of utility). Both Susemihl and the OCT (following Bonitz and Fritzsche) transpose γάρ to follow χαλεπτόν and change the punctuation, writing: …κατ’ εὐθυωρίαν, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἵδειν οὐ ράδιον. χαλεπτόν γάρ μετρήσαι ἐν τῷ τῷ δὲ εὐθυωρίαν (‘…in a straight line, and to see the just is not easy. For it is hard to measure by this one thing what is not in a straight line’). The emendations seem obvious. However, Bekker’s text can again be given a sense and, though nothing of significance seems to hang on the fact, the sense is worth noting: ‘Many complaints arise in friendships for those not in a straight line even to see the just. For to measure a difficult thing by this one thing is not easy for him who is not in a straight line, as happens in love affairs…’ Those who are not friends on the same basis are ‘not in a straight line even to see the just’ because each is looking in different directions, as one at pleasure and the other at utility. Friendships on different bases are ‘a difficult thing’ and to measure such a difficult thing by ‘this one thing’, namely by justice (each friend getting his due), is ‘hard’ for ‘him who is not in a straight line’, namely for each of the friends, for neither is in a straight line with the other.

7.12.1245b1-7

tοῦτο δ’ ἐστίν ὅτε μὲν πάθος, ὅτε δὲ πρᾶξις, ὅτε δὲ ἔτερον τι, εἰ δυνατὸν εὖ ζῆν, καὶ οὔτω
καὶ τὸν φίλον. ἐν δὲ τῷ συζήν συνεργεῖν, ἥ κοινωνίαν τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε. διὸ συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι... ‘And this [sc. contemplating oneself in a good] is sometimes a feeling, sometimes a doing, sometimes something else, if it is possible to live well, and thus also one’s friend; and in living together working together, or community of things included in the end, surely most of all. Hence it is to contemplate together and feast...’ Again the problems are clear from the literal translation. Note first, however, that μάλιστά γε is from the Aldine editio princeps; the mss. read μάλιστά τε. Susemihl and the OCT both write as follows: ...οτὲ δὲ ἐτερὸν τι. εἰ δ’ αὐτόν εῦ ζήν, καὶ οὔτω καὶ τὸν φίλον, ἐν δὲ τῷ συζήν συνεργεῖν, ἥ κοινωνία τῶν ἐν τέλει μάλιστά γε. διὸ <δὲ> συνθεωρεῖν καὶ συνευωχεῖσθαι... ‘...sometimes something else. But if it is pleasant [supplied from the previous sentence] to live well oneself and for one’s friend also to live thus, and if in living together there is working together, surely their sharing will be mainly in things included in the end. Hence it is necessary to contemplate together and feast together...’). Here the δ’ αὐτόν comes from L, ἥ κοινωνία from D, and δὲ from Fritzsche. Nevertheless, the readings of all the remaining mss., including μάλιστά τε (which there is no compelling reason to change to μάλιστά γε), can be given an acceptable sense and, though again nothing of significance seems to hang on the fact, this sense is worth noting: ‘And this is sometimes a feeling, sometimes a doing, sometimes something else, provided one can live well, and one’s friend in this way too; and it [sc. the feeling or doing] is in working together at living together or at a community of things included in the end, and particularly so. Hence it is to contemplate together and feast together...’
8.1.1246a26-29

ἀπορήσειε δ’ ἂν τις ἐστιν ἐκάστῳ φίλῳ χρήσασθαι καὶ ἑφ’ ἂ πέφυκε καὶ ἄλλως, καὶ

tούτῳ ἢ αὐτῷ ἡδὺ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἶον ἢ ὀφθαλμὸς ἰδεῖν ἢ καὶ ἄλλως παριδεῖν

dιαστρέψαντα, ὡστε δύο τὸ ἐν φανῆναι. ‘One might raise the puzzle whether it is

possible to use each friend in fact for the things which are natural to him and otherwise,

and this either as itself pleasant accidentally. For example, either an eye is to see or

also in another way to mis-see, when distorting it so that one thing appears two.’ First, L

and C² omit φίλῳ, followed by both Susemihl and the OCT. In addition ἑφ’ ἂ is the

reading of Laur. 81.12; the other mss. have ἑφ’ ὑ. Instead of καὶ τούτῳ ἢ αὐτῷ ἡδὺ κατὰ

συμβεβηκός Susemihl follows Spengel in writing καὶ τούτῳ ἢ <καθ’> αὐτῷ ἢ κατὰ

συμβεβηκός (‘...and this either by itself or accidentally’) and the OCT follows Dirlmeier

and Jackson in writing καὶ τούτῳ ἢ <ἤ> αὐτῷ ἢ αὖ κατὰ συμβεβηκός (‘...and this either

qua itself or again accidentally’). The emendations are plausible (and Jackson’s ἢ αὖ for

ἡδὺ ingenious), but if one combines them with the deletion of φίλῳ one loses any

connection to what has gone before, and so makes the beginning of this book (or

chapter; 8.1 is also numbered 7.13) very abrupt. An alternative is to note that the topic

that ends the previous chapter is about the bad man using his friend badly by killing him

along with himself because he judges it pleaasanter, or less painful, to know his friend will

die with him than go on living beyond him (7.12.1246a18-25). If, however, φίλῳ is kept

the question with which this book begins is a natural continuation, for it is about whether

one can indeed use each friend, or each dear thing, both for what he is naturally for and
otherwise (that is, badly, as the bad man does). The chapter does, indeed, range beyond the limitation of this question to friends and raises it about virtue and prudence, but each of these is just a particular case of the same general puzzle. A suggestion, then, is to keep ἡδύ as well as φίλω, prefer ἐφ’ ὑπὲρ ἑφ’ ἀ, and follow Jackson in writing καὶ τοῦτο ἦ αὐτὸ instead of καὶ τοῦτο ἦ αὐτὸ: ‘One might raise the puzzle whether it is possible to use in fact each thing that is dear on the basis natural to it and otherwise, namely this [treating καὶ as epexegetic], insofar as it is pleasant incidentally [sc. the way the bad man uses his friend badly, because of the incidental pleasure he gets from knowing his friend will not survive him].’ In this way too the example Aristotle immediately gives of an incidental use of an eye, namely to eat it (b31), falls neatly into place, for an eye might very well be judged pleasant to eat (by those who like eyes).

8.3.1248b39-49a3
εἰσὶ γὰρ οἳ οἴονται τὴν ἀρετὴν δεῖν μὲν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν φύσει ἄγαθῶν ἐνεκεν. διὸ ἄγαθοι μὲν ἀνδρεῖς εἰσί· τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἄγαθὰ αὐτοῖς ἐστίν· καλοκάγαθιαν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν. οὐ γὰρ ὑπάρχει αὐτοῖς τὰ καλὰ δι’ αὐτὰ... ‘There are people [the Spartans have just been mentioned] who think it necessary to have virtue but for the sake of natural goods. Hence they are good men; for they have the natural goods; for they do not have the quality of gentlemen; for they do not have noble things for their own sake.’ Susemihl and the OCT print the same as Bekker save that both follow Victorius and Λ1 in writing καλοκάγαθιαν δὲ οὐκ ἔχουσιν (‘but they do not have the quality of gentlemen’), and the OCT follows Solomon in writing τὰ γὰρ φύσει μὲν ἄγαθὰ <ἄγαθὰ> αὐτοῖς ἐστίν. The δὲ
seems a definite improvement over the γὰρ of the other mss. (it nicely answers the preceding μὲν), but the extra ἀγαθὰ seems unnecessary. However, the main issue is that none of the mss. have διὸ ἀγαθοὶ μὲν ἀνδρεῖς εἰσι. In place of ἀγαθοὶ they all have ἄγριοι (‘wild’); ἀγαθοὶ is first found in the Aldine editio princeps. The reason for the change is clear. If the people in question, the Spartans notably, have the virtues, though they have them for the sake of natural goods, they must be good men (for to have the virtues is to be good). They do not fail to be good, then; they just fail to be gentlemen (they are ἀγαθοὶ but not καλοὶ). Hence it must be wrong to say they are wild.

The reasoning is not compelling. Aristotle does think the Spartans were like wild beasts, and precisely because they pursued virtue for the ultimate sake of gaining the natural goods (Pol/2.9.1271a41-b17, 7.15.1334a40-b3). Indeed when speaking of the Spartans’ training he actually uses of them the word θηριώδεις, compares them to animals and nations that are ἄγριωτάτοις, and says they thus make their sons βαναύσους (8.4.1338b12-13, 18, 29, 33). Recall too that the brutality of the Spartans when in possession of rule over others was notorious. Aristotle’s point would seem to be (and it is a point suggested by the whole of the chapter on the gentleman) that virtuous acts, like most acts, can have two ends: the immediate end which is internal to the act, and the remote end which is the sort of overall life for which the act is done. A Spartan soldier, for instance, is brave in battle for he holds bravery to be a noble thing. He is thus really brave (for intending the beauty of the virtuous act is a mark of virtue). But he is brave so that he and his fellow Spartans can live a life of dominance over others in enjoyment of the natural goods, whether the others be helots at home or Greeks abroad.
The problem, as Aristotle remarks (Pol 2.9.1271b3-6), is that Spartans only practiced with a view to war and did not know how to be at leisure; hence, while they had the virtues of occupation (courage, endurance, justice, moderation), they did not have the virtue of leisure, philosophy (Pol 7.15.1334a19-34). In other words, they knew only of the secondary happiness of the political life and not also the primary happiness of the contemplative life (for the sake of which, however, politics exists, Ethica Nicomachea 10.7.1177b4-6, 12-15). So they were drawn, as simply political men are, to covet the material goods and occasions in which the virtues of the political life are best displayed (EN 10.7.1177b6-12, 8.1178a28-b7). To call such men wild does not seem inappropriate. The gentleman, by contrast, is brave and moderate and just for the sake of a life of philosophic leisure, and not of dominance over others. He intends not only, like the Spartan, the beauty of each act of virtue, but also the beauty of a whole life of virtue, and especially of the virtue of philosophy.9

Some Passages Needing Textual Emendation but Different Textual Emendation

7.6.1240b1-3

ἐτι τὰ τοιάδε λέγεται περὶ τῆς φιλίας, ὡς ἰσότης φιλότης, καὶ μὴ μίαν φιλίαν εἶναι τοὺς ἀληθῶς φίλους. ‘Further, these sorts of things are said about friendship, as ‘equality is amity’ and that those truly friends are not one friendship.’ Both Susemihl and the OCT follow Casaubon in deleting μὴ and replacing φιλίαν with ψυχήν. That there is something wrong with μὴ is evident, for if a negative is necessary it should really be οὐ (an indirect statement regularly retains the negative of the original direct statement, which here would be οὐ), and, further, true friends would seem to be those whose friendship, or
whose soul, is most single or united rather than not being so. The deletion of μη is philologically easy since it could have arisen by dittography from the μίαν that follows.\textsuperscript{10} Jackson, however, following Susemihl thinks something more has gone wrong and suggests emending καὶ to καν ει to give: καν ει μη μιαν ψυχην (‘even if we do not allow the exaggeration μια ψυχη’).\textsuperscript{11} But if indeed more has gone wrong here than can be corrected by deletion of μη, a simpler solution philologically would be to regard μη as a scribal error for μην (the same scribal error occurs at 1245a15 where Bekker himself changed the mss. ἀλλα μη to ἀλλα μην). The addition of μην to καὶ makes a certain sense anyway because Aristotle is giving two common sayings about friendship, but the first he gives in direct speech and in the nominative while the second he gives in indirect speech and in the accusative and infinitive. This grammatical change is no doubt because the first repeats the actual words people use (ἰσότης φιλότης is a sort of Ancient Greek jingle), but the second reports people’s meaning and not necessarily their precise words. Now, as we learn from Denniston,\textsuperscript{12} καὶ μην can be used to indicate more than another addition to a list but also to express some further sense of difference or newness. Perhaps, then, Aristotle uses καὶ μην here to indicate not merely the new item but the newness too of the grammatical construction.

The replacement of φιλίαν with ψυχην is motivated in part because this very point is made a few lines later at b9 where the mss. do have μια ψυχη and not μια φιλια. Also, friends being μια ψυχη is a common saying but their being μια φιλια seems not to be. Further, Aristotle is here showing how the features of friendship are found in and
referred back to the individual, and while an individual is one soul it seems odd to say he is one friendship. Probably the emendation should be accepted, but it is nevertheless worth noting that something can be said in defense of Bekker’s text even if that text is finally rejected. First, to say true friends are one friendship covers, and so explains, all the features Aristotle mentions in the next lines while to say true friends are one soul repeats one of them. Second, true friends being one friendship would seem to be a saying that lies behind, and also explains, the phenomena of untrue friends listed later (7.10.1243b15-37). Third, bad men do not have one friendship with themselves but different and conflicting ones, being friends to themselves in pleasure when giving in to temptation but friends in utility when full of blame and regret later (1240b21-24), so that it can make a certain sense, at least as regards good men, to say that they are one friendship, because they are always friends to themselves in the same way at the same time and not friends in this way at this time and in that way at another.

7.12.1244b34-45a1
deĩ γὰρ ἀμα συνθεῖναι δύο ἐν τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι τὸ ζῆν καὶ αἱρετόν, καὶ ὅτι τὸ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. Εἰ οὖν ἔστιν ἄεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ἢ ἐτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐτέρου τάξει… ‘For it is, at the same time, necessary to put two things together in the argument, both that living is indeed a thing to be preferred and that the good is to be preferred (or: that living is the good), and from these that the same to the… such a nature to be present. If then always in this sort of ordered series one of two things is in the column of the other of them…’ Both Susemihl and the OCT follow Fritzsche in deleting καὶ in τὸ ζῆν καὶ αἱρετόν. However, the main problem in the
passage is καὶ ἐκ τούτων ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν and especially τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς, which makes no sense in the context (as the literal translation above shows). Susemihl leaves the mss. readings as they are but reports in the *apparatus* Brandis’ emendation αὐτοῖς and Fritzsche’s emendation τὸ αὐτὸ δεῖ ὑπάρχειν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει.

The *OCT* prints Mingay’s emendation τῷ αὐτῷ [sc. τρόπῳ] αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν. Presumably both Brandis and Mingay are supplying αἱρετὸν [ἐστὶ] or the like from the previous lines, for otherwise the infinitive ὑπάρχειν will be ungrammatical. At any rate Rackham and Solomon in their translations adopt Brandis’ emendation and translate: ‘that it is desirable for ourselves to possess that sort of nature [sc. good].’ Fritzsche’s emendation will give the sense: ‘that the same thing must be present to such a nature’, which is a bit obscure.

All these emendations suppose that ὑπάρχειν is falling within the scope of the ὅτι clause; hence the need to supply a finite verb to govern it (Fritzsche’s δεῖ or Brandis’ and Mingay’s αἱρετὸν [ἐστὶ]). An alternative grammatical construction is to regard it as falling outside that clause and as being governed instead by the δεῖ at the beginning, thus giving the sense ‘it is necessary...that this sort of nature be present’. The problem now is what to do with the ὅτι clause and the τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς that follows. Since something has to be done with τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς in any event, an alternative suggestion is to see if we do not have here another case of *EE*’s common error of misspelling and misdividing words. Now in antiquity and for several centuries thereafter manuscripts were written in capitals without word divisions, hence τὸ αὐτὸ τοῖς would appear as ΤΟΑΥΤΟΤΟΙΣ. But
ΤΟΑΥΤΟΤΩΙΣ looks not unlike ΤΟΑΥΠΟΤΩΒ, and might look very like it depending on how carefully formed the letters were in the mss. being copied, and ΤΟΑΥΠΟΤΩΒ, when written out with proper word divisions, becomes τὸ Α ύπό τὸ Β or ‘the A is under the B’. The expression is not uncommon in Aristotle’s logical works (Analytica Priora 1.9.30a40, 30b13, 11.31a30, a37, b17, b20) to mean that one term falls under another. Hence the sense will be: ‘it is necessary that, because the A is under the B, this sort of nature be present/available’. How this sense fits the argument will be discussed directly. One immediate advantage of it, however, is that it gives a ready sense to the phrase that next follows: εἰ οὖν ἐστιν ἀεὶ τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας ή ἐτέρα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐτέρου τάξει.

The reference of ‘this sort of ordered series’ (τῆς τοιαύτης συστοιχίας) is usually said to be to some table or column of opposites, probably the Pythagorean, which Aristotle is understood to be pointing to as he makes the remark. But on the alternative suggested here, the ordered series is what he has just said, namely A falling under B or one term falling under another (hence we should follow Bekker in preferring the reading ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἐτέρου τάξει with P and C rather than ἐν τῇ τοῦ αἱρέτου τάξει with L).

This advantage will count for little, however, if the overall translation does not make sense in the context. So first, as regards the A and B, these will refer to the two propositions just stated (about the preferable and the good), and the sense will be that the predicate of the first falls under the predicate of the second. The first proposition speaks of living as to be preferred, and living in this sense, as Aristotle has argued in the preceding lines (b23-34), is the living that is our living, the living that we experience, and not someone else, as us being alive (hence we should probably keep καὶ at b35
because, rendered as ‘indeed’ or ‘in fact’, it serves to emphasize this point). However, when Aristotle first introduced this discussion he said that the thing will be plain if we take life ‘in actuality and as end’ (τὸ ζῆν τὸ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν καὶ ὡς τέλος, b23-24), and life taken as end is happy life, for happiness is the end and the good. We should probably, therefore, translate the second proposition as ‘living is the good’ and not as ‘the good is to be preferred’, and understand the argument Aristotle is going to give as showing that, because the living that is to be preferred falls under the good, this ‘sort of nature’, that is, life as the good, must be ‘present’ to us, that is, available to us as something we can possess as our own. The argument will thus be that it is necessary to put ‘life as preferable’ together with ‘life as the good’, and then necessary, because life as preferable is under life as the good, that such a life is in fact available to us for our own living.

Interestingly enough, what Aristotle does in the long passage that follows (1245a1-b19) is these two things. First he explains how the life that is preferable is or can become the good. For life as preferable for us exists in perceiving and knowing, and perceiving and knowing are perfected through sharing with friends; but such sharing, when it is a matter of doing the best things with the best friends, is the human equivalent of the divine life; and, of course, the divine life is the good simply. Hence life as preferable falls under life as the good. But, second, this life must therefore be available to us, because doing the best things with the best friends is available to us, at least if we and our friends pursue and achieve virtue together. The argument is lengthy and involved but it is ultimately clear. It also shows, as was Aristotle’s intention from the beginning of the chapter, how the comparison with God is leading us astray about the need of friends. For the good life, which is available to God all by himself, is only
available to us through sharing with friends. Hence the self-sufficient man (as opposed to the self-sufficient God) will need friends as constitutive of the happy and self-sufficient life and not as an extrinsic or dispensable extra.

8.1.1246b19-22

ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τῆς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἁρετῆς μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη μὲν τῷ λόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἄγνοεῖν, ὡς ἀρετῆ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἄγνοιας ἐνούσης οὐ στρέψει ταύτην… ‘For it is odd if of virtue in the calculating part wickedness coming to be on the one hand to the reasoning part will distort and make ignorant, but virtue in the unreasoning part when folly is present will not distort this…’ Susemihl and the OCT follow Λ¹ and change τῆς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἁρετῆς to read τήν μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἁρετήν, thus making it object of στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἄγνοεῖν (‘will distort virtue in the calculating part and make it ignorant’), and follow Spengel in changing μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη μὲν τῷ λόγῳ to read μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένη ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ (‘wickedness, when once it comes to be present in the unreasoning part, [will distort…]’). The first change, following Λ¹, seems necessary (if one prefers to regard the phrase as a genitive absolute one must provide a verb for it, as Spengel does by adding ἐνούσης from the lines following). The second change is less compelling. Certainly if ἐγγενομένη is left as it is λόγῳ must be changed to ἀλόγῳ. But perhaps we have here another case of the EE mss. misrecognizing letters and misdividing words. For while it seems necessary to change μὲν to ἐν, it is not necessary simply to get rid of the μ. One may instead regard it as a misspelling for ν and add it on to the end of ἐγγενομένη to give ἐγγενομένην. One will
thus make ἐγγενομένην agree with ἀρετήν in the line above, and so obviate the need to change λόγῳ to ἀλόγῳ. The sentence will then read: ‘For it is odd if, on the one hand, wickedness will distort virtue in the calculating part (when it [sc. virtue] at any time comes to be present in reason) and make one ignorant, but...’ The philology is perhaps now more intelligible, but in any event the philosophical point remains the same (it is just expressed from the opposite direction). The apparent redundancy (‘virtue in the calculating part...comes to be present in reason’) is only apparent. The phrase ‘virtue in the calculating part’ refers to the kind of virtue in question (namely intellectual virtue and not moral), and the phrase ‘comes to be present in reason’ refers to this virtue actually being present in the soul. Note too that, if this emendation is accepted, it will no longer be necessary, with the OCT, to add ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ το ἁγνοίας ἐνούσης in the next line (b21) since ἐν τῷ λόγῳ can be supplied from the ἐγγενομένην ἐν τῷ λόγῳ that precedes.

An alternative suggestion is to regard the μ as a misspelling for ς and read the whole passage thus: ἀτοπον γάρ εἰ τῆς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετῆς μοχθηρία ποτὲ ἐγγενομένης ἐν τῷ λόγῳ στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἁγνοεῖν ἢ δ’ ἀρετή ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἁγνοίας ἐνούσης οὐ στρέψει ταύτην. We will now have a verb for making τῆς μὲν ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἀρετῆς into a genitive absolute (namely ἐγγενομένης), but this genitive absolute will, oddly, split and be split by the main clause μοχθηρία...στρέψει καὶ ποιήσει ἁγνοεῖν. On the other hand we will also now have a balance with the genitive absolute ἁγνοίας ἐνούσης in the next line, which itself will split the main clause ἢ δ’ ἀρετή ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ...οὐ στρέψει ταύτην. This way of emending the text may not be as happy as the
former but its peculiar structure makes it, perhaps, worth noting.

8.2.1247b15-18

τί οὖν κωλύει συμβηναί τινι ἐφεξῆς τὰ τοιαύτα πολλάκις, οὕχ ὅτι τοῖς δεῖ, ἀλλ' οἶν ἂν ἔιν τὸ κύβους ἁμαρτάνναι; ‘What then prevents such things happening to someone often one after the other, not because it is necessary to the..., but the way they would be always the throwing high in dice?’ Susemihl and the OCT both follow Sylburg and Λ2 in emending ἂν εἶν to ἂν εἴη (‘it [sc. throwing high in dice] would be’), and follow Fritzsch in emending μακρὰν βάλλειν to μακαρίαν βάλλειν (‘...but the way that always throwing successfully in dice would be?’). The first of these emendations seems necessary, and perhaps the second too though it is perhaps not of great moment. In any event the problem words are οὐχ ὅτι τοῖς δεῖ which make no sense. Susemihl follows Sylburg in changing τοῖς to οὕτως (‘not because it must be thus’) and the OCT follows Jackson in changing τοῖς δεῖ to τοιοσδ (‘not because he is such’). In the context Aristotle is raising questions about luck and specifically about the puzzle that, on the one hand, some people seem to be fortunate often or always and yet, on the other hand, luck is not the sort of thing that happens often or always. Hence either these people are not really fortunate by luck (but by some other cause) or, if they are, it should be possible, by luck, to go on endlessly scoring high in games of chance (which we do not see happening). Aristotle eventually solves the puzzle by distinguishing two kinds of fortune: the natural or divine kind which is continuous and is a natural tendency to do the right thing because one’s desires are naturally well directed, and the ordinary kind which is simply
happenstance and is not continuous. Sylburg’s and Jackson’s emendation both make the same point (the luck involved in throwing high in dice is not a matter of any necessity nor a matter of having a certain sort of nature), but Jackson’s is philologically more likely. However, an equally likely or perhaps more likely emendation is to change τοῖς δεῖ to πως δεῖ (‘not because it somehow must’). The sense produced is the same or similar but there is perhaps more likelihood that τοῖς δεῖ is a misreading of πως δεῖ than of οὔτως δεῖ or τοιοοδί. Also, Λ² has hos oportet and it could conceivably be that what the Latin translator read was τοὺς δεῖ and that hos was the best he could make of τοὺς. For a τοὺς could be misread in place of πως as easily as a τοῖς could.

8.2.1247b28-38

Or is good fortune said in more than one way? For some things are done from impulse and from people choosing to do them, but other things are not but the opposite... So as regards the former it is possible that they are successful through nature; for their impulse and their appetite, being of what it should be, went right, but the calculation was silly; and as regards the latter, when calculation not seeming to be right, luck however being cause here and it being right ?pushed? them out of the way.’ In the context Aristotle is again talking about the two kinds of luck and explaining how each
seems to work. The first are fortunate by nature because their natural impulse (but not their choice and calculation) is what guides them and it is right, and the second are fortunate by mere happenstance, for they do follow calculation (and their calculation, even if mistaken, is not silly like that of the first), but, in this case, the happenstance stops them following it and suffering something bad as a result.

A first emendation, then, taken from Λ², is to put ἔσωσεν (‘saved them’) in place of the grammatically dubious ἔξωσεν at the end. The problem words, however, are those that precede it, ὅταν μὲν…αὐτῇ δ᾽ ὀρθῇ ὦσα, since, in particular, there is no finite verb for the ὅταν clause. Susseimihl changes ὀρθῶς to ὀρθὸς, deletes the δ in αὐτῇ δ᾽ ὀρθῇ ὦσα, and, in his apparatus, marks εἶναι, τύχη δ᾽ as corrupt. The OCT also changes ὀρθῶς to ὀρθὸς and deletes the δ, but, in addition, deletes the ὦσα in τύχη δ᾽ αὐτοῦ αἰτία ὦσα and, following Allan, marks as corrupt the whole of καὶ τοῦς μὲν ἐνταῦθα…ὡρθῇ ὦσα ἔσωσεν. An attractive emendation, then, would be to follow Mingay (in the apparatus of the OCT) and, in addition to the other changes made in the OCT, change δοκῶν to δοκῆ to give the sense: ‘whenever calculation does not seem to be right but chance is cause here and it, being right, saved them.’ Another is to follow Spengel by changing τύχη to τυχή, adding ἢ before the following δ’, and punctuating thus: εἶναι τυχή, ἢ δ᾽ αὐτοῦ αἰτία (with the ἢ δ’ referring back, presumably, to the ὀρμή or ὀρεξίς in b34 just before) to give the sense: ‘whenever calculation happened not to be right, but impulse (or appetite) being cause here and it…’

The problem, however, with both emendations is in the philosophical sense produced. For the sort of fortune in question here seems to be mere happenstance. The
people who benefit from it are not those who are incapable of calculating well and who go right because of some natural impulse, but precisely those who are capable of calculating well and who go right because of their correct calculation. Such people are fortunate by happenstance when events turn out contrary even to correct calculation but some lucky intervention saves them from the consequences. An example might be travelers who have calculated correctly that the best way into town is by a first road but are forced by some chance to take a second and so happily escape the thieves who, unbeknownst to them, are lying in wait on the first. In this case, clearly, the calculation was correct, for it was not foolish or silly (unlike the calculation of those fortunate by natural impulse) but soundly based on the known facts (or as soundly based as human calculation can be). That the results of following it in this case would, nevertheless, have been bad is no fault of the calculation, but of things beyond human knowledge and control.

Suspicion, therefore, should fall on the negative μὴ in ὅταν μὲν λογισμὸς μὴ δοκῶν ὁρθῶς εἶναι. So here is a suggestion. Regard this case as another of EE’s typical fault of misreading, and replace μὴ with ἦν (MH misread for HN); ἦν with ὅταν will then produce the same construction of a past tense of the indicative with ἄν to express a past condition as just before at 1247b32.¹⁴ (Or alternatively, if ἦν with ὅταν is thought to be dubious, one could write ἦ instead of ἦν and get the necessary sense.) If we also retain the δ’ in τύχη δ’ αὐτοῦ, we will get the sense: ‘whenever there was a calculation seeming to be right, luck however being here cause and it being right saved them.’ This sense is now just what we need for fortune as happenstance (like the case of the lucky travelers): the calculation was right, at least as far as all the known facts were
concerned (it ‘seemed’ right), but chance intervened (it became ‘cause’ of what they did), and chance turned out to be really right (it was in accord with the unknown facts), and so saved them.

8.2.1248a34-37

καὶ τούτων φρονίμων καὶ σοφῶν ταχεῖαν εἶναι τὴν μαντικήν, καὶ μόνον ὅπι τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου δεῖ ἀπολαβεῖν, ἀλλ’ ὁ μὲν δι’ ἐμπειρίαν, ὁ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι: ‘Also, that the divination of these prudent and wise is swift and one must all but take away the one which is apart from reason; but some through experience and others through familiarity and in using speculation.’ Aristotle is still comparing the two kinds of fortune and he is here talking of those who operate by reason (and do not go right because their desires are naturally right), and he seems to be saying that these, like the others, are in a way operating by divination but by some sort of rational and not non-rational divination (not a divination that is ‘apart from reason’). An obvious and first emendation is to follow Ross and Λ² and replace ἀπολαβεῖν with ὑπολαβεῖν to give the sense: ‘Also, one must suppose that the divination of these prudent and wise is swift and is all but (or: almost) the one which is apart from reason...’ The sense is that those who have reason are also able, through their reason, to divine things, including likely events in the future (as, say, coming changes in weather), and their divining can be almost as quick as those whose divination is not by reason. The main problem with the Greek, however, lies not here but with τε ἐν τῷ σκοπεῖν χρῆσθαι, which is without grammatical sense. Susemihl prints the text without change while the OCT deletes τε, but both record in their apparatus Spengel’s suggestion to read τοῦ in its place, with the
sense: ‘...through familiarity with its use in speculation.’ This suggestion gives some meaning to the phrase in itself, but since Spengel thought there must be a lacuna somewhere in the preceding lines he did not endeavor to show how his emendation gave sense to the phrase in the larger context. A better suggestion, then, comes from von Fragstein\textsuperscript{15} who suggested replacing τε ἐν with δύνανται (from a34) or the like, with the sense: ‘...through familiarity are able to use speculation.’ One problem, however, with this suggestion is that its meaning does not fit very happily with what follows next, which talks about how both divinations (that of those who act with reason and that of those who do not) use God, and not of how one group uses speculation. Nevertheless, von Fragstein does seem right to suppose that a verb is to be supplied from the context. An alternative, then, is to adapt both Spengel and von Fragstein and write τὸ rather than τοῦ in place of τε and supply ἔχουσι (from a32 and a33) instead of δύνανται, thus giving the sense: ‘...through familiarity have the use of it [sc. divination] in their speculation.’ The meaning will be that those who act by reason have in their acts of speculation some access to divination through their experience or familiarity with things. A case in point might be Thales divining, through his knowledge of things in the heavens, a coming bumper olive harvest (\textit{Politica} 1.11.1259a6-19). At all events the whole sentence now reads with fair intelligibility: ‘Also, one must suppose that the divination of these prudent and wise is swift and is almost the one which is apart from reason; but some have the use of it in their speculation through experience and others through familiarity.’\textsuperscript{16}
The two main editions of *EE* are F. Susemihl [Aristotelis Eudemia Ethica] *Eudemii Rhodii Ethica* (Leipzig, 1884), and R.R. Walzer and J.M. Mingay *Aristotelis Ethica Eudemia* (Oxford, 1991). Bekker’s original text of all of Aristotle’s works is also invaluable but its *apparatus criticus* is thin. I. Bekker *Aristotelis Opera* (Berlin, 1831).

F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles. Eudemische Ethik* (Darmstadt, 1962), 363, who speaks, in this regard, of Aristotle’s ‘Brachylogie’ in *EE*, and A.J.P. Kenny, *Aristotle on the Perfect Life* (Oxford, 1992), 115, 141, who uses the word ‘telegrammatic’ in the same regard; see also A. von Fragstein, *Studien zur Ethik des Aristoteles* (Amsterdam, 1974), 397; J. Mingay, ‘How Should a Philosopher Live? Two Aristotelian Views,’ *History of Political Thought* 8 (1987), 21-32, at 27, 29, 31. Why such compression of thought, in both logic and grammar, should be a mark of *EE* when it is not, say, a mark of *NE*, is worth pondering. One suggestion, following Kenny (n.2), 141, is that *NE* (which continues immediately into the *Politica*) is addressed to would-be legislators or *politikoi*, while *EE* seems aimed at a philosophically more sophisticated audience. The former would likely not be able or eager to follow a highly compressed piece of reasoning, but the latter almost certainly would, and might indeed relish a good intellectual work-out. This suggestion, however, must remain merely a suggestion here. An adequate defense of it would require an article by itself.


A point forcibly made in defense of ἐνδέχεσθαι by Alfred Gudeman, *Aristoteles ΠΕΡΙ ΠΟΙΗΤΙΚΗΣ* (Berlin, 1934), 27.
5 W. W. Goodwin, *A Greek Grammar* (London, 1968), section 1462 notes that μὴ is used in causal relative clauses that have also a conditional force.

6 Or alternatively, taking μόνον οὖν together and not separately, ‘he who is friend of a man almost belongs…’, i.e. is almost part of a city, for all he has left to do to become a part is to advance to the next stage beyond the household.


8 The distinction is noted by D.J. Allan, ‘The Fine and the Good in the Eudemian Ethics’, in Moraux and Harlfinger, (n. 7), 63-72, at 70, who uses it precisely to explain the relation between individual virtuous acts and an overall virtuous life.

9 The argument of this paragraph is admittedly controversial and there are able defenses of the emended reading ἀγαθοὶ, as S.A. White, *Sovereign Virtue* (Stanford, 1992). But since the mss. reading of ἄγριοι can also be given a plausible sense, one should at least give this reading serious consideration.

10 Dirlmeier (n. 2), 425-26.

11 The suggestion is not listed in the *apparatus criticus* of the *OCT*. It comes from H. Jackson, *On Some Passages in the Seventh Book of the Eudemian Ethics Attributed to Aristotle* (Cambridge, 1900), 29.

12 J. D. Denniston, *Greek Particles* (Oxford, 1950), 352, who also suggests a translation of “and especially.”

14 Goodwin, (n.5), section 1421 note 3.

15 von Fragstein, (n. 2), 376.

16 My thanks to my colleague Jacob Stern and to an anonymous reviewer for *CQ* for comments and criticisms on earlier versions of this article.