ARISTOTLE’S ETHICS: ALL FOUR OF THEM

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Abstract
In the Aristotelian corpus of writings as it has come down to us, there are four works specifically on ethics: the Nicomachean ethics, the Eudemian ethics, the Magna moralia (or Great ethics), and the short On virtues and vices. Scholars are now agreed that the first two are genuinely by Aristotle and most also believe that the Nicomachean is the later and better of the two. About the Magna moralia, there is still a division of opinion, though probably most scholars hold that it is not genuine. Those who hold it is genuine suppose it to be an early work or a redaction of an early work made by a later Peripatetic. As for On virtues and vices almost everyone holds it to be a spurious work written some two centuries after Aristotle's death. However, the arguments scholars give for these opinions are entirely unconvincing. In fact, they beg the question by assuming the conclusion in order to prove the conclusion. My own contention is that all the hard evidence we have compels us to conclude that all of these works are definitely by Aristotle but that they differ not by time of writing, as scholars universally suppose, but by audience and purpose. In brief, the Nicomachean and Eudemian ethics are writings internal to Aristotle's School with the Nicomachean being directed to legislators and the Eudemian to philosophers. The Magna moralia is an exoteric work meant for those outside the school. On virtues and vices is a collection of endoxa, or common and received opinions about virtues, perhaps meant as a handbook for young students but also for use in philosophical analysis. It is almost certainly referred to as such by a cryptic remark in the Eudemian ethics.

Aristotle’s Ethical Works Then and Now
In the Aristotelian corpus of works as it has come down to us from antiquity there are found four works on ethics: the Nicomachean Ethics, the Eudemian Ethics, the Great Ethics (or Magna Moralia), and the short On Virtues and Vices. Of these the best known and most read and studied, as well by scholars as by general readers, is the first. The Eudemian Ethics has, at least in recent years, come to be read and used as a useful support and confirmation and sometimes foil for the Nicomachean. The Eudemian was considered for some time by scholars to be inauthentic, but it is now held to be as genuine as the Nicomachean. The Great Ethics, on the other hand, is judged to be of doubtful authenticity and generally languishes in obscurity, while On Virtues and Vices has long

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1 Such are the standard names, but we know from Elias (CAG xviii, pars 1, 32.31-33.2) that the Great Ethics was also called the Great Nicomachean Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics the Lesser Nicomachean Ethics.
been condemned by scholars and is now consigned to a sort of academic outer darkness.

In the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, by contrast, all four were accepted as being by Aristotle.\(^2\) The only doubts expressed about the authenticity of the ethical works were that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was attributed hesitantly to Aristotle’s son Nicomachus by Cicero and positively by Diogenes Laertius, and that the *Eudemian Ethics* was hesitantly attributed to Eudemus by Aspasius.\(^3\) The *Great Ethics*, by contrast, was never doubted but whenever mentioned is attributed to Aristotle.\(^4\) Doubts first began again to be cast on some of them during the Renaissance when scholars puzzled over why Aristotle, notorious otherwise for his brevity, could have gone to the trouble of writing three major works on ethics that all covered pretty much the same ground in the same way. Their suggested solution was to say that one or two of them were written by someone else, and since by then the *Nicomachean Ethics* had achieved canonical status as the ethics of Aristotle, it was the *Eudemian* and *Great Ethics* that they cast into doubt.\(^5\)

These doubts, while not altogether allayed, ceased to attract much attention until Schleiermacher raised them again in the early nineteenth century by propounding the controversial thesis that only the *Great Ethics* was by Aristotle. Schleiermacher argued for his thesis on the philosophical ground that only the *Great Ethics* was consistent and coherent because, unlike the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian*, it downplayed or ignored


\(^4\) See in particular the accounts by Dirlmeier and Kenny, both of whom well show that none of the historical evidence impugns its authenticity.

\(^5\) The details are again in Dirlmeier. Case (1596: 1-7) explicitly defended the *Great Ethics* against these doubts, arguing that it served a different purpose and was for a different audience.
the so-called intellectual virtues and located morality where it properly belonged in the moral virtues.\(^6\) Schleiermacher was challenged by Spengel who responded with philological and historical arguments, such as references to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in other genuine works of Aristotle, that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was genuine and the only genuine ethics of Aristotle.\(^7\) Spengel’s view became the norm for most of the nineteenth century, though a few dissenting voices could be heard here and there.\(^8\)

The next major stage in the controversy occurred in the early twentieth century when Jaeger popularized the developmental or chronological thesis about all Aristotle’s works (and not just his ethical ones),\(^9\) and this developmental thesis is still accepted by many scholars today. The thesis says that Aristotle’s works as we have them are a compilation of disparate writings from different stages in Aristotle’s career and reflect different stages in his intellectual development. About the ethical works, Jaeger held that the *Nicomachean Ethics* was Aristotle’s mature ethics and that the *Eudemian* was a less mature version from his younger years. The *Great Ethics*, he thought, was a work by a later follower of Aristotle dating from after Aristotle’s death. Scholars are now inclined to think that both the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* are certainly by Aristotle (with doubt as to which is earlier), and that the *Great Ethics* is perhaps or perhaps not by

\(^{6}\) Scheiermacher (1835). His arguments have found echoes among contemporary scholars who have been engaged for some time in a debate about whether the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which they nevertheless hold to be genuine, is inconsistent in its argument about happiness and whether it is incoherently split between the practical life of moral virtue and the contemplative life of intellectual virtue. See the discussion in Natali (2001: 111-14) and Caesar (2009).

\(^{7}\) Spengel (1841, 1843). His move to philological considerations from philosophical ones was compelling and enough to defeat Schleiermacher’s thesis in the eyes of most scholars, despite the fact that, for instance, the references to the *Ethics* in other writings of Aristotle are to books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that it has in common with the *Eudemian*, Kenny (1978: 5-8). But Spengel’s rejection of the *Eudemian* did not, ultimately, win as much favor as his support of the *Nicomachean*.

\(^{8}\) Notably that of Thomas (1860).

\(^{9}\) Jaeger (1923).
Aristotle but, if it is, roughly contemporaneous, at least in its origin, with the *Eudemian*.

Arguments about Authenticity

Passing on from this overview of scholarly opinions, the next thing to consider is the reasons on either side about the authenticity of Aristotle’s ethical writings. These reasons are many and a full treatment of them would be a volume in itself. There are also two ways, at least, to approach them: either as a whole according to the legitimacy of the method of reasoning adopted, or severally according to the particular facts the arguments rely on. For instance, there are, in the case of the *Great Ethics*, certain uses of words that are said not to be Aristotelian, and to assess the truth of such claims we need to examine both the relevant word use and the method of reasoning whereby it is deduced that such use is not something Aristotle could or did adopt.

There are two problems to consider with respect to legitimacy of reasoning, the first of which concerns what conclusions may rightly be drawn from what evidence and the second of which concerns the way rival hypotheses about the evidence are accepted or rejected. To take the first point first, there are, as a general rule, two basic kinds of evidence to use in arguments about authenticity: either (1) those intrinsic to the text or (2)

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10 See Plebe (1965: vii-ix) for a summary review of those who accept the authenticity of the *Great Ethics*, to which list we can add also the name of Elorduy (1939). Others, as Cooper (1973), Kenny (1978: 219-20), and Theiler (1934), are also inclined to accept its authenticity but at one remove, through the medium or editorship of someone else. Pellegrin, too (in Dalimier 1992), seems inclined to accept it though his official position is one of neutrality. Among those who reject authenticity one may note, besides the school of Jaeger, Donini (1965), Fahnenschmidt (1968), and Rowe (1971, 1975). Doubt, if not rejection, is expressed by Bobonich (in Kraut, 2006: 16) and by Natali (2001: 10).

11 The argument that follows was first developed independently, though with much stimulus from Wilpert (1946). It was, however, to some extent anticipated by Shute when he remarks (1888: 16): “As to the arguments from style and matter these must always be of very doubtful nature, resting, as they needs must, upon preconceived ideas of the arguer,” and anticipated even more, in the reverse direction, by Littré (1834 I.171 – appositely quoted by Shute, *ibid.* 17), when Littré writes the following about using such arguments for judging the authenticity of works of Hippocrates: “…il y a là une petition de principes; car avant de dire que tel style appartient à Hippocrate, il faut prouver que les ouvrages où l’on croit, à tort ou à raison, reconnaître ce style, sont réellement de l’auteur auquel on les attribue.”
those extrinsic to it. By the latter I mean information about the texts from other authors or
from other works of the same author, or from the actual material on which the original
texts, or at least early copies thereof, are written (their archaeological date or location or
their physical composition and the like, as in the case of Oxyryynchus papyri or the Dead
Sea Scrolls). By the former I mean evidence within the texts themselves, which will be
either (1.1) those based on its matter or content or (1.2) those based on its words or its
verbal form. By the matter or content I mean either (1.1.1) the actual statements and
arguments of the text, or (1.1.2) the references present in these statements and arguments
that go outside these statements and arguments, either to historical facts or to statements
and arguments elsewhere in the same or other texts of the same or other authors. By the
verbal form (1.2) I mean the style of the writing, such as its word use, its phraseology, its
sentence structure, and so forth, although I should properly exclude from this division
and add under 1.1.2 any verbal data, such as technical or novel or foreign vocabulary or
meanings, that contain an implicit reference to external facts, say, of first invention or
discovery. Arguments based on the matter we may call philosophical if they regard the
statements and arguments, and historical if they regard the references. Arguments based
on the verbal form we may call literary or philological.

So we have four kinds of argument, one extrinsic (2) and three intrinsic, namely
the philosophical (1.1.1), the historical (1.1.2), and the literary (1.2). If we compare these
kinds, it can be shown that no compelling argument about authenticity can be made on
either philosophical or literary grounds alone. Such arguments, to be persuasive, must
rely instead or additionally on extrinsic and historical grounds. The reason is as follows.
Arguments about authenticity based on philosophical or literary grounds, in order to be
successful, must say that the work said to be inauthentic contains philosophical statements or arguments or uses words or phrases or sentence structures that are foreign to the author whose work it is said to be. But in order to know that these statements or arguments or verbal forms are foreign to the author we must first know which works the author actually wrote, since it is only from his works that we could know what was or was not foreign to him. But in order to know which works he actually wrote we would have to know that the works said to be inauthentic are indeed inauthentic. In other words we would have to know that he did not write these works in order to be able to assert the premise on which the proof rests that he did not write these works – a manifest begging of the question.

In order to make this point as clear as possible, for it may seem too quick, one can illustrate it by means of the following argumentative schemata:

1. Author A could not have written any text with properties XYZ (say philosophical ones like incoherence, contradictions, falsehoods, or literary or philological ones like certain words, sentences, phrases, and so forth).  

2. Text T (for example, the Great Ethics) has properties XYZ.

3. Therefore author A could not have written text T.

Or, in another form (which includes reference also to questions of relative dating):

1. Author A could not have written both text S, which has properties ABC

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12 Examples of the sorts of properties in question here abound in the scholarly literature on Aristotle, not to mention Plato and many others.

13 A classic instance is the first page in Walzer (1929: 1).
(sophistication, intelligence, and so forth) and text T which has properties XYZ (the opposite or different qualities) either simply or at the same period of development.\textsuperscript{14}

2. Author A wrote text S (for example, the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}).

3. Therefore author A could not have written text T (for example, the \textit{Great Ethics}) either simply or at the same period of development.

The problem with both these argumentative schemata is the first premise. For that premise must be either an empirical claim or some sort of non-empirical or a priori claim. If it is an empirical claim it presupposes the truth of the conclusion. For we could not know that author A could not write a text with properties XYZ or write both text T and text S which have different or opposed qualities if we did not already know that author A did not in fact write those texts. For if he did write them, which, if the claim is empirical, must at least be possible, then premise 1 is false. So, to rule out this possibility and to be able to assert premise 1, we would have to know in advance that he did not write them, which is to say we would have to know in advance that the conclusion was true, which is to beg the question. If, however, premise 1 is a non-empirical or a priori claim then it is false. There is no telling, before the event, what texts a given author could or could not write. A clever writer who was master of several styles (as we know Aristotle was) could, if he chose, write a bad book or a worse book than some other he also wrote, or could write one book in one style and another in another style, and do so at the same period.

Such is the general form of the reasoning against arguments about authenticity

\textsuperscript{14} The standard Jaegerian position, adopted also by his opponents, like von Arnim, who disagreed less with Jaeger’s method than with his results.
based on literary and philosophical features. But there is a second problem with the legitimacy of reasoning in arguments about authenticity, the exclusion of rival hypotheses. Let us suppose that certain writings attributed to the same author show significant divergence in terms of literary and philosophical features. Let us further suppose that this divergence is sufficient to call for special explanation. In order to know which explanation to adopt we would need first to consider which explanations are possible or plausible (for we need not consider outlandish possibilities, as that the author wrote one of the works while under hypnosis by Martians). In the case of the *Great Ethics* there are several possibilities. The first and most obvious, if not indeed the most popular, is that the divergences between it and known works of Aristotle are to be explained on the hypothesis that it is not by Aristotle but by a different (and inferior) author. Another and perhaps equally popular one is that it is by the same author but at an earlier stage of development. A third and related one is that it is by the same author but as mediated through some editor or redactor or student reporter. A fourth, and least popular, is that it is by the same author but as directed to a different audience.\(^{15}\)

The question arises about how one is to decide between the truth or likelihood of these options (or of any others that might plausibly be suggested). Scholars have devoted very little attention to this question, and not surprisingly because, if we confine ourselves to the literary and philosophical evidence, it has no answer. For either each of the options explains this evidence or it does not. If it does not, the option is not an option but a mistake. It purports to explain but fails to do so. We must confine our attention to those

\(^{15}\) The first hypothesis was espoused by Spengel and all who followed him including the school of Jaeger; the second by the school of von Armim; the third, in different degrees, by Dirlmeier, Cooper, Kenny; the fourth definitely by Case, though as a general possibility, if not specifically for *GE*, it is noted by Allan, in Mansion (1961), and Wilpert, as well as by Kenny (1992: 141) for the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics*. 
options only that do explain. But among options that do explain there can be no good reason, on these grounds, to prefer any as more true or likely than another. For ex hypothesi they do explain, and since explanation is the only criterion we are supposed here to be using to judge between them, all are successful. Therefore all are, to this extent, equally true or likely. One of these options might be simpler than another or more elegant or easier to handle or more in accord with our tastes, but it would not, on that account, be shown to be truer. The choice of one option over another, which is supposed to be a choosing of the true account over false accounts, cannot, if made on literary or philosophical grounds alone, be anything of the kind. The evidence is ex hypothesi not historical or extrinsic and so cannot contain any indication of facts outside the text (as time of writing or manner of transmission), but it is only by reference to such facts that we could determine, as regards options all presumed successful as explanations, which of them was truer or more likely than which other.

This conclusion is again very strong, but it is also very limited. It concerns only one sort of evidence (literary and philosophical evidence) and only one set of options (those that do explain this evidence). If some of this evidence contains, whether implicitly or explicitly, extrinsic or historical data, or if some of these options turn out not to be very good at explaining, then this conclusion will no longer apply. There will now be good reason, reason based on further evidence, to prefer one or more options as truer or more likely, namely those that do a better job of explaining and that better save the extrinsic or historical data. Scholars do typically rely on such further data when making a judgment of authenticity. But no less typically they slide, sometimes unconsciously, from such data to literary and philosophical data and think that their preferred explanation of
this latter data provides independent support for their judgment, when in fact it does not.

The only way to draw conclusions about authenticity is to have recourse to other grounds, namely those referred to above as extrinsic and historical grounds (numbered 2 and 1.1.2). That all those grounds in the case of Aristotle’s ethical writings speak in favor of authenticity and none of them against it is plain from what has been said.

**Authenticity of the Great Ethics: Intrinsic Evidence**

The sort of literary or stylistic features that distinguish the *Great Ethics* from the rest of the Aristotelian corpus and are said to show that it cannot be authentic are numerous,\(^{16}\) the most notable being the extensive use of *hyper* instead of *peri* to mean ‘about’ or ‘on’. In addition there are certain historical references.\(^{17}\) If the identifications are correct,\(^{18}\) they require a dating of the *Great Ethics* in the form we now have it to a period not much earlier than the 330s or 320s, or toward the end of Aristotle’s life (he died in 322 BC).

Since those scholars who favor the authenticity of the *Great Ethics* judge it to be an early or juvenile work (because of its relative lack of philosophical sophistication), they are forced to suppose that the *Great Ethics* underwent some revision or reworking by an editor or student near or after the time of Aristotle’s death.\(^ {19}\) Such a supposition is not impossible, but it complicates rather than simplifies the theory that the work is authentic.

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\(^{16}\) See the summary and review of Fahnenschmidt (1968: 2-51), but also of Dirlmeier (1939: *passim* and especially 217-28).

\(^ {17}\) The following personages are mentioned: a certain Mentor (1197b21), most likely as already dead, and the likely Mentor died about 337 BC; a tyrant called Clearchus (1203a23), who ruled from about 364-352 BC; a certain Neleus (1205a19-23), who is most likely the Neleus who inherited Theophrastus’ library on the latter’s death in 285 BC; Darius of Persia (1212a4), most likely Darius III who was defeated by Alexander and died in 330 BC; a certain Archicles (1189b20-21), and the best known Archicles was a trierarch who fought in a battle in 334/3 BC.

\(^ {18}\) It is not clear that they are all correct, but for the purposes of the argument here, nothing hangs on the question.

\(^ {19}\) Kenny (1978: 216-19).
There is, on the other hand, one reference in the *Great Ethics* that embarrasses partisans of the view that it is not authentic, namely the assertion by its author that he is also the author of the *Analytics* (1201b25), a reference almost certainly to the *Analytics* of Aristotle, and there are, one would think, few more direct ways an author could indicate to readers his own identity.

The historical references of the text are compatible with Aristotelian authorship, if of relatively late Aristotelian authorship. The literary or philosophical elements are also compatible with Aristotelian authorship, if untypical Aristotelian authorship (they all appear, though not with the same frequency, in others of his writings). For those elements show that the *Great Ethics* has marked differences of style and content from Aristotle’s other known works. The question is what to make of those differences. Some explanation is necessary, but more than one explanation is possible. The hypothesis of difference of author is only one such explanation and there are others, namely those mentioned before that hypothesize difference of time of writing, or also medium of transmission, or audience addressed.

The hypothesis of difference of audience has no problem explaining any of the literary or philosophical features of the *Great Ethics*. The hypothesis is that the work is an exoteric one directed to a popular audience outside the school. One would not expect it, therefore, to display all the philosophical elaboration or sophistication of a work intended for those within the school (such as the *Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* are). One would not expect it to contain all the doctrines of a work of the school. One would

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20 A complication is that Theophrastus also wrote an *Analytics*, which has not survived, and the reference could conceivably be to that; Pellegrin, in Dalimier (1992: 23).
21 Fahnenschmidt (1968: 15) regards the frequency of the use, not the mere use (which he cannot deny to be Aristotelian), as the sign of inauthenticity.
even expect it, where necessary, to hide such doctrines if, for some reason, an exoteric audience would be puzzled by them or have an instinctive, if unfounded, prejudice against them. One would also expect it to follow the speech patterns and terminology common and familiar to an exoteric audience, and not, say, the more careful and nuanced style that an author might prefer in a formal work of philosophy; hence in particular one should not be surprised to find, as one does find, many Hellenistic elements in the language of the *Great Ethics*, for these would reflect the speech of its intended audience. One would, further, expect it to make its arguments and process of reasoning easy to note and follow for an exoteric audience that would be unlikely to be practiced in argumentative subtleties (so, for instance, it would be more likely, where it gives lists, to make the lists simple and without much elaboration or nuance).

The hypothesis also explains the division among scholars about the quality of the *Great Ethics*, that some think it a poor work while others think it a fine or at least respectable work. Both views can be correct. The work is indeed simple and heavy handed and undeveloped, but it is also subtle and sophisticated and provocative (as is discussed more fully in the commentary); indeed even the simplicity has an imposing _

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22 Spoken speech patterns tend to anticipate written speech patterns so that when such patterns first appear in formal writing one can usually expect them to have existed in speech and popular writing for much longer. The style of Greek found in the *Great Ethics*, as scholars have often noted, Berg (1934), Dirlmeier (1958: 138-39), Elorduy (1939: 64-45 n1), Fahnnenschmidt (1967: 13, 15), Stevens (1936), is like the written Greek of the Hellenistic age (the *koinē*), and such Greek, whose elements are already present in authors of the Classical period, including Aristotle himself, was presumably more widespread in the spoken Greek of that period than the written.

23 A point that Fahnnenschmidt concedes even against himself (1968: 24, 26, 48), for he allows that the *GE* has the character of a lecture simplified according to pedagogical necessities and lacking the subtleties of Aristotle’s other works, which, for a work before a popular audience, is exactly what one would expect.

24 Something complained about by Ramsauer (1858: 31) and Fahnnenschmidt (1968: 7, 184).

25 Brink (1933), Donini (1965), Pansch (1841), Ramsauer (1858), Rowe (1971), Walzer (1929).

26 Schleiermacher (1835) and Elorduy (1939), who both think it the only authentic ethics of Aristotle, because the best), von Arnim (1924-1929), Dirlmeier (1958), Cooper (1973), Gohlke (1944), Plebe (1965).

27 Kenny’s “philosophically naïve and crude” (1978: 218) is too strong but captures something of the right spirit.
vigor and the serried arguments a compelling directness.\textsuperscript{28} That the same book could have such divergent characteristics is readily explicable on the hypothesis that the \textit{Great Ethics} is an exoteric work, written for the wider public outside Aristotle’s school. The other ethics, the \textit{Nicomachean} and \textit{Eudemian}, will be meant for those within the school. The \textit{Great Ethics}, therefore, will not display the philosophical qualities of the other ethics, which would be too much for a general audience, but it will, besides the expected simplicity and directness, contain invitations and hints (the subtlety and sophistication and provocation of the work) to pique the interest of the more curious and intelligent so as to attract them, if they prove themselves otherwise worthy, into joining the school.\textsuperscript{29}

The hypothesis is thus in principle better \textit{qua} explanation. The other explanations, even those that accept authenticity, account well for one side only of the character of the \textit{Great Ethics}, the side of unsophisticated directness and repetition.

The same hypothesis has no trouble dealing with any of the historical references. For it posits no special date within Aristotle’s life for the work’s composition. Whether Aristotle was writing it in his last years, or whether he wrote it first in his younger years and continually updated it, makes no difference to the hypothesis \textit{qua} explanation. By contrast the hypothesis that it is a juvenile work is embarrassed by the historical references, and the hypothesis that it is not a work of Aristotle’s at all is embarrassed by

\textsuperscript{28} Pellegrin, in Dalimier (1992: 25-26), speaks of \textit{GE} as “un traité aussi subtil, à l’argumentation aussi serrée, aux interrogations aussi originales” and of “la grandeur de la pensée;” also Elorduy (1939: 27, 65).\textsuperscript{29} Elorduy (1939: 68) remarks a propos Aristotle’s exoteric writings, such as the lost \textit{Eudemus} and the\textit{ Protrepticus}, that they were a sort of advertising or ‘propaganda’ for the school. But while exoteric works can point to an esoteric meaning, there is no reason to think, unlike say the followers of Leo Strauss, that esoteric works themselves point to some additional esoteric meaning (see Simpson, 1998: xiv-xv). Further, the meaning that exoteric works point to, if they do, can only be learnt from comparing them with the relevant esoteric texts and not independently. If the \textit{Great Ethics} is an exoteric work, and the other two ethics are the esoteric works to which it is exoteric, and if comparisons between these works can show us what, for Aristotle, an exoteric work looks like, then the \textit{Great Ethics} can serve as a standing refutation of the Straussian theory of esotericism, at least as applied to Aristotle.
the claim the author makes to be Aristotle, as well as by the universal witness of the ancient tradition, noted earlier, that Aristotle is the author. There are shifts one can make, as have been noted, for saving the hypotheses from such embarrassment, but those shifts do have to be made.

*Authenticity of the Great Ethics: Extrinsic Evidence*

The hypothesis says that the *Great Ethics* is an exoteric work meant for an audience outside the school, so extrinsic evidence of two sorts is relevant: that relating to the character of an ancient exoteric audience and that relating to the character of the *Great Ethics*.

As for the audience, there is first a speech attributed to Callicles in Plato’s *Gorgias* (484c-486d) which praises the value of philosophical study and practice provided it is indulged in moderately and at an early age. If it is pursued beyond that limit (in the way Socrates has done) it will ruin a man and prevent him being a good and decent citizen. Persons with Callicles’ view would be likely to value the limited treatment of the subject one finds in the *Great Ethics* but not the more elaborated and developed treatment one finds in the *Nicomachean*, especially if the effect of the *Nicomachean* was to draw men away from the active life of the citizen into the contemplative life of the philosopher, which, of course, the *Nicomachean* notoriously does in its last book (and the *Eudemian* arguably does the same).\(^{30}\)

Socrates in the *Republic* (497e-501a) gives voice to a like opinion with the *Nicomachean Ethics* about the pursuit of philosophy, and criticizes the existing contrary practice in cities, which practice he describes as being what Callicles said it was and

\(^{30}\) The point is controversial, see Kenny (1978, 1992), and contrast Simpson (2013).
should be. Socrates notes further that most people are prejudiced against extensive philosophic learning. He also admits, in the passage about philosophers needing to rule which opens his praise of the philosophic life (473c-74a), that there is need to be careful about praising such life before an audience of decent citizens, at least until they have been brought, if they can be brought, to see that philosophy is not what they think it to be.

The conversation in Plato’s *Meno* (90a-94e) between Socrates and Anytus, who is a classic example of a decent citizen prejudiced against philosophy, shows on Anytus’ part a similar pattern of regard for learning in moderation but an angry fear of learning very much, especially if the learning comes from intellectualists like the sophists. Notoriously Anytus, who was one of Socrates’ accusers at his trial, could not or did not distinguish sophistry from philosophy.

Another piece of evidence is Isocrates in the *Antidosis* (written 354 or 353 BC), where the aged orator writes: “I do not think it right to call philosophy what is of no help in the moment either for speaking or for doing, but rather I would call such a pastime a gymnastic of the soul and a preparation for philosophy; more manly, to be sure, than what boys in school do but for the most part very similar… I would advise the young to pass a certain time in such education but not to allow their nature to get all dried up on these matters… For I think that such verbal quibbles are like jugglers’ tricks which, though of no benefit, attract crowds of senseless people, and that those who want to do something valuable must remove from all their pastimes vain words and acts with no bearing on life” (sections 266-69).31 A second is a work attributed to the ancient Sicilian lawgiver Charondas (6th or 5th Century BC) though perhaps dating much after his time.32

31 See Broadie’s apposite comments (2002: 54) on this passage in the context of Aristotle’s ethical thinking.
32 The *Anthology* of Stobaeus, IV.151.20-23.
“Let each citizen make profession rather of moderation (sōphronein) than of wisdom (phronein), since profession of wisdom is significant evidence of pettiness (smikrotētos) and lack of experience with what is fine (apeirokalias).” These sentiments nicely mirror those of Callicles and Anytus referred to above. A third such source is Tacitus (1st/2nd Century AD), who says of his father-in-law (Agricola 4.4-5): “He used to relate that in his early youth he would have engaged with more fervor in the study of philosophy than was permitted to a Roman and a senator had not the prudence of his mother kept his ardent and burning spirit in check: for his lofty and upright mind sought the beauty and splendor of great and exalted glory with more eagerness than discretion. Reason and age soon tempered him, and from wisdom he retained what is most difficult: moderation.”

As to extrinsic evidence about the exoteric character of the Great Ethics, there is first Aulus Gellius who, when speaking of the two classes or kinds that Aristotle’s works were said to fall into, the exoteric and the acroatic,\(^{33}\) writes:

Those were called exoteric that had to do with rhetorical reflections and the ability to argue and knowledge of civil matters, but those were called acroatic in which more remote and subtle philosophy was handled and which pertained to the study of nature and dialectical disputations. To the exercise of this latter discipline, the acroatic, he would devote time in the Lyceum in the morning and would not admit anyone rashly, but only those whose intelligence and foundation in learning and attention to teaching and hard work he had tested. But the exoteric lectures and exercise in speaking he used to give in the same place in the evening, and he offered them to the young openly and without distinction, and he used to

\(^{33}\) Or acromatic, designed for hearing. The quotation is from Attic Nights 20.5. Düring (1957: 431-34) discusses this passage and invents the story that its story is invented.
call them ‘evening walk’ but that other earlier one ‘morning walk’, for he used to discourse on each occasion while walking. He divided up his books too, his treatises on all these things, so that some were called exoteric and part acroatic.

Note that the Great Ethics is properly described as ‘knowledge of civil matters’ (civilium rerum notitiam), for it significantly omits the reflections on philosophy and legislation (the ‘more remote and subtle philosophy,’ philosophia remotior subtiliorque) that mark the other two ethics and that make them rather more than merely ‘knowledge of civil matters’. Also note that the Great Ethics can be viewed as a suitable vehicle for testing the ‘intelligence and foundation in learning and attention to teaching and hard work’ of potential hearers of the acroatic lectures, since its arrangements and syllogisms, with their directness in some respects and indirectness in others, might well serve to show which hearers had the capacity and will to learn enough from the first to sort out the second, and so accordingly had the capacity and will to enter the school.

To this evidence we can add that of Cicero who says, speaking of Aristotle and Theophrastus:

About the summum bonum, because there are two kinds of books, one popularly written which they called exoteric, the other more carefully composed (limatius), which they left in their treatises (commentariis), they do not always seem to say the same thing; there is not, however, any variation in the sum itself (in summa ipsa) of what those at least whom I have mentioned say, nor any internal disagreement with themselves.

Note again that the Great Ethics does seem not to say the same thing as the other ethics

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34 Aulus Gellius was writing in Latin but he here uses the Greek words and the Greek for ‘walk’ is peripatos, which is what gave to Aristotle and his school the name of Peripatetics.

35 De Finibus 5.5.
yet, in the end or in sum, it does say the same (as will be discussed in some detail in the commentary).

Some further and stronger support for the hypothesis that the Great Ethics is exoteric comes from the passage of Cicero just quoted. This passage immediately precedes the one where Cicero speculates that the Nicomachean Ethics could be by Aristotle’s son Nicomachus (as mentioned in an earlier note), and from such a circumstance one can construct an argument that Cicero must have been aware of at least three ethics by Aristotle. For first he speaks (in the passage just quoted) of an exoteric ethics as opposed to a different and non-exoteric one found among the treatises. Then he speaks (a few lines later) of an ethics that could be by the son because it is like another ethics\textsuperscript{36} that Cicero already attributes to the father and because Cicero does not see that the son could not, in this respect, be like the father. But the ethics that could be by the son could not be either of the first two ethics mentioned, for then Cicero would not have two separate ethics by Aristotle to contrast as exoteric and non-exoteric. Therefore it must be a third ethics.\textsuperscript{37}

Now if this third ethics, the one that could be by the son, is the Nicomachean, then the ethics which Cicero says the Nicomachean is like, and which he judges definitely to be by the father, will be either the Eudemian or the Great Ethics or something else. But of the Eudemian and Great Ethics only the latter could plausibly be judged an exoteric text. So either the Great Ethics is the exoteric ethics Cicero is thinking of (in which case the ethics that he thinks is definitely by the father will be the

\textsuperscript{36} That there must be at least two ethics under consideration by Cicero at this point in his argument is missed by many commentators but is rightly noted by Kenny (1978: 16, following Titze). Kenny says nothing about the need, within the larger context, for Cicero to be considering a third ethics as well.

\textsuperscript{37} This argument that Cicero must be referring to three ethics and not just one was already anticipated by Shute (1888: 55-56), save that Shute does not suggest that the third or exoteric ethics was the Great Ethics.
or precisely one of the dialogues). It would be hard, however, for Cicero to say of these lost writings (if we go by what we know of them, as of the *Protrepticus* in particular) that any of them, despite “not always seeming” to say the same thing, nevertheless agreed “in the sum itself” with the ethical treatises, for they do not say enough about the several virtues and about the mean and about choice and deliberation and continence and friendship and the like to count as covering the same ground as those treatises, and so do not say enough to count as agreeing with them in sum despite not always seeming to. The *Great Ethics* does cover the same ground and does precisely agree in sum with the other ethics despite not always seeming to (as argued in the commentary). So it well fits the context and content of Cicero’s remarks.

*The Authenticity of On Virtues and Vices*

The *Great Ethics* has thus shown itself to support and be supported by the argument about authenticity given above. The same argument supports and is supported by *On Virtues and Vices* which, despite its slightness. The way into considering the question of the authenticity of *On Virtues and Vices* is best done through considering a controversial and puzzling passage in the *Eudemian Ethics*.

In the *Eudemian Ethics* book 2 chapter 2, at 1220b10-11, a well-known crux in the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις. The context makes clear that Aristotle is using this phrase to refer to some writing or other, but scholars have been puzzled both about what the phrase means and what writing it refers to.

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38 That the *Eudemian* is the ethics Cicero thinks definitely to be by Aristotle was suggested by Shute (*ibid.*) as well as by Titze (1826: 39), noted and endorsed by Kenny (1978: 16).
In the part of the text where the phrase occurs Aristotle is discussing moral character and he has just concluded that characters are qualities in the soul brought about by custom or habituation. He continues that what must next be discussed is what qualities in what part of soul. From what he stated earlier (at 2.1.1219b39-20a12, 29-37), as well as from what he has just concluded here, he is able to say, in general terms, that these qualities are in accord with the powers whereby people feel the various passions and in accord also with the soul’s customs or habits whereby people are spoken of as being accustomed to feel or not to feel the several passions in some specific way. But such generalities are not enough. Aristotle needs to go beyond them and descend to details (in particular the details, in the next chapters, of the several virtues and that each virtue is a mean between two opposed vices). His method, as he has just recalled (at 2.1.1220a15-18, repeating what was said at 1.6.1216b30-35), is to begin with truths already known but unclearly so as to reach truths that are clear. So the thing to do would be to appeal to the unclear truths about moral characters that we already have and use them to advance to what is clear, and it is at this point that Aristotle appeals to a division, ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις, of passions and powers and habits.

As for ἀπηλλαγμένοις, the suggestions are that it means ‘the canceled version’ or ‘the separate section’, both from Allan,\(^{39}\) or ‘the finished works’, that is, works separated off or released from further discussion, from Dirlmeier.\(^{40}\) Another suggestion worth considering, is that it means, or carries the idea of, ‘abstracts’, for things ‘released’ or ‘separated’ (the literal meaning of the Greek word) are the sort of thing that abstracts are. They are statements or summaries separated or taken from a fuller discussion or writing.

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and presented on their own (the English word does, after all, come from the Latin
‘abstraho’ which means to remove or take away). ‘Abstracts’ would also fit the context of
Aristotle’s argument since the work he is referring to would seem to be some set of
summaries or abstracts of moral characters.

There are good reasons for thinking that the reference is neither to Aristotle’s lost
work *On Divisions* nor to the list given in chapter 2 of *EE*. These reasons come from
what Aristotle immediately says following his mention of the division and the writing
that contains it, for his words here give valuable clues as to what sort of thing he has in
mind. The passage runs (1220b12-20):

After this there is the division ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις of passions and powers and
habits. I mean by passions such things as these, spirit, fear, shame, desire, things
generally which are for the most part followed of themselves by perceptible
pleasure or pain. And according to these there is no quality, but there is active
feeling. There is quality, however, according to powers. I mean by powers things
according to which people are said to be active with respect to their passions, as
the angry person, the insensible person, the erotic person, the shame-faced person,
the shameless person. Habits are all those things which are cause that these [sc.
the powers and/or passions] are either in accord with reason or the opposite, such
as courage, temperance, cowardice, license.

If we judge, then, by these comments we should say that the work referred to
should have the following features. First it should be about moral characters, for
Aristotle’s aim now is to find what sort of things in what part of soul moral characters are, and so a set of abstracts or selections relevant to such a search should be of moral characters. Second, it should be of moral characters in such a way as to include some sort of division of passions (as spirit and fear), powers (as that whereby angry and shameless people are angry or shameless), and habits in accord with or against reason (as courage and cowardice). But, further, in view of what Aristotle immediately goes on to argue in the next chapter, this writing can contain no explicit statement of the doctrine of actions and passions being divisible into excess and defect and mean, nor of the accompanying doctrine that virtues are in the mean and are opposed by two vices each, one at either extreme. For these doctrines are the clearer truths that we do not yet possess and that Aristotle intends to argue for by using the less clear truths he here briefly summarizes, and so these less clear truths can hardly include the doctrines already. Aristotle confirms the point himself, for his examples of habits in accord with and against reason (given at the end of the passage quoted) include only one of each, courage and temperance being opposed only to cowardice and license and not also to rashness and insensibility. Still, even if this writing contains nothing about the mean, it must contain something about reason being what separates the habits into opposites. It must also, and more importantly, contain something from which the doctrine of the mean may be reached. It will necessarily do so, however, if it contains a division of powers and passions and habits. For Aristotle’s argument to the mean, which he gives and illustrates with several examples in the next chapter (2.3.1220b21-35) proceeds from the fact that the habits are qualities in the powers for exercising, or being active with, the passions in certain ways. Such action, he says (b26-27), is change, and change is a quantity (a continuous
quantity), and quantities admit of a mean and an excess and a deficiency (b21-22), of which the mean for us as commanded by knowledge and reason is best (b27-29).

Recall then the character of \textit{VV}.\footnote{As to the reasons given against the authenticity of VV, too involved to go into here, there is a fine book by E. A. Schmidt, \textit{Aristoteles, Über die Tugend} (Darmstadt, 1965).} It is a set of selections or abstracts; it is about moral characters; it talks about them in terms of passions and powers and habits; it lists virtues against only one opposed vice; it makes clear, in its descriptions, that the virtues are cause of rational and the vices of irrational behavior. In evidence here are some representative passages.\footnote{The text used for the translations is Susemihl’s (n. 2).}

2.1250a6-9: Courage is a virtue of the spirited part that makes people hard to panic in face of the fears of death. Temperance is a virtue of the desiring part that takes away their appetite for enjoying base pleasures…

3.1250a18-21: Cowardice is a vice of the spirited part that makes them panic in face of fears and those of death most of all. License is a vice of the spirited part that makes them prefer joy in base pleasures…

4.1250a44-b3: It belongs to courage to be hard to panic before the fears of death, and to be bold readily in terrible things, and to dare dangers well, and to take rather noble death than disgraceful safety, and to be cause of victory…

4.1250b6-10: It belongs to temperance not to marvel at enjoyments of bodily pleasures, and to have no appetite for any pleasure of shameful enjoyment, and to fear disorder, and to live an orderly life in things both small and great…

6.1251a10-15: It belongs to cowardice to be easily moved by any chance fear and by fears of death and bodily maiming above all, and to suppose that it is better to
win safety by any means than to die nobly. Along with cowardice come softness, unmanliness, shirking of toil, love of life.
6.1251a16-23: It belongs to license to take enjoyment in harmful and disgraceful pleasures, and to suppose that those people are most of all happy who live in such pleasures, and to be fond of laughter and mockery and witticisms, and to be reckless in words and deeds. Along with license come disorder, shamelessness, lack of decorum, luxury, slackness, carelessness, contempt, looseness…
8.1251b26-37: In general it belongs to virtue to make one’s disposition of soul good, with use of emotions peaceful and ordered, in harmony in all its parts. That is why a virtuous disposition of soul seems also to be model of a good regime… Along with virtue come usefulness, decency, kindliness, optimism, and further such things as love of home and of friends and of comrades and of strangers and of mankind and of beauty… The opposite things belong to vice …

One notices about these brief descriptions of virtues and vices that in each case they are in terms of a division of passions and powers and habits. So courage is of the spirited part (a power) and makes people hard to panic (a habit) by fear of death (a passion); temperance is of the desiring part (a power) and makes people cease to have appetite (a habit) for base pleasure (a passion); cowardice is of the spirited part (a power) and makes people panicked and easily moved (a habit) by fear of death (a passion); license is of the desiring part (a power) and makes people prefer (a habit) base pleasure (a passion).

If we look further at what is said of these habits, or of these vices and virtues, we
will see that in each case they are described as being in agreement with reason or contrary to it. The words reason and unreason do not appear in the descriptions (they do appear in the accounts of prudence and folly and of continence and incontinence), but the kinds of behavior listed are described in ways that all would see to be rational or irrational. The fit, therefore, between the work referred to in the crux phrase from EE and VV is tight. Moreover, the features of VV that scholars have used to reject its authenticity (that it fails to talk about the mean and the extremes in the case of actions and passions; that it lists only one vice for each virtue; that it begins with an appeal to the division of soul proposed by Plato; that it talks of δαίμονες; that it gathers certain virtues under others; that it is, in general, eclectic in character) are all features which make that work to be just the sort of writing EE is here referring to.

Accordingly we have good reasons to conclude that VV is the work (or at least one of the works), being referred to by the phrase ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγένοις. The reasons are not determinative proof (we are unlikely to get such proof in these sorts of matters), but they are sufficient to make the conclusion plausible, even probable.

The Titles of the Works on Ethics

A couple of questions remain: first about why Aristotle wrote two esoteric ethics, the Nicomachean and Eudemian, when one might have sufficed, and second about the names of the ethical works and in particular of the Great Ethics. A suggestion is that the two esoteric ethics differ, as is in large part evident from their beginnings and endings, in that the Eudemian is directed primarily to philosophers and the Nicomachean (which

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43 That one of these other works might be Rh, and in particular Rh 1.9, is possible but unlikely because Rh 1.9 does not speak of the virtues and vices in terms of a division into passions and powers and habits.
continues immediately into the *Politics*) primarily to legislators (which will include especially advisers to kings). So the *Eudemian* will have the name it has because it commemorates Eudemus of Rhodes, student and colleague of Aristotle, who established a school of philosophy at Rhodes after the fashion of the one established by Aristotle at Athens. Eudemus will thus represent the philosopher, which is why the *Eudemian Ethics* bears his name. The *Nicomachean* will have the name it has because it commemorates Aristotle’s father and son (both named Nicomachus), the former of whom was physician and adviser at the royal court in Macedon (where Aristotle himself was also long an adviser), and the latter of whom was no doubt destined for a similar life at the same court. That he was to die young was unknown to his father who had already predeceased him. Nicomachus *père et fils* will thus represent the wise legislator, which is why the *Nicomachean Ethics* bears their name. The *Great Ethics*, by contrast, will have the name it has because it has a great audience, the large and extended audience of decent citizens to whom it is directed. 44

Citizens, legislators, philosophers, these three, would seem, on reflection, to cover the full range of an ancient philosopher’s ethical concern. Citizens, both rulers and ruled, are they who compose the city; legislators are they who fashion it and its constituent households; philosophers are they who, superseding the parochial and all-too-human

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44 These suggestions about the names are entirely speculative since we do not know from ancient sources how any of them arose; see the discussion in Décarie (1978: 17-31). The prevailing view about the *Great Ethics*, for instance, is that the name comes from the fact that both its books are unusually long, so that the rolls on which it would have been written out in the ancient world were ‘great’, that is, longer than any of the rolls that contained the books of the *Eudemian* or *Nicomachean*. The opinion is of course possible but by no means compelling. Case, by contrast, opines (1596: 5) that the *Great Ethics* is called great because though little in mass it is great in virtue, that is, in the great richness of the matter of virtue dealt with in it. Pellegrin, in Dalimier (1992: 26) has recently said something similar (“cette éthique est ‘grande’ aussi par la grandeur de la pensée qui s’y déploie”), though without, to my knowledge, being aware of Case’s work.
mythology of the poets, point it to what is truly beyond and divine.\footnote{We can throw in the \textit{Virtues and Vices} too, if we like, as an ethical \textit{vade-mecum} for the noble young. For there is something to be said for Zürcher’s charming suggestion (1952: 259) that the \textit{Virtues and Vices} was first conceived and written for the young Alexander (and other princes) under Aristotle’s tutelage at Pella.}

Finally, as for \textit{VV}, a likely answer is that it is a brief summary or abstract of the chief virtues and vices, to be used as a quick and handy guide, especially perhaps by younger students, for judgment and direction of behavior. Such an answer is proposed by Zürcher, who suggested it was written first by Aristotle as a sort of ethical \textit{vademecum} for Alexander and other young princes under his tutelage at Pella. The suggestion is attractive but it could never be more than a happy guess (it lacks any independent support). Another answer, compatible with and not opposed to the first, is that it is a brief summary or abstract of ethical phenomena, or \textit{endoxa}, for use in philosophical analysis and in the exposition of ethical theory.
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